RBI directs NBFCs to limit fresh investments from FATF non-compliant jurisdictions to 20% of voting rights

Our article as published in moneylife can be accessed through the link below:

https://www.moneylife.in/article/nbfcs-asked-to-limit-fresh-investments-to-20-percentage-of-voting-rights-from-fatf-non-compliant-jurisdictions/62964.html

Presentation on scalar regulatory framework for the NBFC sector

The video of “Round table discussion on RBI’s proposed regulatory framework for NBFCs” can be viewed here 

Our write-up on the topic titled “Scalar regulatory framework for the NBFC sector” can be viewed here

Investment window for FPIs widened

Permitting FPIs to invest in defaulted debt securities

 

-Aanchal Kaur Nagpal (aanchal@vinodkothari.com)

 

While the Indian equity market has consistently shown a rigorous growth, the bond market in India has mostly been relatively lagging behind. The size and performance of the Indian bond market has been quite inappreciable as compared to the developed economies in the world. The COVID-19 pandemic further caused a turmoil in the market. Among the investor class, Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPI) are a major participant in the debt market contributing to approximately 10% of the total debt investment.

Source: CRISIL Yearbook on Indian Debt Market, 2018

Further, as depicted below, the investments by FPIs in debt market has not been a consistent or a straight line and has seen more downward trend than upward.

Source: NSDL

As on February 5, 2021, foreign investment in corporate bonds has only reached 25% of the total available limit[1]. Further, the proportion of FPI investment as a part of the total foreign investment in India, is constrained by various investment limits and regulatory requirements.

FPIs are allowed to invest in eligible government securities and eligible corporate bonds. In case of corporate bonds, the following restrictions are imposed –

  • Restriction on short term investment in corporate bonds

FPIs are not permitted to make short term investments of more than 20% of their total investment in corporate bonds. The above cap was increased from 20% to 30% of the total investment of the FPI providing more flexibility to FPIs in making investment decisions.

  • Issue limit

Investment by any FPI, including related FPIs, cannot exceed 50% of any issue of a corporate bond. In case an FPI, including related FPIs breaches the same and invests in more than 50% of any single issue, it cannot make further investments in that issue until the condition is met.

  • Minimum residual maturity

FPIs can only invest in corporate bonds with a minimum residual maturity of 1 years, subject to the condition that short-term investments limit in corporate bonds.

Exempted Securities –

However, there are certain securities that are exempt from the above restrictions –

  • Debt instruments issued by ARCs; and
  • Debt instruments issued by an entity under the CIRP as per the resolution plan approved by the NCLT under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

The aforesaid exemption was introduced with the intent to further widen the scope of investment by FPIs. It not only allowed FPIs to make short term investments in the above debt instruments without any limit but also bring in more options for FPIs to invest without having to consider the single/group investor-wise limits

FPIs are allowed to invest in security receipts issued by ARCs to address the NPA issue of financial institutions. Further, debt instruments issued by a corporate debtor under CIRP have also been made eligible for FPI investment. This was done with the intent to revive corporate debtors under a resolution plan. Thus, RBI has allowed FPIs to invest in such securities that are in dire need of investment, while granting various exemptions to make them more attractive.

Power of RBI to permit debt instruments or securities for FPI investment

As per SEBI (Foreign Portfolio Investors) Regulations, 2019, amongst other eligible debt instruments, FPIs are allowed to invest in any debt securities or other instruments as permitted by RBI [Regulation 20(1) (g)].

Thus, RBI has the power to prescribe eligible debt securities for FPI investment.

Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPIs) Investment in Defaulted Bonds

As discussed, investment by FPIs in debt instruments issued by ARCs or an entity under the CIRP, are exempted from the short-term limit and minimum residual maturity requirement. In order to further promote investment by FPIs in corporate bonds, RBI, in its Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies dated 5th February, 2021[2], has proposed to extend similar exemptions to defaulted corporate bonds. Accordingly, FPI investment in defaulted corporate bonds are proposed to be exempted from the short-term limit and the minimum residual maturity requirement. For this purpose, detailed guidelines will be issued separately by RBI.

Defaulted debt securities refer to ‘non-payment of interest or principal amount in full on the pre-agreed date and shall be recognized at the first instance of delay in servicing of any interest or principal on such debt.

At present, FPIs are permitted to invest in defaulted debt securities only against repayment of amortising bonds. Now, RBI is intending to permit FPIs to invest in defaulted corporate bonds as fresh issues as well and in all other cases as well.

Existing provision on FPI investment in corporate bonds under default –

Investments by FPIs in corporate bonds under default [Para 15 of Operating Guidelines for FPIs[3]]

  1. FPIs are permitted to acquire NCDs/bonds, which are under default, either fully or partly, in the repayment of principal on maturity or principal instalment in the case of an amortising bond.
  2. FPIs will be guided by RBI’s definition of an amortising bond in this regard.
  • The revised maturity period for such NCDs/bonds restructured based on negotiations with the issuing Indian company, should be as per the norms prescribed by RBI from time to time, for FPI investments in Corporate Debt.
  1. The FPIs shall disclose to the Debenture Trustees, the terms of their offer to the existing debenture holders/beneficial owners of such NCDs/bonds under default, from whom they propose to acquire.
  2. All investments by FPIs in such bonds shall be reckoned against the prevalent corporate debt limit. All other terms and conditions pertaining to FPI investments in corporate debt securities shall continue to apply.

SEBI also issued an operational framework[4] for transactions in defaulted debt securities post redemption date along with obligations of Issuers, Debenture Trustees, Depositories and Stock Exchanges while permitting such transaction

However, the motive for FPIs for investing in such defaulted corporate bonds is still to be understood. Since defaulted debt securities refer to securities even with one-time defaults, corporate bonds with favourable future prospects or where the security against such bonds is sufficient and promising, may attract FPI investments. RBI’s intent behind this move is to deepen the financial market, bring better liquidity in defaulted debt securities and also provide an additional investment opportunity to FPIs. The detailed guidelines are awaited to be issued by RBI.

 

[1] Source: NSDL- https://www.fpi.nsdl.co.in/web/Reports/ReportDetail.aspx?RepID=1

[2] https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=51078

[3]https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/commondocs/nov-2019/Operational%20Guidelines%20for%20FPIs,%20DDPs%20and%20EFIs%20revised_p.pdf

[4]https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/jun-2020/operational-framework-for-transactions-in-defaulted-debt-securities-post-maturity-date-redemption-date-under-provisions-of-sebi-issue-and-listing-of-debt-securities-regulations-2008_46912.html

Our articles on related topics-

RBI redefines the Grievance Redress Mechanism in Banks

To improve the efficacy and provide better customer service

– CS Burhanuddin Dohadwala | finserv@vinodkothari.com

What is Grievance Redress Mechanism (‘GRM’)

GRM means the receipt and processing of complaints from the customer and taking necessary actions to address the same. The GRM of any organization is the gauge to measure its efficiency and effectiveness and provides a picture on how the banks value its customer.

Background:

Banks are in service organization. Customer satisfaction and loyalty is prime focus of any bank. Customer complaints are the part and parcel of day to day functioning of banks in India. To address this Reserve Bank of India (‘RBI’) had taken various initiatives over the years for improving customer service and GRM in banks which are as follows:

  •          The Banking Ombudsman Scheme was introduced in 1995 to serve as an alternate GRM for customer complaints against banks;
  •       In 2019, RBI introduced the Complaint Management System (‘CMS’)[1], a fully automated process-flow based platform, available 24×7 for customers to lodge their complaints with the Banking Ombudsman (‘BO’);
  •          As a part of the disclosure initiative, banks were advised to disclose in their annual reports, summary information regarding the complaints handled by them and certain disclosures were also being made in the annual report of the Ombudsman Schemes published by the RBI;
  •       Banks were mandated to appoint an Internal Ombudsman (‘IO’) to function as an independent and objective authority at the apex of their GRM;

It is evident from the increasing number of complaints received in the Offices of Banking Ombudsman (‘OBOs’)[2] as per Annexure-1, that greater attention by banks to this area is warranted. More focused attention to customer service and grievance redress was required to ensure satisfactory customer outcomes and greater customer confidence.

Hence, with a view to strengthen and improve the efficacy of the internal GRM of the banks and to provide better customer service RBI vide its press release dated December 04, 2020 w.r.t Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies[3] decided:

  •        To put in place a comprehensive framework comprising inter alia of enhanced disclosures on customer complaints by the banks;
  •       A monetary disincentive in the form of recovery of cost of redress of complaints from banks when maintainable complaints are comparatively high; and
  •          Undertaking intensive review of GRM and supervisory action against banks that fail to improve their redress mechanism in a time bound manner.

The aforesaid framework was introduced by RBI on January 27, 2021 vide its notification w.r.t Strengthening of GRM in Banks[4]. The same shall be effective from January 27, 2021 and applicable to all scheduled commercial banks (excluding regional rural banks).

 The write-up below shall discuss the framework introduced by RBI and actionables required at the end of the banks.

Framework for GRM:

RBI proposes to strengthen GRM in the following areas:

        I.         Enhanced disclosure on complaints:

Currently, banks were required to make disclosure regarding customer complaints and grievance redress in their annual report in terms of Para 16.4 w.r.t Analysis and Disclosure of complaints – Disclosure of complaints / unimplemented awards of Banking Ombudsmen along with Financial Results of the Master Circular on ‘Customer Service in Banks’ dated July 01, 2015[5] which are as follows:

A. Customer Complaints

(a) No. of complaints pending at the beginning of the year;

(b) No. of complaints received during the year;

(c) No. of complaints redressed during the year;

(d) No. of complaints pending at the end of the year;

B. Awards passed by the Banking Ombudsman

(a) No. of unimplemented Awards at the beginning of the year;

(b) No. of Awards passed by the Banking Ombudsmen during the year;

(c) No. of Awards implemented during the year;

(d) No. of unimplemented Awards at the end of the year.

The same is now replaced by the set of granular disclosures to be made by banks in their annual reports as per Annexure 2. These disclosures are intended to provide to the customers of banks and members of public greater insight into the volume and nature of complaints received by the banks from their customers and the complaints received by banks from the OBOs, as also the quality and turnaround time of redress. 

      II.         Recovery of cost of redress of complaints from banks

Presently, redress of complaints under BO Scheme, 2006[6] (‘BOS’) is cost-free for banks as well as their customers. With a view to ensure that banks discharge this responsibility effectively, the cost of redress of complaints will be recovered from those banks against whom the maintainable complaints[7] in the OBOs exceed their peer group average as provided below. However, grievance redressal under BOS for customers will continue to remain cost-free.

The cost-recovery framework for banks, peer groups based on the asset size of banks as on March 31 of the previous year will be identified, and peer group averages of maintainable complaints received in OBOs would be computed on the following three parameters: 

The cost of redressing complaints in excess of the peer group average will be recovered from the banks as follows:

·        Excess in any one parameter: 30% of the cost of redressing a complaint[8] (in the OBO) for the number of complaints in excess of the peer group average;

·        Excess in any two parameters: 60% of the cost of redressing a complaint for the number of complaints exceeding the peer group average in the parameter with the higher excess;

·       Excess in all the three parameters: 100% of the cost of redressing a complaint for the number of complaints exceeding the peer group average in the parameter with the highest excess.

   III.            Intensive Review of GRM

RBI will undertake, as a part of its supervisory mechanism, annual assessments of customer service and grievance redressal in banks based on the data and information available through the CMS, and other sources and interactions.

Banks who are identified as having persisting issues in grievance redress will be subjected to an intensive review of their GRM to better identify the underlying systemic issues and initiate corrective measures. The intensive review shall include but not limited to the following area:

  1.           Adequacy of the customer service and customer grievance redress related policies;
  2.              Functioning of the Customer Service Committee of the Board;
  3.         Level of involvement of the Top Management in customer service and customer grievance related issues;
  4.         Effectiveness of the GRM of banks.

Based on the review, a remedial action plan will be formulated and formally communicated to the banks for implementation within a specific time frame. In case no improvement is observed in the GRM within the prescribed timelines despite the measures undertaken, the banks will be subjected to corrective actions through appropriate regulatory and supervisory measures.

Actionable required at the end of the Banks:

To provide disclosure in the revised format on complaints received by the bank from customers and from the OBOs in the annual report from FY 20-21;

Conclusion:

RBI with a view to strengthen and protect the consumers has laid down the aforesaid framework. This will make banks more vigilant to avoid any levy of the cost and supervisory action by RBI.

Annexure A: Chart representing number of complaints received by OBOs

Annexure 2: Part A w.r.t Summary information on complaints received by the bank from customers and from the OBOs

Sr. No   Particulars Previous Year Current Year
  Complaints received by the bank from its customers    
1.           Number of complaints pending at beginning of the year;    
2.           Number of complaints received during the year;    
3.           Number of complaints disposed during the year;    
  3.1 Of which, number of complaints rejected by the bank; (Newly Inserted)    
4.           Number of complaints pending at the end of the year;    
  Maintainable complaints received by the bank from OBOs    
5.           Number of maintainable complaints received by the bank from OBOs; (Newly Inserted)    
  5.1 Of 5, number of complaints resolved in favour of the bank by BOs; (Newly Inserted)    
  5.2 Of 5, number of complaints resolved through conciliation/mediation/advisories issued by BOs; (Newly Inserted)    
  5.3 Of 5, number of complaints resolved after passing of Awards by BOs against the bank; (Newly Inserted)    
6.         Number of Awards unimplemented within the stipulated time (other than those appealed)    
Note: Maintainable complaints refer to complaints on the grounds specifically mentioned in BO Scheme 2006 and covered within the ambit of the Scheme.

Annexure 2: Part B w.r.t Top five grounds of complaints received by the bank from customers (Newly Inserted)

Grounds of complaints, (i.e. complaints relating to) Number of complaints pending at the beginning of the year Number of complaints received during the year % increase/ decrease in the number of complaints received over the previous year Number of complaints pending at the end of the year Of 5, number of complaints pending beyond 30 days
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Current Year
Ground-1
Ground-2
Ground-3
Ground-4
Ground-5
Others
Total
Previous Year
Ground-1
Ground-2
Ground-3
Ground-4
Ground-5
Others
Total
Note: The master list for identifying the grounds of complaints is as follows:

·         ATM/Debit Cards;

·         Credit Cards;

·         Internet/Mobile/Electronic Banking;

·         Account opening/difficulty in operation of accounts;

·         Mis-selling/Para-banking;

·         Recovery Agents/Direct Sales Agents;

·         Pension and facilities for senior citizens/differently abled;

·         Loans and advances;

·         Levy of charges without prior notice/excessive charges/foreclosure charges;

·         Cheques/drafts/bills;

·         Non-observance of Fair Practices Code;

·         Exchange of coins, issuance/acceptance of small denomination notes and coins;

·         Bank Guarantees/Letter of Credit and documentary credits;

·         Staff behavior;

·         Facilities for customers visiting the branch/adherence to prescribed working hours by the branch, etc.;

·         Others.


 

 

Our link to YouTube video and other articles can be accessed below:

1. YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCgzB-ZviIMcuA_1uv6jATbg;

2. Other articles w.r.t Financial Sector: http://vinodkothari.com/category/financial-services/

 


[2] As per RBI Annual Report of the Banking Ombudsman Scheme and Ombudsman Scheme for Non-Banking Financial Companies for the year 2018-19:

https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/AR201820190FB8B9072F984910A9FC7BA568B634D8.PDF

[7] Maintainable complaints refer to complaints on the grounds specifically mentioned in BOS 2006 and are covered 1301within the ambit of the Scheme.

[8] Average cost of handling a complaint at the OBOs during the year.

About time to unfreeze NPA classification and reporting

-Siddarth Goel (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

Introduction

The COVID pandemic last year was surely one such rare occurrence that brought unimaginable suffering to all sections of the economy. Various relief measures granted or actions taken by the respective governments, across the globe, may not be adequate compensation against the actual misery suffered by the people. One of the earliest relief that was granted by the Indian government in the financial sector, sensing the urgency and nature of the pandemic, was the moratorium scheme, followed by Emergency Credit Line Guarantee Scheme (ECLGS). Another crucial move was the allowance of restructuring of stressed accounts due to covid related stress. However, every relief provided is not always considered as a blessing and is at times also cursed for its side effects.

Amid the various schemes, one of the controversial matter at the helm of the issue was charging of interest on interest on the accounts which have availed payment deferment under the moratorium scheme. The Supreme Court (SC) in the writ petition No 825/2020 (Gajendra Sharma Vs Union of India & Anr) took up this issue. In this regard, we have also earlier argued that government is in the best position to bear the burden of interest on interest on the accounts granted moratorium under the scheme owing to systemic risk implications.[1] The burden of the same was taken over by the government under its Ex-gratia payment on interest over interest scheme.[2]

However, there were several other issues about the adequacy of actions taken by the government and the RBI, filed through several writ petitions by different stakeholders. One of the most common concern was the reporting of the loan accounts as NPA, in case of non-payment post the moratorium period. The borrowers sought an extended relief in terms of relaxation in reporting the NPA status to the credit bureaus. Looking at the commonality, the SC took the issues collectively under various writ petitions with the petition of Gajendra Sharma Vs Union of India & Anr. While dealing with the writ petitions, the SC granted stay on NPA classification in its order dated September 03, 2020[3]. The said order stated that:

In view of the above, the accounts which were not declared NPA till 31.08.2020 shall not be declared NPA till further orders.”

The intent of granting such a stay was to provide interim relief to the borrowers who have been adversely affected by the pandemic, by not classifying and reporting their accounts as NA and thereby impacting their credit score.

The legal ambiguity

The aforesaid order dated September 03, 2020, has also led to the creation of certain ambiguities amongst banks and NBFCs. One of them being that whether post disposal of WP No. 825/2020 Gajendra Sharma (Supra), the order dated September 03, 2020, should also nullify. While another ambiguity being that whether the stay is only for those accounts that have availed the benefit under moratorium scheme or does it apply to all borrowers.

It is pertinent to note that the SC was dealing with the entire batch of writ petitions while it passed the common order dated September 03, 2020. Hence, the ‘stay on NPA classification’ by the SC was a common order in response to all the writ petitions jointly taken up by the court. Thus, the stay order on NPA classification has to be interpreted broadly and cannot be restricted to only accounts of the petitioners or the accounts that have availed the benefit under the moratorium scheme. As per the order, the SC held that accounts that have not been declared/classified NPA till August 31, 2020, shall not be downgraded further until further orders. This relaxation should not just be restricted to accounts that have availed moratorium benefit and must be applied across the entire borrower segment.

The WP No. 825/2020 Gajendra Sharma (Supra) was disposed of by the SC in its judgment dated November 27, 2020[4], whereby in the petition, the petitioner had prayed for direction like mandamus; to declare moratorium scheme notification dated 27.03.2020 issued by Respondent No.2 (RBI) as ultra vires to the extent it charges interest on the loan amount during the moratorium period and to direct the Respondents (UOI and RBI) to provide relief in repayment of the loan by not charging interest during the moratorium period.

The aforesaid contentions were resolved to the satisfaction of the petitioner vide the Ex-gratia Scheme dated October 23, 2020. However, there has been no express lifting of the stay on NPA classification by the SC in its judgment. Hence, there arose a concern relating to the nullity of the order dated September 03, 2020.

The other writ petitions were listed for hearing on December 02, 2020, by the SC via another order dated November 27, 2020[5]. Since then the case has been heard on dates 02, 03, 08, 09, 14, 16, and 17 of December 2020. The arguments were concluded and the judgment has been reserved by the SC (Order dated Dec 17, 2020[6]).

As per the live media coverage of the hearing by Bar and Bench on the subject matter, at the SC hearing dated December 16, 2020[7], the advocate on behalf of the Indian Bank Association had argued that:

It is undeniable that because of number of times Supreme Court has heard the matter things have progressed. But how far can we go?

I submit this matter must now be closed. Your directions have been followed. People who have no hope of restructuring are benefitting from your ‘ don’t declare NPA’ order.

Therefore, from the foregoing discussion, it could be understood that the final judgment of the SC is still awaited for lifting the stay on NPA classification order dated September 03, 2020.

Interim Dilemma

While the judgment of the SC is awaited, and various issues under the pending writ petitions are yet to be dealt with by the SC in its judgment, it must be reckoned that banking is a sensitive business since it is linked to the wider economic system. The delay in NPA classification of accounts intermittently owing to the SC order would mean less capital provisioning for banks. It may be argued that mere stopping of asset classification downgrade, neither helps a stressed borrower in any manner nor does it helps in presenting the true picture of a bank’s balance sheet. There is a risk of greater future NPA rebound on bank’s balance sheets if the NPA classification is deferred any further. It must be ensured that the cure to be granted by the court while dealing with the respective set of petitions cannot be worse than the disease itself.

The only benefit to the borrower whose account is not classified NPA is the temporary relief from its rating downgrade, while on the contrary, this creates opacity on the actual condition of banking assets. Therefore, it is expected that the SC would do away with the freeze on NPA classification through its pending judgment. Further, it is always open for the government to provide any benefits to the desired sector of the economy either through its upcoming budget or under a separate scheme or arrangement.

THE VERDICT

[Updated on March 24, 2021]

The SC puts the final nail to almost a ten months long legal tussle that started with the plea on waiver of interest on interest charged by the lenders from the borrowers, during the moratorium period under COVID 19 relief package.  From the misfortunes suffered by the people at the hands of the pandemic to economic strangulation of people- the battle with the pandemic is still ongoing and challenging. Nevertheless, the court realised the economic limitation of any Government, even in a welfare state. The apex court of the country acknowledged in the judgment dated March 23, 2020[8], that the economic and fiscal regulatory measures are fields where judges should encroach upon very warily as judges are not experts in these matters. What is best for the economy, and in what manner and to what extent the financial reliefs/packages be formulated, offered and implemented is ultimately to be decided by the Government and RBI on the aid and advice of the experts.

Thus, in concluding part of the judgment while dismissing all the petitions, the court lifted the interim relief granted earlier- not to declare the accounts of respective borrowers as NPA. The last slice of relief in the judgement came for the large borrowers that had loans outstanding/sanctioned as on 29.02.2020 greater than Rs.2 crores. The court did not find any rationale in the two crore limit imposed by the Government for eligibility of borrowers, while granting relief of interest-on-interest (under ex-gratia scheme) to the borrowers.[9] Thus, the court directed that there shall not be any charge of interest on interest/penal interest for the period during moratorium for any borrower, irrespective of the quantum of loan. Since the NPA stay has been uplifted by the SC, NBFCs/banks shall accordingly start classification and reporting of the defaulted loan accounts as NPA, as per the applicable asset classification norms and guidelines.

Henceforth, the CIC reporting of the defaulted loan accounts (NPA) must also be done. Surely, the said directions of the court would be applicable only to the loan accounts that were eligible and have availed moratorium under the COVID 19 package. [10]

The lenders should give credit/adjustment in the next instalment of the loan account or in case the account has been closed, return any amount already recovered, to the concerned borrowers.

Given that the timelines for filing claims under the ex-gratia scheme have expired, it is expected that the Government would be releasing extended/updated operational guidelines in this regard for adjustment/ refund of the interest in interest charged by the lenders from the borrowers.

 

 

[1] http://vinodkothari.com/2020/09/moratorium-scheme-conundrum-of-interest-on-interest/

[2] http://vinodkothari.com/2020/10/interest-on-interest-burden-taken-over-by-the-government/#:~:text=Blog%20%2D%20Latest%20News-,Compound%20interest%20burden%20taken%20over%20by%20the%20Central%20Government%3A%20Lenders,pass%20on%20benefit%20to%20borrowers&text=Of%20course%2C%20the%20scheme%2C%20called,2020%20to%2031.8.

[3] https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2020/11127/11127_2020_34_16_23763_Order_03-Sep-2020.pdf

[4] https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2020/11127/11127_2020_34_1_24859_Judgement_27-Nov-2020.pdf

[5] https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2020/11127/11127_2020_34_1_24859_Order_27-Nov-2020.pdf

[6] https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2020/11162/11162_2020_37_40_25111_Order_17-Dec-2020.pdf

[7] https://www.barandbench.com/news/litigation/rbi-loan-moratorium-hearings-live-from-supreme-court-december-16

[8] https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2020/11162/11162_2020_35_1501_27212_Judgement_23-Mar-2021.pdf

[9] Compound interest burden taken over by the Central Government: Lenders required to pass on benefit to borrowers – Vinod Kothari Consultants

[10] Moratorium on loans due to Covid-19 disruption – Vinod Kothari Consultants; also see Moratorium 2.0 on term loans and working capital – Vinod Kothari Consultants

 

 

Law relating to collective investment schemes on shared ownership of real assets

-Vinod Kothari (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

The law relating to collective investment schemes has always been, and perhaps will remain, enigmatic, because these provisions were designed to ensure that enthusiastic operators do not source investors’ money with tall promises of profits or returns, and start running what is loosely referred to as Ponzi schemes of various shades. De facto collective investment schemes or schemes for raising money from investors may be run in elusive forms as well – as multi-level marketing schemes, schemes for shared ownership of property or resources, or in form of cancellable contracts for purchase of goods or services on a future date.

While regulations will always need to chase clever financial fraudsters, who are always a day ahead of the regulator, this article is focused on schemes of shared ownership of properties. Shared economy is the cult of the day; from houses to cars to other indivisible resources, the internet economy is making it possible for users to focus on experience and use rather than ownership and pride of possession. Our colleagues have written on the schemes for shared property ownership[1]. Our colleagues have also written about the law of collective investment schemes in relation to real estate financing[2]. Also, this author, along with a colleague, has written how the confusion among regulators continues to put investors in such schemes to prejudice and allows operators to make a fast buck[3].

This article focuses on the shared property devices and the sweep of the law relating to collective investment schemes in relation thereto.

Basis of the law relating to collective investment schemes

The legislative basis for collective investment scheme regulations is sec. 11AA (2) of the SEBI Act. The said section provides:

Any scheme or arrangement made or offered by any company under which,

  • the contributions, or payments made by the investors, by whatever name called, are pooled and utilized solely for the purposes of the scheme or arrangement;
  • the contributions or payments are made to such scheme or arrangement by the investors with a view to receive profits, income, produce or property, whether movable or immovable from such scheme or arrangement;
  • the property, contribution or investment forming part of scheme or arrangement, whether identifiable or not, is managed on behalf of the investors;
  • the investors do not have day to day control over the management and operation of the scheme or arrangement.

The major features of a CIS may be visible from the definition. These are:

  1. A schematic for the operator to collect investors’ money: There must be a scheme or an arrangement. A scheme implies a well-structured arrangement whereby money is collected under the scheme. Usually, every such scheme provides for the entry as well as exit, and the scheme typically offers some rate of return or profit. Whether the profit is guaranteed or not, does not matter, at least looking at the definition. Since there is a scheme, there must be some operator of the scheme, and there must be some persons who put in their money into the scheme. These are called “investors”.
  2. Pooling of contributions: The next important part of a CIS is the pooling of contributions. Pooling implies the contributions losing their individuality and becoming part of a single fungible hotchpot. If each investor’s money, and the investments therefrom, are identifiable and severable, there is no pooling. The whole stance of CIS is collective investment. If the investment is severable, then the scheme is no more a collective scheme.
  3. Intent of receiving profits, produce, income or property: The intent of the investors contributing money is to receive results of the collective investment. The results may be in form of profits, produce, income or property. The usual feature of CIS is the operator tempting investors with guaranteed rate of return; however, that is not an essential feature of CISs.
  4. Separation of management and investment: The management of the money is in the hands of a person, say, investment manager. If the investors manage their own investments, there is no question of a CIS. Typically, investor is someone who becomes a passive investor and does not have first level control (see next bullet). It does not matter whether the so-called manager is an investor himself, or may be the operator of the scheme as well. However, the essential feature is there being multiple “investors”, and one or some “manager”.
  5. Investors not having regular control over the investments: As discussed above, the hiving off of the ownership and management of funds is the very genesis of the regulatory concern in a CIS, and therefore, that is a key feature.

The definition may be compared with section 235 of the UK Financial Services and Markets Act, which provides as follows:

  • In this Part “collective investment scheme” means any arrangements with respect to property of any description, including money, the purpose or effect of which is to enable persons taking part in the arrangements (whether by becoming owners of the property or any part of it or otherwise) to participate in or receive profits or income arising from the acquisition, holding, management or disposal of the property or sums paid out of such profits or income.
  • The arrangements must be such that the persons who are to participate (“participants”) do not have day-to-day control over the management of the property, whether or not they have the right to be consulted or to give directions.
  • The arrangements must also have either or both of the following characteristics—
  • the contributions of the participants and the profits or income out of which payments are to be made to them are pooled;
  • the property is managed as a whole by or on behalf of the operator of the scheme.
    • If arrangements provide for such pooling as is mentioned in subsection (3)(a) in relation to separate parts of the property, the arrangements are not to be regarded as constituting a single collective investment scheme unless the participants are entitled to exchange rights in one part for rights in another.

It is conspicuous that all the features of the definition in the Indian law are present in the UK law as well.

Hong Kong Securities and Futures Ordinance [Schedule 1] defines a collective investment scheme as follows:

collective investment scheme means—

  • arrangements in respect of any property—
  • under which the participating persons do not have day-to-day control over the management of the property, whether or not they have the right to be consulted or to give directions in respect of such management;
  • under which—
  • the property is managed as a whole by or on behalf of the person operating the arrangements;
  • the contributions of the participating persons and the profits or income from which payments are made to them are pooled; or
  • the property is managed as a whole by or on behalf of the person operating the arrangements, and the contributions of the participating persons and the profits or income from which payments are made to them are pooled; and
  • the purpose or effect, or pretended purpose or effect, of which is to enable the participating persons, whether by acquiring any right, interest, title or benefit in the property or any part of the property or otherwise, to participate in or receive—
  • profits, income or other returns represented to arise or to be likely to arise from the acquisition, holding, management or disposal of the property or any part of the property, or sums represented to be paid or to be likely to be paid out of any such profits, income or other returns; or
  • a payment or other returns arising from the acquisition, holding or disposal of, the exercise of any right in, the redemption of, or the expiry of, any right, interest, title or benefit in the property or any part of the property; or
  • arrangements which are arrangements, or are of a class or description of arrangements, prescribed by notice under section 393 of this Ordinance as being regarded as collective investment schemes in accordance with the terms of the notice.

One may notice that this definition as well has substantially the same features as the definition in the UK law.

Judicial analysis of the definition

Part (iii) of the definition in Indian law refers to management of the contribution, property or investment on behalf of the investors, and part (iv) lays down that the investors do not have day to day control over the operation or management. The same features, in UK law, are stated in sec. 235 (2) and (3), emphasizing on the management of the contributions as a whole, on behalf of the investors, and investors not doing individual management of their own money or property. The question has been discussed in multiple UK rulings. In Financial Conduct Authority vs Capital Alternatives and others,  [2015] EWCA Civ 284, [2015] 2 BCLC 502[4], UK Court of Appeal, on the issue whether any extent of individual management by investors will take the scheme of the definition of CIS, held as follows:  “The phrase “the property is managed as a whole” uses words of ordinary language. I do not regard it as appropriate to attach to the words some form of exclusionary test based on whether the elements of individual management were “substantial” – an adjective of some elasticity. The critical question is whether a characteristic feature of the arrangements under the scheme is that the property to which those arrangements relate is managed as a whole. Whether that condition is satisfied requires an overall assessment and evaluation of the relevant facts. For that purpose it is necessary to identify (i) what is “the property”, and (ii) what is the management thereof which is directed towards achieving the contemplated income or profit. It is not necessary that there should be no individual management activity – only that the nature of the scheme is that, in essence, the property is managed as a whole, to which question the amount of individual management of the property will plainly be relevant”.

UK Supreme Court considered a common collective land-related venture, viz., land bank structure, in Asset Land Investment Plc vs Financial Conduct Authority, [2016] UKSC 17[5]. Once again, on the issue of whether the property is collective managed, or managed by respective investors, the following paras from UK Financial Conduct Authority were cited with approval:

The purpose of the ‘day-to-day control’ test is to try to draw an important distinction about the nature of the investment that each investor is making. If the substance is that each investor is investing in a property whose management will be under his control, the arrangements should not be regarded as a collective investment scheme. On the other hand, if the substance is that each investor is getting rights under a scheme that provides for someone else to manage the property, the arrangements would be regarded as a collective investment scheme.

Day-to-day control is not defined and so must be given its ordinary meaning. In our view, this means you have the power, from day-to-day, to decide how the property is managed. You can delegate actual management so long as you still have day-to-day control over it.[6]

The distancing of control over a real asset, even though owned by the investor, may put him in the position of a financial investor. This is a classic test used by US courts, in a test called Howey Test, coming from a 1946 ruling in SEC vs. Howey[7]. If an investment opportunity is open to many people, and if investors have little to no control or management of investment money or assets, then that investment is probably a security. If, on the other hand, an investment is made available only to a few close friends or associates, and if these investors have significant influence over how the investment is managed, then it is probably not a security.

The financial world and the real world

As is apparent, the definition in sec. 235 of the UK legislation has inspired the draft of the Indian law. It is intriguing to seek as to how the collective ownership or management of real properties has come within the sweep of the law. Evidently, CIS regulation is a part of regulation of financial services, whereas collective ownership or management of real assets is a part of the real world. There are myriad situations in real life where collective business pursuits,  or collective ownership or management of properties is done. A condominium is one of the commonest examples of shared residential space and services. People join together to own land, or build houses. In the good old traditional world, one would have expected people to come together based on some sort of “relationship” – families, friends, communities, joint venturers, or so on. In the interweb world, these relationships may be between people who are invisibly connected by technology. So the issue, why would a collective ownership or management of real assets be regarded as a financial instrument, to attract what is admittedly a  piece of financial law.

The origins of this lie in a 1984 Report[8] and a 1985 White Paper[9], by Prof LCB Gower, which eventually led to the enactment of the 1986 UK Financial Markets law. Gower has discussed the background as to why contracts for real assets may, in certain circumstances, be regarded as financial contracts. According to Gower, all forms of investment should be regulated “other than those in physical objects over which the investor will have exclusive control. That is to say, if there was investment in physical objects over which the investor had no exclusive control, it would be in the nature of an investment, and hence, ought to be regulated. However, the basis of regulating investment in real assets is the resemblance the same has with a financial instrument, as noted by UK Supreme Court in the Asset Land ruling: “..the draftsman resolved to deal with the regulation of collective investment schemes comprising physical assets as part of the broader system of statutory regulation governing unit trusts and open-ended investment companies, which they largely resembled.”

The wide sweep of the regulatory definition is obviously intended so as not to leave gaps open for hucksters to make the most. However, as the UK Supreme Court in Asset Land remarked: “The consequences of operating a collective investment scheme without authority are sufficiently grave to warrant a cautious approach to the construction of the extraordinarily vague concepts deployed in section 235.”

The intent of CIS regulation is to capture such real property ownership devices which are the functional equivalents of alternative investment funds or mutual funds. In essence, the scheme should be operating as a pooling of money, rather than pooling of physical assets. The following remarks in UK Asset Land ruling aptly capture the intent of CIS regulation: “The fundamental distinction which underlies the whole of section 235 is between (i) cases where the investor retains entire control of the property and simply employs the services of an investment professional (who may or may not be the person from whom he acquired it) to enhance value; and (ii) cases where he and other investors surrender control over their property to the operator of a scheme so that it can be either pooled or managed in common, in return for a share of the profits generated by the collective fund.”

Conclusion

While the intent and purport of CIS regulation world over is quite clear, but the provisions  have been described as “extraordinarily vague”. In the shared economy, there are numerous examples of ownership of property being given up for the right of enjoyment. As long as the intent is to enjoy the usufructs of a real property, there is evidently a pooling of resources, but the pooling is not to generate financial returns, but real returns. If the intent is not to create a functional equivalent of an investment fund, normally lure of a financial rate of return, the transaction should not be construed as a collective investment scheme.

 

[1] Vishes Kothari: Property Share Business Models in India, http://vinodkothari.com/blog/property-share-business-models-in-india/

[2] Nidhi Jain, Collective Investment Schemes for Real Estate Investments in India, at http://vinodkothari.com/blog/collective-investment-schemes-for-real-estate-investment-by-nidhi-jain/

[3] Vinod Kothari and Nidhi Jain article at: https://www.moneylife.in/article/collective-investment-schemes-how-gullible-investors-continue-to-lose-money/18018.html

[4] http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2015/284.html

[5] https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2014-0150-judgment.pdf

[6] https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/PERG/11/2.html

[7] 328 U.S. 293 (1946), at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/328/293/

[8] Review of Investor Protection, Part I, Cmnd 9215 (1984)

[9] Financial Services in the United Kingdom: A New Framework for Investor Protection (Cmnd 9432) 1985

 

Our Other Related Articles

Property Share Business Models in India,< http://vinodkothari.com/blog/property-share-business-models-in-india/>

Collective Investments Schemes: How gullible investors continue to lose money < https://www.moneylife.in/article/collective-investment-schemes-how-gullible-investors-continue-to-lose-money/18018.html>

Collective Investment Schemes for Real Estate Investments in India, < http://vinodkothari.com/blog/collective-investment-schemes-for-real-estate-investment-by-nidhi-jain/>

 

Digital Consumer Lending: Need for prudential measures and addressing consumer protection

-Siddarth Goel (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

Introduction

“If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck”

The above phrase is the popular duck test which implies abductive reasoning to identify an unknown subject by observing its habitual characteristics. The idea of using this duck test phraseology is to determine the role and function performed by the digital lending platforms in consumer credit.

Recently the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has constituted a working group to study how to make access to financial products and services more fair, efficient, and inclusive.[1]  With many news instances lately surrounding the series of unfortunate events on charging of usurious interest rate by certain online lenders and misery surrounding the threats and public shaming of some of the borrowers by these lenders. The RBI issued a caution statement through its press release dated December 23, 2020, against unauthorised digital lending platforms/mobile applications. The RBI reiterated that the legitimate public lending activities can be undertaken by Banks, Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) registered with RBI, and other entities who are regulated by the State Governments under statutory provisions, such as the money lending acts of the concerned states. The circular further mandates disclosure of banks/NBFCs upfront by the digital lender to customers upfront.

There is no denying the fact that these digital lending platforms have benefits over traditional banks in form of lower transaction costs and credit integration of the unbanked or people not having any recourse to traditional bank lending. Further, there are some self-regulatory initiatives from the digital lending industry itself.[2] However, there is a regulatory tradeoff in the lender’s interest and over-regulation to protect consumers when dealing with large digital lending service providers. A recent judgment by the Bombay High Court ruled that:

“The demand of outstanding loan amount from the person who was in default in payment of loan amount, during the course of employment as a duty, at any stretch of imagination cannot be said to be any intention to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit the suicide,”[3]

This pronouncement of the court is not under criticism here and is right in its all sense given the facts of the case being dealt with. The fact there needs to be a recovery process in place and fair terms to be followed by banks/NBFCs and especially by the digital lending platforms while dealing with customers. There is a need to achieve a middle ground on prudential regulation of these digital lending platforms and addressing consumer protection issues emanating from such online lending. The regulator’s job is not only to oversee the prudential regulation of the financial products and services being offered to the consumers but has to protect the interest of customers attached to such products and services. It is argued through this paper that there is a need to put in place a better governing system for digital lending platforms to address the systemic as well as consumer protection concerns. Therefore, the onus of consumer protection is on the regulator (RBI) since the current legislative framework or guidelines do not provide adequate consumer protection, especially in digital consumer credit lending.

Global Regulatory Approaches

US

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has laid a Special Purpose National Bank (SPNV) charters for fintech companies.[4] The OCC charter begins reviewing applications, whereby SPNV are held to the same rigorous standards of safety and soundness, fair access, and fair treatment of customers that apply to all national banks and federal savings associations.

The SPNV that engages in federal consumer financial law, i.e. in provides ‘financial products and services to the consumer’ is regulated by the ‘Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)’. The other factors involved in application assessment are business plans that should articulate a clear path and timeline to profitability. While the applicant should have adequate capital and liquidity to support the projected volume. Other relevant considerations considered by OCC are organizers and management with appropriate skills and experience.

The key element of a business plan is the proposed applicant’s risk management framework i.e. the ability of the applicant to identify, measure, monitor, and control risks. The business plan should also describe the bank’s proposed internal system of controls to monitor and mitigate risk, including management information systems. There is a need to provide a risk assessment with the business plan. A realistic understanding of risk and there should be management’s assessment of all risks inherent in the proposed business model needs to be shown.

The charter guides that the ongoing capital levels of the applicant should commensurate with risk and complexity as proposed in the activity. There is minimum leverage that an SPNV can undertake and regulatory capital is required for measuring capital levels relative to the applicant’s assets and off-balance sheet exposures.

The scope and purpose of CFPB are very broad and covers:

“scope of coverage” set forth in subsection (a) includes specified activities (e.g., offering or providing: origination, brokerage, or servicing of consumer mortgage loans; payday loans; or private education loans) as well as a means for the CFPB to expand the coverage through specified actions (e.g., a rulemaking to designate “larger market participants”).[5]

CFPB is established through the enactment of Dood-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The primary function of CFPB is to enforce consumer protection laws and supervise regulated entities that provide consumer financial products and services.

“(5)CONSUMER FINANCIAL PRODUCT OR SERVICES  The term “consumer financial product or service” means any financial product or service that is described in one or more categories under—paragraph (15) and is offered or provided for use by consumers primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; or **

“(15)Financial product or service-

(A)In general The term “financial product or service” means—(i)extending credit and servicing loans, including acquiring, purchasing, selling, brokering, or other extensions of credit (other than solely extending commercial credit to a person who originates consumer credit transactions);”

Thus CFPB is well placed as a separate institution to protect consumer interest and covers a wide range of financial products and services including extending credit, servicing, selling, brokering, and others. The regulatory environment has been put in place by the OCC to check the viability of fintech business models and there are adequate consumer protection laws.

EU

EU’s technologically neutral regulatory and supervisory systems intend to capture not only traditional financial services but also innovative business models. The current dealing with the credit agreements is EU directive 2008/48/EC of on credit agreements for consumers (Consumer Credit Directive – ‘Directive’). While the process of harmonising the legislative framework is under process as the report of the commission to the EU parliament raised some serious concerns.[6] The commission report identified that the directive has been partially effective in ensuring high standards of consumer protection. Despite the directive focussing on disclosure of annual percentage rate of charge to the customers, early payment, and credit databases. The report cited that the primary reason for the directive being impractical is because of the exclusion of the consumer credit market from the scope of the directive.

The report recognised the increase and future of consumer credit through digitisation. Further the rigid prescriptions of formats for information disclosure which is viable in pre-contractual stages, i.e. where a contract is to be subsequently entered in a paper format. There is no consumer benefit in an increasingly digital environment, especially in situations where consumers prefer a fast and smooth credit-granting process. The report highlighted the need to review certain provisions of the directive, particularly on the scope and the credit-granting process (including the pre-contractual information and creditworthiness assessment).

China

China has one of the biggest markets for online mico-lending business. The unique partnership of banks and online lending platforms using innovative technologies has been the prime reason for the surge in the market. However, recently the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) issued draft rules to regulate online mico-lending business. Under the draft rules, there is a requirement for online underwriting consumer loans fintech platform to have a minimum fund contribution of at least 30 % in a loan originated for banks. Further mico-lenders sourcing customer data from e-commerce have to share information with the central bank.

Australia

The main legislation that governs the consumer credit industry is the National Consumer Credit Protection Act (“National Credit Act”) and the National Credit Code. Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) is Australia’s integrated authority for corporate, markets, financial services, and consumer credit regulator. ASIC is a consumer credit regulator that administers the National Credit Act and regulates businesses engaging in consumer credit activities including banks, credit unions, finance companies, along with others. The ASIC has issued guidelines to obtain licensing for credit activities such as money lenders and financial intermediaries.[7] Credit licensing is needed for three sorts of entities.

  • engage in credit activities as a credit provider or lessor
  • engage in credit activities other than as a credit provider or lessor (e.g. as a credit representative or broker)
  • engage in all credit activities

The applicants of credit licensing are obligated to have adequate financial resources and have to ensure compliance with other supervisory arrangements to engage in credit activates.

UK

Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is the regulator for consumer credit firms in the UK. The primary objective of FCA ensues; a secure and appropriate degree of protection for consumers, protect and enhance the integrity of the UK financial system, promote effective competition in the interest of consumers.[8] The consumer credit firms have to obtain authorisation from FCA before carrying on consumer credit activities. The consumer credit activities include a plethora of credit functions including entering into a credit agreement as a lender, credit broking, debt adjusting, debt collection, debt counselling, credit information companies, debt administration, providing credit references, and others. FCA has been successful in laying down detailed rules for the price cap on high-cost short-term credit.[9] The price total cost cap on high-cost short-term credit (HCSTC loans) including payday loans, the borrowers must never have to pay more in fees and interest than 100% of what they borrowed. Further, there are rules on credit broking that provides brokers from charging fees to customers or requesting payment details unless authorised by FCA.[10] The fee charged from customers is to be reported quarterly and all brokers (including online credit broking) need to make clear that they are advertising as a credit broker and not a lender. There are no fixed capital requirements for the credit firms, however, adequate financial resources need to be maintained and there is a need to have a business plan all the time for authorisation purposes.

Digital lending models and concerns in India

Countries across the globe have taken different approaches to regulate consumer lending and digital lending platforms. They have addressed prudential regulation concerns of these credit institutions along with consumer protection being the top priority under their respective framework and legislations. However, these lending platforms need to be looked at through the current governing regulatory framework from an Indian perspective.

The typical credit intermediation could be performed by way of; peer to peer (P2P) lending model, notary model (bank-based) guaranteed return model, balance sheet model, and others. P2P lending platforms are heavily regulated and hence are not of primary concern herein. Online digital lending platforms engaged in consumer lending are of significance as they affect investor’s and borrowers’ interests and series of legal complexions arise owing to their agency lending models.[11] Therefore careful anatomy of these models is important for investors and consumer protection in India.

Should digital lending be regulated?

Under the current system, only banks, NBFCs, and money lenders can undertake lending activities. The regulated banks and NBFCs also undertake online consumer lending either through their website/platforms or through third-party lending platforms. These unregulated third-party digital lending platforms count on their sophisticated credit underwriting analytics software and engage in consumer lending services. Under the simplest version of the bank-based lending model, the fintech lending platform offers loan matching services but the loan is originated in books of a partnering bank or NBFC. Thus the platform serves as an agent that brings lenders (Financial institutions) and borrowers (customers) together. Therefore RBI has mandated fintech platforms has to abide by certain roles and responsibilities of Direct Selling Agent (DSA) as under Fair Practice Code ‘FPC’ and partner banks/NBFCs have to ensure Guidelines on Managing Risks and Code of Conduct in Outsourcing of Financial Service (‘outsourcing code’).[12] In the simplest of bank-based models, the banks bear the credit risk of the borrowers and the platform earns their revenues by way of fees and service charges on the transaction. Since banks and NBFCs are prudentially regulated and have to comply with Basel capital norms, there are not real systemic concerns.

However, the situation alters materially when such a third-party lending platform adopts balance sheet lending or guaranteed return models. In the former, the servicer platform retains part of the credit risk on its book and could also give some sort of loss support in form of a guarantee to its originating partner NBFC or bank.[13] While in the latter case it a pure guarantee where the third-party lending platform contractually promises returns on funds lent through their platforms. There is a devil in detailed scrutiny of these business models. We have earlier highlighted the regulatory issues in detail around fintech practices and app-based lending in our write up titled ‘Lender’s piggybacking: NBFCs lending on Fintech platforms’ gurantees’.

From the prudential regulation perspective in hindsight, banks, and NBFCs originating through these third-party lending platforms are not aware of the overall exposure of the platforms to the banking system. Hence there is a presence of counterparty default risk of the platform itself from the perspective of originating banks and NBFCs. In a real sense, there is a kind of tri-party arrangement where funds flow from ‘originator’ (regulated bank/NBFC) to the ‘platform’ (digital service provider) and ultimately to the ‘borrower'(Customer). The unregulated platform assumes the credit risk of the borrower, and the originating bank (or NBFC) assumes the risk of the unregulated lending platform.

Curbing unregulated lending

In the balance sheet and guaranteed return models, an undercapitalized entity takes credit risk. In the balance sheet model, the lending platform is directly taking the credit risk and may or may not have to get itself registered as NBFC with RBI. The registration requirement as an NBFC emanates if the financial assets and financial income of the platform is more than 50 % of its total asset and income of such business (‘principal business criteria’ see footnote 12). While in the guaranteed return model there is a form of synthetic lending and there is absolutely no legal requirement for the lending platform to get themselves registered as NBFC. The online lending platform in the guaranteed return model serves as a loan facilitator from origination to credit absorption. There is a regulatory arbitrage in this activity. Since technically this activity is not covered under the “financial activity” and the spread earned in not “financial income” therefore there is no requirement for these entities to get registered as NBFCs.[14]

Any sort of guarantee or loss support provided by the third-party lending platform to its partner bank/NBFC is a synthetic exposure. In synthetic lending, the digital lending platform is taking a risk on the underlying borrower without actually taking direct credit risk. Additionally, there are financial reporting issues and conflict of interest or misalignment of incentives, i.e. the entities do not have to abide by IND AS and can show these guarantees as contingent liabilities. On the contrary, they charge heavy interest rates from customers to earn a higher spread. Hence synthetic lending provides all the incentives for these third-party lending platforms to enter into risky lending which leads to the generation of sub-prime assets. The originating banks and NBFCs have to abide by minimum capital requirements and other regulatory norms. Hence the sub-prime generation of consumer credit loans is supplemented by heavy returns offered to the banks. It is argued that the guaranteed returns function as a Credit Default Swap ‘CDS’ which is not regulated as CDS. Thus the online lending platform escapes the regulatory purview and it is shown in the latter part this leads to poor credit discipline in consumer lending and consumer protection is often put on the back burner.

From the prudential regulation perspective restricting banks/NBFCs from undertaking any sort of guaranteed return or loss support protection, can curb the underlying emergence of systemic risk from counterparty default. While a legal stipulation to the effect that NBFCs/Banks lending through the third-party unregulated platform, to strictly lend independently i.e. on a non-risk sharing basis of the credit risk. Counterintuitively, the unregulated online lending platforms have to seek registration as an NBFC if they want to have direct exposure to the underlying borrower, subject to fulfillment of ‘principal business criteria’.[15] Such a governing framework will reduce the incentives for banks and NBFCs to exploit excessive risk-taking through this regulatory arbitrage opportunity.

Ensuring Fairness and Consumer Protection

There are serious concerns of fair dealing and consumer protection aspects that have arisen lately from digital online lending platforms. The loans outsourced by Banks and NBFCs over digital lending platforms have to adhere to the FPC and Outsourcing code.

The fairness in a loan transaction calls for transparent disclosure to the borrower all information about fees/charges payable for processing the loan application, disbursed, pre-payment options and charges, the penalty for delayed repayments, and such other information at the time of disbursal of the loan. Such information should also be displayed on the website of the banks for all categories of loan products. It may be mentioned that levying such charges subsequently without disclosing the same to the borrower is an unfair practice.[16]

Such a legal requirement gives rise to the age-old question of consumer law, yet the most debatable aspect. That mere disclosure to the borrower of the loan terms in an agreement even though the customer did not understand the underlying obligations is a fair contract (?) It is argued that let alone the disclosures of obligations in digital lending transactions, customers are not even aware of their remedies. Under the current RBI regulatory framework, they have the remedy to approach grievance redressal authorities of the originating bank/NBFC or may approach the banking ombudsman. However, things become even more peculiar in cases where loans are being sourced or processed through third-party digital platforms. The customers in the majority of the cases are unaware of the fact that the ultimate originator of the loan is a bank/NBFC. The only remedy for such a customer is to seek refuge under the Consumer Protection Act 2019 by way of proving the loan agreement is the one as ‘unfair contract’.

“2(46) “unfair contract” means a contract between a manufacturer or trader or service provider on one hand, and a consumer on the other, having such terms which cause significant change in the rights of such consumer, including the following, namely:— (i) requiring manifestly excessive security deposits to be given by a consumer for the performance of contractual obligations; or (ii) imposing any penalty on the consumer, for the breach of contract thereof which is wholly disproportionate to the loss occurred due to such breach to the other party to the contract; or (iii) refusing to accept early repayment of debts on payment of applicable penalty; or (iv) entitling a party to the contract to terminate such contract unilaterally, without reasonable cause; or (v) permitting or has the effect of permitting one party to assign the contract to the detriment of the other party who is a consumer, without his consent; or (vi) imposing on the consumer any unreasonable charge, obligation or condition which puts such consumer to disadvantage;

It is pertinent to note that neither the scope of consumer financial agreements is regulated in India, nor are the third-party digital lending platforms required to obtain authorisation from RBI. There are instances of high-interest rates and exorbitant fees charged by the online consumer lending platforms which are unfair and detrimental to customers’ interests. The current legislative framework provides that the NBFCs shall furnish a copy of the loan agreement as understood by the borrower along with a copy of each of all enclosures quoted in the loan agreement to all the borrowers at the time of sanction/disbursement of loans.[17] However, like the persisting problem in the EU 2008/48/EC directive, even FPC is not well placed to govern digital lending agreements and disclosures. Taking a queue from the problems recognised by the EU parliamentary committee report. There is no consumer benefit in an increasingly digital environment, especially in situations where there are fast and smooth credit-granting processes. The pre-contractual information on the disclosure of annualised interest rate and capping of the total cost to a customer in consumer credit loans is central to consumer protection.

The UK legislation has been pro-active in addressing the underlying unfair contractual concerns, by fixation of maximum daily interest rates and maximum default fees with an overall cost cap of 100% that could be charged in short-term high-interest rates loan agreements. It is argued that in this Laissez-faire world the financial services business models which are based on imposing an unreasonable charge, obligations that could put consumers to disadvantage should anyways be curbed. Therefore a legal certainty in this regard would save vulnerable customers to seek the consumer court’s remedy in case of usurious and unfair lending.

The master circular on loan and advances provide for disclosure of the details of recovery agency firms/companies to the borrower by the originating bank/NBFC.[18] Further, there is a requirement for such recovery agent to disclose to the borrower about the antecedents of the bank/NBFC they are recovering for.  However, this condition is barely even followed or adhered to and the vulnerable consumers are exposed to all sorts of threats and forceful tactics. As one could appreciate in jurisdictions of the US, UK, Australia discussed above, consumer lending and ancillary services are under the purview of concerned regulators. From the customer protection perspective, at least some sort of authorization or registration requirement with the RBI to keep the check and balances system in place is important for consumer protection. The loan recovery business is sensitive hence there is a need for a proper guiding framework and/or registration requirement of the agents acting as recovery agents on behalf of banks/NBFCs. The mere registration requirement and revocation of same in case of unprofessional activities will serve as a stick to check their consumer dealing practices.

The financial services intermediaries (other than Banks/NBFCs) providing services like credit broking, debt adjusting, debt collection, debt counselling, credit information, debt administration, credit referencing to be licensed by the regulator. The banks/NBFCs dealing with the licensed market intermediaries would go much farther in the successful implementation of FPC and addressing consumer protection concerns from the current system.

Conclusion

From the perspective of sound financial markets and fair consumer practices, it is always prudent to allow only those entities in credit lending businesses that are best placed to bear the credit risk and losses emanating from them. Thus, there is a dearth of a comprehensive legislative framework in consumer lending from origination to debt collection and its administration including the business of providing credit references through digital lending platforms. There may not be a material foreseeable requirement for regulating digital lending platforms completely. However, there is a need to curb synthetic lending by third-party digital lending platforms. Since a risk-taking entity without adequate capitalization will tend to get into generating risky assets with high returns. The off-balance sheet guarantee commitments of these entities force them to be aggressive towards their customers to sustain their businesses. This write-up has explored various regulatory approaches, where jurisdictions like the US and UK, and Australia being the good comparable in addressing consumer protection concerns emanating from online digital lending platforms. Henceforth, a well-framed consumer protection system especially in financial products and services would go much farther in the development and integration of credit through digital lending platforms in the economy.

 

[1] Reserve Bank of India – Press Releases (rbi.org.in), dated January 13, 2020

[2] Digital lending Association of India, Code of Conduct available at https://www.dlai.in/dlai-code-of-conduct/

[3] Rohit Nalawade Vs. State of Maharashtra High Court of Bombay Criminal Application (APL) NO. 1052 OF 2018 < https://images.assettype.com/barandbench/2021-01/cf03e52e-fedd-4a34-baf6-25dbb55dbf29/Rohit_Nalawade_v__State_of_Maharashtra___Anr.pdf>

[4] https://www.occ.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/responsible-innovation/comments/pub-special-purpose-nat-bank-charters-fintech.pdf

[5]  12 USC 5514(a); Pay day loans are the short term, high interest bearing loans that are generally due on the consumer’s next payday after the loan is taken.

[6] EU, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: on the implementation of Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreement for consumers’, dated November, 05, 2020, available at < https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2020/EN/COM-2020-963-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF>

[7] https://asic.gov.au/for-finance-professionals/credit-licensees/applying-for-and-managing-your-credit-licence/faqs-getting-a-credit-licence/

[8] FCA guide to consumer credit firms, available at < https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/finalised-guidance/consumer-credit-being-regulated-guide.pdf>

[9] FCA, ‘Detailed rules for price cap on high-cost short-term credit’, available at < https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps14-16.pdf>

[10] FCA, Credit Broking and fees, available at < https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps14-18.pdf>

[11] Bank of International Settlements ‘FinTech Credit : Market structure, business models and financial stability implications’, 22 May 2017, FSB Report

[12] See our write up on ‘ Extension of FPC on lending through digital platforms’ , available at < http://vinodkothari.com/2020/06/extension-of-fpc-on-lending-through-digital-platforms/>

[13] Where the unregulated platform assumes the complete credit risk of the borrower there is no interlinkage with the partner bank and NBFC. The only issue that arises is from the registration requirement as NBFC which we have discussed in the next section. Also see our write up titled ‘Question of Definition: What Exactly is an NBFC’ available at http://vinodkothari.com/nbfcs/definition-of-nbfcs-concept-of-principality-of-business/

[14] The qualifying criteria to register as an NBFC has been discussed in our write up titled ‘Question of Definition: What Exactly is an NBFC’ available at http://vinodkothari.com/nbfcs/definition-of-nbfcs-concept-of-principality-of-business/

[15] see our write up titled ‘Question of Definition: What Exactly is an NBFC’ available at http://vinodkothari.com/nbfcs/definition-of-nbfcs-concept-of-principality-of-business/

[16] Para 2.5.2, RBI Guidelines on Fair Practices Code for Lender

[17] Para 29 of the guidelines on Fair Practices Code, Master Direction on systemically/non-systemically important NBFCs.

[18] Para 2.6, Master Circular on ‘Loans and Advances – Statutory and Other Restrictions’ dated July 01, 2015;

 

Our Other Related Write-Ups

Lenders’ piggybacking: NBFCs lending on Fintech platforms’ guarantees – Vinod Kothari Consultants

Extension of FPC on lending through digital platforms – Vinod Kothari Consultants

Fintech Framework: Regulatory responses to financial innovation – Vinod Kothari Consultants

One-stop guide for all Regulatory Sandbox Frameworks – Vinod Kothari Consultants

 

Impact of restructuring on ECL computation

-Aanchal Kaur Nagpal (aanchal@vinodkothari.com)

Introduction

The disruption throughout the globe due to the COVID-19 pandemic has hit the Indian economy as well significantly. The financial sector has experienced a massive blow due to the impact of the pandemic on the credit worthiness and repayment capacity of the overall general public. RBI has responded through various measures including allowing moratorium period, providing resolution framework for stressed accounts due to COVID-19 and numerous other measures.

The retail borrower segment of several banks and NBFCs has also been adversely affected by the disruption and hence, the lenders are contemplating ways to extend certain benefits to such borrowers them under the various circulars issued by the RBI and government. In this regard, restructuring or modification in terms of a loan is being done for economic or legal reasons, relating to the borrower’s financial difficulty. However, such restructuring may also have implications on the books of accounts, especially for IndAS compliant entities.

The following note discusses the meaning of ‘restructuring’ and it impact on the credit risk of the borrower.

Meaning of Restructuring

As per RBI norms on Restructuring of Advances by NBFC, A restructured account is one where the NBFC, for economic or legal reasons relating to the borrower’s financial difficulty, grants to the borrower concessions that the NBFC would not otherwise consider.

As per the Basel guidelines on prudential treatment of problem assets –definitions of nonperforming exposures and forbearance, definition of forbearance is as follows:

4.1. Identification of forbearance

  1. Forbearance occurs when:
  • a counterparty is experiencing financial difficulty in meeting its financial commitments; and
  • a bank grants a concession that it would not otherwise consider, irrespective of whether the concession is at the discretion of the bank and/or the counterparty. A concession is at the discretion of the counterparty (debtor) when the initial contract allows the counterparty (debtor) to change the terms of the contract in their favour (embedded forbearance clauses) due to financial difficulty.

The meaning of restructuring is modification in terms of a loan, which is done for economic or legal reasons, relating to the borrower’s financial difficulty. Usually, restructuring may be of various types. A credit weakness related restructuring is one which is done to assist the borrower to continue to service the facility. If such restructuring was not done, potentially, the borrower may not have been able to service the facility. Therefore, this is done with a view to avert a default. Yet another type of restructuring is a preponement of payments or early clearance of a loan. A third example has been given in the definition itself – for example, passing on the benefit of any interest rate increase or decrease in case of floating rate loans.

Change in credit risk

Under Indian Accounting Standard (Ind AS) 109 Financial Instruments (‘IndAS 109’), Expected Credit Loss (ECL) provision is computed for the loan accounts and it is important to determine whether restructuring should be considered as a factor in determining change in the credit risk characteristic of the borrower.

Significant Increase in Credit Risk (SICR), in the context of IFRS 9, is a significant change in the estimated Default Risk (over the remaining expected life of the financial instrument). The term ‘significant’ is not defined in IFRS-9 and thus SICR is determined using various internal and external indicators. The provisions of para 5.5.12 of IndAS 109[1] are self-explanatory on the point that if there has been a modification of the contractual terms of a loan, then, in order to see whether there has been a SICR, the entity shall compare the credit risk before the modification, and the credit risk after the modification.

While SICR indicators usually suffice during normal circumstances, but adjusting to the ‘new normal’ would require ‘new’ ways to consider SICR. The most important question that arises is whether modification in the loan terms to avoid a credit default due to COVID-19 disruption would lead to SICR.

International Guidance

  • As per the International Monetary Fund Report on The Treatment of Restructured Loans for FSI Compilation,

The BCBS (2017) defines loan forbearance as a situation in which (1) a counterparty is experiencing financial difficulty in meeting its financial commitments, and (2) a bank grants a concession that it would not otherwise consider, whether or not the concession is at the discretion of the bank and/or the counterparty. The Guide defines restructured loans as loans arising from rescheduling and refinancing of the original loan. Therefore, all forbearance measures are loan restructuring, but not all loan restructurings are forbearance measures.

Recently, in response to COVID-19 shock, the BCBS (2020) has clarified that when borrowers accept the terms of a payment moratorium (public or granted by banks on a voluntary basis) or have access to other relief measures such as public guarantees, these developments may not automatically lead to the loan being categorized as forborne. At the same time, banks would still need to assess the likelihood of the borrower’s rescheduled payments after the moratorium period ends.

  • The Indian Accounting Standard Board also released a clarification under ‘IFRS 9 and Covid-19’[2] stating that,

Entities should not continue to apply their existing ECL methodology mechanically. For example, the extension of payment holidays to all borrowers in particular classes of financial instruments should not automatically result in all those instruments being considered to have suffered an SICR.

  • According to the European Banking Authority’s Final Report on ‘Guidelines on reporting and disclosure of exposures subject to measures applied in response to the COVID‐19 crisis’[3],

More precisely, moratoria on loan payments that are in accordance with the EBA Guidelines on legislative and non‐legislative moratoria on loan repayments applied in the light of the COVID‐ 19 crisis do not trigger forbearance classification and the assessment of distressed structuring of loans and advances benefiting from these moratoria and they do not automatically lead to default classification. For example, if a performing loan is subject to a moratorium compliant with the GL on moratoria, which brings contractual changes to the terms of the loan, in the existing supervisory reporting this loan will continue to be reported under the category of performing exposures with no specific indication of the measures applied. However, it is also emphasised that the credit institutions should continue the monitoring and where necessary the unlikeliness to pay assessment of loans and advances that fall under the scope of these moratoria.

  • The Prudential Regulatory Authority of the Bank of England sent letters[4] to CEOs of various Banks guiding the following –

Our expectation is that eligibility for, and use of, the UK Government’s policy on the extension of payment holidays should not automatically, other things being equal, result in the loans involved being moved into Stage 2 or Stage 3 for the purposes of calculating ECL or trigger a default under the EU Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR). This expectation extends to similar schemes to respond to the adverse economic impact of the virus.

We do not consider the use of a Covid-19 related payment holiday by a borrower to trigger the counting of days past due or generate arrears under CRR. We also do not consider the use of such a payment holiday to result automatically in the borrower being considered unlikely to pay under CRR.

Firms are reminded to apply sound risk management practices regarding the identification of defaults. Firms should continue to assess borrowers for other indicators of unlikeliness to pay, taking into consideration the underlying cause of any financial difficulty and whether it is likely to be temporary as a result of Covid-19 or longer term

Our expectation is that a covenant breach or waiver of a covenant relating to a modification of the audit report attached to audited financial statements because of the Covid-19 pandemic should not automatically, other things being equal, trigger a default under CRR or result in a move of the loans involved into Stage 2 or Stage 3 for the purposes of calculating ECL. This expectation extends to other covenant breaches and waivers of covenants with a direct link to the Covid-19 pandemic.

A breach of the covenants of a credit contract is a possible indication of unlikeliness to pay under the CRR definition of default. However, a covenant breach does not automatically trigger a default. Rather, firms have scope to assess covenant breaches on a case-by-case basis and determine whether they indicate unlikeliness to pay.

  • The Accounting Standards Board of Canada[5] also took note of the guidance provided by IASB on guidance on applying IFRS 9 Financial Instrument. Further, it also took note of the guidance[6] provided by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OFSI) in Canada and specified that the guidance is consistent with the requirements in IFRS 9 and should thus be considered along with the guidance provided by the IASB. The OFSI, through its guidance, provided the following in relation to applying IFRS in extraordinary circumstances –

IFRS 9 is principles-based and requires the use of experienced credit judgement. Consistent with OSFI’s IFRS 9 Financial Instruments and Disclosures guideline, OSFI is providing guidance on three specific aspects of the accounting for Expected Credit Losses (ECLs) due to the exceptional circumstances arising from COVID-19. Deposit taking Institutions (DTIs) should also consider any additional guidance provided by the International Accounting Standards Board on the application of IFRS 9 in relation to COVID-19.

Under the IFRS 9 ECL accounting framework, DTIs should consider both quantitative and qualitative information, including experienced credit judgment, in assessing for significant increase in credit risk. In OSFI’s view, the utilization of a payment deferral program should not result in an automatic trigger, all things being equal, for significant increase in credit risk.

  • The International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) released QnA[7] to provide insight into the financial reporting issues associated with COVID-19 government responses, and the relevant International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS). According to the same,

Given the economic severity associated with COVID-19, entities will need to review their portfolio of financial assets and assess whether an impairment is necessary.

Considering the aforesaid guidelines, all restructuring should not automatically be implied as SICR and the same should be based on facts after analyzing the background of credit worthiness of the borrower.

In case the restructuring is done under the disruption scenario then the same is not indicative of any increase in the probability of default. Accordingly, the same should ideally not be considered as a factor for considering SICR. Thus, if the restructuring is done for accounts that are stressed as a direct result of COVID-19, then the same shall not be treated as SICR.

However, if the restructuring is granted as a generalized option to all customers without any attention paid to reasons for such credit weakness, then the same is done to merely avoid credit difficulty or default of such borrowers which may not necessarily be caused by COVID-19.

Further, something like moratorium, which is granted for a systemic disruption such as a crisis of payment and settlements, natural calamities, etc. is for non-economic reasons, and therefore, may not be likened with a credit-weakness-related restructuring. In the current scenario, the general assumption may be that the credit default is directly associated with the COVID-19 pandemic in most cases.

Restructuring to all borrowers at a class level

A financial institution may also intend to modify the terms of the loan for the entire class as against a particular individual. If the underlying reason for such modification is the financial difficulty faced by the entire class due to Covid disruption, such that the modification is to tide over such difficulty and continue to service the loan, in our view, this will amount to restructuring and lead to a downgrade of asset classification. The underlying rationale is that a loan is a credit decision which is made looking at the prevailing situation at the time of extension of the credit. If the payment schedule is adjusted to take into consideration any change in situations that has happened subsequent to the grant of the credit, the same should be a case of deterioration in the credit quality of the loan. While going by the language of the regulation it seems to refer to only individual cases of restructuring, however, the fact that the entire class of borrower is facing the financial difficulty cannot be overlooked. Merely because the restructuring has been done for a class of borrowers does not mean the restructuring is not to avert a potential default.

Usually, the need for restructuring is identified at the individual exposure level to which concessions are granted due to financial difficulties of the respective borrower. Taking a decision to provide relief to an entire class of borrower instead of considering individual restructuring of each borrower account is a matter of prudence, which must be taken without compromising the interest of the Company, that is the lender.

Impact on IND AS treatment

Based on the aforesaid discussion, it can be inferred that the restructuring under the disruption scenario is not indicative of any increase in the probability of default. Accordingly, the same should ideally not be considered as a factor for considering SICR and in turn, should not result in shifting of the financial instruments from one stage to another. However, in case the account showed signs of credit weakness even before the restructuring, then there should be a shift from one stage to another.

Our related articles–

 

[1] If the contractual cash flows on a financial asset have been renegotiated or modified and the financial asset was not derecognised, an entity shall assess whether there has been a significant increase in the credit risk of the financial instrument in accordance with paragraph 5.5.3 by comparing:

(a) the risk of a default occurring at the reporting date (based on the modified contractual terms); and

(b) the risk of a default occurring at initial recognition (based on the original, unmodified contractual terms).

[2] ifrs-9-ecl-and-coronavirus.pdf

[3] Microsoft Word – Guidelines on Covid -19 measures reporting and disclosure.docx (europa.eu)

[4] Dear CEO Letter on Covid-19 IFRS 9 Capital Requirements and Loan Covenants (bankofengland.co.uk)

[5] IFRS 9 Expected Credit Losses and COVID-19 (frascanada.ca)

[6] OSFI Actions to Address Operational Issues Stemming from COVID-19 (osfi-bsif.gc.ca)

[7] IPSASB-Staff-QA-COVID-19-Relevant-Accounting-Guidance_0.pdf (ifac.org)

Credit Cards Business- Regulatory nuances from issuance to co-branding

RBI aligns list of compoundable contraventions under FEMA with NDI Rules

‘Technical’ contravention subject to minimum compoundable amount, format for public disclosure of compounding orders revised.

– CS Burhanuddin Dohadwala | corplaw@vindkothari.com

Introduction

Compounding refers to the process of voluntarily admitting the contravention, pleading guilty and seeking redressal. It provides comfort to any person who contravenes any provisions of FEMA, 1999 [except section 3(a) of the Act] by minimizing transaction costs. Reserve Bank of India (‘RBI’) is empowered to compound any contraventions as defined under section 13 of FEMA, 1999 (‘the Act’) except the contravention under section 3(a) of the Act in the manner provided under Foreign Exchange (Compounding Proceedings) Rules, 2000. Provisions relating to compounding is updated in the RBI Master Direction-Compounding of Contraventions under FEMA, 1999[1].

Following are few advantages of compounding of offences:

  1. Short cut method to avoid litigation;
  2. No further proceeding will be initiated;
  3. Minimize litigation and reduces the burden of judiciary;

Present Circular

Pursuant to the supersession of FEM (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2017[2] (‘TISPRO”)and issuance of FEM (Non-Debt Instrument) Rules, 2019[3] [‘NDI Rules] and FEM (Mode of Payment and Reporting of Non-Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2019[4] [‘MPR Regulations’], RBI has updated the reference of the erstwhile regulations in line with the NDI Rules and MPR Regulations vide RBI Circular No.06 dated November 17, 2020[5] (‘Nov 2020 Circular’).

Additionally, the Nov 2020 Circular does away with the classification of a contravention as ‘technical’, as discussed later in the article.

Lastly, the Nov 2020 Circular modifies the format in which the compounding orders will be published on RBI’s website.

Compounding of contraventions relating to foreign investment

The power to compound contraventions under TISPRO delegated to the Regional Offices/ Sub Offices of the RBI has been aligned with corresponding provisions under NDI Rules and MPR Regulation as under:

Compounding of contraventions under NDI Rules
Rule No. Deals with Corresponding regulation under TISPRO Brief Description of Contravention
Rule 2(k) read with Rule 5 Permission for making investment by a person resident outside India; Regulation 5 Issue of ineligible instruments
Rule 21 Pricing guidelines; Paragraph 5 of Schedule I Violation of pricing guidelines for issue of shares.
Paragraph 3 (b) of Schedule I Sectoral Caps; Paragraph 2 or 3 of Schedule I Issue of shares without approval of RBI or Government respectively, wherever required.
Rule 4 Restriction on receiving investment; Regulation 4 Receiving investment in India from non-resident or taking on record transfer of shares by investee company.
Rule 9(4) Transfer by way of gift to PROI by PRII of equity instruments or units of an Indian company on a non- repatriation basis with the prior approval of the Reserve Bank. Regulation 10(5) Gift of capital instruments by a person resident in India to a person resident outside India without seeking prior approval of the Reserve Bank of India.
Rule 13(3) Transfer by way of gift to PROI by NRI or OCI of equity instruments or units of an Indian company on a non- repatriation basis with the prior approval of the Reserve Bank.

 

Compounding of contraventions under MPR Regulations
Regulation No. Deals With Corresponding regulation under TISPRO Brief Description of Contravention
Regulation 3.1(I)(A) Inward remittance from abroad through banking channels; Regulation 13.1(1) Delay in reporting inward remittance received for issue of shares.
Regulation 4(1) Form Foreign Currency-Gross Provisional Return (FC-GPR); Regulation 13.1(2) Delay in filing form FC (GPR) after issue of shares.
Regulation 4(2) Annual Return on Foreign Liabilities and Assets (FLA); Regulation 13.1(3) Delay in filing the Annual Return on Foreign Liabilities and Assets (FLA).
Regulation 4(3) Form Foreign Currency-Transfer of Shares (FC-TRS); Regulation 13.1(4) Delay in submission of form FC-TRS on transfer of shares from Resident to Non-Resident or from Non-resident to Resident.
Regulation 4(6) Form LLP (I); Regulations 13.1(7) and 13.1(8) Delay in reporting receipt of amount of consideration for capital contribution and acquisition of profit shares by Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs)/ delay in reporting disinvestment / transfer of capital contribution or profit share between a resident and a non-resident (or vice-versa) in case of LLPs.
Regulation 4(7) Form LLP (II);
Regulation 4(11) Downstream Investment Regulation 13.1(11) Delay in reporting the downstream investment made by an Indian entity or an investment vehicle in another Indian entity (which is considered as indirect foreign investment for the investee Indian entity in terms of these regulations), to Secretariat for Industrial Assistance, DIPP.

Technical contraventions to be compounded with minimal compounding amount

As per RBI’s FAQs[1] whenever a contravention is identified by RBI or brought to its notice by the entity involved in contravention by way of a reference other than through the prescribed application for compounding, the Bank will continue to decide (i) whether a contravention is technical and/or minor in nature and, as such, can be dealt with by way of an administrative/ cautionary advice; (ii) whether it is material and, hence, is required to be compounded for which the necessary compounding procedure has to be followed or (iii) whether the issues involved are sensitive / serious in nature and, therefore, need to be referred to the Directorate of Enforcement (DOE). However, once a compounding application is filed by the concerned entity suo moto, admitting the contravention, the same will not be considered as ‘technical’ or ‘minor’ in nature and the compounding process shall be initiated in terms of section 15 (1) of Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 read with Rule 9 of Foreign Exchange (Compounding Proceedings) Rules, 2000.

Nov 2020 Circular provides for regularizing such ‘technical’ contraventions by imposing minimal compounding amount as per the compounding matrix[1] and discontinuing the practice of giving administrative/ cautionary advice.

Public disclosure of compounding order

Compounding order by RBI can be accessed at the RBI website-FEMA tab-compounding orders[1]. In partial modification of earlier instructions issued dated May 26, 2016[2] it has been decided that in respect of the Compounding Orders passed on or after March 01, 2020 a summary information, instead of the compounding orders, shall be published on the Bank’s website in the following format:

Sr. No. Name of the Applicant Details of contraventions (provisions of the Act/Regulation/Rules compounded)

(Newly inserted)

Date of compounding order

(Newly inserted)

Amount imposed for compounding of contraventions Download order

(Deleted)

It seems that the compounding order will not be available for download.

Conclusion:

The delegation of power is done for enhanced customer service and operational convenience. Revised format of disclosure of compounding orders will be more reader friendly. Delay in filing of forms under MPR Regulations on FIRMS portal is subject to payment of Late Submission Fees (LSF) as per Regulation 5. The payment of LSF is an additional option for regularising reporting delays without undergoing the compounding procedure.

Abbreviations used above:

  • PROI: Person Resident Outside India;
  • PRII: Person Resident In India;
  • NRI: Non-Resident Indian;
  • OCI: Overseas citizen of India;

FIRMS: Foreign Investment Reporting & Management System.

Our other articles/channel can be accessed below:

1. Compounding of Contraventions under FEMA, 1999- RBI delegates further power to Regional Offices:

http://vinodkothari.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Compounding_of_Contraventions_under_FEMA_1999_-_RBI_delegates_further_power_to_Regional_Offices.pdf

 

2. Other articles on FEMA, ODI & ECB may be access below:

http://vinodkothari.com/category/corporate-laws/

 

3. You Tube Channel:

https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCgzB-ZviIMcuA_1uv6jATbg

[1] https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/Compoundingorders.aspx

[2] https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=10424&Mode=0

[1] https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=10424&Mode=0

[1] https://m.rbi.org.in/Scripts/FAQView.aspx?Id=80 (Q. 12)

[1] https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_ViewMasDirections.aspx?id=10190

[2] https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=11253&Mode=0

[3] http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2019/213332.pdf

[4] https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_FemaNotifications.aspx?Id=11723

[5]https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/APDIRS62545AA7432734B31BD5B59601E49AA6C.PDF