New NBFC Regulations: A ready reckoner guide

-Team Finserv | finserv@vinodkothari.com

From 28th Nov 2025, all RBI regulated entities are governed by a completely new set of regulations.

We provide a complete comparative snapshot of the familiar old regulations and the new avatars. We have also shortlisted the changes, if any, as also commented for your comfort where there are no changes from the earlier regime.

Actionables: While there are rarely any significant substantive changes, however, REs may, at an early date, bring this major rewriting exercise to the knowledge of their boards, and proceed to make consequential changes in policies, SOPs, etc.

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Other Resources on the topic:

a. Old Rules, New Book: RBI consolidates Regulatory Framework

The Hidden Hand: Understanding Beneficial Ownership in case of Trusts

Saket Kejriwal, Assistant Manager | corplaw@vinodkothari.com, finserv@vinodkothari.com

Background

The structure of a trust inherently creates a separation of roles, typically involving three distinct parties viz. the author/settlor, trustee, and beneficiaries. While the control/operations rests with the trustee, economic benefit lies with the beneficiaries, and the settlor may continue to exert influence through the trust deed or reserved powers, thus  making it difficult to clearly identify who actually “owns” or “controls” the trust. This intrinsic separation of legal control, economic interest and potential influence renders trusts far more opaque than other conventional structures like companies or partnerships. What makes the structure even more complicated is that trusts are mostly governed by 19th century laws. Trusts are not required to publicly file information about their beneficiaries; in many cases, trustees may even contend that they are not maintaining any such regular list.

Adding to this complexity is the fact that trusts may be structured in different forms. Based on the degree of control with the trustees,  trusts may be discretionary, where the trustee has full discretion to identify the beneficiaries and/or their share, or non-discretionary, where the beneficiaries have identifiable and predetermined rights in the trust property.There are trusts where the determination of beneficiaries is either contingent or future – for example, children and grandchildren of the settlor. In discretionary trusts, beneficiaries may not have a defined share or enforceable claim at any given point, making it unclear whether they can be treated as beneficial owners at all. In non-discretionary trusts, although the beneficiaries are identifiable, the trustee continues to hold legal title, again blurring the line of who truly “owns” the trust.

For Reporting Entities1 (“REs”), including Banks and NBFCs, identification and onboarding becomes more complex when the customer is a non-individual entity. The extent of verification varies by entity type, and trusts in particular create added challenges because of the reasons cited above.

Relevance of Identifying Beneficial Owners (‘BO’)

Before discussing how REs should identify a trust’s BO, it is important to understand why they must do so. Under para 9 and 10 of the RBI KYC Directions, 2016, every regulated entity is required to frame a Customer Acceptance Policy which, at a minimum, mandates that no account-based relationship or transaction may be undertaken unless full Customer Due Diligence (‘CDD’) is completed. The same is based on R.10 of The FATF Recommendations.

As defined under para 3(b) Clause (v) of RBI KYC Directions, 2016, “Customer Due Diligence means identifying and verifying the customer and the beneficial owner using reliable and independent sources of identification”. Further, clause 3 under explanation to the above para extends this requirement to “Determining whether a customer is acting on behalf of a beneficial owner, and identifying the beneficial owner and taking all steps to verify the identity of the beneficial owner, using reliable and independent sources of identification.”.  Similar to what is prescribed under Rule 9(1) of PML Rules, 2005

As part of CDD, REs are required to identify customers and their BOs, which in turn places a corresponding obligation on customers to truthfully disclose their ownership structure and furnish relevant documents that establish the identity of a natural BO. This process obliges REs to verify the authenticity and completeness of the information and documents submitted, use these findings to determine whether to establish the business relationship and to appropriately assign a risk rating.

However, in practice, BOs may be reluctant to provide their KYC documents due to privacy concerns, fear of scrutiny, or because complex structures were intentionally designed to keep the BO’s identity concealed. 

Who are ‘beneficial owners’?

As per para 3(a)(iv) clause (d) of RBI KYC Directions, “Where the customer is a trust, the identification of beneficial owner(s) shall include identification of the author of the trust, the trustee, the beneficiaries with 10 percent or more interest in the trust and any other natural person exercising ultimate effective control over the trust through a chain of control or ownership”. A similar definition is provided under Rule 9(3) of PML Rules, 2005.  

Aforesaid definitions originates from The FATF Recommendations which clearly defines that in context of legal arrangements i.e. Trust, beneficial owner includes: “(i) the settlor(s); (ii) the trustee(s); (iii) the protector(s) (if any); (iv) each beneficiary, or where applicable, the class of beneficiaries and objects of a power; and (v) any other natural person(s) exercising ultimate effective control over the arrangement. In the case of a legal arrangement similar to an express trust, beneficial owner refers to the natural person(s) holding an equivalent position to those referred above.” 

In a discretionary trust, the trustee has full discretion, whereas in a non-discretionary trust, beneficiaries have fixed rights and the trustee has limited discretion. This influences who can practically be identified as exercising control.

Now, in the case of a discretionary trust, the above framework is usually manageable because the trustee, who exercises control, may not object to being identified as a BO. However, in a non-discretionary trust, the trustee does not exercise independent discretion. In such cases, the trustee may express reluctance to be classified as a BO because he does not “benefit” from the trust in an economic sense and may view BO identification as an unwarranted extension of responsibility. This confusion often results from equating BO with someone who derives economic benefit, whereas under AML laws the emphasis is on identifying at least one identifiable individual, ensuring that there is an accountable natural person whom authorities and REs can pursue in the event of ML/TF concerns, regardless of whether they receive monetary benefit.

Difference between BO and Beneficiary

It is important to understand that the terms “beneficiary” and “beneficial owner” serve different purposes. The objective of identifying the BO is not to treat the trustee or settler as recipients of trust benefits, but to ensure that the RE can clearly trace the natural persons involved in controlling, directing, and/or benefiting from the trust arrangement. BO identification is a regulatory requirement aimed at preventing misuse of trusts for ML/TF purposes, not a determination of who is entitled to trust assets. When viewed this way, trustee and settler identification becomes a matter of transparency and risk assessment, not a reclassification of their legal or economic rights under the trust.

Identification of the natural person behind the Trust

REs typically encounter two scenarios that require them to look behind the trust structure, first, when the trust is the direct customer, second, when the trust is recognised as a BO of another entity.

  • Trust itself is the customer

When the trust itself is the customer, the BO identification framework is relatively straightforward. The PML Rules clearly prescribe that the following individuals must always be treated as BOs:

  • the author/settlor,
  • the trustee(s), and
  • any beneficiary holding 10% or more interest, where such interest is defined or quantifiable.

These natural persons fall squarely within the definition of beneficial owners and should be identified and verified without debate.

Where specific beneficiaries cannot be identified, for example, in a public charitable trust, or in a private trust where beneficiaries do not meet the 10% threshold, the obligation to identify BOs does not fall away. In such cases, the RE must still identify:

  • the author/settlor,
  • the trustee(s), and
  • any natural person exercising ultimate effective control, if any, .

Thus, the absence of identifiable beneficiaries does not dilute the requirement. 

  • Indirect Identification (Trust as a BO / Shareholder / Partner of Another Entity)

Complexity increases when the customer is not the trust, but another legal entity, such as a company, LLP, or partnership, in which a trust holds a substantial stake. In such cases, identifying the natural person as BO requires a deeper “look-through” analysis.

The Interpretive Note to Recommendation 10 of The FATF Recommendations provides a structured cascading approach to determine BOs of legal persons. This approach should be applied sequentially2:

Step 1: Identify the natural persons with controlling ownership interest 

Determine whether any natural person ultimately owns or controls the entity through direct or indirect ownership (including ownership via the trust), if yes, identify the person(s) as BO.

Step 2: Identify natural persons exercising control through other means

If no natural person is identifiable through ownership, identify the natural persons exercising control of the entity through other means, such as through one or more juridical persons.

In such cases, the BO definition for trusts should not be imported from the definitions as discussed above i.e. all parties to the trust need not automatically be treated as BOs of the entity concerned.

Instead, the focus should be on identifying the natural person(s), whether trustee or settlor, who genuinely hold or exercise the relevant control over the underlying company, and evaluating them against the test of control.

Step 3: Identify the Senior Managing Official (SMO)

If no natural person can be identified under Step 1 or Step 2, the reporting entity must identify and verify a Senior Managing Official of the customer entity itself.

Intent behind this clause, might be to cater to conditions where the legal person is held by another legal person which is, in turn, held by a trust or where the trust is a charitable trust with no identifiable beneficiaries and no effective control exercised by the trustee, the chain may not yield any natural person with a controlling ownership or control interest. In such situations, the responsibility reverts to the customer entity itself, and the senior managing official (SMO) of the customer is identified as the BO for CDD purposes.

However, even in such cases, the SMO is identified purely for the purposes of AML laws, as discussed above. (see para 31 of the FATF Guidance on Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons)

Difference between BO and SBO

While the concept of a BO and the concept of a Significant Beneficial Owner (SBO) under the Companies Act both aim to identify the natural persons behind an entity, the two frameworks differ significantly in scope and approach. The SBO definition focuses on identifying individuals who hold a prescribed level of ownership or control, and it does not provide a structured fallback if no individual meets that threshold. 

In contrast, the BO identification under the Rule 9(3) PML Rules follows a cascading approach i.e. REs must first identify natural persons with ownership, then those who exercise control through other means. Further, only when neither approach detects a clear individual do the rules require identifying the senior managing official as the BO of last resort. This ensures that BO identification cannot be left blank, every entity must ultimately map to a natural person for AML purposes, even where no SBO exists, so that transactions are not carried out in benami or opaque structures.

Conclusion

It is important to clarify that being identified as a BO is primarily a regulatory formality for compliance. It does not alter a person’s rights, liabilities, or relationship with the trust or entity. The core objective is simply to ensure that there is a clearly identifiable natural person connected to the legal entity so that the RE can complete its due diligence and satisfy ALM requirements. Following are the limited obligations of being identified as a BO: 

  • Provide basic KYC documents or Official Valid Document (OVDs) for verification of identity;
  • Respond to any follow-up queries during onboarding or monitoring; and 
  • Undergo periodic KYC updates, as requested by the RE.
  1.  As per Section 2(wa) of PMLA Act, 2002 “reporting entity” means a banking company, financial institution, intermediary or a person carrying on a designated business or profession.
    ↩︎
  2.  Refer footnote no. 37 of The FATF Recommendations ↩︎

Operational Risk Assessment for NBFCs : Understanding The Basics

Simrat Singh | finserv@vinodkothari.com 

Operational risk, as defined by the Basel framework, refers to the possibility that a financial institution’s routine operations may be disrupted due to failures in processes, systems, people, or external events. While historically treated as secondary to credit and market risk, it has increasingly become a central focus of risk management, particularly for institutions with complex operations, heavy technology dependence, extensive outsourcing, and stringent regulatory obligations. Reflecting this shift, the RBI’s 2024 Guidance Note on Operational Risk Management and Resilience expands its expectations for operational risk management to all NBFCs. 

Having previously discussed the guidance note (refer here), this article now explains the fundamentals of operational risk assessment and outlines its process.

Operational Risk Management

Operational risk poses unique challenges because many of the events that cause losses arise from internal factors, making them difficult to generalise or predict. Large operational losses are often viewed as rare, which can make it difficult to get sustained management attention on the steady, routine work required to identify issues and track trends1. Operational risks typically stem from people, processes, systems and external events, ironically, the same resources essential for running the business. Unlike credit and market risk which are modelled and hedged, operational risks are often idiosyncratic, event-driven and subject to human, process and system failure.

Relevance For Financial Institutions

Financial institutions operate with complex processes, large transaction volumes, strict regulatory reporting requirements and often heavy dependence on technology, outsourcing arrangements and third-party service providers. Because of this, operational failures, such as system glitches, fraud, compliance breaches or breakdowns in business continuity, can result in substantial financial losses, regulatory sanctions, reputational harm and other disruptions to business operations. 

Given these risks, regulators have placed growing emphasis on the measurement and management of operational risk. Based on our experience, RBI has frequently raised queries regarding the operational risk frameworks of NBFCs during its supervisory inspections. Under Basel II, for instance, banks using the Advanced Measurement Approach were required to maintain strong, demonstrable operational risk management systems. Recognising the importance of operational risk, the Bank of England’s FSA0732 report, which is applicable on banks and large investment firms, requires firms to record the top ten operational risk loss events for each reporting year. This provides a clear view of what went wrong, where it occurred and the scale of the financial impact.

Operational Risk Assessment Process

In its guidance note for operational risk, RBI at many places underscored the importance for risk assessment. One such example is given below:

Principle 6: Senior Management should ensure the comprehensive identification and assessment of the Operational Risk inherent in all material products, activities, processes and systems to make sure the inherent risks and incentives are well understood. Both internal and external threats and potential failures in people, processes and systems should be assessed promptly and on an ongoing basis. Assessment of vulnerabilities in critical operations should be done in a proactive and prompt manner. All the resulting risks should be managed in accordance with operational resilience approach.

6.1 Risk identification and assessment are fundamental characteristics of an effective Operational Risk Management system, and directly contribute to operational resilience capabilities. Effective risk identification considers both internal and external factors. Sound risk assessment allows an RE to better understand its risk profile and allocate risk management resources and strategies most effectively.

Figure 1: Operational Risk Assessment Process

Risk identification

Risk identification means figuring out what exactly you need to assess. It involves recognising the different risk sources and risk events that may disrupt your business. A risk source is the underlying cause, something that has the potential to create a problem. A risk event is when that problem actually occurs. For example, a weak password is a risk source, while a data breach caused by that weak password is the risk event. 

As per the RBI’s Guidance Note, REs are expected to take a comprehensive view of their entire “risk universe”. This means identifying all categories of risks, traditional or emerging, that could potentially affect their operations. These may include insurance risk, climate-related risk, fourth- and fifth-party risks, geopolitical risk, AML and corruption risk, legal and compliance risks, and many others. The underlying expectation is simple: an RE should systematically identify everything that can go wrong within its business model, processes, people, systems, and external dependencies, and ensure that no material source of risk is overlooked.

There are many ways to identify risks. You may use questionnaires, self-assessments by business or functional heads, workshops with staff involved in risk management, or you may review past failures within the company. Industry reports, experiences of peers, and linking organisational goals to potential obstacles can also reveal important risks. You can even look at upcoming strategic initiatives and think ahead about the risks that may arise when these changes are implemented.

Every organisation has its own risk profile. A lender may worry about borrowers not repaying, untrained staff, biases in an AI underwriting model, IT system failures, employee fraud, or suppliers not delivering on time. These risks should be recorded in a risk register, but it is important that this register reflects your business. A company offering only physical loans may not face digital lending risks, and should not simply copy any generic list. The goal is to identify risks that genuinely matter to your day-to-day operations.

Assessment

Once you know which risks matter, the next step is to assess each of them. For every risk, ask yourself two basic questions: 

  1. What is the likelihood of this risk actually happening? This is simply the chance that the event might occur; You may assign parameters to determine the likelihood – for eg if the risk event is almost certain to occur in the next 1 year or is it likely to occur or it will occur only in remote situations?

Figure 2: Illustrative likelihood assessment criterias

  1. If it does happen, what impact will it have on my organisation? Will it hurt my reputation? Lead to financial loss? Negative feedback from customers? Cause a data leak? One can record the impact of the risk as High, medium or low based on its gravity

Figure 3: Illustrative impact assessment of risks

These two questions help you understand how serious the risk is inherently (inherent risk level) i.e, before considering whether you have any controls in place. Note that at this stage, you’re only interested in the natural level of risk that exists ignoring any controls you might already have. 

Evaluating Controls

Once the inherent risks are understood, the next step is to look at how these risks are currently being managed. These risk-reducing efforts are your controls or mitigation measures. Controls are simply the actions, checks, or processes already in place to lower the likelihood or impact of a risk. For example: Is your underwriting model checked for bias? Are board committees meeting regularly? Do you have proper maker–checker checks in your V-CIP process? Controls can take many forms such as policies, procedures, tools, system checks, reviews, or even day-to-day practices followed by employees. In essence, a control is any measure that maintains or modifies risk and helps the organisation manage it more effectively. 

Residual Risk

After evaluating the controls, you can determine the residual risk i.e. the level of risk that remains even after your mitigation measures have been applied. Residual risk shows whether the remaining exposure is acceptable or whether additional controls are needed. By definition, residual risk can never be higher than inherent risk. Generally, residual risk can be interpreted as follows:

  • Low Residual Risk: When the effectiveness of internal controls fully covers or even exceeds the inherent risk;
  • Medium Residual Risk: When controls reduce most of the risk, leaving only a small gap;
  • High Residual Risk: When controls address only part of the risk and a significant gap still remains;
CategoryRisk SourceRisk eventRoot causeLikelihoodConsequenceLevel of inherent riskControl EffectivenessLevel of Residual Risk
People RiskEmployees / StaffEmployee fraud, misappropriation, or collusionWeak internal controls, poor background checksHighly LikelyMediumHighWeakHIGH
Information Technology & Cyber RiskIT Infrastructure / SystemsSystem downtime or core platform failureServer outage, inadequate IT resiliencePossibleLowLowStrongLOW
Process & Internal Control RiskOnboarding / KYC ProcessesNon-compliance with KYC or onboarding proceduresInadequate verification, manual errorsPossibleHighHighAdequateMEDIUM
Legal & Compliance RiskOutsourcing / LSP ArrangementsNon-compliance in outsourcing / LSP arrangementsWeak SLA oversight, inadequate due diligenceUnlikelyLowLowAdequateLOW
External Fraud RiskBorrowers / External PartiesBorrower fraud – identity theft, fake borrowers, or collusionForged documents, weak KYCPossibleLowLowStrongLOW
Model / Automation / Reporting RiskData Aggregation / SystemsFailure in data aggregation across systems for regulatory returnsSystem inconsistencies, poor data governanceHighly LikelyMediumHighStrongLOW
Reputation Risk / Customer ExperienceCustomer Communication / Sales PracticesMiscommunication of terms or conditions to customersPoor training, unclear communication scriptsPossibleMediumMediumWeakMEDIUM

Figure 5: An illustrative Snapshot of Operational Risk Assessment

Understanding residual risk helps decide where further action is required and where the organisation may still be vulnerable.

Conclusion

The goal, therefore, is to move away from a simple “tick-box” approach and make the operational risk assessment truly tailored to the organisation. For ML and above NBFCs, the ICAAP requirement to set aside capital for operational risk is useful, but it covers only a narrow part of what operational risk really involves. A comprehensive assessment goes much further by examining the strength of the entity’s internal controls and how effectively they manage real-world risks. If the residual risk exceeds the organisation’s tolerance level, it should trigger a closer look at those controls and prompt corrective action. Ultimately, the focus should be on building a risk framework that is meaningful, proactive, and aligned with how the organisation actually operates. The ultimate goal is therefore to develop ‘operational resilience’ which as per Bank of England3 is the ability of firms and the financial sector as a whole to prevent, adapt, respond to, recover from, and learn from operational disruptions.

Our other resources on risk management:

  1. Analysing Banking Risk: World Bank ↩︎
  2. FSA073: Instruction ↩︎
  3. Operational resilience of the financial sector: Bank of England ↩︎

RBI Trade Relief Directions: How is your company impacted?

– Team Finserv | finserv@vinodkothari.com

Call it Trump relief! The RBI announced relief measures on the 14th Nov to help the exporters of certain specified items, who may have availed export credit facilities from a regulated lender, whereby all regulated entities (REs) “may” provide a moratorium, from 1st September 2025 to 31st December, 2025. The grant of such a relief shall be based on a policy, consisting of the criteria for grant of the subject relief, and such criteria shall be disclosed publicly. Not only this, REs shall also make a fortnightly disclosure of the reliefs granted to eligible borrowers on a RBI format on Daksh portal.

The Reserve Bank of India (Trade Relief Measures) Directions, 2025 (‘Directions’) are applicable to NBFCs and HFCs as well. This is accompanied with amendment to Foreign Exchange Management (Export of Goods and Services) (Second Amendment) Regulations, 2025 for extension of the period for both realization/repatriation of export value (from 9 to 15 months) and the shipment of goods against advance payment (from 1 to 3 years).

Highlights:

  • Whether your company grants an export credit or not, if your borrower is the one who has availed export credit for export of specified goods or services, the borrower may approach you for the moratorium.
  • Are you bound to grant the moratorium? Answer is, no. However, basis a policy which is publicly hosted, you will consider the eligibility of the borrower. The relevant factors on which the eligibility will be examined may also form a part of the policy, and ideally, should include the extent of dependence on exports of specified items to the USA, tariff-based disruption in the cashflows, alternative markets and transitioning possibilities, etc.
  • Effective: Immediately. 
  • Actionables: (a) Framing of policy to consider the eligibility of affected borrowers; (b) Hosting the policy on public website; (c) Creating mechanism for receiving and transmission of borrower requests for the moratorium and giving timely responses to the same (d) RBI fortnightly reporting.

What is the intent?

To mitigate the disruptions caused by global headwinds, and to ensure the continuity of viable businesses.

Tariff impositions by the USA are likely to impact several exporters. There may be a ripple effect on penultimate sellers or other segments of the economy as well, but the intent of the Trade Relief Directions seems limited to the direct exporters only.

Which all regulated entities are covered?

The Directions are applicable to following entities:

  • Commercial Banks
  • Primary (Urban) Co-operative Banks, State Co-operative Banks and Central Co-operative Banks
  • NBFCs
  • HFCs
  • All-India Financial Institutions
  • Credit Information Companies (only with reference to paragraph 16 of these Directions).

Does it matter whether the RE in question is giving export credit facilities or not? In our view, it does not matter. The intent of the Directions is to mitigate the impact of trade disruptions. Of course, the borrower in question must be an exporter, must have an export credit facility outstanding as on 31st Aug 2025, and the same must be standard.

If these conditions are met, then the RE which holds the export credit, as also other REs (of course, the nexus between the trade disruption and the servicing of the credit facility will have to be seen) should consider the borrower for the purpose of grant of relief.

Relief may or may not be granted. 

Policy on granting relief

The consideration of the grant of relief will be based on a policy. 

Below are some of the brief pointers to be incorporated in the policy: 

  1. Purpose and Scope: define which loan products, sectors, or borrower categories are covered; effective period for granting relief
  2. Eligibility Criteria for borrowers
  3. Assessment criteria for relief requests received from the borrowers
  4. Authority responsible for approving such request
  5. Relief measures that can be offered to borrowers
  6. Impact on asset classification and provisioning
  7. Disclosure Requirements
  8. Monitoring and Review: Authority which is responsible for monitoring such accounts; periodicity of review

How is the assessment of eligible borrowers to be done?

In our view, the relevant information to be obtained from the candidates should be:

  • Total export over a relevant period in the past, say 3 years
  • Break up of export of “impacted items” and other item
  • Of the above, exports to the USA
  • Gross profit margin
  • Impact on the cashflows
  • Information about cancellation of export orders from US importers
  • Any damages or other payments receivable from such importers
  • Any damages or other payments to be made to the penultimate suppliers
  • Alternative business strategies – repositioning of markets, alternative buyer base, etc
  • Cashflow forecasts, and how the borrower proposes to pay after the Moratorium Period.

What sort of lending facilities are covered?

Please note the following from the preamble: “mitigating the burden of debt servicing brought about by trade disruptions caused by global headwinds and to ensure the continuity of viable businesses”. Therefore, clearly, the relief intended here is one where “trade disruptions” create such a burden on debt servicing, which may impact the viability of the business.

From this, it implies that the entity in question must be a business entity, and the loan in question should be a business loan. 

In our thinking, the following facilities seem covered:

  1. Export credits of all forms, including packing credit, funded as well as unfunded, letters of credit, etc.
  2. Buyer’s credit or facilities for inward acquisitions/purchases by an exporter
  3. Cash credits, overdrafts or working capital related facilities, intended for export business of impacted items.
  4. Term loans relating to an impacted business
  5. Loans against property, where the end use is working capital

Eligible and ineligible borrowers:

Eligible borrowers:

  • Borrowers who have availed credit for export
  • Borrower had an outstanding export credit facility from a RE as of August 31, 2025 (However, in case the borrower has a sanctioned facility pending disbursement as on Aug 31, the same shall not be eligible)
  • Borrower with all REs was/were classified as ‘Standard’ as on August 31, 2025

In our view, the following borrowers/ credit facilities are not eligible for the relief:

  • Individuals or borrowers who have not borrowed for business purposes
  • Home loans or loans against specific assets or cashflows, where the debt servicing is unconnected with the cash flows from an export business
  • Loans against securities or against any other financial assets
  • Gold loans, other than those acquired for business purposes
  • Car loans, loans against commercial vehicles or construction equipment, unless the borrower is engaged in export business and the cashflows have a nexus with such business
  • Borrower is engaged in exports relating to any of the sectors specified
  • Borrower accounts which were restructured before August 31, 2025
  • Accounts which are classified as NPA as on August 31, 2025

Consider a borrower who is not an exporter himself, but an ancillary supplier, supplying to a trading house. Will such a penultimate exporter be covered by the Relief Directions? In our view, the answer is negative, as the “eligible borrowers” are defined to mean an exporter.

Impacted items and impacted markets

The list of impacted items broadly covers a wide spectrum of manufacturing and export-oriented sectors, including marine products, chemicals, plastics, rubber, leather goods, textiles and apparel, footwear, stone and mineral-based articles, jewellery and precious metals, metal products, machinery, electrical and electronic equipment, automobiles and auto components, medical and precision instruments, and furniture and furnishing items.

Is it mandatory that the borrower shall be exporting to USA? While the Directions do not specifically mandate that the borrower shall be exporting to the USA, the concerned REs should, as part of their assessment, evaluate whether the borrower genuinely requires such relief measures and, in our view, should consider the extent to which the borrower depends on exports of the specified items to the USA.

Why have HFCs been covered?

Generally speaking, the servicing of home loans is not supposed to be based on business cashflows, and therefore, the impact of trade disruptions on servicing of a home loan does not seem easy to establish.

However, HFCs grant other credit facilities too, including LAP or business loans. Therefore, there is no carve out for HFCs as such. HFCs are also expected to prepare the policy referred to above and be sensitive to requests from impacted borrowers.

Is the moratorium retrospective?

Yes, clearly, the moratorium is retrospective, as it covers the period from 1st September to 31st December. This is the range over which the moratorium may be granted; of course, the decision as to how much moratorium, within the above maximum range, is warranted in the particular case, is that of the lender. Let us call the agreed moratorium as the Moratorium Period.

If the moratorium is granted from 1st Sept., then any payments which were due for the period covered by the Moratorium Period will  not be taken as having fallen due. This will have significant impact on the loan management systems:

  • Considering that we are already in the middle of November, the day count for any payments due during the part of the Moratorium Period will be set to zero. In other words, day count will stop during the Moratorium Period. Thus, if an account was showing a DPD status of 60 days as on Aug 31, 2025, the DPD count will remain at a standstill till the moratorium period is over.
  • However, in case a borrower has made payment during the moratorium period, will the DPD count decrease or will it remain the same? 

The RBI Directions state that the days past due (DPD) count during the moratorium period will be excluded. However, this does not imply that a borrower who makes payments during this period should be denied the corresponding benefit. In our view, if a payment is received from the borrower, the DPD count should accordingly be reduced.

  • Any payments already made during the part of the Moratorium Period already elapsed may be taken towards principal, or may be held to be adjusted against the future dues of the borrower, after the Moratorium Period. This should also, appropriately, be captured in the policy.
  • Further, for accounts for which the CIC reporting has already been done on or after Aug 31, 2025, and the lender decides to extend the moratorium benefit, it must be ensured that the DPD count is revised so as to reflect the status as on Aug 31, 2025. 

Do lenders have to necessarily grant moratorium, or grant partial interest/principal relief?

The RBI Directions do not mandate REs from granting such relief measures. Accordingly, the concerned RE will need to assess individual cases based on the sectors, the need for such relief and the extent to which such relief may be granted. 

Lenders may grant full moratorium during the Moratorium Period, or may grant relief as may be considered appropriate.

Do lenders take positive actions, or simply respond to borrower requests?

The lenders must establish a policy for granting such relief measures prior to extending any relief, as the authority to do so will be derived from this policy. As discussed above, the discretion to grant relief rests with the concerned RE; therefore, each request submitted by a borrower must be evaluated on an individual basis.

For this purpose, the following information must be obtained from the borrowers seeking relief:

  1. The concerned sector and how the same has been impacted necessitating such relief
  2. Information relating to the current financial condition of the business of the borrower
  3. Facilities taken and outstanding with other REs 

Non-compounding of interest during the Moratorium Period:

Para 9 (iii) provides that while interest will accrue during the Moratorium Period, but the interest shall be simple, that is, shall not be compounded.

This may require REs to tweak their loan management systems to stop the compounding of interest during the Moratorium Period. 

However, the actual population of affected borrowers for a particular RE may be quite limited. Hence, REs may do manual or spreadsheet-based adjustments for affected borrowers, instead of making adjustments to their LMS itself.

Recomputation of facility cashflows after Moratorium:

During the moratorium period, as per the RBI directive, the lender can only accrue simple interest. Accordingly, the IRR of the credit facility will have a negative impact unlike the covid moratorium where the compound interest loss was compensated by the central government. 

Further, it has also been provided that the accrued interest may be converted into a new term loan which shall however be repayable in one or more installments after March 31, 2026, but not later than September 30, 2026. Accordingly, the accrued interest should anyhow be received by September 30, 2026.

Similar moratoriums in the past

  • Moratorium on loans due to COVID-19 disruption: Refer to our write-up here.
  • Moratorium 2.0 on term loans and working capital: Refer to our write-up here.

Our write-ups on similar topics:

India FSAP 2025: Key Takeaways and Policy Recommendations

– Chirag Agarwal, Assistant Manager | chirag@vinodkothari.com

A joint World Bank-IMF team visited India in 2024 to update the findings of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), which took place in 2017. World Bank on October 30, 2025 released the report1 which summarises the main findings of the mission, identifies key financial development issues, and provides policy recommendations.

We were in touch with the FSA team for our recommendations on certain aspects. The FSA recommendation on leasing (discussed below) is based on our feedback.

This article discusses in brief the key takeaways from the FSA Report.

Key Takeaways:

  1. Stronger and More Diversified Financial System: As per the report, India’s financial system has become more resilient, inclusive, and diversified since the previous 2017 assessment. Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) and market financing (other than from banks) now account for 44% of total financial assets—up from 35% in 2017—reflecting deeper financial intermediation beyond banks.
  2. Reforms Critical for India’s 2047 Growth Vision: The report suggests that to achieve the target of a USD 30 trillion economy by 2047, India must modernize its financial architecture to channel both domestic and foreign savings into productive investment, deepen capital markets, and attract long-term infrastructure and green financing2.
  3. Macroprudential Tools: The assessment highlights rising systemic risks due to financial diversification and interlinkages. It recommends expanding data collection and deploying macroprudential tools—including introducing Debt Service to Income (DSTI) limits across banks and NBFCs and building counter-cyclical capital buffers (CCyBs) for banks to manage liquidity, intersectoral contagion, household credit risks, and climate-related financial risks
  4. Regulatory and Supervisory Enhancements: While India’s regulatory oversight framework for banks, insurers, and markets is broadly sound, lingering issues include state influence on regulators, limited powers over governance of state-owned entities, and gaps in conglomerate and climate-risk supervision. The report suggests that efforts should be made to ensure better coordination between regulators and extending the scope of the regulatory and supervisory frameworks.
  5. Banking and NBFC Reforms: The report stresses adoption of IFRS 9, enforcing Pillar 2 capital add-ons, and elimination of prudential exemptions for state-owned NBFCs. It also suggests considering additional liquidity requirements tailored to different business models.
  6. Tax  treatment of leasing: The report suggests that to diversify MSME finance the tax treatment of leasing should be reviewed to ensure an equal treatment between lease and debt transactions. At present, interest on loans is exempted under the GST laws and hence, there is no GST levied on the loan repayments, however, the entire rentals are subject to GST in case of financial leases.
  7. Transfer of oversight function of NHB to RBI: While regulation of HFCs moved to RBI in 2019, supervision still rests with NHB, which follows a limited, compliance-based approach. Shifting supervision to RBI would strengthen oversight and remove the conflict of interest since NHB also acts as promoter and refinancer for HFCs.
  8. MSME Finance: The report recommends integrating TReDs with the e-invoicing portal for automatic invoice uploads. It also suggests incentivizing large buyers and mandating state-owned enterprises to upload invoices to improve cash flow for MSMEs. Further, the report also mentions that SIDBI’s funding support to NBFCs, including NBFC factors, should be increased, along with developing credit enhancement and guarantee facilities for NBFC bonds and MSME loan securitizations.
  1. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099103025110514063/pdf/BOSIB-606133f7-2e00-4696-9b41-57f3737d140d.pdf
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  2. See our resources on sustainable financing: https://vinodkothari.com/resources-on-sustainability-finance/  ↩︎

The Great Consolidation: RBI’s subtle shifts; big impacts on NBFCs

Team Finserv | finserv@vinodkothari.com

In its recent consolidation exercise of the Master Directions applicable to NBFCs, the RBI has done a lot of clause shifting, reshuffling, reorganisation, replication for different regulated entities, pruning of redundancies, etc. However, there are certain places where subtle changes or glimpses of mindset may have a lot of impact on NBFCs. Here are some:

Read more

Old Rules, New Book: RBI consolidates Regulatory Framework

Team Finserv | finserv@vinodkothari.com


Read our related resources:

Expected to bleed: ECL framework to cause ₹60,000 Cr. hole to Bank Profits

Dayita Kanodia and Chirag Agarwal | finserv@vinodkothari.com

The proposed ECL framework marks a major regulatory shift for India’s banking sector; it is long overdue, and therefore, there is no case that the RBI should have deferred it further. However, it comes coupled with regulatory floors for provisions, which would cause a major increase in provisioning requirements over the present requirements. Our assessment, on a very conservative basis, is that the first hit to Bank P/Ls will be at least Rs 60000 crores in the aggregate. 

RBI came up with a draft framework on ECL pursuant to the Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies, wherein it indicated its intention to replace the extant framework based on incurred loss with an ECL approach. The highlights can be accessed here.

A major impact that the draft directions will have on the Banking sector is the need to maintain increased provisioning pursuant to a shift from an incurred loss framework to the ECL framework. Under the existing framework, banks make provisions only after a loss has been incurred, i.e., when loans actually turn non-performing. The proposed ECL model, however, requires banks to anticipate potential credit losses and set aside provisions for such anticipated losses. 

Banks presently classify an asset as SMA1 when it hits 30 DPD, and SMA2 when it turns 60. Both these, however, are standard assets, which currently call for 0.4% provision. Under ECL norms, both these will be treated as Stage 2 assets, which calls for a lifetime probability of loss, with a regulatory floor of 5%. Thus, the differential provision here becomes 4.6%.

Once an asset turns NPA, the present regulatory requirement is a 15% provision; the ECL framework puts these assets under Stage 3, where the regulatory minimum provision, depending on the collateral and ageing, may range from 25% to 100%. Our Table below gives more granular comparison.

Type of assetAsset classificationExisting requirement Proposed requirementDifference
Farm Credit, Loan to Small and Micro EnterprisesSMA 00.25%0.25%
SMA 10.25%5%4.75%
SMA 20.25%5%4.75%
NPA15%25%-100% based on Vintage10%-85% based on Vintage
Commercial real estate loansSMA 01%Construction Phase -1.25%

Operational Phase – 1%
Construction Phase -0.25%

Operational Phase – Nil
SMA 11%Construction Phase -1.8125%

Operational Phase – 1.5625%
Construction Phase -0.8125%

Operational Phase – 0.5625%
SMA 21%Construction Phase -1.8125%

Operational Phase – 1.5625%
Construction Phase -0.8125%

Operational Phase – 0.5625%
NPA15%25%-100% based on Vintage10%-85% based on Vintage
Secured retail loans, Corporate Loan, Loan to Medium EnterprisesSMA 00.4%0.4%
SMA 10.4%5%4.6%
SMA 20.4%5%4.6%
NPA15%25%-100% based on Vintage10%-85% based on Vintage
Home LoansSMA 00.25%0.40%0.15%
SMA 10.25%1.5%1.25%
SMA 20.25%1.5%1.25%
NPA15%10%-100% based on Vintage(-)5% – 85% based on Vintage
LAPSMA 00.4%0.4%
SMA 10.4%1.5%1.1%
SMA 20.4%1.5%1.1%
NPA15%10%-100% based on Vintage (-)5% – 85% based on Vintage
Unsecured Retail loanSMA 00.4%1%0.6%
SMA 10.4%5%4.6%
SMA 20.4%5%4.6%
NPA25%25%-100% based on Vintage0%-75% based on Vintage

The actual impact of such additional provisioning will be a hit of more than 3% to the profit of banks1. Based on the RBI Financial Stability Report of FY 24-252, the current level of SMA and NPA is estimated to be ₹3,78,000 crores (2%) and ₹4,28,000 crores (2.3%), respectively. 


Accordingly, an additional provision of approximately₹ 18,000 crores (4.6% of SMA volume) and ₹ 42,000 crores (10% of NPA volume) will be required for SMA and NPA respectively, leading to a total impact of at least ₹60,000 crores. This estimate has been arrived at by considering the % of NPAs and SMA-1 & SMA-2 portfolios of banks. The actual impact may be higher, as lot of loans may be unsecured, and may have ageing exceeding 1 year, in which case the differential provision may be higher.

It may be noted that while the draft directions allow Banks to add back the excess ECL provisioning to the CET 1 capital, it does not neutralize the immediate profitability impact, as the additional provisions would still flow through the profit and loss account.

How do we expect banks to smoothen this hit that may affect the FY 27-28 P/L statements? We hold the view that it will be prudent for banks, who have system capabilities, to estimate their ECL differential, and create an additional provision in FY 25-26, or do technical write-offs.

Other Resources

  1. The total Net profit of SCBs is ₹ 23.50 Lakh Crore for FY 24. (https://ddnews.gov.in/en/indian-scbs-post-record-net-profit-of-%E2%82%B923-50-lakh-crore-in-fy24-reduce-npas/ )
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  2.  Based on our rough estimate of the data available here: https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/PublicationReportDetails.aspx?UrlPage=&ID=1300 ↩︎

AIF Regulatory framework evolves from light-touch to right-hold

Simrat Singh | Finserv@vinodkothari.com

When AIF Regulations were formally introduced in 2012, the regulatory approach was deliberately light. The framework targeted sophisticated investors, allowing flexibility with limited oversight. Over the years, however, AIFs have become significant participants in capital markets. Market practices over the decade exposed regulatory loopholes and arbitrages. For example, some investors who did not individually qualify as QIBs accessed preferential benefits indirectly through AIF structures and investors who were restricted to invest in certain companies started investing through AIF making AIF an investment facade. There were concerns regarding circumvention of FEMA norms as well1. In the credit space, regulated entities such as banks and NBFCs started channeling funds through AIFs to refinance their stressed borrowers, raising concerns around loan evergreening2. These developments prompted regulatory response. RBI first issued two circulars, one in 2023 and the other in 2024. Finally, in 2025 formal directions governing investments by regulated entities in AIFs were also issued3. These Directions introduced exposure caps and provisioning requirements.4 

While the RBI addressed prudential risks arising from regulated entities’ participation in AIFs, SEBI focused on investor protection, governance within the AIF ecosystem and curbing the regulatory arbitrages. First it mandated on-going due diligence by AIF Managers5. It then mandated specific due diligence6 of investors and investments of AIF to prevent indirect access to regulatory benefits. Fiduciary duties of sponsors and investment managers and reporting obligations were progressively codified through circulars. Managers were expected to maintain transparency vis-a-vis their investment decisions, maintain written policies including ones to deal with conflict of interest with unitholders and submit accurate information to the Trustee. What were once broad, principle-based expectations have evolved into detailed, enforceable rules. Regulatory tightening has been matched by a more assertive enforcement approach. SEBI’s recent settlement order7 against an AIF underscores its increasing scrutiny of governance lapses, mismanagement of conflicts and inaccurate reporting. This clearly signals that any compliance gaps will no longer be overlooked and are likely to attract regulatory action. In a separate adjudication order, SEBI imposed penalties on both the Trustee and the Manager for the delayed winding-up of the scheme, underscoring that accountability within an AIF structure extends to all key parties and is not limited to the Manager alone.  

However, SEBI’s approach has not been solely restrictive. Alongside regulatory tightening, it has also sought to preserve commercial flexibility and respond to market needs. Examples include the introduction of the co-investment framework8 for AIFs, framework for offering differential rights to select investors and a revamp for angel funds9.

Together, these measures are reshaping the regulatory landscape for AIFs and their managers. Investors can no longer rely on AIF structures to indirectly obtain regulatory advantages otherwise unavailable to them. As AIFs have grown in scale and importance, what is emerging is a more transparent, prudentially sound and closely supervised regulatory regime designed to align investor protection and commercial flexibility.

  1. See SEBI’s Consultation paper on proposal to enhance trust in the AIF ecosystem ↩︎
  2. See our write-up on AIFs being used for regulatory arbitrages here. ↩︎
  3.  RBI (Investment In AIF) Directions, 2025 ↩︎
  4. See our detailed analysis of the Directions here. ↩︎
  5. See our write-up on ongoing due diligence for AIFs here ↩︎
  6. See our FAQs on specific due diligence of investors and investments of AIFs here. ↩︎
  7. See the complete order here ↩︎
  8. See our write-up on co-investments here. ↩︎
  9. See our write-up on changes w.r.t Angel Funds here ↩︎

ECL Framework for Banks: Key Highlights

-Team Finserv (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

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