TReDS Master Directions issued by RBI

  • Harshita Malik | finserv@vinodkothari.com

RBI has issued the Reserve Bank of India (Trade Receivables Discounting System) Directions, 2026 (‘Final Directions’), replacing the draft Trade Receivables Discounting System (TReDS) directions (‘Draft Directions’) published earlier (read our article on the draft here). The Final Directions make a number of substantive changes from the Draft Directions and consolidate several operational and supervisory requirements by cross-referencing the Master Directions on Authorisation to operate a Payment System (‘PSO Authorisation Directions’). 

Highlights:

  • Net-worth compliance: Prescribed minimum limit of ₹25 crore, deadline being 31st March 2028 for existing entities;
  • Credit Guarantee: Financiers may now avail credit guarantee cover from any credit guarantee fund trust notified by the Government of India (earlier draft limited cover to NCGTC);
  • Platform Functions: ‘Bidding’ added as a formally recognised core platform function alongside uploading, accepting, discounting and settlement;
  • Discounting Process: Three operational obligations for discounting: 

(i) transparent multi-financier competitive bidding; (this is similar to multi-lending platform in case of digital lending)

(ii) intimation to the working capital/CC account banks of the buyer and seller; and 

(iii) formal service of a notice of assignment to the buyer in favour of the financier;

  • Governance Chapter: Deletion of the standalone governance/fit-and-proper chapter proposed in the draft; presumably now guided by the like provisions in the PSO Authorisation Directions;
  • MSME Validation: Platforms must implement validation mechanisms to ensure that sellers uploading invoices or bills of exchange are bona fide MSMEs; While the draft recommended a simplified process for onboarding of MSMEs, the Final Directions requires a validation mechanism to ensure that seller is MSME;   
  • Linkage to PSO Authorisation Directions: Several application and authorisation procedures are cross-referenced to the PSO Authorisation Directions;
  • IS & Cyber Security Audit: IS audit and cyber security audit requirements have been aligned with RBI guidance referenced in DPSS.CO.OD.No.1325/06.11.001/2019-20 dated January 10, 2020 (scope and coverage to follow that letter).

Background:

TReDS is a technology-enabled platform for financing trade receivables through multiple financiers. The Draft Directions issued earlier set out proposed regulatory, governance and operational requirements. The Final Directions refine those proposals, streamline supervisory overlaps by cross-referencing existing PSO Authorisation Directions, and add operational safeguards to strengthen transparency and MSME protection.

Discounting Process:

The platform shall facilitate the discounting of factoring units by way of receiving bids from multiple financiers in a transparent manner, resulting in flow of funds to the sellers, providing intimation to banks holding working capital / cash credit accounts of buyer and seller, serving of notice of assignment to buyer in favour of financier, with final payment being made by the buyer to the financier on due date. Since financing a transaction on TReDS will result in assignment of receivables in favour of the financier, the platform shall file the said assignment with the central registry (CERSAI), as provided under Registration of Assignment of Receivables (Reserve Bank) Regulations, 2022 dated January 14, 2022 (as amended from time to time).

Changes at a Glance:

BasisErstwhile Guidelines/CircularsDraft DirectionsFinal Directions
Definition of TReDSScheme for setting up and operating the institutional mechanism for facilitating the financing of trade receivables of MSMEs from corporate and other buyers, including Government Departments and Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs), through multiple financiersA system for facilitating financing of trade receivables. It is a technology platform on a digital or electronic network for facilitating factoring of trade receivables through multiple financiersA technology platform on a digital or electronic network for facilitating factoring of trade receivables through multiple financiers. Although the definition has changed from the erstwhile guidelines, the substance remains the same.
Application MechanismApplication format same as for any non-bank entity to seek authorisation under the PSS ActPRAVAAH portal, Form A of Appendix 1 of these directionsSubsumed into the consolidated PSO Authorisation Master Direction. Application through the PRAVAAH portal.
Capital Requirement₹25 crore paid-up equity capital₹25 crore Net Worth₹25 crore Net Worth
Governance / Fit-and-ProperSpecified fit and proper criteria for entities and their promoter/promoter group- sound credentials and integrity, financial soundness and track record of at least 5 years in running the businessSpecified fit and proper criteria for directors- fairness and integrity, conviction, insolvency debarment, unsound mind, financially unsoundNo such requirement prescribed under the Final Directions, since such aspects are covered under the PSO Authorisation Directions
Net-worth Compliance Deadline Paid-up equity capital to be maintained from the inception itself31st March 2027- for existing entities authorised to operate TReDS31st March 2028- for existing entities authorised to operate TReDS
Participants on TReDS PlatformSeller, Buyer, Financier, and Insurance CompaniesSellers, Buyers, Financiers, Insurance Companies, NCGTCSellers, Buyers, Financiers, Insurance Companies, Credit Guarantee Fund Trust notified by Government of India (not restricted to NCGTC)
Platform ActivitiesUploading, accepting, discounting, bidding, trading and settlementUploading, accepting, discounting and settlement of factoring unitsUploading, accepting, bidding, discounting and settlement of factoring units
MSME Eligibility VerificationRequired as part of the KYC processValidation mechanisms required to be put in place to ensure that the seller uploading invoices/bills of exchange is an MSMEValidation mechanisms to ensure that the seller is an MSME, and funds due to the seller are credited in the seller’s bank account only.
Discounting ProcessFacilitate the discounting of the factoring units by the financiers resulting in flow of funds to the MSME with final payment of the factoring unit being made by the buyer to the financier on due date.Facilitate the discounting of factoring units by the financiers, resulting in flow of funds to the sellers, with final payment of the factoring unit being made by the buyer to the financier on due date2 new operational obligations added: (i) intimation to working capital/CC account banks of buyer and seller; (ii) formal serving of notice of assignment to buyer in favour of the financier
Credit GuaranteeCredit insurance available, no mention of credit guaranteeOnly through NCGTCCan be provided by any credit guarantee fund trust set up by Government of India
IS Audit& Cyber Security AuditNo such mandatory requirementConducted by CERT-In empanelled auditorsScope and coverage shall be as per the RBI’s Letter DPSS.CO.OD.No.1325/06.11.001/2019-20 dated January 10, 2020
Reporting RequirementsNo such requirement.Annually (by 30 Sept): submit audited net-worth certificate and IS/Cyber Security Audit report. Monthly (by 7th): submit TReDS statistics. (Format: Appendix 1)Event-based: report any change in Board along with director declaration/undertaking. (Format: Appendix 2)Remains unchanged from the draft.
Settlement ProcessTReDS will generate the payment obligations of all financiers in respect of all factoring units financed on a given date, on T+2 basis.TReDS to ensure efficient and seamless settlement of transactions amongst the participantsRemains unchanged from the draft
KYC KYC of both the buyer and the MSME seller is requiredKYC of the buyer is required. Validation mechanism that the seller is an MSME to be put in place.Remains unchanged from the draft

Closing Remarks

The Final Directions strengthen operational transparency, broaden access to government-backed credit guarantees, and place explicit obligations on platforms to verify MSME eligibility and formalise discounting workflows. By folding several requirements into the PSO Authorisation Directions, the RBI has aimed to streamline authorisation and oversight while emphasising operational controls that protect MSMEs and financiers.

Avoid Turning Your Referral Partner into a DSA/LSP

Simrat Singh | Finserv@vinodkothari.com

RBI regulatory framework for banks and NBFCs recognise entities such as LSPs and DSAs, but do not define the term “referral partner”. Consequently, several lenders engage referral partners under agreements that merely replicate the DSA arrangement with a change in the nomenclature but without altering its substance. This is a risky approach. Courts have held that the existence of an agency relationship depends on the rights created between the parties, not on the title of the agreement. Therefore, if a referral partner agreement authorises the intermediary to represent the lender or perform functions ordinarily discharged by a DSA or outsourced agent, the intermediary may be regarded as a DSA irrespective of its contractual designation. Accordingly, while drafting a referral partner agreement, equal attention must be paid not just to the scope of what can be done but also  what the agreement does not permit. To understand the difference between a LSP, Referral partner and DSA, may refer to our resource Referral or Representation? The Fine Line Between LSP, DSA and Referral Partner.

Set out below are contractual provisions that should be avoided in an agreement with a referral partner.

  1. Do not confer authority to make commitments: Such authority is inconsistent with a mere referral arrangement and indicates an agency relationship. The agreement should not permit the referral partner to:
    1. assure loan sanction;
    2. quote specific interest rates since that is a function of borrower risk and lender’s credit evaluation and interest rate model;
    3. commit timelines for approval or disbursement; or
    4. make any representation which is binding on the lender
  2. Do not permit the referral partner to hold itself out as representing the lender: A referral partner should not portray itself as the lender’s representative or create the impression that it is authorised to act on the lender’s behalf. Accordingly, the agreement should prohibit the intermediary from describing itself as the lender’s agent or representative, using the lender’s name or branding in a manner that suggests an affiliation beyond a referral arrangement, or making any statement or representation that could lead customers to believe that it has authority to act for or bind the lender. 
  3. Do not permit collection or processing of loan applications and loan repayments: These functions form part of customer acquisition, onboarding and servicing, which are characteristics of DSAs or LSPs. A referral partner should not collect or verify KYC documents and/or scrutinise applications and collect customer information/documents in any manner. Further, activities such as identity verification, obtaining customer consents, conducting due diligence or facilitating KYC should remain with the lender or its authorised service providers. A referral partner should not participate in the lending process beyond introducing the customer.
  4. Keep performance obligations limited to referrals: The referral partner should not be evaluated based on portfolio quality; recovery performance; or loan servicing metrics. Performance obligations should relate only to successfully introducing prospective customers. 
  5. No compensation linked to lending functions or loan performance: A success-based referral fee, by itself, does not create an agency relationship. However, the consideration should not be linked to underwriting, servicing, collections, portfolio performance, recoveries or any other lending function. The agreement should make it clear that the referral fee is payable solely for successful referrals and not for performing any activity connected with the lending process.
  6. Do not authorise communication of lending decisions/negotiation: All customer communications should originate directly from the lender. The referral partner should not communicate sanction or rejection of applications; loan terms; deficiencies in documentation; repayment schedules; or disbursement confirmation. Further, negotiation on behalf of the lender is a strong indicator of representation/agency. The agreement should not authorise the intermediary to negotiate pricing; tenure; collateral requirements; repayment schedules; or restructuring terms.
  7. Do not assign post-disbursement responsibilities: Its role should ordinarily cease once the customer has been introduced. The referral partner should not undertake collections; recovery; repayment follow-ups; customer grievance handling; restructuring assistance; or foreclosure processing.
  8. Avoid clauses indicating exclusive representation: Clauses requiring the intermediary to exclusively promote the lender’s products or act as its sales representative reinforce the impression that the intermediary is representing the lender rather than merely referring customers.
  9. Avoid excessive operational control: Compliance obligations may be imposed, but they should not amount to day-to-day supervision. Operational control is a recognised indicator of agency. Accordingly, the agreement should avoid prescribing detailed supervision clauses or detailed operational instructions unrelated to regulatory compliance.
  10. Include non-agency provisions: The agreement should expressly provide that:
    1. the referral partner is an independent contractor;
    2. the relationship between the parties is on a principal-to-principal basis;
    3. it has no authority to represent or bind the lender;
    4. the referral partner shall not collect, process, or handle customer documents, KYC records, or sensitive customer information;
    5. all lending decisions are taken exclusively by the lender;
  11. Avoid agency terminology: Last but not the least, expressions such as authorised representative; sales representative; marketing representative; branch; agent; or authorised person should be avoided throughout the agreement because the language used often reflects the intended legal relationship.

NBFC-UL Classification Approach Revised by RBI

  • Harshita Malik | finserv@vinodkothari.com

Background

RBI, vide its Press Release dated April 10, 2026, had issued draft Amendment Directions (read our article on the draft here) proposing changes to the methodology for identification of NBFC-Upper Layer (NBFC-UL) and the inclusion of Government-owned NBFCs in the Upper Layer. Following the consultation period, the RBI has finalised these proposals vide its Press Release dated June 24, 2026, effective immediately. The amendment package comprises four directions:

  1. SBR 2nd Amendment Directions: revises the UL identification framework under the Scale Based Regulation architecture;
  2. CRM 3rd Amendment Directions: extends concentration norms to Govt.-owned NBFCs and introduces the State Government guarantee provision;
  3. Governance Amendment Directions: exempts Govt.-owned NBFC-ULs from mandatory listing and pre-listing disclosures; and
  4. Financial Statements 2nd Amendment Directions: aligns the financial statements framework with the revised UL classification.

Revised Norms of Classification and Compliance

  1. Annual Classification/Identification Process:
    RBI will continue to conduct an annual identification exercise for classifying NBFCs in the Upper Layer. Compliance obligations attach from the date the RBI notifies the NBFC-UL list, not from the date an entity crosses the asset threshold independently.  
  2. Revised Criteria for UL-Classification:
    The current two-step approach (top ten by asset size and parametric scoring) will be replaced by a simple, absolute asset size criterion.
An NBFC with standalone audited assets of ₹1,00,000 crore or more (as per the latest audited balance sheet) shall be classified in the Upper Layer.

Key features of the revised criterion are: 

  1. Standalone basis: asset size test applies to the standalone balance sheet of the NBFC, not consolidated group assets.
  2. Periodic review: ₹1,00,000 crore threshold will be reviewed every 3 years, more stringent than the 5-year cycle proposed in the draft, ensuring the threshold remains calibrated to market evolution.
  3. Bright-line simplicity: subjective scoring element is eliminated entirely, reducing regulatory uncertainty for entities near the boundary.
  4. Category-agnostic: UL list may include NBFC-ICCs, HFCs, CICs, deposit-taking NBFCs, and Government NBFCs; the type of NBFC is not a pre-condition.
  5. Inclusion of Government-owned NBFCs:
    Eligible Government-owned NBFCs that breach the ₹1,00,000 crore threshold will now be included in the NBFC-UL list for the first time. Previously, these entities were placed only in the Base or Middle Layer. However, Government-owned NBFC-ULs are exempt from two obligations:
    1. Mandatory listing within three years of notification (proviso to Para 43 of the Governance Directions); and
    2. Pre-listing disclosures (proviso to Para 23 of the Financial Statements Directions).

All other Upper Layer norms, including CET-1 capital, leverage, large exposures, governance, and provisioning requirements, apply in full.

  1. No exemption to Government Owned NBFCs from Concentration Norms:
    Government-owned NBFCs will henceforth be subject to the concentration norms applicable to their respective layer. The earlier blanket exemption has been withdrawn. The transition is handled as follows:
    1. Existing exposures that currently breach prudential limits are grandfathered and may continue until maturity, but no fresh exposure to such obligors is permitted.
    2. Additional exposure beyond prudential limits is permissible only if fully covered by eligible credit risk transfer instruments, resulting in zero net incremental exposure for Middle Layer and Upper Layer NBFCs.
  2. Provision for Credit Risk Transfer:
    All NBFC-ULs may now use State Government guarantees to offset credit exposures without any portfolio-level cap. The regulatory treatment of the exposure so transferred is:
    1. The exposure is recognised on the State Government (rather than the borrower);
    2. The exposure is exempt from prudential exposure limits; and
    3. 20% risk weight applies for capital computation purposes.
  3. Higher permissible exposure limit on connected counterparties for IFCs in Upper Layer:
    NBFC-Infrastructure Finance Companies (‘NBFC-IFCs’) benefit from a specific carve-out: while the general rule caps exposure to a group of connected counterparties at 25% of the eligible capital base, NBFC-IFCs in the Upper Layer are permitted to go up to 45% of the eligible capital base (a 20 percentage-point premium) under the proviso to Para 35 of the Concentration Risk Management Directions. This reflects the inherently concentrated and long-tenor nature of infrastructure financing.  
  4. NBFCs in the Banking Group to comply with existing provisions:
    NBFCs that are part of a banking group do not follow the SBR layer-based identification process for UL compliance. Instead, they shall continue to adhere to the applicable provisions for Upper Layer NBFCs, as per the RBI (Commercial Banks – Undertaking of Financial Services) Directions, 2025, for NBFCs under the banking group and carrying out lending activities. Our article on compliances to be followed by such NBFCs in the banking group can be seen here.

Regulatory Implications for Newly Classified NBFCs-UL

Classification as an NBFC-UL triggers a comprehensive set of enhanced regulatory requirements. Entities crossing the ₹1,00,000 crore threshold for the first time should anticipate the following:

Compliance AreaRequirement for NBFC-ULTrigger/Notes
CET-1 CapitalMinimum 9% of Risk-Weighted AssetsBinding where growth is aggressive
Leverage RatioMaintained alongside CRAR; special attention for derivative-heavy entitiesCurrently less acute as most NBFCs in India are not active in derivatives
Large Exposures FrameworkSingle-party cap: 20% of Tier 1 capital; Group cap: 25% (NBFC-IFC: 45%)Economic-interdependence test determines group risk
Standard Asset ProvisioningDifferential provisioning by asset classHigher than ML/BL requirements
Mandatory ListingWithin 3 years of notification as ULExempt for Govt.-owned NBFC-ULs
GovernanceEnhanced governance- board composition and listing requirementsApplicable under Chapter-V of the Governance Directions 2025

Closing Remarks

The shift from a hybrid scoring methodology to a single asset-size threshold is a significant moment in India’s NBFC regulatory architecture. The old framework, elegant in theory but notoriously opaque in application, left entities in a state of perpetual uncertainty about whether their exposure profile, liability structure, or interconnectedness would tip them over the UL line in any given year. The replacement with a bright-line rule removes that ambiguity.

That clarity, however, comes with a structural trade-off: the parametric approach was designed to capture systemic importance beyond sheer size: interconnectedness, leverage complexity, and liability fragility. A purely asset-based threshold is a blunter instrument. An NBFC with ₹1,05,000 crore in assets but a conservative, government-securities-heavy balance sheet will face the same UL compliance burden as one of equal size with complex wholesale funding and concentrated sector exposures.

The inclusion of Government-owned NBFCs is the more substantive policy shift. Large public-sector financial institutions, several of which have historically operated outside the SBR scrutiny framework, will now be subject to CET-1 discipline, large exposure limits, and differential provisioning. The listing exemption softens the reputational-governance dimension but does not dilute the prudential obligations.

The three-year review cycle (tightened from the draft’s five years) signals that the RBI is alive to the possibility that India’s NBFC sector may grow in ways that make ₹1,00,000 crore a less meaningful threshold over time. Market participants should treat this as a dynamic floor, not a permanent bright line.

Finally, the State Government guarantee provision, extending a zero-cap credit risk transfer tool to all NBFC-ULs, is a quiet but important liquidity-facilitation measure, especially relevant for NBFCs with significant exposure to state-owned utilities and infrastructure projects.

RBI’s Draft Model Risk Management Guidelines, 2026; What NBFCs using AI/ML Need to Know

RBI has published a draft “Guidance on Regulatory Principles for Model Risk Management, 2026” for public consultation and it’s the first time AI/ML models used in credit underwriting, customer interaction and other business processes get a dedicated regulatory lens, applicable across the full spectrum of REs, including NBFC-BL, ML, UL and TL.

Here’s what stood out for NBFCs deploying AI/ML:

𝟏. 𝐈𝐭’𝐬 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐣𝐮𝐬𝐭 𝐚𝐛𝐨𝐮𝐭 “𝐀𝐈” — 𝐬𝐜𝐨𝐩𝐞 𝐢𝐬 𝐰𝐢𝐝𝐞 A “model” now covers any system — including spreadsheet-based tools — that takes inputs, applies processing logic, and produces outputs materially affecting decisions, irrespective of whether the RE itself labels it a “model.” A loan pricing calculator that drives lending rates qualifies. Many NBFCs may discover they’re running more “models” than they thought.

𝟐. 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐲𝐬 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐍𝐁𝐅𝐂 — 𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐧 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐫𝐝-𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐭𝐲/𝐯𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐨𝐫 𝐀𝐈 Many NBFCs lean on fintech/vendor-provided AI for underwriting or collections scoring. The draft makes clear: outsourcing the model doesn’t outsource the risk. Independent validation by the RE is mandatory regardless of any certification the vendor provides, plus enhanced RMCB oversight irrespective of risk tier, and contractual rights to technical documentation and audit access.

𝟑. 𝐄𝐱𝐩𝐥𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐝𝐞𝐜𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 Credit underwriting models fall squarely in “material decision-making” territory — meaning higher explainability thresholds apply. If a model (e.g., a black-box ML scorecard) can’t fully explain itself, NBFCs must compensate with enhanced validation, output verification, frequent monitoring and usage restrictions.

𝟒. 𝐁𝐢𝐚𝐬 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐟𝐚𝐢𝐫𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐬 𝐭𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐛𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞𝐬 𝐞𝐱𝐩𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐢𝐭 NBFCs must proactively identify risks of discriminatory outputs — especially unfair treatment of customer groups in credit decisions — run fairness assessments, and recalibrate or redesign where needed.

𝟓. 𝐂𝐡𝐚𝐭𝐛𝐨𝐭𝐬, 𝐯𝐨𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐛𝐨𝐭𝐬 & 𝐠𝐞𝐧𝐀𝐈 𝐜𝐮𝐬𝐭𝐨𝐦𝐞𝐫 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐟𝐚𝐜𝐞𝐬 𝐠𝐞𝐭 𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐢𝐟𝐢𝐜 𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐫𝐝𝐫𝐚𝐢𝐥𝐬 For any AI model interfacing with customers, NBFCs must:

  • Disclose to customers that they’re interacting with an AI/ML system, with its limitations;
  • Provide an option to switch to a human when requested;
  • Guard against hallucinations via system-level controls (critical for generative AI);
  • Build in protections against prompt injection, adversarial inputs and anomalous usage;
  • Run structured “red-teaming” / challenge testing on such models

𝟔. 𝐇𝐮𝐦𝐚𝐧 𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐢𝐠𝐡𝐭 𝐢𝐬 𝐧𝐨𝐧-𝐧𝐞𝐠𝐨𝐭𝐢𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞 Human-in-the-loop/on-the-loop arrangements, kill-switch/override mechanisms, and periodic human review of AI-driven decisions are mandated — with explicit attention to “automation bias” and decision fatigue among reviewing staff.

𝟕. 𝐆𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐧𝐞𝐞𝐝𝐬 𝐭𝐨 𝐠𝐨 𝐭𝐨 𝐁𝐨𝐚𝐫𝐝 𝐥𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐥 A Board-approved Model Risk Management Framework covering AI/ML models is mandatory, with high-risk models requiring Risk Management Committee of the Board (RMCB) approval, risk-based tiering, a living model inventory, and decommissioned models retained for 10+ years.

𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐭𝐚𝐤𝐞𝐚𝐰𝐚𝐲 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐍𝐁𝐅𝐂𝐬: this is currently in draft/consultation stage and will eventually replace Chapter 3 (Credit Risk Models) of RBI’s 2002 Guidance Note on Credit Risk Management. NBFCs using AI/ML for credit underwriting, collections, or customer-facing chat/voice interfaces should start mapping their existing models against this framework now — inventory, validation independence, explainability thresholds, and human oversight will likely demand real governance uplift, not just policy paperwork.

FAQs on Advertising, Marketing and Sale of Financial Products and Services, agency and referral activities: Commercial Banks

– Team Finserv | finserv@vinodkothari.com

In order to regulate mis-selling concerns for both products/ services of regulated entities and third-parties by a regulated entity, amendments have been issued  ‘Advertising, Marketing and Sale of Financial Products and Services by Regulated Entities’, via two sets of amendment directions for Commercial Banks: 

See our other resources on the subject: 

  • Detailed write up on the Amendment Directions here.
  • Youtube video here
  • FAQs on Advertising, Marketing and Sale of Financial Products and Services, and agency activities: NBFCs here.
  • The Brochure for a half day workshop on June 26, 2025 (Physical-Bengaluru) where we will be discussing the Amendment Directions in detail can be accessed through here.

The Sale That Was Never About the Product

Why RBI’s New Directions on Responsible Business Conduct Could Change Financial Services More Than Any New Technology

– Guest Contributor | Dr. Aneish Kumar (aneishk@yahoo.com)

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Other Resources on the topic:

FAQs on Advertising, Marketing and Sale of Financial Products and Services, and agency activities: NBFCs

– Team Finserv | finserv@vinodkothari.com

In order to regulate mis-selling concerns for both products/ services of regulated entities and third-parties by a regulated entity, amendments have been issued  ‘Advertising, Marketing and Sale of Financial Products and Services by Regulated Entities’, via two sets of amendment directions for NBFCs: 

  1. Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Responsible Business Conduct) Second Amendment Directions, 2026 (‘RBC Amendment Directions’/’Amendment Directions’) 
  2. Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Undertaking of Financial Services) Second Amendment Directions, 2026 (‘UFS Amendment Directions’)

(Refer to our detailed write up on the Amendment Directions here, our youtube video here. Further we are also hosting a half day workshop on June 26, 2025 (Physical-Bengaluru) where we will be discussing the Amendment Directions in details. The Brochure for the workshop can be accessed through here)

Refer to our FAQs on the Amendment Directions and the UFS Amendment Directions below

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Pay for Performance Or Pay for Prudence?

Understanding Compensation Framework for NBFCs

On 9 March 2026, the Reserve Bank of India imposed a monetary penalty of ₹2.70 lakh on a financial institution for violations regarding the payment of  the entire variable remuneration to certain KMPs upfront, without deferring any portion, in breach of applicable compensation guidelines. While the quantum of the penalty is insignificant relative to the Company’s scale of operations, it reflects the RBI’s clear regulatory emphasis on ensuring that NBFC compensation practices are aligned with prescribed regulatory requirements. 

Compensation structures in financial institutions, like any other institution, have traditionally been designed to reward performance. Higher profits, stronger business growth, and increased market share have often translated into higher incentives and bonuses for senior management. However, the manner in which institutions reward their key personnel can significantly influence the risks they choose to take. Where the remuneration is excessively linked to short-term profitability, it may encourage risk-taking without adequate regard to long-term consequences, particularly where the underlying risks may materialise only several years later. 

The Lessons of History: From Performance to Prudence

The 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) illustrated the above mechanism. Mortgage originators earned fee income upfront on loan disbursements while credit risk was securitised and passed to counterparties; traders at large investment banks received annual cash bonuses tied to mark-to-market gains while systemic risks accumulated on balance sheets. When those risks materialised, bonus recipients were under no obligation to return payments. 

Mr Raghuram Rajan (2006), writing before the GFC , identified competitive pressures pushing financial sector executives toward risk strategies concealed within opaque compensation structures, specifically, strategies that generate near-certain short-term income while accumulating rare but catastrophic risks. 

In a landmark 2011 study, Fahlenbrach and Stulz revealed a shocking paradox – banks where CEOs owned the most stock actually suffered the worst losses during the crash. Because their personal wealth was tied to share prices, these executives took massive, highly concentrated gambles to boost short-term returns. The conclusion of their research was clear that how an executive is paid is just as critical as how much they are paid. 

The international response to these concerns was reflected in the Financial Stability Board’s Principles for Sound Compensation Practices and the accompanying implementation standards, which advocated alignment of remuneration with long-term risk outcomes. This was followed by further guidance from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision on the assessment and risk-adjustment of remuneration practices.

Why only financial institutions? Rather, every Company is covered

Section 178(4)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013, requires the Nomination and Remuneration Committee (NRC) of every prescribed class of company to formulate the criteria for, and recommend to the Board, a policy relating to the remuneration of directors, KMPs, and other employees. While RBI has prescribed a more structured framework for banks and NBFCs, the underlying principles are equally relevant to non-financial entities and are consistent with the remuneration governance framework envisaged under Section 178 of the Companies Act, 2013. In any company, compensation is often linked to performance metrics such as profits, revenue growth, operational targets, or share price performance. Where such performance is subsequently found to have been achieved through misconduct, inaccurate reporting, regulatory breaches, or unsustainable business practices, malus and clawback mechanisms enable the company to reduce or recover variable remuneration. 

Where an industrial company’s CEO makes poor strategic decisions, the primary losers are shareholders. Where an NBFC’s senior management makes poor credit or investment decisions, the losses spread to depositors (in deposit-taking NBFCs), borrowers facing credit contraction, financial system counterparties, and, at sufficient scale, the broader economy. 

Consider a hypothetical Middle Layer NBFC. In FY2023, its loan book grew by 35%, driven by aggressive commercial lending and disbursements. Net interest margin expands, provisions are low, and PAT rises sharply. The board approves variable pay of ₹8 crore for the MD and ₹3-5 crore for the senior credit team, paid immediately in April 2023.

By FY2025, borrower stress in the commercial segment becomes apparent. NPA recognition in the FY2023-24 begins. Provisions of ₹400-600 crore are required across two financial years, erasing the PAT that justified the FY2023 bonuses. The credit decisions that drove FY2023 profitability and the bonuses are the same decisions that drove FY2025 impairment. 

Under a properly designed deferral and clawback framework, a material portion of the FY2023 variable pay would remain unvested in FY2024 and FY2025. As NPA ratios deteriorate beyond prescribed thresholds, malus provisions would cancel unvested amounts. If fraud or deliberate misreporting in origination is subsequently found, clawback provisions would enable recovery of amounts already paid. In the absence of such provisions, the incentive structure is undisturbed: gains are privatised, losses are socialised.

Building Blocks of Sound Compensation Governance

A simple principle: individuals who generate profits should also bear the consequences of the risks taken to generate those profits. 

A.  Variable Pay

Variable pay is the performance-linked component of remuneration. Two dimensions are critical: the quantum that is the share of variable pay relative to fixed pay must be material enough to serve as a genuine incentive without dominating compensation to the point of creating perverse incentives to maximise near-term metrics. Secondly, the variable pay must be assessed against risk-adjusted, institution-wide outcomes, not merely individual disbursement volumes, gross fees, or absolute PAT. Variable pay must be capable of being reduced to zero in poor performance periods. 

B.  Deferral of Compensation

Deferral withholds a portion of variable pay for payment at a future date, subject to the absence of adverse risk outcomes during the deferral window. The purpose is to ensure that remuneration remains exposed to the consequences of decisions throughout the period over which those decisions actually materialise. The deferral period must be calibrated to the risk horizon. 

C.  Share-Linked Instruments

Awarding a portion of variable pay in share-linked instruments like stock options, ESOPs, phantom stock, stock appreciation rights aligns executive incentives with the long-term market value of the institution. An executive holding significant unvested equity is personally exposed to the consequences of decisions that may impair the institution’s stock price years after they are taken.

D.  Malus

The term “malus” originates from the Latin word meaning bad or adverse, reflecting a mechanism that reduces or cancels remuneration before it vests. It is the primary ex-post adjustment tool during the deferral period.

The malus period must cover, at minimum, the entire deferral period, otherwise the deferral itself is meaningless. For malus to operate as a genuine deterrent, the policy must specify quantitative triggers rather than purely discretionary language.

E.  Clawback

Clawback” literally denotes the act of taking back something previously given, and refers to the recovery of remuneration that has already vested or been paid. It operates after the deferral period and is therefore more operationally complex. It requires enforceable contractual provisions in individual employment agreements (a policy reference alone is insufficient), may face legal challenges in certain jurisdictions, and demands investigation processes before invocation.

Malus and clawback are complementary, not substitutes. Malus stops deferred pay from flowing out during the risk-materialisation window; clawback reverses compensation already received where subsequent investigation reveals misconduct or misreporting that was not apparent at the time of payment.

Global Compensation Frameworks: Numbers, Not Principles

All major jurisdictions that have addressed financial institution compensation have converged on prescriptive parameters such as minimum deferral percentages, defined deferral periods, mandatory clawback windows, and MRT identification beyond the C-suite.

European Union: Capital Requirements Directive V (Art. 94)

Variable remuneration for MRTs is capped at 100% of fixed remuneration, extendable to 200% with shareholder approval. A minimum of 40% of variable pay must be deferred, rising to 60% where variable pay is ‘of a particularly high amount’, for at least four to five years (five years for senior managment). Malus and clawback provisions are mandatory during the deferral and retention periods. Payout schedules must be ‘sensitive to the time horizon of risks.’

Refer here: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32019L0878

Australia: APRA CPS 511

CPS 511 is among the most granular remuneration standards globally. For Significant Financial Institutions (SFIs): (i) the CEO must defer 60% of variable pay for a minimum of six years; (ii) other senior managers must defer 40% of variable pay for at least four years; (iii) the clawback window extends to a minimum of two years from the date of payment or vesting. Clawback criteria explicitly include ‘material misstatements of financial statements.’ CPS 511 also requires boards to link individual accountability (under the Banking Executive Accountability Regime) directly to the deferral and clawback framework.

Refer here: https://handbook.apra.gov.au/standard/cps-511

United Kingdom: SMCR / PRA Remuneration Code

Under the Senior Managers and Certification Regime, each Senior Manager holds a personal ‘Statement of Responsibilities.’ SYSC 19D mandates that MRTs face: (i) malus and clawback for a minimum of five to seven years (seven years for Senior Managers); (ii) minimum deferral of 40% of variable pay (rising to 60% for higher amounts); and (iii) a minimum deferral period of four years.

Refer here: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/policy-statement/2025/october/remuneration-instrument-2025—pra2025_14.pdf

Compensation Regulation in Banks and NBFCs: A Comparative Regulatory Assessment

A comparison of the compensation frameworks prescribed under Paras 61–67 of the Reserve Bank of India (Commercial Banks – Governance) Directions, 2025 and Paras 29–37 of the Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Governance) Directions, 2025 reveals a clear regulatory distinction. Banks are subject to a rule-based compensation regime with defined quantitative thresholds and risk-adjustment mechanisms, whereas NBFCs operate under a principles-based framework that affords greater implementation flexibility. 

ParameterCommercial Banks NBFCs Key Difference
Board-approved Compensation PolicyRequiredRequired (Para 29)Similar requirement: the NBFC framework is principle-based.
Nomination & Remuneration Committee (NRC)RequiredRequired (Para 30)Similar requirement.
NRC-Risk Management Committee CoordinationMandatory; compensation outcomes to be aligned with capital adequacy and cost-to-income ratioRequired (Para 31)Banks have more prescriptive alignment requirements.
Variable Pay – Minimum ShareAt least 50% of total compensation for senior executives and MRTsNo prescribed minimumSignificant flexibility for NBFCs.
Variable Pay – Maximum CapMaximum 300% of fixed payNot prescribedNo regulatory cap for NBFCs.
Fixed vs Variable Pay StructureQuantitatively prescribedPrinciple-based (Para 33)Banks subject to detailed limits.
Deferral of Variable PayMinimum 60% deferredDeferral contemplated (Para 35)NBFCs have no specified percentage.
Deferral PeriodMinimum 3 yearsNot specifiedNBFCs may determine internally.
Deferral of Cash ComponentAt least 50% of cash component deferred (subject to threshold exemption)Not specifiedNo equivalent requirement for NBFCs.
Vesting ScheduleNo faster than a pro rata cumulative basis over deferral periodNot specifiedBanks are subject to structured vesting norms.
Share-linked InstrumentsMinimum 50%–67% of variable pay depending on pay structureNot requiredNo specific requirement for NBFCs.
Alternative to Share-linked InstrumentsAll-cash permitted only in limited cases; variable pay capped at 150% of fixed payNot prescribedNo comparable restriction for NBFCs.
Material Risk Taker (MRT) IdentificationMandatory identification beyond KMPsNot prescribedThe NBFC framework does not define MRTs.
Control Function IndependenceImplied through governance frameworkSpecifically required (Para 35(4))Explicit requirement under NBFC Directions.
Malus and Clawback FrameworkMandatoryMandatory (Para 37)A framework is required for both.
Malus/Clawback ScopeMust cover at least deferral and retention periodsNo prescribed periodBanks have detailed implementation standards.
NPA-specific Malus TriggerMandatory prohibition on unvested variable pay where NPA divergence exceeds RBI disclosure thresholdNot prescribedUnique requirement for banks.
Guaranteed BonusProhibited except for a sign-on bonus for new hiresProhibited except for a sign-on bonus (Para 36)Broadly aligned.
Hedging of Variable PayProhibitedNot prescribedNo express prohibition for NBFCs.
Compensation Disclosure RequirementsPrescribed under governance frameworkNo specific disclosure frameworkBanks are subject to greater transparency obligations.
Alignment with Risk OutcomesDetailed linkage to risk, capital and performance metricsPrinciple-based requirementBanks have significantly greater regulatory prescription.

Conclusion

The regulation of compensation is fundamentally a question of governance. While remuneration frameworks are intended to reward performance, financial sector experience has repeatedly demonstrated that performance measured over a short horizon may not accurately reflect the risks embedded in business decisions. Accordingly, modern compensation regulation seeks to align remuneration outcomes not merely with current profitability, but with the sustainability of that profitability over time.

From Consent to Compensation: RBI’s Directions for REs on Sales Practices

RBI issues Directions on Advertising, Marketing and Sales of Financial Products and Services by Regulated Entities

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Agency and referral activities of NBFCs and Banks: RBI June 2026 Amendments

– Team Finserv | finserv@vinodkothari.com

RBI has issued Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Undertaking of Financial Services) Second Amendment Directions, 2026 (‘UFS Amendment Directions’) on June 15, 2026. The RBI also issued the Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Responsible Business Conduct) Second Amendment Directions, 2026 (‘RBC Amendment Directions’) under the RBI press release for issuance of Amendment Directions on ‘Advertising, Marketing and Sale of Financial Products and Services by Regulated Entities’. Earlier draft Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Undertaking of Financial Services) Amendment Directions, 2026 (‘Draft Direction’) were issued as a part of the Draft Amendment Directions for Advertising, Marketing and Sales of Financial Products and Services by Regulated Entities

By way of Highlights, the UFS Amendments introduce a unified framework for agency business of banks and NBFCs, and referral activities of banks. Specifically, the Amendments provide that agency/referral activities will be undertaken without risk participation, and in case of referral, the bank will be limited to simply connecting the customer with the external provider (TPPSP), and will not be involved in the sale process. The physical or electronic machinery of the bank will not be used for third party product sales.

Our interpretation of the regulated entity’s (RE’s) participation being on no-risk basis is that if the agency or referral fees are linked with the profits or performance of the product/service offered by the third party, the agent or referring entity indeed gets subjected to risk.

We also give specific details about insurance distribution, a lucrative add-on income opportunity for most regulated entities.

Unified Framework for Agency Business

  • RBI has formally defined “Agency Business” as an arrangement where a Bank/ NBFC acts as an agent of a third-party product or service provider (TPPSP) for the distribution of financial products and services. Thus, banks/NBFCs under agency business can only distribute financial products or services. 
  • The RBI has not covered non-financial products and services under the purview of the UFS Directions, however, the same is not restricted in case of NBFCs.
  • The distribution of financial products and services would include marketing, sales, promotion, customer onboarding support, grievance facilitation and after-sales services.
  • The arrangement must be undertaken without any risk participation by the NBFC.

Agency versus referral

  • A principle-based distinction is required between Agency Business and Referral Services. Refer to our article discussing this in detail- Referral or Representation? The Fine Line Between LSP, DSA and Referral Partner – Vinod Kothari Consultants
  • For such TPPS that require higher and continuous customer interactions, the Agency Business arrangement may be used instead of Referral Services. However, REs may undertake only such third-party product or services under referral route where continued customer interactions such as distribution, grievance redressal, post sales services are not required to be undertaken. 

Undertaking Insurance Agency business by Banks/NBFCs/HFCs

  • Banks may act as an insurance broker departmentally
  • NBFCs and eligible HFCs may undertake insurance distribution under the corporate agency or broking model without prior RBI approval.
  • Prior approval/registration from IRDAI and compliance with applicable IRDAI regulations remain mandatory. Here, it may be noted that the RBI NOC is generally required at the time of making an application to IRDAI.
  • Insurance distribution must:
    • Be undertaken on a fee basis;
    • Involve no risk participation;
    • Be clearly disclosed to customers by disclosing the products on the website of the NBFC;
    • Be supported by robust grievance redressal mechanisms of the insurer. The NBFC may facilitate the redressal of grievances.
  • Earlier, the Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Undertaking of Financial Services) Directions, 2025 (‘UFS Direction’), provided that no incentive (cash or non-cash) should be paid to the staff engaged in insurance broking/ corporate agency services by the insurance company. The same has now been deleted. However, it may be noted that this requirement has been covered under para 101U of the RBC Amendment Directions.

Does Insurance Distribution include  a lender acting as master policyholer?

The UFS Amendment Directions uses the terms ‘Agency Business’ to mean an arrangement under which an NBFC acts as an agent of a third-party product or service provider (TPPSP), without risk participation, to facilitate the sale of the latter’s financial products or services (e.g., insurance, mutual fund, pension fund, etc.) to its own customers Para 32 clarifies that an NBFCs intending to undertake insurance distribution can do so only in the capacity of a Corporate Agent (“CA”) or an Insurance Broker, in accordance with the applicable regulations issued by the Insurance Regulation Development Authority of India (‘IRDAI’). This disallows any unregulated or informal distribution arrangements, including informal referral models or structures that may resemble the outsourcing of distribution without appropriate licensing.

The question arises as to whether NBFCs may act as a master policyholder for group insurance or through Insurance Self-Network Platforms (‘ISNP’), in accordance with the applicable IRDAI regulations.

In our view, the amendment does not restrict the NBFCs from acting as the Master Policy Holder for group insurance policy covering lender-borrower groups, as permitted under the IRDAI_Master_Circular_on_Protection_of_Policyholders_interests_2024 as while acting as a master policyholder, the NBFC cannot draw any commission from the insurance company, it solely acts as a policyholder for the benefit of its customers. In this capacity, the NBFC facilitates enrolment, premium collection, and claims support, without undertaking solicitation in the capacity of an agent or broker. 

With respect to ISNP Platforms, only insurance intermediaries are permitted to take registration for operating an ISNP. Therefore, in our view NBFCs shall still be permitted to operate ISNPs. 

Further, the recent Sabka Bima Sabki Raksha (Amendment of Insurance Laws) Act, 2025 has introduced the concept of Managing General Agent (“MGA”) (which is still not implemented by IRDA) by including the same within the definition of “insurance intermediary”. Given that the MGA construct involves undertaking core functions such as underwriting support (assessment of risk only), product design, and distribution facilitation on behalf of insurers, it may fall within the broader ambit of “insurance distribution business”. While the regulatory contours around MGAs are still evolving, NBFCs have not been expressly restricted from acting as MGAs via this amendment, subject to clarity from the IRDAI on permissibility, registration requirement etc.  Read our article on Managing General Agents here.

No Routing of Funds through the NBFC/HFC

The UFS Directions earlier provided that the premium shall be paid by the insured directly to the insurance company without routing through the NBFC. This requirement has now been deleted under the present UFS Amendment Directions. It may however, be noted that Section 64VB of the Insurance Act, 1938 provides that, 

Where an insurance agent collects a premium on a policy of insurance on behalf of an insurer, he shall deposit with, or dispatch by post to, the insurer, the premium so collected in full without deduction of his commission within twenty-four hours of the collection excluding bank and postal holidays.

Accordingly, in case the NBFC/HFC acts as the corporate agent and collects any insurance amount, the same must be deposited with the insurance company within a period of 24 hours. 

Enhanced Disclosures in case of undertaking insurance agency business


The UFS Amendment Directions introduce an explicit requirement for NBFCs to make clear, upfront disclosures to customers that insurance distribution activities are undertaken strictly on a fee-based model and without any risk participation. Unlike the earlier framework where disclosure obligations were largely confined to financial statements (such as notes to accounts) and did not necessarily extend to customer-level communication at the point of sale. While the quantum or percentage of fees is not required to be disclosed, an appropriate disclaimer should be incorporated in the relevant loan documentation and/or on the website/ application through which loan journey is conducted, clarifying that the NBFC does not assume any risk participation in the insurance product and is acting solely in the capacity of an agent for the insurer.

Illustrative Disclaimer- The Company acts solely as an agent of the insurer for distribution of insurance products. The Company does not underwrite or assume any insurance risk, and all claims, benefits, and liabilities under the insurance policy are the sole responsibility of the respective insurer.

Mutual Fund Distribution Framework Revised

  • NBFCs may distribute mutual funds subject to:
    • Compliance with applicable SEBI regulations and code of conduct;
    • Compliance with the RBC Directions;
    • Distribution being undertaken solely on a fee-based, non-risk participation basis and with upfront disclosure to the customer.
  • Mutual fund houses whose products are distributed must maintain robust grievance redressal systems. The NBFC may also facilitate the redressal of grievances. 
  • MF products should be clearly disclosed to customers by disclosing the products on the website or other digital channels of the NBFC.
  • Nothing has been specifically provided for Banks in this regard

Pension Distribution / NPS Services

  • Eligible NBFCs (other than Base Layer NBFCs) meeting prescribed CRAR requirements and having reported profits in the previous financial year may act as Points of Presence (PoPs) for NPS.
  • Registration with PFRDA remains mandatory.
  • Activities must be undertaken on a fee basis without risk participation and in compliance with RBI’s RBC Directions and PFRDA guidelines.

Referral business in case of Banks

  • A specific definition of “Referral Services” has been introduced to mean an arrangement under which a bank may refer its customers to a TPPSP by making available information about the financial products or services offered by the TPPSP. This definition has not been introduced in the case of NBFCs/HFCs.
  • Banks may refer customers only to products and services regulated by financial sector regulators and must comply with the instructions of the relevant regulator.
  • Banks may market and refer the TPPS to their customers, but cannot sell under the referral arrangement. This should be made explicitly clear upfront through a disclaimer to the customers.
  • The name or brand of the bank shall not feature in any of the product/ service documents. This ensures that customers do not misconstrue the product as being offered or backed by the bank.
  • Banks must publicly disclose the list of TPPSPs and products covered under referral arrangements on their website, mobile application and other digital banking channels.
  • Product onboarding, servicing and other TPPS-related processes cannot be integrated into the bank’s platform. The bank may only provide a link redirecting the customer to the TPPSP’s platform.
  • Banks must undertake proper due diligence before entering into referral arrangements with TPPSPs. Particular emphasis is placed on assessing reputational risks associated with the TPPSP.
  • Banks must ensure that the TPPSP has robust customer grievance redressal mechanisms in place before referring customers.

Grievance Redressal Mechanism

Under the erstwhile IRDAI (Registration of Corporate Agents) Regulations, 2015, corporate agents were permitted only to provide guidance and advisory to customers on issues arising during the course of an insurance contract. However, pursuant to the IRDAI (Protection of Policyholders’ Interests, Operations and Allied Matters of Insurers) Regulations, 2024, it has been mandated that every insurer and distribution channel shall establish robust procedures and effective mechanisms for the efficient and timely resolution of policyholder and/or claimant grievances.

In alignment with the above, the RBI, through its UFS Amendment Directions, has required NBFCs to ensure that the insurance companies whose products are distributed by them have adequate and effective customer grievance redressal mechanisms in place. Additionally, NBFCs may facilitate the redressal of such grievances.

Policy Mandate

The UFS Amendment Directions proposes to delete Para 6 of the UFS Direction, which requires NBFCs to put in place a broad Board-approved policy governing the distribution of third-party financial products, including insurance products. A closer reading indicates that the change is primarily structural rather than substantive, as the underlying policy requirement has already been added within the RBI’s RBC Amendment Directions, through the insertion of Para 101A, which mandates every regulated entity to adopt a comprehensive policy covering advertising, marketing, and sales of both its own and third-party financial products and services. 

It is also relevant to note that, independent of RBI requirements, sectoral regulators already mandate similar requirements. For instance, IRDAI requires corporate agents to maintain an open architecture policy and a grievance redressal policy. As such, most NBFCs engaged in these activities are likely to have comparable policies already in place. Consequently, we understand that where an NBFC has already adopted policies to comply with the RBC Amendment Directions or applicable sectoral regulations, those frameworks would adequately satisfy the regulatory expectation.