Redeemable preference shares not debt under IBC

– SC reinforces the distinction between ‘debt’ and ‘share capital’ for the purpose of IBC

– Sourish Kundu | resolution@vinodkothari.com

Introduction

The Supreme Court in a recent judgement in the matter of EPC Constructions India Limited v. M/s Matix Fertilizers and Chemicals Limited, has categorically clarified that holders of Cumulative Redeemable Preference Shares (“CRPS”) are classified as investors rather than creditors (more specifically, financial creditors) and are therefore not entitled to file for insolvency under Section 7 of the IBC, since non-redemption of these shares do not qualify as a “default” under the Code.

In an article titled “Failed Redemption of Preference Shares: Whether a Contractual Debt?”, written way back in May, 2021, in the context of SC judgment in Indus Biotech Private Limited v. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund (earlier known as Kotak India Ventures Limited) & Ors, we  concluded, on the basis of the provisions of section 55 of the Companies Act, 2013 (“Act”) and related judicial precedents around the meaning of “debt”, that there can be no debt associated with a preference share and, where there is no ‘debt’, there is no question of it being a ‘financial debt’.

The findings of the SC in EPC Constructions judgement resonate with our views as explained in the article. However, we delve deeper into the aspect with analysis of the ruling as below, as to on what basis it was concluded that preference shares cannot be considered as ‘debt.

Brief facts of the case

The appellant entered into a contract for construction of a fertilizer complex with  the respondent, pursuant to which certain amounts  became due and payable by the respondent to the appellant, The receivables under the contract was converted into NCRPS, and such conversion was duly approved by the respective boards. Eventually, in course of certain events, the appellant filed a Section 7 petition against the respondent, on account of failure to pay the redemption amount on account of maturity of CRPS. The application was dismissed by NCLT, and then NCLAT on grounds that the CRPS cannot be termed as debt. The application then came for appeal before SC.

Below is a discussion highlighting the rationale for which dues pertaining to preference shares were not held to be financial debt.

Actions speak about “intent”: Conversion of receivables into CRPS conclusive of intent

It was contended by the Appellant that the true nature of the transaction should be unveiled in order to determine whether such preference shares should be treated as debt or not. The fact that there were outstanding receivables, which had become due and payable, the Appellant argued that conversion of the same into preference shares was in a way ‘subordination of debt’, i.e. debt which is having lower priority than other debt in terms of payment, and was with the objective of maintaining the debt-equity ratio. As clear from the communication between the parties, the CRPS merely acted as a temporary tool for borrowing, providing Matix “a pause point” under the arrangement entered by way of exchange of emails. Therefore, the substance of the transaction should be given weightage, and an expansive interpretation of the term “commercial effect of borrowing” should be applied, as was interpreted by the Apex Court while classifying home buyers as FCs.[1] In fact, the SC, in another matter[2] delved into the real nature of a transaction while determining whether a debt is a financial debt or an operation debt.

On this, the Court noted that the preference shares were issued upon conversion of outstanding receivables. The board of the preference shareholder exercised its commercial wisdom in accepting the shares, given the low recovery prospects. Therefore, what was actually a financial debt, extinguished owing to such conversion, and hence the appellant cannot pose as a financial creditor.There is no question of there being any underlying contrary intent as the only intent was to convert the debt into preferential shareholding[3]. The SC, therefore, remarked:

“There is no question of there being any underlying contrary intent as the only intent was to convert the debt into preferential shareholding. The egg having been scrambled, . . .  attempt to unscramble it, must necessarily fail.

Debt vs. preference shares: Redeemable preference shareholder not a creditor

The SC placed reliance on the relevant provisions of the Companies Act, particularly Sections 43, 47, and 55, and held that preference shares form part of the company’s share capital and not its debt capital. Consequently, preference shareholders cannot be treated as creditors, nor can they initiate insolvency proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC, which is reserved for financial creditors.

The Court noted that –

“It is well settled in Company Law that preference shares are part of the company’s share capital and the amounts paid up on them are not loans. Dividends are paid on the preference shares when company earns a profit. This is for the reason that if the dividends were paid without profits or in excess of profits made, it would amount to an illegal return of the capital. Amount paid up on preference shares not being loans, they do not qualify as a debt.” (Emphasis added)

Dividends on preference shares are payable only out of profits or proceeds from a fresh issue of shares for redemption. Thus, only a profit-making company can redeem its preference shares, as profits accrue after all expenses, including interest on borrowings. To suggest that preference shareholders become creditors upon default, even when the company has no profits, would distort this basic principle. [4] As aptly stated in “Principles of Modern Company Law”[5]:

“The main difference between the two in such a case may then be that the dividend on a preference share is not payable unless profits are available for distribution, whereas the debt holder’s interest entitlement is not subject to this constraint; and that the debt holder will rank before the preference holder in a winding-up.”

In the context of a CIRP, initiation under Section 7 requires a “default”, a debt that has become due and payable. The Supreme Court observed that since preference shares are redeemable only out of profits or fresh issue proceeds, no “debt” arises unless such conditions exist; consequently, there can be no default under Section 7.

Difference between preference shareholder and a creditor was concisely captured in “A Ramaiya’s Guide to the Companies Act”[6]:

It must be remembered that a preference shareholder is only a shareholder and cannot as a matter of course claim to exercise the rights of a creditor. Preference shareholders are only shareholders and not in the position of creditors. They cannot sue for the money due on the shares undertaken to be redeemed, and cannot, as of right, claim a return of their share money except in a winding-up. In Lalchand Surana v. Hyderabad Vanaspathy Ltd., (1990) 68 Com Cases 415 at 419 (AP), where a preference shareholder was denied redemption in spite of maturity, he was not allowed to file a creditor’s petition for a winding-up order under s. 433(e) of the 1956 Act. An unredeemed preference shareholder does not become a creditor.

A financial debt necessarily involves disbursal against the consideration for time value of money, typically represented through interest.[7] While interest may not be a sine qua non in every case[8], there must at least be an element of consideration for the time value of money. In the present case, no such disbursal or consideration existed and hence, the claim failed to meet the threshold of a financial debt.

As such, preference shares do not fall within the ambit of “financial debt” under Section 5(8)(f) of the Code, and equating them with financial creditors would distort the fundamental distinction between shareholders and creditors[9].

Whether accounting entries/recognition as “liability” would make a difference

It was contended that financial debt is an admitted liability in the books of accounts of Matix.

However, the SC[10], held the treatment in the accounts due to the prescription of accounting standards will not be determinative of the nature of relationship between the parties as reflected in the documents executed by them. Further the IBC has its own prerequisites which a party needs to fulfil and unless those parameters are met, an application under Section 7 will not pass the initial threshold. Hence, by resort to the treatment in the accounts this case cannot be decided.

Our Analysis

While the judgment firmly settles that preference shareholders cannot be treated as creditors, since shares represent ownership and not loans, the question often arises why such instruments, though debt-like in spirit and accounting treatment, are not “debt” under law. The rationale goes beyond mere nomenclature.

Ind AS 32 [Para AG25 to AG28] clarifies that in determining whether a preference share is a financial liability, or in other words, a debt, or simply an equity instrument, the shares has to be assessed against the rights attached to it, and whether it signifies a character of financial liability. In other words, if a preference share is redeemable at a specific date in the future at the option of the shareholder, such instrument carries a financial liability and is treated as such. However, it should be noted that every law has to be read in a given context. Treatment under accounting standards is more from the perspective of the financial position of the issuer. However, in case of IBC, the question is of rights – as a creditor will have right to file an application under section 7, but a shareholder will not have such right; similarly, a creditor will have a higher priority under section 53, while a shareholder stands in the lowest step of the priority ladder.

Therefore, the context in which accounting standards operate cannot be superimposed while interpreting the rights and liabilities under laws like the Code. Therefore, preference shares, depending on their terms of issuance may be classified as a liability for the purpose of complying with accounting principles, however, that cannot be said to be confer such preference shareholders the status of a creditor, and consequently, entitling them to file CIRP application under the Code.

Hence, there is a fundamental difference between “debt” and “shares” – a “debt” once converted into “shares”, moves from one end of the spectrum to another, and cannot retain its original nature and rights under the Code.


[1] Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. and Another v. Union of India and Others ((2019) 8 SCC 416)

[2]  Global Credit Capital Ltd and Anr. v. Sach Marketing Pvt Ltd and Anr. (2024 SCC OnLine SC 649)

[3] Commissioner of Income Tax v. Rathi Graphics Technologies Limited (2015 SCC OnLine Del 14470), where it was held that, where the interest or a part thereof is converted into equity shares, the said Interest amount for which the conversion is taking place is no longer a liability.

[4] Lalchand Surana v. M/s Hyderabad Vanaspathy Ltd. (1988 SCC OnLine AP 290)

[5] (Tenth Edition) at page 1071

[6] (18th Edition, Volume 1 Page 879)

[7]  Anuj Jain, Interim Resolution Professional for Jaypee Infratech Limited v. Axis Bank Limited and Others ((2020) 8 SCC 401)

[8]  Orator Marketing v. Samtex Desinz (Civil Appeal No. 2231 of 2021)

[9] Radha Exports (India) Private Limited v. K.P. Jayaram and Another ((2020) 10 SCC 538)

[10] Relied on State Bank of India v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Ernakulam ((1985) 4 SCC 585)

Read more:

Failed Redemption of Preference Shares: Whether a Contractual Debt?

Kabhi Naa, Kabhi Haan: Key Takeaways from the SC’s verdict in Bhushan Steel

Presentation on Interest under IBC: Balancing Creditor Recovery and Resolution Viability

Kabhi Naa, Kabhi Haan: Key Takeaways from the SC’s verdict in Bhushan Steel

– Sikha Bansal, Senior Partner | resolution@vinodkothari.com

The proceedings in Bhushan Steel now take a U-turn, as the SC ruling has upheld the resolution plan of SRA. Earlier, the SC had ordered liquidation of the CD. 

Here is a quick round up of important takeaways from the verdict:

  1. CoC has a vital interest in the resolution plan and that such an interest would continue till the Resolution Plan is actually implemented. If it is argued that the CoC cannot act in any manner after approval of resolution plan, then it can lead to a limbo or an anomalous situation where, say, the plan could not be implemented for any reason, leaving the creditors high and dry. Notably, the cloud of uncertainty exists until finality is given by the SC under section 62. Until then, CoC remains interested. 
  2. Appeal to SC can be made only if it was appealed against before the NCLAT. Also, appeal to SC is available only on questions of law pertaining to any of the five grounds specified in Section 61 of the IBC – and, for no other reason.
  3. A clause in the resolution plan empowering the CoC to merely extend the implementation timeline by a specified majority and neither providing for withdrawal nor modification, cannot be stated to be an open ended or indeterminate plan solely at the discretion of the resolution applicant.
  4. CCDs are equity. Courtesy: SC rulings in Narendra Kumar Maheshwari, IFCI Limited v. Sutanu Sinha and Others. Also, if CoC has exercised its commercial wisdom in the matter, judiciary has nothing to interfere with.
  5. For issues like distribution of profits arising during CIRP, look at the RFRP and the resolution plan. Unless there is a specific provision with regard to such distribution to be made to creditors, the money shall remain with CD. Also, in this case, the resolution plan explicitly contemplated that SRA shall take over the assets and liabilities of the CD as a ‘going concern’, which would include the profits or losses that may be generated by the company during CIRP.
  6. Where a creditor was classified as contingent creditor by SRA and the plan was approved by CoC; and ambivalent stance was taken by the concerned creditor, then the commercial wisdom of CoC cannot be challenged.
  7. Payments to creditors against pre-CIRP dues must be done only in accordance with the resolution plan and with the express agreement of the CoC.
  8. Decisions pertaining to the resolution plan and dues thereunder fall under the “commercial wisdom” of CoC. Where CoC exercises commercial wisdom, the decision  is deemed to be non-justiciable by this Court in view of ruling in K. Sashidhar
  9.  Once the resolution plan has been approved by the CoC and NCLT, permitting any claims to be reopened which were not a part of the RFRP/resolution plan will open Pandora’s box, and will do violence to the provisions of IBC. SRA cannot be forced to deal with claims that are not a part of the RfRP issued in terms of Section 25 of the IBC or a part of its Resolution Plan. Courtesy: SC ruling in Essar Steel and Ghanshyam Mishra.

Ruling available here: https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2020/7358/7358_2020_1_1501_64744_Judgement_26-Sep-2025.pdf

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Done, dented, damaged: The IBC edifice, even before it’s 10

IBC for a makeover: bold and beautiful! Quick highlights of the IBC Amendment Bill, 2025

Presentation on IBC Amendment Bill, 2025

YouTube Recording of Discussion on Bill: https://youtube.com/live/jAvKP7U5qKY

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IBC for a makeover: bold and beautiful! Quick highlights of the IBC Amendment Bill, 2025

Done, dented, damaged: The IBC edifice, even before it’s 10

Supreme Court’s Judgment in Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd.: a wake up call for the Resolution Professionals and Committee of Creditors

Discussion on IBC Amendment Bill, 2025

Register here: https://forms.gle/czHgAXfWi8gn6DDX6

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IBC for a makeover: bold and beautiful! Quick highlights of the IBC Amendment Bill, 2025

Done, dented, damaged: The IBC edifice, even before it’s 10

Supreme Court’s Judgment in Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd.: a wake up call for the Resolution Professionals and Committee of Creditors

IBC for a makeover: bold and beautiful! Quick highlights of the IBC Amendment Bill, 2025

– Team Resolution | resolution@vinodkothari.com

Far reaching changes, several strategic initiatives, bold moves to overcome impact of jurisprudence that did not seem to serve the policy framework – these few words may just approximately describe the IBC Amendment Bill. The Bill has been put to a Select Committee of the Parliament, and may hopefully come back in the Winter Session. However, the mind of the Government is clear: if a bold legal reform has faced implementation challenges, the Government will clear the roadblocks. Some extremely crucial amendments might soon see the light of day, providing much-required clarity on priority of creditors, role of AA, group insolvency, among others.

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Done, dented, damaged: The IBC edifice, even before it’s 10

– Sikha Bansal, Senior Partner | resolution@vinodkothari.com

What was ushered in as a new era of legal reforms in the country, with keen interest from all over the world, is now a bruised, battered structure, even before it cuts its cake for the 10th time.

The BLRC Vision

When the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee first put the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) into its mould, they envisaged it as a tool in the hands of creditors who should decide on the fate of a defaulting firm. As they put it, “The appropriate disposition of a defaulting firm is a business decision, and only the creditors should make it.” Needless to say, they also recognised that decision-making has to be quick – as delays lead to value destruction. Indeed, the design and structure of IBC was promising enough – a unique categorisation of creditors as financial and operational creditors (found no-where in the world) with financial creditors, a creditor-driven resolution process, strict hardbound timelines, an irreversible liquidation outcome, a well-thought of priority waterfall, and a court-appointed liquidator taking the corporate debtor to the death pyre.

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Supreme Court’s Judgment in Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd.: a wake up call for the Resolution Professionals and Committee of Creditors

Team Resolution | resolution@vinodkothari.com

The Supreme Court judgement in the matter of Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd., set aside the resolution plan for Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd., and directed liquidation, after almost 6 years the resolution plan was approved by National Company Law Tribunal, citing  significant gaps in the conduct of corporate insolvency resolution processes – for instance,  lapses in meeting statutory timelines, deficiencies in eligibility verification under section 29A,  irregularities in plan implementation, judicial overreach by National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, among others. 

In this write up, we have made an attempt to discuss significant points of law as discussed by SC in this ruling and also provide our humble comments on the same. Needless to say, many of the concerns highlighted by the SC in this judgment would act as a binding code of conduct for all resolution professionals, CoCs, and even judicial institutions. 

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Classification of lease transactions under IBC: Financial vs. Operational debt

– Barsha Dikshit, Partner | resolution@vinodkothari.com

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’) broadly classifies debts into two categories-Financial Debt and Operational Debt. The classification of a debt as either financial or operational plays a pivotal role, particularly in determining the eligibility of the creditor for inclusion in the committee of creditors upon the initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution process 

Section 5(8) of the IBC defines “Financial Debt” as a debt, along with any interest thereon, that is disbursed against the consideration for the time value of money and encompasses a wide range of debts, including any liability or obligation arising from disbursement of funds to a borrower for financing the operations of a debtor., or any similar arrangement. Notably, the definition under Section 5(8) further elaborates that financial debt includes:

“Any liability in respect of any lease or hire purchase contract that is deemed a finance or capital lease under Indian Accounting Standards (IND AS) or other prescribed accounting standards.”

This provision underscores the significance of the classification of lease agreements. When a lease is structured in such a manner that it aligns with the criteria provided for lease arrangements under applicable accounting standards, it qualifies as a finance lease, and thus, a financial debt; otherwise will be treated as an operational debt (We have earlier discussed in detail the treatment of lease transactions under IBC. The same can be seen here.)

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Presentation on IBBI’s Discussion Paper on ‘Streamlining Processes under the Code: Reforms for Enhanced Efficiency and Outcomes’

– Team Resolution | resolution@vinodkothari.com

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Comments on the IBBI Discussion Paper on ‘Streamlining Processes under the Code: Reforms for Enhanced Efficiency and Outcomes’

Discussion on IBBI Discussion Paper dated 4th February, 2025

Affixing Vicarious Liability on Directors: See a Breakthrough

Introduction:

It is well established that a company, being an artificial legal entity, conducts its day-to-day operations through a collective body of individuals known as the Board of Directors. This body bears direct responsibility for the company’s functioning and decision-making. Consequently, in instances of default, both the company and its directors are often held accountable. Under Section 2(60) of the Companies Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), directors can be designated as “officers who are in default,” thereby making them personally liable in specific situations.

Despite its artificial nature, a company is recognized as a separate legal entity under the law. Therefore, for any offence committed by a company, it is primarily the company itself that is liable to face legal consequences. However, this fundamental principle is sometimes overlooked, and directors are held accountable for the corporation’s adverse actions. This stems from the perception that directors act as the “mind” of the company and control its operations.

Recently, the Supreme Court of India, in Sanjay Dutt & ORS. v. State of Haryana & ANR (Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 2025), reaffirmed the distinction between the company’s liability and that of its directors. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to the principle of separate legal personality, ensuring that directors are not unfairly held liable unless their personal involvement or negligence in the offence is established.

Brief facts of the Case: 

The case under discussion revolves around a complaint lodged under the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900 (PLPA) against three directors of a company, alleging environmental damage caused by uprooting trees using machinery in a notified area. The appellants (directors of Tata Realty and related entities) sought to quash the complaint, asserting that the alleged actions were conducted by the company and not attributable to them personally. The complaint, however, excluded the company as a party and focused on the directors’ liability under Section 4 read with Section 19 of the PLPA.

Key observations by the Supreme Court:

  1. Primary Liability of the Company: The Court emphasized that the company itself, as the licensee and beneficiary of the land, was primarily liable for any violations. Excluding the company from the complaint undermined the case’s premise.
  1. Vicarious Liability Not Automatic: The Court reiterated that directors cannot be automatically held vicariously liable unless the statute explicitly provides for such liability or there is evidence of their personal involvement in the offence.
  1. Lack of Specific Allegations: The complaint failed to attribute specific actions or responsibilities to the directors. It merely assumed liability based on their official positions, which is insufficient for criminal prosecution.
  1. Legal Fiction Requires Explicit Provision: Vicarious liability in criminal matters requires clear statutory backing. The PLPA contains no provisions imposing vicarious liability on directors for offences committed by the company.

Understanding the Concept of Vicarious Liability:

The concept of vicarious liability allows courts to hold one person accountable for the actions of another. This principle is rooted in the idea that a person may bear responsibility for the acts carried out by someone under their authority or on their behalf. In the corporate context, this doctrine extends to holding companies liable for the actions of their employees, agents, or representatives.

Initially developed within the framework of tort law, the doctrine of vicarious liability later found application in criminal law, particularly in cases involving offences of absolute liability. This marked a departure from the once-prevailing notion that corporations, as artificial entities, could not commit crimes. Modern legal interpretations now recognize that a corporation may be held criminally liable if its human agents, acting within the scope of their employment, engage in unlawful conduct.

Doctrine of Attribution:

Currently, a company does not have the immunity to safeguard itself under the blanket of laxity of mens rea, an important component for the constitution of a criminal intent. It was established that corporations are  liable for  criminal and civil wrongdoings if the offences were committed through the corporation’s ‘directing mind and will’. This attribution of liability to the corporations is known as the ‘Doctrine of Attribution’

‘Doctrine of Attribution’ says that in the event of an act or omission leading to violation of criminal law, the mens rea i.e. intention of committing the act is attributed to those who are the ‘directing mind and will’ of the corporations. It can be said that Doctrine of Attribution is a subset of Principle of Vicarious Liability wherein a corporation can be held responsible even in case of a criminal liability.

The landmark judgment in H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd. v. T.J. Graham & Sons Ltd., (1957 1 QB 159) provided a foundational understanding of corporate liability. The court compared a corporation with a human body, with its directors and managers representing the “mind and will” of the organization. These individuals dictate the company’s actions and decisions, and their state of mind is legally treated as that of the corporation itself. Employees or agents, by contrast, are viewed as the “hands” that execute tasks but do not represent the company’s intent or direction.

This conceptual framework underscores that while corporations are artificial entities, they can be held criminally liable when those who embody their directing mind commit offences. The recognition of corporate criminal liability has since evolved, balancing the need for accountability with the distinction between the roles of employees and the decision-makers within an organization.

You can read more about the corporate criminal liability here.

Analyzing the Sanjay Dutt Judgment:

  1. Liability must be expressly mentioned

In the present case, the Court underscored the principle that vicarious liability cannot be imposed on directors or office-bearers of a company unless explicitly provided by statute. This was reiterated in Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (AIR 2015 SC 923) where it was held that individual liability for an offence must be clearly established through direct evidence of involvement or by a specific statutory provision. Without such statutory backing, directors cannot be presumed vicariously liable for a company’s actions.

The Court further emphasized that statutes must clearly define the scope of liability and the persons to whom it applies. This clarity is essential to prevent ambiguity and ensure that only those genuinely responsible for the offence are held accountable.

  1. Personal involvement of Directors :

The Court reaffirmed that corporate liability does not inherently extend to directors unless supported by statutory provisions or evidence of personal involvement. In Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and Anr. (AIR 2005 SC 3512), it was held that directors are not automatically vicariously liable for offences committed by the company. Only those who were directly in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company’s business at the time of the offence may be held liable.

The judgment further emphasized that liability must stem from personal involvement or actions beyond routine corporate duties. Routine oversight or general authorization does not suffice to establish criminal liability unless it can be shown that the director personally engaged in, or negligently facilitated, the unlawful act.

  1.  In charge of’ and ‘responsible to

In K.K. Ahuja vs V.K. Vora & Anr. (2009 10 SCC 48), the Supreme Court analysed the two terms often used in vicarious liability provisions, i.e., ‘in charge of’ and ‘responsible to’. It was held that the ‘in-charge’ principle presents a factual test and the ‘responsible to’ principle presents a legal test. 

A person ‘responsible to’ the company might not be ‘in charge’ of the operations of the company and so in order to be vicariously liable for the act, both the principles must satisfy. It stated as, “Section 141 (of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881), uses the words “was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company”. There may be many directors and secretaries who are not in charge of the business of the company at all.

  1. The Complainant’s Burden of Proof:

Under Section 104 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the burden of proof lies on the complainant. It is the complainant’s responsibility to make specific allegations that directly link a director’s conduct to the offence in question. This principle was reiterated in Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat (AIR 2007 SC 332), where the Court held that vague or generalized accusations against directors are insufficient.

A valid complaint must include:

  1. Clear and specific allegations detailing the director’s role in the offence.
  2. Evidence linking the director’s actions to the company’s criminal liability.
  3. Statutory provisions or legal grounds for attributing vicarious liability.

Referring to Susela Padmavathy Amma and M/s Bharti Airtel Limited (Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.12390-12391 of 2022), wherein it was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court that even when statutes explicitly provide for vicarious liability, merely holding the position of a director does not automatically render an individual liable for the company’s offences.

To establish a director’s liability, the Court emphasized the need for specific and detailed allegations that clearly demonstrate the director’s involvement in the offence. It must be shown how and in what manner the director was responsible for the company’s actions.

The Court further clarified that there is no universal rule assigning responsibility for a company’s day-to-day operations to every director. Vicarious liability can only be attributed to a director if it is proven that they were directly in charge of and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company at the time the offence occurred.

  1. MCA Directive to RD and ROCs: Circular Dated March 2, 2020:

It’s noteworthy that, even MCA, vide its General Circular no. 1/2020 dated 2nd March, 2020, directed Regional Directors and Registrar of Companies that at the time of serving notices relating to non-compliances, necessary documents may be sought so as to ascertain the involvement of the concerned officers of the company.

  1. Duties of Directors under the Companies Act, 2013

Section 166 of the Act lists down duties of directors of a company. To summarise, directors must adhere to the company’s articles, act in good faith for members’ benefit, exercise due care and independent judgment, avoid conflicts of interest, undue gain. However, of note, it does not mention that a director shall be responsible for all the affairs of a company. 

In addition to the above case, the following related judgements are also noteworthy:

  1. Pooja Ravinder Devidasani vs. State of Maharashtra and another, (2014) 16 SCC 1: In this case, the Court asserted that, only those persons who were in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the time of commission of an offence will be liable for criminal action.
  1. S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs Neeta Bhalla and another, (2005) 8 SCC 89: the Court considered the definition of the word “director” as defined in Section 2(13) of the Companies Act, 1956. It held that “…There is nothing which suggests that simply by being a director in a company, one is supposed to discharge particular functions on behalf of a company. It happens that a person may be a director in a company but he may not know anything about the day-to-day functioning of the company…”.
  1. SEBI vs. Gaurav Varshney, (2016) 14 SCC 430: The Court held that even a person without any official title or designation such as “director” in a company may still be liable, if they fulfill the main requirement of being in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business at the relevant time. Liability is contingent upon the role one plays in the affairs of a company, rather than their formal designation or status.
  1. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited and Anr., v. Datar Switchgear Limited and Ors., (10 SCC 479): The Supreme court held that wherever by a legal fiction the principle of vicarious liability is attracted and a person who is otherwise not personally involved in the commission of an offence is made liable for the same, it has to be specifically provided in the statute concerned and it is necessary for the the complainant to specifically aver the role of each of the accused in the complaint.

Vicarious liability must be explicitly provided for in the statute and supported by clear evidence of personal involvement and criminal intent. Also, it is necessary for the complainants to make specific averments in the complaints.  

Conclusion:

The above judgments reinforces the principle that corporate and individual liabilities are distinct. Vicarious liability of directors is not presumed and can only be imposed with statutory backing or compelling evidence of personal involvement. By placing the burden of proof on the complainant, the judiciary ensures fairness and prevents misuse of the legal system to harass directors without substantive evidence. This balanced approach safeguards both corporate governance and individual accountability.

You can read more about this subject here.