Recent trends in IBC

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Resolution Division

(resolution@vinodkothari.com)

The field of Insolvency in India has of late seen constant change in order to adapt the ever moving global scenario. Being one of the topics that has been trending ever since its inception and with the possible introduction of several new concepts including subjects like pre pack insolvency and some recent amendments due to the pandemic, a compilation on the following topics in our presentation providing a brief glance through on the same has been made-

  1. Amendments due to COVID 19
  2. Separate Insolvency process for MSME’s
  3. Expected introduction of pre pack insolvency framework
  4. Assignment of NRRA
  5. Group Insolvency
  6. Developments in Going Concern Sale

https://vinodkothari.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Recent-trends-in-IBC.pdf

 

 

Digital Consumer Lending: Need for prudential measures and addressing consumer protection

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-Siddarth Goel (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

Introduction

“If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck”

The above phrase is the popular duck test which implies abductive reasoning to identify an unknown subject by observing its habitual characteristics. The idea of using this duck test phraseology is to determine the role and function performed by the digital lending platforms in consumer credit.

Recently the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has constituted a working group to study how to make access to financial products and services more fair, efficient, and inclusive.[1]  With many news instances lately surrounding the series of unfortunate events on charging of usurious interest rate by certain online lenders and misery surrounding the threats and public shaming of some of the borrowers by these lenders. The RBI issued a caution statement through its press release dated December 23, 2020, against unauthorised digital lending platforms/mobile applications. The RBI reiterated that the legitimate public lending activities can be undertaken by Banks, Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) registered with RBI, and other entities who are regulated by the State Governments under statutory provisions, such as the money lending acts of the concerned states. The circular further mandates disclosure of banks/NBFCs upfront by the digital lender to customers upfront.

There is no denying the fact that these digital lending platforms have benefits over traditional banks in form of lower transaction costs and credit integration of the unbanked or people not having any recourse to traditional bank lending. Further, there are some self-regulatory initiatives from the digital lending industry itself.[2] However, there is a regulatory tradeoff in the lender’s interest and over-regulation to protect consumers when dealing with large digital lending service providers. A recent judgment by the Bombay High Court ruled that:

“The demand of outstanding loan amount from the person who was in default in payment of loan amount, during the course of employment as a duty, at any stretch of imagination cannot be said to be any intention to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit the suicide,”[3]

This pronouncement of the court is not under criticism here and is right in its all sense given the facts of the case being dealt with. The fact there needs to be a recovery process in place and fair terms to be followed by banks/NBFCs and especially by the digital lending platforms while dealing with customers. There is a need to achieve a middle ground on prudential regulation of these digital lending platforms and addressing consumer protection issues emanating from such online lending. The regulator’s job is not only to oversee the prudential regulation of the financial products and services being offered to the consumers but has to protect the interest of customers attached to such products and services. It is argued through this paper that there is a need to put in place a better governing system for digital lending platforms to address the systemic as well as consumer protection concerns. Therefore, the onus of consumer protection is on the regulator (RBI) since the current legislative framework or guidelines do not provide adequate consumer protection, especially in digital consumer credit lending.

Global Regulatory Approaches

US

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has laid a Special Purpose National Bank (SPNV) charters for fintech companies.[4] The OCC charter begins reviewing applications, whereby SPNV are held to the same rigorous standards of safety and soundness, fair access, and fair treatment of customers that apply to all national banks and federal savings associations.

The SPNV that engages in federal consumer financial law, i.e. in provides ‘financial products and services to the consumer’ is regulated by the ‘Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)’. The other factors involved in application assessment are business plans that should articulate a clear path and timeline to profitability. While the applicant should have adequate capital and liquidity to support the projected volume. Other relevant considerations considered by OCC are organizers and management with appropriate skills and experience.

The key element of a business plan is the proposed applicant’s risk management framework i.e. the ability of the applicant to identify, measure, monitor, and control risks. The business plan should also describe the bank’s proposed internal system of controls to monitor and mitigate risk, including management information systems. There is a need to provide a risk assessment with the business plan. A realistic understanding of risk and there should be management’s assessment of all risks inherent in the proposed business model needs to be shown.

The charter guides that the ongoing capital levels of the applicant should commensurate with risk and complexity as proposed in the activity. There is minimum leverage that an SPNV can undertake and regulatory capital is required for measuring capital levels relative to the applicant’s assets and off-balance sheet exposures.

The scope and purpose of CFPB are very broad and covers:

“scope of coverage” set forth in subsection (a) includes specified activities (e.g., offering or providing: origination, brokerage, or servicing of consumer mortgage loans; payday loans; or private education loans) as well as a means for the CFPB to expand the coverage through specified actions (e.g., a rulemaking to designate “larger market participants”).[5]

CFPB is established through the enactment of Dood-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The primary function of CFPB is to enforce consumer protection laws and supervise regulated entities that provide consumer financial products and services.

“(5)CONSUMER FINANCIAL PRODUCT OR SERVICES  The term “consumer financial product or service” means any financial product or service that is described in one or more categories under—paragraph (15) and is offered or provided for use by consumers primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; or **

“(15)Financial product or service-

(A)In general The term “financial product or service” means—(i)extending credit and servicing loans, including acquiring, purchasing, selling, brokering, or other extensions of credit (other than solely extending commercial credit to a person who originates consumer credit transactions);”

Thus CFPB is well placed as a separate institution to protect consumer interest and covers a wide range of financial products and services including extending credit, servicing, selling, brokering, and others. The regulatory environment has been put in place by the OCC to check the viability of fintech business models and there are adequate consumer protection laws.

EU

EU’s technologically neutral regulatory and supervisory systems intend to capture not only traditional financial services but also innovative business models. The current dealing with the credit agreements is EU directive 2008/48/EC of on credit agreements for consumers (Consumer Credit Directive – ‘Directive’). While the process of harmonising the legislative framework is under process as the report of the commission to the EU parliament raised some serious concerns.[6] The commission report identified that the directive has been partially effective in ensuring high standards of consumer protection. Despite the directive focussing on disclosure of annual percentage rate of charge to the customers, early payment, and credit databases. The report cited that the primary reason for the directive being impractical is because of the exclusion of the consumer credit market from the scope of the directive.

The report recognised the increase and future of consumer credit through digitisation. Further the rigid prescriptions of formats for information disclosure which is viable in pre-contractual stages, i.e. where a contract is to be subsequently entered in a paper format. There is no consumer benefit in an increasingly digital environment, especially in situations where consumers prefer a fast and smooth credit-granting process. The report highlighted the need to review certain provisions of the directive, particularly on the scope and the credit-granting process (including the pre-contractual information and creditworthiness assessment).

China

China has one of the biggest markets for online mico-lending business. The unique partnership of banks and online lending platforms using innovative technologies has been the prime reason for the surge in the market. However, recently the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) issued draft rules to regulate online mico-lending business. Under the draft rules, there is a requirement for online underwriting consumer loans fintech platform to have a minimum fund contribution of at least 30 % in a loan originated for banks. Further mico-lenders sourcing customer data from e-commerce have to share information with the central bank.

Australia

The main legislation that governs the consumer credit industry is the National Consumer Credit Protection Act (“National Credit Act”) and the National Credit Code. Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) is Australia’s integrated authority for corporate, markets, financial services, and consumer credit regulator. ASIC is a consumer credit regulator that administers the National Credit Act and regulates businesses engaging in consumer credit activities including banks, credit unions, finance companies, along with others. The ASIC has issued guidelines to obtain licensing for credit activities such as money lenders and financial intermediaries.[7] Credit licensing is needed for three sorts of entities.

  • engage in credit activities as a credit provider or lessor
  • engage in credit activities other than as a credit provider or lessor (e.g. as a credit representative or broker)
  • engage in all credit activities

The applicants of credit licensing are obligated to have adequate financial resources and have to ensure compliance with other supervisory arrangements to engage in credit activates.

UK

Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is the regulator for consumer credit firms in the UK. The primary objective of FCA ensues; a secure and appropriate degree of protection for consumers, protect and enhance the integrity of the UK financial system, promote effective competition in the interest of consumers.[8] The consumer credit firms have to obtain authorisation from FCA before carrying on consumer credit activities. The consumer credit activities include a plethora of credit functions including entering into a credit agreement as a lender, credit broking, debt adjusting, debt collection, debt counselling, credit information companies, debt administration, providing credit references, and others. FCA has been successful in laying down detailed rules for the price cap on high-cost short-term credit.[9] The price total cost cap on high-cost short-term credit (HCSTC loans) including payday loans, the borrowers must never have to pay more in fees and interest than 100% of what they borrowed. Further, there are rules on credit broking that provides brokers from charging fees to customers or requesting payment details unless authorised by FCA.[10] The fee charged from customers is to be reported quarterly and all brokers (including online credit broking) need to make clear that they are advertising as a credit broker and not a lender. There are no fixed capital requirements for the credit firms, however, adequate financial resources need to be maintained and there is a need to have a business plan all the time for authorisation purposes.

Digital lending models and concerns in India

Countries across the globe have taken different approaches to regulate consumer lending and digital lending platforms. They have addressed prudential regulation concerns of these credit institutions along with consumer protection being the top priority under their respective framework and legislations. However, these lending platforms need to be looked at through the current governing regulatory framework from an Indian perspective.

The typical credit intermediation could be performed by way of; peer to peer (P2P) lending model, notary model (bank-based) guaranteed return model, balance sheet model, and others. P2P lending platforms are heavily regulated and hence are not of primary concern herein. Online digital lending platforms engaged in consumer lending are of significance as they affect investor’s and borrowers’ interests and series of legal complexions arise owing to their agency lending models.[11] Therefore careful anatomy of these models is important for investors and consumer protection in India.

Should digital lending be regulated?

Under the current system, only banks, NBFCs, and money lenders can undertake lending activities. The regulated banks and NBFCs also undertake online consumer lending either through their website/platforms or through third-party lending platforms. These unregulated third-party digital lending platforms count on their sophisticated credit underwriting analytics software and engage in consumer lending services. Under the simplest version of the bank-based lending model, the fintech lending platform offers loan matching services but the loan is originated in books of a partnering bank or NBFC. Thus the platform serves as an agent that brings lenders (Financial institutions) and borrowers (customers) together. Therefore RBI has mandated fintech platforms has to abide by certain roles and responsibilities of Direct Selling Agent (DSA) as under Fair Practice Code ‘FPC’ and partner banks/NBFCs have to ensure Guidelines on Managing Risks and Code of Conduct in Outsourcing of Financial Service (‘outsourcing code’).[12] In the simplest of bank-based models, the banks bear the credit risk of the borrowers and the platform earns their revenues by way of fees and service charges on the transaction. Since banks and NBFCs are prudentially regulated and have to comply with Basel capital norms, there are not real systemic concerns.

However, the situation alters materially when such a third-party lending platform adopts balance sheet lending or guaranteed return models. In the former, the servicer platform retains part of the credit risk on its book and could also give some sort of loss support in form of a guarantee to its originating partner NBFC or bank.[13] While in the latter case it a pure guarantee where the third-party lending platform contractually promises returns on funds lent through their platforms. There is a devil in detailed scrutiny of these business models. We have earlier highlighted the regulatory issues in detail around fintech practices and app-based lending in our write up titled ‘Lender’s piggybacking: NBFCs lending on Fintech platforms’ gurantees’.

From the prudential regulation perspective in hindsight, banks, and NBFCs originating through these third-party lending platforms are not aware of the overall exposure of the platforms to the banking system. Hence there is a presence of counterparty default risk of the platform itself from the perspective of originating banks and NBFCs. In a real sense, there is a kind of tri-party arrangement where funds flow from ‘originator’ (regulated bank/NBFC) to the ‘platform’ (digital service provider) and ultimately to the ‘borrower'(Customer). The unregulated platform assumes the credit risk of the borrower, and the originating bank (or NBFC) assumes the risk of the unregulated lending platform.

Curbing unregulated lending

In the balance sheet and guaranteed return models, an undercapitalized entity takes credit risk. In the balance sheet model, the lending platform is directly taking the credit risk and may or may not have to get itself registered as NBFC with RBI. The registration requirement as an NBFC emanates if the financial assets and financial income of the platform is more than 50 % of its total asset and income of such business (‘principal business criteria’ see footnote 12). While in the guaranteed return model there is a form of synthetic lending and there is absolutely no legal requirement for the lending platform to get themselves registered as NBFC. The online lending platform in the guaranteed return model serves as a loan facilitator from origination to credit absorption. There is a regulatory arbitrage in this activity. Since technically this activity is not covered under the “financial activity” and the spread earned in not “financial income” therefore there is no requirement for these entities to get registered as NBFCs.[14]

Any sort of guarantee or loss support provided by the third-party lending platform to its partner bank/NBFC is a synthetic exposure. In synthetic lending, the digital lending platform is taking a risk on the underlying borrower without actually taking direct credit risk. Additionally, there are financial reporting issues and conflict of interest or misalignment of incentives, i.e. the entities do not have to abide by IND AS and can show these guarantees as contingent liabilities. On the contrary, they charge heavy interest rates from customers to earn a higher spread. Hence synthetic lending provides all the incentives for these third-party lending platforms to enter into risky lending which leads to the generation of sub-prime assets. The originating banks and NBFCs have to abide by minimum capital requirements and other regulatory norms. Hence the sub-prime generation of consumer credit loans is supplemented by heavy returns offered to the banks. It is argued that the guaranteed returns function as a Credit Default Swap ‘CDS’ which is not regulated as CDS. Thus the online lending platform escapes the regulatory purview and it is shown in the latter part this leads to poor credit discipline in consumer lending and consumer protection is often put on the back burner.

From the prudential regulation perspective restricting banks/NBFCs from undertaking any sort of guaranteed return or loss support protection, can curb the underlying emergence of systemic risk from counterparty default. While a legal stipulation to the effect that NBFCs/Banks lending through the third-party unregulated platform, to strictly lend independently i.e. on a non-risk sharing basis of the credit risk. Counterintuitively, the unregulated online lending platforms have to seek registration as an NBFC if they want to have direct exposure to the underlying borrower, subject to fulfillment of ‘principal business criteria’.[15] Such a governing framework will reduce the incentives for banks and NBFCs to exploit excessive risk-taking through this regulatory arbitrage opportunity.

Ensuring Fairness and Consumer Protection

There are serious concerns of fair dealing and consumer protection aspects that have arisen lately from digital online lending platforms. The loans outsourced by Banks and NBFCs over digital lending platforms have to adhere to the FPC and Outsourcing code.

The fairness in a loan transaction calls for transparent disclosure to the borrower all information about fees/charges payable for processing the loan application, disbursed, pre-payment options and charges, the penalty for delayed repayments, and such other information at the time of disbursal of the loan. Such information should also be displayed on the website of the banks for all categories of loan products. It may be mentioned that levying such charges subsequently without disclosing the same to the borrower is an unfair practice.[16]

Such a legal requirement gives rise to the age-old question of consumer law, yet the most debatable aspect. That mere disclosure to the borrower of the loan terms in an agreement even though the customer did not understand the underlying obligations is a fair contract (?) It is argued that let alone the disclosures of obligations in digital lending transactions, customers are not even aware of their remedies. Under the current RBI regulatory framework, they have the remedy to approach grievance redressal authorities of the originating bank/NBFC or may approach the banking ombudsman. However, things become even more peculiar in cases where loans are being sourced or processed through third-party digital platforms. The customers in the majority of the cases are unaware of the fact that the ultimate originator of the loan is a bank/NBFC. The only remedy for such a customer is to seek refuge under the Consumer Protection Act 2019 by way of proving the loan agreement is the one as ‘unfair contract’.

“2(46) “unfair contract” means a contract between a manufacturer or trader or service provider on one hand, and a consumer on the other, having such terms which cause significant change in the rights of such consumer, including the following, namely:— (i) requiring manifestly excessive security deposits to be given by a consumer for the performance of contractual obligations; or (ii) imposing any penalty on the consumer, for the breach of contract thereof which is wholly disproportionate to the loss occurred due to such breach to the other party to the contract; or (iii) refusing to accept early repayment of debts on payment of applicable penalty; or (iv) entitling a party to the contract to terminate such contract unilaterally, without reasonable cause; or (v) permitting or has the effect of permitting one party to assign the contract to the detriment of the other party who is a consumer, without his consent; or (vi) imposing on the consumer any unreasonable charge, obligation or condition which puts such consumer to disadvantage;”

It is pertinent to note that neither the scope of consumer financial agreements is regulated in India, nor are the third-party digital lending platforms required to obtain authorisation from RBI. There are instances of high-interest rates and exorbitant fees charged by the online consumer lending platforms which are unfair and detrimental to customers’ interests. The current legislative framework provides that the NBFCs shall furnish a copy of the loan agreement as understood by the borrower along with a copy of each of all enclosures quoted in the loan agreement to all the borrowers at the time of sanction/disbursement of loans.[17] However, like the persisting problem in the EU 2008/48/EC directive, even FPC is not well placed to govern digital lending agreements and disclosures. Taking a queue from the problems recognised by the EU parliamentary committee report. There is no consumer benefit in an increasingly digital environment, especially in situations where there are fast and smooth credit-granting processes. The pre-contractual information on the disclosure of annualised interest rate and capping of the total cost to a customer in consumer credit loans is central to consumer protection.

The UK legislation has been pro-active in addressing the underlying unfair contractual concerns, by fixation of maximum daily interest rates and maximum default fees with an overall cost cap of 100% that could be charged in short-term high-interest rates loan agreements. It is argued that in this Laissez-faire world the financial services business models which are based on imposing an unreasonable charge, obligations that could put consumers to disadvantage should anyways be curbed. Therefore a legal certainty in this regard would save vulnerable customers to seek the consumer court’s remedy in case of usurious and unfair lending.

The master circular on loan and advances provide for disclosure of the details of recovery agency firms/companies to the borrower by the originating bank/NBFC.[18] Further, there is a requirement for such recovery agent to disclose to the borrower about the antecedents of the bank/NBFC they are recovering for.  However, this condition is barely even followed or adhered to and the vulnerable consumers are exposed to all sorts of threats and forceful tactics. As one could appreciate in jurisdictions of the US, UK, Australia discussed above, consumer lending and ancillary services are under the purview of concerned regulators. From the customer protection perspective, at least some sort of authorization or registration requirement with the RBI to keep the check and balances system in place is important for consumer protection. The loan recovery business is sensitive hence there is a need for a proper guiding framework and/or registration requirement of the agents acting as recovery agents on behalf of banks/NBFCs. The mere registration requirement and revocation of same in case of unprofessional activities will serve as a stick to check their consumer dealing practices.

The financial services intermediaries (other than Banks/NBFCs) providing services like credit broking, debt adjusting, debt collection, debt counselling, credit information, debt administration, credit referencing to be licensed by the regulator. The banks/NBFCs dealing with the licensed market intermediaries would go much farther in the successful implementation of FPC and addressing consumer protection concerns from the current system.

Conclusion

From the perspective of sound financial markets and fair consumer practices, it is always prudent to allow only those entities in credit lending businesses that are best placed to bear the credit risk and losses emanating from them. Thus, there is a dearth of a comprehensive legislative framework in consumer lending from origination to debt collection and its administration including the business of providing credit references through digital lending platforms. There may not be a material foreseeable requirement for regulating digital lending platforms completely. However, there is a need to curb synthetic lending by third-party digital lending platforms. Since a risk-taking entity without adequate capitalization will tend to get into generating risky assets with high returns. The off-balance sheet guarantee commitments of these entities force them to be aggressive towards their customers to sustain their businesses. This write-up has explored various regulatory approaches, where jurisdictions like the US and UK, and Australia being the good comparable in addressing consumer protection concerns emanating from online digital lending platforms. Henceforth, a well-framed consumer protection system especially in financial products and services would go much farther in the development and integration of credit through digital lending platforms in the economy.

 

[1] Reserve Bank of India – Press Releases (rbi.org.in), dated January 13, 2020

[2] Digital lending Association of India, Code of Conduct available at https://www.dlai.in/dlai-code-of-conduct/

[3] Rohit Nalawade Vs. State of Maharashtra High Court of Bombay Criminal Application (APL) NO. 1052 OF 2018 < https://images.assettype.com/barandbench/2021-01/cf03e52e-fedd-4a34-baf6-25dbb55dbf29/Rohit_Nalawade_v__State_of_Maharashtra___Anr.pdf>

[4] https://www.occ.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/responsible-innovation/comments/pub-special-purpose-nat-bank-charters-fintech.pdf

[5]  12 USC 5514(a); Pay day loans are the short term, high interest bearing loans that are generally due on the consumer’s next payday after the loan is taken.

[6] EU, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: on the implementation of Directive 2008/48/EC on credit agreement for consumers’, dated November, 05, 2020, available at < https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2020/EN/COM-2020-963-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF>

[7] https://asic.gov.au/for-finance-professionals/credit-licensees/applying-for-and-managing-your-credit-licence/faqs-getting-a-credit-licence/

[8] FCA guide to consumer credit firms, available at < https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/finalised-guidance/consumer-credit-being-regulated-guide.pdf>

[9] FCA, ‘Detailed rules for price cap on high-cost short-term credit’, available at < https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps14-16.pdf>

[10] FCA, Credit Broking and fees, available at < https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps14-18.pdf>

[11] Bank of International Settlements ‘FinTech Credit : Market structure, business models and financial stability implications’, 22 May 2017, FSB Report

[12] See our write up on ‘ Extension of FPC on lending through digital platforms’ , available at < https://vinodkothari.com/2020/06/extension-of-fpc-on-lending-through-digital-platforms/>

[13] Where the unregulated platform assumes the complete credit risk of the borrower there is no interlinkage with the partner bank and NBFC. The only issue that arises is from the registration requirement as NBFC which we have discussed in the next section. Also see our write up titled ‘Question of Definition: What Exactly is an NBFC’ available at https://vinodkothari.com/nbfcs/definition-of-nbfcs-concept-of-principality-of-business/

[14] The qualifying criteria to register as an NBFC has been discussed in our write up titled ‘Question of Definition: What Exactly is an NBFC’ available at https://vinodkothari.com/nbfcs/definition-of-nbfcs-concept-of-principality-of-business/

[15] see our write up titled ‘Question of Definition: What Exactly is an NBFC’ available at https://vinodkothari.com/nbfcs/definition-of-nbfcs-concept-of-principality-of-business/

[16] Para 2.5.2, RBI Guidelines on Fair Practices Code for Lender

[17] Para 29 of the guidelines on Fair Practices Code, Master Direction on systemically/non-systemically important NBFCs.

[18] Para 2.6, Master Circular on ‘Loans and Advances – Statutory and Other Restrictions’ dated July 01, 2015;

 

Our Other Related Write-Ups

Lenders’ piggybacking: NBFCs lending on Fintech platforms’ guarantees – Vinod Kothari Consultants

Extension of FPC on lending through digital platforms – Vinod Kothari Consultants

Fintech Framework: Regulatory responses to financial innovation – Vinod Kothari Consultants

One-stop guide for all Regulatory Sandbox Frameworks – Vinod Kothari Consultants

 

Global Securitisation Markets in 2020: A Year of Highs in the midst of Turmoil

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-Vinod Kothari (vinod@vinodkothari.com)

[Revised March 2021]

Even as the pandemic disrupted life and economies across the globe, securitisation activity in different countries scaled new highs, at least in certain asset classes.

Securitisation in USA

Agency and non-agency RMBS

Agency RMBS was the star performer, at least in terms of new issuance volumes. Data available till Nov 2020 suggests that the new issuance volumes for 2020 will be about double of what it was in 2019, and the highest ever achieved in history. There are two reasons primarily responsible, of which the first one is quite obvious – historically low mortgage rates, particularly for refinancing activity. Second reason is that during the pandemic, there was extensive use of technology in mortgage origination and documentation, which led to far faster and simpler turnarounds for the borrowers.

Non-agency RMBS, however, is expected to end about 40% lower than 2019 volumes. Origination levels were halted because of shut-downs and the prevailing economic situation. Lenders put caution on the forefront as 30-day delinquencies continued to soar up.

Figure 1: US RMBS Issuance [By author, based on SIFMA data]

As may be clear, the issuance of agency MBS in 2020 was almost double of last year, whereas as non-agency securities were 45% lower or almost half of the number in 2019.

Asset-backed securities

The issuance volumes across all other classes of asset backed securities were down – from about 6% in case of auto-ABS to about 90% in case of credit cards ABS.

Figure 2: ABS issuance in USA

The CLO market was among the asset classes very badly affected, with the 2020 issuance less than 40% of the number in 2019. The decline in origination volumes of asset classes like credit cards is attributed to tighter lending standards by banks, and of course, lesser spending by individuals on travel or amusement, due to lock down.

Securitisation in Europe

Euro area will end with a GDP contraction estimated at 7.7% in 2020[1].

As per data prepared by AFME, new issuance in 2020 in Europe was down by about 11.9% compared to 2019[2].

EU regulators proposed some amendments to securitisation regulations, by amending Capital Requirements Regulations. “Securitisation can play an important role in enhancing the capacity of institutions to support the economic recovery, providing for an effective tool for funding and risk diversification for institutions. It is therefore essential in the context of the economic recovery post COVID-19 pandemic to reinforce that role and help institutions to be able to channel sufficient capital to the real economy.”[3] Accordingly, three amendments are proposed to securitisation regulatory framework: more risk-sensitive treatment for STS on-balance-sheet securitisation; removal of regulatory constraints to the securitisation of non-performing exposures; and recognition of credit risk mitigation for securitisation positions.

Figure 3: European securitisation issuance

Securitisation in China

Securitisation in China is expected to be about 10-15% lower than the volumes in 2019. A report from S&P recorded first half of 2020 to be almost the same as first half of 2019, but given the concerns and tightened lending by banks, it is expected that lower RMBS issuance will keep overall issuance levels low in 2020[4].

Figure 4: Securitisation Issuance in China – from S&P report

Securitisation in India

Indian securitisation statistics are typically collated on April-March basis. For Q2, Q3 and Q4 of calendar year 2020, securitisation activity [in Indian parlance, securitisation also includes bilateral portfolio transfers, called direct assignment] was highly subdued, as shadow-banking entities which are the major originators of transactions had stopped lending due to the prevailing lock-down. In addition, there were moratoriums imposed by the RBI whereby payments under existing loans were permitted to be withheld for a period of 5 months.

However, once the lockdowns have gradually been lifted, there is a very strong resurgence of economic activity. The Govt. had provided a sovereign guarantee for an additional 20% lending on existing lending facilities, subject to limits. While the non-banking financial entities are not needing significant funding by way of securitisation, there is a strong investor appetite.

This period has also been associated with defaults or credit events by some of the originators, and sale of the ABS investments held by some mutual funds. Hence, the market has seen servicer transitions, as also tested the (il)liquidity of investments in securitisation transactions.

Rating activity

As may be expected, there have been major rating actions during the year as performance of most asset classes was disrupted due to the pandemic. Rating agency S&P reported 2551 structured finance rating actions, which included 1950 downgrades owing to the impact of the pandemic[5]. Moody’s, in a report, states that once Covid-led payment holidays abate, there will be increasing pressures on retail-focused ABS transactions. RMBS transactions, consumer ABS etc are likely to see rising delinquencies.

Moody’s also forecasts the default rates in non-investment grade corporates to increase to 9.7% (trailing average of 12 months) by March, 2021. This will be the highest default rate after 2009. This will result into substantial pressure on CLOs.[6]

 

[1] Moody’s estimate

[2] https://www.afme.eu/Publications/Data-Research/Details/AFME-Securitisation-Data-Report-Q4-2020

[3] https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/printficheglobal.pdf?id=716379&l=en

[4] https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/200811-china-securitization-performance-watch-2q-2020-the-worst-may-have-passed-11604587

[5] https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/201218-covid-19-activity-in-global-structured-finance-as-of-dec-11-2020-11782903

[6] https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_1249099

Link to related articles:

New regime for securitisation and sale of financial assets

Comparison of the Draft Securitisation Framework with existing guidelines and committee recommendations

 

Banking exposure to open the current account by the banks

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-Siddarth Goel (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

Background

Declaration from current account customers

The RBI issued a circular dated August 06, 2020, whereby the regulator instructed all scheduled commercial banks and payments banks shall not open a current account for customers who have availed credit facilities in form of cash credit (CC)/overdraft (OD) from the banking system. The motive behind the circular being that all the transactions of borrowers should be routed through the CC/OD account.

The genesis of this circular was in RBI circular dated May 15, 2004, where banks were advised that at the time of opening of current accounts for their customers, they have to insist on a declaration form by the account-holder to the effect that he is not enjoying any credit facility with any other bank or obtain a declaration giving particulars of credit facilities enjoyed by such customer. The move was in essence to secure the overall credit discipline in banking so that there is no diversion of funds by the borrowers to the detriment of the banking system. Post-May 15, 2004, a clarification notification was issued by the regulator dated August 04, 2004, stipulating that in case there is no response obtained concerning NOC after waiting a minimum period of a fortnight, the banks may open current accounts of the customers.

Thus there was an obligation on banks to scrupulously ensure that their branches do not open current accounts of entities that enjoy credit facilities (fund based or non-fund based) from the banking system without specifically obtaining a No-Objection Certificate (NOC) from the lending bank(s). Further, the non-adherence by banks as per the circular is to be perceived as abetting the siphoning of funds and such violations which are either reported to RBI or noticed during the regulator inspection would make the concerned banks liable for penalty under Banking Regulation Act.

Establishment of CRILC

The RBI established a Central Repository of Information on Large Credits (CRILC). The CRILC was established in connection to the RBI framework “Early Recognition of Financial Distress, Prompt Steps for Resolution and Fair Recovery for Lenders: Framework for Revitalising Distressed Assets in the Economy“. As under the framework banks were required to furnish credit information to CRILC on all their borrowers having aggregate fund-based and non-fund based exposure of Rs. 5 Crores and above with them. Besides banks were required to furnish current accounts of their customers with outstanding balance (debit or credit) of Rs 1 Crore and above to the CRILC. The reporting under the extant framework was to determine SMA-0 classification, where the principal or interest payment is not overdue for more than 30 days but account showing signs of stress. An increase in the frequency of overdrafts in current accounts is one of the illustrative methods for determining stress.

Reposting of large credits

Post establishment of CRILC, a subsequent guideline on the opening of current accounts by banks was issued by the RBI via circular dated July 02, 2015, dealing with the same subject. To enhance credit discipline, especially for the reduction in NPA level in banks, banks were asked to use the information available in CRILC and not limit their due diligence to seeking NOC. Banks were to verify from the data available in the CRILC database whether the customer is availing of credit facility from another bank.

The chart below highlights the series and events and relevant circulars.

Credit Discipline- August 06, 2020 Circular

As per the circular dated August 06, 2020, issued by the regulator on Opening of Current Accounts by Banks – Need for Discipline (‘Revised Guidelines’), there are two aspects that need to be considered before opening a CC/OD facility or opening the current account of the customer. The Revised Guidelines provides a clear guiding flowchart for banks to follow when the customer approaches a bank for opening of the current account, the same has been categorised into two scenarios which could be considered by the banks to comply with the revised guideline.

Case 1: Customer wants to avail or is already having a credit facility in form of CC/OD

Case 2: Customer wants to open a current account or have an existing current account with the bank

 

Further, there is a requirement on banks to monitor all CC/OD accounts regularly at least quarterly, especially concerning the exposure of the banking system to the borrower. There has been an ambiguity surrounding what would amount to ‘exposure’ under the Revised Guidelines.

‘Exposure to the banking system’ under Revised Guidelines

The Revised Guidelines provides that exposure shall mean the sum of sanctioned ‘fund based and non-fund based credit facilities’. However, there is a regulatory ambiguity, since neither the term used by the RBI has been specifically defined in the Revised Guideline nor elsewhere under any other regulations. There is no straight jacket exclusive definition for determining as to what exposure banks should include determining funded and non-funded credit facilities. Therefore, based on back-tracing of regulatory regime an inclusive list can be of guidance for banks and borrowers especially large borrowers (like NBFCs and HFCs) and other financial institutions and corporates who rely on banking facilities (current account and CC/OD) extensively for their business.

The CRILC may not be the only source for banks while the collection of borrower’s credit information. Other modes could be information by Credit Information Companies (CICs), National E-Governance Services Ltd. (NeSL), etc., and even by obtaining customers’ declaration, if required. However, since the revised guideline stresses on borrowers having exposure more than 5 crores, therefore, information disseminated by the banks to CRILC is a good point to start with and to comply with under the revised guidelines. The circular dated July 02, 2015, draws reference to the Central Repository of Information on Large Credits (CRILC) to collect, store, and disseminate data on all borrowers’ credit exposures. The guideline further provided banks to verify the data available in the CRILC database whether the customer is availing credit facility from another bank. Further even under the Guidelines on “Early Recognition of Financial Distress, Prompt Steps for Resolution and Fair Recovery for Lenders” dated January 30, 2014, provided that credit information shall include all types of exposures as defined under RBI Circular on Exposure Norms.

The RBI Exposure Norms dated July 01, 2015, defines exposure as;

“Exposure shall include credit exposure (funded and non-funded credit limits) and investment exposure (including underwriting and similar commitments). The sanctioned limits or outstandings, whichever are higher, shall be reckoned for arriving at the exposure limit. However, in the case of fully drawn term loans, where there is no scope for re-drawal of any portion of the sanctioned limit, banks may reckon the outstanding as the exposure.”

The banking exposure norms provide for two exposures; namely credit and investment exposures. Further RBI Exposure Norms defines ‘credit exposure’ and ‘Investment Exposure’ as follows;

“2.1.3.3. Credit Exposure

Credit exposure comprises the following elements:

(a) all types of funded and non-funded credit limits.

(b) facilities extended by way of equipment leasing, hire purchase finance and factoring services.

2.1.3.4 Investment Exposure

  1. a) Investment exposure comprises the following elements:

(i) investments in shares and debentures of companies.

(ii) investment in PSU bonds

(iii) investments in Commercial Papers (CPs).

  1. b) Banks’ / FIs’ investments in debentures/ bonds / security receipts / pass-through certificates (PTCs) issued by an SC / RC as compensation consequent upon sale of financial assets will constitute exposure on the SC / RC. In view of the extraordinary nature of the event, banks / FIs will be allowed, in the initial years, to exceed the prudential exposure ceiling on a case-to-case basis.
  2. c) The investment made by the banks in bonds and debentures of corporates which are guaranteed by a PFI1(as per list given in Annex 1) will be treated as an exposure by the bank on the PFI and not on the corporate.
  3. d) Guarantees issued by the PFI to the bonds of corporates will be treated as an exposure by the PFI to the corporates to the extent of 50 per cent, being a non-fund facility, whereas the exposure of the bank on the PFI guaranteeing the corporate bond will be 100 per cent. The PFI before guaranteeing the bonds/debentures should, however, take into account the overall exposure of the guaranteed unit to the financial system.”

The Revised Guidelines, specifically define exposure in a footnote to the revised guideline stipulating that to arrive at aggregate exposures in the footnote as follows;

“‘Exposure’ for the purpose of these instructions shall mean sum of sanctioned fund based and non-fund based credit facilities”.

Further the RBI in its subsequent FAQs on revised guidelines dated December 14, 2020, guided on what could be included in aggregate exposure.

“4. Whether aggregate exposure shall include Day Light Over Draft (DLOD)/ intra-day facilities and irrevocable payment commitments, limits set up for transacting in FX and interest rate derivatives, CPs, etc.

All fund based and non-fund based credit facilities sanctioned by the banks and carried in their Indian books shall be included for the purpose of aggregate exposure.”

Further in FAQ No. 3 in the circular dated December 14, 2020, the RBI clarified that

“3. For the purpose of this circular, whether exposure of non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) and other financial institutions like National Housing Bank (NHB) shall be included in computing aggregate exposure of the banking system.

The instructions are applicable to Scheduled Commercial Banks and Payments Banks. Accordingly, the aggregate exposure for the purpose shall include exposures of these banks only”

While the regulator evaded assigning express meaning as to what could be included while determining banking exposure and took an inclusive view. However, from the foregoing, it is amply clear that the credit facilities should include credit exposures (funded and not funded) that have been sanctioned by banks. Therefore, only exposures to banks and payments banks are to be included while calculating exposures, any or all the exposure of a borrower to the other financial institutions like NHB, LIC Housing, SIDBI, NABARD, Mutual funds & other development Banks are neither commercial banks nor payments banks hence are to be excluded. [The list of licensed payments banks by the RBI can be viewed here. ]

CIRLC captures credit information of borrowers having aggregate fund-based and non-fund based exposures of Rs. 5 Crores and above including investment exposures. The banks are required to submit a quarterly return to CIRLC. It is pertinent to note that total investment exposure is to be indicated separately under the head total investment exposure. While there is a need for a detailed breakup on fund-based and non-fund based credit facilities in the CIRLC return. The table below is an indicative list of (funded and non-funded) loans to be submitted from the CIRLC return.

 

Non-Funded credit exposure  Funded credit exposure
Letter of Credit Cash Credit/ Overdraft
Guarantees Working Capital Demand Loan (including CPs)*
Acceptances Inland Bills
Foreign Exchange Contracts Packing Credit
Interest Rate Derivatives (incl FX Interest Rate Derivatives) Export Bills
Term Loan
Credit equivalent of OBS/derivative exposure

*CP to be included in WCDL only if part of working capital sanctioned limit. All other CPs are to be considered as investment exposure.

Therefore, all the investment exposures of banks to the borrower such as investments in corporate bonds, shares, PTCs issued by asset reconstruction companies and securitisation companies, and others are to be excluded while arriving at aggregate fund-based and non-fund based credit facilities as under the Revised Guidelines. Nevertheless, the PTCs issued by NBFCs or HFCs are investment exposure of banks on the underlying loan pools and not on the originator entity. Similarly, exposure of a bank in a co-lending transaction is exposure on the ultimate obligor and not the co-originating partner NBFC.

 

 

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First phase of commencement of Companies (Amendment) Act, 2020

/0 Comments/in , , , /by

-Commencement notification dated 21st December, 2020

Smriti Wadehra, Manager and Henil Shah, Assistant Manger

corplaw@vinodkothari.com

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs vide its commencement Notification dated 21st December, 2020 has notified 45 sections of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2020 [1]which recently received the President’s assent on 28th September, 2020[2]. The sections notified by the Ministry majorly relate to re-categorization of criminal offences into civil wrongs which is in line with the Government of India’s policy to decriminalise non-compliances that are technical and procedural nature thereby promoting ease of doing business.

A brief synopsis of the amendments is detailed below:

Section No. of CAA, 2020 Section No. of CA, 2013 Pertains to Existing Provisions Amended Provisions
Shift from fine to penalty
9 56(6) Any default in transfer and transmission of Securities Fine on Company: Min Rs. 25,000 Max Rs. 5 Lakhs and

Fine on Officer of the company in default: Min- Rs.10,000 Max – Rs. 1 Lakhs.

 

 The company and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 50,000.
16 86(1) Contravention of provisions relating to registration of charges Fine on Company: Min- Rs. 1 Lakh Max- Rs. 10 Lakhs

Fine on officer in default: Imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months or with fine Min- Rs. 25,000 Max- Rs. 1 Lakh, or with both.

 Company shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 5 Lakhs and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 50,000.
17 88(5) Failure to maintain Register of Members or debenture holders etc.

 

 Fine on Company: Min- Rs. 50,000 Max- Rs. 3 Lakhs and where the failure is a continuing one, with a further fine of Rs. 1000 for every day,

 

Every officer of the company who is in default: Fine of min- Rs. 50,000 Max-Rs. 3 Lakhs where the failure is a continuing one, with a further fine of Rs. 1000 for every day.

 

 Company shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 3 Lakhs and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 50,000.
18 89(5) Failure to submit declaration in respect of beneficial Interest in any share

 

 Person shall be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 50,000 and where the failure is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to Rs. 1000 for every day after the first during which the failure continues.

 

 Person shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 50,000 and in case of continuing failure, with a further penalty of Rs. 200 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 5 Lakhs.
18 89(6) Declaration in Respect of Beneficial Interest in any Share

 

 The company and every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 500 but which may extend to Rs. 1000 and where the failure is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to Rs. 1000 for every day after the first during which the failure continues.

 

 The company and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 1000 for each day during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 5 Lakhs in the case of a company and Rs. 2 Lakhs in case of an officer who is in default.
19 90(10) Failure to declare significant beneficial ownership in the Company Person shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 1 year or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 1 Lakh but which may extend to Rs. 10 Lakhs or with both and where the failure is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to Rs. 1000 for every day after the first during which the failure continues.

 

 Person shall be liable to penalty of Rs. 50,000 and in case of continuing failure, with a further penalty of Rs. 1000 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 2 Lakhs.
19 90(11) Failure to maintain register of significant beneficial owners in a company

 

 Company and every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 10 Lakhs but which may extend to Rs. 50 Lakhs and where the failure is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to Ra. 1000 for every day after the first during which the failure continues. Company shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 1 Lakhs and in case of continuing failure, with a further penalty of Rs. 500 for each day, after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 5 Lakhs and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 25,000 and in case of continuing failure, with a further penalty of Rs. 200 for each day, after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs.1 Lakh

 
20 92(6) Certification of Annual Return not in conformity with the section

 

 Company secretary in practice shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 50,000 but which may extend to Rs. 5 Lakhs.

 

 Company secretary in practice shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 2 Lakhs.
21 105(5) Proxies If for the purpose of any meeting of a company, invitations to appoint as proxy a person or one of a number of persons specified in the invitations are issued at the company’s expense to any member entitled to have a notice of the meeting sent to him and to vote thereat by proxy, every officer of the company who knowingly issues the invitations as aforesaid or wilfully authorises or permits their issue

shall be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 1 Lakh:

Provided that an officer shall not be punishable under this sub-section by reason only of the issue to a member at his request in writing of a form of appointment naming the proxy, or of a list of persons willing to act as proxies, if the form or list is available on request in writing to every member entitled to vote at the meeting by proxy.

 

 If for the purpose of any meeting of a company, invitations to appoint as proxy a person or one of a number of persons specified in the invitations are issued at the company’s expense to any member entitled to have a notice of the meeting sent to him and to vote thereat by proxy, every officer of the company who issues the invitation as aforesaid or authorises or permits their issue, shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 50,000.

Provided that an officer shall not be liable under this sub-section by reason only of the issue to a member at his request in writing of a form of appointment naming the proxy, or of a list of persons willing to act as proxies, if the form or list is available on request in writing to every member entitled to vote at the meeting by proxy
30 143(15) Failure to report fraud under the section Any auditor, cost accountant or company secretary in practice shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 1 Lakh but which may extend to Rs. 25 Lakhs. Any auditor, cost accountant, or company secretary shall,

(a)    in case of a listed company, be liable to a penalty of Rs. 5 Lakhs; and

(b)    in case of any other company, be liable to a penalty of Rs. 1 Lakh
35 172 Non-compliance of any provisions of chapter relating to appointment and qualification of directors Company and every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 50,000 but which may extend to Rs. 5 Lakhs. Company and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 50,000, and in case of continuing failure, with a further penalty of Rs. 500 for each day during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 3 Lakhs in case of a company

 
36 178(8) Non-compliance of provisions relating to section 177 and 178 of the Act. Company shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 1 Lakh but which may extend to Rs. 5 Lakhs and every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 1 year or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 25,000 but which may extend to Rs. 1 Lakh, or with both.

 

 Company shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 5 Lakhs and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 1 Lakh.

 
37 184(4) Failure of disclosure of Interest by Director

 

 Director shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 1 year or with fine which may extend to Rs. 1 Lakh, or with both. Director shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 1 Lakh.

 
38 187(4) Failure to hold investments by the company in its own name

 

 The company shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 25,000 but which may extend to Rs. 25 Lakhs and every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 25,000 but which may extend to Rs. 1 Lakh, or with both.

 

 The company shall be liable to a penalty of Rs 5 Lakhs and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 50,000.
39 188(5) Related Party Transactions

 

 Any director or any other employee of a company, who had entered into or authorised the contract or arrangement in violation of the provisions of this section shall-

(i) in case of listed company, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 1 year or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 25,000 but which may extend to Rs. 5 Lakhs, or with both; and

(ii) In case of any other company, be punishable with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 25,000 but which may extend to Rs. 5 Lakhs.

 

 Any director or any other employee of a company, who had entered into or authorised the contract or arrangement in violation of the provisions of this section shall-

(i)            in case of listed company, be liable to a penalty Rs. 25 Lakhs; and

(ii)            In case of any other company, be liable to a penalty of Rs. 5 Lakhs.
41 204(4) Contravention of provisions relating to secretarial Audit for bigger companies

 

 The company, every officer of the company or the company secretary in practice, who is in default, shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 1 Lakh but which may extend to Rs. 5 Lakhs. The company, every officer of the company or the company secretary in practice, who is in default, shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 2 Lakhs.
42 232(8) Merger and Amalgamation of Companies

 

 If a transferor company or a transferee company contravenes the provisions of the section, the transferor company or the transferee company, as the case may be, shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 1 Lakh but which may extend to Rs. 25 Lakhs and every officer of such transferor or transferee company who is in default, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 1 year or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 1 Lakh but which may extend to Rs. 3 Lakhs, or with both.

 

 If a company fails to file the certified true copy of the order with the Registrar for registration within 30 days of the receipt of order, the company and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 20,000, and where the failure is a continuing one, with a further penalty of Rs. 1000 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 3 Lakhs.
57 405 Failure to provide any information or statistic to CG Company shall be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 25,000 and every officer of the company who is in default, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 25, 000 but which may extend to 3 lakh rupees, or with both.

 

 The company and every officer of the company who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 25,000 and in case of continuing failure, with a further penalty of Rs. 1000 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 3 lakh rupees.
63 450 Punishment where no specific penalty or punishment is provided Company and every officer of the company who is in default or such other person shall be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 10,000, and where the contravention is continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to Rs. 1000 for every day after the first during which the contravention continues. Company and every officer of the company who is in default or such other person shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 10,000 and in case of continuing contravention, with a further penalty of Rs. 1000 foreach day after the first during which the contravention continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 2 lakhs in case of a company and Rs. 50,000 in case of an officer who is in default or any other person.

 
Omission of imprisonment provisions
3 8(11) Failure in fulfilment in requirement relating to formation of companies with Charitable Objects, etc.

 

 Directors and every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 25000 which may extend to Rs. 25 lakhs, or with both.

 

Provided that when it is proved that the affairs of the company were conducted fraudulently, every officer in default shall be liable for action under section 447.

 

 Directors and every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 25000 which may extend to Rs. 25 lakhs, or with both.

 

Provided that when it is proved that the affairs of the company were conducted fraudulently, every officer in default shall be liable for action under section 447.

 
6 26(9) Issue of prospectus in contravention of provisions of section 26 of the Act Every person who is knowingly a party to the issue of such prospectus:

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 50,000 but which may extend to Rs. 3 Lakhs or with both.

 Every person who is knowingly a party to the issue of such prospectus:

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 50,000  but which may extend to Rs. 3 Lakhs or with both.

 
7 40(5) Default in complying with provisions relating to securities being dealt with in Stock Exchanges

 

 Every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable:

With imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 50,000 but which may extend to Rs. 3 Lakhs, or with both.

 

 Every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable :

With imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 50,000 but which may extend to Rs. 3 Lakhs, or with both.

 
14 68(11) Non-compliance of buyback provisions Every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable:

With imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 1 Lakh but which may extend to Rs. 3 Lakhs, or with both.

 

 Every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable:

With imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 1 Lakh but which may extend to Rs. 3 Lakhs, or with both.

 
24 128(6) Books of Account, etc., to be kept by Company

 

 If the managing director, the whole-time director in charge of finance, the Chief Financial Officer or any other person of a company charged by the Board with the duty of maintenance of books of accounts of the company and contravenes such provisions, such persons of the company shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 1 year or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 50,000 but which may extend to Rs. 5 Lakhs or with both.

 

 If the managing director, the whole-time director in charge of finance, the Chief Financial Officer or any other person of a company charged by the Board duty of maintenance of books of accounts of the company and contravenes such provisions, such persons of the company shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 1 year or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 50,000 but which may extend to Rs. 5 Lakhs or with both.

 
26 134(8) Contravention of provision relating to the Financial Statements, Board’s Report, etc of the Company Every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 50,000 but which may extend to Rs. 5 Lakhs, or with both.

 

 Every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 50,000.

 
31 147(1) Punishment for contravention of provision relating to appointment of auditors and audit of the Company Every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable:

with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 1 year or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 10,000 but which may extend to Rs. 1 Lakh, or with both.

 

 Every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable:

with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 1 year or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 10,000 but which may extend to Rs. 1 Lakh, or with both.

 
34 167(2) Continuation of office by director after knowing his disqualifications Director shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 1 year or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 1 Lakh but which may extend to Rs. 5 Lakhs, or with both

 

 Director shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 1 year or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 1 Lakh but which may extend to Rs. 5 Lakhs, or with both

 
43 242(8) Failure to comply with alteration in the charter documents by the Tribunal Every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 25,000 but which may extend to Rs. 1 Lakh, or with both.

 

 Every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 25,000 but which may extend to Rs. 1 Lakh, or with both.

 
44 243(2) Person who knowingly acts as MD or other director in the company while entering into agreements Such person shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months or with fine which may extend to Rs. 5 Lakhs, or with both.

 

 Such person shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months or with fine which may extend to Rs. 5 Lakhs, or with both.

 
49 347(4) Disposal of Books and Papers of Company.

 

 If any person acts in contravention of any rule framed or an order made under sub-section (3), he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months or with fine which may extend to Rs. 50,000, or with both.

 

 If any person acts in contravention of any rule framed or an order made under sub-section (3), he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months or with fine which may extend to Rs. 50,000, or with both.

 
54 392 Punishment for contravention of provisions of Chapter XXII relating to companies incorporated outside India The foreign company shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 1 lakh but which may extend to Rs. 3 lakh and in the case of a continuing offence, with an additional fine which may extend to Rs. 50, 000 for every day after the first during which the contravention continues and every officer of the foreign company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 25,000 but which may extend to Rs. 5 lakhs, or with both The foreign company shall be punishable with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 1 lakh but which may extend to Rs. 3 lakhs and in the case of a continuing offence, with an additional fine which may extend to Rs. 50, 000 for every day after the first during which the contravention continues and every officer of the foreign company who is in default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 25,000 but which may extend to Rs. 5 lakhs, or with both
61 441 Compounding of certain offence Any officer or other employee of the company who fails to comply with any order made by the Tribunal or the Regional Director or any officer authorised by the Central Government under sub-section (4) shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months, or with fine not exceeding Rs. 1 lakh, or with both If any officer or other employee of the company who fails to comply with any order made by the Tribunal or the Regional Director or any officer authorised by the Central Government under sub-section (4), the maximum amount of fine for the offence proposed to be compounded under this section shall be twice the amount provided in the corresponding section in which punishment for such offence is provided.

 
Amendment in penal provisions
20 92(5) Failure to file Annual Return within the specified time Company and its every officer who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 50,000 and in case of continuing failure, with further penalty of Rs. 100 for each day during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 5 Lakhs. Company and its every officer who is in default shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 10,000 and in case of continuing failure, with further penalty of Rs. 100 for each day during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 2 Lakhs in case of a company and Rs. 50,000 in case of an officer who is in default.
22 117(2) Failure to file resolution or agreement with the Registrar Penalty on Company: Rs. 1 Lakh and in case of continuing failure, with further penalty of Rs. 500 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 25 Lakhs.

Every officer of the company who is in default including liquidator of the company, if any, shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 50,000 and in case of continuing failure, with further penalty of Rs. 500 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 5 Lakhs.

 Penalty on Company: Rs. 10,000 and in case of continuing failure, with further penalty of Rs. 100 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 2 Lakhs.

Every officer of the company who is in default including liquidator of the company, if any, shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 10,000 and in case of continuing failure, with further penalty of Rs. 100 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 50,000.
28 137(3) Failure to file a copy of Financial Statement to be Filed with Registrar

 

 Company shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 1000 for every day during which the failure continues but which shall not be more than Rs. 10 Lakhs, and the MD and the CFO of the company, if any, and, in the absence, any other director who is charged by the Board with the responsibility of complying with the provisions of this section, and, in the absence of any such director, all the directors of the company, shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 1 Lakh and in case of continuing failure, with further penalty of Rs. 100 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 5 Lakhs. Company shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 10,000 and in case of continuing failure, with a further penalty of Rs. 100 for each day during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 2 Lakhs, and the MD and the CFO of the company, if any, and, in the absence any other director who is charged by the Board with the responsibility of complying with the provisions of this section, and, in the absence of any such director, all the directors of the company, shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 10,000 and in case of continuing failure, with further penalty of Rs. 100 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 50,000.
29 140(3) Failure to file resignation with the company and Registrar The auditor shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 50,000 or an amount equal to the remuneration of the auditor, whichever is less, and in case of continuing failure, with further penalty of Rs. 500 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 5 Lakhs. The auditor shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 50,000 or an amount equal to the remuneration of the auditor, whichever is less, and in case of continuing failure, with further penalty of Rs. 500 for each day after the first during which such failure continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 2 Lakhs.
33 165(6) Failure to comply with restriction on maximum number of Directorships

 

 Person shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 5000 for each day after the first during which such contravention continues. Person shall be liable to a penalty of Rs. 2000 for each day after the first during which such violation continues, subject to a maximum of Rs. 2 Lakhs.
50 348(6) Information as to pending liquidations If a Company Liquidator contravenes the provisions of this section, the Company Liquidator shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees for every day during which the failure continues.

 

 Where a Company Liquidator, who is an insolvency professional registered under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is in default in complying with the provisions of this section, then such default shall be deemed to be a contravention of the provisions of the said Code, and the rules and regulations made thereunder for the purposes of proceedings under Chapter VI of Part IV of that Code.

 
Omission of penal provisions
8 48(5) Failure to protect rights of the members during variation of Shareholders’ Rights Fine on Company: Which shall not be less than Rs. 25,000 but which may extend to Rs. 5 Lakhs and

Every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable: with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 25,000 but which may extend to Rs. 5 Lakhs, or with both.

 Omitted
10 59(5) Default in complying with order of Tribunal w.r.t. rectification of register of members Fine on Company: Which shall not be less than Rs. 1 Lakh but which may extend to Rs. 5 Lakhs and

Every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable: With imprisonment for a term which may extend to 1 year or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 1 Lakh but which may extend to Rs. 3 Lakhs, or with both.

 Omitted
13 66(11) Failure to publish the order of reduction of capital of the Company Fine on Company: not be less than Rs. 5 Lakhs but which may extend to Rs. 25 Lakhs

 

 Omitted
15 71(11) Failure to comply with order of Tribunal for discharge of assets of the Company Every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable: With imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years or with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 2 Lakhs but which may extend to Rs. 5 Lakhs, or with both. Omitted
46 284(2) Promoters, directors etc. to cooperate with Company Liquidator Where any person, without reasonable cause, fails to discharge his obligations under sub-section (1), he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees, or with both

 

 If any person required to assist or cooperate with the Company Liquidator under sub-section (1) does not assist or cooperate, the Company Liquidator may make an application to the Tribunal for necessary directions.

 

On receiving an application under sub-section (2), the Tribunal shall, by an order, direct the person required to assist or cooperate with the Company Liquidator to comply with the instructions of the Company Liquidator and to cooperate with him in discharging his functions and duties
47 302(4) Dissolution of company by Tribunal If the Company Liquidator makes a default in forwarding a copy of the order within the period specified in sub-section (3), the Company Liquidator shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees for every day during which the default continues.

 

 Omitted
48 342(6) Prosecution of Delinquent Officers and Members of Company

 

 If a person fails or neglects to give assistance required by sub-section (5), he shall be liable to pay fine which shall not be less than Rs. 25,000 but which may extend to Rs. 1 Lakh.

 

  
50 348(7) Information as to Pending Liquidations.

 

 If a Company Liquidator makes wilful default in causing the statement referred to in sub-section (1) audited by a person who is not qualified to act as an auditor of the company, the Company Liquidator shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months or with fine which may extend to Rs. 1 Lakh, or with both. Omitted
Amendments relating to dissolution of company
47 302(3) Dissolution of company by tribunal A copy of the order shall, within thirty days from the date thereof, be forwarded by the Company Liquidator to the Registrar who shall record in the register relating to the company a minute of the dissolution of the company

 

 The Tribunal shall, within a period of thirty days from the date of the order—

(a) forward a copy of the order to the Registrar who shall record in the register relating to the company a minute of the dissolution of the company; and

(b) direct the Company Liquidator to forward a copy of the order to the Registrar who shall record in the register relating to the company a minute of the dissolution of the company.

 
51 356 Powers of Tribunal to declare dissolution of company void It shall be the duty of the Company Liquidator or the person on whose application the order was made, within thirty days after the making of the order or such further time as the Tribunal may allow, to file a certified copy of the order with the Registrar who shall register the same, and if the Company Liquidator or the person fails so to do, the Company Liquidator or the person shall be punishable with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees for every day during which the default continues.

 

 The Tribunal shall—

(a) forward a copy of the order, within thirty days from the date thereof, to the Registrar who shall record the same; and (b) direct the Company Liquidator or the person on whose application the order was made, to file a certified copy of the order, within thirty days from the date thereof or such further period as allowed by the Tribunal, with the Registrar who shall record the same

 

[1] https://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/AmendmentAct_29092020.pdf

[2] http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2020/223873.pdf

 

Our other write ups covering Companies (Amendment) Act, 2020:

  1. Highlights of Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2020: https://vinodkothari.com/2020/03/highlights-of-the-companies-amendment-bill-2020/
  2. Companies (Amendment) Act, 2020 PowerPoint presentation: https://vinodkothari.com/2020/09/companies-amendment-act-2020/
  3. Enforcement Status of Companies (Amendment) Act, 2020:https://vinodkothari.com/2020/12/enforcement-status-of-companies-amendment-act-2020/