Archive for category: Related Party Transactions

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SEBI rolls out Consultation Paper: Materiality threshold for RPTs to be scale-based, Industry Standard to get softer, de minimis exemptions

Since 2021, the RPT framework for listed entities has been witnessing repetitive changes, and the current year 2025 has seen SEBI on a regulatory fast track in relation to RPTs.  Be it the launch of RPT Analysis Portal, offering unprecedented visibility into RPT governance data, or the Industry Standards Note (‘ISN’), requiring seemingly a pile of information w.r.t RPTs, both in the month of February, 2025. Originally scheduled to be effective from FY 25, the applicability of ISN was later pushed on to July 1, 2025, and while on the verge of becoming effective, on June 26, 2025, SEBI notified Revised RPT Industry Standards, prescribing tiered but somewhat simplified disclosure formats effective September 1, 2025.

Even before the ISN could become effective, a 32-pager consultation paper proposing further amendments to RPT provisions has been rolled out by SEBI on August 4, 2025.

Based on the “Ease of Doing Business” theme, the Consultation Paper proposes  amendments in the RPT framework, based on recommendations from the Advisory Committee on Listing Obligations and Disclosures (ACLOD). The proposals aim to address practical challenges faced by listed entities while maintaining robust governance standards.

Below we present the proposed amendments and our analysis of the same.

1. Materiality Thresholds: From One-Size-Fits-All to several sizes for short-and-tall

Proposal in CP

A scale-based threshold mechanism is proposed through a new Schedule XII to LODR Regulations, such that the RPT materiality threshold increases with the increase in the turnover of the company, though at a reduced rate, thus leading to an appropriate number of RPTs being categorized as material, thereby reducing the compliance burden of listed entities. The maximum upper ceiling of materiality has been kept at Rs. 5,000 crores, as against the existing absolute threshold of Rs. 1000 crores.

Proposed materiality thresholds:

Annual Consolidated Turnover of listed entity (in Crores)	Proposed threshold (as a % of consolidated turnover)	Maximum upper ceiling (in Crores)
< Rs.20,000	10%	2,000
20,001 – 40,000	2,000 Crs + 5% above Rs. 20,000 Crs	3,000
> 40,000	3,000 Crs + 2.5% above Rs. 40,000 Crs	5,000 (as proposed)

Back-testing the proposal scale on RPTs undertaken by top 100 NSE companies show a 60% reduction in material RPT approvals for FY 2023-24 and 2024-25 with total no. of such resolutions reducing from 235 and 293, to around 95 to 119. The 60% reduction may itself be seen as a bold admission that the present framework is causing too many proposals to go for shareholder approval.

Historical Benchmark

The absolute threshold of Rs. 1000 crores, for determination of RPTs as material was brought pursuant to an amendment in November 2021, following the recommendations of the Working Group on RPTs. The proposal of WG was based on the data between the years 2015 to 2019, which showed that only around 70 to 91 resolutions were placed for material RPT approvals by the top 500 listed entities.

Our Analysis and Comments

• Turnover as a single metric is not a measure of materiality: Scale-based tests align materiality with turnover, introducing proportionality, but the question remains whether turnover itself is at all an appropriate yardstick to measure materiality.

Turnover is an inadequate metric for determining the materiality of RPTs. Materiality should reflect the likely financial impact of a transaction, which may have little or no correlation with turnover. For instance, transactions involving investments, asset acquisitions or disposals, or borrowings pertain to the balance sheet rather than the revenue-generating side of operations. Even if an item pertains to revenues, there are businesses where gross profits ratios are low, and therefore, turnover will be high. Globally, jurisdictions like the UK adopt a more nuanced, consonance-based approach [Refer Annex 1 of UKLR 7] using different parameters viz. gross assets test, consideration test, and the gross capital test for different transaction types to ensure relevance and proportionality. Section 188 of the Companies Act, 2013 also adopts a similar multi-metric approach, applying turnover and net worth, depending on the nature of the transaction.

It is also critical to recognise the wide disparity in asset-turnover ratio across industries. A trading company might turn its assets over 20 times annually, while a manufacturing entity with a 90-day working capital cycle may show a turnover approximately four times its assets. On the other hand, entities in the financial sector, such as NBFCs and banks, generate turnover largely through interest income, which is barely 6 to 10 percent of the asset base. Therefore, applying a turnover-based threshold to such entities results in thresholds being disproportionately low when compared to the actual scale of transactions, thereby distorting the materiality assessment.

Given these sectoral variations and the diversity of transaction types, a flat turnover-based threshold oversimplifies the assessment and may result in both overregulation and underreporting. A more calibrated, transaction-specific materiality framework, drawing on consonance-based criteria as seen in Regulation 30 of the LODR Regulations, would offer a more balanced and effective approach. SEBI may consider moving towards such a harmonised model to ensure that materiality thresholds meaningfully reflect the substance of transactions, rather than relying on a single yardstick.

• Regulatory Lag: It took SEBI almost 4 years, i.e., from 2021 to 2025, to conclude that the threshold of ₹1,000 crores is too small, and that it requires an upward revision, which is now proposed to be increased to ₹5,000 crores. In the context of India’s rapidly growing economy, where turnover figures are expected to rise steadily, even this upwardly revised absolute threshold may soon lose relevance. Frequent threshold shifts risk “chasing” market realities rather than anticipating them. SEBI’s decision to cap at ₹5,000 crore reflects caution but may quickly become outdated.

2. Significant RPTs of Subsidiaries: Plugging Gaps with Dual Thresholds

Existing provisions vis-a-vis Proposal in CP

Pursuant to the amendments in 2021, RPTs exceeding a threshold of 10% of the standalone turnover of the subsidiary are considered as Significant RPTs, thus, requiring approval of the Audit Committee of the listed entity. The CP proposes the following modifications with respect to the thresholds of Significant RPTs of Subsidiaries:

• ‘Material’ is always ‘Significant’: There may be instances where a transaction by a subsidiary may trigger the materiality threshold for shareholder approval, based on the consolidated turnover of the listed entity, but still fall below the 10% threshold of the subsidiary’s own standalone turnover. As a result, such a transaction would escape the scrutiny of the listed entity’s audit committee. This inconsistency highlights a regulatory gap and reinforces the need to revisit and revise the threshold criteria to ensure comprehensive oversight in a way that aligns with evolving group structures and scale of operations. RPTs of subsidiary would require listed holding company’s audit committee approval if they breach the lower of following limits:

• 10% of the standalone turnover of the subsidiary or
  • Material RPT thresholds as applicable to listed holding company

• Exemption for small value RPTs: The threshold for Significant RPTs is subject to an exemption for small value RPTs based on the absolute value of Rs. 1 crore. Thus, where a transaction between a subsidiary and a related party (of the listed entity/ subsidiary), on an aggregate, does not exceed Rs. 1 crore, the same is not required to be placed for approval of the Audit Committee of the listed entity, even if the aforesaid limits are breached.
• Net Worth Alternative: For newly incorporated subsidiaries which are <1 year old, consequently not having audited financial statements for a period of at least one year, the threshold for Significant RPTs to be determined as below:

• 10% of standalone net worth of the subsidiary (or share capital + securities premium, if negative net worth),
  • as on a date not more than 3 months prior to seeking AC’s approval
  • certified by a practising CA

Our Analysis and Comments

●      De-minimis exemption for significant RPTs of subsidiaries

The exemption for RPTs up to Rs. 1 crore in absolute terms might provide some relief for the holding entities, particularly, entities having various small subsidiaries, which, on a standalone basis, may not be material for the listed entity at all – however, the RPTs being significant at the subsidiary’s level still required approval of the parent’s audit committee. However, still the exemption threshold may be further enhanced to a higher limit, as a de minimis exemption of Rs. 1 crore entails the subsidiary having a turnover of mere Rs. 10 crores, which, from the perspective of a listed entity is a not a very practically beneficial scenario.

For newly incorporated companies not having a financial track record, linking the significant RPT threshold with net worth brings additional compliance burden in the form of certification requirements from PCA. Net worth alternative introduces valuation and certification burdens for newly incorporated entities, in which case It may be considerable to extend a blanket first year exemption of upto Rs. 5 crore, to balance ease of doing business for newly incorporated subsidiaries, the very decision of which would be stemming from the management of the parent listed entity. In fact, insisting on the net worth certificate itself seems unnecessary, as the net worth is mostly based on paid up capital, which does not warrant certification.

●      Need for easing inclusion of RPs of subsidiaries as RPs of listed entity

First of all, a statement of fact. The number of related parties of listed entities went for a significant explosion in November, 2021, where the definition of RP of a listed entity included RPs of subsidiaries. For any diversified group, there are typically several subsidiaries, each of them with their own independent boards.

While the proposals pertain to significant RPTs of subsidiaries, the most crucial component of the RPT framework lies in identification of RPs, which, under the current framework, covers RPs of subsidiaries as well. These RPs may be, many a times, companies in which the directors of the subsidiaries are holding mere directorships, often, an independent directorship. There is absolutely no scope of conflict of interests in dealing with companies where a person is interested, solely on account of his directorship where there is no direct or indirect shareholding or ownership interest. Such a situation has an explicit carve out under the Ind AS 24 as well, where an entity does not become a RP by the mere reason of having a common director or KMP [Para 11(a) of Ind AS 24]. While the Companies Act treats a company as an RP based on common directorship (in case of a private company), however, the extension of such definition to RPs of subsidiaries is pursuant to the provisions of SEBI LODR and hence, appropriate exclusions may be specified for under LODR.

3. Tiered Disclosures: Balancing Transparency and Burden

Existing provisions vis-a-vis Proposal in CP

The Industry Standards Note on RPTs, effective from 1st September, 2025 provides an exemption from disclosures as per ISN for RPTs aggregating to Rs. 1 crore in a FY. The proposal seeks to provide further relief from the ISN, by introducing a new slab for small-value RPTs aggregating to lower of:

• 1% of annual consolidated turnover of the listed entity as per the last audited financial statements, or
• Rs. 10 crore

In such cases, the disclosures are proposed to be given in the Annexure-2 of the Consultation Paper. The disclosure as per the Annexure is in line with the minimum information as is currently required to be placed by the listed entity before its Audit Committee in terms of SEBI Circular dated 22nd November, 2021 (currently subsumed in LODR Master Circular dated November 11, 2024). In the event of the same becoming effective, disclosures would be required in the following manner as per LODR:

Value of transaction	Disclosure Requirements	Applicability of ISN
< Rs. 1 crore	Reg 23(3) of SEBI LODR	NA – exempt as per ISN
> Rs 1 crore, but less than 1% of consolidated turnover of listed entity or Rs. 10 crores, whichever is lower (‘Moderate Value RPTs’)	Annexure-2 of CP (Paragraph  4  under  Part  A  of  Section  III-B of SEBI Master Circular dated November 11, 2024)	Proposed to be exempt from ISN
Other than Moderate Value RPTs but less than Material RPTs (specified transactions)	Part A and B of ISN	Yes
Material RPTs (specified transactions are material)	Part A, B and C of ISN	Yes
Other than Moderate Value RPTs but less than Material RPTs (other than specified transactions)	Part A of ISN	Yes

 Our Analysis and Comments

The proposal would result in creation of multiple reference points with respect to disclosure requirements. As per the existing regulatory requirements, the disclosure requirements before the Audit Committee comes from the following sources:

• Rule 6A of Companies (Meetings of Board and its Powers) Rules, 2014 – for listed entities incorporated as a company
• Reg 23(3)(c) of SEBI LODR – for omnibus approvals
• SEBI Circular dated 26th June, 2025 read with Industry Standards Note on RPTs – effective from 1st September 2025, for all RPTs other than exempted RPTs (aggregate value of upto Rs. 1 crore)

The proposal leads to an additional classification of RPTs into moderate value RPTs where limited disclosures in terms of the draft Circular will be applicable. While the introduction of differentiated disclosure thresholds aims to rationalise compliance, care must be taken to ensure that the disclosure framework does not become overly template-driven. RPTs, by nature, require contextual judgment, and a uniform disclosure format may not always capture the nuances of each case. It is therefore important that the regulatory design continues to place trust in the informed discretion of the Audit Committee, allowing it the flexibility to seek additional information where necessary, beyond the prescribed formats.

4. Clarification w.r.t. validity of shareholders’ Omnibus Approval

Existing provisions vis-a-vis Proposal in CP

The existing provisions [Para (C)11 of Section III-B of LODR Master Circular] permit the validity of the omnibus approval by shareholders for material RPTs as:

• From AGM to AGM – in case approval is obtained in an AGM
• One year – in case approval is obtained in any other general meeting/ postal ballot

A clarification is proposed to be incorporated that the AGM to AGM approval will be valid for a period of not more than 15 months, in alignment with the maximum timeline for calling AGM as per section 96 of the Companies Act.

Further, the provisions, currently a part of the LODR Master Circular, are proposed to be embedded as a part of Reg 23(4) of LODR.

5. Exemptions & Definitions: Pruning Redundancies

Problem Statement

Proviso (e) to Regulation 2(1)(zc) of the SEBI LODR Regulations exempts transactions involving retail purchases by employees from being classified as Related Party Transactions (RPTs), even though employees are not technically classified as related parties. Conversely, it includes transactions involving the relatives of directors and Key Managerial Personnel (KMPs) within its ambit. Additionally, Regulation 23(5)(b) provides an exemption from audit committee and shareholder approvals for transactions between a holding company and its wholly owned subsidiary. However, the term “holding company” used in this context has remained undefined, leaving ambiguity as to whether it refers only to a listed holding company or includes unlisted ones as well.

Proposal in CP

The Consultation Paper proposes two key clarifications:

1. The exemption related to retail transactions should be expressly limited to related parties (i.e., directors, KMPs, or their relatives) to grant the appropriate exemption.
2. The exemption for transactions with wholly owned subsidiaries should apply only where the holding company is also a listed entity, thereby excluding unlisted holding structures from this relaxation

Our Analysis and Comments

Under the existing framework, retail purchases made on the same terms as applicable to all employees are exempt when undertaken by employees, but not when made by relatives of directors or KMPs. This has led to an inconsistent treatment, where similarly situated individuals receive different regulatory treatment solely on the basis of their relationship with the company. The proposed language attempts to streamline this by including such relatives within the exemption, but it introduces its own drafting concern.

• The phrasing – “retail purchases from any listed entity or its subsidiary by its directors or its employees key managerial personnel(s) or their relatives, without establishing a business relationship and at the terms which are uniformly applicable/offered to all employees and directors and key managerial personnel(s)” – creates a potential loophole. As worded, the exemption could be interpreted to cover purchases made on favourable terms offered to directors or KMPs themselves, rather than being benchmarked against terms applicable to employees at large. The intended spirit of the provision seems to be to exempt only those transactions where the terms are genuinely uniform and non-preferential. A more appropriate construction would make it clear that the exemption is intended to apply only where such transactions mirror employee-level retail transactions, not privileged arrangements for senior management.
• Regarding the exemption under Regulation 23(5)(b) for transactions between a holding company and its wholly owned subsidiary, this clarification seeks to align the treatment under Regulations 23(5)(b) and 23(5)(c). While this provides helpful interpretational guidance, incorporating the word “listed” directly into the text of the Regulation itself could offer greater precision and eliminate the need for retrospective explanations. Since unlisted holding companies are not subject to LODR, they are unlikely to have interpreted the exemption as applicable in the first place. As such, a simple prospective clarification might serve the purpose more effectively.

Conclusion

SEBI’s August 2025 proposals are largely aimed at relaxation, though in some cases, the ability to think beyond the existing track of the law seems missing. With the new leadership at SEBI meant to rationalise regulations, it was quite an appropriate occasion to do so. However, at many places, the August 2025 proposals are simply making tinkering changes in 2021 amendments and fine-tuning the June 2025 ISN. In sum, SEBI’s iterative approach to RPT governance demonstrates commendable responsiveness but calls for a holistic RPT policy road-map, harmonizing LODR regulations, circulars, and guidelines. Only a forward-looking, principles-based framework, will deliver the twin objectives of ease of doing business and investor protection in the long run.

Read More:

FAQs on Standards for minimum information to be disclosed for RPT approval

Tailored to Fit Practically: Disclosure for RPTs under Revised Industry Standards

Related Party Transactions- Resource Centre