Self-paced Certificate Course on Insider Trading for Compliance Officers

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Shastrarth 29 – Compliance Officer’s risks in Abusive RPT Structures

You may register your interest and the questions that you’d like us to discuss at: https://forms.gle/1iR2xaFKGBU1kRJ3A

Our resource centre on RPTs can be accessed at: https://vinodkothari.com/article-corner-on-related-party-transactions/

Some of our recent resources on the subject: 
SEBI approves relaxed norms on RPTs 
Moderate Value RPTs : Interplay of disclosure norms and impracticalities

Span of Welspun: Is pledge/unpledge a trade under PIT?

– Payal Agarwal, Partner | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

An August 2025 Informal Guidance by SEBI for Welspun Corp Limited sought to clarify the applicability of contra trade on release of pledge. However, it goes on to say that: “…in case of creation of pledge/ revocation, the beneficial ownership does not change till pledge is invoked”. While the IG was specific to revocation of pledge, this seems to be creating a confusion on the contra trade restrictions on creation of pledge. In this article, we discuss the nature of pledge as a trade, and applicability of trading related restrictions on various stages of pledge. Also see a detailed article on treatment of various stages of pledge as trading under PIT Regulations.

Is pledge a trade?

  • Answer is yes
  • Trading means dealing in securities in any form [Reg 2(1)(l) of PIT Regulations]
  • Explanation to the definition expressly includes “pledging”
  • Creation of pledge may be considered equivalent to disposal/ intent to dispose the shares

Is release of pledge a trade?

  • Technically, a release (or so-called revocation) of a pledge is also a trade. However, given there is no change in beneficial ownership, there is no concern, at least from a contra trade perspective
  • There is no actual acquisition or intent to acquire shares, it is mere restoring back the position as it was prior to the creation of pledge 
  • The shares are coming back to the person who was the beneficial owner of such shares previously. 

Is invocation of pledge a trade?

  • No, since invocation of pledge is not at the discretion of the holder of shares 
  • Invocation results in actual disposal of shares, however, related compliances w.r.t. such shares are undertaken at the stage of creation of pledge itself 

Examples to understand contra-trade on pledge

Any opposite trade within 6 months of a prior trade attracts violation of contra-trade, except in case of specific waiver for a bona fide purpose. We discuss various combinations of trades within a span of 6 months to understand whether such trades attract contra-trade restrictions. 

Transaction 1 Transaction 2 Is it contra-trade?Can a waiver be granted by CO? 
Purchase of shares (Buy)Creation of pledge (Sell)Yes, opposite trades within 6 monthsYes, if the DP is able to demonstrate the urgency and bona fide nature of such transaction
Creation of pledge (Sell)Purchase of shares (Buy)Yes, opposite trades within 6 monthsIn such a case, it is very difficult to prove bona fide of the subsequent trades of purchase of shares after creation of pledge. 
Creation of pledge (Sell)Release of pledge No, since the release of pledge does not result in an opposite trade per se, it is incidental to the primary trade of pledge creation and only restores back the position as it was prior to creation of pledge. NA
Release of pledge Creation of pledge with another person (Sell)NoYes, if the DP is able to demonstrate the urgency and bona fide nature of the underlying transaction for which the pledge is to be created
Purchase of shares (Buy)Invocation of pledge (Sell)No, since the invocation of pledge is not at the discretion of the shareholder. The relevant act of disposal of shares is taken into account as a “trade” upon creation of pledge itself, and hence, not considered as “trade” again, upon such invocation. NA
Invocation of pledge (Sell)Purchase of shares (Buy)NA

What is a bonafide purpose in the case of a pledge?

How does the Compliance officer verify/ensure that the purpose of the pledge is bonafide?

There cannot be any sure or one-size-fits-all response to this. Pledge is not for its own sake; pledge for an underlying transaction, which may be margin trading facility, borrowing, etc. The Compliance Officer should see whether that underlying transaction is within the regular business or activity of the pledgor. Whether the pledge is limited to the shares of the listed entity or has other securities? Whether the pledgee is an entity which is engaged in providing similar facilities to several unrelated entities? Whether the timing of the pledge is not indicating the advantage of a price spurt, etc.

Compliances applicable to various stages of pledge

The applicability of contra trade restrictions on the various stages of pledge are tabulated hereunder:

Stage of pledge Nature of trade (Acquisition/ Disposal) Pre-clearance required?TWC applicable?Contra-trade restrictions applicable?Remarks
Creation of pledge Disposal YesNo, if the trade is bona fideYes While creation of pledge amounts to trade, exemptions from TWC and contra trade may be availed if the trade is for bona fide purpose. 
Release of pledgeAcquisitionNoNoNo No change in beneficial ownership, and no actual acquisition/ disposal – mere restoration of the position prior to creation of pledge
Notice of invocation of pledge NA NANANA No dealing in securities, mere notice specifying intent 
Invocation of pledge Disposal, however, continuation of the prior action of creation of pledge NoNANoInvocation of pledge is done by the pledgee upon default. Once a pledge is created, the pledgor has no control over the invocation of such pledge upon default. Further, since creation of pledge is itself considered as ‘disposal’, the same shares cannot be considered to have been ‘disposed’ again, upon invocation. 
Sale of pledged securities Disposal, however, continuation of the prior action of creation of pledge No (however, intimation to CO post sale, if not covered by  System Driven Disclosure)NANoSale of pledged securities is done by the pledgee, and is not under the control of the pledgor. Further, since creation of pledge is itself considered as ‘disposal’, the same shares cannot be considered to have been ‘disposed’ again, upon sale. 

Prohibition of Insider Trading – Resource Centre

The fine line between gossip and truth: conflicting rulings on price sensitive information disclosure

NFRA’s Call for a Two-Way Communication: A New Requirement or a Gentle Reminder?

Tagging auditors and TCWG to make amends 

– Team Corplaw | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Introduction

NFRA moved the needle, and it is to be seen if the ocean starts boiling.! A 7th Jan 2026 circular from NFRA, addressed to listed entities and their auditors, seemed like an attention-drawer to standards of auditing which are already there, and yet, the auditing fraternity is holding meetings with boards and senior management of listed entities, to comply with what was always a compliance requirement. Does the 7th Jan circular bring up any new boxes to be ticked, any new procedures to be laid or responsibilities to be reiterated? As we detail out in this article, there may be need for action on several fronts on the part of listed entities – identification of nodal persons, listing developments that need to be communicated, constituting team for responding to the findings of the auditors in course of their audit other than those that sit in the audit report, formation of sub-groups of TCWG, etc. 

Read more

A Guide for AIF Managers on Investor Eligibility and Regulatory Restrictions

Simrat Singh, Senior Executive | finserv@vinodkothari.com

Introduction

An AIF raises capital by issuance of units, which are privately placed.  Most AIFs follow a commitment–drawdown model, under which investors agree upfront to commit a specified amount of capital (‘committed capital’). The AIF manager then calls this committed capital, either in full or in tranches, as investment opportunities arise (‘drawdown’). This model helps the AIF to minimise the negative carry that would result from raising investments which are yet to be invested. 

This fund-raising process is shaped not only by SEBI’s AIF framework but also by the oversight of the respective sectoral regulators of the relevant investors. AIFs are meant strictly for sophisticated investors, and as such, various categories of AIF investors, such as insurance companies, pension funds, banks and NBFCs, etc. are subject to their respective regulations. When they invest in an AIF, they must comply with SEBI’s rules as well as the investment norms prescribed by their own regulators, each seeking to regulate how the capital of the investor is deployed. In fact, SEBI regulations are agnostic as to who the investor is, hence, most of the SEBI regulations relate to the AIF or the manager, with limited provisions dealing with investors. For example, whether and to what extent an insurance company or a pension fund can invest in an AIF is driven by the guidelines issued by the sectoral regulators such as IRDAI or PFRDA.

In this article, we try to bring together, in one place, the key regulatory norms imposed by various regulators; while these are primarily meant for the investor, however, it will be useful for the AIF managers to keep in mind these restraints while expecting or inviting investments from different categories of investors.

Categories of investors and regulatory restrictions on each category

Minimum investment norms: Common across all categories

  1. ₹25 crore for investors in Large Value Funds (reduced from ₹ 70 Crore per investor vide SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) (Third Amendment) Regulations, 2025) [Reg. 2(1)(pa)];
  2. ₹1 crore for other investors [Reg 10(c)];
  3. ₹25 lakh for employees or directors of the AIF, manager, or sponsor [Reg 10(c)];
  4. No minimum for units issued to employees solely for profit-sharing (and not capital contribution) [Para 4.6 of AIF Master Circular];
  5. For open-ended AIFs, the initial investment must meet the minimum threshold, and partial redemptions must not reduce the holding below this minimum [Para 4.7 of AIF Master Circular].

Individuals

An AIF may raise funds from individual investors, whether resident, non-resident (NRI), or foreign, through private placement, subject to the following conditions (Refer Reg. 10(a) of AIF Regulations r/w Chapter 4 of AIF Master Circular).

  1. Foreign investors: A foreign investor must:
    1. be a resident of a country whose securities market regulator is a signatory to the IOSCO Multilateral MoU (Appendix A) or has a Bilateral MoU with SEBI; or
    2. be a government or government-related investor from a country approved by the Government of India, even if the above condition is not met.

Additionally, neither the investor nor its beneficial owner1:

  1. May be listed on the UN Security Council Sanctions List; or
  2. may be a resident of a country identified by the FATF as having serious AML/CFT deficiencies or insufficient progress in addressing such deficiencies.

If a foreign investor ceases to meet these conditions after admission, the AIF manager must stop making further drawdowns from that investor until compliance is restored.

  1. Joint Investments: Joint investments, for the purpose of investment of not less than the minimum investment amount in the AIF, are permitted only between:
    1. an investor and spouse;
    2. an investor and parent; or
    3. an investor and child.

A maximum of two persons may invest jointly. Any other combination of joint investors must individually meet the minimum investment threshold. (Refer Reg. 10(c) of AIF Regulations r/w Chapter 4 of AIF Master Circular)

  1. Terms of Investment: The terms agreed with investors cannot override or go beyond the disclosures in the PPM [Para 4.3 of AIF Master Circular].
  2. The total number of investors is limited to 1000 investors per scheme; also note that an AIF cannot make a public offer. AIF units are commonly offered through distributors; but even the distributors cannot make an open offer (Please refer to our resource on Dos and Don’ts for AIF Distributors and AIF Managers).

Insurance Companies

  1. Permissible AIF Categories [Para 1.5 of Investments – Master Circular, 2022 read with IRDAI Circular No. IRDAI/F&I/CIR/INV/074/04/2021 dated 05.04.2021]
    1. Category I AIFs: Infrastructure Funds, SME Funds, Venture Capital Funds, and Social Venture Funds (‘Specified Cat I AIFs’);
    2. Category II AIFs: Only where at least 51% of the corpus is proposed to be invested in infrastructure entities, SMEs, venture capital undertakings, or social venture entities (‘Specified Cat II AIFs’).
    3. Investment in a Fund of Fund (‘FoF’) is allowed only if such FoF does not directly or indirectly invest funds outside India (Refer Section 27E of Insurance Act, 1938). This is to be ensured by inserting a clause in the Fund offer Documents executed by FoF to restrain such FoF investing into AIFs which invest in overseas companies/funds. Further, investment is not allowed in an AIF which in-turn has an exposure to a FoF in which the insurer already invested. Lastly, no investment in an AIF is allowed which undertakes leverage/borrowing other than to meet operational requirements. 

Compliance of conditions laid down in (iii) are to be certified by the concurrent auditor of the insurer and filed along with quarterly periodical returns. Notably, insurance companies are prohibited from investing in Cat III AIFs

  1. Prohibited Structures: Insurers shall not invest in AIFs that:
    1. offer variable rights attached to units.
    2. invest funds outside India either directly or indirectly [s. 27E of Insurance Act, 1938];
    3. are sponsored by persons forming part of the insurer’s promoter group;
    4. are managed a manager who is controlled, directly or indirectly, by the insurer or its promoters;
  2. Investment Limits: 
    1. For life insurers, combined exposure to AIFs and venture capital funds is capped at 3% of the relevant insurance fund2.
    2. For general insurers, the cap is 5% of total investment assets3.

Exposure to any single AIF cannot exceed the lower of 10% of the AIF’s corpus or 20% of the insurer’s total AIF exposure. For Infrastructure Funds, the 10% limit is enhanced to 20%.

Banks and other Regulated Entities (REs)

Banks and other REs may invest in Category I and Category II AIFs, subject to layered limits:

  1. Bank level: Not more than 10% of the AIF corpus.
  2. Group level: Up to 20% without RBI approval, and up to 30% with prior RBI approval, subject to capital adequacy and profitability conditions.
  3. System level: Aggregate investments by all regulated entities cannot exceed 20% of the AIF corpus.

Banks must ensure that AIF investments do not circumvent banking regulations by creating prohibited indirect exposures. Banks are not permitted to invest in Category III AIFs, except for the minimum sponsor contribution where a bank subsidiary sponsors such a fund. For a more detailed discussion on Banks’ investment in AIFs, refer to our resource here

NBFCs

An NBFC shall not individually contribute more than 10 percent of the corpus of an AIF Scheme. [See Para 8 of RBI ( NBFC –  Undertaking of Financial Services) Directions, 2025]. The system-level investment limit of 20% for all REs shall also apply. Notably, unlike banks, NBFCs can invest in Cat III AIFs. 

Pension, Provident and Gratuity Funds

Pursuant to a 15 March 2021 notification, non-government Provident Funds, Superannuation Funds, and Gratuity Funds may invest up to 5% of their investible surplus in Specified Cat I AIFs and Specified Cat II AIFs, classified as “Asset Backed, Trust Structured and Miscellaneous Investments”.

Key conditions include:

  • Minimum AIF corpus of ₹100 crore;
  • Maximum exposure of 10% to a single AIF (not applicable to government-sponsored AIFs);
  • Investments restricted to India-based entities only;
  • The AIF sponsor and manager must not be part of the fund’s promoter group.

For Government  Sector Schemes such as UPS/NPS/NPA Lite/Atal Pension Yojna and Corporate CG schemes, the conditions are the same as above for non-government pension funds. 

Mutual Funds

Mutual funds are governed by the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996. The Seventh Schedule to these regulations sets out the permissible investment universe. Units of AIFs are not included, and accordingly, mutual funds cannot invest in AIF units.

  1. beneficial owner as determined in terms of sub-rule (3) of rule 9 of the Prevention of Money-laundering (Maintenance of Records) Rules, 2005 ↩︎
  2. The relevant insurance fund would refer to the specific fund of a life insurer from which an investment is made, rather than the insurer’s overall balance sheet. This is because Life insurers maintain separate, ring-fenced funds for different lines of business, such as the life fund, pension fund, annuity fund or ULIP fund and investments must be made out of, and limits calculated with reference to, the particular fund whose money is being deployed. ↩︎
  3. Investment assets would refer to the total pool of assets held by a general insurer that are available for investment, across all lines of non-life insurance business. Unlike life insurers, general insurers do not maintain separate, ring-fenced policyholder funds for each product. Instead, premiums collected from various non-life insurance policies are invested as a consolidated portfolio, and regulatory investment limits such as exposure to AIFs are calculated with reference to the insurer’s aggregate investment assets shown on its balance sheet. ↩︎

See our other resources on AIFs:

  1. CIV-ilizing Co-Investments: SEBI’s new framework for Co-investments under AIF Regulations
  2. Understanding the Governance & Compliance Framework for AIFs
  3. FAQs on specific due diligence of investors & investments of AIFs;
  4. RBI bars lenders’ investments in AIFs investing in their borrowers;
  5. Capital subject to ‘caps’: RBI relaxes norms for investment by REs in AIFs, subject to threshold limits;
  6. Can CICs invest in AIFs? A Regulatory Paradox;
  7. Trust, but verify: AIFs cannot be used as regulatory arbitrage;
  8. 2020 – Year of change for AIFs;
  9. AIF ail SEBI: Cannot be used for regulatory breach;

SEBI removes redundancy to ease compliance

– Team Corplaw | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

See our other resources:

  1. SEBI Clears the Way : HVDLEs Set to Move from “High Value” to “Higher Value” 
  2. SEBI fixes the cut-off date for re-lodgement of physical transfers

Securities Market Code: Consolidation, principled regulation-making, and decriminalisation

– Payal Agarwal, Partner | Vinod Kothari & Company | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Year 2025 will go down in the history of independent India as the year of the most brisk legislative activity – mostly by way of consolidation of some of the major laws. Income Tax Act, labour laws, securities markets, IBC, RBI Regulations etc – everywhere, we find the lawmakers have been quite busy themselves,  of course making the subjects and companies even busier. The Securities Market Code (SMC) has been introduced in the Lok Sabha, pursuant to the announcement in the Union Budget 21-22. Divided into a total of 18 chapters, the SMC seeks to consolidate and repeal the following: 

  • SEBI Act, 1992, 
  • Depositories Act, 1996, and 
  • Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956

The Code reflects a structural consolidation exercise, however, also with an underpinning attempt to make rule making more practical and principled, providing for investor protection by reintroducing ombudsman, providing legal sanctity to inter-regulatory coordination, covering complex securities transactions, etc. Further, the gazette notifications issued in relation to the aforesaid Acts are also proposed to be made a part of the Code. 

Major proposals 

  • Providing timelines & limitation period for investigations and validity of interim orders, with scope of extension in some cases
  • Classification between fraudulent/ unfair practices and market abuse, towards better clarity with powers to order cease and desist, authorisation for seizure of books etc. in case of market abuse 
  • Strengthening powers and functions of SEBI by enabling power to issue subsidiary instructions, undertaking periodic research and regulatory impact assessment studies etc. 
  • Issue of new regulations in relation to SEBI Ombudsperson, restitution to persons suffering losses on account of contravention etc. 
  • Introduction of new terms such as – market participants (issuers and investors), Securities Market Service Providers (Intermediary + MII + SRO) etc. 
  • Clarity in the scope of securities and recognition to “other regulated instruments”
  • Clarifications in relation to scope of investment vehicles, title over securities held with depository etc. 

Time-bound investigations and interim orders 

  • Limitation period for investigation: eight years from the date of default or contravention
    • Extension permitted in case of matters referred by Investigating Officer or matters having systemic impact on the securities market  [Clause 16] 
  • Investigation to be completed within 180 days
    • In case of delay, status to be provided along with the reasons for delay in writing, and extension to be sought from a Whole-time Member [Clause 13] 
  • Interim orders to be valid for upto 180 days
    • Extension may be granted for upto 2 years pending adjudication/ completion of inspection/ investigation [Clause 27]

Adjudication of penalties 

  • Maximum penalty to be linked with whether or not the default results in unlawful gain or losses to the investors or other persons, and whether such gain or loss is quantifiable
  • Decriminalisation of offences, provisions in relation to fines limited to offences such as market abuse, failure of compliance with orders of SEBI etc. 
  • Additional factors to be considered for adjudication of penalty incorporated based on judicial precedents 

Clarity in the scope of securities

  • Securities to include notes or papers issued for the purpose of raising of capital, which are listed or proposed to be listed, other regulated instruments etc. 

Classification between fraudulent/ unfair practices and market abuse 

  • To classify grave acts adversely affecting the integrity of securities market as “market abuse” 
  • Powers of SEBI to order cease and desist, authorisation for seizure of books etc. in case of market abuse 

Re-introduction of SEBI Ombudsperson

  • In case of non-redressal of grievances through GRM within specified period (180 days from receipt of grievance), may file a complaint with Ombudsperson within 30 days

Introduction of new terms

  • Market participant –  a person or its agent participating in the securities markets as an issuer or an investor; SEBI may issue instructions, call for information, etc from market participants
  • Securities market service provider – Intermediary + Market Infrastructure Intermediary (stock exchange, depository & clearing corporation) + SRO.
    • Obligations of SMSP given under Clause 35 – includes fair disclosure of information, investment of money collected by it in the manner as specified, furnishing information etc.
      • To be specified by the regulations 
  • Subsidiary instructions 
    • Power to issue to be with Chairperson along with WTM or by two WTMs of Board
      • To clarify ambiguity or laying down procedural requirements 
    • Contravention to be considered as contravention of the primary regulations 

Clarifications proposed

  • Records of depository to act as conclusive proof of title over security [Clause 58(2)]
  • Issuance and holding of securities in dematerialised form only [Clause 55(2) & (3)]
    • Option with the holder for holding in physical form has been omitted 
  • Right to be consulted or to give directions not a safeguard from being considered as investment scheme [Clause 32]

Private Credit AIFs: Lenders of Last Resort?

Simrat Singh | Finserv@vinodkothari.com

Private credit is becoming a new force in India’s lending ecosystem. As traditional banks and NBFCs operate under the strict regulations on capital, exposure and asset quality norms, they are often unable, or unwilling to cater to certain borrowers. In addition, for banks in particular, what kind of lending opportunities can be tapped is often a matter of having typecast lending products, policies and procedures. This leaves occasional, however, lucrative gaps in funding needs which are not serviced by regulated lenders. Into these gaps step in Private Credit AIFs (in India), Business Development Companies (BDCs) and Private Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs) (in the USA and Australia), these funds can structure deals creatively, customise financing to borrower needs and capture higher-yield opportunities that conventional lenders must pass over. What is emerging is a parallel channel of credit, one that is nimble, agile and focused.

Globally, this shift hasn’t gone unnoticed. Policymakers and institutions like the IMF have flagged the risks tied to private credit markets, especially around opacity, leverage and borrower quality (see below). Yet in India, the momentum continues to build. Tight constraints on banks, the rise of alternative asset managers and the unmet capital needs of businesses beyond the traditional credit universe are all fuelling rapid expansion.

This article examines what private credit is, why it is growing in India, the risks associated with this market and whether their growth creates regulatory arbitrage relative to banks and NBFCs.

What is Private Credit?

As per an IMF paper1, private credit is defined as “non-bank corporate credit provided through bilateral agreements or small “club deals” outside the realm of public securities or commercial banks. This definition excludes bank loans, broadly syndicated loans, and funding provided through publicly traded assets such as corporate bonds.

Simply, private credit is the lending by non-bank and non-NBFCs. The sector predominantly involves alternative asset managers2 who raise capital from institutional investors using closed-end funds and lend directly to predominantly middle-market firms3.

How is it Different From Normal Credit?

Unlike traditional credit, private credit is typically tailored to the specific needs of each borrower. Repayment terms can, for instance, be aligned with the timing of a funding round or disbursements can be structured to match capital expenditure plans. Interest rates may also be designed on a step-up basis, linked to the borrower’s turnover. Many elements that are otherwise rigid under RBI-regulated lending can be flexibly structured in private credit (see table 2 below). This flexibility is especially valuable for start-ups and small businesses, which often require customised financing solutions that traditional lenders may be unable to provide. 

ParameterPrivate CreditTraditional Credit
Source of CapitaPrivate debt funds (Category II AIFs), investors like HNIs, family offices, institutional investorsBanks, NBFCs and mutual funds
Target BorrowersCompanies lacking access to banks; SMEs, mid-market firms, high-growth businessesHigher-rated, established borrowers.
Deal StructureBespoke, customised, structured financingStandardised loan products
FlexibilityHigh flexibility in terms, covenants, and structuringRestricted by regulatory norms and rigid approval processes
Returns Higher yields (approx. 10–25%)Lower yields (traditional fixed-income)
Risk LevelHigher risk due to borrower profile and limited diversificationLower risk due to stronger credit profiles and diversified portfolios
RegulationLight SEBI AIF regulations; fewer lending restrictionsHeavily regulated by RBI and sector-specific norms
LiquidityClosed-ended funds; limited exit optionsMore liquid; established repayment structures; some products have secondary markets
DiversificationLimited number of deals; concentrated portfoliosBroad, diversified loan books
Role in MarketFills credit gaps not served by traditional lendersCore credit providers in the financial system

Table 1: Differences between private credit and traditional credit

How Much of it is in India?

Global private credit assets under management have quadrupled over the past decade to US$2.1 trillion in 20234. Compared with the rest of the world, the private credit market in India is very small, with estimated assets under management of $25 billion to $30 billion as of March 31, 2025, representing about 0.6% of India’s GDP and 30-35% of the total investments made by AIFs in India.5

Figure 1: Private credit share (1%) as a part of overall corporate lending. Source: RBI, AMFI

Figure 2:  Size of Private Credit Market. Source: RBI

Reasons for Rise in Private Credit?

Private credit is expanding rapidly because it steps in where traditional banks hesitate. It provides capital for last-mile project completion, cost overruns and promoter equity infusion; areas that fall outside the comfort zone of regulated lending. The asset class has also delivered consistently higher risk-adjusted returns, a compelling draw for global and domestic investors, especially through long phases of low interest rates.6

A key advantage lies in its flexibility. Private lenders can tailor covenants7, link returns to cash flows and restructure repayment terms during stress, offering a level of customisation that conventional bank credit cannot match. For investors, this translates into both diversification and access to high-growth segments that remain beyond the scope of mainstream credit markets.

Sector specific regulatory gaps: There is a concern that tighter bank regulation will continue to encourage the migration of credit from banks to private credit lenders8. Certain regulatory restrictions on banks directly push borrowers toward private credit:

  1. Real estate: Banks cannot lend for land acquisition (Para 3.3.1, Master Circular – Housing Finance), leading to real estate becoming a major private-credit segment, accounting for about one-third of all private credit deals.9
  1. Mergers & acquisitions: Banks are not expected to lend to promoters for acquiring shares of other companies (Para 2.3.1.6, Master Circular – Loans and Advances). Consequently, 35% of private credit deals involve M&A financing. However, RBI’s Draft Directions on Acquisition Finance proposes to somewhat ease this restriction.10

Apart from the above, The IBC significantly strengthened creditor rights and recovery prospects, boosting confidence among lenders and supporting the growth of private credit. At the same time, many borrowers, particularly smaller firms, those with weak earnings, high leverage or insufficient collateral, struggle to access bank loans making private credit a natural alternative11. This shift was further accelerated by an extended period of low global interest rates, which pushed investors to seek higher-yielding opportunities and increased capital flows into private credit strategies.

The most common structure for channelising private credit is an AIF – more specifically, a Category II AIF. A ‘Private Credit AIF’ is essentially an AIF whose primary investment strategy is direct debt financing (by investing in debt instruments) to borrowers outside the conventional banking/syndicated loan market. Since AIFs are not subject to the same regulatory framework as traditional lenders (for example, no deposit-taking, no CRR/SLR requirements etc.), they can offer tailor-made structures such as step‐up interest rates, bullet repayments, equity warrants, convertible features, etc. 

A private credit fund requires long-term, stable capital, and frequent redemption demands can disrupt lending strategy. A closed-ended Category II AIF structure suits this model well, as it locks in investor capital for the fund’s life and prevents premature withdrawals. Private credit deals are idiosyncratic and difficult for outside parties to value or trade, lenders typically rely on long-term pools of locked-up capital for financing. One advantage AIFs have over mutual funds is that mutual funds are restricted to investing only up to 10% of their debt portfolio in unlisted plain vanilla NCDs.

Compared to private equity or venture capital, where performance depends heavily on market conditions and timing exits, private credit offers returns that are largely predetermined by contract. The trade-off, however, is that like most AIFs, these investments typically come with multi-year lock-ins and fewer exit opportunities, underscoring their inherently illiquid nature. Typically, investors which can commit long term capital are well-suited to invest in such AIFs – such as pension funds and sovereign wealth funds etc.

Rise of Business Development Companies

Regulatory Concerns with Growth of Private Credit?

IMF in its 2024 Global Financial Stability Report highlighted risks w.r.t rise in private credit since its growth comes with several structural weaknesses that make the market vulnerable, especially in a downturn. Its rapid expansion is happening largely outside traditional regulatory oversight and because the market has not been stress-tested, the true scale of risk remains unclear. Borrowers tend to be smaller and more leveraged and with most loans being floating-rate, repayment stress can escalate quickly when interest rates rise. Although private credit funds’ leverage appears low compared with other lenders, end borrowers tend to be more highly leveraged than those in public markets, increasing the risks to financial stability.14

Instruments such as PIK interest16 only defer the problem, increasing loss severity if performance deteriorates. Liquidity is another pressure point since private credit funds are inherently illiquid. Risk is further amplified by layers of hidden leverage, at the borrower, SPV, investor and fund level making contagion hard to track. Layers of leverage are created by the AIF lending against equity to a holding entity, which infuses the equity into an operating company, and the operating company borrowing against such equity.

Because loans are private, unrated and rarely traded, valuation is opaque and losses may remain masked until too late. Growing competition also risks weakening underwriting standards and covenant discipline, particularly as larger banks participate in private deals.

Practical challenges add to this vulnerability. Collateral enforcement may not always hold up legally, say due to restrictions on transferability of collateral (say, shares of a private company). Equity-linked security is volatile as well, and during distress, equity tends to lose its value almost completely. In essence, private credit offers flexibility and returns, but its opacity, leverage, illiquidity and weaker borrower profiles create risks that could surface sharply in stress conditions. Private credit certainly warrants closer attention. Nonbank lenders, especially private credit funds, have grown rapidly in recent years, adding to financial stability risks because they are less transparent and not as firmly regulated.

Do private credit AIFs create any regulatory arbitrage?

What you cannot do directly, you cannot do indirectly – the age-old maxim might apply in case a RE which is otherwise barred by RBI for an object, uses the AIF route to achieve that object. Below we examine some of the distinctions in the regulatory oversight: 

FunctionPrivate Credit AIFsRE
Credit & Investment rules
Credit underwriting standardsNo regulatory prescriptionNo such specific rating-linked limits. However, improper underwriting will increase NPAs in the future.
Lending decisionManager-led

Investment Committee under Reg. 20(7) may decide lending

Manager controls composition of IC;

IC may include internal/external members;

IC responsibilities may be waived if investor commitment ≥₹70 Cr w/ undertaking
Primarily i.e. the main thrust should be in:
– Unlisted securities; and/or
– Listed debt rated ‘A’ or below
Lending decisions guided by Board-approved credit policy
Exposure normsMax 25% of investible funds in one investee company.Exposure is limited to 25% of Tier 1 Capital per borrower and 40% per borrower group for NBFC ML;

No such limit for NBFC BL.

Banks can lend maximum upto 15% of their Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital to a single borrower. Large exposure norms may apply in case of banks and Upper Layer NBFCs
End-use restrictionsNone prescribed under AIF Regulations, results in high investment flexibilityBanks cannot lend for land acquisition or for funding a M&A deal [refer ‘sector-specific regulatory gaps’ above]
NBFCs do not have any such restrictions. They do have internal limits on sensitive sector exposures which includes capital market and commercial real estate [See Para 92 of SBR]
Related party transactionsNeed 75% investors consent [reg 15(1)(e)]Board approval mandatory for loans ≥₹5 Cr to directors/relatives/interested entities;

Disclosure + abstention from decision-making;Loans to senior officers requires Board reporting [See para 93 of SBR]
Capital, Liquidity & Leverage Requirements
Capital requirementsNo regulatory prescription as the entire capital of the fund is unit capitalMinimum net owned funds of ₹10 Cr, CRAR 15% for NBFC-ML and above [See para 133.1 of SBR]9% CRAR in case of banks, 
Liquidity & ALMUninvested funds may be parked in liquid assets (MFs, T-Bills, CP/CDs, deposits etc.) [15(1)(f)] NBFC asset size more than 100 Cr. have to do LRM [Para 26]
Leverage limitsNo leverage permitted at AIF level for investment activities
Only operational borrowing allowed
Leverage ratio of BL NBFC cannot be more than 7
No restriction on NBFC ML however, CRAR of 15% makes results into leverage limit of 5.6 times 
For Banks, in addition to CRAR,  there is  minimum leverage ratio is 4%
Monitoring, Restructuring and Settlements
Loan monitoringNo regulatory prescriptionRBI-defined SMA classification, special monitoring, provisioning & reporting.
Compromise & settlementsNo regulatory prescriptionGoverned by RBI’s Compromise & Settlement Framework
Governance, Oversight & Compliance
Governance & oversightOperate in interest of investors
Timely dissemination of info
Effective risk management process and internal controls
Have written policies for conflict of interest, AML.
Prohibit any unethical means to sell/market/induce investors
Annual audit of PPM termsAudit of accounts 
15(1)(i) – investments shall be in demat form 
Valuation of investments every 6 months
A Risk Management Committee is required for all NBFCs. [See para 39 of SBR]
AC [94.1], NRC [94], CRO [95] ID and internal guidelines on CG [100] required for NBFC-ML and above 
Diversity of borrowersPrivate credit AIFs usually have 15-20 borrowers.Far more diversified  as compared to AIFs
Pricing Freely negotiated which allows for high structuring flexibilityGuided by internal risk model

Table 2: Differences in regulatory oversight between AIFs and Regulated Entities (REs)

The core difference between private credit AIFs and RBI-regulated lenders lies in regulatory intent. SEBI is a disclosure-driven market regulator, it relies on transparency, governance and informed investor choice. RBI is a prudential regulator tasked with protecting systemic stability, and therefore imposes capital buffers, exposure limits and stricter supervision. Private credit AIFs operate within SEBI’s lighter, disclosure-based approach, while banks and NBFCs function under RBI’s risk-averse framework. This does not always create arbitrage, but it does allow credit activity to grow outside the prudential perimeter. As private credit scales, a coordinated SEBI-RBI framework may be necessary to preserve flexibility without compromising financial stability. 

It is important to recognise that Category I and Category II AIFs are prohibited from taking long-term leverage. As a result, any loss arising from their lending or investment exposures does not cascade into the wider financial system. Therefore, concerns around applying capital adequacy requirements to these AIF categories are largely unwarranted.

Conclusion

Though still a small fragment of India’s wider corporate lending landscape, private credit AIFs are steadily gaining ground reaching those nooks and crannies of credit demand that banks and NBFCs often cannot, or would not, serve. Their ability to operate beyond the traditional comfort zone of regulated lenders is what makes this segment structurally relevant and increasingly attractive to borrowers and investors alike.

At the same time, rapid expansion brings the potential for regulatory arbitrage. The RBI has already acknowledged this risk, most notably through its actions on evergreening via AIF structures, ultimately resulting in exposure caps of 10% for individual regulated entities and 20% collectively, along with mandatory full provisioning where exposure exceeds 5% in an AIF lending to the same borrower. These measures serve as guardrails to prevent private credit vehicles from functioning as an indirect tool for evergreening of loans. 

  1. IMF Global Financial Stability Report 2024 ↩︎
  2. Ibid ↩︎
  3. A middle-market firm is a firm that is typically too small to issue public debt and requires financing amounts too large for a single bank because of its size and risk profile. The size of middle-market firms varies widely. In the United States, they are sometimes defined as businesses with between $100 million and $1 billion in annual revenue. ↩︎
  4. IMF Global Financial Stability Report 2024 and Federal Reserve Note dated May 23, 2025 ↩︎
  5. India’s private credit market is coming of age: S&P Global and SEBI Data ↩︎
  6. RBI’s Financial Stability Report June 2024 ↩︎
  7. Customized lending terms can include, for example, the option to capitalize interest payments (that is, pay in kind) in times of poor liquidity ↩︎
  8. Cai and Haque 2024 ↩︎
  9. India’s private credit market is coming of age: S&P Global ↩︎
  10. See our article ‘Draft RBI Directions: Banks may finance Acquisitions’ ↩︎
  11. Chernenko, Erel, and Prilmeier 2022 ↩︎
  12. Source: https://sbia.org/bdc-council/ (Numbers are as on Q4 2024). ↩︎
  13. Source: S&P Global ↩︎
  14. Growth in Global Private Credit: Reserve Bank of Australia ↩︎
  15. From the speech of Fed Reserve Governor Lisa D. Cook on financial stability ↩︎
  16.  Payment-in-kind (PIK) is noncash compensation, usually by treating accrued interest as an extension of the loan. ↩︎

See our other resources of Alternative Investment Funds here

SEBI approves relaxed norms on RPTs 

  • Materiality thresholds increased, significant RPTs relaxed for small-value RPTs and newly incorporated subsidiaries 

Highlights:

Following a 32-pager consultation paper proposing significant amendments to RPT provisions, towards ease of doing business, rolled out by SEBI on August 4, 2025, several amendments were approved by SEBI in its Board Meeting on 12th September, 2025. The SEBI (Listing Obligation and Disclosure Requirements) (Fifth Amendment) Regulations, 2025 have been notified on 19th November, 2025 amending the RPT framework for listed entities. 

Some of our comments on the proposals, as recommended to SEBI, have also been accepted in the approved decisions. Our comments on the Consultation Paper may be read here

Applicability of the Amendment Regulations 

While the Amendment Regulations have been notified, the amendments with respect to the RPT framework are effective from the 30th day of the notification of the Amendment Regulations, that is, with effect from 19th December, 2025. 

1. Materiality Thresholds: From One-Size-Fits-All to several sizes for the short-and-tall

A scale-based threshold mechanism has been approved, such that the RPT materiality threshold increases with the increase in the turnover of the company, though at a reduced rate, thus leading to an appropriate number of RPTs being categorized as material, thereby reducing the compliance burden of listed entities. The maximum upper ceiling of materiality has been kept at Rs. 5,000 crores, as against the existing absolute threshold of Rs. 1000 crores. The thresholds have been provided in Schedule XII, along with an illustration towards better understanding of the materiality thresholds. 

Materiality thresholds as specified in Schedule XII: 

Annual Consolidated Turnover of listed entity (in Crores)Approved threshold (as a % of consolidated turnover)Maximum upper ceiling (in Crores)
< Rs.20,00010%2,000 
20,001 – 40,0002,000 Crs + 5% above Rs. 20,000 Crs3,000
> 40,0003,000 Crs + 2.5% above Rs. 40,000 Crs5,000  (deemed material) 

Back-testing the proposal scale on RPTs undertaken by top 100 NSE companies show a 60% reduction in material RPT approvals for FY 2023-24 and 2024-25 with total no. of such resolutions reducing from 235 and 293, to around 95 to 119. The 60% reduction may itself be seen as a bold admission that the existing regulatory framework was causing too many proposals to go for shareholder approval.

Our Analysis and Comments 

With the amendments becoming effective, RPT regime is all set to be a lot relaxed, with the absolute threshold for taking shareholders’ approval to be doubled to Rs. 2000 crores. In addition, for larger companies, there will be a scalar increase in the threshold, rising to Rs. 5000 crores. A lot lesser number of RPTs will now have to go before shareholders for approval in general meetings.

In times to come, a multi-metric approach, depending on the nature of the transaction, may be adopted, drawing on a consonance-based criteria as seen in Regulation 30 of the LODR Regulations, thus offering a more balanced and effective approach. See detailed discussion in the article here.

2. Significant RPTs of Subsidiaries: Plugging Gaps with Dual Thresholds

Extant provisions vis-a-vis Amended Regulations

Pursuant to the amendments in 2021, RPTs exceeding a threshold of 10% of the standalone turnover of the subsidiary are considered as Significant RPTs, thus, requiring approval of the Audit Committee of the listed entity. The following modifications have been approved with respect to the thresholds of Significant RPTs of Subsidiaries: 

  • ‘Material’ is always ‘Significant’: RPTs of subsidiary would require listed holding company’s audit committee approval if they breach the lower of following limits:
    • 10% of the standalone turnover of the subsidiary or 
    • Material RPT thresholds as applicable to listed holding company 

This is a mathematical impossibility, since materiality threshold is based on “consolidated turnover”, and hence, includes the turnover of the subsidiary. Further, unlike networth, turnover cannot be a negative number, and hence, even if one or more of the subsidiaries of the listed entity are loss-making entities, the same cannot reduce the consolidated turnover of the listed entity to a number below the standalone turnover of its subsidiaries, whose accounts are being consolidated with the entity.  

  • Exemption for small value RPTs: The threshold for Significant RPTs is subject to an exemption for small value RPTs based on the absolute value of Rs. 1 crore. Thus, where a transaction between a subsidiary and a related party (of the listed entity/ subsidiary), on an aggregate, does not exceed Rs. 1 crore, the same is not required to be placed for approval of the Audit Committee of the listed entity, even if the aforesaid limits are breached.
  • Alternative for newly incorporated subsidiaries without a track record: For newly incorporated subsidiaries which are <1 year old, consequently not having audited financial statements for a period of at least one year, the threshold for Significant RPTs to be based on lower of:
    • 10% of aggregate of paid-up capital and securities premium of the subsidiary, or
    • Material RPT thresholds as applicable to listed holding company 

The aggregate value of paid-up capital and securities premium, to be considered for the purpose of determination of Significant RPTs, should not be older than three months prior to the date of seeking AC approval. Since the value of paid-up capital and securities premium would be available with the company on a real-time basis, the same does not result in any additional compliance burden. 

Our Analysis and Comments

For newly incorporated subsidiaries, the Consultation Paper proposed linking the thresholds with net worth, and requiring a practising CA to certify such networth, thus leading to an additional compliance burden in the form of certification requirements.  Following the approval in SEBI BM, the Amendment Regulations provide a threshold based on paid-up share capital and securities premium, and hence, certification requirement does  not arise.  

3. Clarification w.r.t. validity of shareholders’ Omnibus Approval 

Existing provisions vis-a-vis Amended Regulations  

The existing provisions [Para (C)11 of Section III-B of LODR Master Circular] permit the validity of the omnibus approval by shareholders for material RPTs as: 

  • From AGM to AGM – in case approval is obtained in an AGM 
  • One year – in case approval is obtained in any other general meeting/ postal ballot 

Pursuant to the Amendment Regulations, the timelines have been incorporated as a proviso to Reg 23(4). Further, a clarification has been incorporated that the AGM to AGM approval will be valid till the date of next AGM held within the timelines prescribed as per section 96 of the Companies Act.

4. Exclusions for retail purchases 

Proviso (e) to Regulation 2(1)(zc) of the extant SEBI LODR Regulations exempted transactions involving retail purchases by employees from being classified as Related Party Transactions (RPTs), even though employees are not technically classified as related parties. Conversely, it includes transactions involving the relatives of directors and Key Managerial Personnel (KMPs) within its ambit. 

The CP proposed that the exemption related to retail transactions should be expressly limited to related parties (i.e., directors, KMPs, or their relatives) to grant the appropriate exemption.

Under the extant framework, retail purchases made on the same terms as applicable to all employees were excluded from the meaning of RPTs when undertaken by employees, but not when made by relatives of directors or KMPs. This led to an inconsistent treatment, where similarly situated individuals receive different regulatory treatment solely on the basis of their relationship with the company. 

Pursuant to the Amendment Regulations, the exclusion for retail purchases has been extended to the relatives of the directors/ KMP, when undertaken on “terms which are uniformly applicable/offered to all employees, directors, key managerial personnel and relatives of directors or key managerial personnel ”. While the language refers to terms offered to “employees, directors, key managerial personnel and relatives of directors or key managerial personnel”, the same cannot be read to mean that preferential terms can be granted to “director”, “KMPs” or “relatives of such directors/ KMPs” as a separate class. The terms need to be uniform to what is otherwise offered to “employees” by such a listed entity/ its subsidiaries. 

5. Exemptions for RPTs between holding company and WoS

Regulation 23(5)(b) provides an exemption from audit committee and shareholder approvals for transactions between a holding company and its wholly owned subsidiary. However, the term “holding company” used in this context has remained undefined, leaving ambiguity as to whether it refers only to a listed holding company or includes unlisted ones as well.

A clarification has been inserted to provide the interpretational guidance that the term ‘holding company’ refers to the listed entity. The relevance of the aforesaid clarification would primarily be in cases where the unlisted subsidiary of the listed entity enters into a significant RPT with its wholly owned subsidiary (step-down subsidiary of the listed entity). Pursuant to the aforesaid proposal, as approved, no exemption will be available in such a case. 

Conclusion

The  amendments seem more or less welcoming, relaxing the RPT regime for listed entities. With the new leadership at SEBI meant to rationalise regulations, it was quite an appropriate occasion to do so. In sum, SEBI’s iterative approach to RPT governance demonstrates commendable responsiveness, contributing to the ease of compliances and in turn, of doing business by the companies. 

Our resources: