Revised Regulatory Framework for IDs of listed entities in India

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-Independence becomes stricter!

Payal Agarwal, Executive ( payal@vinodkothari.com )

Updated on 6th August, 2021

Introduction

The concept of independent directors was first introduced in the Desirable Corporate Governance Code issued by the Confederation of Indian Industry[1] followed by the recommendation in the Corporate Governance Committee constituted by SEBI and headed by Mr. Kumar Mangalam Birla[2] (Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee). Later in the year 2000, SEBI incorporated the recommendations of the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee under Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement[3]. Independent directors have always been regarded as the means to strengthen the corporate governance framework in a public or a listed company.

Keeping in mind the intent of the lawmakers to introduce the requirement for having Independent Directors (IDs) on the board of certain companies, it is understood that SEBI cannot accept a situation where the IDs themselves turnout to either be ineffective for strengthening the corporate governance or act against the interest of the public shareholders. Therefore, with the intent to further strengthen the role and responsibility of IDs, SEBI had introduced a Consultation Paper[4] (Paper) on review of regulatory provisions related to IDs on 2nd of March, 2021. Through this Paper, SEBI had proposed to make stringent regulatory changes in the provisions of the Listing Obligation and Disclosure Requirements Regulations (LODR/ Listing Regulations) relating to

  • eligibility criteria of IDs,
  • role of Nomination and Remuneration Committee (NRC),
  • composition of Audit Committee (AC) and Nomination and Remuneration Committee (NRC)
  • appointment and removal procedure of IDs

Further, SEBI, in its Board Meeting held in July, 2021 discussed to review the regulatory framework applicable on IDs and incorporate amendments in the Listing Regulations based on public comments and discussions w.e.f. 1st January, 2022. However, the changes in the regulatory framework as notified on 3rd August, 2021 vide SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) (Third Amendment) Regulations, 2021 [the Amendment Regulations],was initially notified to be applicable with immediate effect whose applicability has now been deferred to the date as originally decided in the Board Meeting of SEBI, i.e., 1st January, 2021 .

A brief snippet on the changes can be accessed here.

This write up critically covers the changes in the regulatory framework for IDs pursuant to the Amendment Regulations and discusses the potential impact of the same on the working of a company including the corporate governance aspects.  The amendments are discussed below under the relevant heads.

1.Widening the criteria for independence

Regulation 16(1) of the Listing Regulations provides the definition of “independent director”. SEBI seeks to broaden the criteria of “independence” by expanding the outreach of the restrictions given under the said Regulation and at the same time standardising the cooling off period provided therein.

Amendments in line with the Paper

The Paper proposed two amendments in the independence criteria of IDs in addition to the extant definition which have been made applicable with the notification of the Amendment Regulations:

  • KMPs and employees of companies falling under the promoter group of the listed entity & relatives of such KMPs should not be eligible to act as an ID until a cooling off period of 3 years has passed.

This is in addition to the existing fetter on the KMP and employee of the listed entity, its holding, subsidiary or associate company.

  • Another amendment is with regard to increasing of the cooling-off period in Regulation 16(1)(iv) and Reg 16(1)(v) of the Listing Regulations.

Currently, the Regulations specify a cooling-off period of 2 years in case of material pecuniary transaction between a person or his relative and the listed entity or its holding, subsidiary or associate company. This has been increased to 3 years to make it similar to the other provisions of Regulation 16 where a cooling-off period of 3 years is required to be satisfied.

Amendments not proposed in the Paper

Certain amendments not proposed in the Paper but brought by means of the Amendment Regulations are given below:

  • The criteria under Regulation 16(b)(v) earlier provided only for the pecuniary relationship of the relatives of proposed ID with the company. This has been amended in line with Section 149(6)(d) of the Companies Act, 2013.
  • Further, a proviso has been inserted after Regulation 16(b)(vi)(A) providing a relief to the proposed ID appointment when the relative of such proposed appointee is a mere employee and not KMP.

Rationale behind the Amendment Regulations:

This amendment aims to make the independence criteria more broader and stricter so that there is no way by which the candidates influenced by promoter group entities can take undue benefit due to any loopholes in the language of law.

On the other hand, the amendment increasing the cooling off period is for making the same uniform all through the independence criteria.

Further, it has to be noted that the amendments are in harmonisation with the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013, as also contemplated in the Board meeting of SEBI and does not bring in any drastic changes in the existing requirements apart from looping in promoter related entities as well.

Actionable arising pursuant to the Amendments

  • Revised declaration to be obtained so as to ensure compliance with meeting the revised independence criteria as soon as possible.

2.Process for appointment/ re-appointment and removal of independent directors

The Paper proposed to bring a major change in the procedure of appointment/ re-appointment as well as removal of IDs by means of “dual approval”. However, the said proposal has not been brought under the current Amendment Regulations. The changes have been brought to have the following impact:

Matter Requirements under extant provisions Proposal under Paper Provisions as per Amendment Regulations
Appointment/ Removal of IDs Ordinary Resolution §  Dual approval (Special Resolution in case the proposal fails)

§  Prior approval of Shareholders

 §  Special Resolution

§  Shareholder’s approval required within earlier of –

§  Next general meeting

§  3 months from appointment of  a person on board
Re-appointment of IDs Special Resolution Dual approval (Special Resolution in case the proposal fails)

 

 Special Resolution

 

(no change from the existing provisions)
Filling of vacancy of IDs Later of the following –

§  Next board meeting

§  3 months from vacancy

 Within 3 months from vacancy Within 3 months from vacancy

Further, in case of appointment of any other director in board, whether executive, non-executive, additional director, director appointed due to casual vacancy etc , every such appointment has to be regularised by the shareholders within a maximum period of 3 months from such an appointment.

Rationale for such Amendments

  • Requirement of passing a special resolution

While SEBI had, in its Paper, proposed the “dual approval” model in line with the legislative requirements of Israel and UK, especially in interest of the minority shareholders, the Board disclosed that majority of comments were against such proposal due to practical difficulties in implementation of the same, citing causes such as delay in appointment due to an unintended deadlock, voting skews in case of minority public shareholders having significant shareholding etc. Due to such practical difficulties, a balanced approach has been chosen to require a special resolution for all cases related to appointment, re-appointment as well as removal.

  • Time gap available to regularise the appointment by the shareholders

Similarly, as regards the proposed prior approval before appointment, the majority of comments dissented against the proposal citing reasons of additional compliance burden on companies, giving a midway suggesting that while the prior approval should not be mandated, a timeline should be provided within which the appointment should be approved by the shareholders.

Actionable pursuant to the Amendments

After the Amendment Regulations come into force, it would be necessary to regularise the appointment of all directors appointed in additional capacity within 3 months of the board meeting in which they were appointed by way of shareholders’ approval. Considering the fact that the amendments have been notified well in advance, the companies will not be able to excuse themselves for some further time after the amendments come into effect.

The amendments can be explained with the help of following examples –

1.A director has been appointed in additional capacity on 10th December, 2021. His appointment will have to be approved by shareholders within 3 months, i.e., 10th March, 2022.

2. A director has been appointed as additional director on 20th August, 2021 in the board of a company. The period of 3 months ends on 20th November, 2021. However, since the amendments are effective from 1st January, 2022, he may continue as an additional director in the board of the company till 31st December, 2021. However, if his appointment is not been approved by the shareholders within such period of time, he’ll have to resign from his position. The proposal of his appointment will have to be re-considered afresh by the NRC and board of the company, followed by a shareholders approval within 3 months.

3.Resignation of IDs

Through the Paper, it became clear that the intention of SEBI is to strictly monitor the resignation of the IDs where the real cause of resignation should be clearly known in place of the apparent cause the company and ID may try to show.

The Paper provided for a cooling off period of 1 year in two cases:

  • Where the ID resigns on account of discretionary reasons of pre-occupation, other commitments or personal reasons – Mandatory cooling period of 1 year before joining another Board as an ID;
  • Similar cooling period of 1 year in case of transition from ID to WTD in the same company.

 Further, the Paper also proposed that the complete resignation letter of the outgoing ID needs to be disclosed to the stock exchange. The same has been made effective vide the Amendment Regulations.

While the proposal of cooling-off period in case of transition of an ID as a whole-time director in the same company has been implemented by means of insertion of sub-regulation (11) in existing Regulation 25, the requirement of such cooling-off period has been further extended to the joining of such person as a whole-time or executive director in the holding, subsidiary, associate or other group companies belonging to the same promoter(s) as well.

The first proposal with regard to the cooling-off period in case of resignation due to personal / discretionary reasons has not been brought into force on account of comments received from public raising concerns over showing ingenious reasons in resignation letter to avoid falling into the cooling-off requirements, or compelled to work in pressurizing circumstances.

Rationale for such Amendments

The cooling off period of 1 year before transition of an ID as a WTD in the same company has been proposed to ensure there is no compromise in the independence of the director during his term as an ID.

It is observed that IDs often resign for reasons such as pre-occupation, other commitments or personal reasons and then join the boards of other companies. There is, therefore, a need to further strengthen the disclosures around resignation of Independent Directors. However, considering the comments received from majority of public, such a proposal has not been implemented.

4. Role of NRC in selection of candidates for the role of ID

The NRC is required to recommend the persons to be appointed as IDs in the board of the company. Though the Listing Regulations already requires the NRC to formulate criteria regarding such appointment, the role of NRC, in practice, does not suffice the intent of law properly.

Therefore, vide the Amendment Regulations, SEBI has brought amendment to Para A of Part D of Schedule II of the Listing Regulations thereby specifying the following procedure for selection of candidates for the role of NRC. The procedure is in line with the proposal laid down in the Paper.

  • Evaluate the balance of skills, knowledge and experience
  • On the basis of above evaluation, prepare description of required roles and capabilities required for that particular appointment of ID
  • Identify the suitable candidate fitting the said description
  • For identifying persons, NRC may
    • use services of external agencies
    • May consider candidates from wide variety of backgrounds ( for diversity)
    • And consider time commitment of appointees
  • The person identified and recommend to the Board should possess capabilities as per description.

Rationale for such Amendment

While the law requires NRC to lay down detailed criteria of qualifications and attributes for directors, apparently there is a lack of transparency in the process followed by NRC. There is therefore, a need to prescribe disclosures regarding the process followed by NRC for selection of candidates for the post of ID.

Actionable pursuant to the Amendments

Any ID appointed on the board of a listed company after the Amendment Regulations come into effect, shall be appointed after following the due procedure as provided in the Amendment Regulations. This implies that even where the meeting of NRC for recommendation of appointment of a person as an ID is held before the Amendment Regulations coming into force, due process will be required to be followed. This is also required to ensure that the additional disclosures required to be made in the notice of general meeting for appointing IDs are available with the company (discussed in later parts of the article).

5.Modification in composition of NRC and AC

The Paper also sought to bring in some changes in the constitution of NRC and AC. The following changes were proposed –

  • NRC to comprise of 2/3rds of ID (earlier atleast one-half IDs required)
  • AC to comprise of 2/3rds of IDs and 1/3rds of Non-executive directors(NED) that are not related to promoter (presently, the AC requires atleast 3 members of which atleast 2/3rds shall be IDs)

The proposals have been implemented partially. While the changes in composition of NRC as proposed in the Paper has been made effective vide the Amendment Regulations, the changes in composition of AC has been rejected on account of decreasing flexibility of the companies.

Approval of Related Party Transaction by AC

Rather, an important amendment has been made to balance out between the flexibility of the companies on one end and the efficiency of the AC on another.  Post amendment, all related party transactions of the companies are required to be approved by only the IDs of the Audit Committee. The executive directors, who are a part of the AC, are not allowed to approve such transactions, however, restriction is not with respect to voting and it is understood that they may accord their dissent to a proposed related party transaction. However, practically, there may be rarely any instance, where the related party transaction, otherwise approved by the independent directors of an AC, has been dissented to by other members of the AC. Further, it shall apply to all the prospective related party transactions, and shall not affect the related party transactions which have already been approved prior to the amendments including the ones under omnibus approval.

A new proviso under Regulation 23(2) has been inserted as follows –

“Provided that only those members of the audit committee, who are independent directors, shall approve related party transactions.”

Rationale for such Amendment

Considering the importance of the Audit Committee with regard to related party transactions and financial matters, it was proposed that AC shall comprise of 2/3rd IDs and 1/3rd Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) who are not related to the promoter, including nominee directors, if any. However, the comments received from the public stakeholders have highlighted the risk of losing flexibility by the companies in case of such rigid composition. Therefore, in view of the same, while the composition of the AC has been kept intact, the requirement of only IDs approving the related party transactions have been made effective. The same serves as a balanced approach ensuring both flexibility of companies and efficiency of Audit Committee.

6.Enhanced disclosure requirements

The Amendment Regulations provide for some additional disclosure requirements in line with the amendments as follows:

At the time of appointment –

  • Details of companies from which the listed entities have resigned in the previous three years
  • Skills and capabilities required for the role
  • Manner in which the proposed appointee meets such requirements

At the time of resignation –

  • Complete letter of resignation
  • Names of listed entities in which the resigning director holds directorships, indicating the category of directorship and membership of board committees, if any

Actionable pursuant to the Amendments

In the light of the amendments, additional details shall be required to be made available to the shareholders for appointment of independent directors.

Similarly, in case of resignation, the letter of resignation and details of continuing directorship shall be made filed with the stock exchanges by the listed entity as received from the resigning ID.

7. Requirement of D&O Insurance

Earlier requirement Requirement post amendment
Applicable to Top 500 listed entities Top 1000 listed entities
With effect from 1st October, 2018 1st January, 2022

Conclusion

The changes brought vide the Amendment Regulations are extremely significant and will have a remarkable impact on the corporate governance of listed entities. More transparency may be achieved by means of these amendments like enhanced disclosure on resignation, appointment, selection of candidates as IDs, etc. of all, the amendments seek to check the interference of promoters at all levels of corporate governance and ensures much more independence to the IDs where the IDs will be independent in both letter and spirit. In areas where the proposals under the Paper seemed to be more rigid, the Amendment Regulations have allowed the companies to take breath in line with the comments received from the public shareholders. However, some amendments required immediate actionable, and especially, at this point of time, when most of the companies are having their AGMs, which was creating a hassle for the listed companies. However, SEBI has come up with a clarification deferring the applicability of the Amendment Regulations. Further, a proposal with respect to remuneration of IDs allowing stock-options to them has been dropped, atleast for the time being in the said Amendment Regulations.

[1] http://www.nfcg.in/UserFiles/ciicode.pdf

[2] http://www.nfcg.in/UserFiles/kumarmbirla1999.pdf

[3] https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/feb-2000/corporate-governance_17930.html

[4] https://www.sebi.gov.in/reports-and-statistics/reports/mar-2021/consultation-paper-on-review-of-regulatory-provisions-related-to-independent-directors_49336.html

Our other articles on related topic can be accessed here –

  1. https://vinodkothari.com/2021/06/re-appointment-of-independent-directors-an-analysis/
  2. https://vinodkothari.com/2021/07/independent-directors-the-global-perspective/

SEBI’s move to allow stock options to independent directors – Whether a threat to independence?

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Aanchal Kaur Nagpal (corplaw@vinodkothari.com)

 

It is said that when morality has a fight against profit, it is rarely that profit loses. Humans are always looking for more and quite often give in to their greed. This is the underlying rationale when it comes to safeguarding the independence of an independent director– to cut off anything that would lure them to compromise the interests of the company.

At the same time, given the crucial role they play in corporate governance and the increasing expectations for ensuring a balance between stakeholders’ interests and ensuring an independent insider’s view on the company’s affairs, they need to be sufficiently compensated for the time they spend and the risk-taking they do as directors.

While adequate compensation is crucial, there is a fine line to be drawn between ‘compensation’ and ‘pecuniary interest’. A balance is required to be maintained where IDs are paid remuneration in fair proportion to the value they bring to an organization while also not compromising their ability to pass an independent judgement.

Currently, IDs receive remuneration in the form of sitting fees and profit-linked commission[1] subject to certain limits. Currently, they are not permitted to receive stock options under the Companies Act as well as LODR regulations. It is felt that a stock option will put the ID to a position of a shareholder, and there may, therefore, be an alignment of the interest of the IDs with those of the shareholders. This is presumed to threaten the independence of IDs. However, SEBI, vide its Consultation Paper on Review of Regulatory Provisions related to Independent Directors dated 1st March, 2021[2] (Consultation Paper) , has proposed a radical change to the conventional remuneration structure of IDs in India by allowing stock options to be granted to IDs.

In this article, the author attempts to analyse whether SEBI’s move to allow grant of options to IDs as a form of their remuneration, will truly threaten the sanctity of their independence.

We have analyzed the Consultation Paper at length in our article.

Law regarding ESOPs to IDs in India

As discussed above, ESOPs are not permitted to be granted to independent directors. The prohibition comes from both – the Companies Act as well as LODR regulations. According to regulation 17(6)(d), Independent directors shall not be entitled to any stock option. As per section 149(9) of the Companies Act, 2013, notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, but subject to the provisions of sections 197 and 198, an independent director shall not be entitled to any stock option and may receive remuneration by way of fee provided under sub-section (5) of section 197, reimbursement of expenses for participation in the Board and other meetings and profit related commission as may be approved by the members.

Therefore, it is established, that currently, Indian laws expressly and absolutely prohibit granting stock options to independent directors. Further, voting power of more than 2% being held by an ID along with his/her relatives is also prohibited. However, this is in case of listed entities and prescribed unlisted public companies.

The problem regarding remuneration to IDs vs remuneration to EDs

Remuneration to IDs

Currently, the following provisions are existent with respect to remuneration to IDs –

  • According to section 149(9) of the Companies Act, 2013,

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, but subject to the provisions of sections 197 and 198, an independent director shall not be entitled to any stock option and may receive remuneration by way of fee provided under sub-section (5) of section 197, reimbursement of expenses for participation in the Board and other meetings and profit related commission as may be approved by the members.

  • As per section 197(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 read with rule 4 of the sitting fees to any director for attending Board or Committee meetings or for any other purpose, as may be decided by the Board, should not exceed Rs. 1 lakh. Further, IDs should not be paid sitting fees that is less than that paid to other directors.
  • As per section 197(1)(ii) of the Companies Act, 2013,

The remuneration payable to directors who are neither managing directors nor whole-time directors shall not exceed, –

(A) one per cent. of the net profits of the company, if there is a managing or whole-time director or manager;

(B) three per cent. of the net profits in any other case.

  • A director or manager may be paid remuneration either by way of a monthly payment or at a specified percentage of the net profits of the company or partly by one way and partly by the other.

The diagram below sums up remuneration that may be paid to an ID:

Thus, the sources of remuneration to IDs have been limited along with further restrictions to the amount of remuneration permitted to be paid. Whereas in case of executive directors, the permissible amount of remuneration is much higher along with lesser restrictions.

The role of both counterparts is paramount and none of the two can undermine the role of the other. However, the compensation received by IDs has been lower than that paid to executive directors. Although the latter are involved in the day to day management of a company’s affairs, the former pitch in their rich expertise, knowledge and unbiased view. Therefore, there should be a way to align or proportionate the remuneration drawn by IDs with executive directors.

However, on the contrary, executive directors are included in the definition of ‘officer in default’ and have a higher liability than that of IDs.

International Practices

As per the Cadbury Committee Report,

On fees, there is a balance to be struck between recognising the value of the contribution made by nonexecutive directors and not undermining their independence. The demands which are now being made on conscientious non-executive directors are significant and their fees should reflect the time which they devote to the company’s affairs. There is, therefore, a case for paying for additional responsibilities taken on, for example, by chairmen of board committees. In order to safeguard their independent position, we regard it as good practice for non-executive directors not to participate in share option schemes and for their service as non-executive directors not to be pensionable by the company.

According to National Foundation for Corporate Governance[3]

To secure better effort from non-executive directors, companies should: • Pay a commission over and above the sitting fees for the use of the professional inputs. The present commission of 1% of net profits (if the company has a managing director), or 3% (if there is no managing director) is sufficient. • Consider offering stock options, so as to relate rewards to performance. Commissions are rewards on current profits. Stock options are rewards contingent upon future appreciation of corporate value. An appropriate mix of the two can align a non-executive director towards keeping an eye on short term profits as well as longer term shareholder value.

UK

According to UK Corporate Governance Code[4] (para 34),

Remuneration for all non-executive directors should not include share options or other performance-related elements.

In exceptional cases where equity is granted, companies should gain shareholder approval prior to grant and the acquired shares should be held for at least 1 year from the director’s departure from the Board.[5]

Thus, in UK, the same is discouraged and not prohibited. The UK Corporate Governance Code represents key corporate governance recommendations of best practice for companies and does not have a statutory force.

The International Corporate Governance Network allows equity-based remuneration to non-executive directors. [6]

Australia

As per Australian Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations – (only recommendatory and not mandatory)

Equity-based remuneration to non-executive directors: it is generally acceptable for non-executive directors to receive securities as part of their remuneration to align their interests with the interests of other security holders. However, nonexecutive directors generally should not receive options with performance hurdles attached or performance rights as part of their remuneration as it may lead to bias in their decision-making and compromise their objectivity.

France

According to the Corporate Governance Code of listed corporations by Afep-Medef[7], the principles for determination of compensation of non-executive directors, state that it is not desirable to award variable compensation, stock options or performance shares to non-executive directors. If, despite this, such awards are granted, then the Board must justify the reasons for this and the director cannot be considered to be independent.

USA

In USA, no express guidelines were found to prohibit share options to independent directors.

However, compensation policies of various companies filed with the SEC include stock options, restricted stock units and equity compensation granted to independent directors or outside directors (directors that are not employees of the Company).

Policies can be viewed here –

What can be seen is that global governance norms have mixed views with respect to stock options to IDs.

Are IDs really independent in the first place?

There are various contentions that can question whether IDs are in fact independent at all.

Appointed by the Board

IDs are appointed by the Board of Directors. Although the appointment requires the approval of the shareholders as well, IDs are nominated by the Board or the Nomination Committee. The nomination is then recommended to the shareholders for their approval. Additionally, where promoters hold majority stake in a company, such appointment may be approved and dominated by them. Thus, expecting and ID to be independent of persons who are in fact behind his/ her appointment is a question in itself. Thus, if an ID truly requires to be independent, then he/ she should be appointed by an independent third party. Various changes have also been proposed with respect to appointment, reappointment and removal of IDs, which have been discussed in our article at length.

Profit related commission

IDs are paid commission that should be related to the profit. Thus, their income is dependent on the progress/ growth of the Company making the independent director ‘interested’ in the Company.

The cons of ESOPs

While the global precedence does not expressly prohibit ESOPs, there still lies an anomaly whether ESOPs would make an ID interested in a company.

Additional methods for fair compensation are needed on one hand but on the other, the independence of an ID cannot be compromised. If ESOPs are granted, IDs will become interested as shareholders and would dwell upon the short-term prosperity of a company since share price at the end of the vesting period would be what would matter to them. They would therefore compromise a long-term return along with interest of other stakeholders. There would be too much pressure on short-term performance mostly compromising the long-term good of the company.

Profit related commission to IDs

Profit related commission is contingent in nature and is a way of sharing risks and rewards. Such commission depends and is proportionate to the profitability of the other party and thus aligns the interests of the parties involved the arrangement.

Indian laws allow IDs to be paid by way of profit related commission. The same can be paid up to a maximum of 1% of the profits of the company in that financial year. This means that the amount of income of the ID, in the form of commission, will directly depend on the amount of profit in that financial year. If the company performs better in a particular financial year, the profit will be higher and in turn the proportionate commission of the ID in that financial year will be higher. This shows that the interests of the ID will be rather short term than long term. The ID will only be concerned about the short-term performance of the company for the years he is an ID since his income would be directly dependent on the same, irrespective of any event hampering or damaging the Company in the long run. Therefore, the permissible form of remuneration to IDs by Indian laws, in reality, adversely affects the independence of an ID.

Profit related commission versus ESOPs

Consequently, there arises a question on how the defense of independence can be used against ESOPs alone if IDs are allowed to receive profit related commission.

ESOPs, as compared to commission, would be a better way to remunerate IDs, when it comes to protecting the interests of Company. Where profit related commission makes the ID interested in the short term performance of the Company, ESOPs provide a longer performance goal. Stock options ensure a balance between the short term and medium term performance of a company.

Profit related commission depends directly on the immediate preceding year (i.e. just one year) while ESOPs depend on a relatively longer time frame (more than one year at the least- tenure of the ESOPs can be decided and controlled by the company).

Thus, if companies are allowed to pay profit related commission to IDs, restrictions on allow ESOPs are unwarranted considering the fact that the latter would be a preferred option to align the interests of the IDs with the medium term performance of a company.

Here, the intention behind granting such ESOPs would be to enable IDs to focus on the medium term/ long term performance of the company rather than retention which is usually the rationale behind ESOPs.

However, the maximum limit for granting such ESOPs as well as maximum shareholding should be monitored to avoid IDs from holding huge stakes in companies. Further, ESOPs with longer vesting periods should be allowed, where the exercise period falls after the expiry of tenure of the ID, to ensure ID’s focus on the long term growth of the company.

SEBI’s Consultation Paper to allow stock options –

SEBI contended that linking remuneration to profit or performance linked commission ensures that IDs have ‘skin-in-the-game’ which may encourage short-termism and lead to conflicts between the interests of the IDs and the overall interest of the Company. A better approach would be to instead permit ESOPs to IDs with a long vesting period (say, 5 years,) as this would ensure alignment of interests of the company and IDs. The rationale is that remuneration to IDs should be on the basis of their value and time-commitments to the company, without linking the same to the profits thereof. This would lead to IDs getting a fixed fee, without having any stake in the long-term growth of the company.

Additionally, the limit on the sitting fees to IDs, is also proposed to be increased.

Accordingly, recommendations will be sent to MCA for modification of the existing remuneration structure under the Companies Act as well.

Conclusion

Thus, SEBI is headed in the right direction to allow ESOPs to IDs and is highly welcomed. This would ensure that IDs are rightly compensated for the value they offer while also ensuring that long term interest. However, various checks should be placed by regulators for monitoring the same so as to safeguard the independence of the ID.

 

[1] While the existing requirement under sections 149(9) and 197(3) of the Companies Act, in case of remuneration to non-executive directors, was to pay them upto a percentage of profits, the amendments made by CAA 2020 (section 32) have delinked the compensation and the profits, permitting companies to pay remuneration by way of “minimum remuneration”, that is, irrespective of adequacy of profits (proviso to section 149(9) inserted and amendment to section 197(3))

[2] https://www.sebi.gov.in/reports-and-statistics/reports/mar-2021/consultation-paper-on-review-of-regulatory-provisions-related-to-independent-directors_49336.html

[3] http://www.nfcg.in/UserFiles/ciicode.pdf

[4] https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.PDF

[5] You may check pay pratices in Europe through this report- https://infokf.kornferry.com/rs/494-VUC-482/images/191206-KF%20-%20NED%20report%202019%20-%20LR%20SPREAD%20mail.pdf

[6] https://www.icgn.org/sites/default/files/ICGN%20NED%20Guidelines%20%282010%29_%20Oct%202013print2_0.pdf

[7] https://afep.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Afep-Medef-Code-revision-June-2018-ENG.pdf

 

 

FAQs on appointment of independent directors

Guide to Independent Directors

 

Factoring Law Amendments backed by Standing Committee

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-Megha Mittal 

[finserv@vinodkothari.com]

In the backdrop of the expanding transaction volumes, and with a view to address the still prevalent delays in payments to sellers, especially MSMEs, the Factoring Regulation (Amendment) Bill, 2020 (‘Amendment Bill’) was introduced in September, 2020, so as to create a broader and deeper liquid market for trade receivables.

The proposed amendments have been reviewed and endorsed by the Standing Committee of Finance chaired by Shri. Jayant Sinha, along with some key recommendations and suggestions to meet the objectives as stated above.  In this article, we discuss the observations and recommendations of the Standing Committee Report  in light of the Amendment Bill.

Read more →

Online Workshop on New Regulatory Framework For Housing Finance Companies

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Our write-up on the topic titled “RBI consolidates directions for Housing Finance Companies” can be viewed here

Vinod Kothari Consultants Pvt. Ltd. have published “Indian Housing Finance Report, 2020” click here for more details

 

MCA eases the requirement for setting up and conversion of an OPC

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-Gift from the Union Budget 2021-2022

-Abhishek Saraf |Deputy Manager| (corplaw@vinodkothari.com)

Introduction

The concept of One Person Company (“OPC”) was discussed for the first time in India in the year 2005 by the JJ Irani Expert Committee[1] which suggested that with increasing use of information technology and computers, emergence of service sector, the entrepreneurial capabilities of the people must be given an outlet for participation in economic activity and was of the opinion that it was not reasonable to expect that every entrepreneur who was capable of developing his ideas and participating in the market place should do it through an association of persons. It may therefore, be possible for individuals to operate in the economic domain and contribute effectively. With this, the Committee recommended the formation of OPC. It suggested that such an entity may be provided with a simpler legal regime through exemptions so that the small entrepreneur is not compelled to devote considerable time, energy and resources on complex legal compliance.

OPC is a combination of a sole proprietorship and an incorporated form of business and takes the form and is registered as a private company.

This concept was then introduced in the Indian company law regime by the enactment of the Companies Act 2013 (“Act”), the earlier laws on companies did not have such concept. It was brought in with the objective of promoting entrepreneurship and help entrepreneurs’ by providing them access to certain facilities like bank loans, thorough market access as a separate entity and legal shield for their business. OPC has been defined under section 2(62) of the Act as “a company which has only one person as a member.”

The graph above shows that there has been an increase in the number of OPCs incorporated in the country on month to month comparison for the last two years barring a portion of the period during the lockdown due to Covid-19 restrictions in the country.

With the intent to benefit start-ups and innovators, the Hon’ble Finance Minister in her speech on Union Budget 2021-22 in the Parliament on 1st February 2021, proposed a measure to directly benefit the aforesaid, by the way of amending certain provisions of OPC to provide relaxations in relation to incorporation of OPCs and its conversion into any other type of companies

Following the same, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs vide its notification dated 1st February, 2021 notified the Companies (Incorporation) Second Amendment Rules, 2021[2] thereby notifying the proposal tabled in the Budget speech which shall come into effect from 1st April, 2021.

This write up briefly discusses on the changes brought under the OPC framework.

Brief discussion on the proposed changes

Residency

The norms for setting up OPC has been eased out considerably by reducing the residency limit for an Indian citizen to set up an OPC from 182 days to 120 days. Secondly, the mandatory criteria of being an Indian resident for being eligible to incorporate an OPC has been done away with. This means that w.e.f.1st April, 2021, even a Non-Resident Indian (NRI) can set up an OPC in India. The aim of these amendments is to make it easy for anyone to set up a company in the form of OPCs in the country and promote entrepreneurship and therefore, boost the economy of the country.

Conversion of OPC into other kind of companies

The Act currently provides that an OPC cannot convert itself into any other kind of company unless a period of 2 years has elapsed since the date of its incorporation. The provision has been removed to allow OPCs to convert into any other type of company except section 8 company, at any time at their own will without any sort of restriction.

The current regulatory framework also provides a fetter that if the paid up share capital of an OPC exceeds Rs. 50 lakhs or its average annual turnover during the relevant period exceeds Rs. 2 crores at any time including even in the first 2 years of its incorporation, OPC has to mandatorily convert into a Private company or a Public company. However, the provision has completely been removed this threshold limits and w.e.f 1st April, 2021 OPCs shall no longer be required to compulsorily go for conversion. They have been allowed to grow without any restrictions on paid up capital and turnover and have been given the freedom to convert at any time.

OPCs will now be allowed to convert into any other kind of company other than section 8 companies by applying in e-Form INC 6 after altering its memorandum and articles, increasing the minimum number of members and directors to the minimum number as provided in the statute for that kind of company and maintaining the minimum paid up capital as per the requirement of the Act for such class of company.

Conversion of Private companies into OPCs

The most significant amendment has been allowing private companies to convert into OPCs at any time irrespective of its paid up share capital or average annual turnover which earlier was a hindrance for Private companies willing to convert to OPCs.

This shall prove beneficial for such private companies who want funds to grow their business and cross the regulatory threshold because of which they are not able to convert themselves into OPCs and have to devote too much of their time, energy and resources on the complex legal requirements and also miss out on the benefits/ exemptions being given to the OPCs by the various provisions of the Act.

Benefits for an OPC under the Act

The Act provides for number of benefits for a company registered as OPC, some of those are:

  1. Abridged form of Annual Return and Board’s Report shall be prescribed by the Central Government for OPCs.
  2. OPCs are not required to hold Annual General Meeting.
  3. It is not required to hold 4 board meetings in a year, OPC may hold 2 board meetings in a calendar year i.e. one Board Meeting in each half of the calendar year with a minimum gap of ninety days between two meetings.
  4. Secretarial Standards-1 is not applicable on OPCs having only 1 director and Secretarial Standards are also not applicable on OPCs.
  5. Lesser Penalties have been prescribed for OPCs under section 446B of the Companies Act 2013.

Conclusion

As evident from the statistical data, since there has been an increase in the number of the OPCs incorporated, MCA has thought fit to ease the requirements for setting or conversion of an OPCs thereby providing a boost to entrepreneurship as well as the economy.

The move to incentivize OPCs by reducing the residency limit and allowing NRIs to set up companies in form of OPC in the country is expected to provide broader investment opportunities for venture funds, while providing leverage to set up businesses in India. The removal of threshold limit for conversion of OPCs into any kind of companies and private companies into OPCs shall be of huge relief for companies going for funding without the burden of compulsorily converting themselves. It also gives them a freedom and ease of converting at point of time which goes with the Government’s agenda of Ease of Doing Business and Self Reliant India.

 

[1] http://www.primedirectors.com/pdf/JJ%20Irani%20Report-MCA.pdf

[2] http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/SecondAmndtRules_02022021.pdf

Ease of doing business: Debt listed companies slide down to unlisted companies

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Companies with listed but privately placed debt paper not to be regulated as ‘listed company’.

FCS Vinita Nair | Senior Partner, Vinod Kothari & Company

With an intent to promote listing of securities and bond market, Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) in consultation with Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), intended to exclude certain class of companies from the definition of ‘listed company’ as defined under Section 2 (52) of Companies Act, 2013 (CA, 2013). The existing provisions of CA, 2013 applicable to a listed company did not distinguish between private companies and public companies. As a result, private companies were unintendedly subject to similar compliance as a public company. A browse through the list of companies with listed privately placed debentures, shows private companies abound in the list[1].  On the other hand, public companies that listed debt securities on a private placement basis, were subject to similar compliances as a public company issuing debt securities to public.

Accordingly, one of major amendments proposed in Companies (Amendment) Act, 2020 (CAA, 2020) was to revisit definition of listed company and provide a suitable carve out to certain class of companies to be determined in consultation with SEBI.

The rationale behind the carve out, as explained in the Report of the Company Law Committee of November, 2019[2] was that private companies listing its debt securities on any recognized stock exchange were subject to more stringent regulations compared to unlisted private companies viz. appointment of auditors, independent directors, woman directors, constitution of board committees etc. that were dis-incentivizing private companies from seeking listing of their debt securities. This was also discussed in the Report of Company Law Committee in 2016[3] wherein the Committee, while acknowledging the anomaly  in the definition of listed company, felt that while the definition of the term ‘listed company’ need not be modified, the thresholds prescribed for private companies for corporate governance requirements may be reviewed. Further, the Committee proposed that specific exemptions under Section 464 of CA, 2013 could also be given to listed companies, other than equity listed companies, from certain corporate governance requirements prescribed in the Act.

Currently, companies issuing non- convertible debt securities (NCDS) or non-convertible redeemable preference shares (NCRPS) on a private placement basis, list the same under SEBI (Issue and Listing of Debt Securities Regulations, 2008 (SEBI ILDS) and SEBI (Issue and Listing of Non-Convertible Redeemable Preference Shares) Regulations, 2013 (SEBI ILNCRPS) respectively and are regarded as ‘listed company’ for the provisions of CA, 2013.

Total number of companies with listed debt 

Number of companies, which come under different buckets as per the outstanding value of listed Debt Securities (as per face value) as on December 31, 2020

Present amendment

While the amendment made in Section 2 (52) in the definition of ‘listed company’ was notified with effect from January 22, 2021[4], the class of companies were pending to be prescribed. Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) on February 19, 2021[5] notified Companies (Specification of Definition Details) Second Amendment Rules, 2021 effective from April 1, 2021 to insert Rule 2A excluding following class of companies from the definition of ‘listed company’ under CA, 2013

  1. Public companies with listed NCDS issued on private placement basis in terms of SEBI ILDS;
  2. Public companies with listed NCRPS issued on private placement basis in terms of SEBI ILNCRPS;
  3. Public companies with listed NCDS and NCRPRS issued on private placement basis in terms of SEBI ILDS and SEBI ILNCRPS respectively;
  4. Private companies with listed NCDS in terms of SEBI ILDS.
  5. Public companies with equity shares exclusively listed on stock exchanges in permissible foreign jurisdictions under Section 23 (3) of CA, 2013.

Point to note here is that companies with listed commercial papers were anyways outside the purview of listed companies as commercial papers are excluded from the definition of debentures.

Listed company post amendment

Post amendment, the definition of listed company will mainly comprise of public companies offering securities to public i.e. having listed equity shares in India (with or without ADR/GDR listed overseas), listed debt securities pursuant to public issue or listed NCRPS pursuant to public issue.

Compliances for listed company under CA, 2013

A listed company is required to ensure following additional compliances under CA, 2013:

Amount in Rs/ Other specification Section No. Rule No. Brief of the provision Other thresholds under CA, 2013
1.       Provisions/ exemptions applicable to all listed companies
Exemption for creation of Debenture Redemption Reserve (DRR) 71 18 (7) (b) (iii) (B) of SHA Rules Listed NBFCs need not create DRR for privately placed and public issue of debentures. Refer discussion below
Creation of Debenture Redemption Fund (DRF) 71(4) Rule 18(7)(b)(v) of SHA Rules as amended. No requirement for creation of DRF by listed companies issuing debenture on private placement basis. Refer discussion below
Annual return 92 11 of MGT Rules

 

 Company to file Annual Return certified by a PCS in Form MGT-8 Applicable to Company with

  • Paid-up share capital of Rs. 10 crore or more; or
  • Turnover of Rs. 50 crore or more.
Records in electronic form 120 27 of MGT Rules Company may maintain records in electronic form.

Note: Whether companies other than those specified have the option to maintain in electronic form, is not clear.

 Company having not less than 1000 shareholders, debenture holders and other security holders.
Investigation by NFRA

 

 132 Rule 3(1)(b) of NFRA Rules NFRA shall undertake investigation or conduct quality review of audit.
  • Unlisted public companies
    • having paid-up capital of not less than Rs. 500 crores; or
    • having annual turnover of not less than Rs. 1000 crores or
    • having, in aggregate, outstanding loans, debentures and deposits of not less than Rs. 500 crores as on the 31st March of immediately preceding financial year;
  • insurance companies, banking companies, companies engaged in the generation or supply of electricity, companies governed by any special Act for the time being in force or bodies corporate incorporated by an Act in accordance with clauses (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of sub-section (4) of section 1 of the CA, 2013;
Statement in Board report indicating manner of Board evaluation 134(3) 8 (4) of AOC Rules

 

 A statement indicating manner in which formal evaluation of Board, committee and individual directors has been done by Board needs to be included in Board’s report. Public company having a paid up share capital of Rs. 25 crore or more calculated at the end of the preceding financial year.
Financial statements in electronic form 136 11

of AOC Rules

 Financial statements may be sent in electronic format. Public companies which have

  • a net worth of more than Rs. 1 crore; and
  • turnover of more than Rs. 10 crore.
Internal auditor 138 13

of AOC Rules

 Appointment of internal auditor or a firm of internal auditors to conduct internal audit.
  • Every unlisted public company having-
    • paid up share capital of Rs. 50 crore or more during the preceding financial year; or
    • turnover of Rs. 200 crore or more during the preceding financial year; or
    • outstanding loans or borrowings from banks or public financial institutions exceeding Rs. 100 crore or more at any point of time during the preceding financial year; or
    • outstanding deposits of Rs. 25 crore or more at any point of time during the preceding financial year;
  • Every private company having
  • turnover of Rs. 200 or more during the preceding financial year; or
  • outstanding loans or borrowings from banks or public financial institutions exceeding Rs. 100 crore or more at any point of time during the preceding financial year:
Appt/ re-appt of Auditor 139

(2)

 5 of ADT Rules

 

 Restriction on term of appointment or reappointment of auditor. Rotation of Statutory Auditors mandatory.
  • all unlisted public companies having paid up share capital of Rs. 10 crore or more;
  • all private limited companies having paid up share capital of Rs. 50 crore or more;
  • all companies having paid up share capital of below threshold limit mentioned above, but having public borrowings from financial institutions, banks or public deposits of Rs. 50 crores or more.
Woman Director 149

(1)

 3 of DIR Rules

 

 Appointment of a Woman Director on the Board.

 

Any intermittent vacancy of a woman director shall be filled-up by the Board at the earliest but not later than immediate next Board meeting or three months from the date of such vacancy whichever is later.

 Public company having –

  • paid–up share capital of Rs. 100 crore or more; or
  • turnover of Rs. 300 crore or more:
Small shareholder director 151 7 of DIR Rules

 

 May appoint a small shareholder director suo moto or upon notice from shareholder. –
Vigil mechanism 177 7 of MBP Rules

 

 Company to establish vigil mechanism for their directors and employees to report genuine concerns.
  • the Companies which accept deposits from the public;
  • the Companies which have borrowed money from banks and public financial institutions in excess of Rs. 50 crore.
Disclosure in Board’s Report 197

(12)

 5 of MR Rules

 

 Disclosure in Board’s report regarding ratio of the remuneration of each director to the median employee’s remuneration and such other details as prescribed in the Rules. –
Appointment of KMP 203 8 of MR Rules Appointment of whole-time key managerial personnel.

 
  • Public company having a paid-up share capital of Rs. 10 crore or more
  • Additionally for appointment of Company Secretary, every private company which has a paid up share capital of Rs. 10 crore.
Secretarial Audit Report 204 9(2) of MR Rules

 

 Shall annex with its Board’s report  a secretarial audit report, given by a company secretary in practice
  • Every public company having a paid-up share capital of Rs. 50 crore or more; or
  • Every public company having a turnover of Rs. 250 crore or more; or
  • Every company having outstanding loans or borrowings from banks or public financial institutions of Rs. 100 crore or more.
2.       Provisions applicable only to a listed public company
Report on Annual General meeting 121 31 of MGT Rules

 

 Report on AGM to be filed with the Registrar in eForm MGT-15. –
Independent  Director 149

(4)

 4 of DIR Rules

 

 Atleast 1/3rd of total number of Board members shall be independent directors.
  • Public Companies having paid up share capital of Rs. 10 crore or more; or
  • Public Companies having turnover of Rs. 100 crore or more; or
  • Public Companies which have, in aggregate, outstanding loans, debentures and deposits, exceeding Rs. 50 crore
Constitution of certain committees 177 & 178 6  of MBP Rules

 

 Constitution of Audit Committee and Nomination and Remuneration Committee.
  • Public Companies having paid up share capital of Rs. 10 crore or more; or
  • Public Companies having turnover of Rs. 100 crore or more; or
  • Public Companies which have, in aggregate, outstanding loans, debentures and deposits, exceeding Rs. 50 crore

 

With the present amendment, the class of companies provided above will not be required to ensure aforesaid compliances unless it meets other criteria/ thresholds prescribed for respective compliance.

As evident from the table above, a public company will hardly have any exemptions if it meets any of the thresholds specified. While the intent of exempting class of companies is benign, it will be of some benefit to public companies only if the other thresholds are also revised. While, the holy wish is for ease of doing business, static thresholds prescribed in 2013 needs to be revisited to assess the adequacy and the intent to regulate such class of companies. For e.g. public companies having paid up capital of 10 crore or borrowing of Rs. 50 crore is a very common phenomena.

Additionally, in case the sectoral regulator prescribes composition of committee or induction of independent directors or other corporate governance requirement, those will override the exemptions.

Applicability of DRR and DRF[6]

Section 71(4) read with Rule 18(1)(c) of the Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014 (SHA Rules) requires every company issuing debentures to create a Debenture Redemption Reserve (DRR) of 10% (as the case maybe) of outstanding value of debentures for the purpose of redemption of such debentures.

Some class of companies as prescribed, has to either deposit, before April 30th each year, in a scheduled bank account, a sum of at least 15% of the amount of its debentures maturing during the year ending on 31st March of next year or invest in one or more securities enlisted in Rule 18(1)(c) of SHA (DRF).

Pursuant to the present amendment, it is important to ascertain applicability of creation of DRR and DRF in terms of CA, 2013. The exemption in relation to DRR and DRF was applicable to listed companies in case of private placement. While NBFCs continue to enjoy exemption even in case of unlisted companies, pursuant to the present amendment Non-NBFCs listing NCDS will not be eligible to avail the benefit of the said exemption and will be required to maintain DRR and DRF.

The intent of MCA at the time of amending Rule 18 of Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014 was to extend the exemption to all listed companies i.e. companies having securities listed on stock exchange, in case of privately placed debentures, from maintenance of DRR and DRF.

The intent behind amending the definition of ‘listed company’ under 2 (52) was to reduce the compliance burden of debt listed entities that were regarded as listed entities merely by virtue of listing the privately placed debentures.

The amendment to the definition of ‘listed company’ was subsequent and the same has resulted in an anomaly as corresponding amendment has not been carried out in Rule 18 of SHA Rules. The intent behind mandating DRR and DRF requirement, in case of private placement, was for unlisted companies with unlisted debt and not for unlisted companies with listed debt.

This is surely a matter of representation to be made to MCA as the gap seems inadvertent and not intentional.

Applicability of Rule 9A of PAS Rules

Section 29 of CA, 2013 read with Rule 9A of Companies (Prospectus and Allotment of Securities) Rules, 2014 (PAS Rules)[7] effective from October 2, 2018 mandates unlisted public companies to issue the securities only in dematerialised form and facilitate dematerialisation of all its existing securities. Physical transfer of securities is prohibited for unlisted public companies. Compliance with the said provisions are exempt only in case of a Nidhi, Government company and wholly owned subsidiary.

Pursuant to amendment in the definition of listed company, public companies that were originally exempted from the requirements by virtue of being a listed company, will now be required to comply with Section 29 and Rule 9A.

Status under Listing Regulations and SEBI ILDS

‘Listed entity’ as defined under Reg. 2 (p) of SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosures Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (Listing Regulations) means an entity which has listed, on a recognised stock exchange(s), the designated securities issued by it or designated securities issued under schemes managed by it, in accordance with the listing agreement entered into between the entity and the recognised stock exchange(s).

The present carve out under CA, 2013 will not result in any carve out for compliances under Listing Regulations as Listing Regulations anyways provides separate set of compliances equity listed companies (Chapter IV) and only NCDS/NCRPS listed companies ( Chapter V) and those with equity and debt listed (Chapter VI).

Further, SEBI Circulars issued from time to time under SEBI ILDS are addressed to all listed entities who have listed their debt securities or issuers who propose to list their debt securities.

Status under PIT Regulations

SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 (PIT Regulations) does not define the term ‘listed company’, however, applies to listed company and securities of an unlisted company proposed to be listed. The definition of ‘proposed to be listed’ is as hereunder:

“proposed to be listed” shall include securities of an unlisted company:

(i) if such unlisted company has filed offer documents or other documents, as the case may be, with the Board, stock exchange(s) or registrar of companies in connection with the listing; or

(ii) if such unlisted company is getting listed pursuant to any merger or amalgamation and has filed a copy of such scheme of merger or amalgamation under the Companies Act, 2013.”

The term ‘listed company’ is not being defined under PIT Regulations and therefore, the definition under CA, 2013 should be referred pursuant to Reg. 2 (2) of PIT Regulations[8].  In that case, PIT Regulations will apply only in case of securities issued by a listed company or a company that is proposed to become a ‘listed company’. Accordingly, only debt/ NCRPS listed companies need not comply with requirements of PIT Regulations. SEBI should consider furnishing a clarification in this regard.

However, that is not the intent of law. If a security is listed, its price is subject to change and be impacted by price sensitive information. Accordingly, such exclusively debt/ NCRPS listed companies, on account of private placement of securities, should continue to comply with the requirements of PIT Regulations. SEBI may also consider furnishing a clarification in this regard.

Conclusion

While, the present amendment expands the originally envisaged carve out for private companies to public companies as well, given the other static thresholds prescribed under CA, 2013 public companies have little reason to rejoice. Exemption to comply with PIT Regulations may be a huge relief, however, there is a need for SEBI to clarify the position given the intent of law.

Further, it is very crucial that MCA revisits DRR and DRF related provision for privately placed NCDS and consider to relax the same especially for the benefit of Non-NBFCs. Lastly, suitability of the exemption in case of companies exclusively listed in foreign jurisdiction will be required to be evaluated after a certain lapse of time as the provisions have been recently inserted in CA, 2013.

 

Our other videos and write-ups may be accessed below:

YouTube:

https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCgzB-ZviIMcuA_1uv6jATbg

Other write-up relating to corporate laws:

https://vinodkothari.com/category/corporate-laws/

Our  our Book on Law and Practice Relating to Corporate Bonds and Debentures, authored by Ms. Vinita Nair Dedhia, Senior Partner and Mr. Abhirup Ghosh, Partner can be ordered though the below link:

https://www.taxmann.com/bookstore/product/6330-law-and-practice-relating-to-debentures-and-corporate-bonds

 

[1] https://www.bseindia.com/markets/debt/debt_instruments.aspx?curpage=4&select_alp=all&select_ord=1

[2] Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India, ‘Report of the Companies Law Committee’

(November 2019) para 2.

[3] Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India, ‘Report of the Companies Law Committee’

(February 2016) para 1.13.

[4] http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/CommencementNotification_23012021.pdf

[5] http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2021/225287.pdf

[6] Refer our write up ‘Easing of DRF’ and ‘Provisions relating to DVR & DRR- stands amended’ by CS Smriti Wadehra.

[7] Discussed in our write up ‘Physical to Demat: A move from opacity to transparency’.

[8] Words and expressions used and not defined in these regulations but defined in the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (15 of 1992), the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (42 of 1956), the Depositories Act, 1996 (22 of 1996) or the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013) and rules and regulations made thereunder shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in those legislation.

LLPs slated for more stringent reforms

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Significant provisions of the Act made applicable on LLPs

Payal Agarwal| Senior Executive| Vinod Kothari and Company

Last updated – 27th June, 2022

Introduction                          

Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs) being a hybrid form of entity with characteristics of both companies as well as partnerships are governed by the provisions of Limited Liability Partnership Act 2008 (“LLP Act”).  LLPs are popular since due to less compliance requirements as compared with a company.

In view of the existing framework for LLPs, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) had published a news material on its website on 18th February 2021 stating that certain provisions of the Companies Act 2013 (“the Act”) will be soon made applicable on the LLPs. The same has been made effective vide a notification dated 11th February 2022 (“Amendment Notification”). The notification specifies certain sections of the Companies Act, 2013 which shall also be applicable on LLPs. These include some very significant provisions like identification of Significant Beneficial Ownership (SBO), application of the criteria for disqualification, capping on the max number of partners/ DPs, etc.

The provisions are applicable immediately from the date of the notification itself, and will require the LLPs to review their existent position to conform that they remain compliant of the provisions newly made applicable on the same.

Intent behind the amendments

LLPs are seen to be entities having less regulatory supervisions and more benefits of the corporate forms of entities. Therefore, conversion of companies into LLPs can be sought as a means of regulatory arbitrage. However, it has to be noted that the regulatory authorities are now set to bring LLPs under the ambit of some stricter supervision. The Company Law Committee Report on Decriminalization of LLP Act also indicated that the attention of the regulatory authorities are now shifted towards the LLPs. Our write up on the same can be read here. In India, mostly the professional service providers such as law firms, practising professionals etc. are formed as LLPs. Also, the AIFs are mostly formed as LLPs. In the aforesaid report too, fund raising by way of issue of Non-Convertible Debentures (NCDs) by the LLPs were barred except for the entities regulated by SEBI or RBI. So, the intent of the Government seems to monitor the activities of LLPs.

Discussion on the changes

The specified provisions of the Act have mostly been made applicable to the LLPs, as it is under the Act, with substitution of the terms “member” with “partner”, “director” with “Designated Partner” and “company” with “LLP”, save as otherwise expressly provided below. The tabular presentation below discusses the requirements of the provisions which have been made applicable on the LLPs along with our analysis on each of them.

Sec No.Deals withRequirements of the Act made applicable to LLPsImpact analysis and immediate actionable
90 except sub-section (12)Significant Beneficial Ownership (SBO)-Declaration of beneficial interest by SBO( 25% or more interest or as specified in the Rules)  
-Company shall maintain register of SBO  
-Inspection of such register by members   Co. shall file return of SBO with ROC  
-Co. shall take necessary steps for identification of SBO  
-Notice by co. to persons who are likely to be/have knowledge of/ were SBO and not registered.  
-Info to be given by concerned person within 30 days of notice  
-Co. shall apply to Tribunal within 15 days if info not provided by the concerned person  
-Tribunal may restricts rights on such shares relating to concerned persons after reasonable opportunity of hearing.  
-Aggrieved person may apply for lifting/ relaxation of such orders   Punishment on contravention  		While this provisions have been made applicable on LLPs, there could be various points to discuss so that the impact can be analysed. Some of these include:  
-The Act intends to identify a natural person controlling or exercising beneficial interest on the company. Under an LLP, the ownership and management need not be different as in the case of companies. LLPs can have partners of various categories like Limited Partner (one who only contributes capital) and General Partner (one who manages the LLP). As we understand, the intent behind introducing the SBO identification for LLPs should be similar to that for companies, i.e. to understand the beneficial owner. The Amendment Notification does not differentiate between the various categories of Partners and include both for the purpose of determination of SBO.  
-From here, we move to the next point for discussion, i.e. the meaning of beneficial interest. Section 89 of the Act defines beneficial ownership. Again, it has to be seen that the word “Significant” is defined under Section 90(1) to mean an interest of 25% or more or such other proportion as prescribed in the Rules. Currently, the same has been prescribed at 10%.   Following the Amendment Notification, the LLP Amendment Rules have also been prescribed, however, no similar thresholds have been provided with respect to SBO as given under the Companies Rules.    
-Further, sub-section (12) has not been made applicable on account of the fact that it relates to punishment under Section 447 of the Act.  
-The amendments will broadly require the LLPs to – Identify the SBO Take declarations from SBO Maintain register of SBO  
164(1) and (2)Disqualification of DirectorsCannot be a Director if –
-Declared unsound mind
-Undischarged insolvent
-Applied to be adjudicated as insolvent
-Convicted and sentenced imprisonment of 6 months or more and 5 years has not elapsed yet from release ( If sentenced for 7 years or more, permanently disqualified)
-Disqualified by an order of Court or Tribunal
-Not paid calls in respect of shares held by him for atleast 6 months from last day fixed for payment of call
-Convicted of offence dealing with RPT u/s 188 during last 5 years
-Not complied with Section 152(3)
-Not complied with Section 165(1)   —

Cannot be appointed in any other co./ re-appointed in that co. for 5 years from the date of failure if is/has been a Director of a co. which has  
-Not filed financial statements/annual returns for 3 consecutive FYs.
-Failed to repay deposits/debentures/pay interest thereon/ dividend declared for 1 year or more		-The grounds of disqualification of Directors under the Act has been made applicable to the Designated Partners of LLPs as well.
-The various grounds for disqualification are linked with certain personal defaults and filing defaults.   An interesting observation with respect to the Amendment is that, for the purposes of sub-section (2), a person being the “director” in a defaulting “company” is also disqualified to act as a Designated Partner in LLP, however, no similar amendments have been made in the Act to make the DPs of a defaulting LLP disqualified from acting as a director in a company.
-The provisions being applicable immediately, there is a need to review the existing DPs in light of the disqualification factors so as to ensure that none of the DPs are disqualified from holding office as such.    
165 except sub-section (2)Number of DirectorshipsMax no. of directorships- 20
-Of which public cos. – max 10
-Dormant co. not included

Person holding directorships above specified limit shall within 1 year of commencement of Act-
-Choose to continue in companies within specified limit
-Resign from other companies
-Intimate his choice to the companies and the ROC

-Resignation under (3)(b) will become effective immediately from despatch of notice to the co.
-No person can hold excess directorship –

Once he resigns from the extra companies or
Expiry of 1 year from commencement, whichever is earlier

-Penalty in case of violation        		-By making this section applicable on LLPs, an upper cap has been put on the maximum number of LLPs in which a person can hold the position as a DP.    
-The DPs have been provided with a timeline of one year within which any person holding office as a DP in more than 20 LLPs is required to choose the ones where he intends to continue and resign from the other LLPs. He is also required to provide an intimation to that effect to the LLPs as well as the Registrar having jurisdiction over such LLPs.  
-In case of violation, the DPs may be liable to fine ranging from Rs. 5,000 upto Rs. 25,000.
167 except sub-section  (4)Vacation of office by DirectorOffice of Director becomes vacant when
-Incurs disqualifications under Section 164
-Contravention of Section 188Fails to disclose interest u/s 184
-Disqualified by an order of Court/Tribunal
-Convicted and sentenced for imprisonment of 6 months or more
-Removed in pursuance of this Act
-Punishment on violation  
-Where all Directors vacate, the promoter ( CG in his absence) shall appoint required number of Directors till appointment of Directors in GM  		On account of disqualification incurred, the DPs will be required to vacant their positions. Where all the DPs vacate office in pursuance of section 164, the partners, or, in their absence, the Central Government shall appoint DPs to meet the minimum requirements of law.    
206(5)InspectionThe Central Government may, if it is satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, direct inspection of books and papers of a company by an inspector appointed by it for the purpose.Powers of inspection into the affairs of LLP has been given to Central Government by way of inclusion of these provisions under the LLP Act.   It is to be noted that powers of investigation already lies with the Central Government under Chapter IX of the LLP Act.
207(3)Conduct of Inspection and InquiryNotwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract to the contrary, the Registrar or inspector making an inspection or inquiry shall have all the powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, while trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely:— (a) the discovery and production of books of account and other documents, at such place and time as may be specified by such Registrar or inspector making the inspection or inquiry; (b) summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons and examining them on oath; and (c) inspection of any books, registers and other documents of the company at any place.Necessary powers with respect to the conduct of inspection and inquiry has been vested upon the concerned officer by way of these provisions.
252Appeal to Tribunal against strike-off-Agg person against order of ROC dissolving a company, may appeal to Tribunal within 3 years to get the name restored
-ROC may also file app. for restoration if satisfied that name struck off on incorrect particulars
-Tribunal’s order filed with ROC within 30 days to restore name
-Company, its member, creditor, or workman, if aggrieved, can apply to Tribunal within 20 years of striking off order.		The striking off of LLPs are governed by Section 75 of the LLP Act read with Rule 37 of the LLP Rules.   The inclusion of the given provision will provide a way for restoration of LLPs whose names were struck off.   The time period of 20 years for an application for restoration of name has been reduced to 5 years in case of LLPs.  
439Non-cognizable offences-Notwithstanding CrPC, every offence under this Act shall be deemed to be non-cognizable
-No court shall take cognizance unless complaint made by ROC, a shareholder or member of company, or person authorised by CG
-Personal appearance of ROC, or person auth. by CG not necessary unless Court requires the same
-The provisions of (2) shall not apply on actions taken by liquidator on any offence during winding up.		Section 212(6) of the Act provides that only those offences that are covered under Section 447 of the Act are cognizable.   Section 447 of the Act dealing with fraud is not recognised under the LLP Act.   This renders a non-cognizable nature to the offences of the LLP.   No court will be able to take cognizance of any offence by an LLP or its partners/DPs unless complaint is made by some specified persons, such as Registrar, or any person authorised by Central Government.   This may be said to be in furtherance of the Report on Decriminalization of offences of LLPs.    

Conclusion

The provisions of the Act that have been incorporated under the LLP Act is likely to cause a wide-spread effect The provisions of the Act have been made applicable immediately, without providing any preparatory time to the LLPs. The amendments result into an increased level of supervision and control on the working and management of the LLPs. The integration of various provisions of the Act with the LLPs indicate an era of LLPs becoming similar with companies.

Our related resources on the topic:

  1. MCA paves way for e-adjudication of penalties, extends C-PACE for LLPs strike off

Extending provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 to Limited Liability Partnerships

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Vinod Kothari and Company

corplaw@vinodkothari.com

As per MCA news and updates certain provisions of Companies Act, 2013 (“CA, 2013”) will now be extended to Limited Liability Partnerships (“LLPs”). Below is a snippet covering  list of provisions of CA, 2013 extended to LLPs.

RBI consolidates directions for Housing Finance Companies

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– Qasim Saif (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

 

Finance Minister in her speech for the budget 2019-20[1] stated that “Efficient and conducive regulation of the housing sector is extremely important in our context. The National Housing Bank (NHB), besides being the refinancer and lender, is also regulator of the housing finance sector. This gives a somewhat conflicting and difficult mandate to NHB. I am proposing to return the regulation authority over the housing finance sector from NHB to RBI. Necessary proposals have been placed in the Finance Bill.” Subsequently, the provisions of National Housing Bank Act, 1987 were amended w.e.f August 09, 2019[2] pursuant to the Finance Act, 2019 thereby shifting the power to govern Housing finance Companies (HFCs) from National Housing Bank (NHB) to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). Consequently, the RBI on June 17, 2020[3], issued a draft for review of extant regulatory framework for HFCs, and had invited comments from the industry on the same. After considering the inputs received from the industry, the RBI, on October 22, 2020[4] issued the Regulatory Framework for HFCs (‘Regulations’).

Our write-up covering the changes made by Regulations issued on October 22, 2020 and its analysis can be accessed here

After the Regulations were notified, the regulatory framework for HFCs became patchy as requirements came in from different sources and the need for a single point reference was felt.

To deal with the said issue, RBI has now issued the Master Directions – Non-Banking Financial Company – Housing Finance Company (Reserve Bank) Directions, 2021 on February 17, 2021[5] (“Directions”). The Directions broadly accumulate the regulatory requirements, from the Regulations notified on October 22, 2020, erstwhile Master Circular for Housing Finance Companies (NHB) Directions, 2010 and other applicable circulars[6]. The Directions neither impose any new requirements nor amend any existing regulation, but merely aggregate them.

Overview of the Direction

In order to get a comprehensive understanding of the Directions we have summarised the major requirements and also provided the original regulations from where the requirement arises.

Para Regulation in Master Direction Reference Circular
3 Following guidelines made applicable to HFC-

➔    Guidelines on Liquidity Risk Management Framework

➔    Guidelines on Maintenance of Liquidity Coverage Ratio

➔    Guidelines on Securitization Transactions and reset of Credit Enhancement

➔    Managing Risks and Code of Conduct in Outsourcing of Financial Services

➔    Implementation of Indian Accounting Standards

➔    Master Direction – Know Your Customer (KYC) Direction, 2016,

➔    Master Direction – Monitoring of Frauds in NBFCs (Reserve Bank) Directions, 2016,

➔    Master Direction – Information Technology Framework for the NBFC Sector dated June 08, 2017,

 October 22, 2020 Regulations
3 LTV for Loan Against Shares and Gold Jewellry capped at 50% and 75% respectively
4 “Housing finance company” shall mean a company that fulfils the following conditions:

a. It is an NBFC whose financial assets, in the business of providing finance for housing, constitute at least 60% of its total assets (netted off by intangible assets)

b. Out of the total assets (netted off by intangible assets), not less than 50% should be by way of housing finance for individuals.
  Existing HFCs to comply the limits in phased manner till 2023
5 NOF Requirement to be increased to Rs. 20 Cr

Existing HFCs to achieve NOF of

➔    Rs. 15 Cr by 31.4.2022 and

➔    Rs. 20 Cr by 31.4.2023

HFC unable to fulfil the NOF requirement may convert to NBFC-ICC
6 HFCs shall, CRAR consisting of Tier-I and Tier-II capital which shall not be less than-

➔    13% on or before 31.4.2020;

➔    14% on or before 31.4.2020; and

➔    15% on or before 31.4.2020 and thereafter

The Tier-I capital, at any point of time, shall not be less than 10%

 NHB Notification dated 17th June 2019[7]

 
7-17 Asset Classification, Provisioning and Accounting requirements As per the existing NHB Guidelines
19 LTV for grant of housing loans to individuals shall be capped at:

➔     < 30 lakhs                             90%,

➔     > 30 lakhs and < 75 lakhs    80%

➔     > 75 lakhs                             75%.
20 Norms for credit/investment concentration
21 Exposure of HFCs to group companies engaged in real estate business October 22, 2020 Regulations
22 Investment in real estate by HFC capped at 20% of capital funds
23 Limits on housing finance companies’ exposure to capital market
Chapter VII Acceptance of Public Deposits As per the existing NHB Guidelines
Chapter VIII Prior approval for change in control and directorship
Chapter IX Corporate Governance Norms
Section IV Miscellaneous Instructions
Chapter XIII Fair Practice Code

Pursuant to the consolidation as above, the corresponding extant NHB Guidelines as well as the October, 22 Regulations have been repealed.

 

[1] Speech Budget 2019-2020

[2] Transfer of Regulation of Housing Finance Companies (HFCs) to Reserve Bank of India

[3] Review of extant regulatory framework for Housing Finance companies (HFCs) – Proposed Changes

[4] Review of regulatory framework for Housing Finance Companies (HFCs)

[5] Master Direction – Non-Banking Financial Company – Housing Finance Company (Reserve Bank) Directions, 2021

[6] Master Circular – The Housing Finance Companies (NHB) Directions, 2010

[7] NHB Notification dated June 17, 2019

 

Our Other Related Write-ups can be viewed here-

RBI all set to regulate the HFCs

HFC Regulations Harmonised with NBFC Regime

Comparison between the proposed and existing regulatory framework for HFCs