Presentation on IBBI’s Discussion Paper on ‘Streamlining Processes under the Code: Reforms for Enhanced Efficiency and Outcomes’
– Team Resolution | resolution@vinodkothari.com
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Discussion on IBBI Discussion Paper dated 4th February, 2025
– Team Resolution | resolution@vinodkothari.com
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Discussion on IBBI Discussion Paper dated 4th February, 2025
An attempt to regulate the unorganised microfinance market
– Team Finserv – Aditya Iyer | Manager (finserv@vinodkothari.com)
As has been evident from numerous reports, the microfinance sector in India is facing mounting pressure. Rising borrower distress and overindebtedness have led to criticism of microlenders for their aggressive loan sanctions without adequate checks on the borrower’s ability to pay and harsh recovery practices. Concerns broadly pertain to: Vulnerability of borrowers, cross-selling and opacity of terms, unjustified/usurious rates of interest, multiple loan facilities and coercive methods of recovery etc.
While RBI registered entities are subjected to various regulations such as sector-specific RBI directions on microfinance, MFIN guardrails, NBFC Directions etc. there is not much to regulate the unorganised sector. In an attempt to address these concerns, and curb the challenges faced by local borrowers, the Karnataka Government promulgated ‘The Karnataka Micro Loan And Small Loan (Prevention Of Coercive Actions) Ordinance, 2025’, hereafter referred to as “Ordinance”. Other states too have attempted to regulate microfinance lending in the past. For instance, the aftermath of the 2010 Andhra Pradesh microfinance crisis, resulted in the Andhra Pradesh Microfinance Institutions (Regulations of Money Lending) Act (2011). Similarly, Assam has also promulgated the Assam Microfinance Institutions (Regulations of Money Lending) Act (2021). The Karnataka ordinance emerges particularly in light of the spate of reported borrower suicides in the region, and reports of usurious recovery practices by lenders.
Read more →ASCR would now consolidate other certifications and require specific confirmations
You may refer to our other FAQs on dematerialization of shares here and you may also refer to our Snippet, detailed article and YouTube Video
– Team Vinod Kothari and Company | corplaw@vinodkothari.com
Our Resource Centre on Related Party Transactions can be viewed here
Changes proposed in manner of RP identification, threshold for significant RPTs
– Avinash Shetty, Manager and Sourish Kundu, Executive | corplaw@vinodkothari.com
Related Party Transactions (“RPTs”) have been one such evergreen and ever-evolving aspect of corporate governance that has been put to guardrails on a frequent basis. SEBI, in its Consultation Paper dated 7th February, 2025 has again rolled out a new set of proposals, this time primarily centered around RPTs undertaken by subsidiaries of a listed entity, but nevertheless leaving listed entities pondering on what their actionables might be. In this article, we have analysed the proposals in brief.
Proposal: Following SEBI’s Informal Guidance on the manner of identification of Related Parties (“RPs”), which opined that the subsidiaries of LEs should maintain a list of their RPs in accordance with the Listing Regulations, instead of maintaining the same as per their respective applicable/local laws, SEBI now proposed to effectuate the same by way of appending an explanation to Reg. 2(1)(zc) that RP of subsidiary to be identified as per Reg. 2(1)(zb) of the Listing Regulations.
Although the proposed insertion does not differentiate between a listed and an unlisted subsidiary, it is clearly understood that a listed subsidiary shall, by default, be following the holistically covered definition of RP given under Reg. 2(1)(zb). On the other hand, an unlisted subsidiary which may so far been following the definition of RP as given under the Companies Act, 2013 (“the Act”) might be expected to buckle up to bring in a lot more persons under the purview of the RPT regime as per the LODR definition – for the purpose of facilitating the parent’s RPT compliances.
Possible concerns: While the SEBI’s approach of applying an entity-agnostic definition may seem to bring consistency and ease of collation of information across the group, but may raise several issues:
The issues in putting the said proposal in action have been discussed in detail in our write up on SEBI’s IG on RP identification by unlisted subsidiaries.
Actionables: If the proposals take the shape of law, the following actionables might arise:
Proposal: Moving on to thresholds for significant RPTs – an RPT of the subsidiary to which the holding LE is not a party requires prior approval of the AC of the holding LE before it can be entered into, if the value of such RPT exceeds 10% of annual standalone turnover, as per the latest audited financial statements of the subsidiary, taken together with all transactions during a FY. [Pursuant to Regulation 23(2)(c) of the Listing Regulations] (hereafter referred to as “significant RPTs”)
However, as discussed in the CP, there may be cases where a transaction by a subsidiary of a LE exceeds the material RPT threshold, requiring shareholder approval, but does not exceed 10% of the subsidiary’s standalone turnover, thus bypassing the AC approval. For example, if a subsidiary has a standalone turnover of ₹12,000 crore, a transaction of ₹1,100 crore would cross the material RPT threshold of ₹1,000 crore . This would require shareholder approval. However, since ₹1,100 crore is below 10% of the subsidiary’s standalone turnover (₹1,200 crore), AC’s approval would not be needed.
The proposal seeks to include the absolute threshold of Rs. 1,000 crores as well in determining significant RPTs. Significance would be determined on the basis of value of transaction being Rs. 1,000 crores or 10% of annual standalone turnover of the subsidiary, whichever is lower. In our view, however, this proposal is more clarificatory in nature as it is difficult to envisage that any RPT proposal going to shareholders of an LE can go directly without coming before the AC of the LE. We have covered this scenario in our FAQs on RPT as well.
A specific carve out from the above requirement has been set down in respect of listed subsidiaries on which corporate governance norms and RPT framework norms are applicable.
Further, in order to impose RPT controls on SME listed entities, SEBI in its Board Meeting held on 18th December, 2024 approved, among other items, the materiality threshold of Rs. 50 crores or 10% of annual consolidated turnover, whichever is lower. Accordingly, for the purpose of determining significant RPTs of an unlisted subsidiary of SME LE, the threshold is Rs. 50 crores or 10% of annual consolidated turnover, whichever is lower. Note that the provision is applicable to a subsidiary of an SME LE – this is clear from para 5.3.1 of the CP.
The proposal as to thresholds is as tabulated below:
| Limits for Significant RPTs (whichever is lower) | Having financial track record* | Not having financial track record* |
| Subsidiaries of Main Board LEs | Rs. 1,000 crores or 10% of annual standalone turnover | Rs. 1,000 crores or 10% of standalone net worth |
| Subsidiaries of SME LEs | Rs. 50 crores or 10% of annual standalone turnover | Rs. 50 crores or 10% of standalone net worth |
*Note:
Actionables: Unlisted subsidiaries of listed entities will have to reassess their transactions falling under significant RPTs to be taken to the listed parent’s AC.
Although the change is merely clarificatory in nature, it is pertinent to note that there has been some ambiguity for RPT approvals, when RPTs are being entered into between a holding company and its wholly owned subsidiary (WoS). Given that applicability of the Listing Regulations encompasses only listed entities, it was implied that the holding company referred is a listed holding company whose accounts are consolidated and presented to shareholders at the general meeting, and not an unlisted one.
This interpretive addition of the word “listed” aims to remove any ambiguity in respect of the exemptions granted for certain RPTs involving WoS.
The impact of the changes, if and when notified, may be expected to be as far fetched and require a revised understanding of the RPT regime to some extent, even if not entirely, similar to the rippling effect of the SEBI (LODR) (3rd Amendment) Regulations, 2024 dated 12th December, 2024. Further, there are certain aspects such as revision in definition of RPs for subsidiaries, which would require an introspection not just on the part of the subsidiaries of LEs, but at the group level as well. Needless to say, RPT – regime and controls, has always been a trending topic and changes w.r.t the same, although the first of this year, can definitely not be expected to be the last.
The RPT framework under the Listing Regulations has already been amended 7 times, and every time, it becomes tougher, all in the name of “Ease of Doing Business”. A document collating the evolution of RPT framework over the years is here: https://lnkd.in/gZ3Ca5yQ
Read more on Related Party Transactions here.
– Sourish Kundu, Executive | corplaw@vinodkothari.com
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Subsidiaries to refer LODR definition of “related party” – going too far with relationships?
– Resolution Team, Vinod Kothari and Company | resolution@vinodkothari.com
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Group Insolvency: Relevance of Substantive Consolidation in Indian Context
Interim Finance becomes effective and attractive
Discussion on IBBI Discussion Paper dated 4th February, 2025
-Abhirup Ghosh (abhirup@vinodkothari.com)
Partial Credit Enhancement (PCE) is a risk-mitigating financial tool where a third party provides limited financial backing to improve the creditworthiness of a debt instrument. It ensures that investors are partially protected against default risk, making it easier for issuers to raise funds at better terms.
The key features of a PCE are as follows:
The concept of PCE has been in India for quite some time now, and is commonly used in securitisation transactions. However, the Finance Minister’s announcement during Union Budget 2025 about setting up of a PCE facility under the National Bank for Financing Infrastructure Development (NaBFID) has brought this into the limelight.
Infrastructure development is the backbone of economic growth, but funding large-scale projects such as highways, railways, power plants, and airports requires substantial capital. Infrastructure projects often face challenges in raising funds due to their long gestation periods, high risks, and lower credit ratings. PCE serves as an effective financial tool to improve the creditworthiness of infrastructure bonds, making them more attractive to investors. By providing a partial guarantee or security, PCE helps reduce the cost of borrowing and widens investor participation, ultimately facilitating infrastructure financing.
Infrastructure bond issuances face several obstacles that make fundraising difficult. One of the primary challenges is low credit ratings. Infrastructure projects, especially those in their early stages, often receive sub-investment-grade ratings (such as BBB or lower), making them unattractive to investors. Additionally, these projects are subject to high perceived risks, including revenue uncertainty, regulatory hurdles, construction delays, and cost overruns. Since many infrastructure projects rely on user charges, such as tolls or metro fares, their cash flow projections can be unpredictable.
Another major issue is the long maturity period of infrastructure bonds. Most investors prefer short- to medium-term investments, whereas infrastructure bonds typically have tenures of 10 to 30 years. This mismatch reduces the appetite for such bonds in the market. Lastly, lack of institutional investor participation further limits the success of infrastructure bond issuances, as pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds prefer highly rated bonds with stable returns.
One of the most significant ways PCE helps infrastructure bond issuances is by improving their credit ratings. When a bank or financial institution provides partial credit enhancement in the form of a guarantee or reserve fund, it reduces the default risk associated with the bond. This leads to a higher credit rating, making the bond more attractive to investors. For example, an infrastructure company with a BBB-rated bond issuance may improve its rating to A with a 20% PCE support, or AA with a 50% PCE support thereby increasing demand from investors. A higher rating not only boosts investor confidence but also expands the pool of potential buyers, including institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies.
By improving the credit rating of infrastructure bonds, PCE directly leads to a reduction in interest costs. Bonds with higher ratings attract lower interest rates, which helps infrastructure companies secure financing at more affordable terms. For instance, without PCE, a BBB-rated bond may require 12%, whereas a bond upgraded to an AA rating with PCE support may only require 9%. This reduction in interest rates can result in significant savings over the life of the bond. Lower borrowing costs also make infrastructure projects more financially viable, ensuring their timely execution and long-term sustainability.
Institutional investors, such as mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies, typically have strict investment guidelines that restrict them from investing in low-rated securities. Since many of these investors require bonds to be rated AA or higher, infrastructure bonds often struggle to meet these requirements. PCE helps bridge this gap by enhancing the credit rating, making infrastructure bonds eligible for investment by these large institutional players. This leads to greater liquidity and stability in the corporate bond market, ensuring a steady flow of capital to infrastructure projects.
PCE contributes to the overall development of the corporate bond market by encouraging more issuers to raise funds through bonds rather than relying solely on bank loans. Traditionally, infrastructure financing in India has been dependent on banks, which exposes them to high asset-liability mismatches due to the long tenure of infrastructure projects. By facilitating infrastructure bond issuances, PCE helps shift the burden away from banks and towards a broader investor base. This not only diversifies funding sources but also enhances financial stability in the banking sector.
As per a CII report (2022), the infrastructure financing gap is estimated at over 5% of GDP. Approx. 80% of the investment in infrastructure space is by government agencies (80%), and the remaining 20% comes from private developers.
As per the National Infrastructure Pipelines, the total investment target was set at INR 111 trillion (USD 1.34 trillion) for the period between FY 20 and FY 25; and only 6-8% (INR 6.66-8.88) of the such targets were expected to be met by bond issuances. Reliance on bond markets is planned to the extent of 6% to 8% (INR 6.66 – 8.88 trillion). As per the said estimates, the average annual issuances should have been INR 1.480 trillion. However, between FY18 and FY22, the issuance of infrastructure bonds has been at INR 5.37 trillion, that is, an average of INR 1.07 trillion per annum, that is a shortfall of ~30% compared to the target.
Furthermore, the issuances have been highly concentrated in the top 5 PSUs. The charts below show the annual bond issuances between FY 18 – FY 22, and share of issuance by top 5 PSUs and others:
Source: CRISIL
The market is dominated by highly rated issuers. In general approx. 75% of bond issuers are rated AAA, and more than 90% of the issuances are by AA and above rated entities. The reason for this dominance by highly rated issuers is the fact that for practical purposes, the most acceptable rating in the infra bonds space is AA, as long term investors like insurance companies, pension funds etc. are by regulation required to invest in AA or above rated papers.
PCE support from a credible source will help a lot of infrastructure operators, who are stopped at the gate, with ratings in the range of A, with easy access to the market.
The existing scheme for PCE was notified by the RBI in 2015. In a nutshell, the scheme provides for the following:
Form of PCE: To be structured as a non-funded, irrevocable contingent line of credit. This facility can be drawn upon in the event of cash flow shortfalls affecting bond servicing.
Limitations: The total PCE extended by a single bank cannot exceed 20% of the bond’s total size; however, overall, the PCE provided by all banks, in aggregate, cannot exceed 50% of the bond’s total size.
Further, PCE can be provided only to bonds which have a pre-enhanced rating of BBB- or above.
Capital Requirements: The bank providing PCE does not hold capital based only on its PCE amount. Instead, it calculates the capital based on the difference between:
The objective is to ensure that the PCE provider should absorb the risks that it covers in the entire transaction. Illustrating with an example:
Assume that the total bond size is Rs. 100 crores for which PCE to the extent of Rs. 20 crore is provided by a bank. The pre-enhanced rating of the bond is BBB which gets enhanced to AA with the PCE. In this scenario:
As can be seen, the capital has to be maintained on the total bond issuance, and not just the exposure. Ironically, this capital has to be maintained until the outstanding principal of bonds falls below the extent of PCE provided. Usually, the bonds are amortising in nature – that is, the actual exposure of the guarantor continues to come down. Given, however, that default in bonds may be back-ended, the capital has still to be maintained till the redemption of the bonds. This requires the PCE provider to maintain huge regulatory capital for a significantly long period of time; which also gets reflected in the ultimate cost to the beneficiary, therefore, making it unviable.
The FM’s announcement though comes with a lot of promise, as it shows a positive intent. But to make things work, there are quite a few things that should be put into place:
