Archive for month: August, 2024
NSE tightens eligibility criteria for SME listing on NSE Emerge
/0 Comments/in Corporate Laws, SEBI /by Team CorplawCat I & II AIFs can borrow to meet temporary shortfall in investment drawdown
/0 Comments/in Capital Markets, Corporate Laws, SEBI /by Team CorplawBond issuers set to become Market Maker to enhance liquidity
/0 Comments/in Bond Market, Corporate Laws, SEBI /by Team CorplawIssuer to provide Liquidity Window facility to eligible investors effective from Nov 1, 2024
Vinita Nair & Palak Jaiswani | corplaw@vinodkothari.com
August 18, 2024 (Updated October 22, 2024)
While SEBI took numerous measures to deepen the bond market and increase transparency and participation viz., Electronic Book Building Platform (‘EBP) for issue above Rs. 50 cr., Request for Quote (‘RFQ’) platform, reduction in face value of privately placed bonds, online bond platform (‘OBP’), corporate bond repo system etc, illiquidity in bond market continued to remain one of the major concerns for SEBI. To address the issue of liquidity mainly for retail investors, SEBI vide its consultation paper dated August 16, 2024, had proposed the introduction of Liquidity Window facility, a unique concept in bond market. SEBI notified this facility vide circular dated October 16, 2024 effective from November 01, 2024.
What is the proposed Liquidity Window Facility (‘LWF’):
LWF, at the issuer’s discretion, allows eligible investors to exercise a put option on NCDs on predetermined dates. This enables investors to sell their securities back to the issuer, removing the need to find prospective buyers in the market. In this setup, the issuer assumes the role of market maker, a concept that has not yet been fully implemented in the bond market.
Key Features of LWF:
- Issuer’s discretion: It is optional for the issuer to provide LWF.
- Nature of issuance: Issuers can provide this facility for prospective bond issuances through public issues as well as on a private placement (proposed to be listed) at the ISIN level.
- Quantum of LWF: Minimum 10%[1] of final issue size. Aggregate limits and sub-limits (in no. of securities) for put option that can be exercised in each window to be disclosed in the offer document.
- Timing: LWF to commence after the expiry of 1 year from date of issuance. Facility may be operated on a monthly or quarterly basis at issuer’s discretion, as indicated in the offer document upfront.
- Eligible Investors: The issuer will determine which investors are eligible, with a particular focus on retail investors. Investors need to hold securities in demat form to avail this benefit. If put options exercised during the period exceed sub-limits, acceptance will be on a proportionate basis.
- Pricing of bonds under LWF:
- Date of valuation: ‘T-1’day where T is the first day of the LWF[2].
- Manner of Valuation: as per chapter 9 of SEBI Master Circular on mutual funds.
- Issuers can provide a maximum discount of 1% on the valuation arrived. Price plus accrued interest payable.
- Display valuation on the website of the issuer and SE during the liquidity window period.
- Option with the issuer for bonds purchased under LWF: Within 45 days of closure of LWF or before the end of quarter, whichever is earlier:
- sell on debt segment of SE; or
- sell on RFQ platform, if eligible to access; or
- sell through an online bond platform provider; or
- extinguish the NCDs.
- In case of sale, amount realized will be added back to the aggregate limit and will replenish any past usage of the limit.
- Restriction on re-issuance[3]: Re-issuance is not allowed under ISINs in which LWF is offered
- Exemption in ISIN capping[4]: ISI.Ns in which LWF is offered are exempted from computation of ISIN limits as per Chapter VIII of NCS Master Circular.
- Operational Guidelines: Stock exchange, in consultation with clearing corporations and depositories, will issue detailed guidelines on how to use the LWF, including the process for exercising the put option.

Other Conditions:
- Authorisation and Implementation
- Prior approval of BOD.
- Monitoring of implementation & outcome SRC or BOD (in case there is no SRC).
- Transparent, non-discretionary and non-discriminatory within the class of investors.
- Does not compromise market integrity or risk management.
- Liquidity Window Period:
- Duration: Open for 3 working days.
- Intimation of proposed schedule: To be provided 5 working days before the start of the financial year in which facility it is to be given via SMS/WhatsApp.
- Mode and manner of availing:
- Put options can be exercised by blocking the securities in demat a/c during trading hours and using the specified mechanism to intimate issuer w.r.t. the exercise of put option.
- Investors may modify or withdraw bids during the window period[5].
- Submissions received during window period (during trading hours) will only be considered valid
- Further guidelines to be provided by SE
- Settlement[6]: T+4 days
- Reporting and disclosure requirements:
- Submit report to SE – within 3 WD from closure of window; and
- Inform the depositories and DT regarding NCDs to be extinguished – within 3 WD from end of 45 days from the closure of window (timeline to sell/ extinguish purchased securities)[7]
- Website disclosure:
- By: SE, depositories, DT, and Issuers
- When: Disclose on website upon issuance of each ISIN in which facility is provided. Details to be maintained and updated at all times.
- Details: List of ISINs for option is available, o/s amount, credit rating, coupon rate, maturity date, valuation details and other relevant information (as per para 6.11 of circular)
- Issuer to submit above details to SE, depositories and DT to disclose on their website
- In case of change: Issuer to intimate SE, depositories and DT within 24 hrs of change. SE, DT and depositories to update their website within 1WD of such intimation.
[1] Minimum 15% was proposed in the CP.
[2] CP proposed the date of valuation as the day of closure of liquidity window.
[3] Not proposed in the CP earlier.
[4] Not proposed in the CP earlier.
[5] Not proposed in the CP earlier.
[6] Not proposed in the CP earlier.
[7] CP proposed the timeline of 3 working days from the date of window closure
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LODR norms of equity extended to debt listed entities; Disclosure of DT Agreement
/0 Comments/in Corporate Laws, NCS /by Team Corplaw– Palak Jaiswani, Manager | Corplaw@vinodkothari.com
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/0 Comments/in Corporate Law Updates, Corporate Laws, FEMA /by Team CorplawVinita Nair and Prapti Kanakia l corplaw@vinodkothari.com
30 hours Online Course on Securities Laws for Newly Listed and To-be Listed Companies
/0 Comments/in Corporate Laws, IPO, IPOs and listing, LODR, PIT, SEBI /by StaffRegister your interest here – https://forms.gle/HGJxAb7e8ds2dMrF9
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Two day refresher course on NBFC Regulations – Delhi
/0 Comments/in Financial Services, NBFCs, Training & Workshops /by Team FinservFill the google form to register: https://forms.gle/bYgcj3fyJodW9tYeA
Following the success of our recent workshop in Mumbai and Bengaluru, we are delighted to announce our upcoming 2-day refresher course on RBI regulations for NBFCs in Delhi!Loading…
Survival at Stake? The impact of RBI’s Norms on P2P Lending Platforms
/0 Comments/in Financial Services, Fintech, RBI /by Team FinservDayita Kanodia and Manisha Ghosh l finserv@vinodkothari.com
Introduction
RBI on August 16, 2024 has issued a notification for the review and modification of Master Direction – Non-Banking Financial Company – Peer to Peer Lending Platform (Reserve Bank) Directions, 2017 (‘Directions’) for platforms acting as intermediaries and providing an online marketplace for lending between peers.
The review has been carried out pursuant to observations that some of these platforms have adopted certain practices which are violative of the said Directions. These practices include, among others, violation of the prescribed funds transfer mechanism, promoting peer to peer lending as an investment product with features like tenure linked assured minimum returns, providing liquidity options and at times acting like deposit takers and lenders instead of being a platform.
Read more →Changes in P2P Norms: Collapse of the marketplace model?
/0 Comments/in Financial Services, RBI /by StaffVinod Kothari | finserv@vinodkothari.com
Introduction
The RBI’s 16th August 2024 changes in P2P Directions may have been inspired by its supervisory observations, and comments by some observers and experts, but the likely impact of the changes may be to make this disintermediation model operationally tough to the extent of unviability.
The key spirit of the amendments is that P2P Platforms (P2PPs) cannot function as virtual alternative deposit-taking entities, promising liquidity, reinvestment and giving tacit assurance of rates of interest. However, to enforce its intent, the regulator has also provided that the lenders’ funds will be called only on “just in time” basis, that is, only when they can be lent within a day. Further, the regulator has put specific stipulation against any secondary market in loans on a P2PP, whereas, for any mode of savings or investment, an exit when needed is a necessary attribute.
Just-in-time availability of lenders:
P2P, like any platform, premises itself on the ability to match the two parties to the bargain. To the borrower, it has to promise funds; and to the lender, it has to promise deployment. Since no borrower may conceivably wait until the P2PP ramps up requisite lenders, the only intuitive solution would be that the P2PP gets lenders, keeping their money in readiness mode, to be deployed when borrowers are available. However, the regulator has now prescribed that, effective 15th November, the funds in lenders’ escrow should not be there for more than 1 day.
It is important to realise, and it seems that this point has escaped attention of the regulator, that funds in lenders’ escrow need to be a state of readiness for 2 reasons: one, at the time of the lender first investing his money; and secondly, as repayments trickle in from the various loans given to borrowers. As a matter of prudent spreading of the risks of a lender, one particular lender’s funds are not lent to a single borrower – on the contrary, the funds are spread, say over 100 or even larger number of borrowers (a process called “mapping”, which has been recognised by the regulator). Thus, each lender would have lent to hundreds of borrowers, and each borrower would have borrowed from hundreds of lenders. Thus, for each such lender, money starts trickling in small bits and pieces every month. If this money is not reinvested into new loans, the lender’s whole purpose, which was to keep money invested and not just to invest it in one cycle of loans, will not be met. Now, between the repayment of the existing loans, and the redeployment into new loans, there may be a time gap, which may be a few days. Under the new regulatory framework, if the money is not redeployed within a day, the money will have to flow back to the lenders.
If the regulator’s expectation is that the P2PP would be making calls on lenders every time there are borrowers, and the lenders will have ready availability of funds to meet such calls, it is quite an impractical expectation. Such a perfect match between cash inflows and cash outflows is aggressively optimistic. In global markets, there are “warehouse financiers” who provide temporary funding to meet these gaps, but that is not the case in India.
In fact, the whole existential idea of P2PPs is disintermediation.
If the Airbnb model will become impractical if the platform starts searching for houses only when an occupier is ready to check-in, the same argument applies with a stronger force in case of loan-connecting platforms.
It seems the regulator may not have been happy with the redeployment of funds by the P2PP, but that is exactly what a lender would want and need. The lender should be free to choose to reinvest his funds, or retrieve them, to be able to get a slow exit.
Lenders providing exit to lenders
In P2PP, a lender provides loans to borrowers; but can a lender buy existing loans given by other P2PP lenders to borrowers? A priori, there should be no reason why a lender could have given a loan to an unknown borrower, but couldn’t have bought the loan taken by an existing borrower. After all, for existing loans, there is a history of performance as well as seasoning. If existing loans given by a lender are bought by incoming lenders, the process will lead to creation of a so-called “secondary market”, which will allow existing lenders to exit by selling their portfolio of loans to incoming lenders. It is in the public domain that the P2P industry has been making a case for such secondary market.
The amended Directions have inserted a clause in reg 6 (1) to say: “NBFC-P2P shall not utilize funds of a lender for replacement of any other lender(s)”. This clause may either be interpreted to mean that there is an absolute bar on secondary marekt in P2P loans. Or, there may be another interpretation: that the right of using the funds of a lender to buying existing lenders shall not be available to the P2PP. However, if that is something that the incoming lender himself wants, that is the exercise of a prudent discretion by the incoming lender, and there should be nothing wrong with that. If it is the first interpretation that the regulator has, then putting a bar on secondary market is most undesirable, given the nature of P2P investing. Exit opportunity is needed for almost every mode of investment. But it becomes critical inthe case of P2P investing, because of the granular spreading of the loans discussed above. Therefore, every lenders’ loans trickle back over a long period, and if the lender has chosen to reinvest the repayments, the period becomes infinite. If at any stage the lender needs to exit, he will have to wait for months and months for the loans to repay. Since need for exit may arise due to exigencies which cannot wait, the slow and protracted exit is unlikely to serve the needs of the lender. As a result, it is only such lenders, and only for a very small part of their lendable portfolios, who can afford to invest in P2PPs, making it a leisurely investing game of one who is flush with money. The whole idea of P2PPs is to take them to a modest lender, so that he may lend at affordable rates to a modest borrower. The idea of reducing cost of lending by a lending marketplace can only be met if the platforms become more and more inclusive on either end. Putting a bar on the secondary market will make it exclusive, rather than inclusive.
See P2P India Report 2023 here

