Co-Lending and GST: Does the relationship between co-lenders constitute a supply that may be subject to GST?

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Team Finserv (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

Introduction 

Banks and Non Banking Financial Companies (‘NBFCs’) have been receiving notices from statutory authorities stating the occurrence of evasion of goods and services tax (‘GST’) in respect of co-lending arrangements. At present, the GST laws do not address the implications of GST on co-lending transactions. In response to the investigations carried out Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (‘CBIC’) on various banks and financial institutions, industry participants had requested for clarification on the matter in 2023 on whether GST is applicable on colending transactions.  However, the issue still remains unaddressed.

While multiple theories go around in the market on the subject, this article aims to discuss the theories and examine them in light of applicable laws. 

The issue

It is common knowledge that, for GST to be applicable, there needs to be a supply of goods or services. Therefore, the primary question to be answered here is whether the originating or servicing co-lender (‘OC’) provides any services to the arrangement? Can it be argued that the OC who is retaining a higher proportion of interest as compared to its proportion of funding of the principal amount of loan is actually providing services to the arrangement, and therefore, should be paying GST on the services to the other lenders?

The analysis

It is crucial to understand the nature of the relationship between the lenders involved. A co-lending arrangement is essentially a collaborative partnership between two lenders. To the extent two lenders agree to originate and partake in lending jointly, it is a limited purpose partnership or a joint venture. To the extent the two co-lenders extend a lending facility, the relation between the two of them together on one side, and the borrower on the other, amounts to a loan agreement. However, as there are two lenders together on the lender side, the borrower makes promises to two of them together, and therefore, the rights of any one of them is governed by the law relating to “joint promisees”. Given this framework, co-lending arrangements cannot simply be viewed as service agreements between the parties involved. Instead, they represent a distinct legal relationship characterized by shared responsibilities, rights, and risks associated with the lending process.

Does it qualify as a Supply?

The interest rates expected by the two co-lenders may vary due to the differing roles they play in the co-lending arrangement. It may be agreed that the funding co-lender receives a specific percentage of the interest charged to the borrower, while any excess interest earned beyond this hurdle rate shall be retained by the OC. Since the OC is performing services in the co-lending arrangement, would this excess spread be considered as consideration for supply of service under GST laws?

As discussed earlier, co-lending is inherently a partnership between two entities where each party’s contributions, functions, and responsibilities can vary. This results in a differential sharing of both risks and rewards, which means that the income earned from the loan may not necessarily be distributed in the same ratio as the principal loan amount.

The sharing of interest in co-lending arrangements is typically determined by each co-lender’s involvement in managing the loan’s overall risk—covering both pre and post-disbursement activities. Consequently, the excess interest earned by one co-lender over another is not reflective of a supply of a service provided by one entity to the other. Instead, this excess interest is merely a differential income that retains its original characteristic as interest income.

In a co-lending arrangement,  the co-lenders split their mutual roles i.e the co-lender performs various services pursuant to the co-lending arrangement, the same cannot be constituted as a separate supply provided to the other co-lender. For example if the borrower interface is being done by OC, it would be wrong to regard the OC as an agent for the Funding Co-lender. Both of them are acting for their mutual arrangement, sharing their responsibilities as agreed. Neither is providing any service to  the other. The co-lenders are effectively splitting the functionalities to the best of their capacity and expertise under their co-lending arrangement, which does not tantamount to any additional services being provided by one co-lender to the other. 

This view can be further strengthened by the ITAT ruling of May 7, 2024 which confirmed that the excess interest allowed to be retained with the NBFC was not a consideration for rendering professional/ technical services by the transferor NBFC to the transferee bank and neither would it fall within the ambit of commission or brokerage. 

ITAT examined some major points for characterisation of the excess interest spread retained by the NBFC analyzing mainly:

Excess interest retained not in the nature of professional/technical fees

The ruling examined whether the retained interest could be classified as fees for professional or technical services under Section 194J. The ITAT noted that while the NBFC had a service agreement with the bank, wherein it was responsible for managing and collecting payments, the agreed-upon service fee of Rs. 1 lakh was clearly defined and separate from the excess interest. The court dismissed the revenue department’s argument that the service fee of Rs 1 lakh was inadequate and the excess interest be considered as fee for rendering the services by the transferor NBFC, stating that the NBFC’s role was not as an agent acting on behalf of the bank.

Excess interest retained not in the nature of commission or brokerage 

The ITAT ruling clarified that the excess interest retained by the NBFC does not qualify as commission or brokerage under Section 194H of the Income Tax Act. The tribunal determined that the loans originated by the NBFC were not on behalf of the bank, but rather as independent transactions governed by a separate service agreement. This agreement stipulated distinct service fees for the NBFC’s management of the loans, emphasizing that the NBFC was not acting as an agent for the bank.

By making this distinction, the ITAT characterized the excess spread as a financial outcome of the contractual arrangement rather than a commission for services rendered. Consequently, the tribunal concluded that there was no obligation to deduct TDS on the excess interest retained by the NBFC, reinforcing the understanding that such retained interest is not subject to typical taxation associated with agent-like relationships. You may refer to our article on the ruling here. 

Conclusion

Therefore, taking into consideration the structure of the co-lending arrangement it can be concluded that the differential or higher interest rate retained by the OC shall not be treated as consideration for performing the agreed-upon role between the co-lenders. The recent ITAT ruling provides crucial clarity regarding the treatment of excess spreads in co-lending arrangements, affirming that such retained interest does not constitute a supply of services or a fees for professional services, commission, or brokerage. By highlighting the distinct nature of the contractual relationship between co-lenders, the ruling reinforces the idea that excess interest is a product of shared risk and reward rather than compensation for services rendered. Consequently, applying GST to a transaction that does not constitute a service would be inappropriate and misaligned with the tax framework.

Workshop on Co-lending and Loan Partnering – For registration click here: https://forms.gle/bq18tHgQb618jAcb9

Our other resources on this topic:

  1. White-paper-on-Co-lending
  2. The Law of Co-lending
  3. Shashtrarth 10: Cool with Co-lending – Analysing Scenario after RBI FAQs on PSL
  4. FAQs on Co-lending
  5. Vikas Path: The Securitised Path to Financial Inclusion

Scope of partial business exit as a mode of scaling down a company

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Mahak Agarwal | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

After the recent Finance Act of 2024 shifts the incidence of tax in case of buyback from the company to the shareholders, a pertinent question that arises is what could be the next best mode for a company which is looking to partially exit from business and scale itself down.

Here is a quick 5 min video analyzing the above: https://lnkd.in/gK6878qg

Also watch our video on the tax regime on buyback proposed by the Finance Bill, 2024 (now enacted as the Finance Act) here: https://lnkd.in/gu7NrbeM

Read our FAQs on Buyback here: https://lnkd.in/gTZx838x

Bye bye to Share Buybacks

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– Finance Bill 2024 puts buybacks to a biting tax proposal w.e.f. 1st October, 2024

-Team Corplaw | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Among the tax law changes proposed by Finance Bill, 2024, the one on share buybacks, explained as one intended to remove tax inequity, is perhaps the most unexplainable.  The proposed change, by introduction of a new sub-clause (f) to section 2 (22) [deemed dividend], and simultaneous amendments to sec. 46A and sec. 115QA, not only shifts the tax burden from companies to shareholders, but surprisingly, brings to tax the entire amount paid on buyback, irrespective of the excess realised by the shareholder. It  leaves the cost of shares to be claimed as capital loss and set off against potential capital gains, of course only if such gains arise  within the prescribed timelines for carry forward and set off.

Buyback of shares is the only way a company seeks to scale down its capital. The proposed amendment makes it impossible for companies to reduce their capital base by returning capital not needed, as the only other way is through reduction of share capital, which is subject to shareholders’, creditors’, and NCLT approval. It is surprising that this amendment by the very same Budget which proposes to introduce the novel concept of “variable capital companies”.

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GST on Corporate Guarantees: Understanding the new regime

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–  Payal Agarwal, Associate | corplaw@vinodkothari.com


The debate around levy of GST on corporate guarantee extended without or with inadequate consideration has been settled with the insertion of sub-rule (2) to Rule 28 of the Determination of Value of Supply Rules (“Valuation Rules”), effective from 26th October, 2023. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 28 specifies a deemed value for provisions of corporate guarantee to a related person subject to certain conditions. Now, vide another notification dated 10th July, 2024, amendments have been made to the said sub-rule, to ease out the provisions with respect to value of corporate guarantee given to a related person.


Effective date of the amendment


Sub-rule (2) of Rule 28 has been notified and made applicable w.e.f. 26th October, 2023. The amendments made under sub-rule (2), vide the July 2024 notification, has also been made applicable retrospectively, i.e., w.e.f. 26th October, 2023. Hence, sub-rule (2) of rule 28 applies to a corporate guarantee issued or renewed on or after 26th October, 2023.


Understanding the terminology


In usual financial parlance, the guarantor provides a guarantee to a lender (or other person to whom certain obligations or performance is owed), in favour of a borrower (or obligant, owing performance obligations). The guarantor is the giver of the guarantee, the lender is the receiver of the guarantee and the person for whom the guarantee is given is the beneficiary of the guarantee.


However, in GST parlance, it is important to understand that the language is from the viewpoint of “supply of services”. Hence, the guarantor is the supplier of the service, the borrower or beneficiary is the recipient of the service, and the lender is actually not a party to the supply, but has a relevance as the rules relate to who the guarantee is given.


Hence, importantly, the receiver of the supply in GST parlance is not the lender, but the borrower.


Value of supply of corporate guarantee for related persons


With the amendments coming into force, there are three ways the value of supply of service, i.e., issue of corporate guarantee, is to be determined, based on the nature of the recipient and the lender:


  • As per the deemed value of the supply

  • As per invoice value of the supply

  • As per determination by the tax officer

The below chart summarises the same:


(a)   Value of corporate guarantee as per deemed value under rule 28(2)


Rule 28 prescribes the value for supply of goods and services between distinct persons or related persons. In view of the common practice among related persons to provide corporate guarantee at nil consideration, sub-rule (2) was inserted under rule 28 to explicitly provide for a deemed value of consideration in case of supply of corporate guarantee. The same has been further amended vide the July amendment.


Sub-rule (2), as amended, reads as below:


“Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), the value of supply of services by a supplier to a recipient  who  is  a  related  person,  located in India, by  way  of  providing  corporate  guarantee  to  any  banking  company  or financial institution on behalf of the said recipient, shall be deemed to be one per cent of the amount of such guarantee offered per annum, or the actual consideration, whichever is higher.”


The deemed value provided under the said rule is 1% p.a. of the amount of guarantee offered, where no consideration is charged, or the actual consideration is lower than the aforesaid threshold. However, the said deemed value is applicable only where the following conditions are met:



  • Recipient of the service (i.e., the borrower) is a related person of the supplier (i.e., the guarantor),

  • Recipient of the service is located in India (since GST is not levied on export of services),

  • Recipient of the service is not eligible for full ITC, and

  • Corporate guarantee has been provided to a banking company or financial institution[1]


(b)  Value of corporate guarantee as per declared value in the invoice


A new proviso has also been inserted to sub-rule (2) of rule 28 vide the July amendment to ease out the GST implications on corporate guarantees. Pursuant to the said amendment, the deemed value of corporate guarantee will not apply, and the declared value in the invoice is taken as the value of the corporate guarantee, where the recipient of the service, i.e., the borrower is eligible for full ITC.


A similar proviso exists under sub-rule (1) of rule 28 as well. However, sub-rule (2) begins with a non-obstante clause, and thus, sub-rule (1) becomes non-existent for corporate guarantees between related persons to the banks/ financial institutions.


Hence, prior to the present amendment, for corporate guarantee between related persons, the relief with respect to invoice value was not available, and hence, GST was leviable on the basis of the deemed value. However, the amendments being applicable retrospectively, for recipients eligible for full ITC, benefit of invoice value will be available for corporate guarantees issued or renewed on or after 26th October, 2023.


Persons eligible for full ITC

Section 16 of the CGST Act specifies the eligibility and conditions for availing ITC. Where a person is eligible for a claim of full ITC, the value of supply of corporate guarantee will be based on the invoice value instead of the deemed value.


Here, it is important to note that the proviso refers to “full ITC”, and hence, eligibility for availing ITC u/s 16 is not enough, the recipient should be eligible for “full ITC”. The meaning of eligibility for full ITC is controversial, with some advance rulings on the subject[2]. In view of the aforesaid, it appears that the benefit of the proviso may not be available for a banking company or financial institution availing the option of 50% ITC as per sub-section (4) of section 17 of the CGST Act, as well as other persons providing exempt supplies. In essence, if the borrower (note, borrower is the recipient of the service) is a bank or financial institution or an entity providing exempt supplies, for whose borrowings a guarantor, being a related person, has given a guarantee, the deemed value will be applicable.


(c)   Value of corporate guarantee determined by tax officers under rule 28(1)


Rule 28(2) being a specific provision for value of corporate guarantee between related persons, valuation as per sub-rule (1) will apply only in cases where sub-rule (2) is not applicable. Sub-rule (1) is a general provision, applicable to supply for any goods or services between distinct or related persons. Under the said sub-rule, the value of corporate guarantee will be based on the determination by the tax officer (refer our article on the same here).


Hence, the same will be applicable only in cases where value of supply as per (a) and (b) above does not apply.


Applicability of deemed value on FLDG arrangements


First Loss Default Guarantee or FLDGs[3] are arrangements that do not involve the borrower, the guarantee is usually given by the supplier (i.e., the DLG provider) to the lender. As such, unlike guarantee which is a tripartite contract between the guarantor, borrower and the lender, FLDG is more like an indemnity, involving only two parties – the indemnifier (i.e., the guarantor) and the indemnified (i.e., the lender). The borrower being out of the picture, the applicability of deemed value of corporate guarantee, if at all, would arise if the guarantor and the lender are related persons. However, going by the nature of FLDG – being an indemnity rather than a guarantee – sub-rule (2) of rule 28 does not seem to be applicable. However, if the transaction is between related persons, the recipient of the service being an NBFC, it is important to ensure that the terms of the service are based on arms’ length consideration.


Conclusion


With the recent amendments in the GST regime applicable on corporate guarantees to related persons, the deemed value of supply for levying GST on corporate guarantee does not apply, if consideration is being charged by the guarantor and the recipient is eligible to claim full ITC. Market valuation principles do not apply, and hence, one may further want to circumvent the provisions by charging guarantee commission at negligible value, thereby, avoiding a higher GST charge. However, that does not preclude the RPT consideration under corporate laws, that require at least companies to ensure that any related party transaction is undertaken at arm’s length terms including pricing, and hence, the guarantee commission charged from a related party should also be based on the same principle.


[1] The meaning of financial institution is to be taken from section 45-I(c) of RBI Act, 1934.


[2] See a few advance rulings on the subject by West Bengal AAR, Tamil Nadu AAR. 


Also see a few articles on the subject: https://www.livelaw.in/law-firms/law-firm-articles-/input-tax-credit-central-goods-services-tax-rules-cgst-act-itc-tlc-legal-243111


https://taxguru.in/goods-and-service-tax/meaning-full-input-tax-credit-2nd-proviso-rule-28.html


[3]Structured Default Guarantees – https://vinodkothari.com/2022/09/structured-default-guarantees/


See our FAQs on default loss guarantee here – https://vinodkothari.com/2023/06/faqs-on-default-loss-guarantee-in-digital-lending/

Capital Treatment, Loan Loss Provisioning and Accounting for Default Loss Guarantees

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Vinod Kothari (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

The FinTech sector is booming and is a market disruptor as well as facilitator, based on the report published by Inc42, the estimated market opportunity in India fintech is around $2.1 Tn+ and currently there are 23 FinTech “unicorns” with combined valuation of $74 Bn+ and 34 FinTech “soonicorns” with combined valuation of $12.7Bn+.

The unprecedented growth of the fintech sector has transformed guarantees specifically First Loss Default Guarantees (FLDG) into a commonly employed tool for emerging players like fintechs. They leverage these guarantees to take exposures on loan transactions using low-cost funding from established entities such as large NBFCs and Banks. Fintechs issue guarantees that enable them to garner trust from prominent lenders, facilitating the origination of new loans through their digital platforms. 

One of the crucial concerns in DLG arrangements is navigating the complexities surrounding capital treatment and NPA accounting covering both lenders and guarantors. In this article, we delve into an in-depth exploration of these crucial issues.

Capital Treatment 

We organise this section into the following parts:

  • Capital treatment for the lender availing the guarantee
  • Capital treatment for the guarantor 
  • Expected credit loss treatment for the lender availing the guarantee
  • Expected credit loss treatment for the guarantor
  • Provisioning requirement for the lender availing the guarantee
  • Provisioning requirement for the guarantor

Capital Treatment for Lenders: 

Capital requirement is linked with the credit risk on the exposure: hence, before getting into the regulatory prescription, let us examine what is impact on the credit risk of the lender. For capital rules, a guarantee is regarded as a case of credit risk mitigation, provided the guarantee satisfies several conditions (e.g., it should be explicit, enforceable, guarantor’s financial resources adequate, etc). The lender, on the basis of the guarantee, shifts the risk of the first (or subsequent, as may be the nature of the guarantee) layer of the losses to the guarantor. Thus, there is a substitution of risk from the borrowers in the pool to the guarantor. The remaining exposure remains unprotected – hence, to that extent, there is no credit risk transfer. Therefore, if the risk weight of the guarantor is lesser than the risk weight of the underlying pool, there was a case to expect a reduction in the capital requirements.

The regulatory prescription is as follows: DLG Guidelines states that for the purpose of capital computation, i.e., computation of exposure and application of Credit Risk Mitigation benefits on individual loan assets in the portfolio shall continue to be governed by the extant norms. The “extant norms” for this purpose would be the norms on credit risk mitigation. These norms are applicable in case of banks [see part 7 of the Basel III  Master circular ] However, in case of NBFCs, there is no equivalent.

However, FLDG is expected to be backed by either a cash deposit, or a bank guarantee. If it is backed by cash deposit, cash is to be assigned 0 risk weight. Similarly, if it is backed by a bank guarantee, the risk shifts to the bank, and therefore, a 20% risk weight as applicable to banks may be assigned by the NBFC. Note that the above risk weights are only for the part backed by the guarantee. That is, if there is a 5% FLDG, the 5% of the loan pool will be risk weighted as above, and the remaining 95% will attract the risk weight applicable to the borrower pool.

Capital Treatment for the guarantor 

When we talk about capital treatment, the same would depend on the capital rules applicable to the guarantor entity. If the guarantor entity is an RBI regulated lender, it will be covered by the capital rules. If the guarantor not a regulated lender, it is unlikely to have any capital rules.

We discussed above the nature of a structured default loss guarantee. A structured DLG (first loss, second loss, or subsequent loss) integrates the risk of a pool of loans and then strips the same into multiple tranches. Therefore, it becomes a case of structured risk transfer.

The generic rule in case of any structured risk transfer is that the acquirer of the first loss tranche acquires the risk of the entire pool. Therefore, a first loss default guarantor is required to keep capital on the pool size (and not the size of the guarantee). However, the size of the guarantee is the loss limit of the guarantor – therefore, the capital requirement, computed by applying the risk weight to the pool size, will be limited to the size of the guarantee. We discuss this further below. 

First Loss

If the guarantee is first loss in nature, then, as the principle goes, the RE will have to maintain capital on the entire pool, since, it is exposed to all the risks associated with all loan accounts individually, subject to a ceiling on the the amount of guarantee it has provided. 

For instance, if the guarantor provides a 5% FLDG for a pool of loans aggregating to Rs. 100 crores, and the regulatory capital requirement of the guarantor is 15%, then the capital required to be maintained against such pool is:

Lower of

  • 15% of Rs. 100 crores * 100% (Assuming 100% is the applicable risk weight of such loans)
  • 5% of Rs. 100 crores

= Rs. 5 crores.

As per the RBI FAQs, RE providing DLG shall deduct “the full amount of the DLG which is outstanding” from its capital. The above is in line with the RBI FAQs on the subject.

This prescription should be taken as applicable in case of first loss guarantees.

Further, the apparent question that arises here is in what proportion should the capital be reduced from Tier I and Tier II. In absence of any specifications in this regard in the regulations or the FAQs, it is only logical to deduct the capital from the Tier I and Tier II in their respective ratios. That is, if the Tier I is 10% and Tier II is 5%, then the capital reduction should also happen in the ratio of 2:1.

Second Loss

If the guarantee is second loss in nature, then, the losses will start piling up on the guarantor only once the first loss support is exhausted. Unlike the other case, here, the guarantor is not exposed to all the risks associated with all loan accounts individually. Therefore, the capital will have to be maintained on the amount of guarantee provided instead of the entire pool. 

Using the same example, as used in the earlier case, the capital requirement for the RE will be:

Rs. 100 crores * 5% * 15% = Rs. 0.75 crores.

Of course, this is applicable only where the first loss guarantee is sufficient to absorb losses upto a level sufficient to absorb a certain multiple of “expected losses”. Usually, the multiple should be sufficient so as to render the second loss facility to achieve an investment grade rating.

Expected credit loss for the recipient of the guarantee

Expected credit losses are for the potential for the loan or pool of loans to result in credit losses. If the lender has the benefit of first loss guarantee, the situation is that to the extent of the FLDG, the lender has exposure on the guarantor, and for the remaining pool size, the lender has exposure on the borrowers.

As regards a potential credit loss on the guaranteed amount, the RBI rules require the guarantee to be either fully backed by cash, or backed by a bank guarantee. Hence, the question of any credit loss on the same does not arise.

Hence, the lender will be exposed to losses only on so much of the expected credit losses as exceed the FLDG cover. For instance, if the FLDG is 5%, and the ECL estimated by the lender is 6.8%, the lender may create ECL provision only for 1.8%.

Note that ECL for any pool is a dynamic number – while estimations of the default probabilities and the exposure change over time, there are also changes due to unwinding of the discounting factor applied in computing present value of the ECL. Therefore, ECL estimation is bound to change every reporting period. For that matter, FLDG will remain fixed as 5% of the originated pool, but this number will also be dynamic as the loan pool matures – partly due to amortisation of the pool, and partly due to utilisation of the guarantee. Therefore, on an ongoing basis, the lender may compare the ECL with the percentage of FLDG still available, and create ECL for the differential amount.

Expected credit loss for the guarantor

If the guarantor is covered by ECL requirements, the guarantor needs to estimate the losses likely to be caused to the guarantor. As against the guarantee, the payoff of the guarantor may be (a) fixed guarantee fees (b) right to get a variable fee, usually linked with the excess spreads from the pool. 

Note that ECL computation is required not only for loans, but also for financial guarantees. Therefore, the guarantor will need to compute the expected credit losses from the underlying loans using exactly the same basis as if the loans were on the books of the guarantor. Of course, the maximum ECL will be the limit of the guarantee.

Provisioning for the recipient of the guarantee

In this regard, the RBI has clearly specified that no benefit will be given for provisioning requirements – that is, the regulatory provisioning will continue irrespective of the guarantee.

Provisioning for the guarantor

As regards the guarantor, while a financial guarantee is regarded as a direct credit substitute, however, there are no explicit provisioning requirements. To the extent the guarantee has already been utilised, it will be taken as a loss (even though recovery may happen subsequently, but it will be contingent). 

Accounting

Given that the recoveries are against an outstanding asset, receipts from DLG invocation should not be treated as income. The recoveries made from the accounts, for which the lender has already invoked DLG, in our view,should be recorded as a liability. This is because any recoveries from borrowers after receiving DLG payout would be liable to be remitted back to the DLG provider, and the lender will only hold it in trust. Hence creating a back to back obligation on the RE. It is important to note that, in general, a lender may not relinquish their legal right to recover a loan, even after the loan has been written off. Consequently, the obligation to pass on the recoveries from the borrower may also persist indefinitely. 

To support this perspective, we suggest that the lender establish a timeline in agreement with the DLG provider. This timeline should specify the duration during which any recoveries from loans, for which DLG payouts were made, will be passed on to the DLG provider. After the specified period, the lender will no longer be obligated to transfer such recoveries. Consequently, upon completion of the agreed period, the RE can write off the liability associated with the credit protection payouts received.

Treatment of an NPA account in case the guarantee is invoked.

Through the DLG Guidelines RBI has stated that the NPA classification would be the responsibility of the RE and would be as per the extant asset classification and provisioning norms irrespective of any DLG cover available at the portfolio level [para 7 of the DLG Guidelines]. The amount invoked by the DLG cannot be set off against the underlying individual loans and thus, asset classification and provisioning would not be affected by any DLG cover. However, any future recovery by the RE from the loans on which the DLG cover was invoked and realised can be shared with the DLG provider in terms of their contractual arrangements.

Since the guarantee invoked cannot be set off against the loan, how would the guarantee amount be shown in the books of the RE?

Accounting-wise, if the amount has been recovered, it is set off from the outstanding pool However, there is a departure here between accounting treatment and the NPA/capital requirements, as the RBI expects the NPA recognition to be continued in the books of the lender. 

Similarly, capital requirements will also remain unaffected. However,  it will be wrong to show the amount recovered from the guarantor as a liability as it is not a liability – though there may be an understanding that any recovery from the loans will be paid back to the guarantor. It is also wrong to treat the amount received from the guarantor as income, as the payment consists of both interest and principal.

Invocation of DLG will not affect NPA classification of borrower

It shall be noted that despite the FLDG being invoked against the borrowers outstanding amount, the capital requirements and asset classification remain unaffected. Further, reporting to CIC and NESL pertains to the borrowers performance, and therefore, the invocation of FLDG shall not influence these reporting. Repayment as well as defaults of the borrower should continue to be reported without any impact from FLDG invocation. Therefore, the borrowes account will continue to be classified as NPA and reported accordingly to the CIC and other relevant reporting entities.

Related Articles – 

FAQs on Default Loss Guarantee in Digital Lending

Lend, Recover, Replenish: A guide to revolving lines of credit

The iSAFE option to start up funding: Legality and taxation

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Mahak Agarwal | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Navigating the world of fundraising for startups is no easy feat. This becomes all the more challenging for a pre-revenue start-up which cannot have a valuation. Amongst the several fundraising options available to a start-up, one of the budding and lesser-known sources happens to be iSAFE.

Origin

iSAFE, short for, India Simple Agreement for Future Equity, was first introduced in India by 100X.VC, an early-stage investment firm. This move was inspired by US’s ‘Simple Agreement for Future Equity (‘SAFE’)’, an alternative to convertible debt and the brainchild of an American start-up incubator. SAFE is a financing contract between a startup and an investor that grants the investor the right to acquire equity in the firm subject to specific activating events, such as a future equity fundraising.[1]

So far as the success of SAFE in India is concerned, being neither debt (since they do not accrue interest), nor equity (since they do not carry any dividend or shareholders’ rights) or any other instrument, it could not carve its place in India and was cornered as a mere contingent contract with low reliability and security. On the contrary, iSAFE happened to be the game changer in the Indian context, being a significantly modified version of SAFE.

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Amendment in Rule 11UA

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– Nitu Poddar and Ankit Singh Mehar | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

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Loan Penal Charges: Accounting and GST implications

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Abhirup Ghosh, Qasim Saif & Aanchal Kaur Nagpal  | finserv@vinodkothari.com

Background

Levying of penal charges or late payment charges are claimed as ‘just’, owing to the underlying breach of contract under the Contract Act, 1972. A breach or a non-performance by one party entitles the other party to receive compensation for any loss or damage suffered due to such breach. Penalties may not only be compensatory; they also have a deterrent element.

In order to ensure compliant behaviour, lenders  charge penalties to their borrowers for various ‘events of default’; the predominant ones being penalty for delayed payments (in the form of charges or interest) and prepayment penalties. However, such charges stopped being ‘just’ and ‘reasonable’ when lenders started maneuvering such penalties as revenue enhancement tools, rather than as a deterrent measure and compensation for a breach. Such unreasonable penalties coupled with non-disclosures, compounding of penal interest, etc. were highly prejudicial to consumer interest and accordingly, caught the eye of the regulator. 

The RBI introduced guidelines to the lenders to ensure reasonableness and transparency in the disclosure of penal interest vide its Circular on ‘Fair Lending Practice – Penal Charges in Loan Accounts’(RBI Guidelines on penal charges’)  dated August 18, 2023. Our article and FAQs[1] on the same may be read here[2].Our YouTube video discussing the guidelines may be viewed here.

However, charging penal interest also raises several practical questions for lenders, mainly indirect taxation and accounting of penal charges, which will be discussed in detail in this article.

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Shorn of tax benefit, MLDs now face tax deduction on payouts

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Dayita Kanodia | Executive

finserv@vinodkothari.com

Background

The Finance Bill, 2023[1], has quite nearly caused the demise of the so-called “Market-Linked Debentures” (MLDs)[2]. The changes made pursuant to the Finance Bill, 2023, took away what seemed to be a strong reason for popularity of MLDs, i.e., the tax arbitrage.

Prior to the change, listed MLDs had the advantage of being exempt from the withholding tax under section 193 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as well as being taxed at 10% as Long Term Capital Gains (LTCG) tax, if held for at least 12 months.

Finance Bill, 2023 inserts a new section 50AA to the Income Tax Act, 1961, which makes MLDs to be taxed at slab rates as a short term capital asset in all cases at the time of  transfer or redemption on maturity, irrespective of the period of holding, therefore losing out on the earlier lower LTCG rate of 10%.

In addition, the earlier exemption from withholding tax on listed debentures has now been removed pursuant to an amendment in section 193, which means that interest paid on listed debentures would now be subject to withholding tax with effect from April 01, 2023[3].

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A Critical Analysis on Corporate Guarantees under Service Tax and GST

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Dayita Kanodia, Executive | finserv@vinodkothari.com

“The Supreme Court’s only armour is the cloak of public trust; its sole ammunition, the collective hopes of our society.” – Irving R. Kaufman

Background

The Supreme Court has ruled that service tax will not be levied on corporate guarantees by a parent company to its subsidiaries where there is no consideration involved.

This article discusses the impact of this ruling on companies which issue corporate guarantees without consideration.

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