Partial Credit Enhancements
Team Finserv | finserv@vinodkothari.com
Team Finserv | finserv@vinodkothari.com
-Vinod Kothari (vinod@vinodkothari.com)
The RBI’s proposed framework for partial credit enhancement for bonds has significant improvements over the last 2015 version
The RBI released the draft of a new comprehensive framework for non-fund based support, including guarantees, co-acceptances, as well as partial credit enhancement (PCE) for bonds. The PCE framework is proposed to be significantly revamped, over its earlier 2015 version.
Note that PCE for corporate bonds was mentioned in the FM’s Budget 20251, specifically indicating the setting up of a PCE facility under the National Bank for Financing of Infrastructural Development (NaBFID).
A quick snapshot of how PCE works and who all can benefit is illustrated below:
The highlights of the changes under the new PCE framework are:
Partial Credit Enhancement (PCE) is a risk-mitigating financial tool where a third party provides limited financial backing to improve the creditworthiness of a debt instrument. Provision of wrap or credit support for bonds is quite a common practice globally.
PCE is a contingent liquidity facility – it allows the bond issuer to draw upon the PCE provider to service the bond. For example, if a coupon payment of a bond is due and the issuer has difficulty in servicing the same, the issuer may tap the PCE facility and do the servicing. The amount so tapped becomes the liability of the issuer to the PCE provider, of course, subordinated to the bondholders. In this sense, the PCE facility is a contingent line of credit.
A situation of inability may arise at the time of eventual redemption of the bonds too – at that stage as well, the issuer may draw upon the PCE facility.
Since the credit support is partial and not total, the maximum claim of the bond issuer against the PCE provider is limited to the extent of guarantee – if there is a 20% guarantee, only 20% of the bond size may be drawn by the issuer. If the facility is revolving in nature, this 20% may refer to the maximum amount tapped at any point of time.
Given that bond defaults are quite often triggered by timing and not the eventual failure of the bond issuer, a PCE facility provides a great avenue for avoiding default and consequential downgrade. PCE provides a liquidity window, allowing the issuer to arrange liquidity in the meantime.
PCE under the earlier framework could have been given by banks. The ambit of guarantee providers has been expanded to include SCBs, AIFIs, NBFCs in Top, Upper and Middle Layers and HFCs. However, in case of NBFCs and HFCs, there are additional conditions as well as limit restrictions.
As may be known, entities such as NABFID have been tasked with promoting bond markets by giving credit support.
The PCE can be extended against bonds issued by corporates /special purpose vehicles (SPVs) for funding all types of projects and to bonds issued by Non-deposit taking NBFCs with asset size of ₹1,000 crore and above registered with RBI (including HFCs).
PCE shall be provided in the form of an irrevocable contingent line of credit (LOC) which will be drawn in case of shortfall in cash flows for servicing the bonds and thereby may improve the credit rating of the bond issue. The contingent facility may, at the discretion of the PCE providing RE, be made available as a revolving facility. Further, PCE cannot be provided by way of guarantee.
What is the difference between a guarantee and an LOC? If a guarantor is called upon to make payments for a beneficiary, the guarantor steps into the shoes of the creditor, and has the same claim against the beneficiary as the original creditor. For example, if a guarantor makes a payment for a bond issuer’s obligations, the guarantor will have the same rights as the bondholders (security, priority, etc). On the contrary, the LOC is simply a line of liquidity, and explicitly, the claims of the LOC provider are subordinated to the claims of the bondholders.
If the bond partly amortises, is the amount of the PCE proportionately reduced? This should not be so. In fact, the PCE facility continues till the amortisation of the bonds in full. It is quite natural to expect that the defaults by a bond issuer may be back-heavy. For example, if there is a 20% PCE, it may have to be used for making the last tranche of redemption of the bonds. Therefore, the liability of the PCE provider will come down only when the outstanding obligation of the bond issuer comes to less than the size of the PCE.
The existing PCE framework restricts a single entity to providing only 20% of the total 50% PCE limit for a bond issuance. It is now proposed that the sub-limit of 20% be removed, enabling single entity to provide upto 50% PCE support.
Further, the exposure of an RE by way of PCEs to bonds issued by an NBFC/ HFC shall be restricted to one percent of capital funds of the RE, within the extant single/ group borrower exposure limits.
Under the existing framework, only the entities providing PCE were restricted from investing in the bonds they had credit-enhanced. However, the new Draft Directions expand this restriction by prohibiting all REs from investing in bonds that have been credit-enhanced through a PCE, regardless of whether they are the PCE provider. The draft regulations state that the same is with an intent to promote REs enabling wider investor participation.
This is, in fact, a major point that may need the attention of the regulator. A universal bar on all REs from investing in bonds which are wrapped by a PCE is neither desirable, nor optimal. Most bond placements are done by REs, and REs may have to warehouse the bonds. In addition, the treasuries of many REs make opportunistic investments in bonds.
Take, for instance, bonds credit enhanced by NABFID. The whole purpose of NABFID is to permit bonds to be issued by infrastructure sector entities, by which banks who may have extended funding will get an exit. But the treasuries of the very same banks may want to invest in the bonds, once the bonds have the backing of NABFID support. There is no reason why, for the sake of wider participation, investment by regulated entities should be barred. This is particularly at the present stage of India’s bond markets, where the markets are not liquid and mature enough to attract retail participation.
Under the Draft Directions the capital is required to be maintained by the REs providing PCE based on the PCE amount based on applicable risk weight to the pre-enhanced rating of the bond. Under the earlier framework, the capital was computed so as to be equal to the difference between the capital required on bond before credit enhancement and the capital required on bond after credit enhancement. That is, the existing framework ensures that the PCE does not result into a capital release on a system-wide basis. This was not a logical provision, and we at VKC have made this point on various occasions2.
-Abhirup Ghosh (abhirup@vinodkothari.com)
Partial Credit Enhancement (PCE) is a risk-mitigating financial tool where a third party provides limited financial backing to improve the creditworthiness of a debt instrument. It ensures that investors are partially protected against default risk, making it easier for issuers to raise funds at better terms.
The key features of a PCE are as follows:
The concept of PCE has been in India for quite some time now, and is commonly used in securitisation transactions. However, the Finance Minister’s announcement during Union Budget 2025 about setting up of a PCE facility under the National Bank for Financing Infrastructure Development (NaBFID) has brought this into the limelight.
Infrastructure development is the backbone of economic growth, but funding large-scale projects such as highways, railways, power plants, and airports requires substantial capital. Infrastructure projects often face challenges in raising funds due to their long gestation periods, high risks, and lower credit ratings. PCE serves as an effective financial tool to improve the creditworthiness of infrastructure bonds, making them more attractive to investors. By providing a partial guarantee or security, PCE helps reduce the cost of borrowing and widens investor participation, ultimately facilitating infrastructure financing.
Infrastructure bond issuances face several obstacles that make fundraising difficult. One of the primary challenges is low credit ratings. Infrastructure projects, especially those in their early stages, often receive sub-investment-grade ratings (such as BBB or lower), making them unattractive to investors. Additionally, these projects are subject to high perceived risks, including revenue uncertainty, regulatory hurdles, construction delays, and cost overruns. Since many infrastructure projects rely on user charges, such as tolls or metro fares, their cash flow projections can be unpredictable.
Another major issue is the long maturity period of infrastructure bonds. Most investors prefer short- to medium-term investments, whereas infrastructure bonds typically have tenures of 10 to 30 years. This mismatch reduces the appetite for such bonds in the market. Lastly, lack of institutional investor participation further limits the success of infrastructure bond issuances, as pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds prefer highly rated bonds with stable returns.
One of the most significant ways PCE helps infrastructure bond issuances is by improving their credit ratings. When a bank or financial institution provides partial credit enhancement in the form of a guarantee or reserve fund, it reduces the default risk associated with the bond. This leads to a higher credit rating, making the bond more attractive to investors. For example, an infrastructure company with a BBB-rated bond issuance may improve its rating to A with a 20% PCE support, or AA with a 50% PCE support thereby increasing demand from investors. A higher rating not only boosts investor confidence but also expands the pool of potential buyers, including institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies.
By improving the credit rating of infrastructure bonds, PCE directly leads to a reduction in interest costs. Bonds with higher ratings attract lower interest rates, which helps infrastructure companies secure financing at more affordable terms. For instance, without PCE, a BBB-rated bond may require 12%, whereas a bond upgraded to an AA rating with PCE support may only require 9%. This reduction in interest rates can result in significant savings over the life of the bond. Lower borrowing costs also make infrastructure projects more financially viable, ensuring their timely execution and long-term sustainability.
Institutional investors, such as mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies, typically have strict investment guidelines that restrict them from investing in low-rated securities. Since many of these investors require bonds to be rated AA or higher, infrastructure bonds often struggle to meet these requirements. PCE helps bridge this gap by enhancing the credit rating, making infrastructure bonds eligible for investment by these large institutional players. This leads to greater liquidity and stability in the corporate bond market, ensuring a steady flow of capital to infrastructure projects.
PCE contributes to the overall development of the corporate bond market by encouraging more issuers to raise funds through bonds rather than relying solely on bank loans. Traditionally, infrastructure financing in India has been dependent on banks, which exposes them to high asset-liability mismatches due to the long tenure of infrastructure projects. By facilitating infrastructure bond issuances, PCE helps shift the burden away from banks and towards a broader investor base. This not only diversifies funding sources but also enhances financial stability in the banking sector.
As per a CII report (2022), the infrastructure financing gap is estimated at over 5% of GDP. Approx. 80% of the investment in infrastructure space is by government agencies (80%), and the remaining 20% comes from private developers.
As per the National Infrastructure Pipelines, the total investment target was set at INR 111 trillion (USD 1.34 trillion) for the period between FY 20 and FY 25; and only 6-8% (INR 6.66-8.88) of the such targets were expected to be met by bond issuances. Reliance on bond markets is planned to the extent of 6% to 8% (INR 6.66 – 8.88 trillion). As per the said estimates, the average annual issuances should have been INR 1.480 trillion. However, between FY18 and FY22, the issuance of infrastructure bonds has been at INR 5.37 trillion, that is, an average of INR 1.07 trillion per annum, that is a shortfall of ~30% compared to the target.
Furthermore, the issuances have been highly concentrated in the top 5 PSUs. The charts below show the annual bond issuances between FY 18 – FY 22, and share of issuance by top 5 PSUs and others:
Source: CRISIL
The market is dominated by highly rated issuers. In general approx. 75% of bond issuers are rated AAA, and more than 90% of the issuances are by AA and above rated entities. The reason for this dominance by highly rated issuers is the fact that for practical purposes, the most acceptable rating in the infra bonds space is AA, as long term investors like insurance companies, pension funds etc. are by regulation required to invest in AA or above rated papers.
PCE support from a credible source will help a lot of infrastructure operators, who are stopped at the gate, with ratings in the range of A, with easy access to the market.
The existing scheme for PCE was notified by the RBI in 2015. In a nutshell, the scheme provides for the following:
Form of PCE: To be structured as a non-funded, irrevocable contingent line of credit. This facility can be drawn upon in the event of cash flow shortfalls affecting bond servicing.
Limitations: The total PCE extended by a single bank cannot exceed 20% of the bond’s total size; however, overall, the PCE provided by all banks, in aggregate, cannot exceed 50% of the bond’s total size.
Further, PCE can be provided only to bonds which have a pre-enhanced rating of BBB- or above.
Capital Requirements: The bank providing PCE does not hold capital based only on its PCE amount. Instead, it calculates the capital based on the difference between:
The objective is to ensure that the PCE provider should absorb the risks that it covers in the entire transaction. Illustrating with an example:
Assume that the total bond size is Rs. 100 crores for which PCE to the extent of Rs. 20 crore is provided by a bank. The pre-enhanced rating of the bond is BBB which gets enhanced to AA with the PCE. In this scenario:
As can be seen, the capital has to be maintained on the total bond issuance, and not just the exposure. Ironically, this capital has to be maintained until the outstanding principal of bonds falls below the extent of PCE provided. Usually, the bonds are amortising in nature – that is, the actual exposure of the guarantor continues to come down. Given, however, that default in bonds may be back-ended, the capital has still to be maintained till the redemption of the bonds. This requires the PCE provider to maintain huge regulatory capital for a significantly long period of time; which also gets reflected in the ultimate cost to the beneficiary, therefore, making it unviable.
The FM’s announcement though comes with a lot of promise, as it shows a positive intent. But to make things work, there are quite a few things that should be put into place:
– Abhirup Ghosh | abhirup@vinodkothari.com
Additional Tier 1 bonds which are known by many names – AT1 bonds or Contingently Convertible Bonds (CoCo Bonds) or Perpetual Bonds, are capital structure instruments. Every liability instrument in corporate finance is essentially a capital structure instrument, that is, it is somewhere in the order of priority for its loss absorbency feature, but some of the instruments are high in the order of priorities, and therefore, their placing in the capital structure is commonly not a matter of concern. However, AT1 bonds are placed just after common equity, and therefore, if equity has suffered a meltdown, AT1 bonds will be next to be hit.
This article examines the life and death of AT1 bonds.
Read more →Team Financial Services | finserv@vinodkothari.com
Section 193 of the Income Tax Act[1] provides for TDS payment in case of interest on securities. Currently listed debentures are exempt from TDS without any limit. The exemption comes way of clause (ix) of the proviso to sec. 193.
The said clause is now sought to be deleted. The deletion, if affirmed by the statute, will be effective from 1st April, 2023, thereby meaning that any interest paid by companies on listed bonds will now be subject to tax.
The amendment has a retroactive effect, as it applies even to bonds that may have already been issued. If the issuer and the investor have both entered into a securities transaction on the strength of the law then existing, and the bondholder suddenly comes under the purview of deduction of tax at source, this will be like acquiring a security with no safe harbor. It is notable that certainty of tax treatment for capital market transactions is an essential mainstay for the healthy growth of capital markets.
Read more →Other ‘I am the best’ presentations can be viewed here
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By Sharon Pinto & Sachin Sharma, Corplaw division, Vinod Kothari & Company (corplaw@vinodkothari.com)
Background
The inception of the idea of Social Stock Exchanges (SSEs) in India can be traced to the mention of the formation of an SSE under the regulatory purview of Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) for listing and raising of capital by social enterprises and voluntary organisations, in the 2019-20 Budget Speech of the Finance Minister. Consequently, SEBI constituted a working group on SSEs under the Chairmanship of Shri Ishaat Hussain on September 19, 2019[1]. The report of the Working Group (WG) set forth the framework on SSEs, shed light on the concept of social enterprises as well as the nature of instruments that can be raised under such framework and uniform reporting procedures. For further deliberations and refining of the process, SEBI set up a Technical Group (TG) under the Chairmanship of Dr. Harsh Kumar Bhanwala (Ex-Chairman, NABARD) on September 21, 2020[2]. The report, made public on May 6, 2021[3], of the TG entails qualifying criteria as well as the exhaustive ecosystem in which such an SSE would function.
In this article we have analysed the framework set forth by the reports of the committees with the globally established practices.
Concept of SSEs
As per the report of the WG dated June 1, 2020[4], SSE is not only a place where securities or other funding structures are “listed” but also a set of procedures that act as a filter, selecting-in only those entities that are creating measurable social impact and reporting such impact. Further the SSE shall be a separate segment under the existing stock exchanges. Thus, an SSE provides the infrastructure for listing and disclosure of information of listed social enterprises.
Such a framework has been implemented in various countries and an analysis of the same can be set forth as follows:
A. United Kingdom
B. Canada
C. Singapore
Further the financial criteria entails the need for a fixed limit of minimum market capitalization, publication of financial statements and use of market-based approach for achieving its purpose.
D. South Africa
Key ingredients for a social enterprise
Qualifying criteria and process for onboarding
As per TG recommendation, an NPO is required to register on any of the Social Stock Exchange and thereafter, it may choose to list or not. However, an FPE can proceed directly for listing, provided it is a company registered under Companies Act and complies with the requirements in terms of SEBI Regulations for issuance and listing of equity or debt securities.
Further, the TG has recommended a set of mandatory criteria as mentioned below that NPOs shall meet in order to register.
A. Legal Requirements:
B. Minimum Fund Flows:
In order to ensure that the NPO wishing to register has an adequate track-record of operations.
Framework for listing
Post establishment of the eligibility for listing and the additional registration criteria in case of NPOs, the social enterprises may list their securities in the manner discussed further. The listing procedures vary for NPOs and FPEs and is set forth as follows:
A. NPOs
B. FPEs
Types of instruments
Depending on the type of organisation, SSEs shall allow a variety of financing instruments for NPOs and FPEs. As FPEs have already well-established instruments, these securities are permitted to be listed on the Main Board/IGP/SME, however visibility shall be given to such entities by identifying them as For Profit Social Enterprise (FPSE) on the respective stock exchanges.
Modes available for fundraising for NPOs shall be Equity (Section 8 Co’s.), Zero Coupon Zero Principal (ZCZP) bonds [this will have to be notified as a security under Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (SCRA)], Development Impact Bonds (DIB), Social Impact Fund (SIF) (currently known as Social Venture Fund) with 100% grants-in grants out provision and funding by investors through Mutual Funds. On the other hand, FPEs shall be able to raise funds through equity, debt, DIBs and SIFs.
While SVF is an existing model for fund-raising, the TG has proposed various changes in order to incentivise investors and philanthropists to invest in such instruments. In addition to change in nomenclature from SVF to SIF, minimum corpus size is proposed to be reduced from Rs. 20 Cr to Rs. 5 Cr. Further, minimum subscription shall stand at Rs. 2L from the current Rs. 1 Cr. The amendments shall also allow corporates to invest CSR funds into SVFs with a 100% grants-in, grants out model.
Disclosure and Reporting norms
Once the FPE or the NPO (registered/listed) has been demarcated by the exchange to be an SE, it needs to comply with a set of minimum disclosure and reporting requirements to continue to remain listed/registered. The disclosure requirements can be enlisted as follows:
For NPO:
For FPE:
FPE’s having listed equity/debt will have to disclose Social Impact Report on annual basis and comply with the disclosure requirements as per the applicable segment such as main board, SME, IGP etc.
Other factors of the SSE ecosystem
a. Capacity Building Fund
As per the recommendation of the WG, constitution of a Capacity Building Fund (CBF) has been proposed. The said fund shall be housed under NABARD and funded by Stock Exchanges, other developmental agencies such as SIDBI, other financial institutions, and donors (CSRs). The fund shall have a corpus of Rs. 100 Cr and shall be an entity registered under 80G, which shall make it eligible for receiving CSR donations pursuant to changes to Section 135/Schedule VII of Companies Act 2013. The role of the fund shall encompass facilitating NPOs for registration and listing procedures as well as proper reporting framework. These functions shall be carried out in the form awareness programs.
b. Social Auditors
Social audit of the enterprises shall compose of two components – financial audit and non-financial audit, which shall be carried out by financial or non-financial auditors. In addition to holding a certificate of practice from the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), the auditors will be required to have attended a course at the National Institute of Securities Markets (NISM) and received a certificate of completion after successfully passing the course examination. The SRO shall prepare the criteria and list of firms/institutions for the first phase soon after the formation of SSEs, and those firms/institutions shall register with the SRO.
c. Information Repositories
The platform shall function as a research tool for the various social enterprises to be listed, thus Information Repository (IR) forms an important component of the framework. It functions as an aggregator of information on NGOs, and provides a searchable electronic database in a comparable form. Thus it shall provide accurate, timely, reliable information required by the potential investors to make well informed decisions.
Conclusion
The social sector in India is getting increasingly powerful – this was evident during Covid-crisis based on the wonderful work done by several NGOs. Of course, all social work requires funding, and being able to crowd source funding in a legitimate and transparent manner is quintessential for the social sector. We find the report of the TG to be raising and addressing relevant issues. We are hoping that SEBI will now find it easy to come out with the needed regulatory platform to allow social enterprises to get funding through SSEs.
Our other article on the similar topic can be read here – http://vinodkothari.com/2019/09/social-stock-exchange-a-guide/
[1] https://www.sebi.gov.in/media/press-releases/sep-2019/sebi-constitutes-working-group-on-social-stock-exchanges-sse-_44311.html
[2] https://www.sebi.gov.in/media/press-releases/sep-2020/sebi-constitutes-technical-group-on-social-stock-exchange_47607.html
[3] https://www.sebi.gov.in/reports-and-statistics/reports/may-2021/technical-group-report-on-social-stock-exchange_50071.html
[4] https://www.sebi.gov.in/reports-and-statistics/reports/jun-2020/report-of-the-working-group-on-social-stock-exchange_46852.html
[5] https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1906&context=jil&httpsredir=1&referer=
[7] https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_rise_of_social_stock_exchanges
[9] https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_rise_of_social_stock_exchanges
[10] https://www.samhita.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/India-SSE-report-final.pdf
[11] https://www.sebi.gov.in/reports-and-statistics/reports/may-2021/technical-group-report-on-social-stock-exchange_50071.html