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RBI Issues Draft Directions on Relief Measures in Areas Affected by Natural Calamities for Regulated Entities

Simrat Singh | finserv@vinodkothari.com 

When nature unsettles the ordinary course of life, the regulatory hand should neither be withdrawn nor clenched; it should extend a humane touch, easing distress and guiding the return of order. In this spirit, the RBI has released draft directions on Relief Measures in Areas Affected by Natural Calamities, setting out a framework under which banks, NBFCs and other Regulated Entities (REs) may provide relief to borrowers impacted by natural calamities or similar external events. The framework enables REs to extend resolution plans to eligible borrowers, while permitting retention of standard asset classification and lower provisioning, benefits that would otherwise not be available if such restructuring were undertaken under the normal IRACP framework.

It may be noted that earlier RBI had issued guidelines for banks in connection with matters relating to relief measures to be provided in areas affected by natural calamities consolidated under ‘Master Direction – Reserve Bank of India (Relief Measures by Banks in Areas affected by Natural Calamities) Directions 2018 – SCBs’ dated October 17, 2018. In 2016, these guidelines were made applicable, mutatis mutandis, to all NBFCs as well, in areas affected by natural calamities as identified for implementation of suitable relief measures by the institutional framework viz., District Consultative Committee (DCCs)/ State Level Bankers’ Committee (SLBCs). However, given that the provisions were drafted considering the banking operations, the implementation by NBFCs was ambiguous and the provisions were often overlooked.

While the proposed framework applies to both banks (Commercial, RRB, Local area banks etc) and NBFCs, there are separate draft Directions issued for each RE. In case of banks the provisions carry additional system-level and public service responsibilities, reflecting their role within SLBCs and DCCs.

Fig 1:  Actionables for NBFCs under the draft directions

Applicability and process flow

The draft directions are proposed to come into effect from 1 April 2026, after the final directions are notified. The framework is triggered upon formal notification of a natural calamity by the Central Government or the concerned State Government.

Where a calamity affects a substantial part of a State, it is proposed that a special meeting of the SLBC  shall be convened within 15 days of such declaration. If the impact is confined to one or more districts, the corresponding DCC(s) are required to meet within the same timeframe. These committees assess the severity of the impact on economic activity, determine objective criteria for identifying impacted borrowers and indicate the nature and extent of relief such as moratoriums that may be extended by regulated entities operating in the affected areas. The decisions taken in these meetings are communicated to regulated entities and are required to be given adequate publicity, primarily by banks, through field outreach and public communication. The relief framework becomes operational in line with such Government notifications and the decisions of the SLBC or DCC, as applicable.

Amendments in the Credit Policy

The draft directions propose that the REs update their credit policies to incorporate a structured and pre-defined framework for dealing with borrower stress arising from natural calamities. The credit policy is expected to provide for resolution in line with the provisions and to set out objective principles governing the terms of relief across different borrower segments and loan categories.

While the precise parameters may vary depending on the nature and severity of the calamity, the decisions of the SLBC/DCC/Governments, the credit policy is expected to lay down a consistent framework to be applied by the REs when extending relief. This includes identifying potential relief measures, specifying verifiable parameters for determining eligibility of borrowers and extent of relief and defining the delegation matrix for approval and implementation. The emphasis is on ensuring timely decision-making, particularly in relation to restructuring of existing exposures and sanction of additional finance.

Eligible Borrowers and Coverage

Relief under the draft Directions is proposed to be available only to borrowers who meet the prescribed eligibility conditions as on the date of occurrence of the natural calamity. To qualify, the borrower’s account must be classified as ‘Standard’ and must not be in default for more than 30 days with the concerned RE in respect of any facility. Other additional conditions may be laid down in the credit policy.

Borrowers who do not meet these conditions fall outside the scope of the calamity relief framework and may instead be considered for resolution under the applicable Resolution of Stressed Assets Directions. In such cases, however, the RE does not receive the benefit of standard asset classification or lower provisioning (see discussion below). The framework extends its shelter only to those borrowers who, till the moment the calamity struck, had kept their financial obligations substantially intact. The protection is not meant to rescue infirm credit, but to steady sound accounts momentarily shaken by forces beyond human control.

Resolution Plan and Permissible Relief Measures

Where a RE decides to extend relief, the resolution plan is to be structured based on an assessment of the borrower’s post-calamity viability. The draft Directions propose a range of relief measures, including rescheduling of repayments, grant of moratorium, and conversion of accrued or future interest into another credit facility. Regulated entities may also consider sanctioning additional or fresh finance to address temporary financial stress, subject to appropriate assessment of viability and credit risk.

Notably, the framework is enabling rather than mandatory. It does not require automatic restructuring of all eligible accounts, thereby allowing REs to exercise credit judgement while operating within the prescribed regulatory parameters.

Timelines for Invocation and Implementation

It is proposed that resolution under the framework must be invoked within 45 days from the date of declaration of the natural calamity, unless an extension is granted by the Regional Director or Officer-in-Charge of the Reserve Bank. This would mean that the aggrieved borrower must approach the lender and the terms of restructuring must be agreed between both of them within the said timeframe. Once invoked, the resolution plan must be implemented within 90 days from the date of invocation.

In practice, this means that following the Government notification and the SLBC or DCC meeting, typically held within the first 15 days from the notification, REs have a limited 30-day window to complete borrower identification, viability assessment, documentation and approval. Failure to adhere to these timelines results in loss of the regulatory benefits available under the framework.

Asset classification treatment

The most significant regulatory benefit under the proposed framework relates to asset classification. Where a resolution plan is implemented in compliance with the Directions, borrower accounts classified as ‘Standard’ may be retained as such upon implementation instead of facing any downgrade. Further, accounts that may have slipped into NPA status between the date of occurrence of the calamity and the implementation of the resolution plan are permitted to be upgraded to ‘Standard’ upon implementation. However, as per the ECL Policy of the RE, generally any restructuring would automatically be treated as a SICR and therefore, the staging may change and a higher ECL would be required to be provided on such restructuring which may nullify the benefit. 

After implementation, subsequent asset classification is governed by the applicable IRACP norms. The proposed framework also addresses cases of repeated restructuring. Where a borrower account is restructured again under these Directions before the reversal of additional provisions (see below), it may continue to be classified as ‘Standard’, subject to recognition of interest on a cash basis from the second restructuring onwards and maintenance of an additional specific provision of five per cent of the outstanding debt for each restructuring, subject to an overall ceiling of 100 per cent.

Income Recognition and Provisioning

For restructured accounts, it is proposed that interest income may be recognised on an accrual basis. At the same time, REs are required to maintain an additional specific provision of 5% of the outstanding debt, over and above the applicable provisioning under IRACP norms. Reversal of this additional provision can happen only where the borrower repays at least 20% of the outstanding debt, the account does not slip into NPA status after implementation of the restructuring and no further restructuring is undertaken during the relevant period. Specifically for banks, if the outstanding debt post-restructuring is only in the form of non-fund-based facilities or facilities in the nature of cash credit / overdraft, the additional provisions can be reversed after one year, post implementation of the restructuring, provided the borrower was not in default at any point of time during the period concerned.

Ancillary relief measures and government support

It is proposed that the REs be required to extend interest subvention or prompt repayment incentive benefits notified by the Government to all eligible borrowers. They must also ensure that any relief already provided, or being provided, by the Central or State Governments is duly factored into the resolution process.

For agricultural loans secured by land, the draft Directions propose acceptance of certificates issued by Revenue Department officials where original title documents have been lost due to the calamity. In areas governed by community ownership arrangements, certificates issued by competent community authorities may also be accepted. REs may also, at their discretion, provide additional relief such as waiver or reduction of fees and charges for borrowers in affected areas, for a period not exceeding one year. Expected proceeds from insurance policies may also be kept while deciding the relief. Additionally for banks it is proposed that they shall open small accounts for displaced borrowers and take immediate action to restore ATM services in the impacted areas. They may operate their natural calamity affected branches from temporary premises under advice to the RBI. For continuing the temporary premise beyond 30 days, banks may obtain specific approval from the concerned Regional Office of RBI. A bank shall also make arrangements to render banking services in the affected areas by setting up satellite offices, extension counters or mobile banking facilities etc. under intimation to the RBI.

Reporting Requirements

It is proposed that the REs shall upload data on relief measures extended under the framework in the prescribed format on a half-yearly basis. The data points include ‘Outstanding eligible for restructuring as on the date of notification of natural calamity’, ‘Credit facilities restructured/rescheduled during the half year’, ‘Additional/fresh loans provided to affected borrowers during the half year’ etc.  The data must be submitted within 30 days from the end of each half-year, i.e., as of 30 September and 31 March, through the CIMS portal. Where no relief measures are extended during a reporting period, a NIL statement is required to be submitted.

See our other resources:

  1. COVID- 19 AND THE SHUT DOWN: THE IMPACT OF FORCE MAJEURE
  2. RBI Trade Relief Directions: How is your company impacted?

Representation with respect to NBFC-related Regulatory Issues

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RBI Integrated Ombudsman Scheme 2026 – Key Changes

– Chirag Agarwal & Siddharth Pandey | finserv@vinodkothari.com

Background 

The framework for Integrated Ombudsman Scheme (IOS) constitutes a cornerstone of the RBI’s customer protection and grievance redressal mechanism across the financial sector. With the objective of providing customers a single, unified and accessible platform for redressal of complaints against Regulated Entities, the RBI introduced the Integrated Ombudsman framework.

The RBI has now introduced the Reserve Bank – Integrated Ombudsman Scheme, 2026 (“IOS 2026”), which supersedes the earlier Reserve Bank – Integrated Ombudsman Scheme, 2021 (“IOS 2021”). The new Scheme shall come into force with effect from July 1, 2026.

Key Changes

The IOS 2026 seeks to refine and reinforce the existing mechanism by expanding the scope of coverage, strengthening the powers of the Ombudsman, tightening procedural timelines, enhancing disclosure and reporting. The table below highlights and analyses the key changes introduced under IOS 2026 as compared to the IOS 2021, to enable stakeholders to assess the regulatory and operational impact of the revised framework.

ProvisionIOS 2021IOS 2026Analysis / Impact
Definition of “Customer” & “Deficiency in Service”The term “Customer” was not defined.
Limited definition for ‘Deficiency in Service’, largely linked to users/applicants of financial services. 
‘Customer’ means a person who uses, or is an applicant for, a service provided by a Regulated Entity. (Para 3(1)(h))
‘Deficiency in Service’ now applicable across all services provided by Regulated Entities and not just restricted to financial services. (Para 3(1)(i))
Broadens the scope of protection by covering all services offered by Regulated Entities, not just financial services.
Definition of “Rejected Complaints”Not expressly definedNew definition introduced – complaints closed under Clause 16 of the Scheme. (Para 3(1)(o))Clarificatory in nature; definition is not used elsewhere in the Scheme
Power to Implead Other Regulated EntitiesNo explicit powerOmbudsman empowered to make other Regulated Entities a party to the complaint if such Regulated Entity has, by an act, negligence, or omission, failed to comply with any directions, instructions, guidelines, or regulations issued by the RBI. (Para 8(6))Expands investigative and adjudicatory powers of the RBI Ombudsman
Annual Report on Scheme FunctioningThe Ombudsman was required to submit an annual report to the Deputy Manager of the RBI; however, the RBI was not obligated to publish it.It has now been made mandatory for the RBI to publish an annual report on the functioning and activities carried out under the Scheme. (Para 8(7))Enhances transparency and public accountability of the Ombudsman framework
Interim AdvisoryNo express provisionOmbudsman expressly empowered, if deemed necessary and based on the circumstances of the complaint, to issue an advisory to the RE at any stage to take such action as may lead to full or partial resolution and settlement of the complaint. (Para 14(6))Enables interim reliefs/directions and more effective complaint handling. This would help in resolving disputes by settlement at any stage. IOS permits advisories i.e., communications from the Ombudsman advising REs to take actions for full or partial complaint resolution. Advisories are non-binding and serve as a pre-award tool to facilitate quicker settlements.
Principal Nodal Officer (PNO) – Change ReportingReporting obligation not specifiedAny change in appointment or contact details of PNO must be reported to CEPD, RBI (prior to change or immediately post-change) (Para 18(2))Additional intimation requirement for regulated entities
Compensation – Consequential LossCapped at ₹20 lakh Enhanced to ₹30 lakh (Para 8(3))Increases the limit of potential financial risk for Regulated Entities
Compensation – Harassment & Mental AnguishConsolatory damages capped at ₹1 lakh Increased to ₹3 lakh (in addition to other compensation) (Para 8(3))Compensation limit tripled
Limit on Amount in DisputeNo monetary cap  No change – still no limit (Para 8(3))Ombudsman continues to have wide jurisdiction irrespective of dispute value
Timeline for Filing Complaint1 year from RE’s reply; or 1 year + 30 days if no reply from RE Complaint must be filed within 90 days from the expiry of the RE’s response timeline (30 days) or last communication, whichever is later. (Para 10(1)(g))Considerably tightens timelines; this would mean the customers must act swiftly
Guidance on Complaint FilingDispersed across the SchemeConsolidated guidance provided in Part A of the Annexure along with Complaint Form. (Annex)The guidance merely reiterates the points from the scheme that relate to admissibility of a valid complaint, but this is useful for the complainant as he will be aware of the complaint filing requirements and shall not be required to be thorough with the scheme itself
Modes of Filing ComplaintSpecified the options to file a complaint through portal, email, or courier at CRPC. Explicitly specified the email-ID of CRPC, and the address at which the complaint shall be couriered.
(Para 6(2))
Specification of the details for filing complaint
Data Consent in Complaint FormNo explicit consent requirementExplicit consent for use of personal data mandatory. (Annex)Aligns complaint process with evolving data protection and privacy standards
Categorisation of Complaints in complaint formLimited classificationDetailed categorisation of complainant type and nature of complaint. (Annex)Enables better routing, analytics, and faster resolution
Maintainability Check in Complaint FormNo upfront maintainability warningExplicit note stating non-maintainable scenarios (court pending, advocate filing, etc.). (Annex)Reduces frivolous filings and early-stage rejections
Appellate AuthorityExecutive Director in charge of concerned RBI departmentExecutive Director in charge of Consumer Education and Protection Department (CEPD) explicitly designated. (Para 3(1)(a))Clarificatory in nature
Introduced system-based validationNo such provisionComplaints received via portal, will undergo a system-based validation/check and will be rejected  at the outset for being non-maintainable complaints.
For the complaints received via e-mail and physical mode,  CRPC will assess their maintainability under the Scheme. (Para 12(1))
This would enhance the “gatekeeping” responsibility of the CRPC, which should speed up the process for valid complaints by weeding out inadmissible ones.

Actionables for REs:

  • REs should review and align their internal grievance handling and escalation processes to ensure all service-related complaints are covered.
  • REs shall provide prior intimation to the CEPD, RBI for any change in the appointment or contact details of the Principal Nodal Officer (PNO)
  • REs shall take note of the enhanced compensation limits under the Scheme and accordingly reassess potential liabilities, update grievance redressal frameworks, and sensitize relevant teams to ensure compliance with revised thresholds.
  • Para 18, as in the earlier Scheme, requires REs to display the salient features of the Scheme, a copy of the IOS 2026, and the updated contact details of the Principal Nodal Officer on their website and at their branches/places where the business is transacted.

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Lending to your own: RBI Amendment Directions on Loans to Related Parties

-Team Finserv | finserv@vinodkothari.com

On January 5, 2026, the RBI issued the Amendment Directions on Lending to Related Parties by Regulated Entities. Pursuant to this, changes were introduced to Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Credit Risk Management) – Amendment Directions, 2026 (CRM Amendment Directions) and Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Financial Statements: Presentation and Disclosures) Directions, Amendment Directions, 2026. Previously, Draft Directions were also issued on the subject. Our write-up on the draft directions can be accessed here.

Highlights

Applicability and Effective Date

The amendments under CRM Directions shall apply to all NBFCs, including Housing Finance Companies (HFCs) with regard to lending by an NBFC to its ‘related party’ and any contract or arrangement entered into by an NBFC with a ‘related party’. However, Type 1 NBFCs and Core Investment Companies shall not be covered under the applicability. 

These amendments shall come into force on 1 April 2026. NBFCs may, however, choose to implement the amendments in their entirety from an earlier date.

In addition to complying with the provisions of the Amendment Directions, listed NBFCs shall continue to adhere to the applicable requirements of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015, as amended from time to time.

Grandfathering of existing arrangements: Existing RPTs that are not compliant with these amendments may continue until their original maturity. However, such loans, contracts, or credit limits shall not be renewed, reviewed, or extended upon expiry, even where the original agreement provides for renewal or review.

Any enhancement of limits sanctioned prior to 1st April 2026 shall be permitted only if they are fully compliant with these amendments.

Relevant Definitions 

Related Party

RPs under Amendment DirectionsWhether covered in the Present Regulations
(A) Related Persons: These can be non-corporate
a promoter, or a director, or a KMP of the NBFC or relatives of the said (natural) personAll other persons except the promoter was covered
Person holding 5% equity or 5% voting rights, singly or jointly, or relatives of the said (natural) personNo
Person having the power to nominate a director through agreement, or relatives of the said (natural) personNo
Person exercising control, either singly or jointly, or relatives of the said (natural) personYes
(B) Related Parties: These can be any person other than individual/HUF, and cover Entities where (A) Covered Partially
is a partner, manager, KMP, director or a promoterPromoter not covered
hold/s 10% of PUSCHolds lower of (i)10% of PUSC and (ii)₹5 crore in PUSC
has single or joint control with another personYes
controls more than 20% of voting rightsNo
has power to nominate director on the BoardNo
are such on the advice  direction, or instruction of which the entities are accustomed to actNo
is a guarantor/suretyYes
is a trustee or an author or a beneficiary (where entity is a private trust)No
Entities which are related to (A) as subsidiary, parent/holding company, associate or joint ventureYes

The definition of “Related Party” remains unchanged from that provided under the Draft Directions. 

Further, a clarification have been added where an entity in which a related person has the power to nominate a director solely pursuant to a lending or financing arrangement shall not be regarded as a related party.

Related Person

Under the Draft directions, the definition of a “related person” included group entities. However, pursuant to the Amendment Directions, group entities have been expressly excluded from the scope of “related person.” The provisions are specific for lending to directors, KMPs and their related parties. In the case of lending to entities such as subsidiaries and associates, the NBFC must adhere to the concentration norms as prescribed under the CRM Directions. 

Specified Employees

The definition of “Senior Officer” as provided under the erstwhile regulations (Para 4(1)(vii) of the Credit Risk Management Directions) has been omitted and, in its place, the concept of “Specified Employees” has been introduced. “Specified Employees” has been defined to mean all employees of an NBFC who are positioned up to two levels below the Board, along with any other employee specifically designated as such under the NBFC’s internal policy.

Under the erstwhile regulations, the term “Senior Officer” was given the same meaning as defined under Section 178 of the Companies Act, 2013. Thus, the terms Senior Officer included the following:

  1. Members of the core management team,
  2. All members of management who are one level below the Executive Directors,
  3. Functional heads

Practically, this change implies that one additional hierarchical level would now need to be designated as “Specified Employees”. Further, the specific inclusions that earlier applied under the Companies Act and the LODR Regulations i.e., functional heads under the Companies Act and CS and CFO under the LODR will no longer be automatically covered, unless they fall within two levels below the Board or are specifically designated as such under the NBFC’s internal policy.

Meaning of “Lending”

‘Lending’ in the context of related party transactions would include funded as well as non-fund-based credit facilities to related parties. It may further be noted that investments in debt instruments of related parties are specifically included within the ambit of lending. Accordingly, the scope is not just restricted to loans and advances but includes all fund based and non-fund based exposures as well as investment exposures. 

Principles to be followed while lending to a related party

While lending to related parties, the following principles and provisions are to be followed by NBFCs:

  1. Credit Policy

The credit policy of the NBFC must contain specific provisions on lending to RPs. Mandatory contents of such policy will include:

  1. Definition of RPs and Specified Employees
  2. Safeguards to address the risks emanating from lending to related parties
  3. Provisions relating to lending to ‘specified officers’ of the NBFC and their relatives
  4. Provisions related to a suitable whistleblower mechanism for employees to raise concerns over irregular and unethical loans to RPs. Any kind of quid pro quo arrangements should also be prohibited.
  5. Materiality Thresholds for sanctioning of the loans
  6. Interested parties to recuse themselves
  7. Limits for lending to RPs, including sub-limits for lending to a single related party and a group of related parties
  8. Monitoring mechanism for such loans to RPs. This would include the designation of a specified authority for monitoring as well as reporting to the Board/Board committee. Further, procedure in case of deviation from the policy must also be prescribed. 

Earlier, the policy requirement was specifically applicable in case of base layer NBFCs, but now the same has been made applicable for all NBFCs. 

  1. Board approved limits for lending to RPs

The CRM Amendment Directions also mandate prescribing board-approved limits for lending to RPs. Further, sub-limits will also have to be prescribed for lending to a single RP and a group of RPs. Here, a question may arise on what basis will the NBFC prescribe such limits? Such limits may be prescribed after considering the ticket size of the loans generally offered by the Company, to ensure the loans to RPs are aligned with the loan products for general customers. The limit may be specified as a percentage of the NOF of the NBFC, similar to the credit concentration limits. 

  1. Materiality Thresholds

NBFCs may extend credit facilities to related parties in accordance with their Board-approved credit policy. Any such lending must be within the board-approved limit prescribed for lending to RPs (including a single RP and a group of RPs). 

Further, under the Amendment Directions (Para 13G of the CRM Amendment Directions), RBI has now clearly laid down materiality thresholds for such lending to related parties, including those to directors, senior officers, and their relatives. Lending above the prescribed materiality threshold should be sanctioned by the Board/Board Committee of the NBFC. (other than the Audit Committee).

It may be noted that earlier, for middle and upper layer NBFCs, any loans aggregating to ₹ 5 Crore and above were to be sanctioned by the Board/Board Committee. The materiality thresholds prescribed under the Amendment Directions are based on the layer of the NBFC, as follows:

Category of NBFCsMateriality Threshold
Upper Layer and Top Layer₹10 crore
Middle Layer₹5 crore
Base Layer₹1 crore
Layer of the NBFC shall be based on the last audited balance sheet.For loans, materiality threshold shall apply at individual transaction level

Can the power to sanction loans be delegated to the Audit Committee?

The CRM Amendment Directions have defined the Committee on lending to related parties which will mean a committee of the Board of the NBFC entrusted with sanctioning of loans to related parties. NBFCs may also identify any existing Committee, other than the Audit Committee, for this purpose.

Further, para 13I provides that,

However, a NBFC at its discretion, may delegate the above powers of lending beyond the materiality threshold to a Committee of the Board (hereafter called Committee) other than the Audit Committee of the Board

Accordingly, on a reading of the above, it seems that the power to sanction loans cannot be provided to the Audit Committee of the Board. 

  1. Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism
  1. NBFC shall maintain and periodically update the list of all related persons, related parties, and loans sanctioned to them. This will be in addition to the list of related parties of the NBFC, which comes from the Companies Act, 2013, LODR and Accounting Standards.
  2. The list shall be reviewed at regular intervals to ensure accuracy and compliance.
  3. Credit facilities sanctioned to specified employees and their relatives shall be reported to the Board annually.
  4. Any deviation from the lending policy on related parties, along with reasons, shall be reported to the Audit Committee or to the Board where no Audit Committee exists.
  5. Products/structures circumventing these Directions (reciprocal lending, quid pro quo) shall be treated as related party lending.

5. Quid Pro Quo Arrangements

The CRM amendment directions also provide that any arrangements which aim at circumventing the Amendment Directions will be treated as lending to RPs. Accordingly, any such arrangements involving reciprocal lending to related parties shall be subject to all the provisions of this direction. 

  1. Refrain from participation

Para 13J requires that Directors, KMPs and specified employees must recuse themselves from any deliberations or decision-making on loan proposals, contracts or arrangements that involve themselves or their related parties. This obligation also applies to all subsequent decisions involving material changes to such loans, including one-time settlements, write-offs, waivers, enforcement of security and implementation of resolution plans, to ensure independence and avoid conflicts of interest.

Financial Statements Disclosures

Details of exposure to related parties as per these Directions shall be disclosed in the Notes To Accounts pursuant to para 21(9A) of the Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Financial Statements: Presentation and Disclosures) Directions, 2025 in the following format:

(Amt in ₹ Crore)
Sr. NoParticulars Previous YearCurrent Year
Loans to Related Parties
1Aggregate value of loans sanctioned to related parties during the year
2Aggregate value of outstanding loans to related parties as on 31st March
3Aggregate value of outstanding loans to related parties as a proportion of total credit exposure as on 31st March
4Aggregate value of outstanding loans to related parties which are categorized as:
(i) Special Mention Accounts as on 31st March
(ii) Non-Performing Assets as on 31st March
5Amount of provisions held in respect of loans to related parties as on 31st March
Contracts and Arrangements involving Related Parties
6Aggregate value of contracts and arrangements awarded to related parties during the year
7Aggregate value of outstanding contracts and arrangements involving related parties as on 31st March

Comparison at a Glance

ParametersExisting GuidelinesAmendment Directions
ApplicabilityNBFC-BL- only policy requirement was prescribedNBFC-ML and above – threshold, approval and reporting was applicableNBFCs in all layers, except Type 1 and CICs
Materiality Threshold/ Threshold for seeking board approvalNBFCs-BL- As per the PolicyNBFCs-ML- Rs. 5 croreNBFCs-UL- Rs. 5 croreNBFCs-BL- Rs. 1 croreNBFCs-ML- Rs. 5 croreNBFCs-UL- Rs. 10 crore. Lending beyond the MT requires board or board committee approval (other than AC).
Board approved limits for lending to RPsNo such limit was required to be prescribedPolicy shall specify aggregate limits for loans towards related parties. Within this aggregate limit, there shall be sub-limits for loans to a single relatedparty and a group of related parties.Lending beyond the board approved limit, requires ratification by the Board/AC.
MonitoringLoans and Advances to Directors less than ₹5 crores shall be reported to the Board.
Further, all loans and advances to senior officers shall be reported to the Board.
Para 13K: Maintain and periodically update list of related persons, related parties, and loans to them.
Para 13L: Annually report credit facilities to specified employees and relatives to the Board.
Para 13M: Quarterly or shorter internal audit reviews on adherence to related party guidelines.
Para 13N: Report deviations and reasons to the Audit Committee or Board.
Para 13O: Products/structures circumventing Directions (reciprocal lending, quid pro quo) shall be treated as related party lending.
Policy RequirementOnly for NBFC-BL. NBFCs were required to prescribe a threshold beyond which the loans shall be required to be reported to the BoardApplicable for all NBFCs.  
Recusal by interested partiesDirectors who are directly or indirectly concerned or interested in any proposal should disclose the nature of their interest to the Board when any such proposal is discussedInterested parties, including specified employees to recuse themselves
Disclosure under FSRelated Party Disclosure were specified as per format prescribed under Para 21(9) of Financial Statement Disclosures DirectionsIn addition to the earlier requirement, another format has been prescribed under Para 21(9A) with respect to details of exposures to related parties
Power to sanction loans to RPsFor NBFCs-BL: Only reporting is required; no board approval
For NBFCs-ML and above: Board approval required for loans above the threshold.
For all NBFCs:Loans above materiality threshold shall be sanctioned by Board or delegated Committee (not Audit Committee)
Loans below the threshold shall be sanctioned by appropriate authority as defined under the Policy.

Our Other Resources:

Does Co-lending Make Default a Communicable Disease?

How to ensure uniform asset classification under co-lending

Simrat Singh | finserv@vinodkothari.com

Asset classification under RBI regulations has always been anchored to the borrower, not to individual loan facilities. Once a borrower shows repayment stress in any exposure, it is no longer reasonable to treat the borrower’s other obligations as unaffected; prudence requires that all other facilities to that borrower reflect the same level of stress. Even the insolvency law reinforces this borrower-level approach to default by allowing CIRP to be triggered irrespective of whether the default is owed to the applicant creditor or not (see Explanation to section 7 of the IBC)

This borrower-level approach is not unique to India. Globally, the Basel framework also defines default at the obligor level – the core idea being that credit stress is a condition of the borrower, not of a single loan. In other words, when a borrower sneezes financial distress, all his loans catch a classification cold.

Position under the earlier co-lending framework

Under the earlier 2020 framework for priority sector co-lending between banks and NBFCs, each RE applied its own asset classification norms to its respective share of the co-lent loan (see para 13 of 2020 framework). This allowed situations where the same borrower and same loan could be classified differently in the books of the two co-lenders. While operationally convenient, this approach sat uneasily with the borrower-level logic of RBI’s IRACP norms and diluted the consistency of credit risk recognition in a shared exposure.

Position under the Co-Lending Arrangements Directions, 2025

The 2025 Directions [now subsumed in Para B of the Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Transfer and Distribution of Credit Risk) Directions, 2025] resolve this inconsistency by requiring uniform asset classification across co-lenders at the borrower level (see para 124 reproduced below for reference).

124. NBFCs shall apply a borrower-level asset classification for their respective exposures to a borrower under CLA, implying that if either of the REs classifies its exposure to a borrower under CLA as SMA / NPA on account of default in the CLA exposure, the same classification shall be applicable to the exposure of the other RE to the borrower under CLA. NBFCs shall put in place a robust mechanism for sharing relevant information in this regard on a near-real time basis, and in any case latest by end of the next working day.

Therefore, where one co-lender classifies its share of a co-lent exposure as SMA or NPA, the other co-lender must apply the same borrower classification to its share of the same exposure. It was an extension of RBI’s long-standing borrower-wise classification principle into a multi-lender structure.

Why “under the CLA” cannot be read in isolation

However, the wording of paragraph 124 has, in practice, been interpreted by some lenders in a much narrower manner. The phrase “under the CLA” has been read to mean that the classification of the other co-lender’s share would change only if the borrower defaults on the co-lent exposure itself. On this interpretation, where a borrower defaults on a separate, non-co-lent loan, lenders may in their books follow borrower level classification but they need not share such information with the co-lending partner since there is no default in the co-lent loan.

This approach, however, runs contrary to the regulatory intent and represents a classic case where the literal reading of a provision is placed in conflict with its underlying purpose. Market practice reflects this divergence. Traditional lenders have generally adopted a conservative approach, applying borrower-level classification across exposures irrespective of whether the default arises under the CLA. Certain other lenders, however, have taken a more aggressive position, limiting classification alignment strictly for defaults under the co-lent exposure. The conservative approach is more consistent with RBI’s prudential framework and intent, which has always treated credit stress as a condition of the borrower rather than of a particular loan structure.

Implications for other exposures to the same borrower

Once borrower-level classification is accepted as the governing principle, the consequence is straightforward: any other exposure that a co-lender has to the same borrower must also reflect the borrower’s SMA or NPA status, even if that exposure is not part of the co-lending arrangement. Let us understand this by way of examples.

Scenario 1: Multiple Loans, No Co-Lending Exposure 

A borrower has three separate loans:

  1. L1: 100% funded by A
  2. L2: 100% funded by B
  3. L3: 100% funded by C

Although A, B and B may be co-lending partners with each other in general, none of the above loans are under a co-lending arrangement (CLA).

Treatment: Since there is no co-lent exposure to the borrower, paragraph 124 of the Directions does not apply. Each lender classifies and reports its own loan independently, as per its applicable asset classification norms. There is no obligation to share asset-classification information relating to these loans among the lenders.

Scenario 2: One Co-Lent Loan and Other Standalone Loans

A borrower has three loans:

  1. L1: Co-lent by B (80%) and A (20%)
  2. L2: 100% funded by A (not co-lent)
  3. L3: 100% funded by C (not co-lent)

Case A: Default under the Co-Lent Loan

If B classifies its 80% share of L1 as NPA:

  • A’s 20% share of L1 must also be classified as NPA, even if it was standard in A’s books. While given that the asset classification norms for different REs are aligned and the invocation of any default loss guarantee also does not impact the asset classification; there does not seem to be any reason for a difference in the asset classification of the co-lenders in this case.  
  • Since asset classification is borrower-level, A must also classify L2 as NPA, even though L2 is not under a co-lending arrangement.
  • L3 remains unaffected, as C is not a co-lender to the same borrower and there is no requirement for B or A to share borrower-level information with C.

Case B: Default under a Non-Co-Lent Loan by any one of the Co-Lenders

If A classifies L2 as NPA:

  • Since asset classification is borrower-level, A must also classify L1 as NPA
  • B’s 80% share of L1 must also be classified as NPA
  • L3 remains unaffected, as C is not a co-lender to the same borrower and there is no requirement for B or A to share borrower-level information with C.

Case B: Default under a Non-Co-Lent Loan of a Third Lender

Assume L3 is classified as NPA by C, while L1 and L2 remain standard.

  • There is no impact on the books of B or A.
  • C is not required to share information on L3 with B or C, as there is no co-lending exposure between them for this borrower.

Note that borrower-level asset classification and information sharing activates only where there is a co-lending exposure to the borrower. Once such an exposure exists, any default in any loan of a co-lender triggers borrower-level classification across all exposures of that lender, including standalone loans. However, lenders with no co-lending exposure to the borrower remain outside this information-sharing loop. May refer the below chart for more clarity:

Fig 1: Decision chart for asset classification of loans under co-lending

Information Sharing and Operational Impact

To make borrower-level classification work in practice, the 2025 Directions require co-lenders to put in place information-sharing arrangements. Any SMA or NPA trigger must be shared with the other co-lender promptly and, in any case, by the next working day. It requires aligned IT systems so that both lenders update their books on the borrower at the same time, or as close to real time as possible.

Conclusion

The 2025 Directions reinforce a long-standing regulatory principle: credit stress belongs to the borrower, not to a specific loan or lender. Uniform borrower-level classification and timely information sharing are essential to preserve consistency in risk recognition across co-lenders. While this increases operational complexity, it aligns co-lending practices with RBI’s prudential intent.

See our other resources on co-lending.

A Guide for AIF Managers on Investor Eligibility and Regulatory Restrictions

Simrat Singh, Senior Executive | finserv@vinodkothari.com

Introduction

An AIF raises capital by issuance of units, which are privately placed.  Most AIFs follow a commitment–drawdown model, under which investors agree upfront to commit a specified amount of capital (‘committed capital’). The AIF manager then calls this committed capital, either in full or in tranches, as investment opportunities arise (‘drawdown’). This model helps the AIF to minimise the negative carry that would result from raising investments which are yet to be invested. 

This fund-raising process is shaped not only by SEBI’s AIF framework but also by the oversight of the respective sectoral regulators of the relevant investors. AIFs are meant strictly for sophisticated investors, and as such, various categories of AIF investors, such as insurance companies, pension funds, banks and NBFCs, etc. are subject to their respective regulations. When they invest in an AIF, they must comply with SEBI’s rules as well as the investment norms prescribed by their own regulators, each seeking to regulate how the capital of the investor is deployed. In fact, SEBI regulations are agnostic as to who the investor is, hence, most of the SEBI regulations relate to the AIF or the manager, with limited provisions dealing with investors. For example, whether and to what extent an insurance company or a pension fund can invest in an AIF is driven by the guidelines issued by the sectoral regulators such as IRDAI or PFRDA.

In this article, we try to bring together, in one place, the key regulatory norms imposed by various regulators; while these are primarily meant for the investor, however, it will be useful for the AIF managers to keep in mind these restraints while expecting or inviting investments from different categories of investors.

Categories of investors and regulatory restrictions on each category

Minimum investment norms: Common across all categories

  1. ₹25 crore for investors in Large Value Funds (reduced from ₹ 70 Crore per investor vide SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) (Third Amendment) Regulations, 2025) [Reg. 2(1)(pa)];
  2. ₹1 crore for other investors [Reg 10(c)];
  3. ₹25 lakh for employees or directors of the AIF, manager, or sponsor [Reg 10(c)];
  4. No minimum for units issued to employees solely for profit-sharing (and not capital contribution) [Para 4.6 of AIF Master Circular];
  5. For open-ended AIFs, the initial investment must meet the minimum threshold, and partial redemptions must not reduce the holding below this minimum [Para 4.7 of AIF Master Circular].

Individuals

An AIF may raise funds from individual investors, whether resident, non-resident (NRI), or foreign, through private placement, subject to the following conditions (Refer Reg. 10(a) of AIF Regulations r/w Chapter 4 of AIF Master Circular).

  1. Foreign investors: A foreign investor must:
    1. be a resident of a country whose securities market regulator is a signatory to the IOSCO Multilateral MoU (Appendix A) or has a Bilateral MoU with SEBI; or
    2. be a government or government-related investor from a country approved by the Government of India, even if the above condition is not met.

Additionally, neither the investor nor its beneficial owner1:

  1. May be listed on the UN Security Council Sanctions List; or
  2. may be a resident of a country identified by the FATF as having serious AML/CFT deficiencies or insufficient progress in addressing such deficiencies.

If a foreign investor ceases to meet these conditions after admission, the AIF manager must stop making further drawdowns from that investor until compliance is restored.

  1. Joint Investments: Joint investments, for the purpose of investment of not less than the minimum investment amount in the AIF, are permitted only between:
    1. an investor and spouse;
    2. an investor and parent; or
    3. an investor and child.

A maximum of two persons may invest jointly. Any other combination of joint investors must individually meet the minimum investment threshold. (Refer Reg. 10(c) of AIF Regulations r/w Chapter 4 of AIF Master Circular)

  1. Terms of Investment: The terms agreed with investors cannot override or go beyond the disclosures in the PPM [Para 4.3 of AIF Master Circular].
  2. The total number of investors is limited to 1000 investors per scheme; also note that an AIF cannot make a public offer. AIF units are commonly offered through distributors; but even the distributors cannot make an open offer (Please refer to our resource on Dos and Don’ts for AIF Distributors and AIF Managers).

Insurance Companies

  1. Permissible AIF Categories [Para 1.5 of Investments – Master Circular, 2022 read with IRDAI Circular No. IRDAI/F&I/CIR/INV/074/04/2021 dated 05.04.2021]
    1. Category I AIFs: Infrastructure Funds, SME Funds, Venture Capital Funds, and Social Venture Funds (‘Specified Cat I AIFs’);
    2. Category II AIFs: Only where at least 51% of the corpus is proposed to be invested in infrastructure entities, SMEs, venture capital undertakings, or social venture entities (‘Specified Cat II AIFs’).
    3. Investment in a Fund of Fund (‘FoF’) is allowed only if such FoF does not directly or indirectly invest funds outside India (Refer Section 27E of Insurance Act, 1938). This is to be ensured by inserting a clause in the Fund offer Documents executed by FoF to restrain such FoF investing into AIFs which invest in overseas companies/funds. Further, investment is not allowed in an AIF which in-turn has an exposure to a FoF in which the insurer already invested. Lastly, no investment in an AIF is allowed which undertakes leverage/borrowing other than to meet operational requirements. 

Compliance of conditions laid down in (iii) are to be certified by the concurrent auditor of the insurer and filed along with quarterly periodical returns. Notably, insurance companies are prohibited from investing in Cat III AIFs

  1. Prohibited Structures: Insurers shall not invest in AIFs that:
    1. offer variable rights attached to units.
    2. invest funds outside India either directly or indirectly [s. 27E of Insurance Act, 1938];
    3. are sponsored by persons forming part of the insurer’s promoter group;
    4. are managed a manager who is controlled, directly or indirectly, by the insurer or its promoters;
  2. Investment Limits: 
    1. For life insurers, combined exposure to AIFs and venture capital funds is capped at 3% of the relevant insurance fund2.
    2. For general insurers, the cap is 5% of total investment assets3.

Exposure to any single AIF cannot exceed the lower of 10% of the AIF’s corpus or 20% of the insurer’s total AIF exposure. For Infrastructure Funds, the 10% limit is enhanced to 20%.

Banks and other Regulated Entities (REs)

Banks and other REs may invest in Category I and Category II AIFs, subject to layered limits:

  1. Bank level: Not more than 10% of the AIF corpus.
  2. Group level: Up to 20% without RBI approval, and up to 30% with prior RBI approval, subject to capital adequacy and profitability conditions.
  3. System level: Aggregate investments by all regulated entities cannot exceed 20% of the AIF corpus.

Banks must ensure that AIF investments do not circumvent banking regulations by creating prohibited indirect exposures. Banks are not permitted to invest in Category III AIFs, except for the minimum sponsor contribution where a bank subsidiary sponsors such a fund. For a more detailed discussion on Banks’ investment in AIFs, refer to our resource here

NBFCs

An NBFC shall not individually contribute more than 10 percent of the corpus of an AIF Scheme. [See Para 8 of RBI ( NBFC –  Undertaking of Financial Services) Directions, 2025]. The system-level investment limit of 20% for all REs shall also apply. Notably, unlike banks, NBFCs can invest in Cat III AIFs. 

Pension, Provident and Gratuity Funds

Pursuant to a 15 March 2021 notification, non-government Provident Funds, Superannuation Funds, and Gratuity Funds may invest up to 5% of their investible surplus in Specified Cat I AIFs and Specified Cat II AIFs, classified as “Asset Backed, Trust Structured and Miscellaneous Investments”.

Key conditions include:

  • Minimum AIF corpus of ₹100 crore;
  • Maximum exposure of 10% to a single AIF (not applicable to government-sponsored AIFs);
  • Investments restricted to India-based entities only;
  • The AIF sponsor and manager must not be part of the fund’s promoter group.

For Government  Sector Schemes such as UPS/NPS/NPA Lite/Atal Pension Yojna and Corporate CG schemes, the conditions are the same as above for non-government pension funds. 

Mutual Funds

Mutual funds are governed by the SEBI (Mutual Funds) Regulations, 1996. The Seventh Schedule to these regulations sets out the permissible investment universe. Units of AIFs are not included, and accordingly, mutual funds cannot invest in AIF units.

  1. beneficial owner as determined in terms of sub-rule (3) of rule 9 of the Prevention of Money-laundering (Maintenance of Records) Rules, 2005 ↩︎
  2. The relevant insurance fund would refer to the specific fund of a life insurer from which an investment is made, rather than the insurer’s overall balance sheet. This is because Life insurers maintain separate, ring-fenced funds for different lines of business, such as the life fund, pension fund, annuity fund or ULIP fund and investments must be made out of, and limits calculated with reference to, the particular fund whose money is being deployed. ↩︎
  3. Investment assets would refer to the total pool of assets held by a general insurer that are available for investment, across all lines of non-life insurance business. Unlike life insurers, general insurers do not maintain separate, ring-fenced policyholder funds for each product. Instead, premiums collected from various non-life insurance policies are invested as a consolidated portfolio, and regulatory investment limits such as exposure to AIFs are calculated with reference to the insurer’s aggregate investment assets shown on its balance sheet. ↩︎

See our other resources on AIFs:

  1. CIV-ilizing Co-Investments: SEBI’s new framework for Co-investments under AIF Regulations
  2. Understanding the Governance & Compliance Framework for AIFs
  3. FAQs on specific due diligence of investors & investments of AIFs;
  4. RBI bars lenders’ investments in AIFs investing in their borrowers;
  5. Capital subject to ‘caps’: RBI relaxes norms for investment by REs in AIFs, subject to threshold limits;
  6. Can CICs invest in AIFs? A Regulatory Paradox;
  7. Trust, but verify: AIFs cannot be used as regulatory arbitrage;
  8. 2020 – Year of change for AIFs;
  9. AIF ail SEBI: Cannot be used for regulatory breach;

Strengthening India’s Corporate Bond Market: A Look at NITI Aayog’s Recommendations

Simrat Singh | finserv@vinodkothari.com

India’s aspiration to become a US $30 Trillion economy by 2047 rests on its ability to mobilise long-term, stable and affordable capital. Debt capital can be an attractive source for this. While banks have historically been the backbone of credit intermediation in India, a bank-dominated financial system may be inadequate to meet the financing needs of a developing country like India which includes long-gestation exposures to infrastructure, climate transition, manufacturing and other emerging sectors. Recognising this constraint, NITI Aayog’s report on Deepening the Corporate Bond Market in India (‘Report’) lays out reforms to develop corporate bonds as another major tool for mobilising long-term low-cost capital. 

In this note we highlight some of the reforms being advocated in the Report.

Key Thrust Areas of Reforms:

Regulatory Efficiency 

A central theme of the Report is the need to reduce regulatory friction arising from fragmented and overlapping oversight by SEBI, RBI and the MCA for corporate bonds. Inconsistent treatment of similar bonds, procedural complexity, overlapping disclosures and different approval timelines are identified as major constraints, particularly for public issuances and lower-rated issuers. A specific concern highlighted is issuer-based regulation: bonds issued by banks and NBFCs are regulated by the RBI, while similar bonds issued by non-financial corporates fall under SEBI and MCA oversight. This results in different disclosure standards and compliance processes for similar bonds

To combat this, first, the Report calls for stronger inter-regulatory coordination and recommends measures such as mutual recognition of disclosures, a joint regulatory help desk/single point of contact as well as joint circulars detailing the jurisdictions of each regulator – essentially a centralised coordination mechanism involving SEBI, RBI, MCA and the Ministry of Finance.

Second, the Report emphasises the need to rationalise disclosure norms for public bond issuances, which are significantly more onerous than those applicable to private placements. This asymmetry has led to an overwhelming reliance on private placements, which account for nearly 98% of corporate bond issuances in India (p. 25). Drawing on global practices, the Report recommends a differentiated disclosure regime for well-compliant issuers (p. 66). Specific reforms include extending the validity of offer documents from one year to two or three years, removing ISIN-wise issuance constraints, simplifying PAS-2 and Information Memorandum filings through digital automation on the MCA portal, and introducing a “Well-Known Seasoned Issuer” framework to enable fast-track access to public bond markets for reputed issuers.

Third, the Report stresses the need for regulatory clarity for hybrid instruments, including covered bonds1, securitised debt and infrastructure-linked securities. Many instruments used globally to fund long-term assets do not fit neatly within India’s regulator-specific silos. Jurisdictional ambiguity (which regulator oversees which instrument?) and the absence of standardised regulatory treatment have impeded market development. The Report recommends clearly defined frameworks to facilitate market clarity. In this context, it also highlights tax distortions; for instance, SDIs2 currently attract significantly higher TDS than corporate bonds. The Report states that SDIs are taxed at a higher rate than corporate bonds which prevents securitisation of bonds. However, effective 1.04.2025, SDI TDS rates are aligned with bond rate; both at 10% (See section 194LBC of Tax Act).

Market Infrastructure and Liquidity

Bonds are heterogeneous instruments, varying by type of issuer, tenor, covenants and structure. Unlike equities, electronic order matching alone cannot ensure immediacy of execution or continuous liquidity in the secondary market, particularly in lower-rated or infrequently traded bonds. Despite progress through electronic platforms such as RFQ for secondary trading and EBP for primary issuance, trading volumes remain shallow and concentrated in highly rated bonds.

The Report recommends expanding electronic trading, enhancing post-trade reporting (to improve price discovery) and increasing the proportion of trades settled on a Delivery-versus-Payment (DVP) basis3. Absence of a robust market-making ecosystem is seen as a major constraint on secondary-market liquidity (pp. 22, 36, 106). Limited risk appetite and balance-sheet constraints deter intermediaries from providing continuous two-way quotes, especially in lower-rated and longer-tenor bonds.

To address this, the Report recommends enabling market-making through regulatory incentives and improved access to repo markets. In particular, the creation of a standing repo facility by RBI for high rated corporate bonds would allow market makers4 to monetise inventories efficiently and support continuous liquidity provision. While corporate bonds are included in the RBI’s list of repo-eligible instruments, their treatment differs materially from Government securities (G-Secs). Repos in G-Secs are exempt from CRR and SLR computation which means Banks can access funds through G-Sec repos without providing SLR and CRR on those funds. In contrast, cash raised through repos backed by corporate bonds is treated as a liability for CRR and SLR purposes, hence banks have to provide CRR and SLR on the resulting liquidity. Also, unlike G-Secs, which are centrally cleared and settled through CCIL, corporate bond repos lack a single, standardised clearing and settlement mechanism; they are cleared through F-TRAC and stock exchanges. The result is that the volume of corporate bond repo is negligible (exact data on corporate bond repo could not be sourced).

The Report also flags structural weaknesses in the credit rating ecosystem, including rating inflation, conflicts of interest under the issuer-pays model, and excessive regulatory reliance on ratings (p. 71). Strengthening governance standards is the key recommendation for credit ratings. To improve credit rating access for smaller issuers, the Report suggests exploring alternative credit assessment models, including technology-driven frameworks using GST-returns and other turnover based data and digital transaction histories.

Further, the Report recommends strengthening the existing framework requiring large corporates to raise a portion of incremental borrowings through debt securities (LCB Framework)5. Proposed enhancements include increasing the minimum market borrowing requirement and progressively extending the framework to smaller corporates with lower thresholds.

Drawing on the IMF’s FSAP 2025, the Report also recommends allowing high-quality corporate bonds to be used as collateral in RBI’s repo operations. International experience from the ECB, Bank of Japan, and Reserve Bank of Australia suggests that such measures can enhance secondary-market liquidity and broaden the investor base, subject to appropriate safeguards.

Equally important is the creation of a government-backed, centralised corporate bond data repository. Fragmented data across regulators and exchanges currently hampers price discovery and covenant monitoring. A unified, real-time repository is recommended to improve transparency for issuers, investors, and regulators.

Innovation in Instruments and Market design

The Report makes it clear that regulatory reforms alone are insufficient; product and market innovation are essential to expand depth and distribute risk. India’s bond market remains narrow not only due to investor risk aversion but also due to the limited availability of instruments aligned with diverse risk–return preferences and long-gestation financing needs. Green bonds, sustainability-linked bonds6, and transition bonds are identified as important instruments for financing climate action and infrastructure. However, the absence of a standardised green taxonomy and concerns around greenwashing have constrained growth. The Report, therefore, recommends establishing clear definitions, disclosure standards and verification frameworks to ensure credibility and scale ESG-oriented bond markets.

The Report proposes institutionalising a dedicated class of Corporate Bond Dealers (CBDs), modelled on the U.S. primary dealer system. Eligible banks, NBFCs and other financial institutions would be required to provide continuous two-way quotes, supported by incentives such as capital relief on bond inventories and access to RBI refinance and repo facilities. Enhanced market surveillance, real-time trade reporting, price dissemination and inventory disclosures are also recommended.

Investor and Issuer Participation

Broadening the investor base is identified as another critical reform pillar. Long-term institutional investors such as insurance companies, pension funds and provident funds are natural holders of long-duration bonds, yet regulatory investment norms constrain exposure only to higher-rated securities. The Report recommends a calibrated relaxation of these norms.

For retail investors, the Report proposes lowering minimum investment thresholds (from existing ₹ 10,000), increasing retail quotas in public bond issuances, particularly for tax-free and ESG-linked bonds7, and simplifying TDS provisions to address tax inefficiencies in secondary market trades. OBPPs have been acknowledged to contribute to secondary market liquidity, however, the volumes are low. Further, there is no mention of concerns w.r.t downselling through OBPPs which was recently highlighted by SEBI8

On the issuer side, India’s corporate bond market remains heavily concentrated among AAA and AA-rated entities. To address this imbalance, the Report advocates scaling up credit enhancement mechanisms such as PCEs and support from development finance institutions. It also highlights the need to promote longer-tenor issuances, especially for infrastructure and climate-linked projects, where asset lives significantly exceed typical corporate bond maturities. In this context, it is noteworthy that NITI Aayog has cited our resource, “Partial Credit Enhancement: A Catalyst for Boosting Infrastructure Bond Issuances?”, in the Report while discussing the role of partial credit enhancement mechanisms in deepening the corporate bond market (pp. 75 and 99). Further, regulatory subsidies for first-time or low-volume issuers and pooled issuance platforms to facilitate market access for smaller issuers is also recommended (pp. 65, 75).

The Report recognizes that CDS are underdeveloped. Currently, CDS can be purchased only by investors who already own the underlying bond, which prevents trading in the CDS market. Further, only single-name CDS are permitted, which means a separate CDS contract is required for each issuer, unlike global markets such as the U.S., where index CDS allows one CDS to cover a basket of bonds. Lastly, there is a limit on FPI investors providing CDS which is 5% of the outstanding corporate bond market. These restrictions have resulted in limited CDS protection. The Report also recommends bigger NBFCs to act as CDS market makers

Conclusion

NITI Aayog’s recommendations envisage a corporate bond market that evolves from a supplementary funding channel into a core pillar of India’s financial system. If implemented in a coordinated manner, these reforms could expand the market to ₹100–120 trillion by 2030, improve financial stability, and channel long-term capital into productive investment. The real challenge, however, lies in execution, particularly in achieving sustained regulatory coordination and market-making capacity. Addressing these constraints will be critical if corporate bonds are to play a meaningful role in financing India’s long-term growth and infrastructure ambitions under the vision of Viksit Bharat by 2047.

See our other resources on bonds

  1. Bond Credit Enhancement Framework: Competitive, rational, reasonable
  2. Demystifying Structured Debt Securities: Beyond Plain Vanilla Bonds
  3. Bond market needs a friend, not parent
  4. SEBI Securitisation Regulations: Track Record, Risk retention and Investment size among several new requirements
  5. Mandatory listing for further bond issues
  6. NHB’s PCE Scheme for HFCs
  7. Corporate Bonds and Debentures
  1. Covered bonds are secured debt instruments backed by a segregated pool of high-quality assets, offering investors dual recourse to both the issuer and the underlying assets. May refer to our resource on covered bonds. ↩︎
  2. May refer to our book Listing Regulations on Securitised Debt Instruments and Security Receipts ↩︎
  3. DVP is a settlement mechanism in which the transfer of securities and funds occurs simultaneously, eliminating counterparty and settlement risk
    ↩︎
  4.  May refer to our resource ‘Bond issuers set to become Market Maker to enhance liquidity’ ↩︎
  5. May refer to our resource ‘Mandatory bond issuance by Large Corporates: FAQs on revised framework’ ↩︎
  6. May refer to our resources ‘Sustainability or ESG Bonds’ and ‘From Rooftops to Ratings: India’s Green Securitisation Debut’ ↩︎
  7. May refer to our resource ESG Debt Securities: Framework for Issuance and Listing in India ↩︎
  8. May refer to our resource “Downstreamed through intermediaries: Deemed public issue concerns for privately placed debt” ↩︎