Proposals in Companies Act, 2013 via Corporate Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026: Key Highlight

Other resources:

Webinar on the Bill: https://youtube.com/live/8TqQJgxMATo

Corporate Laws Amendment Bill: Recognizing LLPs in IFSCA, decriminalisation  and easing compliances for AIF LLPs
Corporate Laws Amendment Bill: Easing, Streamlining and  Updating the Regulatory Framework 

NFRA Circular on effective communication between auditors and TCWG – Frequently Asked Questions

Team Corplaw | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Other resources:

NFRA’s Call for a Two-Way Communication: A New Requirement or a Gentle Reminder?

Corporate Laws Amendment Bill: Recognizing LLPs in IFSCA, decriminalisation  and easing compliances for AIF LLPs

– Team Corplaw | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

In line with an overhaul of changes proposed in the Companies Act, 2013, the Corporate Laws (Amendment) Bill proposes some changes in the Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) Act, 2008. Aimed at greater ease of doing business for corporates, the proposals are dominated by provisions to recognise LLPs operating in International Financial Services Centres by allowing them to issue and maintain share capital in foreign currency as permitted by the International Financial Services Centres Authority . Further, decriminalisation of various procedural defaults under the LLP Act have been provided for by replacing criminal provisions with civil penalties, , and easing compliances for Alternative Investment Funds which are formed asLLPs. 

Following definitions added: 

  • IFSC and IFSCA inserted and aligned with definition in International Financial Services Centres Authority Act, 2019
  • “Permitted foreign currency” to be specified by IFSCA in consultation with CG
  • “Specified IFSC LLP” meaning an LLP set up in an IFSC, and regulated by IFSCA
    • To facilitate LLPs operating in International Financial Services Centres allowing them to issue and maintain share capital in foreign currency

Specified IFSC LLPs

  • Registered office to be in IFSC
  • “IFSC LLP” to form part of its name.
  • If any LLP is regulated by SEBI or IFSC, primarily meaning AIFs:
    • Details of changes in partners to be furnished to the Registrar annually. 
    • Manner of filing changes in LLP Agreement to be prescribed.
  • Monetary value of contribution by partner in Specified IFSC LLP to be accounted for and disclosed only in permitted foreign currency and any prior contribution also to be converted to such foreign currency.
    • Subsequent monetary contribution not allowed without converting the same into permitted foreign currency.
  • To prepare its books and records in the permitted foreign currency, however, may be allowed to prepare in INR, if permitted by IFSCA. [Section 34(1)]
  • Specified IFSC LLPs may be required to use permitted foreign current for filings under this Act, however, payment of fees/fines/penalties, to be made in INR. [Section 68]

Incorporation/Conversion of/into LLP 

  • Changes in the LLP agreement, names and other details of partner of those LLPs regulated by SEBI or IFSCA to be intimated as may be prescribed i
  • Requirement of compliance statement by advocate/CS/CA/CMA replaced by the requirement of an affidavit, only in cases where such professional is engaged
  • Specified IFSC LLP to state its objects of financial service activities as per Section 3(1)(e) of IFSC Authority Act, 2019 
  • Enabling provisions for conversion of a specified trust, established under Indian Trusts Act, 1882 or Central/State Act and registered by SEBI/IFSCA, having prescribed activities. primarily aimed at AIFs formed as trust, to convert into LLPs. [Sections 57A and 58]

Adjudication and Penalties

  • Decriminalising extant provisions providing for punishment with:
    • Fine of Rs. 2,000-25,000 for failure to comply with Registrar’s summons/requisition to a penalty of Rs. 10,000 for failing to comply with any requisition of Registrar (other than summons). [Section 38(4)]
    • Fine of Rs. 25,000-5,00,000 for LLP, and Rs. 10,000-1,00,000 for every DP, for failure to comply with requirements of maintenance of accounts, and annual Statement of Account and Solvency to Rs. 100/day upto Rs. 1,00,000 for LLP, and Rs. 50,000 for DP.
  • LLP/Partner/DP expressly permitted to make application suo moto for adjudication of penalty.
  • For failure to comply with any requisition of the Registrar, penal actions will apply instead of fine  
  • From the commencement of the proposed legislation, where a provision in respect of any offence provided in LLP Act has been amended to provide for adjudication under the said section, the manner of withdrawal of the complaint and the manner of transfer of such matter for adjudication under such section, whether pending in the Court or otherwise, shall be dealt with in accordance with such Scheme as may be notified by the Central Government.
  • Appeal allowed against decision of Registrar  regarding name reservation (Section 16) or declining to incorporate LLP (Section 12). [Section 68B]

Valuation

  • Provisions of Section 247 of Companies Act, 2013 to apply mutatis mutandis for valuation of partner’s contribution, property/assets/net worth i.e. only valuer registered with IBBI in accordance with Section 247

Read our coverage on the amendments proposed in the Companies Act, 2013 here.

Webinar on Corporate Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026

Webinar on Corporate Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026

Register here: https://forms.gle/1iR2xaFKGBU1kRJ3A

Read our brief analysis of the proposals here:

Corporate Laws Amendment Bill: Easing, Streamlining and  Updating the Regulatory Framework 

Corporate Laws Amendment Bill: Recognizing LLPs in IFSCA, decriminalisation  and easing compliances for AIF LLPs

Corporate Laws Amendment Bill: Easing, Streamlining and  Updating the Regulatory Framework 

– Team Corplaw | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

The Statement of Objects and Reasons refers to the Govt’s constant “endeavour to facilitate greater ease of doing business for corporates”; after reading through the provisions of the Bill, that indeed seems to be the intent, though, as happens often, the intent may get miscarried.  The provisions are admittedly inspired by the recommendation of the 2025 High Level Committee on Non-financial Regulatory Reforms.

Broadly, the Bill focuses on decriminalisation, streamlining of provisions, bringing more audit quality oversight with powers to NFRA, regulation of the profession of valuations, etc. While doing so, it also makes the provisions of the State more aligned to present day realities, permitting greater digitisation, recognising concepts such as stock-appreciation rights or similar share-related benefits, etc. Note that the Bill has been referred to the Joint Parliamentary Committee.

Directors and KMPs

  • Directors related 
    • Independence criteria for Independent director
      • Clarification u/s 149(6)(e)(i) and (ii) referring to disability of a person to be appointed as ID in case of his association with the appointee company, its holding, subsidiary, associate or their auditor for not just “three financial years immediately preceding the financial year”  but also “or during the current financial year”. 
      • Amount of transaction allowed with a legal or consulting firm whose employee / partner / proprietor may be appointed as the ID of the company / its holding / subsidiary / associate has been changed from “10% or more of the gross turnover of such firm” to “amounting to 10% or such lower per cent., as may be prescribed of the gross turnover of such firm”
        • Where the transaction of such legal or consulting firm with the company, its holding or subsidiary or associate company is less than the prescribed thresholds, the ID may continue his association with the legal or consulting firm
      • Clarification: that every ID shall ensure that he continues to fulfil the requirements specified under sub-section (6) during the term of his appointment.
      • The restriction in respect of appointment or association in any other capacity during cooling off period of three years is applicable to the company as well as its holding, subsidiary or associate company.
      • Clarification: any period during which an ID has served as an additional director of the company, shall be included in his tenure as an ID
    • Additional director
      • An additional director may hold office up to the date of the next general meeting or up to a period of three months from the date of his appointment, whichever is earlier.
    • Restriction for appointment of a person not considered / approved to be director in a general meeting
      • a person whose appointment as a director could not be considered or could not be approved in a general meeting, shall not be appointed by the Board as an additional director, or alternate director or a director against a casual vacancy without the prior approval of its members
    • Disqualifications of a director
      • Clarified: While sec 188 has been decrimilarised since 2020, the respective reference u/s 164(1)(g) was not amended. Post amendment, a person has been subjected to a penalty for default under section 188 of the said Act will be disqualified from appointment. 
      • an auditor or a secretarial auditor or a cost auditor or a registered valuer or an insolvency professional of the company or its holding, subsidiary or associate company discharging the functions as such under the Act or under the IBC during the immediately preceding three financial years or during the current financial year, shall be disqualified to be appointed as a director.
      • What  or who is a “fit and proper person”
        • Criteria shall be prescribed in the rules
      • Reduces the period of non-filing of financial statements or annual returns from “3  financial years” to “2 financial years” so that companies are more diligent in filing such documents within time.
      • Default of sec 164(2) will lead to vacancy of office in every company where he is a director (including the company which is in default under that sub-section), after six months from the date of incurring such disqualification or upon expiry of his tenure in such company, whichever is earlier. Proviso to sec 167(1)(a) also proposed to be amended.  Of course, the automatic vacation of office takes place 6 months after the disqualification. This may result in a curious situation where every director of a defaulting company gets disqualified, leaving the company headless. How does a headless company ever come out of the default is a curious question. 
  • Board Meeting 
    • Small companies / OPC and dormant companies may have one BM in a calendar year against the requirement of one BM in each HY.
    • Subsequent disclosure u/s 184(1) will be required only in case of  any change in the disclosures made and not “at the first meeting of the Board in every financial year”.
  • Sec 185 (clarification)
    • LLPs are also covered along with firms u/s 185(1)(b) i.e company cannot extend loan / guarantee/ security in connection with loan to even LLPs where the directors / their relatives are partners 
  • Resignation by whole time Non director KMP – New insertion 203A.
    • CFO, CS may resign giving notice in writing to the company, 
    • Board shall take note and shall intimate the RoC:
    • In case of failure to intimate RoC by Board, said KMP may forward a copy of his resignation along with detailed reasons for his resignation to the RoC
    • Resignation takes effect from the date on which the notice is received by the company or the date, if any, specified by such KMP in the notice, whichever is later. This is, again, surprising as KMPs are not only office-holders, they are also bound by the contractual terms of their employment. It is unthinkable to think of an employment contract that allows an office holder at that level to resign with immediate effect. While the very intent of this provision is difficult to understand, in our view, the only way to align this with employment contracts is to say that for giving the notice u/s 203A, the KMP shall have to adhere to the employment contract. 
    • Such KMP will be liable even after his resignation for the default for which he was liable during his tenure.
  • Secretarial Audit  – Sec 204
    • Allowing multi disciplinary firms with majority of PCS as partners to undertake secretarial audit
  • Directors Report 
    • Additional disclosure in directors report:
      • While the management is required to explain or comment on every observation, comment or adverse remark of auditor, specific attention has been made to comment on matters relating to:
        • financial transactions
        • matters which have any adverse effect on the functioning of the company
        • maintenance of accounts
      • details in respect of composition of the ACB and where the Board had not accepted any recommendation of the ACB, a statement along with the reasons for the same

Issuance and buy of securities 

  • Private placement offences become more punitive: Proposed amendment to increase the penalty for private placement offences to Rs 2 crores or up to the amount involved in the placement, whichever is lower. This may potentially relate to some of the so-called private placements against which adjudication orders were made by some registrars. Read our related articles
  • More flexibility for Buyback of shares [Sec 68]
    • Power to prescribe different percentage of maximum buy-back value (based on aggregate of paid-up capital and free reserves) for prescribed class of companies
      • Currently the maximum buy-back size is 25% of aggregate of paid-up share capital and free reserves for all classes of companies
      • It appears that the government may offer more flexibility for scaling down business by companies; notably, the tax provisions for buybacks were rationalised by the Finance Act, 2026.
    • Enabling prescribed class of companies to make upto two buyback offers in a year; with minimum gap of 6 months between closure of first buyback offer and opening of second buyback
      • Such enabling clause is proposed for companies that are debt-free
      • Currently, minimum time gap between two buyback offers shall be atleast 1 year 
    • Doing away with the requirement of affidavit for declaration of solvency by the directors
  • Share capital of IFSC companies 
    • Section 43A inserted
      • Companies set up and incorporated in IFSC are allowed to convert, issue and maintain capital in permitted foreign currency
        • IFSCA will prescribe regulations. 
      • Books of accounts, financial statements and other records to also be aligned to be prepared in the  permitted foreign currency unless IFSCA permits to maintain these in Indian rupees

Presently, the Companies Act does not include specific provisions to enable companies to prepare accounts or financial statements in foreign currencies. Taking into account the nature of companies set up in IFSC jurisdiction, this is a welcome change. It also seeks to clarify that such companies shall pay fees, fines and penalties under the Companies Act and the rules made thereunder in Indian rupees.

  • Recognition of other forms of share-linked benefits, such as SARs, RSUs etc.  
    • Inclusion of reference to “or such other scheme linked to the value of the share capital of a company” in certain provisions, such as:
      • Issue of shares to employees on preferential basis in addition to ESOPs [Sec 62(1)(b)]
      • Class of security holders to be excluded while counting the number of allottees in a financial year for private placement limits [Sec 42(2)
        • Reason – executive compensation is issued with approval of shareholders
      • Enabling buyback of such securities [Sec 68(5)(c)]
  • Come-back provision: Trust not to be recognised as member [Sec 88(2A)]
    • The good old principle of CA 1956, that no notice of trust shall be taken in the register of members, subsequently removed in CA 2013, is now finding its way again.
    • Quite likely, the trigger may have been FATF concerns, to ensure that beneficial ownerships are not garbed under the so-called notice of trust. 
    • However, the classic principle that companies shall not recognise holding of shares in fiduciary capacity belongs to the bygone era where shares were partly paid, and companies had difficulty in claiming money from the contributories. In recent practices, the law specifically requires noting of beneficial interest [sec. 89] – hence the relevance of this provision is difficult to understand.

Dividend and IEPF 

  • Dividend and IEPF 
    • Clarified that the dividend not paid / claimed on the shares which has been transferred to IEPF, shall also be transferred to IEPF
    • Clarified that amounts in respect of shares bought back and extinguished, remaining unpaid or unclaimed for seven or more  shall be credited to IEPF

Audit and Auditors 

  • Audit and auditors
    • Non audit services
      • an auditor or audit firm of prescribed class or classes of companies shall not provide, directly or indirectly, any non-audit services to the company or its holding company or subsidiary
      • restriction under s. 144 shall also apply for a period of 3 years after the auditor or audit firm has completed his or its term u/s 139(2)
    • Fine prescribed for sec 143 (except sub-section 12) and sec 146
      • This will mean, if the auditor is not attending the general meetings, he shall be liable to fine and punishment under sec 147(2)
    • Cost Audit
      • Empower the Central Government to provide standards of cost accounting by rules, after examination of recommendations of the Institute of Cost Accountants of India.

NFRA 

  • Strengthening NFRA – Sec 132
    • NFRA shall be a body corporate 
    •  Chairperson shall have the power of general superintendence and direction of affairs of NFRA.
    •  the executive body of NFRA may, by way of a general or special order in writing delegate such of its powers and functions as it considers necessary to the chairperson
    • NFRA can give orders relating to imposing penalty or debar the member of the firm
    • NFRA can also give warning or censure to the member or the firm or may require additional professional training of the member or the firm or can also refer the  matter to central government for taking action 
    • any person who fails to comply with any order of the NFRA u/s 132(4) or fails to pay the penalty imposed shall be liable to punishment with imprisonment, fine and further period of debarment. 
    • NFRA shall meet at such times and places as specified by regulations of the  said authority.  
    • Appointment of secretary and such other employees shall be done by the NFRA.
    • No act or processing of NFRA shall be invalid merely by the reason of- 
    • (a) any vacancy in, or any defect in the constitution of such Authority; or (b) any defect in the appointment of a person acting as a member of such Authority; or (c) any irregularity in the procedure of such Authority not affecting the merits of the case. Subsection(16) to be inserted 
  • Intimation of registration details of auditors and filing of returns  – Section  132A
    •  No firm shall be appointed as auditor unless the individual or firm  intimates the details of his or its registration with the ICAI, to the NFRA within such time.
    • The auditors shall file such documents or returns or information with the NFRA, , as may be specified by regulations by the said Authority
    • Non compliance with the above provision shall attract penalty  of not less than twenty-five thousand rupees, but which may extend to five hundred rupees for each day during which such default continues, subject to a maximum of twenty-five lakh rupees, if such person is an auditor or an audit firm
    • If a person while performing his duties under this section, knowingly furnishes false information, omits material facts or wilfully alters/suppresses/destroys required documents he shall be liable to penalty of not less than fifty thousand rupees, but which may extend to one thousand rupees for each day during which such default continues, subject to a maximum of fifty lakh rupees, if such person is an auditor or an audit firm.
  • Section 132B
    • The CG may make grants to the NFRA.
    • NFRA fund shall be created and the following shall be credited there:
  • Grants by the Central government 
  • All fees received by the authority
  • All sums received by the said authority from such other sources
  • Interest  or other income received out of the investments made by NFRA.
  • The fund shall be applied for meeting the expenses of NFRA for the discharge of its functions.
  • NFRA can now give directions to the certain classes of companies as it considers appropriate.
  • NFRA can hold inquiry and it shall have power to summon and enforce attendance of any person
  • There are some more changes relating to NFRA which are not very relevant.

Corporate Social Responsibility 

  • Corporate Social Responsibility
    • Enhancing applicability threshold of net profit from 5 crore to 10 crore  under 135(1) 
    • Enable additional time period for transfer of unspent CSR amounts relating to ongoing projects to the Unspent CSR Account from “30  days” to “90 days” i.e extending the time till 29th day of June of each year. 
    • Companies having minimum CSR spent u/s 135(5) up to 1 crore (or such other higher amount) need not constitute the CSR Committee [sec 135(9)]
    • New insertion: prescribed class or classes of companies which fulfil prescribed conditions shall not be required to comply with the section

Schemes 

  • Easing of Schemes of arrangements
    • An important and welcome change: Schemes of arrangement will not require adjudication by multiple NCLTs in case of multiple states. Proviso to sub-section (1) allows the matter to be disposed of by the NCLT of the transferee or resulting company’s jurisdiction. Currently, a lot of time is lost as each Bench continues to wait for the orders of the other.
    • In case of  fast track mergers, applications are filed before jurisdictional RD by transferee/ resulting company, and in cases where the RD found that the application is not in public interest or in the interest of the creditor, RD is required to file an application to the Tribunal. Now, such application is to be made to the Tribunal  having jurisdiction over the transferee/resultant company only.
    • In case of demerger, a report from OL will not be  needed.
  • Fast Track mergers [Sec 233]
    • The amendment reduces approval requirements in the following manner- –
      • In case of members,  twin test approval will be applicable. i.e. ‘Majority in number representing 75% in value of the members present and voting’
      • In case of creditors, 75% majority in value will suffice as opposed to the present 90%..
    • Central Government gets power to make rules procedures with regard to fast track mergers u/s 233. 
  • A new Section 233A has been introduced, dealing with ‘Treasury shares’
    • While sec 230 and 232 specifically provides that any treasury shares arising as a result of a compromise or arrangement shall be cancelled and extinguished, however treatment w..r.t. Shares held prior to commencement of CA, 2013 are not provided in the Act.
    • To avoid misuse of voting rights vide such treasury shares, Section 233A now provides a three-year sunset period requiring all existing treasury stock in entities to not carry voting rights after such period.
    • Consequence of non compliance with the above is also prescribed as follows-
      • In case of failure to comply within the prescribed period of 3 years,  such shares shall be  cancelled or extinguished, and such extinguishment or cancellation will be treated as capital reduction
      • Further, non compliance will attract a penalty of Rs. 10,000/-  per day during which the default continues to the company and every officer in default.

IBBI to be Valuation Authority; valuers get significant powers and responsibilities 

  • IBBI – Appointed as “Valuation Authority” and entrusted with the powers to grant certificate to Registered Valuers and Valuers’ Organisation and imposing penalties in Registered Valuers
  • Appointment of a valuer will be done with audit committee resolution:
    • The new requirement that appointment of valuers will have to be done by the audit committee should be read with sec 247 (1) – it only relates to such valuations as are required under the Act.
  • Several powers, including those for regulation making, are proposed to be given to IBBI.

Striking off names of defunct companies – [Sec 248]

  • Conditions for strike off names by RoC becomes  to introduce other grounds
    • non happening of any significant accounting transaction in the preceding 2 years and in the current FY.
      • Meaning of significant accounting transaction same as u/s 455
    • Additionally, has not filed financial statements or annual returns that were due to be filed for two consecutive financial years preceding the previous financial year
    • An illustration to clarify the same has also been inserted.
    • In case of opting for striking off by companies, ‘manner of extinguishing liabilities’, to be prescribed vide Rules
    • The offence relating to filing an application for strike off in violation of the prescribed conditions has been decriminalised by replacing the penal provision with a monetary penalty
      • Earlier–  Punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 1,00,000 
      • Now: Liable to a penalty of Rs. 50,000
  • Revival application u/s 252
    • If made within 3 years of striking off, application to be filed before RD
  • If made after 3 years but before 20 years, application to be filed before NCLT
  • Incorporation related 
    • Declaration from professionals required at the time of incorporation only if their services are engaged in the formation or incorporation of such company [Sec 7(1)(ba)]
  • Ease of compliances 
    • Charges related
      • Additional time for registration of charges for prescribed class of companies (for e.g. – small companies)
        • 120 days instead of existing 60 days from creation of charge after payment of such ad valorem fees as may be prescribed. 
    • Auditor appointment (small companies)
      • Class of companies like small companies to be prescribed who, upon fulfilment of the prescribed conditions, shall not be required to appoint auditors under Chapter X. 
  • Moving towards digitalisation 
    • Powers to prescribe certain class of companies that will be required to maintain a website, an email address and other modes of communication [Sec 12A]
      • The class of companies will be listed companies or other unlisted public companies meeting prescribed thresholds 
      • The form and manner of these modes will be prescribed
      • Details of website, e-mail address and other modes of communication, and the changes therein shall be intimated to the Registrar in the prescribed manner and timeline
    • Powers to prescribe class of companies that will be required to service prescribed class of documents to their members only through electronic means [proviso to Sec 20(2)]
      • Manner in which members may seek physical copies will be prescribed
    • Enable holding of AGM and EGM in fully physical/ virtual/ hybrid mode in the manner prescribed under the rules [Sec 96 and 100]
      • However, mandatory to hold AGM in physical mode atleast once in every 3 years 
      • Number of members referred to in sec 100(2) may put requisition for the meeting to be held in a hybrid mode
      • For fully virtual EGMs, notice period to be reduced from 21 clear  days to 7 days or such period and manner to be prescribed by the rules 
  • In case of specific requisition by members to hold meeting in hybrid mode, mandatory to conduct meeting in such form
  • Penalty and prosecution 
    • Fixed penalty prescribed in place of a range of penalty 
    • The penal proposals inter-alia include the following: 
Section ActionExisting Penalty Proposed Penalty
4(5)(ii)Name applied by furnishing wrong or incorrect information Upto 1 Lakh50, 000
42(10) Makes offer or accepts money in contravention of sec. 42Upto money raised through private placement or 2 crore, whichever is lowerMoney raised through private placement or 2 crore, whichever is lower
128(6)MD, WTD, CEO fails to comply with Section 12950,000 – 5,00,005,00,000 – listed company and 50,000 -any other company
166(8) Director  violated the provisions of sec. 166 except sub-section (5) 1 lakh – 5 lakh Listed company – 5 lakhOther company – 2 lakh 
189Fails to comply with provisions w.r.t Register of contracts or arrangements in which directors are interestedNA2 lakh
446BLesser Penalty for certain companiesIn case of Company- upto 50% of penalty specified in provisions upto 2 lakh
In case of officer in default or any other person- upto 50% of penalty specified in provisions upto 1 lakh
In case of Company- 50%  or such per cent not exceeding the 50% penalty prescribed in such provision upto 2 lakh
In case of officer in default or any other person-50%  or such per cent not exceeding the 50% penalty prescribed in such provision upto 1 lakh
  • Fixed penalty in case of non-compliance under sec 152, 155, 156. Also fixing a maximum penalty upto 5 lakh in case of continuing non-compliance. 
  • Decriminalisation of offences under following provisions, including:
Section ActionExisting FIne Proposed Penalty
128(6)MD, WTD, CEO fails to comply with Section 12850,000 – 5,00,0005,00,000 – listed company and 50,000 -any other company
147(1)Punishment for contravention of provisions of sections 139 to 146Company- Fine – 25,000 – 5,00,000
OID – Fine – 10,000 – 1,00,000 
Company – Penalty – 1,00,000 – 5,00,000
OID – Penalty – 25,000 – 1,00,000
166(7)Default in complying with Section 166 except sub-section (5)Director – 1,00,000 – 5,00,000Listed company – 5,00,000Any other Company – 2,00,000
167(2)In case a Director continues as a director even when he knows that the office of director held by him has become vacant on account of any of the disqualificationsDirector – 1,00,000 – 5,00,000Listed company – 5,00,000Any other Company – 2,00,000
  • Realigning the financial year to the period ending on 31st March
    • Companies / body corporates which have changed their FYs pursuant to NCLT approval, may realign it back to period ending 31st day of March of the following year though:
      • Approving the application; or
      • On commercial consideration
  • Expansion of definition of small companies
    • increasing the upper limit of paid-up share capital to Rs 20 crore from existing 10 crore and upper limit of turnover to Rs 200 crore from existing 100 crore [sec 2(85)]

Compounding of certain offences [Sec 441]

  • Increase of  amount of fine involved to INR 1 crore for the RD to take up compounding matters 

Miscellaneous [Sec 447- 470]

  • Increase in limit of amount involving fraud 
    • The threshold for applicability of fraud leading to minimum 6 months  imprisonment increased to 25 lacs instead of 10 lacs. Any fraud involving an amount lesser than that also liable to face imprisonment which can extend to 5 years and/or fine of 1 crore rupees (earlier 50 lacs rupees).
  • Decriminalisation of certain offences like improper use of word ‘limited’ or ‘private limited’ 
  • CG reserves the power to issue  guidelines circulars and directions , for clarifying the intent of a provisions or laying out the procedural requirement with or without holding consultation with experts
  • Non disclosure of source of information where investigation has been probed by into SFIO
  • In the context of ‘Dormant Company’, significant accounting transaction also excludes receipt or payment not relatable to the business or operations of the company
  • Adjudication of Penalties
    • Assistant Registrar additionally may be appointed as adjudicating officers for adjudging penalty
    • CG to notify additional appellate authority in addition to RD, not below the rank to Joint Director
    • Appointment of Recovery officer for recovering penalty under the Act from persons who fail to pay with power to attachment and sale of movable and immovable property [Sec 454B]
    • Constitution of “Specified Authority” for conducting the settlement proceedings for contraventions which shall be liable for penalty under Act [Sec 454C]

Read our coverage on the amendments proposed in the LLP Act, 2008 here.

Webinar on Corporate Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026

NFRA’s Call for a Two-Way Communication: A New Requirement or a Gentle Reminder?

Tagging auditors and TCWG to make amends 

– Team Corplaw | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Introduction

NFRA moved the needle, and it is to be seen if the ocean starts boiling.! A 7th Jan 2026 circular from NFRA, addressed to listed entities and their auditors, seemed like an attention-drawer to standards of auditing which are already there, and yet, the auditing fraternity is holding meetings with boards and senior management of listed entities, to comply with what was always a compliance requirement. Does the 7th Jan circular bring up any new boxes to be ticked, any new procedures to be laid or responsibilities to be reiterated? As we detail out in this article, there may be need for action on several fronts on the part of listed entities – identification of nodal persons, listing developments that need to be communicated, constituting team for responding to the findings of the auditors in course of their audit other than those that sit in the audit report, formation of sub-groups of TCWG, etc. 

Read more

Partly Paid Shares – Whether Doppelganger of Share Warrants?

– Pammy Jaiswal and Saket Kejriwal | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Background

In recent times, the use of partly-paid shares has seen some traction[1] where several listed companies[2] came up with issuance of partly-paid shares[3]. While the law provides for the issuance of partly-paid securities, it is important to understand how this instrument has not been used merely as a capital-structuring tool, but arguably, as a regulatory workaround. An analogy may be drawn to a situation where a customer is allowed to purchase a valuable by paying a token money today and pay the full consideration after a period of say 1-2 years at the same price which prevailed at the time of payment of token money. Specifically, promoters and investors appear to be utilizing partly-paid shares as a substitute for share warrants, by paying a minuscule part of the value of shares as a part of application money and the balance payment is allowed to be made at any time in the future, sometimes after an unreasonably long time.

In this article, we argue that the issue of such partly-paid shares is as good as issuing share warrants, However, circumventing the challenges associated with warrants.

Fundamentals of Share Warrants

Ashare warrant is a security issued by a company that grants its holder the right/option to subscribe to equity shares of the company (i.e. Future Equity) at a predetermined price, within  a predetermined period, upon the upfront payment of a token amount referred to as the option premium.

Legal Context

A share warrant, being marketable in nature, provides a right in securities, therefore, it is treated as a security under Section 2(h) of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. Some of the relevant legal provisions would include:

  • Sections 42, 62 and other relevant provisions of the Companies Act, 2013; and
  • The SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018.

Key Features

  • Right to Decide: A share warrant allows an investor to subscribe to the company’s equity shares in the future, typically at a price lower than the anticipated market price at the time of exercise. Conversely, if the market price at the time of exercise falls below the pre‑determined price, the investor may choose not to subscribe, thereby limiting their loss to the option premium paid (i.e., the upfront cost), rather than incurring the full loss arising from the difference between the initial/subscription value and the reduced market price.
  • Option Premium: The upfront amount paid for obtaining this right is called the option premium i.e. if the current market value of shares is Rs.100, then the issuer may issue equity shares immediately at Rs.100, or Issue a share warrant where the investor pays Rs. 10 upfront for the right to subscribe the equity at Rs. 100 in the future. If, at the time of exercise, the market price of the share has risen to Rs. 120, the investor benefits from locking the price at Rs. 100, making the Rs. 10 upfront cost worthwhile. Conversely, if the market price falls to Rs. 50, the investor may choose not to exercise the warrant, limiting the loss to Rs. 10 i.e. option premium. This forms a part of the net worth of the company. For details on option pricing, may refer to our resource on Option Pricing Model.
  • Forfeiture: If the warrant holder chooses not to exercise the right, the upfront option premium is forfeited.

Pricing

The value of option premium is generally determined by Black Scholes Model, Binomial Options Pricing Model or Monte Carlo Simulation Method. The most appropriate method for calculation of option premium, in the context of companies using warrants as a regulatory workaround, is the Simulation Method.

One of the key features of share warrants is that the longer the life of the option, there is a higher probability of its price being high. In accordance with the above models, issuing share warrants for an extended period can raise the option premium to a point where it becomes undesirable. Therefore, it is recommended that the life of a warrant should be just and reasonable, and that it should not be used as a substitute for long‑term convertible instruments such as OCDs, CCDs, CCPS, or other similar securities.

Difference between warrants and partly-paid up shares

While both partly‑paid shares and warrants involve an upfront payment towards a future right in equity shares, they differ significantly on the following points:

Basis of DifferencePartly-Paid SharesShare Warrants
Right and ObligationHolder is obligated to pay the remaining call money when demanded by the company.   Failure to pay will lead to forfeiture of the subscription and call money received by the company.Holder has a right, but not an obligation, to subscribe to equity shares at a future date.
Nature of InvestmentThese are equity shares issued with part of the value paid upfront, making the holder a shareholder of the company.These are options issued for a premium, entitling the holder to subscribe for equity shares in the future.
ValuationShares are subscribed at fair value computed as on the date of making the first subscription/ call moneyShares are subscribed at current fair value on a future date along with payment of option premium
Shareholder RightsPartly-paid equity shareholders enjoy rights proportionate to their paid-up amount.No rights until conversion.

Why are partly-paid shares doppelgangers ?

Partly-paid shares in its usual nature when used for capital needs in tranches serves the permitted purpose for this concept was introduced, however, this benefit becomes a governance concern when it is used as an alternative to share warrants and as evident from the table above, the two differ in various aspects. The primary reason for this mirroring lies in valuation. In the case of share warrants issued with a longer tenor, the cost of the warrant, representing the right to subscribe to future equity, tends to be higher when calculated using fair value methods, making this option impractical. As an alternative, many companies have opted to issue partly-paid shares, allowing an investor to pay only a minimal upfront amount (similar to the option premium in the case of a warrant) as part of the application money and reserving the right with the investor to infuse the remaining funds for a longer period like 5-10 years which would not be possible in case of warrants as the premium will increase drastically, if calculated as per fair value methods.

Token money to secure allotment of shares

It is imperative to note that in case of share warrants, the price paid upfront is the option premium which is basically the price paid to get the equity at the current value at the future date as against in case of partly-paid shares, where the investor becomes a shareholder on the first payment date by even paying a nominal part amount reflecting the fair value (consisting of part face value and proportionate premium) as on the date of making such first payment. The catch lies in the fact that there is no legal prescription on the maximum time within which a company needs to make the final call on such partly-paid shares (except in case of IPOs) which in case of warrants runs up to 18 months for listed securities as well as size of the calls which in the case of listed companies requires at least 25% of the consideration amount calculated as per the formula for exercise price[4] with reference date being the record date shall be received at the time of option premium. 

One may argue that, given the fundamental difference between the two instruments is that one comes with a right (warrants) and the other with the security (partly-paid shares), they can not be used as substitutes as in case of partly-paid shares the right to call money lies with the Board and the investor is obligated to pay on demand, failing which shares may be forfeited, resulting in the loss of upfront amount paid.

On the other hand, a share warrant gives a right to the investor to decide when, or even if, to make the payment. If the investor chooses not to exercise the option, the upfront money paid is still forfeited, with the key difference being that the loss occurs at the investor’s discretion.

The above argument is valid theoretically. However, in practice, this mirroring is frequently used by start‑ups, which are generally incorporated as private companies. In such cases, although the ‘right to call money’ rests with the Board of Directors, the Board itself typically comprises the promoters i.e. the very investors who subscribe to these mirrored partly-paid shares or in the case of external investors/subscribers, their appointed representatives form an integral part of the Board. As a result, the obligation on the subscriber to pay the balance can, in reality, be viewed more as a right, given that it is exercised by a Board largely aligned with the interests of the investors themselves.

Additionally, partly-paid shares provide several benefits to the investor, like proprietary rights, chances to book profits in case of transfer, etc.We have discussed the same below:

Proprietary interest of partly-paid shares

Partly-paid shares are not merely rights in equity shares but allotment of the shares itself. Once an investor pays the subscription money/ first call, the shares are allotted to the investor who becomes a shareholder immediately and gets ownership rights from day one. Having said that, while the benefits arising out of such ownership is proportional to the amount paid up on the shares, it still dilutes the stake of the other investors who hold fully paid up shares.

The investor’s economic risk is lower compared to a fully paid-up shareholder since only part of the share price has been paid, the investor’s capital at risk is limited to the amount actually contributed, while the ownership position in the company already stands created.

Chance to book profits by transfer of partly-paid shares 

If an investor who has paid only a nominal amount intends to sell such shares for reasons like liquidity or apprehension of the investee not doing well for some reason, he stands a chance to make profits on the part payment where the fair value of such shares have appreciated at the time of such transfer. A purchaser can acquire ownership interest by paying only the fair value of the amount paid-up, while the remaining payment is effectively locked in at the historical fair value. This allows the investor to benefit from future upside without proportionately funding the company at the prevailing fair value for the unpaid portion, which remains priced at the value as on the date of issuance.

Imagine a situation where Mr. A invests in the partly-paid up equity shares of XYZ Ltd. The fair value of the equity shares is say INR 150 (face value INR 10) where Mr. A invests only INR 30 as paid up amount. Thereafter he decides to sell these partly-paid shares to another investor after 2 years by which time the balance amount is still uncalled. The transfer of these partly-paid shares would be done at a fair value where lets assume the value of the shares have appreciated and as a consideration, Mr. A receives INR 80 as the sale consideration and also passes on the legacy of holding partly-paid shares to the buyer.

However, this issue does not arise in listed companies, where market mechanisms ensure fair price discovery.

An Ideal partly-paid share

Situation where a partly-paid share shall not be considered as a share warrant

In our view, partly‑paid shares should be supported by a concrete plan or blueprint specifying when the call money is expected to be raised along with its purpose. This includes:

  • A defined timeline for making the call on unpaid money;

  • A specific purpose for which the call money will be used; and

  • An upfront subscription amount that is significant and reflects commitment, rather than being a token.

Even if an exact date cannot be determined, it is advisable to link the call to milestones/events ,such as regulatory approvals, project launches, or specific capital needs, rather than leaving it open-ended. This approach distinguishes a legitimate capital-raising intent from doppelganger design of warrants.

Situation where a partly-paid share shall be considered as a share warrant

A partly-paid share may raise regulatory concerns when above conditions do not exist. This includes situations where the initial application amount is nominal, resulting in minuscule capital infusion. Additionally, if the call structure is vague and lacks a defined timeline or commercial justification, it creates ambiguity around the company’s intention to actually raise the remaining capital. The concern is further amplified when the Board of Directors, which holds the discretion to make the call on these partly-paid shares, is influenced or controlled by the very investors who subscribed to these shares. In such scenarios, the obligation to pay the balance amount may become just theoretical.

Conclusion

The intention behind partly-paid shares is to raise capital while allowing the issuer to secure future source of funding, However, when a minuscule amount is paid at the time of subscription of partly-paid shares and the remaining calls are deferred for a long period without any definite /concrete plan, this raises concern as sighted above and from a valuation perspective may not be seen as a partly-paid shares.


[1] Economic Times

[2] Economic Times

[3] Economic TImes

[4] Regulation 67 of SEBI ICDR, 2018

Read more:

Share warrants under cloud – are companies not allowed to issue share warrants?

Downstreamed through intermediaries: Deemed public issue concerns for privately placed debt

– Vinod Kothari and Payal Agarwal | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

While equity is the “flavour of the season”, companies can produce efficient returns on equity only if they leverage it; therefore, companies are also reaching out to investors through debt issuance. Most of the bond issuance in India is privately placed; however, it is increasingly common for companies to reach out, mostly through intermediaries, to HNIs and other  investors to invest in privately placed listed debt. While some of it happens through OBPPs (see an article on Regulatory framework for Online Bond Platform), much of it is simply distributed to investors by brokers, portfolio managers, distributors, investment advisers, and so on. Question is, if a privately placed bond issue is downsold, through intermediaries, to more than 200 investors, will the issue itself be regarded as a “deemed public offer” and therefore, require compliance with public offer norms as per Part I of Chapter III of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Chapter III of the SEBI (Issue and Listing of Non-Convertible Securities) Regulations, 2021. 

If you cannot do something, you cannot employ someone to do it. In Sanskrit Nyayavali, there is a maxim that reads:

यः करोति  स करोत्येवेति  न्यायः

This maxim is used to denote that the responsibility of one who sets another to do a thing is quite equal to that of the doer himself. That is, what you cannot do, you cannot employ someone to do.

If a bond issuer engages an intermediary to downsell an issue to an undefined group of investors, it must be taken to be the act of the issuer itself. While mostly the focus is on the magical number 200, but 200 is only the “deeming line”. The real line of distinction is – did I reach out to a closed group of investors who were known to me, or did I make a wide and open offer to whoever might be interested. Even if one might contend that all the offerees were known to the offerers, the 200 lakshman rekha will still apply and will result in the so-called private placement being taken as a public offer.

This article discusses:

  • The contours of the deemed public offer provision in context of bonds 
  • What difference would be made if the bonds were privately placed and listed
  • Is the limit to be counted for all bonds issued in a year, or per ISIN or per bond issuance?
  • What if the intermediary buys the bonds from secondary market and then downsells the same?
  • How is the nexus between the bond issue and downselling derived/deduced?
  • What difference is made if the bonds are sold on OBPPs? What are the defining features of an OBPP, as opposed to securities intermediaries?
  • So, in what circumstances will a downsold bond not result in a breach of sec. 25(2) and 42 of the Companies Act / NCS Regs?

There have been various actions taken by ROC against use of crowdsourcing platforms for equity shares. Refer our article on Crowdsourcing funds faces stiff penal actions.

Contours of deemed public offer on bond issuance 

Section 25(2) of the Companies Act specifies cases that may be considered as a deemed public offer. 

For the purposes of this Act, it shall, unless the contrary is proved, be evidence that an allotment of, or an agreement to allot, securities was made with a view to the securities being offered for sale to the public if it is shown—

(a) that an offer of the securities or of any of them for sale to the public was made within six months after the allotment or agreement to allot; or

(b) that at the date when the offer was made, the whole consideration to be received by the company in respect of the securities had not been received by it.

Additionally, in terms of section 42(11) of the Act, a private placement offer, non-compliant with the provisions of Section 42(2) shall be deemed to be a public offer and shall attract the provisions as applicable to any public offer. Section 42(2) requires that a private placement offer be made only to pre-identified investors and to not more than 200 persons in a financial year. Penalty for breach of section 42 may stretch to the amount of funding raised, capped at Rs 2 crores. Further, the issuer is also required to refund all monies with interest to subscribers within a period of 30 days of the order imposing the penalty. The interest is to be paid at the rate of 12% p.a. calculated from the expiry of the 60th day from the date of the receipt of application money for such securities till the time the money has been refunded. 

Thus, downselling of bonds by the investor within 6 months of issuance by the bond issuer results in a deemed public offer. Further, in case of a public offer, section 40 mandates the listing of securities, in case of public offer of securities. In case of listed or proposed to be listed securities, Section 24 of the Act extends SEBI’s authority to administer the provisions of the Act (Chapter III and IV) in relation to the issue and transfer of such securities.

Deemed public issue in privately issued bonds and recent SEBI orders 

In an August 2025 order pertaining to downselling of privately placed unlisted NCDs to 699 investors, the issuer contended that the allotment of NCDs was made to a single investor on private placement basis, and any subsequent transfer of such securities within 6 months from its allotment is an independent action of the investor, with no direction or influence from the issuer. Here, SEBI referred to the legal maxim ‘acta exterior indicant interior secreta’ (external action reveals inner secrets) to rule out the aforesaid contention of the issuer. 

In the facts of the said case, the investor (primary subscription) was referred to as Debenture Holder Representative (DHR), and the investor was identified as a depository account of such DHR. The issue related documents indicated the primary subscriber’s intention to downsell, and not to hold investments in the NCDs.  

In the said case, while dealing with the concept of “deemed public offer”, SEBI also interpreted the construct of section 25, and observed: 

The expression “with a view to” in section 25 indicates  the  reason  or  goal  behind  an  action. It  signifies  the  action  being  taken  with  a specific  objective  in  mind  and  implies  a  forward-looking  perspective,  suggesting  that  the action is a means to an end. It is pertinent to mention that such intent, design or reason can be  drawn  from  a  mass  of  factual  details  and  can  be  gleaned  from  the  whole  gamut  of surrounding foundational facts and circumstances both poste and ante the typical gambit of allotment in this case.

SEBI also held that: 

…(unless the contrary is proved) if it is shown that an offer of the securities allotted or of any of them, for sale to the public was made within six months after the allotment or agreement to allot, it is presumed that the allotment or an agreement to allot the securities was made with a view to the securities being offered to the public and the document whereby the offer for sale is made shall be deemed to be a prospectus under section 25(1).

The order also referred to another adjudication order of SEBI dated 20th September, 2023 (subsequently settled on 10th April, 2024). In the said case, the allotment of NCDs was made in the portfolio demat account of the primary investor, which were subsequently transferred to 355 investors. The application money was also received from the portfolio pool account of the investor, and not the proprietary account. In the facts of the case, the investor had also acted as a structurer of the deal and received an advisory fee from the issuer for the same.

Downselling of privately placed “listed” bonds

Securities, once listed, are freely transferable. There is no lock-in period or transfer restrictions on the listed bonds. Therefore, a question arises on whether the downselling restrictions and deemed public issue implications arise in a case where the NCDs are issued through private placement, and listed on the stock exchanges? 

In our view, if the bonds were privately placed, but have been downsold in a quick succession, it is implied that the downselling was a part of the primary issuance. In such cases, the issuer may be said to have violated public issue norms by calling what was really a public offer as a private placement. Thus, if the nexus between primary issuance through private placement and secondary transfer to retail investors is clear, it is substantively a public offer, being camouflaged as a private placement. The impugning issue here is not the sale of a listed security, but claiming the issue to be private placement, though with distribution nexus.

Had the securities been intended to be offered to the public, the same should have been done through “public issue” of such bonds, and not through the “private placement” route. 

Downselling of bonds purchased from secondary market

The trigger of deemed public issue norms is not based on the number of stopovers; what is relevant is the intent of downselling to the retail public. For instance, consider a case where the issuer issues bonds to XYZ Ltd, an investor. The investor, in turn, transfers the same to a market intermediary (portfolio manager/ stock broker etc). Now, the market intermediary downsells such bonds to a large number of investors. The proximity of each of the aforesaid events, viz., (a) primary issuance, (b) secondary transfer to intermediary and (c) downselling by intermediary to public – are itself suggestive of the ultimate intent of downselling. Therefore, in such cases as well, the provisions of deemed public issue should apply. 

Further, where a registered market intermediary acts as a conduit investor to facilitate such transfers, SEBI may also take action against the same. For instance, In an adjudication order dated 25th April, 2023, SEBI has levied penalty on the registered intermediary (portfolio manager) for having facilitated downselling of privately placed securities in violation of the regulatory requirements. Similarly, in the August 2025 order referred above, while penalty has not been levied on the conduit investor, SEBI observed the following in relation to the role of the conduit investor: 

Down-selling of the NCDs cannot entirely be a unilateral and independent act without the involvement of other parties and the entire scheme could not have been possible without the connivance of the parties involved.

Nexus between primary issuance and secondary transfers

Section 25(2) of the Act refers to a time gap of six months between primary issuance and secondary transfer for considering the same as a deemed public issuance. The time period of six months is for the purpose of reasonability of connection between the primary issuance and the secondary sale. Thus, proximity between primary issuance and secondary transfer is one of the factors to be considered. 

Sometimes, attending circumstances make it clear that the intent of the intermediary was to downsell. For example, the intermediary may have reached out to the potential investors, sourced their intent to subscribe or actually procured their subscriptions, and then may have made the investment in the bonds. Or, as sometimes seen, there may be an irrevocable intent expressed by the ultimate investors to invest the subject bonds.

Charging of fees, by whatever name called, by the primary investor from the issuer may also indicate that the fees is being charged by the investor for acting as a conduit in the private placement offer of the issuer. 

Because the substantive view of the arrangement in its entirety is by connecting the dots together, the view may be subjective, but mostly, it is not difficult to discern.

Limit on number of offerees: each ISIN or each issuer? 

Section 42(2) r/w Rule 14 of the PAS Rules provides that an offer or invitation to subscribe securities under private placement should only be made upto 200 investors (excluding QIBs and employees under ESOP) in aggregate for a financial year. Further, an explanation to Rule 14(2) clarifies that the limit would be reckoned individually for each kind of security that is equity share, preference share or debenture. The same is based on the recommendations of the Report of the Companies Law Committee, 2016

The term “securities” is defined to include “debentures”, however, different series of debentures having different terms of issue, inter alia, nature of security, nature of listing, terms of conversion (OCDs, NCDs etc) does not comprise a separate “kind” of security altogether. ISIN (International Securities Identification Number) of securities is a unique 12-character alphanumeric code that identifies a specific financial security, such as a stock, bond, or mutual fund unit. As such, it is merely a tool of identification of security rather than a determinant of the kind of security.  Accordingly, the limit of 200 under the Rule should be reckoned at the issuer level for each type of security and not on ISIN basis. 

Sale of privately placed bonds by Online Bond Platform Providers

Offer of NCDs in secondary market transactions are permitted through the registered Online Bond Platform Providers (OBPP), as per Reg 51A of NCS Regulations read with Chapter XXI of the Master Circular for issue and listing of Non-convertible Securities, Securitised Debt Instruments, Security Receipts, Municipal Debt Securities and Commercial Paper. However, the OBPP is required to be registered with SEBI and their services are restricted to only (a) listed bonds and (b) bonds that are proposed to be listed through a public offering. 

In case of OBPPs, the concept itself was introduced to facilitate offering of listed debentures, in a controlled and compliant environment. That the lock-in restrictions of six months do not apply in case of sale of bonds through OBPP has been discussed by SEBI in its Board Meeting dated 30th Sep, 2022. Para 3.4.3. of the Board Note provides the rationale, as summarised below: 

SEBI already has regulations on issue and listing of privately placed debt securities which inter-alia provides for furnishing of private placement memorandum (which itself is very elaborate), memorandum of association, articles of association, requisite resolutions from the board or committees authorizing such listing of securities on stock exchanges. Once listed, the issuer has to follow all the requirements including detailed disclosures at various intervals. Hence, once the securities are listed, there is not likely to be any circumvention of key public issue requirements. Lock-in requirements, if introduced, may rob the investors from liquidity and the opportunity to exit their investments, if so desired. Debt investors may involve mutual funds or other institutional investors. Restrictions on liquidity can have ramifications which could have large scale implications. Accordingly, the lock-in requirement for listed debts is not proceeded with. 

However, it is to be noted that the registered OBPP can deal only in listed or to-be listed securities. The OBPP is not permitted to offer unlisted bonds/ other products either through the same platform or through a separate platform/ website. In this regard, SEBI, in its interim order dated 18th November, 2024, took action against three unregistered OBPPs that facilitated the offering of unlisted NCDs to retail investors.

Circumstances where downselling does not result in deemed public issue 

We will want to conclude the write up with some thoughts. 

The fact that an issuer cannot market debt instruments to over 200 investors surely cannot mean that at no point of time, the number of investors can exceed 200. While securities of a public company are freely transferable, even if the company is a private company, after listing of the debt securities, the transfers thereafter are largely beyond the control of the issuer. Therefore, the real issue is not the actual number of persons who have invested in the bonds: the real issue is, to how many persons was the issue offered? 

Hence, if the nexus between the issuance, and the downselling, is not clear or unambiguous, secondary market transactions do not necessarily hint at the intent of offering to over 200 investors. Even the provision of sec. 25 (2) (a) of the Companies Act is a rebuttable inference – it is capable of being dismissed by contrary evidence. Below, we list out some illustrative situations where it may be possible to contend that the issuer did not make an offer to over 200 investors:

  1. The primary investor of the bonds makes an offer on OBPP. As discussed above, the same is exempt from the deemed public issue restrictions u/s 25(2)(a).  
  2. There are acquirer/acquirers who have made a genuine investment in the bonds, and after a reasonable time, make a phased exit by downselling the bonds
  3. A portfolio manager acquires the bonds in the names of various clients, spaced over time, indicating clearly that the acquisition by the PMS clients was not a part of the initial offer.

We do understand the growing debt market in India needs wider investor participation, but there have been instances in the past where the device of private placement was exploited to the hilt. Hence there has to be that delicate balance between regulatory concerns and the need for broadbasing of listed debt, which is why instrumentalities like OBPPs have been permitted. 

Our other resources:

Crowdsourcing funds faces stiff penal actions

Resource Centre on Corporate Bonds

Introducing common offer document disclosures for Private Placement and Public Issue

Revamping private placement mechanism

Virtual Certificate Course on Grooming of Chief Compliance Officers of NBFCs

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Refer our other resources:

  1. Tech-driven compliance monitoring and validation of internal models
  2. Compliance-o-meter: From abstraction to structured granular assessment
  3. Compliance Risk Assessment
  4. Enhanced Corporate Governance and Compliance Function for larger NBFCs

Exempting IFSCA-registered Finance Companies from section 186

Ayush Kumar – Executive | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Background:


With a view to promoting ease of doing business for Finance Companies (FCs) operating in the IFSC jurisdiction, the MCA, upon the request of the IFSCA, has vide its notification dated November 3, 2025, extended the exemptions available under section 186 of the Companies Act, 2013, to FCs registered with the IFSCA – similar to those already available to NBFCs registered with the RBI.


Exempted companies – existing exemption list 

Under the existing framework, the following companies were exempted from section 186 (except sub section (1)), if loan given, guarantee made, security in connection with loan given, investment in securities done was in the ordinary course of business of:

  • Banking company
  • Insurance company
  • Housing finance company
  • Registered NBFCs
    • which is in the business of giving loans or providing any guaranty or security for due repayment of any loan 
  • Company established with the object of and engaged in the business of providing infrastructural facilities

Finance Companies registered with IFSCA – added in the exemption list 

Finance Companies are defined under Rule 2(1)(e) of IFSCA (Finance Company) Regulations, 2021. 

  • FCs should be separately incorporated 
  • It is not a Banking Unit registered with IFSCA
  • It deals in permitted activities under Reg 5(1)
  • It cannot accept public deposit from residents / non-residents 

FCs engaged in the following permitted activities (Eligible FCs) are exempted from the applicability of sec 186:

The condition for availing the exemption remains the same as that for NBFCs and other companies i.e the loan / guarantee / security in connection with loan should be extended in the ordinary course of its business.

Related articles:

  1. IFSC Finance Company: Section 186 Compliance Not Required for Routine Financial Activities
  2. Two’s cute, three’s a crowd?
  3. Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017 brings relief under sections 185 and 186

Our resource centre on IFSCA – https://vinodkothari.com/resources-on-ifsca/