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Bond Credit Enhancement Framework: Competitive, rational, reasonable

-Vinod Kothari (vinod@vinodkothari.com)

The RBI’s proposed framework for partial credit enhancement for bonds has significant improvements over the last 2015 version

The RBI released the draft of a new comprehensive framework for non-fund based support, including guarantees, co-acceptances, as well as partial credit enhancement (PCE) for bonds. The PCE framework is proposed to be significantly revamped, over its earlier 2015 version.

Note that PCE for corporate bonds was mentioned in the FM’s Budget 20251, specifically indicating the setting up of a PCE facility under the National Bank for Financing of Infrastructural Development (NaBFID).

A quick snapshot of how PCE works and who all can benefit is illustrated below:

The highlights of the changes under the new PCE framework are:

What is PCE?

Partial Credit Enhancement (PCE) is a risk-mitigating financial tool where a third party provides limited financial backing to improve the creditworthiness of a debt instrument. Provision of wrap or credit support for bonds is quite a common practice globally. 

PCE is a contingent liquidity facility – it allows the bond issuer to draw upon the PCE provider to service the bond. For example, if a coupon payment of a bond is due and the issuer has difficulty in servicing the same, the issuer may tap the PCE facility and do the servicing. The amount so tapped becomes the liability of the issuer to the PCE provider, of course, subordinated to the bondholders. In this sense, the PCE facility is a contingent line of credit. 

A situation of inability may arise at the time of eventual redemption of the bonds too – at that stage as well, the issuer may draw upon the PCE facility. 

Since the credit support is partial and not total, the maximum claim of the bond issuer against the PCE provider is limited to the extent of guarantee – if there is a 20% guarantee, only 20% of the bond size may be drawn by the issuer. If the facility is revolving in nature, this 20% may refer to the maximum amount tapped at any point of time.

Given that bond defaults are quite often triggered by timing and not the eventual failure of the bond issuer, a PCE facility provides a great avenue for avoiding default and consequential downgrade.  PCE provides a liquidity window, allowing the issuer to arrange liquidity in the meantime. 

Who can be the guarantee provider?

PCE under the earlier framework could have been given by banks. The ambit of guarantee providers has been expanded to include SCBs, AIFIs, NBFCs in Top, Upper and Middle Layers and HFCs. However, in case of NBFCs and HFCs, there are additional conditions as well as limit restrictions. 

As may be known, entities such as NABFID have been tasked with promoting bond markets by giving credit support. 

Who may be the bond issuers?

The PCE can be extended against bonds issued by corporates /special purpose vehicles (SPVs) for funding all types of projects and to bonds issued by Non-deposit taking NBFCs with asset size of ₹1,000 crore and above registered with RBI (including HFCs).

What are the key features of the bonds?

  1. REs may offer PCE only in respect of bonds whose pre-enhanced rating is “BBB minus” or better.
  2. REs shall not invest in corporate bonds which are credit enhanced by other REs. They may, however, provide other need based credit facilities (funded and/ or non-funded) to the corporate/ SPV. 
  3. To be eligible for PCE, corporate bonds shall be rated by a minimum of two external credit rating agencies at all times.
  4. Further, additional conditions for providing PCE to bonds issued by NBFCs and HFCs:
    1. The tenor of the bond issued by NBFCs/ HFCs for which PCE is provided shall not be less than three years. 
    2. The proceeds from the bonds backed by PCE from REs shall only be utilized for refinancing the existing debt of the NBFCs/ HFCs. Further, REs shall introduce appropriate mechanisms to monitor and ensure that the end-use condition is met. 

What will be the form of PCE? 

PCE shall be provided in the form of an irrevocable contingent line of credit (LOC) which will be drawn in case of shortfall in cash flows for servicing the bonds and thereby may improve the credit rating of the bond issue. The contingent facility may, at the discretion of the PCE providing RE, be made available as a revolving facility. Further, PCE cannot be provided by way of guarantee. 

What is the difference between a guarantee and an LOC? If a guarantor is called upon to make payments for a beneficiary, the guarantor steps into the shoes of the creditor, and has the same claim against the beneficiary as the original creditor. For example, if a guarantor makes a payment for a bond issuer’s obligations, the guarantor will have the same rights as the bondholders (security, priority, etc). On the contrary, the LOC is simply a line of liquidity, and explicitly, the claims of the LOC provider are subordinated to the claims of the bondholders.

If the bond partly amortises, is the amount of the PCE proportionately reduced? This should not be so. In fact, the PCE facility continues till the amortisation of the bonds in full. It is quite natural to expect that the defaults by a bond issuer may be back-heavy. For example, if there is a 20% PCE, it may have to be used for making the last tranche of redemption of the bonds. Therefore, the liability of the PCE provider will come down only when the outstanding obligation of the bond issuer comes to less than the size of the PCE.

Any limits or restrictions on the quantum of PCE by a single RE?

The existing PCE framework restricts a single entity to providing only 20% of the total 50% PCE limit for a bond issuance. It is now proposed that the sub-limit of 20% be removed, enabling single entity to provide upto 50% PCE support. 

Further, the exposure of an RE by way of PCEs to bonds issued by an NBFC/ HFC shall be restricted to one percent of capital funds of the RE, within the extant single/ group borrower exposure limits.

Who can invest in credit-enhanced bonds?

Under the existing framework, only the entities providing PCE were restricted from investing in the bonds they had credit-enhanced. However, the new Draft Directions expand this restriction by prohibiting all REs from investing in bonds that have been credit-enhanced through a PCE, regardless of whether they are the PCE provider. The draft regulations state that the same is with an intent to promote REs enabling wider investor participation.

This is, in fact, a major point that may need the attention of the regulator. A universal bar on all REs from investing in bonds which are wrapped by a PCE is neither desirable, nor optimal. Most bond placements are done by REs, and REs may have to warehouse the bonds. In addition, the treasuries of many REs make opportunistic investments in bonds.

Take, for instance, bonds credit enhanced by NABFID. The whole purpose of NABFID is to permit bonds to be issued by infrastructure sector entities, by which banks who may have extended funding will get an exit. But the treasuries of the very same banks may want to invest in the bonds, once the bonds have the backing of NABFID support. There is no reason why, for the sake of wider participation, investment by regulated entities should be barred. This is particularly at the present stage of India’s bond markets, where the markets are not liquid and mature enough to attract retail participation. 

What is the impact on capital computation?

Under the Draft Directions the capital is required to be maintained by the REs providing PCE based on the PCE amount based on applicable risk weight to the pre-enhanced rating of the bond. Under the earlier framework, the capital was computed so as to be equal to the difference between the capital required on bond before credit enhancement and the capital required on bond after credit enhancement. That is, the existing framework ensures that the PCE does not result into a capital release on a system-wide basis. This was not a logical provision, and we at VKC have made this point on various occasions2

Related Resources –

  1.  Union Budget 2025: Key Highlights and Reforms focusing on Financial Sector Entities ↩︎
  2. Partial Credit Enhancement: A Catalyst for Boosting Infrastructure Bond Issuances? ↩︎

Partial Credit Enhancement: A Catalyst for Boosting Infrastructure Bond Issuances?

-Abhirup Ghosh (abhirup@vinodkothari.com)

What is partial credit enhancement?

Partial Credit Enhancement (PCE) is a risk-mitigating financial tool where a third party provides limited financial backing to improve the creditworthiness of a debt instrument. It ensures that investors are partially protected against default risk, making it easier for issuers to raise funds at better terms.

The key features of a PCE are as follows:

  1. Parties involved: A typical PCE structure would involve at least three parties:
  • Issuer: A company or an entity that wants to raise funds by issuing debt instruments;
  • PCE Provider or Credit Enhancer: A third party (usually a government agency or a financial institution with strong credibility) that provides the credit enhancement 
  • Investor(s): The one who invests in the debt instruments. 
  1. Multiple forms: Can be structured in various forms, like guarantee, subordinated line of credit, investment in subordinated tranche, cash collateral etc. 
  2. Limited coverage: Unlike full credit enhancement, PCE covers only a portion of the potential losses in case of default. The extent of coverage is pre-fixed and does not extend once the same is exhausted.
  3. Improved Credit Rating: PCE lowers the perceived credit risk, leading to an improved bond rating by credit rating agencies. A higher credit rating results in lower interest rates, benefiting the issuer.

Why has this become so important all of a sudden?

The concept of PCE has been in India for quite some time now, and is commonly used in securitisation transactions. However, the Finance Minister’s announcement during Union Budget 2025 about setting up of a PCE facility under the National Bank for Financing Infrastructure Development (NaBFID) has brought this into the limelight.

How does it help issuance of bonds by an infrastructure entity?

Infrastructure development is the backbone of economic growth, but funding large-scale projects such as highways, railways, power plants, and airports requires substantial capital. Infrastructure projects often face challenges in raising funds due to their long gestation periods, high risks, and lower credit ratings. PCE serves as an effective financial tool to improve the creditworthiness of infrastructure bonds, making them more attractive to investors. By providing a partial guarantee or security, PCE helps reduce the cost of borrowing and widens investor participation, ultimately facilitating infrastructure financing.

Challenges in Infrastructure Bond Issuances

Infrastructure bond issuances face several obstacles that make fundraising difficult. One of the primary challenges is low credit ratings. Infrastructure projects, especially those in their early stages, often receive sub-investment-grade ratings (such as BBB or lower), making them unattractive to investors. Additionally, these projects are subject to high perceived risks, including revenue uncertainty, regulatory hurdles, construction delays, and cost overruns. Since many infrastructure projects rely on user charges, such as tolls or metro fares, their cash flow projections can be unpredictable.

Another major issue is the long maturity period of infrastructure bonds. Most investors prefer short- to medium-term investments, whereas infrastructure bonds typically have tenures of 10 to 30 years. This mismatch reduces the appetite for such bonds in the market. Lastly, lack of institutional investor participation further limits the success of infrastructure bond issuances, as pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds prefer highly rated bonds with stable returns.

Enhancing Credit Ratings and Investor Confidence

One of the most significant ways PCE helps infrastructure bond issuances is by improving their credit ratings. When a bank or financial institution provides partial credit enhancement in the form of a guarantee or reserve fund, it reduces the default risk associated with the bond. This leads to a higher credit rating, making the bond more attractive to investors. For example, an infrastructure company with a BBB-rated bond issuance may improve its rating to A with a 20% PCE support, or AA with a 50% PCE support thereby increasing demand from investors. A higher rating not only boosts investor confidence but also expands the pool of potential buyers, including institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies.

Reducing Cost of Borrowing

By improving the credit rating of infrastructure bonds, PCE directly leads to a reduction in interest costs. Bonds with higher ratings attract lower interest rates, which helps infrastructure companies secure financing at more affordable terms. For instance, without PCE, a BBB-rated bond may require 12%, whereas a bond upgraded to an AA rating with PCE support may only require 9%. This reduction in interest rates can result in significant savings over the life of the bond. Lower borrowing costs also make infrastructure projects more financially viable, ensuring their timely execution and long-term sustainability.

Attracting Institutional Investors

Institutional investors, such as mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies, typically have strict investment guidelines that restrict them from investing in low-rated securities. Since many of these investors require bonds to be rated AA or higher, infrastructure bonds often struggle to meet these requirements. PCE helps bridge this gap by enhancing the credit rating, making infrastructure bonds eligible for investment by these large institutional players. This leads to greater liquidity and stability in the corporate bond market, ensuring a steady flow of capital to infrastructure projects.

Why is issuance of bonds helpful/ important for the infrastructure entity?

PCE contributes to the overall development of the corporate bond market by encouraging more issuers to raise funds through bonds rather than relying solely on bank loans. Traditionally, infrastructure financing in India has been dependent on banks, which exposes them to high asset-liability mismatches due to the long tenure of infrastructure projects. By facilitating infrastructure bond issuances, PCE helps shift the burden away from banks and towards a broader investor base. This not only diversifies funding sources but also enhances financial stability in the banking sector.

As per a CII report (2022), the infrastructure financing gap is estimated at over 5% of GDP. Approx. 80% of the investment in infrastructure space is by government agencies (80%), and the remaining 20% comes from private developers. 

As per the National Infrastructure Pipelines, the total investment target was set at INR 111 trillion (USD 1.34 trillion) for the period between FY 20 and FY 25; and only 6-8% (INR 6.66-8.88) of the such targets were expected to be met by bond issuances. Reliance on bond markets is planned to the extent of 6% to 8% (INR 6.66 – 8.88 trillion). As per the said estimates, the average annual issuances should have been INR 1.480 trillion. However, between FY18 and FY22, the issuance of infrastructure bonds has been at INR 5.37 trillion, that is, an average of INR 1.07 trillion per annum, that is a shortfall of ~30% compared to the target.

Furthermore, the issuances have been highly concentrated in the top 5 PSUs. The charts below show the annual bond issuances between FY 18 – FY 22, and share of issuance by top 5 PSUs and others:

Source: CRISIL

The market is dominated by highly rated issuers. In general approx. 75% of bond issuers are rated AAA, and more than 90% of the issuances are by AA and above rated entities. The reason for this dominance by highly rated issuers is the fact that for practical purposes, the most acceptable rating in the infra bonds space is AA, as long term investors like insurance companies, pension funds etc. are by regulation required to invest in AA or above rated papers. 

PCE support from a credible source will help a lot of infrastructure operators, who are stopped at the gate, with ratings in the range of A, with easy access to the market. 

Existing scheme for PCE – why has it not found takers

The existing scheme for PCE was notified by the RBI in 2015. In a nutshell, the scheme provides for the following:

Form of PCE: To be structured as a non-funded, irrevocable contingent line of credit. This facility can be drawn upon in the event of cash flow shortfalls affecting bond servicing.

Limitations: The total PCE extended by a single bank cannot exceed 20% of the bond’s total size; however, overall, the PCE provided by all banks, in aggregate, cannot exceed 50% of the bond’s total size.

Further, PCE can be provided only to bonds which have a pre-enhanced rating of BBB- or above.

Capital Requirements: The bank providing PCE does not hold capital based only on its PCE amount. Instead, it calculates the capital based on the difference between:

  • The capital required before credit enhancement.
  • The capital required after credit enhancement.

The objective is to ensure that the PCE provider should absorb the risks that it covers in the entire transaction. Illustrating with an example:

Assume that the total bond size is Rs. 100 crores for which PCE to the extent of Rs. 20 crore is provided by a bank. The pre-enhanced rating of the bond is BBB which gets enhanced to AA with the PCE. In this scenario:

  1. At the pre-enhanced rating of BBB (100% risk weight), the capital requirement on the total bond size (Rs.100 crores) is Rs.9.00 crores.
  2. The capital requirement for the bond (Rs.100 crores) at the enhanced rating (AA, i.e., 30% risk weight)) would be Rs.2.70 crores.
  3. As such, the PCE provider will be required to hold the difference in capital i.e., Rs.6.30 crores (Rs.9.00 crores – Rs.2.70 crores).

As can be seen, the capital has to be maintained on the total bond issuance, and not just the exposure. Ironically, this capital has to be maintained until the outstanding principal of bonds falls below the extent of PCE provided​. Usually, the bonds are amortising in nature – that is, the actual exposure of the guarantor continues to come down. Given, however, that default in bonds may be back-ended, the capital has still to be maintained till the redemption of the bonds​. This requires the PCE provider to maintain huge regulatory capital for a significantly long period of time; which also gets reflected in the ultimate cost to the beneficiary, therefore, making it unviable. 

How to make it work?

The FM’s announcement though comes with a lot of promise, as it shows a positive intent. But to make things work, there are quite a few things that should be put into place:

  1. Specific applicability: Currently, the PCE framework applies only to banks. For NaBFID to commence its PCE operations, it would be ideal to receive explicit approval from the RBI, even if the requirement is minor or procedural in nature.
  1. Limitations: Currently, the RBI’s PCE framework restricts a single entity to providing only 20% of the total 50% PCE limit for a bond issuance. It is recommended that a single institution, such as NaBFID, be allowed to provide the entire PCE, which would enhance flexibility.  The existing framework is not particularly attractive for banks in India. In the infrastructure finance sector, a 20% PCE contribution from a single entity may not be sufficient to secure a strong rating from credit rating agencies. Removing this 20% sub-limit would grant NaBFID greater flexibility while also reducing the time required to identify multiple institutions to fulfill the remaining PCE. Additionally, this change would lead to a reduction in operational expenses associated with coordinating multiple PCE providers.
  1. Capital treatment: The current setting of capital requirement makes the transactions very costly. There has to be an alternative way of achieving the objective. Setting the capital requirement as a fixed proportion of the outstanding bond value may not be appropriate, as defaults can occur at any stage. A more effective approach would be to apply the capital treatment for structured credit risk transfer under the Basel III framework, that is SEC ERBA.  Under Basel III, capital requirements are not linked to the total bond issuance size but are instead based on the rating of the tranche and the extent of exposure undertaken. This method ensures that capital is aligned with the actual risk exposure, rather than a fixed percentage of the bond size. Additionally, it accounts for the possibility of defaults occurring later in the bond’s lifecycle, providing a more efficient risk management framework.
  1. Credit risk transfer: The PCE framework should specifically allow credit risk transfer by the PCE provider – this will help the PCE provider reduce its exposures, and consequently, extent of capital to be maintained on the PCE provided​. This will help in reducing the cost of the PCE support as well.

Enhanced role of CRAs in technical defaults by issuers

– Palak Jaiswani, Manager & Simrat Singh, Executive | corplaw@vinodkothari.com


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AT1 Bonds: Death before it is due?

– Abhirup Ghosh | abhirup@vinodkothari.com

Additional Tier 1 bonds which are known by many names – AT1 bonds or Contingently Convertible Bonds (CoCo Bonds) or Perpetual Bonds, are capital structure instruments. Every liability instrument in corporate finance is essentially a capital structure instrument, that is, it is somewhere in the order of priority for its loss absorbency feature, but some of the instruments are high in the order of priorities, and therefore, their placing in the capital structure is commonly not a matter of concern. However, AT1 bonds are placed just after common equity, and therefore, if equity has suffered a meltdown, AT1 bonds will be next to be hit.

This article examines the life and death of AT1 bonds.

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A shocker for the bond markets: Withholding tax to apply on listed bonds, without grandfathering 

Team Financial Services | finserv@vinodkothari.com

Section 193 of the Income Tax Act[1] provides for TDS payment in case of interest on securities. Currently listed debentures are exempt from TDS without any limit. The exemption comes way of clause (ix) of the proviso to sec. 193.

The said clause is now sought to be deleted. The deletion, if affirmed by the statute, will be effective from 1st April, 2023, thereby meaning that any interest paid by companies on listed bonds will now be subject to tax.

The amendment has a retroactive effect, as it applies even to bonds that may have already been issued. If the issuer and the investor have both entered into a securities transaction on the strength of the law then existing, and the bondholder suddenly comes under the purview of deduction of tax at source, this will be like acquiring a security with no safe harbor. It is notable that certainty of tax treatment for capital market transactions is an essential mainstay for the healthy growth of capital markets.

Read more

Credit Default Swaps (Global and Indian Scenario)

Credit default swaps (what is happening in global markets and the recommendations of the working group)

Other ‘I am the best’ presentations can be viewed here

Our other resources on related topics –

      1. https://vinodkothari.com/wp-content/uploads/RBIa%CC%82%C2%80%C2%99s-Guidelines-on-Credit-Default-Swaps-for-Corporate-Bonds.pdf
      2. https://vinodkothari.com/2021/02/rbi-issues-draft-directions-on-credit-derivatives/
      3. https://vinodkothari.com/isda_new_definition_credit-derivs_impact/
      4. https://vinodkothari.com/2013/12/secnews-110810/
      5. https://vinodkothari.com/rbi-new-cds-guidelines-feeble-effort-start-non-starting-product/

Social Stock Exchanges – Enabling funding for social enterprises the regulated way

By Sharon Pinto & Sachin Sharma, Corplaw division, Vinod Kothari & Company  (corplaw@vinodkothari.com) 

Background

The inception of the idea of Social Stock Exchanges (SSEs) in India can be traced to the mention of the formation of an SSE under the regulatory purview of Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) for listing and raising of capital by social enterprises and voluntary organisations, in the 2019-20 Budget Speech of the Finance Minister. Consequently, SEBI constituted a working group on SSEs under the Chairmanship of Shri Ishaat Hussain on September 19, 2019[1]. The report of the Working Group (WG) set forth the framework on SSEs, shed light on the concept of social enterprises as well as the nature of instruments that can be raised under such framework and uniform reporting procedures. For further deliberations and refining of the process, SEBI set up a Technical Group (TG) under the Chairmanship of Dr. Harsh Kumar Bhanwala (Ex-Chairman, NABARD) on September 21, 2020[2]. The report, made public on May 6, 2021[3], of the TG entails qualifying criteria as well as the exhaustive ecosystem in which such an SSE would function.

In this article we have analysed the framework set forth by the reports of the committees with the globally established practices.

Concept of SSEs

As per the report of the WG dated June 1, 2020[4], SSE is not only a place where securities or other funding structures are “listed” but also a set of procedures that act as a filter, selecting-in only those entities that are creating measurable social impact and reporting such impact. Further the SSE shall be a separate segment under the existing stock exchanges. Thus, an SSE provides the infrastructure for listing and disclosure of information of listed social enterprises.

Such a framework has been implemented in various countries and an analysis of the same can be set forth as follows:

A. United Kingdom

  • The Social Stock Exchange (SSX) was formed in June 2013 on the recommendation of the report of Social Investment Taskforce. The exchange does not yet facilitate share trading, but instead serves as a directory of companies that have passed a ‘social impact test’. It thus provides a detailed database of companies which have social businesses. It facilitates as a research service for potential social impact investors.
  • Further, companies that are trading publically in the main board stock exchange, may list their securities on SSX, thus only for-profit companies can list on the SSX[5] It works with the support of the London Stock Exchange and is a standalone body not regulated by any official entity.
  • Social and environment impact is the core aim of SSX. To satisfy the same, companies are required to submit a Social Impact Report for review by the independent Admissions Panel composed of 11 finance and impact investing experts.
  • The disclosure framework comprises adherence to UK Corporate Governance Guidelines and Filing Annual Social Impact Reports determine the continuation of listing in SSX.

B. Canada

  • Social Venture Connection (SVX)[6] was launched in 2013. Like SSX, SVX is not an actual trading platform but it is a private investment platform built to connect impact ventures, funds, and investors. It is open only for institutional investors[7].
  • The platform facilitates listing of for-profit business, NPO, or cooperatives categorized as, Social Impact Issuers and Environment Impact Issuers. These entities are required to be incorporated in Ontario for at least 2 years and have audited financial statements available.
  • For listing, a for-profit business must obtain satisfactory company ratings through GIIRS, a privately administered rating system.
  • Issuer must conform to the SVX Issuer Manual. In addition to this reporting of expenditure and other financial transactions shall be done once capital is raised. Further the issuers are required to file financial statements annually in accepted accounting methods and shall not have any misleading information. Ratings are required to be obtained, however the provisions are silent on the periodicity of revision of ratings.

C. Singapore

  • Singapore has established Impact Exchange (IX) which is operated by Stock Exchange of Mauritius and regulated by the Financial Service Commission of Mauritius.
  • IX is the only SSE that is an actual public exchange. It is thus a public trading platform dedicated to connecting social enterprise with mission-aligned investment. Social enterprises, both for-profits and non-profits, are permitted to list their project. NGOs are allowed as issuers of debt securities (such as bonds).
  • Listing requirements on the exchange are enumerated into social and financial categories. Following comprise the social criteria for listing:
  1. Specify social or economic impact as the reason for their primary existence.
  2. Articulate the purpose and intent of the company in the form of a theory of change- basis for demonstrating social performance.
  3. Commit to ongoing monitoring and evaluation of impact performance assessment and reporting.
  4. Minimum 1 year of impact reports prepared as per IX reporting principles.
  5. Certification of impact reports by an independent rating body 12 months prior listing.

Further the financial criteria entails the need for a fixed limit of minimum market capitalization, publication of financial statements and use of market-based approach for achieving its purpose.

D. South Africa

  • The ‘South Africa Social Exchange’ or SASIX[8], offers ethical investors a platform to buy shares in social projects according to two classifications: by sector and by province[9]. Guidelines for listing prescribe compliance with SASIX’s good practice norms for each sector.
  • In order to get listed, entities have to achieve a measurable social impact. The platform acts as a tool of research, evaluation and match-making to facilitate investments into social development projects
  • NGOs can also list their social projects on the exchange. Value of the projects is assessed and then divided into shares. Following project implementation, investors are given access to financial and social reports.
  • While social enterprises are required to have a social purpose as their primary aim, they are also expected to have a financially sustainable business model. The SASIX ceased functioning in 2017[10].

Key ingredients for a social enterprise

  • The report of the TG[11] has categorised social enterprises into For Profit Enterprise (FPEs) and Not for Profit Organisation (NPOs). In order to qualify as a social enterprise the entities shall establish primacy of social impact which shall be determined by application of the following 3 filters:

  • On establishment of the primacy of social impact through the three filters as stated above, the entity shall be eligible to qualify for on-boarding the SSE and access to the SSE for fund-raising upon submitting a declaration as prescribed.

Qualifying criteria and process for onboarding

As per TG recommendation, an NPO is required to register on any of the Social Stock Exchange and thereafter, it may choose to list or not. However, an FPE can proceed directly for listing, provided it is a company registered under Companies Act and complies with the requirements in terms of SEBI Regulations for issuance and listing of equity or debt securities.

Further, the TG has recommended a set of mandatory criteria as mentioned below that NPOs shall meet in order to register.

A. Legal Requirements:

  • Entity is legally registered as an NPO (Charitable Trust/ Society/Section-8 Co’s).
  • Shall have governing documents (MoA & AoA/ Trust Deed/ Bye-laws/ Constitution) & Disclose whether owned and/or controlled by government or private.
  • Shall have Registration Certificate under 12A/12AA/12AB under Income Tax.
  • Shall have a valid IT PAN.
  • Shall have a Registration Certificate of minimum 3 years of its existence.
  • Shall have valid 80G registration under Income-Tax.

B. Minimum Fund Flows:

In order to ensure that the NPO wishing to register has an adequate track-record of operations.

  • Receipts or payments from Audited accounts/ Fund Flow Statement in the last financial year must be at least Rs. 50 lakhs.
  • Receipts from Audited accounts/ Fund Flow Statement in the last financial year must be at least Rs. 10 lakhs.

Framework for listing

Post establishment of the eligibility for listing and the additional registration criteria in case of NPOs, the social enterprises may list their securities in the manner discussed further. The listing procedures vary for NPOs and FPEs and is set forth as follows:

A. NPOs

  • NPO shall be required to provide audited financial statements for the previous 3 years and social impact statements in the format prescribed. Further the offer document shall comprise of ‘differentiators’ which shall help the potential investors to assess the NPOs being listed and form a sound and well-informed investment decision. A list of 11 such differentiators has been provided in the report of the TG.
  • Further in case of program-specific or project-specific listings, the NPO shall have to provide a greater level of detail in the listing document about its track record and impact created in the program target segment.
  • All the information submitted as part of pre-listing and post-listing requirements, shall be duly displayed on the website of the NPO.

B. FPEs

  • In case of an FPE, existing regulatory guidelines under various SEBI Regulations for listing securities such as equity, debt shall be complied with.
  • The differentiators will be in addition to requirements as mandated in SEBI Regulations in respect of raising funds through equity or debt.
  • Further, FPEs have been granted an option to list their securities on the appropriate existing boards. Thus the issuer may at their discretion list their debt securities on the main boards, while equity securities may be listed on the main boards, or on the SME or IGP.

Types of instruments 

Depending on the type of organisation, SSEs shall allow a variety of financing instruments for NPOs and FPEs. As FPEs have already well-established instruments, these securities are permitted to be listed on the Main Board/IGP/SME, however visibility shall be given to such entities by identifying them as For Profit Social Enterprise (FPSE) on the respective stock exchanges.

Modes available for fundraising for NPOs shall be Equity (Section 8 Co’s.), Zero Coupon Zero Principal (ZCZP) bonds [this will have to be notified as a security under Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (SCRA)], Development Impact Bonds (DIB), Social Impact Fund (SIF) (currently known as Social Venture Fund) with 100% grants-in grants out provision and funding by investors through Mutual Funds. On the other hand, FPEs shall be able to raise funds through equity, debt, DIBs and SIFs.

While SVF is an existing model for fund-raising, the TG has proposed various changes in order to incentivise investors and philanthropists to invest in such instruments. In addition to change in nomenclature from SVF to SIF, minimum corpus size is proposed to be reduced from Rs. 20 Cr to Rs. 5 Cr. Further, minimum subscription shall stand at Rs. 2L from the current Rs. 1 Cr. The amendments shall also allow corporates to invest CSR funds into SVFs with a 100% grants-in, grants out model.

Disclosure and Reporting norms

Once the FPE or the NPO (registered/listed) has been demarcated by the exchange to be an SE, it needs to comply with a set of minimum disclosure and reporting requirements to continue to remain listed/registered. The disclosure requirements can be enlisted as follows:

For NPO:

  • NPO’s (either registered or listed) will have to disclose on general, governance and financial aspects on an annual basis.
  • The disclosures will include vision, mission, activities, scale of operations, board and management, related party transactions, remuneration policies, stakeholder redressal, balance sheet, income statement, program-wise fund utilization for the year, auditors report etc.
  • NPO’s will have to report within 7 days any event that might have a material impact on the planned achievement of their outputs or outcomes, to the exchange in which they are registered/listed. This disclosure will include details of the event, the potential impact and what the NPO is doing to overcome the impact.
  • NPO”s that have listed its securities will have to disclose Social Impact Report covering aspects such as strategic intent and planning, approach, impact score card etc. on annual basis.

For FPE:

FPE’s having listed equity/debt will have to disclose Social Impact Report on annual basis and comply with the disclosure requirements as per the applicable segment such as main board, SME, IGP etc.

Other factors of the SSE ecosystem

a. Capacity Building Fund

As per the recommendation of the WG, constitution of a Capacity Building Fund (CBF) has been proposed. The said fund shall be housed under NABARD and funded by Stock Exchanges, other developmental agencies such as SIDBI, other financial institutions, and donors (CSRs). The fund shall have a corpus of Rs. 100 Cr and shall be an entity registered under 80G, which shall make it eligible for receiving CSR donations pursuant to changes to Section 135/Schedule VII of Companies Act 2013. The role of the fund shall encompass facilitating NPOs for registration and listing procedures as well as proper reporting framework. These functions shall be carried out in the form awareness programs.

b. Social Auditors

Social audit of the enterprises shall compose of two components – financial audit and non-financial audit, which shall be carried out by financial or non-financial auditors. In addition to holding a certificate of practice from the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), the auditors will be required to have attended a course at the National Institute of Securities Markets (NISM) and received a certificate of completion after successfully passing the course examination. The SRO shall prepare the criteria and list of firms/institutions for the first phase soon after the formation of SSEs, and those firms/institutions shall register with the SRO.

c. Information Repositories

The platform shall function as a research tool for the various social enterprises to be listed, thus Information Repository (IR) forms an important component of the framework. It functions as an aggregator of information on NGOs, and provides a searchable electronic database in a comparable form. Thus it shall provide accurate, timely, reliable information required by the potential investors to make well informed decisions.

Conclusion  

The social sector in India is getting increasingly powerful – this was evident during Covid-crisis based on the wonderful work done by several NGOs. Of course, all social work requires funding, and being able to crowd source funding in a legitimate and transparent manner is quintessential for the social sector. We find the report of the TG to be raising and addressing relevant issues. We are hoping that SEBI will now find it easy to come out with the needed regulatory platform to allow social enterprises to get funding through SSEs.

Our other article on the similar topic can be read here – http://vinodkothari.com/2019/09/social-stock-exchange-a-guide/

[1] https://www.sebi.gov.in/media/press-releases/sep-2019/sebi-constitutes-working-group-on-social-stock-exchanges-sse-_44311.html

[2] https://www.sebi.gov.in/media/press-releases/sep-2020/sebi-constitutes-technical-group-on-social-stock-exchange_47607.html

[3] https://www.sebi.gov.in/reports-and-statistics/reports/may-2021/technical-group-report-on-social-stock-exchange_50071.html

[4] https://www.sebi.gov.in/reports-and-statistics/reports/jun-2020/report-of-the-working-group-on-social-stock-exchange_46852.html

[5] https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1906&context=jil&httpsredir=1&referer=

[6] https://www.svx.ca/faq

[7] https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_rise_of_social_stock_exchanges

[8] https://www.sasix.co.za/

[9] https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_rise_of_social_stock_exchanges

[10] https://www.samhita.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/India-SSE-report-final.pdf

[11] https://www.sebi.gov.in/reports-and-statistics/reports/may-2021/technical-group-report-on-social-stock-exchange_50071.html

 

Market Linked Debentures – Adding Flavour to Plain Vanilla Bonds

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