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Unlocking Access to Public Markets: Regulator brings Relaxation to Minimum Public Offer and Shareholding Rules

– Team Corplaw | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

The Case For Regulating Private Credit Funds

Simrat Singh | Finserv@vinodkothari.com

Private credit is, in essence, shadow banking without corresponding discipline. Market reports indicate that Private Credit in India (and globally) is beginning to show signs of stress. Several global private credit fund managers have reportedly frozen withdrawals amid rising investor withdrawals. Given that private credit by its very nature is supposed to be illiquid, even a modest redemption pressure may hamper the ability of the fund manager to honor the withdrawals. Although this type of liquidity risk is limited in Indian private credit funds since they are usually close-ended category II funds in which investors are mandated to stay invested throughout the tenure of the fund. However, other risks such a opacity still loom. An equally important issue is the regulatory asymmetry, with private credit funds being regulated far less stringently than banks, NBFCs and other comparable lending institutions. Private credit funds take money from investors and lend to businesses; so do banks and NBFCs. Both carry systemic risks and can trigger panic on failure. Yet, only one is properly regulated. 

In our earlier write-up on private credit funds we tried to list down the differences between regulated entities and these funds, a distinction which highlights the scarcity of controls and oversight in a lending fund that is expected in a lending vehicle. Notable examples include no uniform credit appraisal, no standardised reporting of performance of borrowers, no CRAR-like minimum capital requirement, no interest rate risk model etc. One may argue that the very absence of these requirements is what makes private credit funds tailor their deals according to the needs of the investee company; payment-in-kind, income-aligned repayment schedules are some of the examples. However, the absence of discipline also introduces opacity and potential systemic risks. Regulators globally have flagged these lending vehicles due to their opacity and market-wide risk (eg. RBI pointed out the systemic risk of private credit in its June 2024 Financial Stability Report). However, no action/mitigation measure has been taken as of now. In our view, atleast provisioning and NPA reporting-like safeguards should be there in such vehicles.

Note that these funds are not completely unregulated, SEBI AIF Regulations contain some safeguards such as concentration cap, valuation norms, no leverage at fund level etc. but these are generic safeguards and are not made keeping in mind the risks involved in a lending-based fund vehicle. 

The case for regulatory intervention, therefore, is not about imposing bank-like rigidity, but about ensuring appropriate discipline for bank-like activities. Whether such oversight should fall within the domain of the RBI, given its expertise in regulating lending institutions, remains an open question. The more immediate concern is that these entities continue to operate outside a robust prudential framework. Importantly, the relatively small share of private credit funds in overall corporate lending (currently less than 2%) should not serve as a justification for regulatory inaction. Risks do not become relevant only at scale; by the time they do, the cost of inaction is often far greater. It is therefore for regulators to move beyond a form-based approach and adopt a substance-based framework for such lending vehicles.

Shastrarth 29 – Compliance Officer’s risks in Abusive RPT Structures

You may register your interest and the questions that you’d like us to discuss at: https://forms.gle/1iR2xaFKGBU1kRJ3A

Our resource centre on RPTs can be accessed at: https://vinodkothari.com/article-corner-on-related-party-transactions/

Some of our recent resources on the subject: 
SEBI approves relaxed norms on RPTs 
Moderate Value RPTs : Interplay of disclosure norms and impracticalities

RBI Proposes Uniform Recovery Norms Across All Lenders

Tejasvi Thakkar and Simrat Singh | Finserv@vinodkothari.com 

Introduction

Pursuant to the RBI’s stated intent in the Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies to harmonise the conduct of Regulated Entities in relation to loan recovery, comprehensive draft instructions have been proposed, to be effective from July 1, 2026, consolidating and rationalising the existing scattered provisions. The instructions are applicable to all NBFCs, excluding Mortgage Guarantee Companies, Core Investment Companies, NBFC-Account Aggregators, Standalone Primary Dealers, Non-Operating Financial Housing Companies, and NBFCs not having any customer interface. The key requirements of the proposed framework are summarised below:

Key highlights

Policy Requirement

REs shall formulate a separate policy on recovery of loan dues, engagement of recovery agents and taking possession of security. The policy shall, inter-alia, cover:

  • Eligibility and due diligence criteria for engagement of recovery agents.
  • Specified recovery activities permitted to be carried out.
  • Code of Conduct requirements.
  • Performance evaluation standards, inspection and control mechanism.
  • Procedures and penal actions in case of non-compliance by recovery agents.
  • Recovery procedures in case of demise of borrower.
  • Mechanism to identify borrowers facing repayment difficulties and provide guidance on recourse options
  • Incentive structures not inducing harsh recovery practices..
  • Enforcement and possession framework including legal action not to be adopted as the first resort.

Issue: Whether this can be combined with the policy on Code of Conduct for DSAs/DMAs?

Our view: Since the present requirement specifically deals with recovery conduct, possession and enforcement of security interest, and engagement of recovery agents, the same should ideally be maintained as a separate policy. The DSA/DMA CoC policy deals largely with sourcing-stage conduct such as mis-selling and consequent compensation-related aspects. However, where there are overlapping requirements, NBFCs may structure the same within a broader conduct framework, divided into separate sections. However, it should remain distinct from the outsourcing policy.

Due diligence (DD) requirements

  1. Frame and implement a due diligence framework in line with the RBI Outsourcing Directions, 2025.
  2. RE to ensure that recovery agencies shall undertake due diligence and verification of their employees/representatives at the time of engagement and on a periodic basis. Policy to specify such periodicity and scope of verification.

Training Requirements 

  1. Recovery agents shall mandatorily possess certification from the Indian Institute of Banking and Finance (IIBF) for debt recovery agents. (Aligned with the HFC Master Directions)
  2. Existing agents without certification shall obtain the same within one year from issuance of directions

Code of Conduct for recovery Agents

  1. REs shall put in place a CoC for recovery agents and employees engaged in recovery and obtain undertakings for adherence.
  2. The CoC shall include, inter alia:
    1. Fair and respectful treatment of borrowers.
    2. Sharing only limited borrower information necessary for recovery and preventing misuse.
    3. Mandatory documents to be carried (ID card, copy of recovery letter etc)
    4. Permissible hours of contact
    5. Place of contact rules
    6. Restriction on contacting third parties
    7. Detailed prohibition of harsh practices
    8. Borrower information confidentiality
    9. No recovery action where grievance is pending, unless found to be frivolous
    10. Recording of recovery calls with due borrower intimation.

Issue: Whether the CoC prescribed earlier under HFC Directions stands subsumed?

Our view: Yes. The earlier HFC provisions largely stand harmonised and subsumed within the present draft framework, except for certain differences which have been captured in the Annexure below.

Recovery agents shall be required to carry recovery notice, identity card and authorisation letter, and shall adhere to the following conduct requirements:

  • Interact only with the borrower / guarantor and not approach relatives or other contacts; maintain civil behavior;
  • Contact / visit borrowers only between 08:00 hours and 19:00 hours;
  • Honour borrower’s request to avoid calls / visits at particular times in normal circumstances;
  • Contact borrowers ordinarily at the place of their choice, failing which at residence, and thereafter at place of business / occupation.
  • Avoid calls / visits during inappropriate occasions such as bereavement, calamities, marriage functions, festivals, etc.
  • In case of microfinance loans, undertake recovery at a mutually decided designated place, with field visits permitted only upon repeated non-appearance.
  • Ensure only duly authorised representatives visit borrower’s premises for recovery activities.
  • Ensure any written communication to borrowers has RE’s approval.
  • Promptly issue proper acknowledgement / receipt for collections made.
  • Refrain from harsh practices, including use of abusive language, excessive or anonymous calls, intimidation or harassment, threats of violence, misleading representations, or intrusion into borrower’s privacy.

Grievance redressal mechanism

  • Establish a dedicated recovery-related grievance redressal mechanism.
  • Provide complete details of the Grievance Redressal Officer and the mechanism in all recovery communications and loan agreements.
  • Define criteria for identification and closure of frivolous complaints with appropriate internal oversight.

Responsibilities of REs

REs shall:

  • Prominently display an up-to-date list of empanelled recovery agents on all customer interface channels. Details to be provided
    • names of agents, 
    • details of individuals engaged and 
    • period of engagement.
  • Promptly intimate the termination of recovery agents to prevent unauthorised interaction.
  • Inform borrowers of the details of the recovery agent at the time of forwarding cases for recovery through written communication (letter, SMS or email), and immediately notify any change in the recovery agent during the recovery process.

Possession of mortgaged / hypothecated assets

Loan agreements shall contain a legally enforceable possession clause, clearly disclosed at the time of execution. The agreement shall, inter alia, specify:

  • Notice period and circumstances for waiver;
  • Procedure for taking possession of security;
  • Final opportunity to the borrower for repayment prior to sale/auction;
  • Procedure for restoration of possession;
  • Transparent process for sale or auction of the secured asset.

Periodic review, monitoring and control

REs shall put in place a management structure to monitor and control the activities of recovery agents and ensure that such agents refrain from actions that could harm the RE’s integrity and reputation. Accordingly, the RE should ensure:

  • Appropriate monitoring and conduct provisions shall be incorporated in agreements with recovery agents.
  • Remain fully responsible for the actions of recovery agents.
  • Undertake periodic review of recovery mechanisms to learn from experience and effect improvements.

For Housing Finance Companies:

Most of the proposed requirements are not entirely new in substance for HFCs, as they were already reflected in the Guidelines for Engaging Recovery Agents under paragraph 170 of the RBI HFC Directions, 2025. The proposal now is to delete those HFC-specific guidelines and require HFCs to comply with the proposed Directions.

However, while the underlying principles remain largely consistent, the proposed Directions significantly strengthen and formalise the recovery framework. The approach shifts from principle-based guidance to a more structured, prescriptive, and compliance-oriented regime. The key changes are as follows:

  1. Mandatory written recovery policy: Under the HFC Directions, compliance was required with paragraph 170, but there was no express requirement to frame a consolidated written policy governing recovery of loans, engagement of recovery agents, and repossession of security. The proposed Directions now mandate a formal, documented recovery policy. Such policy must specifically cover eligibility criteria for engagement of agents, due diligence standards, performance evaluation parameters, inspection and audit mechanisms, and penal actions for non-adherence. This marks a shift from guideline-based adherence to a structured governance framework.
  2. Borrower distress identification mechanism: The HFC Directions required utilisation of credit counsellors in cases where a borrower was considered to “deserve sympathetic consideration,” which was discretionary and reactive in nature. The proposed Directions introduce a mandatory mechanism to identify borrowers facing repayment difficulties, engage with them, and provide guidance on available recourse. The regulatory trigger is the existence of repayment difficulty itself, rather than a subjective assessment of sympathy, thereby institutionalising borrower engagement.
  3. Explicit data governance controls: While the HFC Directions required training of recovery agents on respecting customer privacy, the proposed Directions go further by mandating that only limited borrower information be shared with recovery agents and that adequate safeguards be put in place to prevent misuse or unauthorised transfer of customer data. This introduces clearer data governance and accountability obligations.
  4. Restriction on initiating legal action as first resort: The HFC Directions did not prescribe any sequencing rule regarding enforcement remedies. The proposed Directions now expressly provide that legal action for recovery or enforcement of security shall not be initiated as a first resort, thereby imposing a structured progression in recovery measures.

Conclusion

Recovery is as vital to lending as disbursement, if not more. Credit often begins with a courteous engagement by the lender, but too often, the standards of professionalism seen at the time of sanction weaken at the stage of enforcement. The right to recover is unquestionable; harassment is not. The proposed Directions seek to correct this imbalance by requiring lenders to uphold the same standards of fairness, transparency and discipline during recovery as at the time of origination.

See our other resources:

  1. Regulator’s February Bonanza: RBI’s  Sweet Surprises for NBFCs;
  2. From Consent to Compensation: RBI’s Draft Directions for REs on Sales Practices;
  3. Vehicle financiers must follow SARFAESI process for repossession: Patna High Court;
  4. A Guide to Accounting of Collateral and Repossessed Assets.

InvITs and REITs: Regulatory actions for more enabling environment 

Simrat Singh | Finserv@vinodkothari.com 

SEBI has issued a Consultation Paper on 05.02.2026 proposing amendments to the InvIT Regulations related to end-use of borrowings, status of SPVs and investment in under-construction projects. Further, it has also proposed to enhance the investible options for both REITs and InvITs w.r.t liquid mutual funds. 

InvITs and REITs have continued on a strong upward growth trajectory. As of November 2025, the aggregate AUM of 27 InvITs stood at approximately ₹7,00,000 Crores after growing at a CAGR of approx 18% per annum since FY 21. The assets spann nine infrastructure sectors including roads, telecom, and power, as well as emerging asset classes such as warehouses and educational infrastructure. Reflecting their expanding scale and leverage capacity, aggregate borrowings of InvITs have crossed ₹2,03,000 Crores1. In contrast, REITs continue to trail InvITs in terms of scale, with the combined AUM of the five listed REITs amounting to approximately ₹2,35,000 Crores during the same period.2 May refer to our article “Roads to Riches: A Snapshot of InvITs in India”. 

SEBI has consistently sought to create a more enabling regulatory environment for these vehicles. A notable example is the classification of REIT units as equity for mutual funds (as discussed below), which sought to enhance institutional participation and liquidity. Complementing these regulatory efforts, the Union Budget 2026 introduced several targeted measures to deepen infrastructure financing, including the proposed Partial Credit Enhancement (PCE) framework and the creation of a dedicated infrastructure fund (see our write-up on the Budget 2026 here). Lastly, RBI in its Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies also allowed Banks to lend to REITs, putting them on same footing as InvITs (see our write-up on RBI’s Statement here). Taken together, these developments indicate that the growth trajectory of InvITs and REITs is expected to remain firmly positive.

Read more

NFRA’s Call for a Two-Way Communication: A New Requirement or a Gentle Reminder?

Tagging auditors and TCWG to make amends 

– Team Corplaw | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Introduction

NFRA moved the needle, and it is to be seen if the ocean starts boiling.! A 7th Jan 2026 circular from NFRA, addressed to listed entities and their auditors, seemed like an attention-drawer to standards of auditing which are already there, and yet, the auditing fraternity is holding meetings with boards and senior management of listed entities, to comply with what was always a compliance requirement. Does the 7th Jan circular bring up any new boxes to be ticked, any new procedures to be laid or responsibilities to be reiterated? As we detail out in this article, there may be need for action on several fronts on the part of listed entities – identification of nodal persons, listing developments that need to be communicated, constituting team for responding to the findings of the auditors in course of their audit other than those that sit in the audit report, formation of sub-groups of TCWG, etc. 

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From Bye Backs to Buy Backs: how new taxation rules impact equity extraction

– Vinod Kothari and Payal Agarwal | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Finance Bill, 2026 brings tax relief to investors for share buybacks, by partially restoring the position that existed before the Finance Bill 2024 amendment. The 2024 Finance Bill changed the taxability of buybacks to impose tax on buyback consideration, taxing the entire “receipt” as “dividend”, implying tax at applicable regular tax rates rather than as capital gains.[See our article on the 2024 amendments here.] 

The 2026 Bill proposes omission of Section 2(40) (f), [dealing with deemed dividend] and amendments to Section 69,  [specifically dealing with tax on buybacks]. The net result of this:

  • Buyback consideration not to be treated as deemed dividend; 
  • Shareholder pays tax on the difference between buyback consideration received and cost of acquisition taxable as capital gains – depending on whether the gain in short term (20%) and long-term (12.5%)
  • In case of promoter shareholders, an additional tax, so as to bring the effective tax rate to 22% in case of corporate shareholders, and 30% in case of non corporate shareholders. No difference between short-term and long-term capital gains. 

Applicability of the amendments: The amended provisions apply for buybacks done on or after 1st April, 2026. The existing provisions were introduced effective 1st Oct., 2024 and therefore, they would have had a life of only 15 months.

Why buyback? 

Buyback is not merely a means of distribution of profits to the shareholders. There may be various reasons or motivations for which buyback may be done by a company, for example: 

  • Distribution or upstreaming of profits – Buyback is used as a means of distribution of accumulated profits (free reserves as well as securities premium) to the shareholders.
  • Scaling down of operations – It is a mode of scaling down the operations of the company, without going through the tedious process of capital reduction through NCLT. 
  • Selective exit to certain shareholders – Buyback may also be used as a means of providing selective exit to certain shareholders, based on pre-determined arrangements. This may include, for instance, exit to some strategic investor, or a particular promoter, or shareholders not willing to dematerialise their securities etc. 
  • Put options to strategic or private equity investors – In case of strategic/ private equity investors, the shareholder agreements may include clauses on exit through put options. One of the ways of giving exit to the shareholders exercising the put option may be through buyback of their shares. 
  • Encashment of stock options granted to employees – It is quite common primarily in case of start-ups, to go for buyback of ESOPs granted to employees, instead of issuing shares upon exercise of options. This helps in providing liquidity to the employees, while also avoiding dilution in the shareholding structure of the company. 

Concept of Buyback and Compliances Involved

  • Governed by section 68 of the Companies Act read with the rules made thereunder (also see figure 1)
  • Out of free reserves, securities premium or proceeds of issue of shares 
  • Only upto 25% of paid up share capital and free reserves, with shareholders’ special resolution
  • Maximum no. of equity shares cannot exceed 25% of total paid-up equity share capital for that financial year 

For detailed guidance on the procedure and compliances involved, refer to our FAQs on buyback here.

Figure 1: Buyback process and timelines under Companies Act

Reduction of share capital as an alternative to buyback 

For buyback of capital beyond the statutory limits, the provisions of capital reduction u/s 66 apply. With the buyback consideration being taxed as deemed dividends, capital reduction through NCLT route was also being seen as an alternate route for scaling down capital in a relatively tax-efficient manner. There are rulings favouring capital reduction as an alternative to buyback, for instance, the ruling of NCLAT in the matter of Brillio Technologies Pvt. Ltd v. ROC, subsequently also referred to by NCLT Mumbai in the matter of Reliance Retail Ltd. Some of these rulings even permitted selective reduction of capital.  See our article on reduction of capital here.

One of the primary deterrents in capital reduction u/s 66 of the Companies Act is the approval requirements – of the shareholders, creditors and even the NCLT. 

Buyback of shares vis-a-vis dividend on shares 

The scope of dividend distribution is quite narrower as compared to share buybacks. The primary difference between the two is in the source of payment. Dividend distribution can be made only out of surplus; where free reserves are proposed to be utilised for dividend payment, additional conditions are applicable. In no case, can such declaration be made out of securities premium, or proceeds of fresh issuance – which are permissible sources for buyback. Buyback, on the other hand, requires mere liquidity, availability of profits is not mandatory. Therefore, dividends are merely a way to upstream the earned profits; buyback can even be the way to scale down, for example, by releasing the share premium, or using one class of shares to buy back the other.

Once dividend is approved by shareholders with requisite majority, there is no provision for a shareholder to waive off his right to  the dividend [see our article on the same here], and unclaimed dividend, if any, are kept in a separate account to be transferred to IEPF. In case of buyback, while the same is also offered to all shareholders, the buyback consideration is paid only to such shareholders who tender their shares for buyback; the question of waiver of rights or unclaimed amounts does not arise.  

Buyback taxation: existing scenario vs new scenario

Particulars Finance Bill, 2024Finance Bill, 2026
Applicability for buybacks done w.e.f. 1st October, 2024w.e.f. 1st April, 2026  
Taxable as Deemed dividend. The holding cost of the bought back shares allowed as short term capital lossCapital gains 
Tax incidence on Recipient shareholderRecipient shareholder
Amount taxable Entire buyback consideration Gains on buyback, that is, Buyback consideration minus, cost of acquisition 
Rate of tax Applicable income tax slab rate LTCG – 12.5%, subject to exemption upto Rs. 1.25 lacs STCG: 20% In case of promoters: 22%/ 30% (depending on whether domestic company/ otherwise)
Differential treatment for promoter shareholders No Yes, additional tax rates apply 

Under the erstwhile regime, the entire buyback consideration was taxable as deemed dividend, with the cost of acquisition claimable as capital loss. In such a case, the higher the cost of acquisition on such shares, higher would have been disincentive in the form of taxing the cost component as dividends. The benefits of capital loss depend on the existence of capital gains, and hence, the effective tax rates on buyback could not be ascertained. 

In the amended tax regime, buyback consideration, minus, cost of acquisition, is taxed at flat rates of capital gains – 12.5%/ 20%, depending on whether the capital gains are long-term or short-term in nature. 

Disincentives under the extant regime and market reaction

The disincentives were two-fold: 

  1. Higher tax slabs: The treatment as “deemed dividend” resulted in higher tax rates for top bracket individuals, as compared to capital gains, chargeable @ 12.5%/ 20% – depending on long-term/ short-term capital gains. 
  2. Taxing entire consideration: The entire “receipt” was taxable, instead of the actual gains, that is, excess of the receipts over the cost of acquisition.
  3. Cost of acquisition as capital loss: The cost of acquisition was to be treated as short term capital loss. As a result, there is an advantage to those shareholders who have short-term capital gains to offset the short term capital loss created as a result of the buyback. Note that the deemed dividend, in case of corporate shareholders, may be claimed as a deduction u/s 80M.

Resultant market reaction: a sharp decrease in buyback offers during FY 24-25 as compared to previous financial years. As per the publicly available data in case of listed companies, the total buyback size for 2024-25 was ₹7,897 Crores when compared to 2023-24 with a buyback offer size of Rs. 49,836 crores, indicating a decrease of 84.2 per cent.

The number of buyback offers sharply declined, with only 17 instances of buyback offer by listed entities between 1st October 2024 till date (3rd February, 2026) as compared to about 36-40 instances in each of FY 22-23 and FY 23-24. 

How Finance Bill 2026 rationalises the tax treatment?

Pursuant to the Finance Bill, 2026, the buyback taxation appears to be rationalised in the following manner: 

  • Buyback consideration not to be treated as deemed dividend [omission of clause (f) to Sec 2(40)]
  • Difference between consideration received and cost of acquisition taxable as capital gains [S. 69(1)]
    • In the hands of the recipient shareholder
  • In case of promoter shareholders, tax payable at higher rates depending on whether promoter is a domestic company or not
    • Effective rate of 22% in case of domestic company and 30% in case of persons other than domestic company 

With this, while the tax incentive remains in the hands of the recipient shareholders, the tax treatment is rationalised in the form of value that is to be taxed and the manner in which tax is levied. However, the provision differentiates between a promoter and non-promoter shareholder. 

Meaning of promoter: moving beyond the statutory definition

In case of listed company

  • Refers to the definition of promoter under Reg 2(1)(k) of SEBI Buyback Regulations 
  • SEBI Buyback Regulations, in turn, refers to Reg 2(1)(s) of SAST Regulations
  • Under SAST Regulations, promoters include “promoter group” 
Promoter Promoter group
Person having control over the affairs of the company, or Named as promoter in annual return, prospectus etc. Includes immediate relatives of promoters Entities in which >20% is held by promoters Entities that hold >20% in promoters etc. Persons identified as such under “shareholding of the promoter group” in relevant exchange filings

The scope of “promoter group” thus, is much broader than “promoter”. 

In case of an unlisted company 

  • Refers to the definition of promoter under Sec 2(69) of the Companies Act 
  • Concept of promoter group is not there under Companies Act 
  • To broaden the scope, a person holding > 10% shares in the company, either directly or indirectly, has also been covered. 

Question may arise on what does “indirect” shareholding mean? Does it include shareholding through relatives, or through other entities as well?  The word “indirect” is not the same as “together with” or “persons acting in concert”. Indirect shareholding should usually mean shares held through controlled entities.

Why additional tax for promoters? 

The amendments bring higher tax rates for promoters, in view of the distinct position and influence of promoters in corporate decision-making including in relation to buyback transactions. Promoters may want to influence buyback decisions for various reasons, for example: 

  1. Providing exit to an existing promoter/ strategic shareholder in accordance with any existing arrangement 
  2. Creation of capital losses (assuming buyback consideration is lower than the cost of acquisition) thus setting off the capital gains earned from other sources
  3. Encashing securities premium or accumulated profits in the company etc. 

In view of the promoter’s ability to influence buyback decisions to meet own objectives, additional tax is levied on buyback consideration received by the promoters, thus addressing any tax-arbitrage that could have been created through buybacks.

See our Quick Bytes on Budget, 2026 at here

Our other resources on buyback at here

Partly Paid Shares – Whether Doppelganger of Share Warrants?

– Pammy Jaiswal and Saket Kejriwal | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Background

In recent times, the use of partly-paid shares has seen some traction[1] where several listed companies[2] came up with issuance of partly-paid shares[3]. While the law provides for the issuance of partly-paid securities, it is important to understand how this instrument has not been used merely as a capital-structuring tool, but arguably, as a regulatory workaround. An analogy may be drawn to a situation where a customer is allowed to purchase a valuable by paying a token money today and pay the full consideration after a period of say 1-2 years at the same price which prevailed at the time of payment of token money. Specifically, promoters and investors appear to be utilizing partly-paid shares as a substitute for share warrants, by paying a minuscule part of the value of shares as a part of application money and the balance payment is allowed to be made at any time in the future, sometimes after an unreasonably long time.

In this article, we argue that the issue of such partly-paid shares is as good as issuing share warrants, However, circumventing the challenges associated with warrants.

Fundamentals of Share Warrants

Ashare warrant is a security issued by a company that grants its holder the right/option to subscribe to equity shares of the company (i.e. Future Equity) at a predetermined price, within  a predetermined period, upon the upfront payment of a token amount referred to as the option premium.

Legal Context

A share warrant, being marketable in nature, provides a right in securities, therefore, it is treated as a security under Section 2(h) of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. Some of the relevant legal provisions would include:

  • Sections 42, 62 and other relevant provisions of the Companies Act, 2013; and
  • The SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018.

Key Features

  • Right to Decide: A share warrant allows an investor to subscribe to the company’s equity shares in the future, typically at a price lower than the anticipated market price at the time of exercise. Conversely, if the market price at the time of exercise falls below the pre‑determined price, the investor may choose not to subscribe, thereby limiting their loss to the option premium paid (i.e., the upfront cost), rather than incurring the full loss arising from the difference between the initial/subscription value and the reduced market price.
  • Option Premium: The upfront amount paid for obtaining this right is called the option premium i.e. if the current market value of shares is Rs.100, then the issuer may issue equity shares immediately at Rs.100, or Issue a share warrant where the investor pays Rs. 10 upfront for the right to subscribe the equity at Rs. 100 in the future. If, at the time of exercise, the market price of the share has risen to Rs. 120, the investor benefits from locking the price at Rs. 100, making the Rs. 10 upfront cost worthwhile. Conversely, if the market price falls to Rs. 50, the investor may choose not to exercise the warrant, limiting the loss to Rs. 10 i.e. option premium. This forms a part of the net worth of the company. For details on option pricing, may refer to our resource on Option Pricing Model.
  • Forfeiture: If the warrant holder chooses not to exercise the right, the upfront option premium is forfeited.

Pricing

The value of option premium is generally determined by Black Scholes Model, Binomial Options Pricing Model or Monte Carlo Simulation Method. The most appropriate method for calculation of option premium, in the context of companies using warrants as a regulatory workaround, is the Simulation Method.

One of the key features of share warrants is that the longer the life of the option, there is a higher probability of its price being high. In accordance with the above models, issuing share warrants for an extended period can raise the option premium to a point where it becomes undesirable. Therefore, it is recommended that the life of a warrant should be just and reasonable, and that it should not be used as a substitute for long‑term convertible instruments such as OCDs, CCDs, CCPS, or other similar securities.

Difference between warrants and partly-paid up shares

While both partly‑paid shares and warrants involve an upfront payment towards a future right in equity shares, they differ significantly on the following points:

Basis of DifferencePartly-Paid SharesShare Warrants
Right and ObligationHolder is obligated to pay the remaining call money when demanded by the company.   Failure to pay will lead to forfeiture of the subscription and call money received by the company.Holder has a right, but not an obligation, to subscribe to equity shares at a future date.
Nature of InvestmentThese are equity shares issued with part of the value paid upfront, making the holder a shareholder of the company.These are options issued for a premium, entitling the holder to subscribe for equity shares in the future.
ValuationShares are subscribed at fair value computed as on the date of making the first subscription/ call moneyShares are subscribed at current fair value on a future date along with payment of option premium
Shareholder RightsPartly-paid equity shareholders enjoy rights proportionate to their paid-up amount.No rights until conversion.

Why are partly-paid shares doppelgangers ?

Partly-paid shares in its usual nature when used for capital needs in tranches serves the permitted purpose for this concept was introduced, however, this benefit becomes a governance concern when it is used as an alternative to share warrants and as evident from the table above, the two differ in various aspects. The primary reason for this mirroring lies in valuation. In the case of share warrants issued with a longer tenor, the cost of the warrant, representing the right to subscribe to future equity, tends to be higher when calculated using fair value methods, making this option impractical. As an alternative, many companies have opted to issue partly-paid shares, allowing an investor to pay only a minimal upfront amount (similar to the option premium in the case of a warrant) as part of the application money and reserving the right with the investor to infuse the remaining funds for a longer period like 5-10 years which would not be possible in case of warrants as the premium will increase drastically, if calculated as per fair value methods.

Token money to secure allotment of shares

It is imperative to note that in case of share warrants, the price paid upfront is the option premium which is basically the price paid to get the equity at the current value at the future date as against in case of partly-paid shares, where the investor becomes a shareholder on the first payment date by even paying a nominal part amount reflecting the fair value (consisting of part face value and proportionate premium) as on the date of making such first payment. The catch lies in the fact that there is no legal prescription on the maximum time within which a company needs to make the final call on such partly-paid shares (except in case of IPOs) which in case of warrants runs up to 18 months for listed securities as well as size of the calls which in the case of listed companies requires at least 25% of the consideration amount calculated as per the formula for exercise price[4] with reference date being the record date shall be received at the time of option premium. 

One may argue that, given the fundamental difference between the two instruments is that one comes with a right (warrants) and the other with the security (partly-paid shares), they can not be used as substitutes as in case of partly-paid shares the right to call money lies with the Board and the investor is obligated to pay on demand, failing which shares may be forfeited, resulting in the loss of upfront amount paid.

On the other hand, a share warrant gives a right to the investor to decide when, or even if, to make the payment. If the investor chooses not to exercise the option, the upfront money paid is still forfeited, with the key difference being that the loss occurs at the investor’s discretion.

The above argument is valid theoretically. However, in practice, this mirroring is frequently used by start‑ups, which are generally incorporated as private companies. In such cases, although the ‘right to call money’ rests with the Board of Directors, the Board itself typically comprises the promoters i.e. the very investors who subscribe to these mirrored partly-paid shares or in the case of external investors/subscribers, their appointed representatives form an integral part of the Board. As a result, the obligation on the subscriber to pay the balance can, in reality, be viewed more as a right, given that it is exercised by a Board largely aligned with the interests of the investors themselves.

Additionally, partly-paid shares provide several benefits to the investor, like proprietary rights, chances to book profits in case of transfer, etc.We have discussed the same below:

Proprietary interest of partly-paid shares

Partly-paid shares are not merely rights in equity shares but allotment of the shares itself. Once an investor pays the subscription money/ first call, the shares are allotted to the investor who becomes a shareholder immediately and gets ownership rights from day one. Having said that, while the benefits arising out of such ownership is proportional to the amount paid up on the shares, it still dilutes the stake of the other investors who hold fully paid up shares.

The investor’s economic risk is lower compared to a fully paid-up shareholder since only part of the share price has been paid, the investor’s capital at risk is limited to the amount actually contributed, while the ownership position in the company already stands created.

Chance to book profits by transfer of partly-paid shares 

If an investor who has paid only a nominal amount intends to sell such shares for reasons like liquidity or apprehension of the investee not doing well for some reason, he stands a chance to make profits on the part payment where the fair value of such shares have appreciated at the time of such transfer. A purchaser can acquire ownership interest by paying only the fair value of the amount paid-up, while the remaining payment is effectively locked in at the historical fair value. This allows the investor to benefit from future upside without proportionately funding the company at the prevailing fair value for the unpaid portion, which remains priced at the value as on the date of issuance.

Imagine a situation where Mr. A invests in the partly-paid up equity shares of XYZ Ltd. The fair value of the equity shares is say INR 150 (face value INR 10) where Mr. A invests only INR 30 as paid up amount. Thereafter he decides to sell these partly-paid shares to another investor after 2 years by which time the balance amount is still uncalled. The transfer of these partly-paid shares would be done at a fair value where lets assume the value of the shares have appreciated and as a consideration, Mr. A receives INR 80 as the sale consideration and also passes on the legacy of holding partly-paid shares to the buyer.

However, this issue does not arise in listed companies, where market mechanisms ensure fair price discovery.

An Ideal partly-paid share

Situation where a partly-paid share shall not be considered as a share warrant

In our view, partly‑paid shares should be supported by a concrete plan or blueprint specifying when the call money is expected to be raised along with its purpose. This includes:

  • A defined timeline for making the call on unpaid money;

  • A specific purpose for which the call money will be used; and

  • An upfront subscription amount that is significant and reflects commitment, rather than being a token.

Even if an exact date cannot be determined, it is advisable to link the call to milestones/events ,such as regulatory approvals, project launches, or specific capital needs, rather than leaving it open-ended. This approach distinguishes a legitimate capital-raising intent from doppelganger design of warrants.

Situation where a partly-paid share shall be considered as a share warrant

A partly-paid share may raise regulatory concerns when above conditions do not exist. This includes situations where the initial application amount is nominal, resulting in minuscule capital infusion. Additionally, if the call structure is vague and lacks a defined timeline or commercial justification, it creates ambiguity around the company’s intention to actually raise the remaining capital. The concern is further amplified when the Board of Directors, which holds the discretion to make the call on these partly-paid shares, is influenced or controlled by the very investors who subscribed to these shares. In such scenarios, the obligation to pay the balance amount may become just theoretical.

Conclusion

The intention behind partly-paid shares is to raise capital while allowing the issuer to secure future source of funding, However, when a minuscule amount is paid at the time of subscription of partly-paid shares and the remaining calls are deferred for a long period without any definite /concrete plan, this raises concern as sighted above and from a valuation perspective may not be seen as a partly-paid shares.


[1] Economic Times

[2] Economic Times

[3] Economic TImes

[4] Regulation 67 of SEBI ICDR, 2018

Read more:

Share warrants under cloud – are companies not allowed to issue share warrants?

A Guide for AIF Managers on Investor Eligibility and Regulatory Restrictions

Simrat Singh, Senior Executive | finserv@vinodkothari.com

Introduction

An AIF raises capital by issuance of units, which are privately placed.  Most AIFs follow a commitment–drawdown model, under which investors agree upfront to commit a specified amount of capital (‘committed capital’). The AIF manager then calls this committed capital, either in full or in tranches, as investment opportunities arise (‘drawdown’). This model helps the AIF to minimise the negative carry that would result from raising investments which are yet to be invested. 

This fund-raising process is shaped not only by SEBI’s AIF framework but also by the oversight of the respective sectoral regulators of the relevant investors. AIFs are meant strictly for sophisticated investors, and as such, various categories of AIF investors, such as insurance companies, pension funds, banks and NBFCs, etc. are subject to their respective regulations. When they invest in an AIF, they must comply with SEBI’s rules as well as the investment norms prescribed by their own regulators, each seeking to regulate how the capital of the investor is deployed. In fact, SEBI regulations are agnostic as to who the investor is, hence, most of the SEBI regulations relate to the AIF or the manager, with limited provisions dealing with investors. For example, whether and to what extent an insurance company or a pension fund can invest in an AIF is driven by the guidelines issued by the sectoral regulators such as IRDAI or PFRDA.

In this article, we try to bring together, in one place, the key regulatory norms imposed by various regulators; while these are primarily meant for the investor, however, it will be useful for the AIF managers to keep in mind these restraints while expecting or inviting investments from different categories of investors.

Categories of investors and regulatory restrictions on each category

Minimum investment norms: Common across all categories

  1. ₹25 crore for investors in Large Value Funds (reduced from ₹ 70 Crore per investor vide SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) (Third Amendment) Regulations, 2025) [Reg. 2(1)(pa)];
  2. ₹1 crore for other investors [Reg 10(c)];
  3. ₹25 lakh for employees or directors of the AIF, manager, or sponsor [Reg 10(c)];
  4. No minimum for units issued to employees solely for profit-sharing (and not capital contribution) [Para 4.6 of AIF Master Circular];
  5. For open-ended AIFs, the initial investment must meet the minimum threshold, and partial redemptions must not reduce the holding below this minimum [Para 4.7 of AIF Master Circular].

Individuals

An AIF may raise funds from individual investors, whether resident, non-resident (NRI), or foreign, through private placement, subject to the following conditions (Refer Reg. 10(a) of AIF Regulations r/w Chapter 4 of AIF Master Circular).

  1. Foreign investors: A foreign investor must:
    1. be a resident of a country whose securities market regulator is a signatory to the IOSCO Multilateral MoU (Appendix A) or has a Bilateral MoU with SEBI; or
    2. be a government or government-related investor from a country approved by the Government of India, even if the above condition is not met.

Additionally, neither the investor nor its beneficial owner1:

  1. May be listed on the UN Security Council Sanctions List; or
  2. may be a resident of a country identified by the FATF as having serious AML/CFT deficiencies or insufficient progress in addressing such deficiencies.

If a foreign investor ceases to meet these conditions after admission, the AIF manager must stop making further drawdowns from that investor until compliance is restored.

  1. Joint Investments: Joint investments, for the purpose of investment of not less than the minimum investment amount in the AIF, are permitted only between:
    1. an investor and spouse;
    2. an investor and parent; or
    3. an investor and child.

A maximum of two persons may invest jointly. Any other combination of joint investors must individually meet the minimum investment threshold. (Refer Reg. 10(c) of AIF Regulations r/w Chapter 4 of AIF Master Circular)

  1. Terms of Investment: The terms agreed with investors cannot override or go beyond the disclosures in the PPM [Para 4.3 of AIF Master Circular].
  2. The total number of investors is limited to 1000 investors per scheme; also note that an AIF cannot make a public offer. AIF units are commonly offered through distributors; but even the distributors cannot make an open offer (Please refer to our resource on Dos and Don’ts for AIF Distributors and AIF Managers).

Insurance Companies

  1. Permissible AIF Categories [Para 1.5 of Investments – Master Circular, 2022 read with IRDAI Circular No. IRDAI/F&I/CIR/INV/074/04/2021 dated 05.04.2021]
    1. Category I AIFs: Infrastructure Funds, SME Funds, Venture Capital Funds, and Social Venture Funds (‘Specified Cat I AIFs’);
    2. Category II AIFs: Only where at least 51% of the corpus is proposed to be invested in infrastructure entities, SMEs, venture capital undertakings, or social venture entities (‘Specified Cat II AIFs’).
    3. Investment in a Fund of Fund (‘FoF’) is allowed only if such FoF does not directly or indirectly invest funds outside India (Refer Section 27E of Insurance Act, 1938). This is to be ensured by inserting a clause in the Fund offer Documents executed by FoF to restrain such FoF investing into AIFs which invest in overseas companies/funds. Further, investment is not allowed in an AIF which in-turn has an exposure to a FoF in which the insurer already invested. Lastly, no investment in an AIF is allowed which undertakes leverage/borrowing other than to meet operational requirements. 

Compliance of conditions laid down in (iii) are to be certified by the concurrent auditor of the insurer and filed along with quarterly periodical returns. Notably, insurance companies are prohibited from investing in Cat III AIFs

  1. Prohibited Structures: Insurers shall not invest in AIFs that:
    1. offer variable rights attached to units.
    2. invest funds outside India either directly or indirectly [s. 27E of Insurance Act, 1938];
    3. are sponsored by persons forming part of the insurer’s promoter group;
    4. are managed a manager who is controlled, directly or indirectly, by the insurer or its promoters;
  2. Investment Limits: 
    1. For life insurers, combined exposure to AIFs and venture capital funds is capped at 3% of the relevant insurance fund2.
    2. For general insurers, the cap is 5% of total investment assets3.

Exposure to any single AIF cannot exceed the lower of 10% of the AIF’s corpus or 20% of the insurer’s total AIF exposure. For Infrastructure Funds, the 10% limit is enhanced to 20%.

Banks and other Regulated Entities (REs)

Banks and other REs may invest in Category I and Category II AIFs, subject to layered limits:

  1. Bank level: Not more than 10% of the AIF corpus.
  2. Group level: Up to 20% without RBI approval, and up to 30% with prior RBI approval, subject to capital adequacy and profitability conditions.
  3. System level: Aggregate investments by all regulated entities cannot exceed 20% of the AIF corpus.

Banks must ensure that AIF investments do not circumvent banking regulations by creating prohibited indirect exposures. Banks are not permitted to invest in Category III AIFs, except for the minimum sponsor contribution where a bank subsidiary sponsors such a fund. For a more detailed discussion on Banks’ investment in AIFs, refer to our resource here

NBFCs

An NBFC shall not individually contribute more than 10 percent of the corpus of an AIF Scheme. [See Para 8 of RBI ( NBFC –  Undertaking of Financial Services) Directions, 2025]. The system-level investment limit of 20% for all REs shall also apply. Notably, unlike banks, NBFCs can invest in Cat III AIFs. 

Pension, Provident and Gratuity Funds

Pursuant to a 15 March 2021 notification, non-government Provident Funds, Superannuation Funds, and Gratuity Funds may invest up to 5% of their investible surplus in Specified Cat I AIFs and Specified Cat II AIFs, classified as “Asset Backed, Trust Structured and Miscellaneous Investments”.

Key conditions include:

  • Minimum AIF corpus of ₹100 crore;
  • Maximum exposure of 10% to a single AIF (not applicable to government-sponsored AIFs);
  • Investments restricted to India-based entities only;
  • The AIF sponsor and manager must not be part of the fund’s promoter group.

For Government  Sector Schemes such as UPS/NPS/NPA Lite/Atal Pension Yojna and Corporate CG schemes, the conditions are the same as above for non-government pension funds. 

Mutual Funds

Mutual funds are governed by the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996. The Seventh Schedule to these regulations sets out the permissible investment universe. Units of AIFs are not included, and accordingly, mutual funds cannot invest in AIF units.

  1. beneficial owner as determined in terms of sub-rule (3) of rule 9 of the Prevention of Money-laundering (Maintenance of Records) Rules, 2005 ↩︎
  2. The relevant insurance fund would refer to the specific fund of a life insurer from which an investment is made, rather than the insurer’s overall balance sheet. This is because Life insurers maintain separate, ring-fenced funds for different lines of business, such as the life fund, pension fund, annuity fund or ULIP fund and investments must be made out of, and limits calculated with reference to, the particular fund whose money is being deployed. ↩︎
  3. Investment assets would refer to the total pool of assets held by a general insurer that are available for investment, across all lines of non-life insurance business. Unlike life insurers, general insurers do not maintain separate, ring-fenced policyholder funds for each product. Instead, premiums collected from various non-life insurance policies are invested as a consolidated portfolio, and regulatory investment limits such as exposure to AIFs are calculated with reference to the insurer’s aggregate investment assets shown on its balance sheet. ↩︎

See our other resources on AIFs:

  1. CIV-ilizing Co-Investments: SEBI’s new framework for Co-investments under AIF Regulations
  2. Understanding the Governance & Compliance Framework for AIFs
  3. FAQs on specific due diligence of investors & investments of AIFs;
  4. RBI bars lenders’ investments in AIFs investing in their borrowers;
  5. Capital subject to ‘caps’: RBI relaxes norms for investment by REs in AIFs, subject to threshold limits;
  6. Can CICs invest in AIFs? A Regulatory Paradox;
  7. Trust, but verify: AIFs cannot be used as regulatory arbitrage;
  8. 2020 – Year of change for AIFs;
  9. AIF ail SEBI: Cannot be used for regulatory breach;