Some relief in RBI stance on lenders’ round tripping investments in AIFs

– Team Finserv | finserv@vinodkothari.com

The Reserve Bank of India on 19th December 2023 issued a notification[1] imposing a bar on all regulated entities[2] (REs) with respect to their investments in AIFs. We had covered the same in our earlier write-up. The Circular has already created some bloodshed as several banks took a hit in their Q3 results. Though late, yet welcome, the RBI has now come with some relief by a March 27 2023 circular.  The following Highlights are based on the original circular, as amended by the March 27th circular :-

What has the RBI done?

  • Prohibited all regulated entities (REs), including banks, cooperative banks, NBFCs and All India Financial Institutions from making investments in Alternative Investment funds (AIFs), if the AIF has made any investment in a “debtor company”, other than by way of equity shares of the debtor company. Hence, if the AIF has made investment by way of bonds, structured capital instruments, etc., issued by a debtor company, the bar as above will apply.
  • Debtor company means a company in which the RE currently has or previously had a loan or investment exposure anytime during the preceding 12 months
  • The bar applies immediately, that is, effective 19th Dec 2023. No further investments to be made.
  • If investments already exist, the RE shall exit within 30 days, that is, by 18th Jan., 2024. Hindsight clearly shows that for most regulated entities, there was no way to cause exit, as AIF investments are evidently illiquid. Hence, most regulated entities took a hit on their P/L.
  • Further, if an RE has made an investment in an AIF, and the AIF invests in a debtor company, the RE shall make an exit within 30 days.
  • Investment by REs in the subordinated units of any AIF scheme with a ‘priority distribution model’ subject to full deduction from RE’s capital funds. See further discussion on priority distribution model below.

What was the intent?

  • Since several REs have affiliated AIFs, routing the money through AIFs to borrowers might have led to ever greening. That is, the AIF would invest the money into a debtor company, and consequently, the debtor company would keep its account as a performing asset. In essence, the AIF was acting as a stopover in the process of round tripping of the money back to a debtor company, from where it will be used to pay off the lender.

What will be the impact of the Circular?

  • Most of the larger REs have affiliated AIFs. Flow of funds to them from the RE would stop completely.
  • The sweep of the circular is wide and non-discriminatory. Not only affiliated AIFs, but any AIF in general will be dried of funding from REs. While the bar is only for those AIFs which have invested in “debtor companies”, it will be practically tough for REs to avoid overlapping investments. Given the severe implications of a breach, compliance-sensitive REs will avoid investing in AIFs.
  • There is an immediate disinvestment pressure on AIFs, as there may be overlapped investments. AIFs’ assets are mostly illiquid – ensuring exit to RE investors may be tough. In many cases, there are lock-in restrictions as well.
  • Not only has the RBI expressed concerns, SEBI also issued a consultation paper for enhancement of trust in the AIF ecosystem, citing use of AIFs for regulatory arbitrage. See our write up on the SEBI proposals.

Direct or indirect investments:

  • As the Circular is driven by concerns of round-tripping, widening the circuit by creating more stop-overs does not help. For example, if a lender invests in an AIF, which invests in an intermediate entity, which in turn invests in a debtor entity, the trail of the money is clear. Likewise, the lender may be making an indirect investment in an AIF.
  • However, where there is no round-tripping of the money to a “debtor company”, there should be no concern. For example, if a lender makes a loan to an entity, where an AIF of the group has also made investments, there is no flow of money from the lender to the AIF, for the purpose of the downstream investment by the AIF into the debtor company.

Investments through mutual funds and FOFs exempt:

  • The 27th March circular exempts instances where investments are made by lenders into mutual funds or FoFs, and those in turn have some exposure in either an AIF or in a debtor entity.

Priority distribution model or structured AIFs

  • In addition to the concerns on downstream investments by AIFs in debtor companies, the RBI also had concerns on the so-called structured AIFs or AIFs with a distribution waterfall. Whether AIFs can at all have a priority distribution waterfall is currently under SEBI examination and SEBI has stopped AIFs from using structured distribution schemes (by way of accepting fresh commitment or making investment in a new investee company) . However, several existing schemes have such models.
  • If a lender makes an investment in the subordinated units of a structured AIF scheme such investments will get deducted from the regulatory capital of the lender. The March 27 circular now clarifies that the deduction will be equally from Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. Further, it also clarifies that the subordinated exposures in the AIF schemes could be in the form of subordinated exposures, including investment in the nature of sponsor units.

Concern areas

  • Ideally, the bar should have been limited to affiliated AIFs. Affiliated AIFs could have been defined appropriately – for example, a related party, or where the investment manager, or sponsor is a related party of the RE. Extending the bar to all AIFs is quite far from the intent of the circular – which is, admittedly, to curb evergreening. It is difficult to see how unrelated AIFs can be used by an RE to evergreen, as investment decisions of these AIFs are not exercised by the investors.
  • Ideally, the bar should have been limited only to Cat 1 and Cat 2 AIFs. Cat 3 AIFs, widely known as hedge funds, typically play in equity long/short strategies, or do other leveraged trades. REs find such investment a useful way to diversify their funds into hedge funds. Hedge fund investments are common by institutional investors all over the world; an outright curb on these investments by REs is, once again, beyond the stated intent. Notably, given the wide range of investments that Cat 3 AIFs make, avoiding an overlap with the RE’s borrowers will be quite impractical.
  • Practical implementation of this circular, if at all a RE invests in an AIF, will be quite tough. AIFs will have to share their potential investment list, which will be against any investment manager’s choice. Assuming there is an overlapped investment, the RE will have to exit within 30 days, which will create liquidity issues for AIFs, in addition to challenging the lock-in restrictions.
  • Most of the regulated entities took a provision in the 3rd quarter. The 27th March circular of the RBI gives some relief by saying that the provision will be required only to the extent of the downstream investment in a debtor entity.

In our view, there is a need to review the regulatory mechanism for AIFs, as currently, AIFs are being used as instruments of regulatory arbitrage.


[1] https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=12572&Mode=0

[2] Commercial Banks (including Small Finance Banks, Local Area Banks and Regional Rural Banks), Primary (Urban) Co-operative Banks/State Co-operative Banks/ Central Co-operative Banks, All-India Financial Institutions, Non-Banking Financial Companies (including Housing Finance Companies)


Other articles related to the topic:

  1. RBI bars lenders’ investments in AIFs investing in their borrowers
  2. AIFs ail SEBI: Cannot be used for regulatory breach
  3. SEBI’s standard approach, standardising valuation for AIFs
  4. Comparison between non-deposit accepting NBFC – Investment and Credit Company (NBFC-ND-ICC), Core Investment Company (CIC) and an Alternative Investment Fund (AIF)
  5. Snippet on credit of existing & issue of new units of AIFs in demat form
  6. SEBI amends framework for Large Value Funds

Call for papers – Wadia Ghandy Award for Structured Finance Research, 2024

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For more information regarding the 12th Securitisation Summit –

Overview of sustainability-linked loans

-An emerging and promising financing substitute

Surabhi Chura | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

There has been a growing emphasis on sustainability across various sectors including finance, especially, with a growing mandatory requirement of disclosure of sustainability practices by companies around the world. Various sustainability-linked finance products are designed to promote the ESG objectives of the borrower while providing financial solutions.

Traditionally, loans have remained the most common way of raising finance, and sustainable finance is no exception to the same. These loans may be labelled as green loans, social loans, sustainable loans etc. Various organisations have issued voluntary guiding principles around the same[1]. A commonality in these loans is the restriction on the “use of proceeds” – that are directed towards the green, social or sustainable objectives of the borrower. Another form of sustainable finance through loans is Sustainability-linked Loans (SLLs), where the loan contains certain sustainability-linked terms. Contrary to typical green finance products, which allocate funds for designated green projects or assets, SLLs align the loan conditions with the sustainability performance of the borrower.

Other instruments of raising sustainable finance can be through the issuance of labelled bonds or GSS+ bonds. Read more about the same in our article – Sustainable finance and GSS+ bonds. One of the more recent innovative ways of financing sustainability objects of the borrower can be through Sustainability-linked derivatives.

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Single Corporate Group focused FPIs & Large value FPIs to disclose granular details of beneficial ownership

Prapti Kanakia | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

March 21, 2024 (original article dated October 31, 2023)

SEBI Circular, effective 1st November 2023, required FPIs to provide the details of their beneficial owners without applying any threshold in the shareholding or on layers of intermediate entities until all the natural persons are identified. An enabling provision to this effect had also been inserted as Reg. 22(6) in SEBI (Foreign Portfolio Investors) Regulations, 2019 effective from 10th August 2023. SEBI vide circular dated 27th July, 2023, had also mandated all non-individual FPIs to obtain Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) number by 23rd January 2024[1]. However, LEI could not address the requirement of additional disclosures as the LEI data stops at the parent entity level and does not provide the details of natural persons in control of the entity.

As to what could be the trigger for these regulatory changes may be anybody’s guess, but tacitly, the SEBI circular dated 24th August, 2023[2] (Circular) introducing some significant changes in beneficial ownership details by FPIs, made several admissions. It seemingly admitted that the disclosure of beneficial ownership by FPIs took advantage of technicalities by structuring the holding of natural persons to less than 10%. It also admitted that several FPIs had concentric investments in a single corporate group, making it apparent that these FPIs were used as conduits for investing in a single entity, and therefore, there may be affiliation between the FPIs and the controlling shareholders.

Briefly stated, the changed norms required FPIs, which have either (a) 50% or more of their Indian equity AUM in a single corporate group; or (b) hold along with investor group more than INR 25,000 Crore of equity AUM in Indian markets, to disclose their beneficial ownership, drilled down to the natural person level, irrespective of the percentage of holding, unless eligible for exemption.

These requirements, though effective from 1st November 2023, gave a time frame of 90 calendar days for existing FPIs to re-adjust their holdings. Meaning, FPIs had time till 29th January 2024 to realign their investment within the threshold prescribed in order to avoid providing the details of the beneficial owner as required under the Circular. Post 29th January 2024, FPIs whose investment continued to exceed the threshold as mentioned above were required to disclose the details of beneficial owners within 30 trading days ending on 12th March 2024, which if not provided led to cancellation of the FPI registration license and in the interim, blocking of account for further purchase of equity securities and restricted voting rights in investee companies. 

Mandatory Beneficial Ownership (‘BO’) disclosure

The new norms differed from the erstwhile norms, where BO disclosure was required if a natural person’s beneficial holding exceeded the threshold as prescribed under PML (Maintenance of Records) Rules 2005, as indicated below:

Figure 1: Threshold under PML (Maintenance of Records) Rules, 2005

The new norms required mandatory disclosure of BO, irrespective of the percentage of holding by the BO. No matter how many layers of entities covered the identity of the BO, FPIs had to identify the natural persons holding any ownership, economic interest, or exercising control, if the FPIs fall in either of the 2 categories discussed below, unless exempted.

FPIs covered under the Circular

(a) Single Corporate Group focused FPIs:

If, instead of investing in a diverse pool of assets, an FPI has concentrated into a single corporate group, there are apparent concerns that the FPI is being used as a facade for making investments into a single entity. Thus, if on an AUM basis, more than 50% of the AUM of an FPI is in a “single corporate group”, the FPI has to provide the BO disclosure unless exempted (refer discussion below).

Intent: As per SEBI BM Agenda, the intent is to ensure there is no circumvention of minimum public shareholding norms or disclosures under SAST Regulations or investing funds routed through land border sharing countries and therefore, the need to obtain granular information around the ownership of, economic interest in, and control of FPIs with concentrated equity holdings in single companies or corporate groups.

Meaning of single corporate group: SEBI did not provide any clarity on single corporate group and left it to the stock exchanges/depositories. Rather than limiting to the existing law, BSE/NSE[3] identified a single corporate group more practically. Apart from entities having common control i.e. holding, subsidiary, associate, joint venture, and entities where promoters have major shareholding, entities which are mentioned on the website or in the annual report of the entity as a group company, have also been considered as a part of the group.

Basis this definition, BSE on its own identified the companies forming part of a single corporate group and asked the listed entities to confirm the name of the group as identified by BSE by sending communication in terms of Para 16 of the SEBI Circular that requires Stock exchanges/ Depositories to maintain a repository containing names of companies forming a part of each single corporate group and disseminate the same publicly on their websites[4].

(b) Large sized FPIs:

FPIs with an AUM of more than INR 25,000 crore, either individually or along with their investor group[5], may pose a systematic risk in the Indian markets. It will be more concerning if such FPIs are tacitly controlled by unfriendly nations, and therefore, SEBI mandated BO disclosure from such FPIs too.

Intent: As per SEBI BM Agenda, the intent was to examine from the perspective of DPIIT Press Note 3 of April 17, 2020 (although not applicable to FPI investments), if the FPI route could potentially be misused to circumvent the stipulations of the same and disrupt the orderly functioning of Indian securities markets by their actions by having a substantial number of investors from countries that share land borders with India. It is likely that the FPI with a large Indian equity portfolio may itself be situated out of a non–land bordering country, the first level/ intermediate investors in such FPIs may be based out of land–bordering countries. This reiterated the need to obtain granular information around the ownership of, economic interest in, and control of such FPIs.

Exemption from BO disclosure

  1. Single Corporate Group (‘SCG’) focused FPIs
  1. Investment in SCG is insignificant compared to global investment

There might be cases where the FPI has taken exposure over an SCG only, however, may have investments globally as well and the percentage of Indian investments might be quite less when compared with its overall global investment. In such a scenario, there are fewer chances of FPIs being used as a conduit for avoiding compliance or hiding the identity of the BO. Therefore, the FPIs which are holding more than 50% of their Indian AUM in an SCG and such investments are less than 25% of their global AUM, are exempt from providing the BO disclosure.

  1. No identified promoter in SCG

SEBI vide circular[6] dated 20th March, 2024, further exempted SCG focused FPIs meeting the following conditions:

  • The apex company does not have identified promoter;
  • Such FPI holds not more than 50% of its India equity AUM in the corporate group, after excluding its holding in the apex company with no identified promoter.
  • The composite holdings of all such FPIs (having SCG exposure) in the apex company with no identified promoter, is less than 3% of its total equity share capital,

Intent: As per the Consultation Paper the intent is that if FPI has exposure in SCG with no identified promoter in the apex company, there is no risk of circumvention of minimum public shareholding provision and may be exempted from the disclosure requirement. Further, there is a possibility that even though the apex company itself has no identified promoter, the FPI might still hold a significant part of its portfolio in group companies that have an identified promoter and therefore if their holding in the group is not significant exemption can be granted.

Figure 2: Exemption from disclosure requirement in case there is no promoter in SCG

  1. Large sized FPIs,

FPIs whose Indian AUM is more than INR 25,000 crore and their investments in India are less than 50% of their overall global investments are exempt from providing such disclosure since the probability of such FPIs being used as a facade to obtain control over Indian markets is quite less.

  1. General Exemption

FPIs that have a wide investor base or are backed by the government or government related investors do not pose any risk to Indian markets or the probability is quite low, and therefore the following categories of FPIs are exempt from providing BO disclosure. Also, if the investors in FPI fall under the below mentioned categories, then identification of BO for such investors will not be required. In case the constituents of Large sized FPIs fall under below mentioned category, their holding will also not be aggregated with their investor group to calculate the limit of Rs. 25,000 Crore.

Figure 3: List of exempted FPI

The below figures provide a gist of the scenarios where FPIs are required to provide the disclosure

Figure 4: Flowchart depicting the scenarios that would warrant additional disclosures

Responsibility of DDPs/Depository

The FPIs are put under the obligation to ensure compliance with the SEBI Circular, i.e. providing the BO disclosure and monitoring the concentration limit in a single corporate group and the equity investments in India. Additionally, DDPs are also required to monitor the same and intimate the FPIs wherever they breach the criteria and once the registration of FPI is invalidated as a result of non-disclosure, the Depository will intimate the investee listed company to freeze the voting rights of such FPIs to the extent of actual shareholding or shareholding corresponding to 50% of its equity AUM on the date its FPI registration is rendered invalid, whichever is lower (refer the example below).

To ensure that there is no regulatory arbitrage amongst DDPs, a standard operating procedure (SOP)[7] has been framed & followed by all the DDPs to independently validate the conformance of FPIs with the conditions and exemptions prescribed. The SOP is based on the application of the core principles of minimising Type II errors i.e. where legitimate FPIs and their investors face challenges of onerous regulatory requirements) without adding to Type I errors i.e., where FPIs that may be breaching regulations, circumvent the need to make disclosures that would bring such breaches to light, through the ‘trust – but verify’ route.

Responsibility of a Listed Entity

The FPIs whose registration is rendered invalid as a result of non-disclosure are restricted from casting their vote and it is the responsibility of investee listed company to ensure that the voting rights of such FPIs are freezed to the extent of actual shareholding or shareholding corresponding to 50% of equity AUM on the date its FPI registration is rendered invalid, whichever is lower. The said information will be provided by the depository to the investee listed entity/its RTA. The following example clarifies calculation of extent of shareholding to be freezed.

Eg. FPI XYZ has 60 shares of Company A and 40 shares of Company B as on May 13, 2024, and the FPI fails to make the additional disclosures, thereby rendering its FPI registration invalid from May 13, 2024. Thereafter, FPI’s voting rights shall be restricted to shareholding corresponding to 30 shares of Company A and 20 shares of Company B.

Suppose as on July 01, 2024, the FPI has liquidated some shares and holds 15 shares of Company A and 30 shares of Company B. As on this date, the FPI will be able to exercise voting rights corresponding to 15 shares of Company A but only 20 shares of Company B (maximum permissible voting rights in Company A).[8]

The listed entities were required to intimate the details of their corporate group to the stock exchanges and any change is to be intimated within 2 working days of the effective date of such change[9].

The non-compliant FPIs are also restricted from purchasing further equity shares, however, the responsibility is not upon the listed entity to not issue equity shares to such FPIs. The DDPs/Custodian will block the account of FPIs for further purchases and they cannot participate in any corporate action which increases the equity shareholding such as rights issue, FPOs, etc. However, credit as a result of any involuntary corporate actions such as bonus issue, scheme of arrangement, etc will be allowed.

Conclusion

SEBI had stated that there cannot be sustained capital formation without transparency and trust. The Circular is a move to foster trust and increase transparency in the Indian Capital markets. The Circular does not seem to be a hindrance to genuine FPIs, though operational challenges might be faced by the FPIs in identifying the BOs.


[1] 180 days from the date of issue of the SEBI Circular.

[2] The said circular was approved in the SEBI Board meeting dated 28th June, 2023

[3] Circular dated 30th November 2023

[4] NSE – https://www.nseindia.com/regulations/listing-compliance

BSE – https://www.bseindia.com/static/about/corporate_group_repository.aspx

[5] Investor group means FPIs which, directly or indirectly, have common ownership of more than 50% or common control.

[6] The said exemption was approved in the SEBI Board meeting dated March 15, 2024

[7] https://av.sc.com/in/content/docs/in-sop-for-granular-reporting.pdf

[8] Calculation manner as provided in SOP

[9] BSE Circular dated 09th February, 2024


Fractional property shares: Come either as Small REIT, or wind up

Avinash Shetty & Kaushal Shah | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Updated as on 21st March, 2024

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Read our other resources on REITs here:

  1. Fractional ownership schemes: Distinguishing between investment schemes and shared ownership of real assets
  2. CG norms for REITs and InvITs aligned with equity-listed entity
  3. Residual income from REITs and InvITs now covered under section 56 of Income-tax Act.
  4. REIT and InvIT unitholders with 10% aggregate holding get Board nomination rights

The iSAFE option to start up funding: Legality and taxation

Mahak Agarwal | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Navigating the world of fundraising for startups is no easy feat. This becomes all the more challenging for a pre-revenue start-up which cannot have a valuation. Amongst the several fundraising options available to a start-up, one of the budding and lesser-known sources happens to be iSAFE.

Origin

iSAFE, short for, India Simple Agreement for Future Equity, was first introduced in India by 100X.VC, an early-stage investment firm. This move was inspired by US’s ‘Simple Agreement for Future Equity (‘SAFE’)’, an alternative to convertible debt and the brainchild of an American start-up incubator. SAFE is a financing contract between a startup and an investor that grants the investor the right to acquire equity in the firm subject to specific activating events, such as a future equity fundraising.[1]

So far as the success of SAFE in India is concerned, being neither debt (since they do not accrue interest), nor equity (since they do not carry any dividend or shareholders’ rights) or any other instrument, it could not carve its place in India and was cornered as a mere contingent contract with low reliability and security. On the contrary, iSAFE happened to be the game changer in the Indian context, being a significantly modified version of SAFE.

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SEBI approves uniform approach for market rumour verification, eases on-going compliance requirement for listed companies, eases norms for IPO/ fund raising, AIFs, relaxes requirement for FPI & extends timeline for HVDLE on March 15, 2024

-Avinash Shetty and Manisha Ghosh | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

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Other related resources:

  1. LODR Resource Centre
  2. AIFs ail SEBI: Cannot be used for regulatory breach
  3. FPIs – Synoptic Overview
  4. FPIs with single corporate group concentration to disclose beneficial ownership

Amendments to Credit Card and Debit Card Master Direction: Enhancing Consumer Protection

-Archisman Bhattacharjee I finserv@vinodkothari.com

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Mandatory bond issuance by Large Corporates: FAQs on revised framework

– Team Corplaw | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

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Our other resources

Expected credit losses on loans: Guide for NBFCs

– Vinod Kothari | finserv@vinodkothari.com

One of the most important, and often the most complicated issues in applying IndAS 109 to financial assets, particularly loan portfolios, is to the computation of expected credit losses (ECL). The following points need to be noted about ECL computation:

  • ECL is not relevant for assets which are subject to FVTPL. Hence, ECL computation is relevant for assets subject to amortised cost and FVOCI. This means, practically, all loan assets of NBFCs will be covered.
  • ECL is not a provision – it is a loss allowance. Therefore, ECL is debited to P/L account.
  • ECL is to be measured and re-measured every reporting period.
  • ECL is a present value measure. Therefore, even if there is no change in the estimates of the delays or defaults, there will still be a change in the ECL estimates, due to unwinding of the discount. The unwinding of the discount results in reduction of the ECL allowance.
  • The assessment of ECL has to be done even if the loan is perfectly performing. In fact, ECL computation has to be done at the very inception of the loan, when the question of monitoring its performance does not arise. As to why ECL is relevant for a performing loan, see discussion below.
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