SEBI removes redundancy to ease compliance
– Team Corplaw | corplaw@vinodkothari.com
See our other resources:
Posts
Securities Market Code: Consolidation, principled regulation-making, and decriminalisation
– Payal Agarwal, Partner | Vinod Kothari & Company | corplaw@vinodkothari.com
Year 2025 will go down in the history of independent India as the year of the most brisk legislative activity – mostly by way of consolidation of some of the major laws. Income Tax Act, labour laws, securities markets, IBC, RBI Regulations etc – everywhere, we find the lawmakers have been quite busy themselves, of course making the subjects and companies even busier. The Securities Market Code (SMC) has been introduced in the Lok Sabha, pursuant to the announcement in the Union Budget 21-22. Divided into a total of 18 chapters, the SMC seeks to consolidate and repeal the following:
- SEBI Act, 1992,
- Depositories Act, 1996, and
- Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956
The Code reflects a structural consolidation exercise, however, also with an underpinning attempt to make rule making more practical and principled, providing for investor protection by reintroducing ombudsman, providing legal sanctity to inter-regulatory coordination, covering complex securities transactions, etc. Further, the gazette notifications issued in relation to the aforesaid Acts are also proposed to be made a part of the Code.
Major proposals
- Providing timelines & limitation period for investigations and validity of interim orders, with scope of extension in some cases
- Classification between fraudulent/ unfair practices and market abuse, towards better clarity with powers to order cease and desist, authorisation for seizure of books etc. in case of market abuse
- Strengthening powers and functions of SEBI by enabling power to issue subsidiary instructions, undertaking periodic research and regulatory impact assessment studies etc.
- Issue of new regulations in relation to SEBI Ombudsperson, restitution to persons suffering losses on account of contravention etc.
- Introduction of new terms such as – market participants (issuers and investors), Securities Market Service Providers (Intermediary + MII + SRO) etc.
- Clarity in the scope of securities and recognition to “other regulated instruments”
- Clarifications in relation to scope of investment vehicles, title over securities held with depository etc.
Time-bound investigations and interim orders
- Limitation period for investigation: eight years from the date of default or contravention
- Extension permitted in case of matters referred by Investigating Officer or matters having systemic impact on the securities market [Clause 16]
- Investigation to be completed within 180 days
- In case of delay, status to be provided along with the reasons for delay in writing, and extension to be sought from a Whole-time Member [Clause 13]
- Interim orders to be valid for upto 180 days
- Extension may be granted for upto 2 years pending adjudication/ completion of inspection/ investigation [Clause 27]
Adjudication of penalties
- Maximum penalty to be linked with whether or not the default results in unlawful gain or losses to the investors or other persons, and whether such gain or loss is quantifiable
- Decriminalisation of offences, provisions in relation to fines limited to offences such as market abuse, failure of compliance with orders of SEBI etc.
- Additional factors to be considered for adjudication of penalty incorporated based on judicial precedents
Clarity in the scope of securities
- Securities to include notes or papers issued for the purpose of raising of capital, which are listed or proposed to be listed, other regulated instruments etc.
Classification between fraudulent/ unfair practices and market abuse
- To classify grave acts adversely affecting the integrity of securities market as “market abuse”
- Powers of SEBI to order cease and desist, authorisation for seizure of books etc. in case of market abuse
Re-introduction of SEBI Ombudsperson
- In case of non-redressal of grievances through GRM within specified period (180 days from receipt of grievance), may file a complaint with Ombudsperson within 30 days
- Manner to be specified through regulations [Clause 73]
- was repealed pursuant to SEBI (Ombudsperson) (Repeal) Regulations, 2023
Introduction of new terms
- Market participant – a person or its agent participating in the securities markets as an issuer or an investor; SEBI may issue instructions, call for information, etc from market participants
- Securities market service provider – Intermediary + Market Infrastructure Intermediary (stock exchange, depository & clearing corporation) + SRO.
- Obligations of SMSP given under Clause 35 – includes fair disclosure of information, investment of money collected by it in the manner as specified, furnishing information etc.
- To be specified by the regulations
- Obligations of SMSP given under Clause 35 – includes fair disclosure of information, investment of money collected by it in the manner as specified, furnishing information etc.
- Subsidiary instructions
- Power to issue to be with Chairperson along with WTM or by two WTMs of Board
- To clarify ambiguity or laying down procedural requirements
- Contravention to be considered as contravention of the primary regulations
- Power to issue to be with Chairperson along with WTM or by two WTMs of Board
Clarifications proposed
- Records of depository to act as conclusive proof of title over security [Clause 58(2)]
- Issuance and holding of securities in dematerialised form only [Clause 55(2) & (3)]
- Option with the holder for holding in physical form has been omitted
- Right to be consulted or to give directions not a safeguard from being considered as investment scheme [Clause 32]
- This is in line with the definition of investment schemes in other countries – UK, Hong Kong, etc. See an article on Law relating to collective investment schemes on shared ownership of real assets
Strengthening India’s Corporate Bond Market: A Look at NITI Aayog’s Recommendations
Simrat Singh | finserv@vinodkothari.com
India’s aspiration to become a US $30 Trillion economy by 2047 rests on its ability to mobilise long-term, stable and affordable capital. Debt capital can be an attractive source for this. While banks have historically been the backbone of credit intermediation in India, a bank-dominated financial system may be inadequate to meet the financing needs of a developing country like India which includes long-gestation exposures to infrastructure, climate transition, manufacturing and other emerging sectors. Recognising this constraint, NITI Aayog’s report on Deepening the Corporate Bond Market in India (‘Report’) lays out reforms to develop corporate bonds as another major tool for mobilising long-term low-cost capital.
In this note we highlight some of the reforms being advocated in the Report.
Key Thrust Areas of Reforms:
Regulatory Efficiency
A central theme of the Report is the need to reduce regulatory friction arising from fragmented and overlapping oversight by SEBI, RBI and the MCA for corporate bonds. Inconsistent treatment of similar bonds, procedural complexity, overlapping disclosures and different approval timelines are identified as major constraints, particularly for public issuances and lower-rated issuers. A specific concern highlighted is issuer-based regulation: bonds issued by banks and NBFCs are regulated by the RBI, while similar bonds issued by non-financial corporates fall under SEBI and MCA oversight. This results in different disclosure standards and compliance processes for similar bonds
To combat this, first, the Report calls for stronger inter-regulatory coordination and recommends measures such as mutual recognition of disclosures, a joint regulatory help desk/single point of contact as well as joint circulars detailing the jurisdictions of each regulator – essentially a centralised coordination mechanism involving SEBI, RBI, MCA and the Ministry of Finance.
Second, the Report emphasises the need to rationalise disclosure norms for public bond issuances, which are significantly more onerous than those applicable to private placements. This asymmetry has led to an overwhelming reliance on private placements, which account for nearly 98% of corporate bond issuances in India (p. 25). Drawing on global practices, the Report recommends a differentiated disclosure regime for well-compliant issuers (p. 66). Specific reforms include extending the validity of offer documents from one year to two or three years, removing ISIN-wise issuance constraints, simplifying PAS-2 and Information Memorandum filings through digital automation on the MCA portal, and introducing a “Well-Known Seasoned Issuer” framework to enable fast-track access to public bond markets for reputed issuers.
Third, the Report stresses the need for regulatory clarity for hybrid instruments, including covered bonds1, securitised debt and infrastructure-linked securities. Many instruments used globally to fund long-term assets do not fit neatly within India’s regulator-specific silos. Jurisdictional ambiguity (which regulator oversees which instrument?) and the absence of standardised regulatory treatment have impeded market development. The Report recommends clearly defined frameworks to facilitate market clarity. In this context, it also highlights tax distortions; for instance, SDIs2 currently attract significantly higher TDS than corporate bonds. The Report states that SDIs are taxed at a higher rate than corporate bonds which prevents securitisation of bonds. However, effective 1.04.2025, SDI TDS rates are aligned with bond rate; both at 10% (See section 194LBC of Tax Act).
Market Infrastructure and Liquidity
Bonds are heterogeneous instruments, varying by type of issuer, tenor, covenants and structure. Unlike equities, electronic order matching alone cannot ensure immediacy of execution or continuous liquidity in the secondary market, particularly in lower-rated or infrequently traded bonds. Despite progress through electronic platforms such as RFQ for secondary trading and EBP for primary issuance, trading volumes remain shallow and concentrated in highly rated bonds.
The Report recommends expanding electronic trading, enhancing post-trade reporting (to improve price discovery) and increasing the proportion of trades settled on a Delivery-versus-Payment (DVP) basis3. Absence of a robust market-making ecosystem is seen as a major constraint on secondary-market liquidity (pp. 22, 36, 106). Limited risk appetite and balance-sheet constraints deter intermediaries from providing continuous two-way quotes, especially in lower-rated and longer-tenor bonds.
To address this, the Report recommends enabling market-making through regulatory incentives and improved access to repo markets. In particular, the creation of a standing repo facility by RBI for high rated corporate bonds would allow market makers4 to monetise inventories efficiently and support continuous liquidity provision. While corporate bonds are included in the RBI’s list of repo-eligible instruments, their treatment differs materially from Government securities (G-Secs). Repos in G-Secs are exempt from CRR and SLR computation which means Banks can access funds through G-Sec repos without providing SLR and CRR on those funds. In contrast, cash raised through repos backed by corporate bonds is treated as a liability for CRR and SLR purposes, hence banks have to provide CRR and SLR on the resulting liquidity. Also, unlike G-Secs, which are centrally cleared and settled through CCIL, corporate bond repos lack a single, standardised clearing and settlement mechanism; they are cleared through F-TRAC and stock exchanges. The result is that the volume of corporate bond repo is negligible (exact data on corporate bond repo could not be sourced).
The Report also flags structural weaknesses in the credit rating ecosystem, including rating inflation, conflicts of interest under the issuer-pays model, and excessive regulatory reliance on ratings (p. 71). Strengthening governance standards is the key recommendation for credit ratings. To improve credit rating access for smaller issuers, the Report suggests exploring alternative credit assessment models, including technology-driven frameworks using GST-returns and other turnover based data and digital transaction histories.
Further, the Report recommends strengthening the existing framework requiring large corporates to raise a portion of incremental borrowings through debt securities (LCB Framework)5. Proposed enhancements include increasing the minimum market borrowing requirement and progressively extending the framework to smaller corporates with lower thresholds.
Drawing on the IMF’s FSAP 2025, the Report also recommends allowing high-quality corporate bonds to be used as collateral in RBI’s repo operations. International experience from the ECB, Bank of Japan, and Reserve Bank of Australia suggests that such measures can enhance secondary-market liquidity and broaden the investor base, subject to appropriate safeguards.
Equally important is the creation of a government-backed, centralised corporate bond data repository. Fragmented data across regulators and exchanges currently hampers price discovery and covenant monitoring. A unified, real-time repository is recommended to improve transparency for issuers, investors, and regulators.
Innovation in Instruments and Market design
The Report makes it clear that regulatory reforms alone are insufficient; product and market innovation are essential to expand depth and distribute risk. India’s bond market remains narrow not only due to investor risk aversion but also due to the limited availability of instruments aligned with diverse risk–return preferences and long-gestation financing needs. Green bonds, sustainability-linked bonds6, and transition bonds are identified as important instruments for financing climate action and infrastructure. However, the absence of a standardised green taxonomy and concerns around greenwashing have constrained growth. The Report, therefore, recommends establishing clear definitions, disclosure standards and verification frameworks to ensure credibility and scale ESG-oriented bond markets.
The Report proposes institutionalising a dedicated class of Corporate Bond Dealers (CBDs), modelled on the U.S. primary dealer system. Eligible banks, NBFCs and other financial institutions would be required to provide continuous two-way quotes, supported by incentives such as capital relief on bond inventories and access to RBI refinance and repo facilities. Enhanced market surveillance, real-time trade reporting, price dissemination and inventory disclosures are also recommended.
Investor and Issuer Participation
Broadening the investor base is identified as another critical reform pillar. Long-term institutional investors such as insurance companies, pension funds and provident funds are natural holders of long-duration bonds, yet regulatory investment norms constrain exposure only to higher-rated securities. The Report recommends a calibrated relaxation of these norms.
For retail investors, the Report proposes lowering minimum investment thresholds (from existing ₹ 10,000), increasing retail quotas in public bond issuances, particularly for tax-free and ESG-linked bonds7, and simplifying TDS provisions to address tax inefficiencies in secondary market trades. OBPPs have been acknowledged to contribute to secondary market liquidity, however, the volumes are low. Further, there is no mention of concerns w.r.t downselling through OBPPs which was recently highlighted by SEBI8
On the issuer side, India’s corporate bond market remains heavily concentrated among AAA and AA-rated entities. To address this imbalance, the Report advocates scaling up credit enhancement mechanisms such as PCEs and support from development finance institutions. It also highlights the need to promote longer-tenor issuances, especially for infrastructure and climate-linked projects, where asset lives significantly exceed typical corporate bond maturities. In this context, it is noteworthy that NITI Aayog has cited our resource, “Partial Credit Enhancement: A Catalyst for Boosting Infrastructure Bond Issuances?”, in the Report while discussing the role of partial credit enhancement mechanisms in deepening the corporate bond market (pp. 75 and 99). Further, regulatory subsidies for first-time or low-volume issuers and pooled issuance platforms to facilitate market access for smaller issuers is also recommended (pp. 65, 75).
The Report recognizes that CDS are underdeveloped. Currently, CDS can be purchased only by investors who already own the underlying bond, which prevents trading in the CDS market. Further, only single-name CDS are permitted, which means a separate CDS contract is required for each issuer, unlike global markets such as the U.S., where index CDS allows one CDS to cover a basket of bonds. Lastly, there is a limit on FPI investors providing CDS which is 5% of the outstanding corporate bond market. These restrictions have resulted in limited CDS protection. The Report also recommends bigger NBFCs to act as CDS market makers
Conclusion
NITI Aayog’s recommendations envisage a corporate bond market that evolves from a supplementary funding channel into a core pillar of India’s financial system. If implemented in a coordinated manner, these reforms could expand the market to ₹100–120 trillion by 2030, improve financial stability, and channel long-term capital into productive investment. The real challenge, however, lies in execution, particularly in achieving sustained regulatory coordination and market-making capacity. Addressing these constraints will be critical if corporate bonds are to play a meaningful role in financing India’s long-term growth and infrastructure ambitions under the vision of Viksit Bharat by 2047.
See our other resources on bonds
- Bond Credit Enhancement Framework: Competitive, rational, reasonable
- Demystifying Structured Debt Securities: Beyond Plain Vanilla Bonds
- Bond market needs a friend, not parent
- SEBI Securitisation Regulations: Track Record, Risk retention and Investment size among several new requirements
- Mandatory listing for further bond issues
- NHB’s PCE Scheme for HFCs
- Corporate Bonds and Debentures
- Covered bonds are secured debt instruments backed by a segregated pool of high-quality assets, offering investors dual recourse to both the issuer and the underlying assets. May refer to our resource on covered bonds. ↩︎
- May refer to our book Listing Regulations on Securitised Debt Instruments and Security Receipts ↩︎
- DVP is a settlement mechanism in which the transfer of securities and funds occurs simultaneously, eliminating counterparty and settlement risk
↩︎ - May refer to our resource ‘Bond issuers set to become Market Maker to enhance liquidity’ ↩︎
- May refer to our resource ‘Mandatory bond issuance by Large Corporates: FAQs on revised framework’ ↩︎
- May refer to our resources ‘Sustainability or ESG Bonds’ and ‘From Rooftops to Ratings: India’s Green Securitisation Debut’ ↩︎
- May refer to our resource ESG Debt Securities: Framework for Issuance and Listing in India ↩︎
- May refer to our resource “Downstreamed through intermediaries: Deemed public issue concerns for privately placed debt” ↩︎
Banks’ exposure to AIFs: Group-wide limits introduced
– Simrat Singh | Finserv@vinodkothari.com
The RBI has long been stitching up the seams where AIF structures threatened to pull at the fabric of Banking regulation. The latest amendment to the Reserve Bank of India (Commercial Banks – Undertaking of Financial Services) Directions, 2025 is another careful thread in that ongoing work. The provisions apply not only to banks directly but also to exposures routed through their group entities (meaning subsidiary, JV or associate of the bank). Banks (and their group entities) may still participate in AIFs but only within closely drawn boundaries. The message is unambiguous: the AIF route cannot be used to skirt evergreen exposures or manufacture regulatory arbitrage.
Limits on investment in AIF schemes
For Category I and Category II AIFs, limits apply at both the individual bank level and at the group level.
- At the bank level, no bank may contribute more than 10% of the corpus of any AIF scheme;
- At the bank group level, investments are permitted within a corridor:
- Less than 20% of the corpus of Cat I or Cat II AIFs may be invested without prior approval, provided the parent bank continues to meet minimum capital requirements and has reported net profit in each of the preceding two financial years. This means even the AMC along with the bank cannot hold more than 20%;
- Between 20% and 30% of the corpus may be invested with prior RBI approval.
A systemic cap overlays this: contributions from all regulated entities – banks, NBFCs, co-operative banks and AIFIs etc. – cannot collectively exceed 20% of any AIF corpus. Similarly investment in the unit capital of REITs and InvITs is capped at 10%, within the overall ceiling of 20% of net worth for equity, convertible instruments and AIF exposures.
A question may arise on whether such limits, as applicable to investments in AIFs, would also be applicable to making investments in FMEs operating in IFSC? Practically, Indian banks are unlikely to invest in FMEs, because such investments would cause the FME to lose its tax benefits. For an FME to qualify as a “specified fund”, all its units must be held by non-residents, except those held by the sponsor. When this condition is met, the income of the fund is exempt under Section 10(4D) and the income received by non-resident investors is exempt under Section 10(23FBC) of the Income Tax Act.
No circumvention of regulations through investments in AIFs
Banks shall ensure that their exposure in an investee company through their investments in AIF schemes does not result in circumvention of any regulations applicable to banks. (see para 38D). This would mean that where a bank is restricted from having any exposure in an investee company (this may include restrictions on account of the end-use of funds, or restrictions in terms of limits to exposures etc), such exposures cannot be made indirectly through making investments in AIF schemes, which, in turn, leads to the bank’s exposures to such investee companies.
Prohibition on Category III AIFs
The clearest prohibition concerns Category III AIFs. Banks are not permitted to invest in their corpus at all. If a subsidiary is a sponsor, it may hold only the minimum contribution required under SEBI’s regulations (which currently is lower of 5% of the corpus or ₹10 Crore as per proviso to Regulation 10(d) of the SEBI AIF Regulations, 2012). Highly traded, leveraged or long-short strategies are thus kept outside the perimeter of bank funding in a deliberate effort to insulate bank balance sheets from hedge-fund-type risk.
Globally, regulators have taken a different, more permissive route. In the United States, banks are not barred from investing in hedge-fund-type vehicles. Instead, the Volcker Rule restricts ownership to de-minimis levels, generally up to 3% of a fund and 3% of Tier 1 capital in aggregate.1
Under Basel’s CRE 60 framework, investments in funds are permitted, however, discipline lies in capital treatment:
- If the bank can look-through to underlying exposures, risk weights are based on the underlying assets2;
- Where transparency is not available, risk weights can rise to punitive levels, up to 1,250% – making opaque fund exposures extremely capital-intensive.
Recently, IMF in its October 2025 Financial Stability Report has highlighted that banks’ exposures to non-banks, including private-credit and private-equity funds, have grown materially, raising concerns about concentration and potential spill-over risks.
India therefore stands apart. Where other jurisdictions rely on expensive capital and other constraints to manage hedge-fund-type exposures, the RBI has chosen to keep such structures outside the banking perimeter altogether.
Provisioning and Capital Treatment
Capital consequences have also been tightened. Where a bank holds more than 5% of the corpus of an AIF that subsequently invests – other than in equity instruments3 – into a debtor company of the bank, a 100% provision must be created for the bank’s proportionate exposure (See our write-up on the same here). This directly addresses the risk that AIFs could become conduits for evergreening or indirect refinancing of stressed loans.
Overall Perspective
The Amendment Directions extend the guardrails on AIF participation to the bank group, as against the previous approach of regulating only the bank’s exposures. Guardrails are numerical and backed by provisioning and capital consequences. Any breach in the limits require reporting to RBI, with clear reasons and plan for corrective actions. For existing investments, banks are required to provide an action plan by 31st March, 2026 – ensuring the compliances within a maximum of 2 years, viz., 31st March 2028.
RBI’s stance is more conservative than many international regimes, but the regulatory intent is unmistakable: prudential norms are not to be diluted simply because exposure is packaged through an AIF.
- See Section 619 of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 2010 ↩︎
- CRE 60 offers three routes for capital treatment – look-through, mandate-based and fall-back – chosen according to how much visibility the bank has into the fund’s underlying assets. ↩︎
- Equity instruments means equity shares, compulsorily convertible preference shares (CCPS) and compulsorily convertible debentures (CCDs) ↩︎
See our other relevant resources:
SEBI Informal Guidance Scheme, 2025
– Kunal Gupta | corplaw@vinodkothari.com
Private Credit AIFs: Lenders of Last Resort?
Updated as on 7th January, 2025
Simrat Singh | Finserv@vinodkothari.com
Private credit is becoming a new force in India’s lending ecosystem. As traditional banks and NBFCs operate under the strict regulations on capital, exposure and asset quality norms, they are often unable, or unwilling to cater to certain borrowers. In addition, for banks in particular, what kind of lending opportunities can be tapped is often a matter of having typecast lending products, policies and procedures. This leaves occasional, however, lucrative gaps in funding needs which are not serviced by regulated lenders. Into these gaps step in Private Credit AIFs (in India), Business Development Companies (BDCs) and Private Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs) (in the USA and Australia), these funds can structure deals creatively, customise financing to borrower needs and capture higher-yield opportunities that conventional lenders must pass over. What is emerging is a parallel channel of credit, one that is nimble, agile and focused.
Globally, this shift hasn’t gone unnoticed. Policymakers and institutions like the IMF have flagged the risks tied to private credit markets, especially around opacity, leverage and borrower quality (see below). Yet in India, the momentum continues to build. Tight constraints on banks, the rise of alternative asset managers and the unmet capital needs of businesses beyond the traditional credit universe are all fuelling rapid expansion.
This article examines what private credit is, why it is growing in India, the risks associated with this market and whether their growth creates regulatory arbitrage relative to banks and NBFCs.
What is Private Credit?
As per an IMF paper1, private credit is defined as “non-bank corporate credit provided through bilateral agreements or small “club deals” outside the realm of public securities or commercial banks. This definition excludes bank loans, broadly syndicated loans, and funding provided through publicly traded assets such as corporate bonds.
Simply, private credit is the lending by non-bank and non-NBFCs. The sector predominantly involves alternative asset managers2 who raise capital from institutional investors using closed-end funds and lend directly to predominantly middle-market firms3.
How is it Different From Normal Credit?
Unlike traditional credit, private credit is typically tailored to the specific needs of each borrower. Repayment terms can, for instance, be aligned with the timing of a funding round or disbursements can be structured to match capital expenditure plans. Interest rates may also be designed on a step-up basis, linked to the borrower’s turnover. Many elements that are otherwise rigid under RBI-regulated lending can be flexibly structured in private credit (see table 2 below). This flexibility is especially valuable for start-ups and small businesses, which often require customised financing solutions that traditional lenders may be unable to provide.
| Parameter | Private Credit | Traditional Credit |
| Source of Capita | Private debt funds (Category II AIFs), investors like HNIs, family offices, institutional investors | Banks, NBFCs and mutual funds |
| Target Borrowers | Companies lacking access to banks; SMEs, mid-market firms, high-growth businesses | Higher-rated, established borrowers. |
| Deal Structure | Bespoke, customised, structured financing | Standardised loan products |
| Flexibility | High flexibility in terms, covenants, and structuring | Restricted by regulatory norms and rigid approval processes |
| Returns | Higher yields (approx. 10–25%) | Lower yields (traditional fixed-income) |
| Risk Level | Higher risk due to borrower profile and limited diversification | Lower risk due to stronger credit profiles and diversified portfolios |
| Regulation | Light SEBI AIF regulations; fewer lending restrictions | Heavily regulated by RBI and sector-specific norms |
| Liquidity | Closed-ended funds; limited exit options | More liquid; established repayment structures; some products have secondary markets |
| Diversification | Limited number of deals; concentrated portfolios | Broad, diversified loan books |
| Role in Market | Fills credit gaps not served by traditional lenders | Core credit providers in the financial system |
Table 1: Differences between private credit and traditional credit
How Much of it is in India?
Global private credit assets under management have quadrupled over the past decade to US$2.1 trillion in 20234. Compared with the rest of the world, the private credit market in India is very small, with estimated assets under management of $25 billion to $30 billion as of March 31, 2025, representing about 0.6% of India’s GDP and 30-35% of the total investments made by AIFs in India.5
Figure 1: Private credit share (1%) as a part of overall corporate lending. Source: RBI, AMFI
Figure 2: Size of Private Credit Market. Source: RBI
Reasons for Rise in Private Credit?
Private credit is expanding rapidly because it steps in where traditional banks hesitate. It provides capital for last-mile project completion, cost overruns and promoter equity infusion; areas that fall outside the comfort zone of regulated lending. The asset class has also delivered consistently higher risk-adjusted returns, a compelling draw for global and domestic investors, especially through long phases of low interest rates.6
A key advantage lies in its flexibility. Private lenders can tailor covenants7, link returns to cash flows and restructure repayment terms during stress, offering a level of customisation that conventional bank credit cannot match. For investors, this translates into both diversification and access to high-growth segments that remain beyond the scope of mainstream credit markets.
Sector specific regulatory gaps: There is a concern that tighter bank regulation will continue to encourage the migration of credit from banks to private credit lenders8. Certain regulatory restrictions on banks directly push borrowers toward private credit:
- Real estate: Banks cannot lend for land acquisition (Para 3.3.1, Master Circular – Housing Finance), leading to real estate becoming a major private-credit segment, accounting for about one-third of all private credit deals.9
- Mergers & acquisitions: Banks are not expected to lend to promoters for acquiring shares of other companies (Para 2.3.1.6, Master Circular – Loans and Advances). Consequently, 35% of private credit deals involve M&A financing. However, RBI’s Draft Directions on Acquisition Finance proposes to somewhat ease this restriction.10
Apart from the above, The IBC significantly strengthened creditor rights and recovery prospects, boosting confidence among lenders and supporting the growth of private credit. At the same time, many borrowers, particularly smaller firms, those with weak earnings, high leverage or insufficient collateral, struggle to access bank loans making private credit a natural alternative11. This shift was further accelerated by an extended period of low global interest rates, which pushed investors to seek higher-yielding opportunities and increased capital flows into private credit strategies.
The most common structure for channelising private credit is an AIF – more specifically, a Category II AIF. A ‘Private Credit AIF’ is essentially an AIF whose primary investment strategy is direct debt financing (by investing in debt instruments) to borrowers outside the conventional banking/syndicated loan market. Since AIFs are not subject to the same regulatory framework as traditional lenders (for example, no deposit-taking, no CRR/SLR requirements etc.), they can offer tailor-made structures such as step‐up interest rates, bullet repayments, equity warrants, convertible features, etc.
A private credit fund requires long-term, stable capital, and frequent redemption demands can disrupt lending strategy. A closed-ended Category II AIF structure suits this model well, as it locks in investor capital for the fund’s life and prevents premature withdrawals. Private credit deals are idiosyncratic and difficult for outside parties to value or trade, lenders typically rely on long-term pools of locked-up capital for financing. One advantage AIFs have over mutual funds is that mutual funds are restricted to investing only up to 10% of their debt portfolio in unlisted plain vanilla NCDs.
Compared to private equity or venture capital, where performance depends heavily on market conditions and timing exits, private credit offers returns that are largely predetermined by contract. The trade-off, however, is that like most AIFs, these investments typically come with multi-year lock-ins and fewer exit opportunities, underscoring their inherently illiquid nature. Typically, investors which can commit long term capital are well-suited to invest in such AIFs – such as pension funds and sovereign wealth funds etc.
Rise of Business Development Companies
A Business Development Company (BDC) is a U.S. investment vehicle designed to channel capital to small and mid-sized businesses that lack easy access to traditional bank financing or public capital markets. BDCs were created by the U.S. in 1980, through amendments to the Investment Company Act of 1940 (see sections 2(48), 54 and 55), with a clear policy objective: to allow retail investors to participate in private credit and growth capital, an area previously accessible only to institutional investors.
As per a Federal Reserve Paper: BDCs are a way for retail investors to invest money in small and medium-sized private companies and, to a lesser extent, other investments, including public companies. BDCs are structured in different ways. Public BDCs refer to those with shares traded on national securities exchanges, and those whose shares are not traded on national securities exchanges but placed through SEC-registered or private placement offerings are non-publicly traded BDCs. BDCs typically finance middle-market firms—companies with EBITDA between $5 to $100 million, which historically have had limited access to funding from commercial banks and public debt markets. They also provide finance to development-stage companies in sectors such as technology, life science, healthcare information and services and sustainability industries, and private-equity owned or sponsored companies.
Structure and regulatory framework: Legally, a BDC is an unregistered closed-end investment company (fund). To qualify as BDC, a company must invest at least 70% of its assets in ‘eligible portfolio companies’ i.e. firms with market values below $250 million and provide ‘significant managerial assistance’ to its portfolio companies [see section 2(48) of the Investment Company Act, 1940]. These companies are often private, thinly traded public firms, or businesses undergoing financial stress. To avoid corporate-level taxation, they must distribute at least 90% of their taxable income to shareholders each year (like REITs and InvITs in India). BDCs are also permitted to use leverage (up to 2x the amount of assets).
BDCs raise capital through IPOs, follow-on equity issuance, corporate bonds or hybrid securities. While many BDCs are publicly traded on stock exchanges (50 in number), offering daily liquidity to investors, some exist as non-traded BDCs with limited liquidity (47 in number) and yet some as private BDCs (50 in number).12
Investment mix: Although BDCs are permitted to invest in both equity and debt, their portfolios are majorly debt-focused. In practice, 60–85% of a typical BDC portfolio is invested in debt instruments, such as senior secured loans, second-lien loans, or mezzanine debt. Equity investments usually comprise 15–30% of assets.13 Because of this allocation, interest income from loans is the primary driver of BDC earnings. This income tends to be steady and predictable, which aligns well with the BDC structure. For example, Ares Capital, one of the largest BDCs, allocates roughly 78–83% of its portfolio to debt (primarily first-lien loans) and about 17% to equity.
How BDCs generate returns: BDCs generate returns through multiple channels:
- Interest income from loans to portfolio companies (the dominant source)
- Dividends from preferred or common equity holdings
- Capital gains from selling equity stakes or converting and exiting convertible securities
Many BDC loans are floating-rate, which provides partial protection in rising interest rate environments. However, most BDC investments are below investment-grade or unrated and equity positions are often in privately held or financially stressed companies, introducing credit and valuation risk.
Comparison with venture capital, private equity AIFs and Mutual Funds: BDCs are often compared with venture capital and private equity funds because all three invest in private, illiquid companies and may provide strategic or managerial support. The key distinction lies in investor access and structure. Venture capital and private equity funds are privately placed vehicles, restricted to institutions and wealthy investors, with long lock-ups and limited transparency. BDCs, by contrast, are designed to be accessible to retail investors and trade on public exchanges.
This distinction becomes especially relevant when comparing BDCs with AIFs in India, particularly private credit AIFs. Economically, BDCs resemble private credit AIFs; both lend to mid-market companies and rely heavily on interest income. The crucial difference lies in retail participation. In India, AIFs exclude retail participation by making the minimum investment amount of Rs. 1 Crore and prohibiting public issuances. In the U.S., BDCs were created to enable retail participation therefore there are no minimum investment norms and public issuances are allowed for BDCs. In this sense, BDCs can be thought of as private credit AIF-like strategies wrapped in a publicly traded structure, placing them between mutual funds (fully liquid public-market vehicles) and AIFs (illiquid private-market vehicles) on the investment spectrum.
From an Indian regulatory perspective, mutual funds offer the closest structural comparison to BDCs, albeit with important distinctions. Indian mutual funds are not permitted to employ leverage as part of their investment strategy and may borrow only to meet temporary liquidity requirements, capped at 20% of net assets (see Regulation 44 of the SEBI Mutual Fund Regulations). In addition, mutual funds face strict asset-side constraints, including a limit of 10% of the debt portfolio in unlisted plain-vanilla non-convertible debentures (see paragraph 12.1.1 of the SEBI Master Circular on Mutual Funds). These restrictions constrain exposure to illiquid private credit, making a BDC-like structure regulatorily infeasible in India under the mutual fund framework.
Global context: No other major market has created a true equivalent of the BDC. While regions such as Europe, Canada, and Australia have listed private credit funds, specialty finance vehicles, or credit income trusts, these structures typically limit or discourage retail participation.
Risk considerations: While BDCs may have stable and regular income, they carry elevated risks. Their portfolios consist largely of non-investment-grade debt and equity in small or distressed companies, often with limited public information. Credit losses, economic downturns or excessive leverage can materially impact returns.
Regulatory Concerns with Growth of Private Credit?
IMF in its 2024 Global Financial Stability Report highlighted risks w.r.t rise in private credit since its growth comes with several structural weaknesses that make the market vulnerable, especially in a downturn. Its rapid expansion is happening largely outside traditional regulatory oversight and because the market has not been stress-tested, the true scale of risk remains unclear. Borrowers tend to be smaller and more leveraged and with most loans being floating-rate, repayment stress can escalate quickly when interest rates rise. Although private credit funds’ leverage appears low compared with other lenders, end borrowers tend to be more highly leveraged than those in public markets, increasing the risks to financial stability.14
The increased complexity and the interconnections with leveraged financial entities create more channels through which unexpected losses in private credit could spread to the broader financial system15
Instruments such as PIK interest16 only defer the problem, increasing loss severity if performance deteriorates. Liquidity is another pressure point since private credit funds are inherently illiquid. Risk is further amplified by layers of hidden leverage, at the borrower, SPV, investor and fund level making contagion hard to track. Layers of leverage are created by the AIF lending against equity to a holding entity, which infuses the equity into an operating company, and the operating company borrowing against such equity.
Because loans are private, unrated and rarely traded, valuation is opaque and losses may remain masked until too late. Growing competition also risks weakening underwriting standards and covenant discipline, particularly as larger banks participate in private deals.
Practical challenges add to this vulnerability. Collateral enforcement may not always hold up legally, say due to restrictions on transferability of collateral (say, shares of a private company). Equity-linked security is volatile as well, and during distress, equity tends to lose its value almost completely. In essence, private credit offers flexibility and returns, but its opacity, leverage, illiquidity and weaker borrower profiles create risks that could surface sharply in stress conditions. Private credit certainly warrants closer attention. Nonbank lenders, especially private credit funds, have grown rapidly in recent years, adding to financial stability risks because they are less transparent and not as firmly regulated.
Do private credit AIFs create any regulatory arbitrage?
What you cannot do directly, you cannot do indirectly – the age-old maxim might apply in case a RE which is otherwise barred by RBI for an object, uses the AIF route to achieve that object. Below we examine some of the distinctions in the regulatory oversight:
| Function | Private Credit AIFs | RE |
|---|---|---|
| Credit & Investment rules | ||
| Credit underwriting standards | No regulatory prescription | No such specific rating-linked limits. However, improper underwriting will increase NPAs in the future. |
| Lending decision | Manager-led Investment Committee under Reg. 20(7) may decide lending Manager controls composition of IC; IC may include internal/external members; IC responsibilities may be waived if investor commitment ≥₹70 Cr w/ undertaking Primarily i.e. the main thrust should be in: – Unlisted securities; and/or – Listed debt rated ‘A’ or below | Lending decisions guided by Board-approved credit policy |
| Exposure norms | Max 25% of investible funds in one investee company. | Exposure is limited to 25% of Tier 1 Capital per borrower and 40% per borrower group for NBFC ML; No such limit for NBFC BL. Banks can lend maximum upto 15% of their Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital to a single borrower. Large exposure norms may apply in case of banks and Upper Layer NBFCs |
| End-use restrictions | None prescribed under AIF Regulations, results in high investment flexibility | Banks cannot lend for land acquisition or for funding a M&A deal [refer ‘sector-specific regulatory gaps’ above] NBFCs do not have any such restrictions. They do have internal limits on sensitive sector exposures which includes capital market and commercial real estate [See Para 92 of SBR] |
| Related party transactions | Need 75% investors consent [reg 15(1)(e)] | Board approval mandatory for loans ≥₹5 Cr to directors/relatives/interested entities; Disclosure + abstention from decision-making;Loans to senior officers requires Board reporting [See para 93 of SBR] |
| Capital, Liquidity & Leverage Requirements | ||
| Capital requirements | No regulatory prescription as the entire capital of the fund is unit capital | Minimum net owned funds of ₹10 Cr, CRAR 15% for NBFC-ML and above [See para 133.1 of SBR]9% CRAR in case of banks, |
| Liquidity & ALM | Uninvested funds may be parked in liquid assets (MFs, T-Bills, CP/CDs, deposits etc.) [15(1)(f)] | NBFC asset size more than 100 Cr. have to do LRM [Para 26] |
| Leverage limits | No leverage permitted at AIF level for investment activities Only operational borrowing allowed | Leverage ratio of BL NBFC cannot be more than 7 No restriction on NBFC ML however, CRAR of 15% makes results into leverage limit of 5.6 times For Banks, in addition to CRAR, there is minimum leverage ratio is 4% |
| Monitoring, Restructuring and Settlements | ||
| Loan monitoring | No regulatory prescription | RBI-defined SMA classification, special monitoring, provisioning & reporting. |
| Compromise & settlements | No regulatory prescription | Governed by RBI’s Compromise & Settlement Framework |
| Governance, Oversight & Compliance | ||
| Governance & oversight | Operate in interest of investors Timely dissemination of info Effective risk management process and internal controls Have written policies for conflict of interest, AML. Prohibit any unethical means to sell/market/induce investors Annual audit of PPM termsAudit of accounts 15(1)(i) – investments shall be in demat form Valuation of investments every 6 months | A Risk Management Committee is required for all NBFCs. [See para 39 of SBR] AC [94.1], NRC [94], CRO [95] ID and internal guidelines on CG [100] required for NBFC-ML and above |
| Diversity of borrowers | Private credit AIFs usually have 15-20 borrowers. | Far more diversified as compared to AIFs |
| Pricing | Freely negotiated which allows for high structuring flexibility | Guided by internal risk model |
Table 2: Differences in regulatory oversight between AIFs and Regulated Entities (REs)
The core difference between private credit AIFs and RBI-regulated lenders lies in regulatory intent. SEBI is a disclosure-driven market regulator, it relies on transparency, governance and informed investor choice. RBI is a prudential regulator tasked with protecting systemic stability, and therefore imposes capital buffers, exposure limits and stricter supervision. Private credit AIFs operate within SEBI’s lighter, disclosure-based approach, while banks and NBFCs function under RBI’s risk-averse framework. This does not always create arbitrage, but it does allow credit activity to grow outside the prudential perimeter. As private credit scales, a coordinated SEBI-RBI framework may be necessary to preserve flexibility without compromising financial stability.
It is important to recognise that Category I and Category II AIFs are prohibited from taking long-term leverage. As a result, any loss arising from their lending or investment exposures does not cascade into the wider financial system. Therefore, concerns around applying capital adequacy requirements to these AIF categories are largely unwarranted.
Conclusion
Though still a small fragment of India’s wider corporate lending landscape, private credit AIFs are steadily gaining ground reaching those nooks and crannies of credit demand that banks and NBFCs often cannot, or would not, serve. Their ability to operate beyond the traditional comfort zone of regulated lenders is what makes this segment structurally relevant and increasingly attractive to borrowers and investors alike.
At the same time, rapid expansion brings the potential for regulatory arbitrage. The RBI has already acknowledged this risk, most notably through its actions on evergreening via AIF structures, ultimately resulting in exposure caps of 10% for individual regulated entities and 20% collectively, along with mandatory full provisioning where exposure exceeds 5% in an AIF lending to the same borrower. These measures serve as guardrails to prevent private credit vehicles from functioning as an indirect tool for evergreening of loans.
- IMF Global Financial Stability Report 2024 ↩︎
- Ibid ↩︎
- A middle-market firm is a firm that is typically too small to issue public debt and requires financing amounts too large for a single bank because of its size and risk profile. The size of middle-market firms varies widely. In the United States, they are sometimes defined as businesses with between $100 million and $1 billion in annual revenue. ↩︎
- IMF Global Financial Stability Report 2024 and Federal Reserve Note dated May 23, 2025 ↩︎
- India’s private credit market is coming of age: S&P Global and SEBI Data ↩︎
- RBI’s Financial Stability Report June 2024 ↩︎
- Customized lending terms can include, for example, the option to capitalize interest payments (that is, pay in kind) in times of poor liquidity ↩︎
- Cai and Haque 2024 ↩︎
- India’s private credit market is coming of age: S&P Global ↩︎
- See our article ‘Draft RBI Directions: Banks may finance Acquisitions’ ↩︎
- Chernenko, Erel, and Prilmeier 2022 ↩︎
- Source: https://sbia.org/bdc-council/ (Numbers are as on Q4 2024). ↩︎
- Source: S&P Global ↩︎
- Growth in Global Private Credit: Reserve Bank of Australia ↩︎
- From the speech of Fed Reserve Governor Lisa D. Cook on financial stability ↩︎
- Payment-in-kind (PIK) is noncash compensation, usually by treating accrued interest as an extension of the loan. ↩︎
See our other resources of Alternative Investment Funds here
The Hidden Hand: Understanding Beneficial Ownership in case of Trusts
Saket Kejriwal, Assistant Manager | corplaw@vinodkothari.com, finserv@vinodkothari.com
Background
The structure of a trust inherently creates a separation of roles, typically involving three distinct parties viz. the author/settlor, trustee, and beneficiaries. While the control/operations rests with the trustee, economic benefit lies with the beneficiaries, and the settlor may continue to exert influence through the trust deed or reserved powers, thus making it difficult to clearly identify who actually “owns” or “controls” the trust. This intrinsic separation of legal control, economic interest and potential influence renders trusts far more opaque than other conventional structures like companies or partnerships. What makes the structure even more complicated is that trusts are mostly governed by 19th century laws. Trusts are not required to publicly file information about their beneficiaries; in many cases, trustees may even contend that they are not maintaining any such regular list.
Adding to this complexity is the fact that trusts may be structured in different forms. Based on the degree of control with the trustees, trusts may be discretionary, where the trustee has full discretion to identify the beneficiaries and/or their share, or non-discretionary, where the beneficiaries have identifiable and predetermined rights in the trust property.There are trusts where the determination of beneficiaries is either contingent or future – for example, children and grandchildren of the settlor. In discretionary trusts, beneficiaries may not have a defined share or enforceable claim at any given point, making it unclear whether they can be treated as beneficial owners at all. In non-discretionary trusts, although the beneficiaries are identifiable, the trustee continues to hold legal title, again blurring the line of who truly “owns” the trust.
For Reporting Entities1 (“REs”), including Banks and NBFCs, identification and onboarding becomes more complex when the customer is a non-individual entity. The extent of verification varies by entity type, and trusts in particular create added challenges because of the reasons cited above.
Relevance of Identifying Beneficial Owners (‘BO’)
Before discussing how REs should identify a trust’s BO, it is important to understand why they must do so. Under para 9 and 10 of the RBI KYC Directions, 2016, every regulated entity is required to frame a Customer Acceptance Policy which, at a minimum, mandates that no account-based relationship or transaction may be undertaken unless full Customer Due Diligence (‘CDD’) is completed. The same is based on R.10 of The FATF Recommendations.
As defined under para 3(b) Clause (v) of RBI KYC Directions, 2016, “Customer Due Diligence means identifying and verifying the customer and the beneficial owner using reliable and independent sources of identification”. Further, clause 3 under explanation to the above para extends this requirement to “Determining whether a customer is acting on behalf of a beneficial owner, and identifying the beneficial owner and taking all steps to verify the identity of the beneficial owner, using reliable and independent sources of identification.”. Similar to what is prescribed under Rule 9(1) of PML Rules, 2005.
As part of CDD, REs are required to identify customers and their BOs, which in turn places a corresponding obligation on customers to truthfully disclose their ownership structure and furnish relevant documents that establish the identity of a natural BO. This process obliges REs to verify the authenticity and completeness of the information and documents submitted, use these findings to determine whether to establish the business relationship and to appropriately assign a risk rating.
However, in practice, BOs may be reluctant to provide their KYC documents due to privacy concerns, fear of scrutiny, or because complex structures were intentionally designed to keep the BO’s identity concealed.
Who are ‘beneficial owners’?
As per para 3(a)(iv) clause (d) of RBI KYC Directions, “Where the customer is a trust, the identification of beneficial owner(s) shall include identification of the author of the trust, the trustee, the beneficiaries with 10 percent or more interest in the trust and any other natural person exercising ultimate effective control over the trust through a chain of control or ownership”. A similar definition is provided under Rule 9(3) of PML Rules, 2005.
Aforesaid definitions originates from The FATF Recommendations which clearly defines that in context of legal arrangements i.e. Trust, beneficial owner includes: “(i) the settlor(s); (ii) the trustee(s); (iii) the protector(s) (if any); (iv) each beneficiary, or where applicable, the class of beneficiaries and objects of a power; and (v) any other natural person(s) exercising ultimate effective control over the arrangement. In the case of a legal arrangement similar to an express trust, beneficial owner refers to the natural person(s) holding an equivalent position to those referred above.”
In a discretionary trust, the trustee has full discretion, whereas in a non-discretionary trust, beneficiaries have fixed rights and the trustee has limited discretion. This influences who can practically be identified as exercising control.
Now, in the case of a discretionary trust, the above framework is usually manageable because the trustee, who exercises control, may not object to being identified as a BO. However, in a non-discretionary trust, the trustee does not exercise independent discretion. In such cases, the trustee may express reluctance to be classified as a BO because he does not “benefit” from the trust in an economic sense and may view BO identification as an unwarranted extension of responsibility. This confusion often results from equating BO with someone who derives economic benefit, whereas under AML laws the emphasis is on identifying at least one identifiable individual, ensuring that there is an accountable natural person whom authorities and REs can pursue in the event of ML/TF concerns, regardless of whether they receive monetary benefit.
Difference between BO and Beneficiary
It is important to understand that the terms “beneficiary” and “beneficial owner” serve different purposes. The objective of identifying the BO is not to treat the trustee or settler as recipients of trust benefits, but to ensure that the RE can clearly trace the natural persons involved in controlling, directing, and/or benefiting from the trust arrangement. BO identification is a regulatory requirement aimed at preventing misuse of trusts for ML/TF purposes, not a determination of who is entitled to trust assets. When viewed this way, trustee and settler identification becomes a matter of transparency and risk assessment, not a reclassification of their legal or economic rights under the trust.
Identification of the natural person behind the Trust
REs typically encounter two scenarios that require them to look behind the trust structure, first, when the trust is the direct customer, second, when the trust is recognised as a BO of another entity.
- Trust itself is the customer
When the trust itself is the customer, the BO identification framework is relatively straightforward. The PML Rules clearly prescribe that the following individuals must always be treated as BOs:
- the author/settlor,
- the trustee(s), and
- any beneficiary holding 10% or more interest, where such interest is defined or quantifiable.
These natural persons fall squarely within the definition of beneficial owners and should be identified and verified without debate.
Where specific beneficiaries cannot be identified, for example, in a public charitable trust, or in a private trust where beneficiaries do not meet the 10% threshold, the obligation to identify BOs does not fall away. In such cases, the RE must still identify:
- the author/settlor,
- the trustee(s), and
- any natural person exercising ultimate effective control, if any, .
Thus, the absence of identifiable beneficiaries does not dilute the requirement.
- Indirect Identification (Trust as a BO / Shareholder / Partner of Another Entity)
Complexity increases when the customer is not the trust, but another legal entity, such as a company, LLP, or partnership, in which a trust holds a substantial stake. In such cases, identifying the natural person as BO requires a deeper “look-through” analysis.
The Interpretive Note to Recommendation 10 of The FATF Recommendations provides a structured cascading approach to determine BOs of legal persons. This approach should be applied sequentially2:
Step 1: Identify the natural persons with controlling ownership interest
Determine whether any natural person ultimately owns or controls the entity through direct or indirect ownership (including ownership via the trust), if yes, identify the person(s) as BO.
Step 2: Identify natural persons exercising control through other means
If no natural person is identifiable through ownership, identify the natural persons exercising control of the entity through other means, such as through one or more juridical persons.
In such cases, the BO definition for trusts should not be imported from the definitions as discussed above i.e. all parties to the trust need not automatically be treated as BOs of the entity concerned.
Instead, the focus should be on identifying the natural person(s), whether trustee or settlor, who genuinely hold or exercise the relevant control over the underlying company, and evaluating them against the test of control.
Step 3: Identify the Senior Managing Official (SMO)
If no natural person can be identified under Step 1 or Step 2, the reporting entity must identify and verify a Senior Managing Official of the customer entity itself.
Intent behind this clause, might be to cater to conditions where the legal person is held by another legal person which is, in turn, held by a trust or where the trust is a charitable trust with no identifiable beneficiaries and no effective control exercised by the trustee, the chain may not yield any natural person with a controlling ownership or control interest. In such situations, the responsibility reverts to the customer entity itself, and the senior managing official (SMO) of the customer is identified as the BO for CDD purposes.
However, even in such cases, the SMO is identified purely for the purposes of AML laws, as discussed above. (see para 31 of the FATF Guidance on Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons).
Difference between BO and SBO
While the concept of a BO and the concept of a Significant Beneficial Owner (SBO) under the Companies Act both aim to identify the natural persons behind an entity, the two frameworks differ significantly in scope and approach. The SBO definition focuses on identifying individuals who hold a prescribed level of ownership or control, and it does not provide a structured fallback if no individual meets that threshold.
In contrast, the BO identification under the Rule 9(3) PML Rules follows a cascading approach i.e. REs must first identify natural persons with ownership, then those who exercise control through other means. Further, only when neither approach detects a clear individual do the rules require identifying the senior managing official as the BO of last resort. This ensures that BO identification cannot be left blank, every entity must ultimately map to a natural person for AML purposes, even where no SBO exists, so that transactions are not carried out in benami or opaque structures.
Conclusion
It is important to clarify that being identified as a BO is primarily a regulatory formality for compliance. It does not alter a person’s rights, liabilities, or relationship with the trust or entity. The core objective is simply to ensure that there is a clearly identifiable natural person connected to the legal entity so that the RE can complete its due diligence and satisfy ALM requirements. Following are the limited obligations of being identified as a BO:
- Provide basic KYC documents or Official Valid Document (OVDs) for verification of identity;
- Respond to any follow-up queries during onboarding or monitoring; and
- Undergo periodic KYC updates, as requested by the RE.
- As per Section 2(wa) of PMLA Act, 2002 “reporting entity” means a banking company, financial institution, intermediary or a person carrying on a designated business or profession.
↩︎ - Refer footnote no. 37 of The FATF Recommendations ↩︎
SEBI approves relaxed norms on RPTs
- Materiality thresholds increased, significant RPTs relaxed for small-value RPTs and newly incorporated subsidiaries
Highlights:
Following a 32-pager consultation paper proposing significant amendments to RPT provisions, towards ease of doing business, rolled out by SEBI on August 4, 2025, several amendments were approved by SEBI in its Board Meeting on 12th September, 2025. The SEBI (Listing Obligation and Disclosure Requirements) (Fifth Amendment) Regulations, 2025 have been notified on 19th November, 2025 amending the RPT framework for listed entities.
Some of our comments on the proposals, as recommended to SEBI, have also been accepted in the approved decisions. Our comments on the Consultation Paper may be read here.
Applicability of the Amendment Regulations
While the Amendment Regulations have been notified, the amendments with respect to the RPT framework are effective from the 30th day of the notification of the Amendment Regulations, that is, with effect from 19th December, 2025.
1. Materiality Thresholds: From One-Size-Fits-All to several sizes for the short-and-tall
A scale-based threshold mechanism has been approved, such that the RPT materiality threshold increases with the increase in the turnover of the company, though at a reduced rate, thus leading to an appropriate number of RPTs being categorized as material, thereby reducing the compliance burden of listed entities. The maximum upper ceiling of materiality has been kept at Rs. 5,000 crores, as against the existing absolute threshold of Rs. 1000 crores. The thresholds have been provided in Schedule XII, along with an illustration towards better understanding of the materiality thresholds.
Materiality thresholds as specified in Schedule XII:
| Annual Consolidated Turnover of listed entity (in Crores) | Approved threshold (as a % of consolidated turnover) | Maximum upper ceiling (in Crores) |
| < Rs.20,000 | 10% | 2,000 |
| 20,001 – 40,000 | 2,000 Crs + 5% above Rs. 20,000 Crs | 3,000 |
| > 40,000 | 3,000 Crs + 2.5% above Rs. 40,000 Crs | 5,000 (deemed material) |
Back-testing the proposal scale on RPTs undertaken by top 100 NSE companies show a 60% reduction in material RPT approvals for FY 2023-24 and 2024-25 with total no. of such resolutions reducing from 235 and 293, to around 95 to 119. The 60% reduction may itself be seen as a bold admission that the existing regulatory framework was causing too many proposals to go for shareholder approval.
Our Analysis and Comments
With the amendments becoming effective, RPT regime is all set to be a lot relaxed, with the absolute threshold for taking shareholders’ approval to be doubled to Rs. 2000 crores. In addition, for larger companies, there will be a scalar increase in the threshold, rising to Rs. 5000 crores. A lot lesser number of RPTs will now have to go before shareholders for approval in general meetings.
In times to come, a multi-metric approach, depending on the nature of the transaction, may be adopted, drawing on a consonance-based criteria as seen in Regulation 30 of the LODR Regulations, thus offering a more balanced and effective approach. See detailed discussion in the article here.
2. Significant RPTs of Subsidiaries: Plugging Gaps with Dual Thresholds
Extant provisions vis-a-vis Amended Regulations
Pursuant to the amendments in 2021, RPTs exceeding a threshold of 10% of the standalone turnover of the subsidiary are considered as Significant RPTs, thus, requiring approval of the Audit Committee of the listed entity. The following modifications have been approved with respect to the thresholds of Significant RPTs of Subsidiaries:
- ‘Material’ is always ‘Significant’: RPTs of subsidiary would require listed holding company’s audit committee approval if they breach the lower of following limits:
- 10% of the standalone turnover of the subsidiary or
- Material RPT thresholds as applicable to listed holding company
This is a mathematical impossibility, since materiality threshold is based on “consolidated turnover”, and hence, includes the turnover of the subsidiary. Further, unlike networth, turnover cannot be a negative number, and hence, even if one or more of the subsidiaries of the listed entity are loss-making entities, the same cannot reduce the consolidated turnover of the listed entity to a number below the standalone turnover of its subsidiaries, whose accounts are being consolidated with the entity.
- Exemption for small value RPTs: The threshold for Significant RPTs is subject to an exemption for small value RPTs based on the absolute value of Rs. 1 crore. Thus, where a transaction between a subsidiary and a related party (of the listed entity/ subsidiary), on an aggregate, does not exceed Rs. 1 crore, the same is not required to be placed for approval of the Audit Committee of the listed entity, even if the aforesaid limits are breached.
- Alternative for newly incorporated subsidiaries without a track record: For newly incorporated subsidiaries which are <1 year old, consequently not having audited financial statements for a period of at least one year, the threshold for Significant RPTs to be based on lower of:
- 10% of aggregate of paid-up capital and securities premium of the subsidiary, or
- Material RPT thresholds as applicable to listed holding company
The aggregate value of paid-up capital and securities premium, to be considered for the purpose of determination of Significant RPTs, should not be older than three months prior to the date of seeking AC approval. Since the value of paid-up capital and securities premium would be available with the company on a real-time basis, the same does not result in any additional compliance burden.
Our Analysis and Comments
For newly incorporated subsidiaries, the Consultation Paper proposed linking the thresholds with net worth, and requiring a practising CA to certify such networth, thus leading to an additional compliance burden in the form of certification requirements. Following the approval in SEBI BM, the Amendment Regulations provide a threshold based on paid-up share capital and securities premium, and hence, certification requirement does not arise.
3. Clarification w.r.t. validity of shareholders’ Omnibus Approval
Existing provisions vis-a-vis Amended Regulations
The existing provisions [Para (C)11 of Section III-B of LODR Master Circular] permit the validity of the omnibus approval by shareholders for material RPTs as:
- From AGM to AGM – in case approval is obtained in an AGM
- One year – in case approval is obtained in any other general meeting/ postal ballot
Pursuant to the Amendment Regulations, the timelines have been incorporated as a proviso to Reg 23(4). Further, a clarification has been incorporated that the AGM to AGM approval will be valid till the date of next AGM held within the timelines prescribed as per section 96 of the Companies Act.
4. Exclusions for retail purchases
Proviso (e) to Regulation 2(1)(zc) of the extant SEBI LODR Regulations exempted transactions involving retail purchases by employees from being classified as Related Party Transactions (RPTs), even though employees are not technically classified as related parties. Conversely, it includes transactions involving the relatives of directors and Key Managerial Personnel (KMPs) within its ambit.
The CP proposed that the exemption related to retail transactions should be expressly limited to related parties (i.e., directors, KMPs, or their relatives) to grant the appropriate exemption.
Under the extant framework, retail purchases made on the same terms as applicable to all employees were excluded from the meaning of RPTs when undertaken by employees, but not when made by relatives of directors or KMPs. This led to an inconsistent treatment, where similarly situated individuals receive different regulatory treatment solely on the basis of their relationship with the company.
Pursuant to the Amendment Regulations, the exclusion for retail purchases has been extended to the relatives of the directors/ KMP, when undertaken on “terms which are uniformly applicable/offered to all employees, directors, key managerial personnel and relatives of directors or key managerial personnel ”. While the language refers to terms offered to “employees, directors, key managerial personnel and relatives of directors or key managerial personnel”, the same cannot be read to mean that preferential terms can be granted to “director”, “KMPs” or “relatives of such directors/ KMPs” as a separate class. The terms need to be uniform to what is otherwise offered to “employees” by such a listed entity/ its subsidiaries.
5. Exemptions for RPTs between holding company and WoS
Regulation 23(5)(b) provides an exemption from audit committee and shareholder approvals for transactions between a holding company and its wholly owned subsidiary. However, the term “holding company” used in this context has remained undefined, leaving ambiguity as to whether it refers only to a listed holding company or includes unlisted ones as well.
A clarification has been inserted to provide the interpretational guidance that the term ‘holding company’ refers to the listed entity. The relevance of the aforesaid clarification would primarily be in cases where the unlisted subsidiary of the listed entity enters into a significant RPT with its wholly owned subsidiary (step-down subsidiary of the listed entity). Pursuant to the aforesaid proposal, as approved, no exemption will be available in such a case.
Conclusion
The amendments seem more or less welcoming, relaxing the RPT regime for listed entities. With the new leadership at SEBI meant to rationalise regulations, it was quite an appropriate occasion to do so. In sum, SEBI’s iterative approach to RPT governance demonstrates commendable responsiveness, contributing to the ease of compliances and in turn, of doing business by the companies.
Our resources:
Insider Trading Concerns in Derivatives trades by Designated Persons
– Payal Agarwal and Saloni Khant | corplaw@vinodkothari.com
Designated persons, being insiders with regular privileged information flow, cannot be doing what other investors can do. Several option trades may be devices to skim short term swings in share prices. can designated insiders do these? This interesting question, mostly ignored in Indian corporate practice, is explored in this article.
Derivatives trading is becoming increasingly popular in India, including amongst the retail investors. A recent address by SEBI’s Chairman urges the retail investors to assess their risk capacity while dealing in derivatives and avoid speculative trades. A July 2025 study by SEBI on trading activity of investors in Equity Derivatives Segment (EDS) indicates a relatively very high level of trading in EDS, as compared to other markets, particularly in index options. Further, within EDS, options segment (in premium terms) has shown growth at the fastest rate with average daily premium traded growing at the CAGR of 72% for index options and 54% for single stock options.
Given the large volumes of derivatives trading, in addition to the concerns on loss of investor’s money (nearly 91% of individual traders incurred net loss in EDS in FY 2025), it is also important to examine the concerns which would arise from an insider trading perspective. Pertinent questions would be whether derivatives trading also comes within the purview of insider trading, and if the answer to this is yes, whether it will also attract the prohibition around contra-trade, where the market participants bet on the short-term future value of the underlying assets to make a profit.
This article examines the aforesaid questions in the light of extant laws, and global position.
Prohibition on insider trading
The prohibition on insider trading comes from Section 12A of SEBI Act –
“No person shall directly or indirectly—
(d) engage in insider trading;”
Reg. 4(1) of PIT Regulations applicable universally to all insiders, also puts a blanket prohibition on trading when in possession of UPSI:
“No insider shall trade in securities that are listed or proposed to be listed on a stock exchange when in possession of unpublished price sensitive information:”
Para 4 of Schedule B (model CoC for listed entities) specifically pertains to trading by Designated Persons (DPs). They can trade subject to compliance with the Regulations – which provide for monitoring through the concept of “trading window” that is, during which a DP can be reasonably expected to have access to UPSI. Therefore, at such times, the trading window is closed, and the DP cannot trade in securities of that company. When the trading window is open, trading can take place after getting pre-clearance from the Compliance Officer.
In case of a fiduciary, the monitoring happens through a grey list. The concerned persons have to take preclearance from the Compliance Officer. Here, trading restrictions are applicable for securities of such listed companies, for which the person/s is/are acting as fiduciary.
Derivative trading vis-a-vis insider trading norms in India
Prohibition on derivative transactions under 1992 Regulations
In India, the concept of contra trade was first discussed in a Consultation Paper issued on 1st January, 2008 by SEBI. Pursuant to the proposals made in the Consultation Paper, the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) (Amendment) Regulations, 2008 was notified, incorporating contra trade restrictions to the insider trading rules of India for the first time, in the following manner:
“4.2 All directors/ officers/ designated employees who buy or sell any number of shares of the company shall not enter into an opposite transaction i.e. sell or buy any number of shares during the next six months following the prior transaction. All directors/ officers/ designated employees shall also not take positions in derivative transactions in the shares of the company at any time.”
Thus, under the 1992 Regulations, there was a complete and explicit prohibition on derivative transactions for designated employees. Note that the ban was for “any time” and not restricted to only while in possession of UPSI.
Position under the 2015 Regulations
While the contra-trade restrictions have been retained in the existing (2015) Regulations, the provision explicitly calling for blanket prohibition on derivative transactions was omitted. The Sodhi Committee Report does not contain any specific discussions in this regard.
Nonetheless, derivatives, qualifying the definition of “securities”, continue to be covered by the insider trading regulations. Reg 6(3) of the 2015 Regulations specifically refers to trading in derivatives, for the purpose of disclosure of trading in securities.
The disclosures of trading in securities shall also include trading in derivatives of securities and the traded value of the derivatives shall be taken into account for purposes of this Chapter.
As regards the value of derivatives for such disclosures, the same refers to the “traded value” of the derivatives. The format for such disclosures, as specified in the SEBI Master Circular on Surveillance of Securities Market (Annexure – I), also refers to disclosure of trading in derivatives on the securities of the company, and requires calculation of notional value of options based on premium plus strike price of the options.
Further, trading in equity derivative instruments i.e. Futures and Options of the listed company are covered by the system driven disclosures [Para 3.3.3. of the SEBI Master Circular].
Further, the Guidance Note on SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 dated 24th August, 2015 currently forming a part of the SEBI FAQs on PIT Regulations dated 31st December, 2024, includes the following:
52. Question
Whether the immediate relative of the designated person can trade in the derivatives of the company?
Answer
Yes. Designated person and its immediate relative can trade in derivatives when not in possession of UPSI and such trades are accordingly governed by the code of conduct.
Thus, the following points may be noted –
- A person cannot undertake insider trading in securities – directly or “indirectly”. Derivatives are defined under Section 2(ac) of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956.
“Derivative”—includes
(A) a security derived from a debt instrument, share, loan, whether secured or unsecured, risk instrument or contract for differences or any other form of security;
(B) a contract which derives its value from the prices, or index of prices, of underlying securities;
(C) commodity derivatives; and
(D) such other instruments as may be declared by the Central Government to be derivatives;
Therefore, trading in derivatives may technically tantamount to trading in underlying securities – indirectly. This is irrespective whether the transaction results in actual delivery or is only net-settled in cash.
- The definition of “securities” includes derivatives – hence, there should not be any confusion as to why trading in derivatives of the underlying securities should be excluded from the scope of “trading”
- Chapter III of PIT Regs. which is applicable to all insiders (note, that DPs are closest insiders), explicitly says that trading in securities includes trading in derivatives.
- SEBI FAQ (Q. 52 above) makes it clear that trading in derivatives is only possible when the DP/ immediate relative is not in possession of UPSI[1]. Of course, whether or not the DP/immediate relative is having possession of UPSI or not, is to be seen at the time the trading is proposed to be done.
Therefore, what is clear is that unlike the 1992 Regulations, there is no explicit provision calling for blanket prohibition on the derivative transactions by DPs and their immediate relatives. However, restrictions as are applicable otherwise in relation to securities of a listed company, would also apply to derivatives having such securities as underlying. Of course, the restriction is not a blanket prohibition as was in 1992.
In simple terms, a derivative should be treated no differently than the underlying security itself. Consequently, in view of the author:
- When the trading window is closed, a DP should not be allowed to enter into a derivative in securities as well.
- When the trading window is open, trading in derivatives should be subjected to preclearance.
The above position is also apparent in other jurisdictions, where, in the context of insider trading norms, dealing in derivatives is equivalent to dealing in underlying securities.
Once it is clear that trading in derivatives is equivalent to trading in underlying security, then it is obvious to conclude that trading in derivatives will also be governed by contra-trade prohibition in the same manner as trading in the underlying itself. See detailed discussion below.
Issues concerning contra-trade
Rationale for prohibiting contra-trade
The insider trading norms around the world prohibit contra trade or short swing trades by the persons privy to or likely to be privy to unpublished price sensitive information (UPSI) about the listed securities. The SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 restricts the Designated Persons (DPs) and their immediate relatives from undertaking reversal trades, within six months from undertaking the previous trade transaction. The intent is to prevent the abuse of UPSI by making short-term profits through unfair means.
The 2008 Consultation Paper states, “It is assumed that insiders have a long term investment in the company and are not expected to make rapid buy/sell transactions, which are assumedly based on at least some level of superior access to information, whether material or not.”
Hence, whenever there is a contra-trade within a short span of time (6 months), there is a presumption that the said trade is based on some “superior” access to information – as such, contra-trades are simply prohibited. The DP cannot undertake a contra-trade even if it is contended that he does not have UPSI.
Contra-trade in case of derivatives
Naturally, a question arises on whether DPs can trade in derivatives, and if so, when does the same qualify as contra-trade or otherwise, and the consequences that follow. Let’s take a simple illustration – Mr. A, a DP of X Ltd. purchases 100 shares of X Ltd. on 1.11.2024. Then purchases a put option on 15.11.2024, for all 100 shares. On 01.02.2025, on maturity of the put option, A exercised the put option and sold all the 100 shares. All these transactions, as one would note, are happening within a period of 6 months. The question is – whether A was allowed to undertake the 2nd transaction of purchasing a put option within 6 months of the 1st transaction.
There is a question appearing in SEBI FAQ, as follows:
37.Question
In case an employee or a director enters into Future & Option contract of Near/Mid/Far month contract, on expiry will it tantamount to contra trade? If the scrip of the company is part of any Index, does the exposure to that index of the employee or director also needs to be reported?
Answer
Any derivative contract that is physically settled on expiry shall not be considered to be a contra trade. However, closing the contract before expiry (i.e. cash settled contract) would mean taking contra position. Trading in index futures or such other derivatives where the scrip is part of such derivatives, need not be reported.
This question above clearly deals with treatment of expiry of a derivative contract or settlement of a derivative contract as to whether those events would be treated as contra-trade. That is, a culmination of a derivative contract, resulting in the delivery of the underlying will, of course, not amount to a separate “trade” – therefore, there is no question of a contra-trade. On the other hand, where no physical delivery is taken, rather, settled in cash (payment of the difference between the contract’s entry price and market price at expiry), the same amounts to a “sell” trade, thereby, a reversal of the position of the DP. Thus, where the contract is proposed to be settled prior to expiry, it would result in a different transaction/trade – thus, it should be treated as a contra-trade.
Now, if seen in a practical context, in India, the validity of derivatives contract would usually be less than 6 months (typically 1-3 months[2]). And, typically, these derivative transactions in such cases are net-settled before expiry, rather than culminating in actual delivery of securities[3]. Options enable the investors to speculate in shares of higher values and volumes as compared to the cash segment since the only amount payable would be the premium and the net difference in the strike price and spot price later on. Further, cash settlement in derivatives provides a higher leverage to the trader.
In the above scenario, there will always be a higher possibility of a contra-trade. The illustrations below explain the same:
| S. No | Transaction | Remarks (assuming T1 and T2 happen within a period of 6 months) |
| 1 | T1 – Buy call option T2 – Cash settlement | Contra trade. Buying call option is equivalent to a “buy” transaction. Subsequent cash settlement indicates a “sale” transaction. |
| 2 | T1 – Buy call option T2 – Physical settlement | Not a Contra trade. Buying call option is equivalent to a “buy” transaction, subsequent physical settlement only results in delivery of such shares. |
| 3 | T1 – Buy call option T2 – Expiry of option on account of out-of-the money | Not a Contra trade. Buying call option is equivalent to a “buy” transaction, however, did not result in delivery on account of the strike price > market price at the time of expiry. |
| 2 | T1 – Sell call option T2 – Cash settlement | Contra trade. Selling call option is a “sale” transaction. Cash settlement indicates a “buy” transaction. |
| 3 | T1 – Buy put option T2 – Cash settlement | Contra trade. Buying put option is a “sale” transaction. Not taking physical delivery of the shares and carrying out cash settlement indicates a “buy” transaction. |
| 4 | T1 – Sell put option T2 – Cash settlement | Contra trade. Selling put option is a “buy” transaction. Cash settlement is deemed to be a “sale” transaction. |
As such, trading in derivatives would be much more vulnerable to chances of insider trading, than actual trading in securities. Hence, it becomes extremely important to put mechanisms in place to ensure that derivatives trading be subjected to enhanced restrictions and controls, as suggested below.
Enhanced safeguards in respect of derivative transactions by DPs
It is quite clear that a derivative transaction that results in cash settlement construes a contra-trade. On the other hand, where physical delivery is taken (although it is not very common to close a derivative contract in physical settlement), the derivative transaction is not considered as a contra-trade (although the same is also to be matched against the previous trade in cash segment). Therefore, in order to ensure that the trade does not result in contra-trade, it is essential that the derivative is either settled by delivery or simply expires on the maturity date, and that there is no cash settlement.
In order to ensure this, in case of purchase of options (put/ call) by the DP, pre-clearance may be provided by the Compliance Officer subject to receipt of a declaration that the DP shall necessarily undertake physical settlement of such trades at the maturity date. Of course, there would be no concerns in case of an out-of-the money option, that is, where prior to the expiry of the contract, the market price remains below the strike price. An out-of-the money option does not result in any profits in the hands of the option holder, however, prevents additional loss in the face of exercising an option where the strike price at which the option is exercised and shares are acquired is higher than the current market price at the time of such exercise of option (upon maturity of the contract).
On the other hand, in case of sale of options (put/ call) by the DP (that is, where the DP is the writer of the option), the physical settlement cannot be guaranteed by the DPs, and chances of contra-trade are higher, as the counterparty (that is, buyer of the option) may choose to have cash settlement before the expiry of the derivative contract. Therefore, in order to obviate the possibility of a contra-trade happening, it might be necessary to completely prohibit sale/writing of options by DPs. This prohibition may be enabled through the code of conduct. . In fact, it is seen that several large listed companies have put a blanket prohibition on derivative transactions by DPs and their immediate relatives.
Contra-trade where there is a preceding/succeeding trade in securities
Besides, this FAQ does not deal with a scenario where a DP who has traded in securities already, now proposes to enter into a derivative contract within a span of 6 months from the date of original contract.
However, one thing is clear from this FAQ – the very entering into the derivative contract (and not expiry/maturity thereof) has been considered to be a trade by SEBI. Also, as discussed in the first part of this article, trading in derivatives should be considered as trading in securities itself. As such, if there has been a trade in securities, and there is a subsequent trade, although in derivatives of those very securities, it would result in contra-trade. That is, if in the above example, A enters into a “put option” – then he will have the right but not the obligation to “sell” the underlying shares, within 6 months of buying the shares. Whether to actually “sell” or have a concrete “right to sell” at a future date at or above a given price – it is nothing but a clear case of “contra-trade”.
For instance, assume a DP purchases shares of the listed company on 1.1.2025. Subsequently, on 1.3.2025, the DP purchased a put option. The put options, akin to a sale transaction, results in contra-trade when matched against the previous “buy” transaction in the cash segment, within a gap of less than 6 months between the two transactions. Similarly, where a call option is bought within 6 months of a previous sale transaction, the same results in contra trade.
Compliances in relation to trading in derivatives by DPs
(1) Appropriate mechanisms in the Code of Conduct
Prior to making trades in the derivatives, it is important for the DP to ensure that the Code of Conduct does not prohibit such trades. Unless expressly prohibited, the Code of Conduct may contain necessary clauses as discussed above, in order to enable derivative trading by DPs, subject to enhanced controls on the same.
(2) Manner of identification of derivative trades
The trading in equity derivative instruments i.e. Futures and Options of the listed company are covered by the system driven disclosures [Para 3.3.3. of the SEBI Master Circular]. Hence, an instance of contra trade through derivative instruments is easily identifiable by the Compliance Officer.
(3) Pre-clearance for the purpose of trading
Not all trades of DPs are pre-cleared by the Compliance Officer. The pre-clearance is required only for such trades that exceed the thresholds provided in the CoC of the respective listed entity, generally Rs. 10 lacs or more. Here, the value of trade becomes important, and cannot be just limited to the premium payable/ receivable at the time of purchase/sale of such contract. The price of the securities is also relevant. Pre-clearance may be granted by the Compliance Officer, subject to such conditions and undertaking as suggested above.
(4) Trading during closure of trading window
The DPs cannot trade in the derivatives of a company’s securities during the trading window closure period. In order to ensure the trades are not done during the trading window closure period, the concept of freezing of PAN has been introduced – both at the level of the DP as well as their immediate relatives (see an article here). However, the freezing of PAN is applicable only to the quarterly TW closure pending announcement of financial results.
The DP to ensure that neither him, nor his DPs trade in the derivatives of the company during the closure of trading window period.
(5) Reporting of trades in derivatives
As regards the reporting of trade in derivatives, the SEBI Master Circular provides guidance on calculation of notional value of trades, to be calculated based on premium plus strike price of the options. The disclosure of trades are primarily system-driven, based on the PAN details of the DPs updated with the designated depository. Having said that, in case of trades of the immediate relatives of the DPs, or where the PAN details are not updated with the depository, manual disclosures are required for such trades.
(6) Consequences of violation – disgorgement of profits and penal actions
A breach of contra trade restriction leads to disgorgement of profits made and its remittance to SEBI for credit to IPEF. Here, the question arises on what is considered the value of profits for disgorgement to IPEF, in the context of derivatives.
Where the transaction pertains to ‘sale’ of options, the profits would usually be the premium earned by the seller of options. On the other hand, in case of ‘purchase’ of options, the profits should be the difference between the buy and sale value, net of other expenses in connection with such option contracts.
Guidance may also be taken from 17 CFR § 240.16b-6(d) of the SEC Act, which states that the amount of profit shall be calculated as the profits that would have been realized had the subject transactions involved purchases and sales solely of the derivative security valued as of the time of the matching purchase or sale, and calculated for the lesser of the number of underlying securities actually purchased or sold. The amount of such profit shall not exceed the premium received for writing the option.
In addition to disgorgement of profits, penalty may also be levied. For instance, in an adjudication order dated 29th April 2022, the purchase and sale of options on consecutive days resulted in contra trade violation attracting a penalty of Rs. 2 lacs.
Global view on contra-trade in derivatives
Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Commission Act, 1934 of the USA, restricts contra trade in equity securities, for a beneficial owner holding more than 10% of any class of any equity security, director and officer, including a security-based swap agreement involving any such equity securities. Exemptions have been prescribed for derivative transactions in certain cases in CFR § 240.16b-3 of the General Rules and Regulations.
The General Rules and Regulations of the SEC provides detailed guidance on when a derivative trade qualifies as a short swing trade and vice versa. The same has been summarised here:
- Transactions that qualify as “purchase” of underlying securities:
- establishment/ increase of a call equivalent position
- liquidation/ decrease of a put equivalent position
- Transactions that qualify as “sale” of underlying securities:
- establishment/ increase of a put equivalent position
- liquidation/ decrease of a call equivalent position
- Transactions that are exempt from short swing restrictions:
- increase/ decrease pursuant to fixing of the exercise price of a right initially issued without a fixed price, where the date the price is fixed is not known in advance and is outside the control of the recipient
- Closing as a result of exercise or conversion of the option, that is,
- Acquisition of underlying securities at a fixed exercise price due to the exercise or conversion of a call equivalent position
- Except in case of out-of-the money option, warrant or right
- Disposition of underlying securities at a fixed exercise price due to the exercise of a put equivalent position.
- Acquisition of underlying securities at a fixed exercise price due to the exercise or conversion of a call equivalent position
- Where the person trading is not a major beneficial holder, and thus, an insider, at the time of both the transactions which are being termed as contra trade [Section 16-b of SEC Act].
- Other exemptions apply w.r.t. transactions with the issuer, subject to certain conditions and transactions pursuant to tax conditioned plans [CFR § 240.16b-6]
Article 164 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, 1948 of Japan also restricts reverse trades in specified securities, by major shareholders and officers etc, who may have obtained secret information in the course of their duty or by virtue of their position. Specified securities, for the purpose of the said provision, include Derivatives [Article 163 r/w Article 2(xix)].
Judicial precedents on contra trade transactions
In Allaire Corporation v. Ahmet H. Okumus, the Circuit Court held that when the option is written by the insider, he has no control over whether the options buyer will exercise the option or square it off. Thus, trade carried out pursuant to selling an option shall not be considered a transaction for the purpose of determining whether a set of transactions is a contra trade or not. The facts of the case involved writing another option within six months of expiry of the first option remaining un-exercised. Note that the expiration of the first set of options does not constitute a purchase matchable to the later sale of a different set of call options.
However, as clarified in Roth v. The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., et al., No. 12-2509 (2d Cir. 2014), when matched against its own writing, the expiration of an option within six months is a “purchase transaction” for the purpose of section 16-b.
The danger of misuse of non-public information exists at the time the option is written, and the expiration of that option is the moment of profit. Matching writings with expirations of different options does not clearly advance the purposes of the statute. Options written at different times are less likely to give rise to speculative abuse, and matching the expiration of an option only to its own writing recognizes the more evident danger.
In Chechele v. Sperling, the Circuit Court held that where pursuant to the settlement of the futures contract, the pledge on shares is revoked, the revocation is not considered to be a ‘purchase’ transaction to be combined with the open market sale of such shares to identify these trades as contra trades.
The exercise of a traditional derivative security is a “non-event” for section 16(b) purposes.
In the case of Macauley Whiting v. Dow Chemical Company, the Court held that where the insider has exercised an option to purchase shares and his spouse has sold shares within a period of 6 months, these transactions shall be considered to be short swing trades (contra trades).
In the context of § 16(a), the Commission has evolved a dual test of an insider’s beneficial ownership of his or her spouse’s shares. Such beneficial ownership may derive from the insider’s “power to revest” in himself title to those shares.[6] Or it may result from his enjoyment of ‘benefits substantially equivalent to those of ownership.’
In the case of Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petr. Corp., a person fails in his attempt of a takeover due to a defensive merger carried out by the target company. During the period when the merger was being finalised, the acquirer entered into an option agreement with the transferee company. The option agreement stipulated that if and when the merger succeeds, the transferee company would buy the shares held by the acquirer pursuant to the takeover attempt. The US Supreme Court held that such a set of trades would not result in contra trade because the actions of the acquirer were involuntary.
The option was grounded on the mutual advantages to respondent as a minority stockholder that wanted to terminate an investment it had not chosen to make and Tenneco, whose management did not want a potentially troublesome minority stockholder; and the option was not a source of potential speculative abuse, since respondent had no inside information about Tenneco or its new stock.
Concluding Remarks
In practice, several large listed companies continue to prohibit trading in derivatives by the Designated Persons and their immediate relatives through their Code of Conduct. The regulations do not enforce such blanket prohibition, although no trading can be done that falls foul of other requirements of the Regulations – viz., trading while in possession of UPSI, contra trades, trading during closure of trading window, trading without pre-clearance etc.
Having said that, derivatives, by nature, are short term trades based on the expectations of the movement in price of the securities in a certain direction within a short period of time. Therefore, in case of trades by DPs, the chance of such trades being motivated by an information asymmetry is comparatively higher, thereby potentially resulting in an insider trading allegation on such DP.
[1] Annexure VII of ICSI Guidance Note on Prevention of Insider Trading states “The designated persons and their immediate relatives shall not take any positions in derivative transactions in the Securities of the company at any time.” However, the source of such stipulation is not clear, as currently there is no corresponding provision in PIT Regulations.
[2] Derivative contracts are mostly for a tenure of up to 3 months as per standardized contract specifications given on BSE – https://www.bseindia.com/static/markets/Derivatives/DeriReports/contractindex.aspx