The Swap that does it all: RBI introduces total return swaps on corporate bonds

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– Dayita Kanodia & Siddharth Pandey | finserv@vinodkothari.com

Budget 2026 proposed to introduce Total Return Swaps (TRS) for corporate bonds, purportedly as a measure for synthetic trading in corporate bonds. However, given the very slow pick up of credit default swaps, the much easier and globally prevalent version of credit derivatives, will the more esoteric TRS really make a difference? We explain what TRS is, how it differs from a CDS, give a sense of the global data on TRS as a part of OTC credit derivatives, and discuss how much the new measure will impact India’s bond market.

On February 6, RBI, in furtherance of the announcement in the Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies dated February 6, 2026, issued the draft revised Master Direction – RBI (Credit Derivatives) Directions, 2022. (‘Draft CD Directions’). The Draft CD Directions permit TRS to be issued to eligible persons.

Background

India’s credit derivatives market has historically remained shallow, with hardly any transanctions involving credit default swaps. This has resulted in limited hedging options focused only on default risk and an absence of tools for transferring market and price risk.

This contrasts sharply with global trends. As of mid-2025, the notional outstanding volume of OTC derivatives exceeded USD 840 trillion, with credit derivatives, despite being smaller in absolute size than interest rate or FX derivatives, recording the fastest year-on-year growth at approximately 23%.

It may be noted that as of 1996, which is when credit derivatives had almost started emerging and gaining strength, TRS transactions were significant and took up almost 32% of the market share. However, the percentage of TRS dropped. Over time, CDSs overtook the position because CDSs are more definitive and limit the risks of the protection seller. In 2025, as per 118th edition of the OCC’s Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activities based on call report information provided by all insured U.S. commercial banks and others, the TRSs had become a smaller segment representing 4.9 per cent of the credit derivative market.

Meaning of TRS

In simple terms, a TRS swap transfers the entire volatility of returns of a reference asset from one party to another. TRS is a kind of derivative contract wherein the protection buyer agrees to transfer, periodically and throughout the term of the contract, the actual returns from a reference asset to the protection seller (“floating returns”), and the latter, in return, agrees to transfer returns calculated at a certain spread over a base rate (“fixed returns”) Total returns include the coupons, appreciation, and depreciation in the price of the reference bond. On the other hand, the protection seller will pay a certain base rate, say, risk free rate, plus a certain spread. The protection seller in the case of a TROR swap is also referred to as the total return receiver, and the protection buyer is similarly called the total return payer. The figure below illustrates the essential mechanics of a total return swap.

Impact of TRS
TRS swaps originate from synthetic equity structures, where economic returns of an asset are transferred without any actual investment in the underlying. The structure separates economic exposure from legal ownership. In a TROR swap, the economic impact is such that the total return receiver assumes the position of a synthetic lender to or investor  in the bonds  of the reference obligor, while the total return payer becomes a synthetic lender to the counterparty. Consider the illustration below:

  • Party PB invests in the unsecured bonds of entity X carrying a fixed coupon of 9.5 per cent. 
  • PB then enters into a TROR swap with PS, under which PB agrees to transfer the actual returns from the bonds of X and, in return, receive MIBOR plus 100 basis points.
  • Under the terms of the swap, PB periodically transfers the coupon income, plus any market price appreciation minus any market price r depreciation in the bonds, while PS periodically pays MIBOR plus 100 basis points. 
  • Although PB technically holds the bonds of X, in substance PB has neither exposure to X nor to the returns generated by X. Instead, PB is economically exposed to PS at MIBOR plus 100 basis points, which is equivalent to having invested in PS at that rate.
  • Conversely, PS, despite not holding the bonds of X, is economically exposed to the actual returns from X’s bonds (net of MIBOR plus 100 basis points). The effect of the TROR swap is therefore to synthetically create a fully refinanced investment in the bonds of X, giving a return equal to the actual returns in the bonds, and having a funding cost equal to MIBOR plus 100 basis points.

Thus, the true impact of a TROR swap is the synthetic replacement of exposures. Consequently, the advantages of a TRS can be:

  • Off-balance sheet exposure: TRS creates synthetic assets without recording loans or bonds on balance sheets improving leverage ratios and capital efficiency.
  • Regulatory Arbitrage: TRS has been used to bypass investment or lending restrictions, such as exposure norms, concentration limits, etc.
  • Provides very high leverage: In the above illustration, the synthetic investment made by the O in the bond is highly leveraged, assuming no margin has been put by the PS.
  • Alternative to a Repo: Assume PB holds a bond and is looking at having it funded. It sells the bond to Q and simultaneously enters into a TRS transaction, paying MIBOR + spread and receiving the actual returns of the bond. Hence, PB continues to have an economic stake in the bond whereas for accounting purposes, the bond may be removed from the balance sheet of PB.

TRS structures have been used globally across a wide range of asset classes, including equities, bonds, loans, real estate and property interests, credit-linked notes, and portfolios or indices of such assets. Hence, a TRS is a credit derivative only when the reference asset is a credit asset, otherwise it is a generic total return derivative. The Draft CD Direction framework deliberately confines TRS usage to specified debt instruments in order to prevent synthetic funding and balance-sheet arbitrage.

CDS Vs TRS

AspectsCDSTRS
Basic DefinitionA credit derivative contract where a protection seller commits to pay the buyer in the event of a credit event.A credit derivative contract where a payer transfers the entire economic performance of an asset to a receiver (protection seller).
Risk TransferredTransfers only the credit risk associated with a specific obligation. 
The protection seller is only concerned with the risk of default or increase in credit spreads of the asset. That is, the reference transaction only shifts the risk of credit spreads		Transfers the total volatility of returns, including credit risk, interest rate risk, and market risk. 
The receiver gains exposure to all gains and losses (coupons, appreciation, and depreciation).
Cash Flow MechanicsThe buyer makes periodic premium payments to the seller until maturity or a credit eventInvolves a periodic exchange of cash flow, the payer gives returns and appreciation; the receiver gives a benchmark rate + spread and depreciation.

No fixed premium; the premium  is inherent in the difference between actual returns and the agreed-upon spread
Synthetic ImpactUsed primarily for credit insurance or hedging against specific default.Used to synthetically replace the entire exposure of the parties, causing the receiver to assume the position of a synthetic lender to the reference obligation.

Types of TRS

Total Return Swaps can be categorized into several types based on their underlying assets and funding structures:

  • Index-Based TRS: Instead of a specific bond, the returns are linked to a diversified index (e.g., a broad-based index of 100 high-yield corporate bonds). The RBI specifically allows these if the index is composed of eligible debt instruments and published by an authorized administrator.
  • Equity Swaps: A type of TRS where the reference asset is one or more equity securities. Here, the total return payer pays the return from the equity or the portfolio, and in turn, receives a base rate spread.
  • Property Derivatives: The TRS methodology has been applied to swapping the returns of property investments also, allowing investors to synthetically invest in properties or property indices. 
  • Structured TRS:  Here, the reference assets would be a pool of loans or bonds. The transaction will make uses of the credit-linked notes.

See further details on TRS in the book on Credit Derivatives and Structured Credit Trading by Mr Vinod Kothari

Regulatory framework for TRS

The Draft CD Directions permit the use of TRS while adding multiple safeguards to ensure that TRS functions strictly as a credit risk transfer instrument and not as a means of synthetic funding, balance-sheet arbitrage, or regulatory circumvention. The regulatory framework governs four key aspects:

  • Eligible participants,
  • Permissible reference assets,
  • Permitted purposes for which these instruments may be used, and
  • Prudential safeguards.

Eligible participants for TRS

Para 4.1.2(iii) of the revised Directions stipulates that at least one counterparty to every credit derivative transaction must be a market-maker. For this purpose, market-makers are defined to include 

  • Scheduled Commercial Banks, 
  • Large NBFCs (including HFCs and SPDs) with a minimum net owned fund of ₹500 crore, and
  • Specified financial institutions such as NABARD, SIDBI, and EXIM Bank.

This requirement ensures that TRS transactions are intermediated by regulated entities with adequate risk management capabilities.

In alignment with this overarching requirement, the Draft CD Directions prescribe the following specific eligibility conditions for TRS:

  • TRS may be offered only by market-makers, ensuring that such transactions are undertaken by regulated entities with adequate risk management capabilities.
  • Residents (other than individuals) may enter into TRS without any restriction on the purpose, allowing both hedging and non-hedging purposes.
  • Persons resident outside India may enter into TRS only for the purpose of hedging, and such TRS may be offered to them exclusively by market-makers.

Reference entities and reference assets for TRS

In addition to prescribing eligible participants, the Draft CD Directions impose strict controls on the nature of reference entities and assets that may be used for TRS transactions. These controls are intended to ensure transparency, prevent regulatory arbitrage, and avoid the creation of complex or opaque synthetic exposures.

Reference entity: 

A reference entity refers to the issuer whose credit risk and economic performance form the basis of the TRS contract. For TRS, the reference entity shall be a indian resident entity that is eligible to issue Reference assets under the Draft CD Directions.

By limiting reference entities to domestic issuers of eligible debt instruments, the framework ensures that TRS activity remains in the Indian corporate debt market, which was also the regulatory intent.

Reference assets: 

A reference asset refers to the underlying corporate bond or debt instrument issued by the reference entity or an index of underlying debt instruments specified in a total return swap contract. The Draft CD Directions specify the following as eligible reference assets for TRS:

  • Money market debt instruments;
  • Rated INR-denominated corporate bonds and debentures;
  • Unrated INR-denominated corporate bonds and debentures issued by Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) set up by infrastructure companies; and
  • Bonds with call and/or put options.

At the same time, the Directions expressly prohibit TRS on certain instruments, including asset-backed securities, mortgage-backed securities, credit-enhanced or guaranteed bonds, convertible bonds, and other hybrid or structured obligations. This exclusion reflects regulatory caution against layering derivatives on complex or credit-enhanced products that could obscure risk transfer.

Index-based reference assets

The Draft CD Directions also permit a TRS to reference an index, provided that:

  • The index comprises only eligible debt instruments as specified above; and
  • The index is published by a financial benchmark administrator duly authorised by the RBI under the Reserve Bank of India (Financial Benchmark Administrators) Directions, 2023

Although such index based reference asset has been introduced for CDS and TRS, no such index for debt securities exists currently. Accordingly, such an index must be developed. 

Preventing Regulatory circumvention:

Para 4.5.1(ii) of the Draft CD Directions expressly provides that market participants shall not undertake credit derivative transactions, including Total Return Swaps, involving reference entities, reference obligations, or reference assets where such transactions would result in exposures that the participant is not permitted to assume in the cash market, or where they would otherwise violate applicable regulatory restrictions. This provision prevents the use of TRS to bypass exposure limits, concentration norms, sectoral caps, or investment restrictions applicable to the participants.

Additional safeguards for TRS used for hedging

Where a TRS is entered into for the purpose of hedging, the market-maker is required to ensure that the user satisfies the following conditions:

  • The user has an existing exposure to the relevant reference asset
  • The notional amount of the TRS does not exceed the face value of the reference asset held by the user, and
  • The tenor of the TRS does not extend beyond:
    • The maturity of the reference asset held by the user, or
    • The standard TRS maturity date is immediately following the maturity of the reference asset.

These safeguards reinforce the principle that hedging-oriented TRS must remain strictly co-terminous and proportionate to the underlying exposure, thereby avoiding over-hedging or speculations. Further, the Draft CD Direction specify that the settlement rules and standard documentation will be specified by shall be specified by the Fixed Income Money Market and Derivatives Association of India (FIMMDA), in consultation with market participants. However, the market participants are allowed to, alternatively, use a standard master agreement for credit derivative contracts.

Will it impact the bond markets in India?

Will this new instrument have an impact on bond markets in India? The first instance of guidelines on credit derivatives was issued in 2011; this failed to have any impact at all. Then, after the report of the Working Group, new Credit Derivatives Directions were issued in 2022. These also, at least based on anecdotal market information, have not had any significant traction at all.

CDS is much more standardised than TRS; as we have noted above, TRS is only 4.9% of the global credit derivatives market. Will the Indian market, which has not yet picked up credit spread trading in the form of CDS, delve into a far more esoteric TRS trade? Was it based on any reasoned or surveyed market feedback that this regulatory change was inspired? These questions, a priori, are difficult to answer. However, like a new flavour of ice cream, you never know until you try it.

Other Resources:

  1. Draft Credit Derivatives directions: Will they start a market stuck for 8 years?
  2. Page on Credit Derivatives
  3. Book on Credit Derivatives and Structured Credit Trading

Quick Bytes on Union Budget 2026

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Our Resources

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  2. State of Climate Finance: Domestic Resources Insufficient to Bridge Funding Gaps 
  3. Microfinance and NBFC-MFIs in Economic Survey 2026
  4. Economic Survey 2026: Key Insights on Infrastructure Financing

Strengthening India’s Corporate Bond Market: A Look at NITI Aayog’s Recommendations

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Simrat Singh | finserv@vinodkothari.com

India’s aspiration to become a US $30 Trillion economy by 2047 rests on its ability to mobilise long-term, stable and affordable capital. Debt capital can be an attractive source for this. While banks have historically been the backbone of credit intermediation in India, a bank-dominated financial system may be inadequate to meet the financing needs of a developing country like India which includes long-gestation exposures to infrastructure, climate transition, manufacturing and other emerging sectors. Recognising this constraint, NITI Aayog’s report on Deepening the Corporate Bond Market in India (‘Report’) lays out reforms to develop corporate bonds as another major tool for mobilising long-term low-cost capital. 

In this note we highlight some of the reforms being advocated in the Report.

Key Thrust Areas of Reforms:

Regulatory Efficiency 

A central theme of the Report is the need to reduce regulatory friction arising from fragmented and overlapping oversight by SEBI, RBI and the MCA for corporate bonds. Inconsistent treatment of similar bonds, procedural complexity, overlapping disclosures and different approval timelines are identified as major constraints, particularly for public issuances and lower-rated issuers. A specific concern highlighted is issuer-based regulation: bonds issued by banks and NBFCs are regulated by the RBI, while similar bonds issued by non-financial corporates fall under SEBI and MCA oversight. This results in different disclosure standards and compliance processes for similar bonds

To combat this, first, the Report calls for stronger inter-regulatory coordination and recommends measures such as mutual recognition of disclosures, a joint regulatory help desk/single point of contact as well as joint circulars detailing the jurisdictions of each regulator – essentially a centralised coordination mechanism involving SEBI, RBI, MCA and the Ministry of Finance.

Second, the Report emphasises the need to rationalise disclosure norms for public bond issuances, which are significantly more onerous than those applicable to private placements. This asymmetry has led to an overwhelming reliance on private placements, which account for nearly 98% of corporate bond issuances in India (p. 25). Drawing on global practices, the Report recommends a differentiated disclosure regime for well-compliant issuers (p. 66). Specific reforms include extending the validity of offer documents from one year to two or three years, removing ISIN-wise issuance constraints, simplifying PAS-2 and Information Memorandum filings through digital automation on the MCA portal, and introducing a “Well-Known Seasoned Issuer” framework to enable fast-track access to public bond markets for reputed issuers.

Third, the Report stresses the need for regulatory clarity for hybrid instruments, including covered bonds1, securitised debt and infrastructure-linked securities. Many instruments used globally to fund long-term assets do not fit neatly within India’s regulator-specific silos. Jurisdictional ambiguity (which regulator oversees which instrument?) and the absence of standardised regulatory treatment have impeded market development. The Report recommends clearly defined frameworks to facilitate market clarity. In this context, it also highlights tax distortions; for instance, SDIs2 currently attract significantly higher TDS than corporate bonds. The Report states that SDIs are taxed at a higher rate than corporate bonds which prevents securitisation of bonds. However, effective 1.04.2025, SDI TDS rates are aligned with bond rate; both at 10% (See section 194LBC of Tax Act).

Market Infrastructure and Liquidity

Bonds are heterogeneous instruments, varying by type of issuer, tenor, covenants and structure. Unlike equities, electronic order matching alone cannot ensure immediacy of execution or continuous liquidity in the secondary market, particularly in lower-rated or infrequently traded bonds. Despite progress through electronic platforms such as RFQ for secondary trading and EBP for primary issuance, trading volumes remain shallow and concentrated in highly rated bonds.

The Report recommends expanding electronic trading, enhancing post-trade reporting (to improve price discovery) and increasing the proportion of trades settled on a Delivery-versus-Payment (DVP) basis3. Absence of a robust market-making ecosystem is seen as a major constraint on secondary-market liquidity (pp. 22, 36, 106). Limited risk appetite and balance-sheet constraints deter intermediaries from providing continuous two-way quotes, especially in lower-rated and longer-tenor bonds.

To address this, the Report recommends enabling market-making through regulatory incentives and improved access to repo markets. In particular, the creation of a standing repo facility by RBI for high rated corporate bonds would allow market makers4 to monetise inventories efficiently and support continuous liquidity provision. While corporate bonds are included in the RBI’s list of repo-eligible instruments, their treatment differs materially from Government securities (G-Secs). Repos in G-Secs are exempt from CRR and SLR computation which means Banks can access funds through G-Sec repos without providing SLR and CRR on those funds. In contrast, cash raised through repos backed by corporate bonds is treated as a liability for CRR and SLR purposes, hence banks have to provide CRR and SLR on the resulting liquidity. Also, unlike G-Secs, which are centrally cleared and settled through CCIL, corporate bond repos lack a single, standardised clearing and settlement mechanism; they are cleared through F-TRAC and stock exchanges. The result is that the volume of corporate bond repo is negligible (exact data on corporate bond repo could not be sourced).

The Report also flags structural weaknesses in the credit rating ecosystem, including rating inflation, conflicts of interest under the issuer-pays model, and excessive regulatory reliance on ratings (p. 71). Strengthening governance standards is the key recommendation for credit ratings. To improve credit rating access for smaller issuers, the Report suggests exploring alternative credit assessment models, including technology-driven frameworks using GST-returns and other turnover based data and digital transaction histories.

Further, the Report recommends strengthening the existing framework requiring large corporates to raise a portion of incremental borrowings through debt securities (LCB Framework)5. Proposed enhancements include increasing the minimum market borrowing requirement and progressively extending the framework to smaller corporates with lower thresholds.

Drawing on the IMF’s FSAP 2025, the Report also recommends allowing high-quality corporate bonds to be used as collateral in RBI’s repo operations. International experience from the ECB, Bank of Japan, and Reserve Bank of Australia suggests that such measures can enhance secondary-market liquidity and broaden the investor base, subject to appropriate safeguards.

Equally important is the creation of a government-backed, centralised corporate bond data repository. Fragmented data across regulators and exchanges currently hampers price discovery and covenant monitoring. A unified, real-time repository is recommended to improve transparency for issuers, investors, and regulators.

Innovation in Instruments and Market design

The Report makes it clear that regulatory reforms alone are insufficient; product and market innovation are essential to expand depth and distribute risk. India’s bond market remains narrow not only due to investor risk aversion but also due to the limited availability of instruments aligned with diverse risk–return preferences and long-gestation financing needs. Green bonds, sustainability-linked bonds6, and transition bonds are identified as important instruments for financing climate action and infrastructure. However, the absence of a standardised green taxonomy and concerns around greenwashing have constrained growth. The Report, therefore, recommends establishing clear definitions, disclosure standards and verification frameworks to ensure credibility and scale ESG-oriented bond markets.

The Report proposes institutionalising a dedicated class of Corporate Bond Dealers (CBDs), modelled on the U.S. primary dealer system. Eligible banks, NBFCs and other financial institutions would be required to provide continuous two-way quotes, supported by incentives such as capital relief on bond inventories and access to RBI refinance and repo facilities. Enhanced market surveillance, real-time trade reporting, price dissemination and inventory disclosures are also recommended.

Investor and Issuer Participation

Broadening the investor base is identified as another critical reform pillar. Long-term institutional investors such as insurance companies, pension funds and provident funds are natural holders of long-duration bonds, yet regulatory investment norms constrain exposure only to higher-rated securities. The Report recommends a calibrated relaxation of these norms.

For retail investors, the Report proposes lowering minimum investment thresholds (from existing ₹ 10,000), increasing retail quotas in public bond issuances, particularly for tax-free and ESG-linked bonds7, and simplifying TDS provisions to address tax inefficiencies in secondary market trades. OBPPs have been acknowledged to contribute to secondary market liquidity, however, the volumes are low. Further, there is no mention of concerns w.r.t downselling through OBPPs which was recently highlighted by SEBI8

On the issuer side, India’s corporate bond market remains heavily concentrated among AAA and AA-rated entities. To address this imbalance, the Report advocates scaling up credit enhancement mechanisms such as PCEs and support from development finance institutions. It also highlights the need to promote longer-tenor issuances, especially for infrastructure and climate-linked projects, where asset lives significantly exceed typical corporate bond maturities. In this context, it is noteworthy that NITI Aayog has cited our resource, “Partial Credit Enhancement: A Catalyst for Boosting Infrastructure Bond Issuances?”, in the Report while discussing the role of partial credit enhancement mechanisms in deepening the corporate bond market (pp. 75 and 99). Further, regulatory subsidies for first-time or low-volume issuers and pooled issuance platforms to facilitate market access for smaller issuers is also recommended (pp. 65, 75).

The Report recognizes that CDS are underdeveloped. Currently, CDS can be purchased only by investors who already own the underlying bond, which prevents trading in the CDS market. Further, only single-name CDS are permitted, which means a separate CDS contract is required for each issuer, unlike global markets such as the U.S., where index CDS allows one CDS to cover a basket of bonds. Lastly, there is a limit on FPI investors providing CDS which is 5% of the outstanding corporate bond market. These restrictions have resulted in limited CDS protection. The Report also recommends bigger NBFCs to act as CDS market makers

Conclusion

NITI Aayog’s recommendations envisage a corporate bond market that evolves from a supplementary funding channel into a core pillar of India’s financial system. If implemented in a coordinated manner, these reforms could expand the market to ₹100–120 trillion by 2030, improve financial stability, and channel long-term capital into productive investment. The real challenge, however, lies in execution, particularly in achieving sustained regulatory coordination and market-making capacity. Addressing these constraints will be critical if corporate bonds are to play a meaningful role in financing India’s long-term growth and infrastructure ambitions under the vision of Viksit Bharat by 2047.

See our other resources on bonds

  1. Bond Credit Enhancement Framework: Competitive, rational, reasonable
  2. Demystifying Structured Debt Securities: Beyond Plain Vanilla Bonds
  3. Bond market needs a friend, not parent
  4. SEBI Securitisation Regulations: Track Record, Risk retention and Investment size among several new requirements
  5. Mandatory listing for further bond issues
  6. NHB’s PCE Scheme for HFCs
  7. Corporate Bonds and Debentures
  1. Covered bonds are secured debt instruments backed by a segregated pool of high-quality assets, offering investors dual recourse to both the issuer and the underlying assets. May refer to our resource on covered bonds. ↩︎
  2. May refer to our book Listing Regulations on Securitised Debt Instruments and Security Receipts ↩︎
  3. DVP is a settlement mechanism in which the transfer of securities and funds occurs simultaneously, eliminating counterparty and settlement risk
    ↩︎
  4.  May refer to our resource ‘Bond issuers set to become Market Maker to enhance liquidity’ ↩︎
  5. May refer to our resource ‘Mandatory bond issuance by Large Corporates: FAQs on revised framework’ ↩︎
  6. May refer to our resources ‘Sustainability or ESG Bonds’ and ‘From Rooftops to Ratings: India’s Green Securitisation Debut’ ↩︎
  7. May refer to our resource ESG Debt Securities: Framework for Issuance and Listing in India ↩︎
  8. May refer to our resource “Downstreamed through intermediaries: Deemed public issue concerns for privately placed debt” ↩︎

Meta-morphed: A corporate bond that puts $27 billion off-the-balance-sheet

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Meta structures a data center investment funding with cash flows linked with rentals and guarantees

– Vinod Kothari | finserv@vinodkothari.com

In India, we often say: upar wala sab dekhta hai (God sees it all). However, if I could do things which God the almighty does not or cannot see, I will be most happy to do those. Doing things off-the-balance-sheet is always equally tempting; structurers of Frankenstein financial instruments have already tried to bring ingenuity to explore gaps in accounting standards to create such funding structures where the asset or the relevant liability does not show on the books. Recently, a $ 27 billion bond issuance by an SPV called Beignet Investor, LLC may have the ultimate effect of keeping the massive investment done at the instance of Meta group  kept off-the-balance-sheet. 

Structural Features

Essentially, the deal involves issuance of  bonds to the investors, the servicing of which is through the cash flows generated from the lease payments. Further, a residual value guarantee has been provided by the group entity which has again led to a rating upliftment for the bonds issued. 

The essential structure of the transaction involves a combination of project finance, lease payments and a residual value guarantee to shelter investors from project-related risks, and use of an operating lease structure, apparently designed to keep the funding off the balance sheet of Meta group. It is a special purpose joint venture which keeps the funding liability on its balance sheet.

Let us understand the transaction structure:

  • Meta intends to do a huge capex to build a massive 2.064-GW data center campus in Richland Parish, LA. The cost of this investment is estimated at $27 billion in total development costs for the buildings and long-lived power, cooling, and connectivity infrastructure at the campus. The massive facility will take until 2029 to finish.
  • The expense will be incurred by a joint venture, formed for the purpose, where Meta (or its group entities) will hold a 20% stake, and the 80% stake will come from Blue Owl Capital. The two of them together form the JV called Beignet Investor, LLC (issuer of the bonds).
  • The JV Co owns an entity called Laidley LLC, which will be the lessor of the data center facilities.
  • The lessee is a 100% Meta subsidiary, called Pelican Leap LLC, which enters into 4 year leases for each of the 11 data centers. Each lease will have a one-sided renewal option with 4 years’ term each, that is to say, a total term at the discretion of the lessee adding to 20 years. The leases are so-called triple-net (which is a term very commonly used in the leasing industry, implying that the lessor does not take any obligations of maintenance, repairs, or insurance). 
  • The 20-year right of use, though in tranches of  4 years at a time, will mean the rentals are payable over as many years. This is made to coincide with the term of amortisation of the bonds issued by the Issuer, as the bonds mature in 2049 (2026-2029 – the development period, followed by 20 years of amortisation).
  • If the lease renewal is at the option of the lessee, then, how is it that the lease payments for 20 years are guaranteed to amortise the bonds? This is where the so-called “residual value guarantee” (RVG) comes in. RVG is also quite a common feature of lease structures. In the present case, from whatever information is available on public domain, it appears that the RVG is an amount payable by Meta Platforms under a so-called Residual Value Guarantee agreement. The RVG on each renewal date (gaps of 4 years) guarantees to make a payment sufficient to take care of the debt servicing of the bonds, and is significantly lower than the estimated fair value of the data center establishment on each such date. 

The diagram below by provides for the transaction structure: 

Off-balance sheet: Gap in the GAAP?

Of course, as one would have expected, the rating agency Standard and Poor’s that was the sole rating agency having given rating for the bonds, its report does not say the structure is off-the-balance sheet for the lessee, a Meta group entity. However, various analysts and commentators have referred to this funding as off-the-balance sheet. For example, Bloomberg report  says “The SPV structure helps tech companies avoid placing large amounts of debt on their balance sheets”. Another report says that the huge debt of $ 27 billion will be on the balance sheet of Beignet, the JV, rather than on the books of Meta. An  FT report says that bond was priced much higher than Meta’s balance sheet bonds, at a coupon of 6.58%, as a compensation for the off-balance sheet treatment it affords. A write up on Fortune also refers to this funding as off-the-balance sheet. 

In fact, Meta itself, on its website, gives a clear indication that the deal was struck in a way to ensure that the funding is not on the balance sheet of Meta or its affiliates. Here is what Meta says: 

“Meta entered into operating lease agreements with the joint venture for use of all of the facilities of the campus once construction is complete. These lease agreements will have a four-year initial term with options to extend, providing Meta with long-term strategic flexibility.

To balance this optionality in a cost-efficient manner, Meta also provided the joint venture with a residual value guarantee for the first 16 years of operations whereby Meta would make a capped cash payment to the joint venture based on the then-current value of the campus if certain conditions are met following a non-renewal or termination of a lease.”

Here, two points are important to understand – first, the operating lease/financial lease distinction, and second, the so-called residual value guarantee – what it means, and why it is opposite in the present case.

The distinction between financial and operating leases, the key to the off-balance sheet treatment of operating leases, was the product of age-old accounting standards, dating back to the 1960s. In 2019, most countries in the world decided to chuck these accounting standards, and move to a new IFRS 16, which eliminates the distinction between financial and operating leases, at least from the lessee perspective. According to this standard, every lease will be put on the balance sheet, with a value assigned to the obligation to pay lease rentals over the non-cancellable lease term.

However, USA has not aligned completely with IFRS 16, and decided to adopt its own version called ASC 842 for lease accounting. The US accounting approach recognises the difference between operating leases and financial leases, and if the lease qualifies to be an operating lease, it permits the lessee to only bring an amount equal to the “lease liability”, that is, the discounted value of lease rentals as applicable for the lease term.

As to whether the lease qualifies to be an operating lease, or financial lease, one will apply the classic tests of present value of “lease payments” [note IFRS uses the expression “minimum lease payments”], length of lease term vis-a-vis the economic life of the asset, existence of any bargain purchase option, etc. “Lease payments” are defined to include not just the rentals payable by a lessee, but also the minimum residual value. This is coming from para 842-10-25-2(d). The reading of this para is sufficiently complicated, as it makes cross references to another para referring to a “probable payment” under “residual value guarantees”. The reference to para 842-10-55-34 may not be needed in the present case, as the residual value agreed to be paid by the lessee is included in “lease payment” for financial lease determination by virtue of the very definition of financial lease. Therefore, it remains open to interpretation whether the leases in the present case are indeed operating leases.

Considering that the residual value guarantee from the parent company in the present case may not meet the requirements for its inclusion in “lease payments”, it is unlikely that the lease payments over any of the 4 year terms will meet the present value test, to characterise the lease as a financial lease. Also, the economic life of the commercial property in form of the data centers may be significantly longer than the 20 year lease period, including the option to renew. Hence, the lease may quite likely qualify as an operating lease.

Residual value guarantee: Rationale and Implications

In lease contracts, a residual value guarantee by the lessee is understandable as a conjoined obligation with fair use and reasonable wear and tear of assets. In the present case, if the lessee is a tenant for only 4 years, and the renewal thereafter is at the option of the lessee. If the lessee chooses not to renew the lease, the lessee is exercising its uncontrolled discretion available under the lease. So, what could be the justification for the parent company being called to make a payment for the residual value of the property? After all, the property reverts to the lessor, and whatever is the value of the property then is the asset of the lessor. 

In the present case, it seems that the RVG comes under a separate agreement – whether that agreement is linked with the leases is not sure. However, for the holistic understanding of any complicated transaction, one always needs to connect all the dots together to get a a complete understanding of the transaction. If the lessee or a related party is paying for future rentals, it transpires that the understanding between the parties was a non-cancelable lease, and the RVG is a compensation for the loss of future rentals to the lessor. If that is the overall picture, then the lease may well be characterised as a financial lease.

Is the lessee’s balance sheet immune from the bond payment liability?

A liability is what one is obligated to pay; a commitment to pay. The $ 27 billion liability for the bonds in the present case sits on the balance of the JV Company. However, the question is, ultimately, what is it that will ensure the repayment of these bonds? Quite clearly, the payment for the bonds is made to match with the underlying lease payments, with a target debt service coverage. In totality, it is the lease payments that discharge the bond obligation; there is nothing else with the JV company to retire or redeem the bonds. From this perspective as well, an off-balance-sheet treatment at the lessee or at the group level seems tough.

However, off-balance-sheet may not be the objective really. What matters is, does the structure insulate Meta group from the risks of the payments from the data center. From the available data, it appears that the project related risks, from delays in completion to non-renewal, are all taken by Meta. Therefore, even from the viewpoint of project-related risks, there do not seem to be sufficient reasons for any off-balance sheet treatment.

Disclaimer: The analysis in the write-up above is limited to the reading that could be done from write-ups/materials in public domain.  

Other Resources:

SEBI facilitates EODB for HVDLEs

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Regulatory threshold enhanced to Rs. 5000 crore, misalignments in CG norms with equity listed cos straightened

– Payal Agarwal, Partner | corplaw@vinodkothari.com 

– Updated on January 23, 2026

Since the introduction of High Value Debt Listed Entities (HVDLEs) as a category of debt-listed entities placed on a similar pedestal to equity-listed entities in terms of corporate governance norms, the regime has undergone several rounds of extensions and regulatory changes. After several extensions towards a mandatory applicability of corporate governance norms, a new Chapter V-A was introduced in LODR, vide amendments notified on 27th March 2025 (see a presentation here), amending, amongst others, the thresholds towards classification of an entity as HVDLE (increased from Rs. 500 crores to Rs. 1000 crores). The new chapter, however, was not updated for the changes brought for equity-listed entities vide the LODR 3rd Amendment Regulations, 2024  and required some refinement, particularly, in respect of provisions pertaining to related party transactions (see an article – Misplaced exemptions in the RPT framework for HVDLEs and the representation made to SEBI). 

In order to address the gaps as well as providing some relaxations to HVDLEs, SEBI released a Consultation Paper  on 27th October, 2025 (CP) primarily proposed an increase in the threshold for identification as HVDLEs and alignment of provisions of Chapter V-A with the corresponding provisions in Chapter IV subsequent to LODR 3rd Amendment Regs, 2024 facilitating ease of doing business, including measures related to RPTs.  The proposals were approved by SEBI in its Board Meeting held on 17th December, 2025. 

SEBI vide Securities and Exchange Board of India (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) (Amendment) Regulations, 2026 (‘LODR Amendment 2026’),  has notified the following amendments effective from January 22, 2026.

Threshold for identification of HVDLEs 

  • Increased from extant Rs. 1000 crores to Rs. 5000 crores . Further, the sunset clause of 3 years as per Reg 15 (1AA) & Reg. 62C(2) will not be applicable to entities that cease to be HVDLE due to revised thresholds.
  • Based on the data of pure debt listed entities as on June 30, 2025, revision in threshold will reduce the number of HVDLE entities from 137 to 48 entities (apprx. 64% entities)
  • VKCO Comments: The increase in the threshold was necessitated on account of the huge compliance burden placed on HVDLEs coupled with the fact that such threshold is disproportionately low for NBFCs engaged in substantial fundraising through debt issuances. Further, the proviso to Reg. 15 (1AA) & Reg. 62C (2) expressly clarifies the position for entities ceasing to be an HVDLE as on January 22, 2026 with the revised threshold coming into effect, that it need not continue to comply with the CG requirements for a period of 3 years. Earlier there had been instances of entities that ceased to be HVDLEs due to outstanding value of listed debt securities as on March 31, 2025 receiving notices from SEs for non-compliance with CG norms despite such entities ceasing to meet the revised threshold. 

Alignment of corporate governance norms for HVDLEs with that for equity-listed entities 

Board composition, committees, filing of vacancy of director/ KMPs etc.
  • Insertion of proviso to clarify that prior approval of shareholders is required for directorship as NED beyond the age of 75 years at the time of appointment or re-appointment or any time prior to the NED attaining the age of 75 years to ensure alignment with similar amendment made for equity listed entities [Reg 62D(2)/ Reg 17(1A)]
  • Time taken to receive approval of regulatory, government or statutory authorities, if applicable, to be excluded from the 3 months’ timeline for shareholders’ approval for appointment of a person on the Board [Reg 62D(3)/ Reg 17(1C)]
  • Exemption from obtaining shareholders’ approval for nominee directors of financial sector regulators or those appointed by Court or Tribunal, since such nomination is for the purpose of oversight and upholding public interest, and by SEBI registered Debenture Trustee registered under a subscription agreement for debentures issued by HVDLEs [Reg 62D(3)/ Reg 17(1C)]
  • Any vacancy in the office of a director of an HVDLE resulting in non-compliance with the composition requirement for board committees i.e., AC, NRC, SRC and RMC to be filled within 3 months [Proviso to Reg 62D(5)/ Reg 17(1E)]
  • Any vacancy in the office of a director of an HVDLE on account of completion of tenure resulting in non-compliance with the composition requirement for board committees i.e.. AC, NRC, SRC and RMC to be filled by the date such office is vacated [Second proviso to Reg 62D(5)/ Reg 17(1E)]
  • Additional timeline of 3 months for filling vacancy in the office of KMP in case of entities having resolution plan approved, subject to having at least 1 full-time KMP [Reg 62P (3)/ Reg 26A (3)]
Secretarial Audit
  • Alignment of the provisions of Secretarial Audit and Secretarial Compliance Report with Reg 24A as applicable to equity listed entities,  to strengthen the secretarial audit and to prevent conflict of interests, which mandates the following:  [Reg 62M(1)/ Reg 24A]
    • An individual may be appointed for a term of 5 years and a firm may be appointed for a maximum of 2 terms of 5 years each subject to approval of shareholders in the annual general meeting. Thereafter a cooling-off period of 5 years will be applicable;
    • Requirements relating to eligibility (being a Peer Reviewed Company Secretary)  and disqualifications, removal of secretarial auditors prescribed.
    • The Secretarial Compliance Report also to be submitted by a Peer Reviewed Company Secretary or Secretarial Auditor fulfilling the eligibility requirements indicated in Reg. 24A.

VKCO Comments: Further disqualifications for Secretarial Auditor and list of services that cannot be rendered by the Secretarial Audit was prescribed vide Annexure 2 and Annexure 3 of  SEBI Circular dated December 31, 2024 and  further clarified vide SEBI FAQs on Listing Regulations (FAQ no. 5) and list of services provided by ICSI. 

The amendments made in Reg 24A in December, 2024 were required to be ensured by the equity listed companies with effect from April 1, 2025 for appointment, re-appointment or continuation of the Secretarial Auditor of the listed entity. Therefore, it was amply clear that the applicability is prospective and to be ensured while appointing Secretarial Auditor for FY 2025-26 onwards. Reg. 24A (IC) clarifies that any association of the individual or the firm as the Secretarial Auditor of the listed entity before March 31, 2025 is not required to be considered for the purpose of calculating the tenure.

Pursuant to LODR Amendment 2026, Reg. 62M (1) cross refers to the requirements under Reg 24A which in turn mandates compliance with effect from April 1, 2025. However, it may not be practically feasible for HVDLEs to ensure compliance towards the end of the financial year and a transition time may be required by such HVDLEs. In our view, the requirements should be applicable for Secretarial Auditor appointments with effect from April 1, 2026  which will be required to be done with shareholders’ approval at the AGM 2026 and not impact the existing tenure/ appointments already done by HVDLE. 

Related Party Transactions
  • Alignment of RPT related provisions with Reg 23, instead of reproducing each of the amendments made in Reg 23 effective from December 13, 2024 and November 19, 2025  [Reg 62K (1)]
    • Turnover scale based materiality thresholds for RPTs and other amendments applicable to  equity-listed entities are now applicable to HVDLEs (see an article on the approved amendments here)
  •  NOC of debenture-holders through DT to be obtained in the manner prescribed by SEBI  [Reg 62K (5)] (see our FAQs here)
  • Aligning the exemptions from RPT approval and clarification on ‘listed’ holding company, with amendments made in Reg. 23 (5) [Reg 62K (7)]

VKCO Comments: Pursuant to the above amendments, HVDLEs will be able to avail the benefits of recent amendments made in Reg 23 as detailed below:

  • Remuneration and sitting fees paid by the listed entity or its subsidiary to its director, key managerial personnel or senior management, except who is part of promoter or promoter group, shall not require audit committee approval or disclosure if it is not material.
  • Independent directors of the audit committee, can provide post-facto ratification to RPTs within 3 months from the date of the transaction or in the immediate next meeting of the audit committee, whichever is earlier, subject to certain conditions like transaction value does not exceed rupees one crore, is not material etc. The failure to seek ratification of the audit committee can render the transaction voidable at the option of the audit committee and if the transaction is with a related party to any director, or is authorised by any other director, the director(s) concerned shall indemnify the listed entity against any loss incurred by it. Audit committee can grant omnibus approval for RPTs to be entered by its subsidiary in addition to listed entity subject to the certain conditions.  
  • Exemption for RPTs in the nature of payment of statutory dues, statutory fees or statutory charges entered into between an entity on one hand and the Central Government or any State Government or any combination thereof on the other hand or  transactions entered into between a public sector company on one hand and the Central Government or any State Government or any combination thereof on the other hand.
  • Scale based threshold for determining material RPTs ranging from minimum of 10% of annual consolidated turnover to Rs. 5000 crore based on the consolidated turnover of the HVDLE.
  • Prior approval of the audit committee of the listed entity required for a subsidiary’s RPTs above Rs. 1 crore if it exceeds the lower of 10% of the annual standalone turnover of the subsidiary (or 10% of paid-up share capital and securities premium, if no audited financials of at least one year) or the listed entity’s material RPT threshold under Regulation 23(1) of LODR.
  • Omnibus shareholder approvals for RPTs granted at an AGM shall be valid up to the next AGM held within the timelines prescribed under Section 96 of the Companies Act, 2013 (currently maximum 15 months), while such approvals obtained in general meetings (other than AGMs) shall be valid for a maximum of one year

The most critical point that remains pending to be addressed is the nature of disclosures to be made before the audit committee and shareholders while approving RPTs – as to whether the existing disclosure requirements as per Chapter VIII of SEBI Master Circular dated July 11, 2025 will apply or the threshold based disclosure requirement as applicable to equity listed companies i.e. disclosure as per Annexure 13A of SEBI Circular dated October 13, 2025 for RPTs not exceeding 1% of annual  consolidated  turnover  of  the  listed  entity  as  per  the  last  audited financial  statements  of  the  listed  entity  or  ₹10 Crore,  whichever  is lower, and disclosure as per ISN on Minimum information to be provided to the Audit Committee and Shareholders for approval of Related Party Transactions for RPTs exceeding the aforesaid limit. Considering that HVDLEs will be proceeding with obtaining  omnibus approval for RPTs proposed to be undertaken during FY 2025-26, in the absence of any clarification or amendment in the Master Circular, the HVDLEs will continue to follow the existing disclosure requirements.

Other amendments
  • Recommendations of board to be included along with the rationale in the explanatory statement to shareholders’ notice [Reg 62D(17)/ Reg 17(11)]
  • Exemption from shareholders’ approval requirements for sale, disposal or lease of assets between two WoS of the HVDLE [Reg 62L (6)/ Reg 24(6)]
  • Minor terminology changes from year to financial year, income to turnover etc. 
  • Disclosure requirement of material RPTs in quarterly corporate governance report omitted. Format and timeline of period CG compliance report to be prescribed by SEBI [Reg 62Q(2)/ Reg 27(2)]

VKCO Comments: For equity-listed entities, reporting on compliance with corporate governance norms are a part of Integrated Filing – Governance, required to be filed within 30 days from end of each quarter. The move to provide flexibility to SEBI in prescribing timelines for corporate governance filings may be in order to extend the applicability of Integrated Filing requirements to HVDLEs as well. 

Conclusion

While the  present amendment strictens the compliance requirement for the HVDLEs with outstanding listed debt securities of Rs. 5000 crore or more, it also provides the ease of compliance as provided for certain matters to  equity listed companies. The actionable for HVDLEs will be mainly amending the RPT policy to align with the amended requirements, evaluate the eligibility of the existing secretarial auditor in the light of amended requirements. The entities that cease to be HVDLEs can evaluate the need to retain the committees and policies, in the light of applicable laws.

Our other resources:

  1. Misplaced exemptions in the RPT framework for HVDLEs
  2. SEBI strictens RPT approval regime, ease certain CG norms for HVDLEs
  3. Presentation on CG Norms for HVDLEs

Demystifying Structured Debt Securities: Beyond Plain Vanilla Bonds

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Palak Jaiswani, Manager | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Debentures, one of the most common means for raising debt funding, where investors lend money to the issuer in return for periodic interest and repayment of principal at maturity. While the basic feature of any debenture is a fixed coupon rate and a defined tenure (commonly referred to as plain vanilla instruments), sometimes these instruments may be topped up with enhanced features such as additional credit support, market-linked returns, convertibility option, etc., thus referred to as structured debt securities.

Structured debt securities: motivation for issuers

Apart from the economic favouring such structural modifications, a primary motivation for the issuer in issuing such structured instruments might be the regulatory advantages that these securities offer. For instance,

  • Chapter VIII of SEBI NCS Master Circular provides an extra limit of 5 ISINs for structured debt securities & market-linked securities, thus more room for the issuers to issue debt securities, compared to the restriction of a maximum of 9 ISINs for plain vanilla debt.
  • In addition, as per NSE Guidelines on Electronic Book Provider (EBP) mechanism, market-linked debentures are not required to be routed through EBP, allowing issuers to place such instruments almost like an over-the-counter trade. This allows issuers to structure the debt securities on a tailored basis and offer them directly to specific investors.
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Round-Tripping Reined: RBI Rolls Out Relaxed Rules for Investments in AIFs

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-Sikha Bansal, Senior Associate & Harshita Malik, Executive | finserv@vinodkothari.com

Background

The RBI’s regulatory approach to investments by Regulated Entities (REs) in Alternate Investment Funds (AIFs) has undergone a remarkable transformation over the past two years. Initially, the RBI responded to the risks of “evergreening”, where banks and NBFCs could mask bad loans by routing fresh funds to existing debtor companies via AIF structures, by issuing stringent circulars in December 20231 and March 20242 (collectively known as ‘Previous Circulars’). The December 2023 circular imposed a blanket ban on RE investments in AIFs that had downstream exposures to debtor companies, while the March 2024 clarification excluded pure equity investments (not hybrid ones) from this restriction. This stance aimed to strengthen asset quality but quickly highlighted significant operational and market challenges for institutional investors and the AIF ecosystem. Many leading banks took significant provisioning losses, as the Circulars required lenders to dispose off the AIF investments; clearly, there was no such secondary market. 

In response to the feedback from the financial sector, as well as evolving oversight by other regulators like SEBI, the RBI undertook a comprehensive review of its framework and issued Draft Directions- Investment by Regulated Entities in Alternate Investment Funds (‘Draft Directions’) on May 19, 20253. The Draft Directions have now been finalised as Reserve Bank of India (Investment in AIF) Directions, 2025 (‘Final Directions’) on 29th May, 2025. The Final Directions shift away from outright prohibitions and instead introduce a carefully balanced regime of prudential limits, targeted provisioning requirements, and enhanced governance standards. 

Comparison at a Glance

A compressed comparison between Previous Circulars and Final Directions is as follows –

ParticularsPrevious CircularsFinal DirectionsIntent/Implication
Blanket BanBlanket ban on RE investments in AIFs lending to debtor companies (except equity)No outright ban; investments allowed with limits, provisioning, and other prudential controlsMove from a complete prohibition to a limit-based regime. Max. Exposures as defined (see below) taken as prudential limits
Definition of debtor companyOnly equity shares excluded for the purpose of reckoning “investment” exposure of RE in the debtor companyEquity shares, CCPSs, CCDs (collectively, equity instruments) excluded Therefore, if RE has made investments in convertible equity, it will be considered as an investment exposure in the counterparty – thereby, the directions become inapplicable in all such cases.
Individual Investment Limit in any AIF schemeNot applicable (ban in place)Max 10% of AIF corpus by a single RE, subject to a max. of 5% in case of an AIF, which has downstream investments in a debtor company of RE.Controls individual exposure risk. Lower threshold in cases where AIF has downstream investments.
Collective Investment Limit by all REs in any AIF schemeNot applicableMax 20%4 of AIF corpus across all REsWould require monitoring at the scheme level itself.
Downstream investments by AIF in the nature of equity or convertible equityEquity shares were excluded, but hybrid instruments were not. All equity instruments Exclusions from downstream investments widened to include convertible equity as well. Therefore, if the scheme has invested in any equity instruments of the debtor company, the Circular does not hit the RE.
Provisioning100% provisioning to the extent of investment by the RE in the AIF scheme which is further invested by the AIF in the debtor company, and not on the entire investment of the RE in the AIF scheme or 30-day liquidation, if breachIf >5% in AIF with exposure to debtor, 100% provision on look-through exposure, capped at RE’s direct exposure5 (see illustrations below)No impact vis-a-vis Previous Circulars. 
For provisioning requirements, see illustrations later. 
Subordinated Units/CapitalEqual Tier I/II deduction for subordinated units with a priority distribution modelEntire investment deducted proportionately from Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital proportionatelyAdjustments from Tier I and II, now to be done proportionately, instead of equally. 
Investment PolicyNot emphasizedMandatory board-approved6 investment policy for AIF investmentsOne of the actionables on the part of REs – their investment policies should now have suitable provisions around investments in AIFs keeping in view provisions of these Directions
ExemptionsNo specific exemption. However, Investments by REs in AIFs through intermediaries such as fund of funds or mutual funds were excluded from the scope of circulars. Prior RBI-approved investments exempt; Government notified AIFs may be exempt
Provides operational flexibility and recognizes pre-approved or strategic investments.No specific mention of investments through MFs/FoFs – however, given the nature of these funds, we are of the view that such exclusion would continue.
Transition/Legacy TreatmentNot applicableLegacy investments may choose to follow old or new rulesSee discussion later.

Key Takeaways: 

Detailed analysis on certain aspects of the Final Directions is as follows:

Prudential Limits 

Under the Previous Circulars, any downstream exposure by an AIF to a regulated entity’s debtor company, regardless of size, triggered a blanket prohibition on RE investments. The Final Directions replace this blanket ban with prudential limits:

  • 10% Individual Limit: No single RE can invest more than 10% of any AIF scheme’s corpus.
  • 20% Collective Limit: All REs combined cannot exceed 20% of any AIF scheme’s corpus; and
  • 5% Specific Limit: Special provisioning requirements apply when an RE’s investment exceeds 5% of an AIF’s corpus, which has made downstream investments in a debtor company.

Therefore, if an AIF has existing investments in a debtor company (which has loan/investment exposures from an RE), the RE cannot invest more than 5% in the scheme. But what happens in a scenario where RE already has a 10% exposure in an AIF and the AIF does a downstream investment (in forms other than equity instruments) in a debtor company? Practically speaking, AIF cannot ask every time it invests in a company whether a particular RE has exposure to that company or not. In such a case, as a consequence of such downstream investment, RE may either have to liquidate its investments, or make provisioning in accordance with the Final Directions. Hence, in practice, given the complexities involved, it appears that REs will have to conservatively keep AIF stakes at or below 5% to avoid the consequences as above. 

Now, consider a scenario – where the investee AIF invests in a company (which is not a debtor company of RE), which in turn, invests in the debtor company. Will the restrictions still apply? In our view, it is a well-established principle that substance prevails over form. If a clear nexus could be established between two transactions – first being investment by AIF in the intermediate company, and second being routing of funds from intermediate company to debtor company, it would clearly tantamount to circumventing the provisions. Hence, the provisioning norms would still kick-in. 

Provisioning Requirements

Coming to the provisioning part, the Final Directions require REs to make 100 per cent provision to the extent of its proportionate investment in the debtor company through the AIF Scheme, subject to a maximum of its direct loan and/ or investment exposure to the debtor company, if the REs exposure to an AIF exceeds 5% and that AIF has exposure to its debtor company. The requirement is quite obvious – RE cannot be required to create provisioning in its books more than the exposure on the debtor company as it stands in the RE’s books. 

The provisioning requirements can be understood with the help of the following illustrations:

ScenarioIllustrationExtent of provisioning required
Existing investment of RE in AIF Scheme (direct loan and/or investment exposure exists as on date or in the past 12 months)For example, an RE has a loan exposure of 10 cr on a debtor company and the RE makes an investment of 60 cr in an AIF (which has a corpus of 800 cr), the RE’s share in the corpus of the AIF turns out to be 7.5%. The AIF further invested 200 cr in the debtor company of the RE. The proportionate share of the RE in the investment of AIF in the debtor company comes out to be 15 cr (7.5% of 200 cr). However, the RE’s loan exposure is 10 crores only. Therefore, provisioning is required to the extent of Rs. 10 crores.
Existing investment of RE in AIF Scheme (direct loan and/or investment exposure does not exist as on date or in the past 12 months)Facts being same as above, in such a scenario, the provisioning requirement shall be minimum of the following two:-15 cr(full provisioning of the proportionate exposure); or-0 (full provisioning subject to the REs direct loan exposure in the debtor company)Therefore, if direct exposure=0, then the minimum=0 and hence no requirement to create provision.

Some possible measures which REs can adopt to ensure compliance are as follows: 

  1. Maintain an up-to-date, board-approved AIF investment policy aligned with both RBI and SEBI rules;
  2. Implement robust internal systems for real-time tracking of all AIF investments and debtor exposures (including the 12-month history);
  3. Require regular, detailed portfolio disclosures from AIF managers;
  4. appropriate monitoring and automated alerts for nearing the 5%/10%/20% thresholds; and
  5. Establish suitable escalation procedures for potential breaches or ambiguities.

Further, it shall be noted that the intent is NOT to bar REs from ever investing more than 5% in AIFs. The cap is soft, provisioning is only required if there is a debtor company overlap. But the practical effect is, unless AIFs develop robust real-time reporting/disclosure and REs set up systems to track (and predict) debtor overlap, 5% becomes a limit for specifically the large-scale REs for practical purposes. 

Investment Policy

The Final Directions call for framing and implementing an investment policy (amending if already exists) which shall have suitable provisions governing its investments in an AIF Scheme, compliant with extant law and regulations. Para 5 of the Final Directions does not mandate board approval of that policy, however, Para 29 of the RBI’s Master Directions on Scale Based Regulations stipulates that any investment policy must be formally approved by the Board. In light of this broader governance requirement, it is our view that an RE’s AIF investment policy should similarly receive Board approval. Below is a tentative list of key elements to be included in the investment policy:

  • Limits: 10% individual, 20% collective, with 5% threshold alerts;
  • Provision for real-time 12-month debtor-exposure monitoring and pre-investment checks;
  • Clear provisioning methodology: 100% look-through at >5%, capped by direct exposure; proportional Tier-1/Tier-2 deduction for subordinated units; and
  • Approval procedures for making/continuing with AIF investments; decision-making process
  • Applicability of the provisions of these Directions on investments made pursuant to commitments existing on or before the effective date of these Directions.

Subordinated Units Treatment

Under the Final Directions, investments by REs in the subordinated units7 of any AIF scheme must now be fully deducted from their capital funds, proportionately from Tier I and Tier II as against equal deduction under the Previous Circulars. While the March 2024 Circular clarified that reference to investment in subordinated units of AIF Scheme includes all forms of subordinated exposures, including investment in the nature of sponsor units; the same has not been clarified under the Final Directions. However, the scope remains the same in our view.

What happens to positions that already exist when the Final Directions arrive?

As regards effective date, Final Directions shall come into effect from January 1, 2026 or any such earlier date as may be decided as per their internal policy by the REs. 

Although, under the Final Directions, the Previous Circulars are formally repealed, the Final Directions has prescribed the following transition mechanism:

Time of making Investments by RE in AIFPermissible treatment under Final Directions
New commitments (post-effective date)Must comply with the new directions; no grandfathering or mixed approaches allowed
Existing InvestmentsWhere past commitments fully honoured: Continue under old circulars
Partially drawn commitments: One-time choice between old and new regimes

Closing Remarks

The RBI’s evolution from blanket prohibitions to calibrated risk-based oversight in AIF investments represents a mature regulatory approach that balances systemic stability with market development, and provides for enhanced governance standards while maintaining robust safeguards against evergreening and regulatory arbitrage. 

Of course, there would be certain unavoidable side-effects, e.g. significant operational and compliance burdens on REs, requiring sophisticated real-time monitoring systems, comprehensive debtor exposure tracking, board-approved investment policies, and enhanced coordination with AIF managers. Hence, there can be some challenges to practical implementation.  Further, the success of this recalibrated regime will largely depend on the operational readiness of both REs and AIFs to develop transparent monitoring systems and proactive compliance frameworks. 

  1.  https://vinodkothari.com/2023/12/rbi-bars-lenders-investments-in-aifs-investing-in-their-borrowers/ 
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  2.  https://vinodkothari.com/2024/03/some-relief-in-rbi-stance-on-lenders-round-tripping-investments-in-aifs/ 
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  3.  https://vinodkothari.com/2025/05/capital-subject-to-caps-rbi-relaxes-norms-for-investment-by-res-in-aifs-subject-to-threshold-limits/ ↩︎
  4.  The limit was 15% in the Draft Directions, the Final Directions increased the limit by 5 percentage points.
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  5.  This cap at RE’s direct loan and/or investment exposure has been introduced in the Final Directions.
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  6.  Para 29 of the RBI’s Master Directions on Scale Based Regulations stipulates that any investment policy must be formally approved by the Board. 
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  7. SEBI, vide Master Circular for AIFs, had put restrictions on priority distribution model. Later, pursuant to Fifth Amendment to SEBI (AIF) Regulations, 2024, SEBI issued a Circular dated December 13, 2024 wherein certain exemptions were allowed and differential rights were allowed subject to certain conditions. See our article here. ↩︎

Master Direction on ETPs: Key Changes & Compliance Guide

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Harshita Malik, Executive | finserv@vinodkothari.com

Background and Overview:

The evolution of Electronic Trading Platform (‘ETPs’) is rooted in the market’s need for speed, efficiency, and enhanced transparency in dissemination of  trade information. Traditional floor based trading methods struggled with sluggish processes, limited data dissemination, and inefficiencies that couldn’t pace with a global financial landscape. In response, industry players and regulators recognised the need for a digital overhaul, a system that could streamline trade execution, provide real-time market data, and foster a more accurate price discovery mechanism. This led to the emergence of specialised platforms, such as those designed for government securities trading, where primary dealers are entrusted with membership and operations. One such platform is ETP. 

An ETP is a computarised system that facilitates the buying, selling and management of a wide range of financial instruments (listed down below). These platforms enable real-time market data dissemination, order execution, and efficient trade processing. For instance, in India, platforms such as the NDS-OM (Negotiated Dealing System – Order Matching) are well-known examples that specialize in government securities (g-sec) trading. Other entities include various bank-operated ETPs such as BARX operated by Barclays Investment Bank (international) and proprietary systems developed by financial institutions such as 360TGTX operated by Three Sixty Trading Networks (India) Pvt. Ltd. 

On June 16, 2025, the RBI issued Master Direction – Reserve Bank of India (Electronic Trading Platforms) Directions, 2025 (‘New ETP Directions’) in supersession of the Electronic Trading Platforms (Reserve Bank) Directions, 2018 dated October 05, 2018 (‘Erstwhile ETP Directions’). This was based on the feedback received on the Draft Directions issued  on April 29, 2024. 

Applivability:

  • Entities operating ETPs facilitating transactions in eligible instruments,under the New ETP Directions,
  • Grandfathering clause:
    • Any entity already authorised under the Erstwhile ETP Directions shall deemed to have been authorised under the New ETP Directions, or
    • any action already taken under the Erstwhile ETP Directions “shall be deemed to have been taken” under the New ETP Directions. 

In practical terms, operators need not re-submit applications, seek fresh authorisations or revisit past actions as long as compliant under the Erstwhile ETP Directions.

Effective Date:

Effective immediately i.e. from June 16, 2025.

All about Electronic Trading Platforms (‘ETPs’)

Before going ahead to analyse the changes let us understand what ETPs are. ETPs are electronic systems, other than recognised stock exchanges, on which transactions in eligible instruments are contracted. But why would someone prefer trading on ETP rather than other exchanges/ platforms such as stock exchanges? ETPs offer eligible entities multi-instrument trading platforms (dealing with money-market, G-Secs, FX, swaps etc.) with tailored tenures and faster settlement process while stock exchanges cater to listed equities and futures with standardised contracts, retail participation and fixed trading hours.

Who operates these electronic systems?

Any entity as defined in the New ETP Directions incorporated in the form of a company and authorised by the RBI in this regard can operate an ETP. Currently, there are 12 authorised ETP operators under the Erstwhile ETP Directions who shall continue to operate under the New ETP Directions.

Types of ETP: Single Dealer Platform v. Multi-Dealer Platform

BasisSingle Dealer PlatformMulti-Dealer Platform
SellerA single bank or financial institutionSeveral banks and financial institutions
PricingTailored pricing from one provider.Competitive pricing with options from several liquidity providers.
LiquidityLowHigh
Liquidity sourceProvided by a single bank or institution.Aggregated liquidity from multiple banks/institutions.
CustomisationTailored interfaces and services designed for specific clients.More standardized interfaces across multiple dealers; less tailored.
Execution qualityStable and consistent execution within one controlled environmentBest execution can be sought across multiple quotes and providers
SuitabilityClients who value a close banking relationship and prefer a dedicated, controlled trading environment Clients who want to compare and execute trades across a range of prices and liquidity providers
ExampleNDS-OM, operated by Clearcorp Dealing Systems (India) Ltd., provides a secondary market platform for government securities owned by RBI360TGTX, operated by Three Sixty Trading Networks (India) Pvt. Ltd., provides a platform for trading in FX Spot, Forwards, Swaps and Options

Players on ETP

  1. Primary Dealers- In 1995, the RBI introduced the system of PDs in the Government Securities (G-Sec) Market. The objectives of the PD system are to strengthen the infrastructure in G-Sec market, development of underwriting and market making capabilities for G-Sec, improve secondary market trading system and to make PDs an effective conduit for open market operations (OMO).

The RBI currently extends various facilities to the PDs to enable them to fulfill their obligations, including memberships of electronic dealing, trading and settlement systems (NDS platforms/INFINET/RTGS/CCIL).

PDs are classified as below:

  1. Standalone Primary Dealers- NBFC-ML
  2. Bank Primary Dealers- Scheduled Commercial Banks and Central Banks- National and International
BasisStandalone Primary DealerBank Primary Dealers
Entity StructureOperate as independent legal entities, often registered as NBFCs or as dedicated subsidiaries/joint ventures.Operate as a departmental function within a scheduled commercial bank (or its branch, including foreign banks).
Regulatory FrameworkRBI guidelinesRBI Guidelines and bank specific norms
Business focusPrimarily focused on government securities trading and related activities, often with more flexibility to diversify (e.g., underwriting, trading derivatives).The primary dealer function is one element of a larger suite of banking services and is more integrated with the bank’s overall operations.
Operational IndependenceGreater operational autonomy, being solely focused on the government securities marketFunctions as an integral part of the bank’s operations, with decisions influenced by the broader business strategy of the bank
PDs registered with RBISBI DFHI LimitedBank of Baroda, Bank of America
  1. Traders

Analysis of Change

Having understood the nomenclature, we may proceed to analyse the changes and what they mean for Regulated Entities. The primary change and intent of the Draft Directions was to curb unregulated entities and platforms, specifically offshore platforms dealing with foreign exchange trading involving inshore/ domestic investors. Please note that foreign exchange instruments have been a part of eligible instruments, however, due to not being defined, the question whether such offshore ETPs would be covered, was always a question. The Draft Directions recommended certain changes, however, the major change was bringing offshore ETPs under the domain of RBI. However, the finalised New ETP Directions do not deal with this aspect.  

While the RBI largely accepted the foundational architecture proposed in the draft, it has revised certain provisions to provide clarity in many areas, especially around risk and operational aspects which are now expressed in more precise terms along with addition of new provisions around enforcement and transitional mechanisms.

Highlights of Major Changes: 

  • Expanded applicability to include outsourcing entities under the purview of the New ETP Directions in essence
  • Carve out to single dealer banks and Standalone Primary Dealer (‘SPD’)
  • Transition to an electronic application process: Moving away from physical submission, the application process is now streamlined through the PRAVAAH portal
  • Quarterly and annual reporting requirements for the operators introduced mandating regular updates thereby tightening regulatory oversight
  •  Framework for data preservation and sharing post-authorisation 

Comparison at a Glance:

AreaErstwhile ETP DirectionsNew ETP DirectionsImplications
Application process for authorisationPhysical submissionThrough PRAVAAH Portal of RBIStreamlining the process, enhancing accessibility, efficiency, and real-time tracking for applicants as well as regulators 
Quarterly reportingNo such requirementQuarterly reporting on functioning of ETPs by Operators (details covered below)Operators to provide periodic updates on operational performance, ensuring regulatory oversight
Annual ReportingNo such requirementAnnual reporting on compliance of the New ETP Directions and terms and conditions prescribed (details covered below)Operators to yearly confirm their adherence to updated regulatory guidelines and contractual conditions
Eligibility CriteriaDid not apply to ETPs operated by SCBs Apply to all the entities including SCBs operated ETPs (except exemption covered below)Banks must now play by the same rulebook as other operators, additionally Public Sector Banks shall have to  incorporate (or spin off) a Companies Act vehicle, infuse requisite capital and adhere to technological standards.
Until now, Public Sector Banks that operate an ETP slipped neatly around the RBI’s “company‐only” eligibility gate. The New ETP Direction takes away that privilege. From the day the change takes effect, every ETP, bank-owned or not must meet the same bar
Preservation, access and use of dataDid not have a provision for treatment of data in the event of cancellation of authorisationSpecifies the requirement to share data, along with form and manner, with the RBI or any agency in the event of cancellation of authorisation as may be called upon by the RBI or any other agency.Enhanced regulatory oversight and post-termination accountability on operators
Definition of ‘Entity’“….an agency formed as a ‘company’ and incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013 (or earlier acts)”“….any person, natural or legal.”Language of the New ETP Directions seems to widen the scope of entity, however reading the impact along with para 6(f)(iii), it only brings the outsourcing entities under the widened scope
Grandfathering RuleNot needed (first issue)All licenses/actions under Erstwhile ETP Directions shall be treated as validNo fresh registration required
ExemptionETPs operated by banks for their customer on a bilateral basis as long as no market is being created for the securitiesCarve out to SCBs (including branches of Foreign Banks operating in India) and SPDs wherein the bank or the SPD operating the electronic system is the sole quote/price provider and a party to all transactions contracted on the system.Banks and SPDs can operate proprietary trading platforms without the full weight of the standard compliance requirements set for multi-dealer platforms. This can streamline their internal processes and reduce regulatory and technological burdens.Acting as the sole quote provider makes these institutions both the operator and counterparty. This can improve execution speed and reduce inter-dealer friction.A single market maker model may lead to faster execution but can constrain competitive pricing, potentially resulting in wider spreads if the operator does not face rival pricing pressures from other dealers.While banks and SPDs gain efficiency due to lesser compliances, they must remain vigilant about disclosure and transparency requirements to avoid any adverse effects on market integrity.Banks and SPDs may develop more tailored platforms, exclusive systems to capture niche market segments.Synchronization with global norms that treat single-dealer platforms as an extension of the dealer’s book and not that of an exchange.

Reporting Requirements:

These new requirements shall have to be complied with along with the existing reporting requirements under the Erswhile ETP Directions from the effective date of the New ETP Directions. Accordingly, the first quarterly report shall be required to be submitted on or before 15th July, 2025 and the annual report shall be submitted on or before 30th April, 2026. The manner of reporting by ETP operators as per the New ETP Directions has been listed below:

Reporting RequirementReporting AuthorityFrequencyFormatTimeline
NewFunctioning of the platform, including but not limited to the following points:Events resulting in disruption of activities, during the quarter, if anyInstances of market abuse, during the quarter, if anyDetails about any material change in trading procedure or technology carried out during the quarterRBIQuarterlyAnnex-2 of the New ETP DirectionsOn or before 15th day of the month following the quarter
Compliance with the New ETP Directions and terms and conditions prescribed at the time of authorisationRBIAnnuallyNot specifiedon or before the 30th of April of the succeeding financial year
Data relating to activities on the ETPRBIPost cancellation of authorisationAs may be prescribedAs may be prescribed
ExistingTransaction informationTrade repository or trading platformAs may be prescribedAs may be prescribedAs may be prescribed
Other report, data and/or information as required by RBIRBIAs may be prescribedAs may be prescribedAs may be prescribed
Data/informationAny agency as required by Indian LawsNot specifiedNot specifiedNot specified
Event resulting in disruption of activities or market abuseRBIEvent-basedNot specifiedNot specified

Conclusion:

By introducing defined protocols for risk management, data governance and reporting, the updated framework seeks to close existing regulatory gaps. Key provisions of the New ETP Directions include, amongst others, a clear exemption for single–dealer platforms and a streamlined application process via the PRAVAAH portal. These measures ensure legal continuity. Ultimately, this transformative framework not only reinforces the integrity of the trading ecosystem but also cultivates an environment conducive to innovation.

Bond Credit Enhancement Framework: Competitive, rational, reasonable

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-Vinod Kothari (vinod@vinodkothari.com)

The RBI’s proposed framework for partial credit enhancement for bonds has significant improvements over the last 2015 version

The RBI released the draft of a new comprehensive framework for non-fund based support, including guarantees, co-acceptances, as well as partial credit enhancement (PCE) for bonds. The PCE framework is proposed to be significantly revamped, over its earlier 2015 version.

Note that PCE for corporate bonds was mentioned in the FM’s Budget 20251, specifically indicating the setting up of a PCE facility under the National Bank for Financing of Infrastructural Development (NaBFID).

A quick snapshot of how PCE works and who all can benefit is illustrated below:

The highlights of the changes under the new PCE framework are:

What is PCE?

Partial Credit Enhancement (PCE) is a risk-mitigating financial tool where a third party provides limited financial backing to improve the creditworthiness of a debt instrument. Provision of wrap or credit support for bonds is quite a common practice globally. 

PCE is a contingent liquidity facility – it allows the bond issuer to draw upon the PCE provider to service the bond. For example, if a coupon payment of a bond is due and the issuer has difficulty in servicing the same, the issuer may tap the PCE facility and do the servicing. The amount so tapped becomes the liability of the issuer to the PCE provider, of course, subordinated to the bondholders. In this sense, the PCE facility is a contingent line of credit. 

A situation of inability may arise at the time of eventual redemption of the bonds too – at that stage as well, the issuer may draw upon the PCE facility. 

Since the credit support is partial and not total, the maximum claim of the bond issuer against the PCE provider is limited to the extent of guarantee – if there is a 20% guarantee, only 20% of the bond size may be drawn by the issuer. If the facility is revolving in nature, this 20% may refer to the maximum amount tapped at any point of time.

Given that bond defaults are quite often triggered by timing and not the eventual failure of the bond issuer, a PCE facility provides a great avenue for avoiding default and consequential downgrade.  PCE provides a liquidity window, allowing the issuer to arrange liquidity in the meantime. 

Who can be the guarantee provider?

PCE under the earlier framework could have been given by banks. The ambit of guarantee providers has been expanded to include SCBs, AIFIs, NBFCs in Top, Upper and Middle Layers and HFCs. However, in case of NBFCs and HFCs, there are additional conditions as well as limit restrictions. 

As may be known, entities such as NABFID have been tasked with promoting bond markets by giving credit support. 

Who may be the bond issuers?

The PCE can be extended against bonds issued by corporates /special purpose vehicles (SPVs) for funding all types of projects and to bonds issued by Non-deposit taking NBFCs with asset size of ₹1,000 crore and above registered with RBI (including HFCs).

What are the key features of the bonds?

  1. REs may offer PCE only in respect of bonds whose pre-enhanced rating is “BBB minus” or better.
  2. REs shall not invest in corporate bonds which are credit enhanced by other REs. They may, however, provide other need based credit facilities (funded and/ or non-funded) to the corporate/ SPV. 
  3. To be eligible for PCE, corporate bonds shall be rated by a minimum of two external credit rating agencies at all times.
  4. Further, additional conditions for providing PCE to bonds issued by NBFCs and HFCs:
    1. The tenor of the bond issued by NBFCs/ HFCs for which PCE is provided shall not be less than three years. 
    2. The proceeds from the bonds backed by PCE from REs shall only be utilized for refinancing the existing debt of the NBFCs/ HFCs. Further, REs shall introduce appropriate mechanisms to monitor and ensure that the end-use condition is met. 

What will be the form of PCE? 

PCE shall be provided in the form of an irrevocable contingent line of credit (LOC) which will be drawn in case of shortfall in cash flows for servicing the bonds and thereby may improve the credit rating of the bond issue. The contingent facility may, at the discretion of the PCE providing RE, be made available as a revolving facility. Further, PCE cannot be provided by way of guarantee. 

What is the difference between a guarantee and an LOC? If a guarantor is called upon to make payments for a beneficiary, the guarantor steps into the shoes of the creditor, and has the same claim against the beneficiary as the original creditor. For example, if a guarantor makes a payment for a bond issuer’s obligations, the guarantor will have the same rights as the bondholders (security, priority, etc). On the contrary, the LOC is simply a line of liquidity, and explicitly, the claims of the LOC provider are subordinated to the claims of the bondholders.

If the bond partly amortises, is the amount of the PCE proportionately reduced? This should not be so. In fact, the PCE facility continues till the amortisation of the bonds in full. It is quite natural to expect that the defaults by a bond issuer may be back-heavy. For example, if there is a 20% PCE, it may have to be used for making the last tranche of redemption of the bonds. Therefore, the liability of the PCE provider will come down only when the outstanding obligation of the bond issuer comes to less than the size of the PCE.

Any limits or restrictions on the quantum of PCE by a single RE?

The existing PCE framework restricts a single entity to providing only 20% of the total 50% PCE limit for a bond issuance. It is now proposed that the sub-limit of 20% be removed, enabling single entity to provide upto 50% PCE support. 

Further, the exposure of an RE by way of PCEs to bonds issued by an NBFC/ HFC shall be restricted to one percent of capital funds of the RE, within the extant single/ group borrower exposure limits.

Who can invest in credit-enhanced bonds?

Under the existing framework, only the entities providing PCE were restricted from investing in the bonds they had credit-enhanced. However, the new Draft Directions expand this restriction by prohibiting all REs from investing in bonds that have been credit-enhanced through a PCE, regardless of whether they are the PCE provider. The draft regulations state that the same is with an intent to promote REs enabling wider investor participation.

This is, in fact, a major point that may need the attention of the regulator. A universal bar on all REs from investing in bonds which are wrapped by a PCE is neither desirable, nor optimal. Most bond placements are done by REs, and REs may have to warehouse the bonds. In addition, the treasuries of many REs make opportunistic investments in bonds.

Take, for instance, bonds credit enhanced by NABFID. The whole purpose of NABFID is to permit bonds to be issued by infrastructure sector entities, by which banks who may have extended funding will get an exit. But the treasuries of the very same banks may want to invest in the bonds, once the bonds have the backing of NABFID support. There is no reason why, for the sake of wider participation, investment by regulated entities should be barred. This is particularly at the present stage of India’s bond markets, where the markets are not liquid and mature enough to attract retail participation. 

What is the impact on capital computation?

Under the Draft Directions the capital is required to be maintained by the REs providing PCE based on the PCE amount based on applicable risk weight to the pre-enhanced rating of the bond. Under the earlier framework, the capital was computed so as to be equal to the difference between the capital required on bond before credit enhancement and the capital required on bond after credit enhancement. That is, the existing framework ensures that the PCE does not result into a capital release on a system-wide basis. This was not a logical provision, and we at VKC have made this point on various occasions2. 

Related Resources –

  1.  Union Budget 2025: Key Highlights and Reforms focusing on Financial Sector Entities ↩︎
  2. Partial Credit Enhancement: A Catalyst for Boosting Infrastructure Bond Issuances? ↩︎

Partial Credit Enhancement: A Catalyst for Boosting Infrastructure Bond Issuances?

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-Abhirup Ghosh (abhirup@vinodkothari.com)

What is partial credit enhancement?

Partial Credit Enhancement (PCE) is a risk-mitigating financial tool where a third party provides limited financial backing to improve the creditworthiness of a debt instrument. It ensures that investors are partially protected against default risk, making it easier for issuers to raise funds at better terms.

The key features of a PCE are as follows:

  1. Parties involved: A typical PCE structure would involve at least three parties:
  • Issuer: A company or an entity that wants to raise funds by issuing debt instruments;
  • PCE Provider or Credit Enhancer: A third party (usually a government agency or a financial institution with strong credibility) that provides the credit enhancement 
  • Investor(s): The one who invests in the debt instruments. 
  1. Multiple forms: Can be structured in various forms, like guarantee, subordinated line of credit, investment in subordinated tranche, cash collateral etc. 
  2. Limited coverage: Unlike full credit enhancement, PCE covers only a portion of the potential losses in case of default. The extent of coverage is pre-fixed and does not extend once the same is exhausted.
  3. Improved Credit Rating: PCE lowers the perceived credit risk, leading to an improved bond rating by credit rating agencies. A higher credit rating results in lower interest rates, benefiting the issuer.

Why has this become so important all of a sudden?

The concept of PCE has been in India for quite some time now, and is commonly used in securitisation transactions. However, the Finance Minister’s announcement during Union Budget 2025 about setting up of a PCE facility under the National Bank for Financing Infrastructure Development (NaBFID) has brought this into the limelight.

How does it help issuance of bonds by an infrastructure entity?

Infrastructure development is the backbone of economic growth, but funding large-scale projects such as highways, railways, power plants, and airports requires substantial capital. Infrastructure projects often face challenges in raising funds due to their long gestation periods, high risks, and lower credit ratings. PCE serves as an effective financial tool to improve the creditworthiness of infrastructure bonds, making them more attractive to investors. By providing a partial guarantee or security, PCE helps reduce the cost of borrowing and widens investor participation, ultimately facilitating infrastructure financing.

Challenges in Infrastructure Bond Issuances

Infrastructure bond issuances face several obstacles that make fundraising difficult. One of the primary challenges is low credit ratings. Infrastructure projects, especially those in their early stages, often receive sub-investment-grade ratings (such as BBB or lower), making them unattractive to investors. Additionally, these projects are subject to high perceived risks, including revenue uncertainty, regulatory hurdles, construction delays, and cost overruns. Since many infrastructure projects rely on user charges, such as tolls or metro fares, their cash flow projections can be unpredictable.

Another major issue is the long maturity period of infrastructure bonds. Most investors prefer short- to medium-term investments, whereas infrastructure bonds typically have tenures of 10 to 30 years. This mismatch reduces the appetite for such bonds in the market. Lastly, lack of institutional investor participation further limits the success of infrastructure bond issuances, as pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds prefer highly rated bonds with stable returns.

Enhancing Credit Ratings and Investor Confidence

One of the most significant ways PCE helps infrastructure bond issuances is by improving their credit ratings. When a bank or financial institution provides partial credit enhancement in the form of a guarantee or reserve fund, it reduces the default risk associated with the bond. This leads to a higher credit rating, making the bond more attractive to investors. For example, an infrastructure company with a BBB-rated bond issuance may improve its rating to A with a 20% PCE support, or AA with a 50% PCE support thereby increasing demand from investors. A higher rating not only boosts investor confidence but also expands the pool of potential buyers, including institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies.

Reducing Cost of Borrowing

By improving the credit rating of infrastructure bonds, PCE directly leads to a reduction in interest costs. Bonds with higher ratings attract lower interest rates, which helps infrastructure companies secure financing at more affordable terms. For instance, without PCE, a BBB-rated bond may require 12%, whereas a bond upgraded to an AA rating with PCE support may only require 9%. This reduction in interest rates can result in significant savings over the life of the bond. Lower borrowing costs also make infrastructure projects more financially viable, ensuring their timely execution and long-term sustainability.

Attracting Institutional Investors

Institutional investors, such as mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies, typically have strict investment guidelines that restrict them from investing in low-rated securities. Since many of these investors require bonds to be rated AA or higher, infrastructure bonds often struggle to meet these requirements. PCE helps bridge this gap by enhancing the credit rating, making infrastructure bonds eligible for investment by these large institutional players. This leads to greater liquidity and stability in the corporate bond market, ensuring a steady flow of capital to infrastructure projects.

Why is issuance of bonds helpful/ important for the infrastructure entity?

PCE contributes to the overall development of the corporate bond market by encouraging more issuers to raise funds through bonds rather than relying solely on bank loans. Traditionally, infrastructure financing in India has been dependent on banks, which exposes them to high asset-liability mismatches due to the long tenure of infrastructure projects. By facilitating infrastructure bond issuances, PCE helps shift the burden away from banks and towards a broader investor base. This not only diversifies funding sources but also enhances financial stability in the banking sector.

As per a CII report (2022), the infrastructure financing gap is estimated at over 5% of GDP. Approx. 80% of the investment in infrastructure space is by government agencies (80%), and the remaining 20% comes from private developers. 

As per the National Infrastructure Pipelines, the total investment target was set at INR 111 trillion (USD 1.34 trillion) for the period between FY 20 and FY 25; and only 6-8% (INR 6.66-8.88) of the such targets were expected to be met by bond issuances. Reliance on bond markets is planned to the extent of 6% to 8% (INR 6.66 – 8.88 trillion). As per the said estimates, the average annual issuances should have been INR 1.480 trillion. However, between FY18 and FY22, the issuance of infrastructure bonds has been at INR 5.37 trillion, that is, an average of INR 1.07 trillion per annum, that is a shortfall of ~30% compared to the target.

Furthermore, the issuances have been highly concentrated in the top 5 PSUs. The charts below show the annual bond issuances between FY 18 – FY 22, and share of issuance by top 5 PSUs and others:

Source: CRISIL

The market is dominated by highly rated issuers. In general approx. 75% of bond issuers are rated AAA, and more than 90% of the issuances are by AA and above rated entities. The reason for this dominance by highly rated issuers is the fact that for practical purposes, the most acceptable rating in the infra bonds space is AA, as long term investors like insurance companies, pension funds etc. are by regulation required to invest in AA or above rated papers. 

PCE support from a credible source will help a lot of infrastructure operators, who are stopped at the gate, with ratings in the range of A, with easy access to the market. 

Existing scheme for PCE – why has it not found takers

The existing scheme for PCE was notified by the RBI in 2015. In a nutshell, the scheme provides for the following:

Form of PCE: To be structured as a non-funded, irrevocable contingent line of credit. This facility can be drawn upon in the event of cash flow shortfalls affecting bond servicing.

Limitations: The total PCE extended by a single bank cannot exceed 20% of the bond’s total size; however, overall, the PCE provided by all banks, in aggregate, cannot exceed 50% of the bond’s total size.

Further, PCE can be provided only to bonds which have a pre-enhanced rating of BBB- or above.

Capital Requirements: The bank providing PCE does not hold capital based only on its PCE amount. Instead, it calculates the capital based on the difference between:

  • The capital required before credit enhancement.
  • The capital required after credit enhancement.

The objective is to ensure that the PCE provider should absorb the risks that it covers in the entire transaction. Illustrating with an example:

Assume that the total bond size is Rs. 100 crores for which PCE to the extent of Rs. 20 crore is provided by a bank. The pre-enhanced rating of the bond is BBB which gets enhanced to AA with the PCE. In this scenario:

  1. At the pre-enhanced rating of BBB (100% risk weight), the capital requirement on the total bond size (Rs.100 crores) is Rs.9.00 crores.
  2. The capital requirement for the bond (Rs.100 crores) at the enhanced rating (AA, i.e., 30% risk weight)) would be Rs.2.70 crores.
  3. As such, the PCE provider will be required to hold the difference in capital i.e., Rs.6.30 crores (Rs.9.00 crores – Rs.2.70 crores).

As can be seen, the capital has to be maintained on the total bond issuance, and not just the exposure. Ironically, this capital has to be maintained until the outstanding principal of bonds falls below the extent of PCE provided​. Usually, the bonds are amortising in nature – that is, the actual exposure of the guarantor continues to come down. Given, however, that default in bonds may be back-ended, the capital has still to be maintained till the redemption of the bonds​. This requires the PCE provider to maintain huge regulatory capital for a significantly long period of time; which also gets reflected in the ultimate cost to the beneficiary, therefore, making it unviable. 

How to make it work?

The FM’s announcement though comes with a lot of promise, as it shows a positive intent. But to make things work, there are quite a few things that should be put into place:

  1. Specific applicability: Currently, the PCE framework applies only to banks. For NaBFID to commence its PCE operations, it would be ideal to receive explicit approval from the RBI, even if the requirement is minor or procedural in nature.
  1. Limitations: Currently, the RBI’s PCE framework restricts a single entity to providing only 20% of the total 50% PCE limit for a bond issuance. It is recommended that a single institution, such as NaBFID, be allowed to provide the entire PCE, which would enhance flexibility.  The existing framework is not particularly attractive for banks in India. In the infrastructure finance sector, a 20% PCE contribution from a single entity may not be sufficient to secure a strong rating from credit rating agencies. Removing this 20% sub-limit would grant NaBFID greater flexibility while also reducing the time required to identify multiple institutions to fulfill the remaining PCE. Additionally, this change would lead to a reduction in operational expenses associated with coordinating multiple PCE providers.
  1. Capital treatment: The current setting of capital requirement makes the transactions very costly. There has to be an alternative way of achieving the objective. Setting the capital requirement as a fixed proportion of the outstanding bond value may not be appropriate, as defaults can occur at any stage. A more effective approach would be to apply the capital treatment for structured credit risk transfer under the Basel III framework, that is SEC ERBA.  Under Basel III, capital requirements are not linked to the total bond issuance size but are instead based on the rating of the tranche and the extent of exposure undertaken. This method ensures that capital is aligned with the actual risk exposure, rather than a fixed percentage of the bond size. Additionally, it accounts for the possibility of defaults occurring later in the bond’s lifecycle, providing a more efficient risk management framework.
  1. Credit risk transfer: The PCE framework should specifically allow credit risk transfer by the PCE provider – this will help the PCE provider reduce its exposures, and consequently, extent of capital to be maintained on the PCE provided​. This will help in reducing the cost of the PCE support as well.