Virtual Certificate Course on Grooming of Chief Compliance Officers of NBFCs
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– Vinod Kothari & Chirag Agarwal | finserv@vinodkothari.com
Volumes of securitisation (which, of course, have always included bilateral assignments or so-called DA transactions) fell by 6% in FY 26, if the origination volume by Reliance group entities in the first half were to be excluded. However, the market has shown more originator diversity, with an increasing share of smaller issuers, including those tasting the market for the first time.

The dip in volumes is because of the larger issuers who were prominently absent or subdued – Shriram Finance as the largest issuer having raised on-balance sheet liquidity, and banking companies. However, the share of gold loans went up sharply, largely due to the sharp increase in gold prices and gold lending, Microfinance companies went more for securitisation, rather than direct assignment transactions.
For anyone studying the Indian securitisation market, it is important to note the following:
Overall, in a stressful global scenario, securitisation has stood firm. Non financial sector entities have shown increasing willingness to tap the market. Of course, SEBI regulations have to be more enabling.
Below, we give a detailed overview of the securitisation market, including a discussion on the asset classes.
Securitisation volumes have been largely driven by NBFCs, which recorded a 30% year-on-year increase in value. In contrast, originations by banks have declined significantly.
Among asset classes, vehicle loans (including commercial vehicles and two-wheelers) accounted for 50% of securitisation volumes (vs 47% in the corresponding period last fiscal). Mortgage-backed loans accounted for about 28% of securitisation volume (vs 37% in the last FY).
Vehicle loan-backed securitisations dominated the market, both in terms of number of deals and total value, reaffirming the sector’s strong position. This is consistent with the growth trend in vehicle loan originations during FY 25.
In addition to vehicle loans, originators also securitised receivables from a diverse set of underlying asset classes during Q4, including:
The continued diversification in underlying asset classes highlights the evolving maturity of India’s securitisation market and growing investor appetite across segments. The break-up of securitisation volumes across various asset classes have been presented below:

Securitisation of Vehicle Loans
The issuance volume for vehicle loan securitisation during FY26 was approximately ₹1.26 lakh crores. Most of the transactions were structured as single-tranche issuances. However, a few exceptions featured more layered structures comprising senior and equity tranches, or senior, mezzanine, and equity tranches.
In terms of credit ratings, the tranches were rated between A- and AAA. Notably, the senior tranches in the majority of transactions received high investment-grade ratings, typically falling within the AA+ to AAA range. This indicates strong investor confidence and reflects the underlying credit quality of the asset pools, supported by adequate credit enhancement mechanisms.
Further, replenishing structures were also observed commonly during FY26. These variations indicate growing sophistication in transaction structuring within the vehicle loan securitisation space, aimed at catering to different investor preferences, improving credit protection, and aligning with originator risk appetite. As the market matures, further innovation in structuring and risk mitigation features can be expected.
In terms of credit enhancements, most vehicle loan securitisation transactions during the last quarter of FY26 featured: cash collateral (CC) and overcollateralisation (OC), with the Excess Interest Spread (EIS) serving as the first layer of loss absorption.
Securitisation of Microfinance Loans
During FY26, the MFI sector has seen a revival after a period of stress during FY 25 and FY 24. This has been due to better credit underwriting of lenders, improving performance trends and granular pool characteristics. Further, after a period of stress, the lenders relied on time-tested borrowers rather than exploring new markets leading to higher average ticket size of loans. This has led to a growth in the volumes of securitisation of microfinance loans during FY26. The PTC issuance volume of microfinance institutions increased to 14% of total PTC issuance in FY26 from 6% of total PTC issuances in FY25. Most of the transactions were structured as a single tranche securitisation.
Further, most microfinance loan securitisation transactions during the quarter featured credit enhancement through two primary mechanisms: CC and overcollateralisation OC, with the EIS serving as the first layer of loss absorption.
Securitisation of pool of loans backed by Home Loans & LAP
The volume of mortgage backed securitisation has been low both in terms of number as well as in terms of amount of issuance. As compared to FY25, the total MBS issuances dropped to 28% of total issuance from 37%. The transactions featured a common waterfall matrix and had received an overall rating of AAA.
In terms of credit enhancement, CC and OC has been provided as a credit enhancement with the EIS serving as the first layer of loss absorption.
Securitisation of Gold Loans
Gold loan securitisation volumes in H2FY26 stood at approximately ₹18,500 crore, significantly higher than the ₹5,000 crore recorded for the whole of FY25.
The jump in gold lending securitisation may be due to increase in gold prices and resultant increase in the value of the collateral. As a result of this valuation spike, average ticket sizes have increased, indicating that as gold valuations rise, consumers are leveraging higher-value loans to meet their financing needs. Another reason for the increased origination may be removal of LTV restriction in case of income generating gold loans.
Securitisation of Unsecured Loans
As per rating rationales published by Care the securitisation volumes of unsecured loans (both personal and business) increased during FY26. Investors in unsecured loan transactions, are preferring the PTC route, due to the support provided by external enhancement. CC and OC have also been provided as a credit enhancement with the EIS serving as the first layer of loss absorption.
Team Finserv | finserv@vinodkothari.com
Following the consolidation action undertaken by the Department of Regulations (DoR) in November 2025, the Department of Supervision has now undertaken a comprehensive exercise to consolidate existing standalone circulars issued by RBI in supervisory domain into function-wise, entity-specific consolidated Directions for easier navigation and application. The supervisory instructions have been organised into distinct Directions for each type of RE on each supervisory function.
A detailed analysis of the drafts for NBFCs has been covered here-
| Proposed Draft | Existing Circulars | Applicability | Key Changes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Compliance Function) Directions, 2026 | Compliance Function and Role of Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) – NBFCs Streamlining of Internal Compliance monitoring function – leveraging use of technology | NBFCs, including HFCs, in the ML and UL. | No major changes.It has been clarified that in the absence of a new product committee, the CCO shall be required to evaluate all new products before they are launched. |
| Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Cybersecurity, Technology: Risk, Resilience and Assurance) Directions, 2026 [IT Directions] | Master Direction – Information Technology Framework for the NBFC Sector (IT Framework)Reserve Bank of India (Information Technology Governance, Risk, Controls and Assurance Practices) Directions, 2023 (IT Governance) | All NBFCs | CICs were not required to comply requirements of IT Governance Framework, the draft IT Directions now mandate CICs to comply with the IT baseline technology standardsFor NBFCs with asset size below ₹ 500 cr-Chapter IV of IT Directions:Use of public key infrastructure (PKI) for ensuring confidentiality of data, access control, data integrity has been made mandatory (earlier recommendatory)Timeline of reporting of cyber incidents to RBI specified as 6 hours (IT Framework did not contain any such timeline)Use of Digital Signature to authenticate electronic records has been made mandatory (earlier recommendatory)For NBFCs with asset size above ₹ 500 cr-Chapter IV of IT Directions, has specified that IT capacity requirements are now to be ensured by ITSC |
| Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Digital Payment Security Controls) Directions, 2026 | Master Direction on Digital Payment Security Controls | Card issuing NBFCs | There is additional expectation that Risk and Control Self Assessment (RCSA) shall be conducted by vendors as well and such RCSA should be evaluated by the Credit-Card issuing NBFC.Credit-Card issuing NBFCs are required to comply with a number of technical standards for card payment security. Status of compliance with these standards are to be reported to the ITSC for deliberation and appropriate action. |
| Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Fraud Risk Management) Directions, 2026 | Master Directions on Fraud Risk Management in Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) (including Housing Finance Companies) FAQs on Master Directions on Fraud Risk Management in Regulated Entities (REs), 2024 | NBFC-ML, NBFC-UL,NBFC-BL having asset size ₹500 crores and aboveHFCs. | No Change. FAQs integrated with the circular. |
| Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Internal Audit Function) Directions, 2026 | Risk-Based Internal Audit (RBIA) | All Deposit taking NBFCs and HFCs Non-Deposit taking NBFCs and HFCs with asset size of ₹5,000 crore and above | No Change |
| Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Statutory Audit) Directions, 2026 | Guidelines for Appointment of Statutory Central Auditors (SCAs)/Statutory Auditors (SAs) of Commercial Banks (excluding RRBs), UCBs and NBFCs (including HFCs) FAQs on Guidelines for Appointment SCAs/ SAs of Commercial Banks (excluding RRBs), UCBs and NBFCs (including HFCs) | NBFCs and HFCs having asset size ₹1000 crores and above | No Change. FAQs integrated with the circular. |
| Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Supervisory Returns) Directions, 2026 | Master Direction – Reserve Bank of India (Filing of Supervisory Returns) Directions – 2024 LIST OF RETURNS SUBMITTED TO RBI | All NBFCs (excluding HFCs) | Change in name of return DNBS09 from DNBS09-CRILC Weekly– RDB return to DNBS09- Return on Defaulted Borrowers.Quarterly return on Large Exposure Framework to be filed quarterly by all NBFCs in the Upper Layer – The earlier requirement was reporting of 10 largest exposures of the entity as against the proposed requirement of reporting the top 20 largest exposures. Change in nomenclature of returns on fraud reporting:FMR-I to FMRFMR-III to FUAFMR-IV to FMR 4Form A Certificate is now proposed to be filed online instead of filing in hard copy/ via email.It is proposed that hard copy of returns (hand/post/courier) or email submissions would not be accepted (i.e., would not be deemed to have been submitted by the NBFC) unless specifically prescribed.Additional returns to be filed by SPDs specified. |
| Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Miscellaneous) Supervisory Directions, 2026 | Implementation of ‘Core Financial Services Solution’ by Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs)Fair Practices Code for Lenders – Charging of InterestCoverage of customers under the nomination facilityPrompt Corrective Action (PCA) Framework for Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) | Chapter III – All NBFCs including HFCs and MFIsChapter IV – Deposit Taking NBFCs (excl. HFCs)Chapter V- Deposit taking, Non-Depositaking, in Middle, Upper and Top Layers including CICs but excluding NBFCs not accepting/ intending to accept public funds. | The phased manner timelines for implementation of CFSS has been removed since the circular is now effective |
| Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Auditor’s Report) Directions, 2026 | Master Direction – Non-Banking Financial Companies Auditor’s Report (Reserve Bank) Directions, 2016 Provisions related to DNBS-10 (SAC) in Master Direction – Reserve Bank of India (Filing of Supervisory Returns) Directions – 2024 | Applicable to every auditor of an NBFC | Clarified that the auditor is now obligated to report to the RBI instances of non-compliance with all applicable extant directions issued by RBI. Other than the above, no major change except updation of references. |
-Vinod Kothari and Chirag Agarwal | finserv@vinodkothari.com
The National Credit Guarantee Trust Company (NCGTC), under the Department of Financial Services, has floated a scheme which will guarantee lending upto ₹20000 crores by banks and financial institutions (Member Lending Institutions or MLIs), for taking incremental loan exposure to MFIs. The Scheme intends to nudge bank lending to MFIs, as the former has shunned away in view of the perceived risk of the sector in the recent past. The NCGTC takes 70% – 80% risk of default of the bank loans to the MFIs, provided the lending is done accordingly with the conditions of the Scheme.
Among the conditions, the MFI must lend at least at 1% lower than the average lending rate over the last 6 months, and the MLI must lend at no more than 2% over the benchmark rate (MCLR or EBLR as applicable).
In our view, the Scheme has following outcome expectations:
Who are MLIs?
What type of loans are covered under the Scheme?
What is the interest cap under the Scheme?
What is the cap on tenure of loans under the Scheme?
Conditions for MLIs to get benefits under the Scheme:
Maximum coverage under the guarantee:
Guarantee Fee:
Claim Process:
Some of our recent write up and videos on Master Directions and amendments/ draft proposals:
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Watch our youtube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IBv09etJb2g
Subhojit Shome, Senior Manager | Finserv@vinodkothari.com
The payments ecosystem is often described as the “plumbing” of commerce—rarely visible to consumers, yet fundamental to economic activity. For decades, this plumbing has been dominated by credit and debit card systems, operated by banks and card networks under tightly regulated frameworks. In recent years, however, global technology platforms have begun experimenting with alternative payment infrastructures, particularly those built on blockchain technology, with the aim of reducing remittance fees and achieving faster settlement.1
One such initiative is the payment infrastructure jointly developed by Shopify and Coinbase (“Shopify–Coinbase Payment Infrastructure”), which enables merchants to accept payments using stablecoins, most notably USD Coin (USDC), without relying on traditional card networks.
Shopify–Coinbase Payment Infrastructure has been initially launched in at least 34 countries where merchants can accept USDC payments via the Base (blockchain) network. This includes a range of markets across the United States, most of Europe, Canada, Australia, Japan, Singapore2. A number of these countries/ regions (e.g. United States3, EU4, Japan5, Singapore6) have statutorily recognised, and regulate the use of stablecoins.
This article examines the Shopify–Coinbase Payment Infrastructure in comparison with traditional card payment rails and analyses the regulatory concerns that would arise if such a system were to operate in India, with particular reference to the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 (“PSS Act”) and the regulatory stance of the RBI.
To appreciate what Shopify and Coinbase seek to replace, it is first necessary to understand the traditional debit/ credit card “payment rails”. The term “rails” is a metaphor, referring to the underlying infrastructure that carries a payment transaction from the payer to the payee—much like railway tracks carry trains.
In a credit or debit card transaction, the rails consist of several interconnected elements. When a customer uses a card, the merchant does not receive money immediately. Instead, the transaction is routed through the card network (such as Visa, Mastercard, or RuPay), which communicates with the customer’s bank (the issuer) and the merchant’s bank (the acquirer). The customer’s bank first checks whether sufficient funds or credit are available and places a temporary hold on that amount. This is known as authorisation (“auth”). The actual transfer of money happens later, when the merchant confirms the transaction—a step known as capture. Settlement between banks typically occurs after a delay of one or two business days.
This system is heavily regulated in India – card networks operate under RBI oversight, settlement occurs through RBI-regulated banking channels, and consumers are protected through structured dispute resolution mechanisms, including chargebacks7. The entire system functions within the legal framework of the PSS Act and the RBI’s directions on payment systems and card networks, payment aggregators, and consumer protection.
The Shopify–Coinbase Payment Infrastructure proposes a fundamentally different way of moving money. Instead of using banks and card networks as intermediaries, it relies on stablecoins, which are digital tokens designed to maintain a stable value by being backed by traditional currency reserves. The stablecoin USDC, for example, is designed to track the value of the US dollar.
In this system, when a customer pays a merchant, the payment is executed on a blockchain network. The funds are first locked in a digital escrow mechanism controlled by software (a “smart contract”) and once the merchant fulfils the order, the funds are automatically released to the merchant. This process replicates the familiar card concepts of authorisation and capture (“auth and capture”), but replaces banks and card networks with software rules and cryptographic verification.
From the user’s perspective, the checkout experience may look familiar. From a legal perspective, however, the system represents a shift from institution-based trust (banks and regulators) to code-based execution. Settlement is near-instant, global, and does not depend on banking infrastructure.
Auth/ Capture using Stablecoins and Smart Contracts
In card payment systems, authorisation and capture are two distinct but linked stages in how a transaction is processed and settled. One of the unique characteristics of the Shopify–Coinbase Payment Infrastructure is that it is able to replicate such an auth/ capture settlement process which is observed in traditional card rails.8
Authorisation is the preliminary step. When a customer enters card details at checkout, the merchant seeks confirmation that the cardholder has sufficient funds or credit and that the transaction is permitted. At this stage, no money actually moves. Instead, the issuing bank places a temporary hold on the relevant amount, effectively earmarking those funds. From a legal perspective, authorisation represents a conditional and revocable promise by the issuer to honour the transaction, subject to subsequent validation and compliance with network rules.
Capture occurs later, when the merchant confirms that the goods or services have been provided (or are about to be provided) and formally requests payment. Upon capture, the transaction becomes final for settlement purposes. The temporary hold created at the authorisation stage is converted into an obligation to transfer funds through the card network’s clearing and settlement process. Only after capture does the merchant acquire an enforceable right to receive payment, subject to chargeback and dispute mechanisms.
The Shopify–Coinbase Payment Infrastructure seeks to recreate this familiar commercial logic—authorisation first, settlement later—while removing traditional card networks entirely. In this model, the customer pays using a stablecoin (typically denominated in a foreign currency such as the US dollar). Rather than immediately transferring funds to the merchant, the payment is first routed into a smart contract–based escrow. This escrow functions as the economic equivalent of card authorisation. The funds are not credited to the merchant and cannot be unilaterally withdrawn. They are effectively “locked,” signalling the payer’s intent and financial capacity, much like a card authorisation hold. The legal character of this stage differs fundamentally from card authorisation. In card systems, the issuer’s promise is conditional and revocable, and the funds remain within the regulated banking system. In a blockchain escrow, by contrast, the customer has already transferred the funds out of their wallet. Control is no longer exercised by a regulated intermediary but by pre-programmed contractual logic embedded in code.
The equivalent of capture occurs when the merchant satisfies predefined conditions—such as confirmation of shipment or lapse of a dispute window. Once those conditions are met, the smart contract automatically releases the stablecoins to the merchant’s wallet. Settlement is thus executed not through interbank clearing, but through an on-chain state change that is immediate, final, and typically irreversible. From a legal standpoint, this mechanism replaces discretionary decision-making by regulated institutions with deterministic execution by software.
The contrast between card rails and the Shopify–Coinbase model is not merely technical; it is institutional and legal.
Card payments are embedded within a regulated financial ecosystem. Every participant—issuer banks, acquirers, networks, payment aggregators—is subject to licensing, capital requirements, audit obligations, and RBI supervision. Settlement occurs in Indian Rupees, and consumer protection is enforced through mandatory refund and dispute resolution frameworks.
By contrast, the stablecoin model shifts settlement outside the traditional banking system. Funds are represented not as bank deposits but as digital tokens. Settlement does not occur through RBI-regulated systems such as RTGS, NEFT, or card clearing arrangements, but on a distributed ledger maintained by a global network of computers. While this may reduce costs and increase speed, it also raises fundamental questions about regulatory oversight, legal accountability, and consumer protection.
The Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 establishes a comprehensive legal framework under which the RBI is the sole authority empowered to regulate and supervise payment systems.
No person, other than the Reserve Bank, shall commence or operate a payment system except under and in accordance with an authorisation issued by the Reserve Bank under the provisions of this Act (Section 4 of the PSS Act)
Under the PSS Act, no person may operate a payment system in India without authorisation from the RBI. A “payment system” is defined broadly to include any arrangement that enables payments to be effected between a payer and a beneficiary. This definition is technology-neutral and focuses on function rather than form. Consequently, even a novel digital arrangement may fall within the regulatory perimeter if it facilitates payment and settlement.
In addition to the PSS Act, the RBI has issued detailed regulations governing card payments, payment aggregators and payment gateways, which impose obligations relating to customer funds, escrow arrangements, settlement timelines, dispute resolution, and grievance redressal. These regulations reflect the RBI’s core concern: protecting consumers and preserving the integrity of the payment system.
From an Indian statutory and regulatory standpoint, several concerns arise if a Shopify–Coinbase-type payment infrastructure were to be used by Indian merchants or consumers.
First, there is the issue of authorisation under the PSS Act. A stablecoin-based payment system that enables Indian users to make payments would likely qualify as a “payment system” under the Act. In the absence of explicit RBI authorisation, operating such a system in India would be impermissible, regardless of its technological sophistication.
Second, there is the question of settlement in Indian Rupees. Domestic payment systems in India settle in INR through RBI-regulated channels. Online card payments made in India using Indian cards cannot be routed through foreign banks or settled in foreign currency — they must be handled by Indian banks and settled in INR.9 Also, “Wallets”, i.e., prepaid payment instruments (PPI) essentially need to be loaded in INR.10 Stablecoin settlement, particularly when denominated in a foreign currency such as the US dollar, bypasses these channels. While stablecoins may be created so as to be denominated in INR, no recognition currently exists for stablecoins as settlement instruments for domestic payments.
Third, custody and consumer protection pose significant challenges. RBI regulations require that customer funds be held with regulated entities, typically banks, and that clear mechanisms exist for refunds, reversals, and dispute resolution. Blockchain-based escrow mechanisms are governed by software rather than law, and once a transaction is final, reversing it may be impossible without voluntary cooperation by the merchant. This stands in tension with RBI’s consumer-centric regulatory approach.
Fourth, there are foreign exchange and monetary policy considerations. Stablecoins backed by foreign currency reserves raise concerns under India’s foreign exchange regime and broader monetary sovereignty objectives. RBI has repeatedly expressed caution about private digital currencies and stablecoins, citing risks to financial stability and policy transmission.11
The Shopify–Coinbase Payment Infrastructure represents a significant evolution in global commerce, demonstrating how technology can replicate—and potentially outperform—traditional card systems in terms of speed and cost. However, from an Indian legal perspective, innovation in payments is not evaluated solely on efficiency. It is assessed through the lens of statutory compliance, regulatory oversight, consumer protection, and monetary stability.
While the logic of authorisation and capture may be technologically reproduced through blockchain-based escrow mechanisms, the legal foundations of payment systems in India remain firmly anchored in the PSS Act and RBI regulation. Until stablecoin-based payment infrastructures are brought within this framework—through authorisation, INR settlement mechanisms, and enforceable consumer protections—their direct adoption in the Indian domestic payments landscape would face substantial legal and regulatory hurdles.
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Simrat Singh | finserv@vinodkothari.com
When nature unsettles the ordinary course of life, the regulatory hand should neither be withdrawn nor clenched; it should extend a humane touch, easing distress and guiding the return of order. In this spirit, the RBI has released draft directions on Relief Measures in Areas Affected by Natural Calamities, setting out a framework under which banks, NBFCs and other Regulated Entities (REs) may provide relief to borrowers impacted by natural calamities or similar external events. The framework enables REs to extend resolution plans to eligible borrowers, while permitting retention of standard asset classification and lower provisioning, benefits that would otherwise not be available if such restructuring were undertaken under the normal IRACP framework.
It may be noted that earlier RBI had issued guidelines for banks in connection with matters relating to relief measures to be provided in areas affected by natural calamities consolidated under ‘Master Direction – Reserve Bank of India (Relief Measures by Banks in Areas affected by Natural Calamities) Directions 2018 – SCBs’ dated October 17, 2018. In 2016, these guidelines were made applicable, mutatis mutandis, to all NBFCs as well, in areas affected by natural calamities as identified for implementation of suitable relief measures by the institutional framework viz., District Consultative Committee (DCCs)/ State Level Bankers’ Committee (SLBCs). However, given that the provisions were drafted considering the banking operations, the implementation by NBFCs was ambiguous and the provisions were often overlooked.
While the proposed framework applies to both banks (Commercial, RRB, Local area banks etc) and NBFCs, there are separate draft Directions issued for each RE. In case of banks the provisions carry additional system-level and public service responsibilities, reflecting their role within SLBCs and DCCs.

Fig 1: Actionables for NBFCs under the draft directions
The draft directions are proposed to come into effect from 1 April 2026, after the final directions are notified. The framework is triggered upon formal notification of a natural calamity by the Central Government or the concerned State Government.
Where a calamity affects a substantial part of a State, it is proposed that a special meeting of the SLBC shall be convened within 15 days of such declaration. If the impact is confined to one or more districts, the corresponding DCC(s) are required to meet within the same timeframe. These committees assess the severity of the impact on economic activity, determine objective criteria for identifying impacted borrowers and indicate the nature and extent of relief such as moratoriums that may be extended by regulated entities operating in the affected areas. The decisions taken in these meetings are communicated to regulated entities and are required to be given adequate publicity, primarily by banks, through field outreach and public communication. The relief framework becomes operational in line with such Government notifications and the decisions of the SLBC or DCC, as applicable.
The draft directions propose that the REs update their credit policies to incorporate a structured and pre-defined framework for dealing with borrower stress arising from natural calamities. The credit policy is expected to provide for resolution in line with the provisions and to set out objective principles governing the terms of relief across different borrower segments and loan categories.
While the precise parameters may vary depending on the nature and severity of the calamity, the decisions of the SLBC/DCC/Governments, the credit policy is expected to lay down a consistent framework to be applied by the REs when extending relief. This includes identifying potential relief measures, specifying verifiable parameters for determining eligibility of borrowers and extent of relief and defining the delegation matrix for approval and implementation. The emphasis is on ensuring timely decision-making, particularly in relation to restructuring of existing exposures and sanction of additional finance.
Relief under the draft Directions is proposed to be available only to borrowers who meet the prescribed eligibility conditions as on the date of occurrence of the natural calamity. To qualify, the borrower’s account must be classified as ‘Standard’ and must not be in default for more than 30 days with the concerned RE in respect of any facility. Other additional conditions may be laid down in the credit policy.
Borrowers who do not meet these conditions fall outside the scope of the calamity relief framework and may instead be considered for resolution under the applicable Resolution of Stressed Assets Directions. In such cases, however, the RE does not receive the benefit of standard asset classification or lower provisioning (see discussion below). The framework extends its shelter only to those borrowers who, till the moment the calamity struck, had kept their financial obligations substantially intact. The protection is not meant to rescue infirm credit, but to steady sound accounts momentarily shaken by forces beyond human control.
Where a RE decides to extend relief, the resolution plan is to be structured based on an assessment of the borrower’s post-calamity viability. The draft Directions propose a range of relief measures, including rescheduling of repayments, grant of moratorium, and conversion of accrued or future interest into another credit facility. Regulated entities may also consider sanctioning additional or fresh finance to address temporary financial stress, subject to appropriate assessment of viability and credit risk.
Notably, the framework is enabling rather than mandatory. It does not require automatic restructuring of all eligible accounts, thereby allowing REs to exercise credit judgement while operating within the prescribed regulatory parameters.
It is proposed that resolution under the framework must be invoked within 45 days from the date of declaration of the natural calamity, unless an extension is granted by the Regional Director or Officer-in-Charge of the Reserve Bank. This would mean that the aggrieved borrower must approach the lender and the terms of restructuring must be agreed between both of them within the said timeframe. Once invoked, the resolution plan must be implemented within 90 days from the date of invocation.
In practice, this means that following the Government notification and the SLBC or DCC meeting, typically held within the first 15 days from the notification, REs have a limited 30-day window to complete borrower identification, viability assessment, documentation and approval. Failure to adhere to these timelines results in loss of the regulatory benefits available under the framework.
The most significant regulatory benefit under the proposed framework relates to asset classification. Where a resolution plan is implemented in compliance with the Directions, borrower accounts classified as ‘Standard’ may be retained as such upon implementation instead of facing any downgrade. Further, accounts that may have slipped into NPA status between the date of occurrence of the calamity and the implementation of the resolution plan are permitted to be upgraded to ‘Standard’ upon implementation. However, as per the ECL Policy of the RE, generally any restructuring would automatically be treated as a SICR and therefore, the staging may change and a higher ECL would be required to be provided on such restructuring which may nullify the benefit.
After implementation, subsequent asset classification is governed by the applicable IRACP norms. The proposed framework also addresses cases of repeated restructuring. Where a borrower account is restructured again under these Directions before the reversal of additional provisions (see below), it may continue to be classified as ‘Standard’, subject to recognition of interest on a cash basis from the second restructuring onwards and maintenance of an additional specific provision of five per cent of the outstanding debt for each restructuring, subject to an overall ceiling of 100 per cent.
For restructured accounts, it is proposed that interest income may be recognised on an accrual basis. At the same time, REs are required to maintain an additional specific provision of 5% of the outstanding debt, over and above the applicable provisioning under IRACP norms. Reversal of this additional provision can happen only where the borrower repays at least 20% of the outstanding debt, the account does not slip into NPA status after implementation of the restructuring and no further restructuring is undertaken during the relevant period. Specifically for banks, if the outstanding debt post-restructuring is only in the form of non-fund-based facilities or facilities in the nature of cash credit / overdraft, the additional provisions can be reversed after one year, post implementation of the restructuring, provided the borrower was not in default at any point of time during the period concerned.
It is proposed that the REs be required to extend interest subvention or prompt repayment incentive benefits notified by the Government to all eligible borrowers. They must also ensure that any relief already provided, or being provided, by the Central or State Governments is duly factored into the resolution process.
For agricultural loans secured by land, the draft Directions propose acceptance of certificates issued by Revenue Department officials where original title documents have been lost due to the calamity. In areas governed by community ownership arrangements, certificates issued by competent community authorities may also be accepted. REs may also, at their discretion, provide additional relief such as waiver or reduction of fees and charges for borrowers in affected areas, for a period not exceeding one year. Expected proceeds from insurance policies may also be kept while deciding the relief. Additionally for banks it is proposed that they shall open small accounts for displaced borrowers and take immediate action to restore ATM services in the impacted areas. They may operate their natural calamity affected branches from temporary premises under advice to the RBI. For continuing the temporary premise beyond 30 days, banks may obtain specific approval from the concerned Regional Office of RBI. A bank shall also make arrangements to render banking services in the affected areas by setting up satellite offices, extension counters or mobile banking facilities etc. under intimation to the RBI.
It is proposed that the REs shall upload data on relief measures extended under the framework in the prescribed format on a half-yearly basis. The data points include ‘Outstanding eligible for restructuring as on the date of notification of natural calamity’, ‘Credit facilities restructured/rescheduled during the half year’, ‘Additional/fresh loans provided to affected borrowers during the half year’ etc. The data must be submitted within 30 days from the end of each half-year, i.e., as of 30 September and 31 March, through the CIMS portal. Where no relief measures are extended during a reporting period, a NIL statement is required to be submitted.
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Simrat Singh | finserv@vinodkothari.com
The Economic Survey 2026 takes an honest view of India’s microfinance sector. Rather than celebrating credit growth alone, it frames microfinance as a household balance-sheet business, where the real test of success is whether borrowing improves stability and resilience at the last mile or not. NBFC-MFIs, as the primary delivery channel, sit at the heart of this assessment. In this short note, we explore major observations of the Survey w.r.t infrastructure financing and microfinance.
The Survey reiterates the importance of microfinance in extending formal credit to underserved households. Women account for the vast majority of borrowers and most lending continues to be rural. Over the past decade, the sector has expanded rapidly in both outreach and scale, with NBFC-MFIs accounting for the largest share of lending, followed by banks and small finance banks.
This expansion has made microfinance one of the most effective channels for last-mile credit delivery but it has also exposed the sector to sharper credit cycles.
The slowdown seen in FY25 is presented as a supply-side correction rather than a failure of the model. The Survey attributes the stress primarily to over-lending and borrower over-indebtedness in certain regions, driven by multiple lenders targeting the same customer base after the pandemic. The key takeaway being that access to credit was not the constraint credit discipline was.
NBFC-MFIs remain indispensable to microfinance, but the Survey recognises their structural vulnerability during rapid growth phases. Unsecured lending and limited visibility into borrowers’ total debt make the model sensitive to concentration risks. Regulatory responses have therefore focused on restoring balance rather than tightening credit indiscriminately. The RBI’s decision to lower the minimum qualifying asset requirement has given NBFC-MFIs room to diversify, while self-regulatory measures have reinforced borrower-level safeguards. The Survey notes early signs of stabilisation in asset quality and disbursement trends.
A recurring concern in the Survey is the lack of reliable tools to assess household income and repayment capacity. Many borrowers carry obligations beyond microfinance such as gold loans or agricultural credit that are not always visible at the point of lending. The Survey sees digital public infrastructure as a gradual solution. Wider use of digital payments, data sharing frameworks and account aggregators is expected to improve cash-flow assessment and reduce reliance on informal income proxies. Using all this information about its borrowers, the MFIs are expected to improve their credit assessment.
One of the Survey’s most important observations is its critique of how success in microfinance is measured. While private capital has helped scale the sector, growth-centric metrics can unintentionally encourage repeated lending without sufficient regard for borrower outcomes. The Survey argues for a shift towards welfare-oriented indicators such as income stability, reduction in distress borrowing and sustainable debt levels rather than portfolio size alone. In doing so, it challenges the assumption that more credit automatically translates into better outcomes.
The Survey neither dismisses microfinance nor romanticises it. It acknowledges its critical role in inclusion, while warning that unchecked expansion can weaken household balance sheets. Long-term sustainability, it suggests, depends less on how fast credit grows and more on how responsibly it is delivered. The Economic Survey’s message is simple: the future of microfinance lies in lending better, not lending more. For NBFC-MFIs, this means aligning growth with borrower capacity, using data more intelligently and treating household stability, not loan volumes, as the true measure of success.
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