Quick Bytes on Union Budget 2026
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Simrat Singh | finserv@vinodkothari.com
This year’s Economic Survey focuses less on the expansion of credit and more on the quality and sustainability of credit. In infrastructure financing for instance, the Survey notes that the emphasis shifts from the sheer scale of investment to project quality and risk allocation. In this short note, we explore major observations of the Survey w.r.t infrastructure financing and microfinance.
The Survey 2026 treats infrastructure financing not as a question of “how much more to spend, but how to finance better.” The message is clear: public capital expenditure will continue to lead, but the future of infrastructure finance lies in diversification and market-based instruments, with InvITs and REITs playing a pivotal role.
The Survey firmly reaffirms public capital expenditure as the backbone of India’s infrastructure push. Government capital expenditure has nearly doubled between FY22 and FY26, underscoring the public sector’s continued leadership in financing infrastructure.
At the same time, the Survey highlights why high public spending alone is not sufficient. Weak project preparation, delays in statutory clearances and rigid contracting structures are identified as key contributors to financial stress in infrastructure projects. The underlying message being that better-prepared projects attract better financing. Public expenditure must increasingly focus on de-risking projects upfront, rather than merely funding asset creation.
A gradual move away from infrastructure financing being overly dependent on bank credit is observed. While banks remain important, the Survey recognises the limits of using short-term deposits to fund long-gestation infrastructure assets. Instead, financing growth is increasingly coming from:
This shift is seen as essential to reduce systemic risk and prevent a repeat of infrastructure-led stress on bank balance sheets.
InvITs are no longer presented as a niche product. The Survey positions them as core infrastructure financing institutions, especially for mature, revenue-generating assets.
Their role is threefold:
Importantly, the Survey sees InvITs less as tools for raising fresh debt for infrastructure spending and more as mechanisms for capital rotation i.e. monetising what is already built to finance what needs to be built next.
The Survey draws a quiet but important distinction between greenfield and brownfield risk. While banks still dominate construction-stage financing, InvITs have become the preferred vehicle for post-construction assets, particularly in roads, power transmission, ports, and telecom. Majorly due to the regulatory requirement of having at least 80% completed and revenue generating assets.
This has strengthened PPP outcomes by:
The proposed launch of the first government-owned public InvIT in 2026 signals the government’s intent to embed InvITs deeper into public asset management, not just private monetisation.
Supporting this transition, the Survey recognises important regulatory reforms for infrastructure financing such as:
The Survey is careful not to oversell InvITs. They are not substitutes for public capex, nor solutions for early-stage project risk. Their success depends on stable cash flows and regulatory certainty. But within those limits, InvITs represent a correction in India’s infrastructure finance model, one that shifts risk away from bank balance sheets and towards diverse long-term capital aligned with infrastructure economics.
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Climate Finance: domestic resources insufficient to bridge funding gaps
Simrat Singh | finserv@vinodkothari.com
The Economic Survey 2026 takes an honest view of India’s microfinance sector. Rather than celebrating credit growth alone, it frames microfinance as a household balance-sheet business, where the real test of success is whether borrowing improves stability and resilience at the last mile or not. NBFC-MFIs, as the primary delivery channel, sit at the heart of this assessment. In this short note, we explore major observations of the Survey w.r.t infrastructure financing and microfinance.
The Survey reiterates the importance of microfinance in extending formal credit to underserved households. Women account for the vast majority of borrowers and most lending continues to be rural. Over the past decade, the sector has expanded rapidly in both outreach and scale, with NBFC-MFIs accounting for the largest share of lending, followed by banks and small finance banks.
This expansion has made microfinance one of the most effective channels for last-mile credit delivery but it has also exposed the sector to sharper credit cycles.
The slowdown seen in FY25 is presented as a supply-side correction rather than a failure of the model. The Survey attributes the stress primarily to over-lending and borrower over-indebtedness in certain regions, driven by multiple lenders targeting the same customer base after the pandemic. The key takeaway being that access to credit was not the constraint credit discipline was.
NBFC-MFIs remain indispensable to microfinance, but the Survey recognises their structural vulnerability during rapid growth phases. Unsecured lending and limited visibility into borrowers’ total debt make the model sensitive to concentration risks. Regulatory responses have therefore focused on restoring balance rather than tightening credit indiscriminately. The RBI’s decision to lower the minimum qualifying asset requirement has given NBFC-MFIs room to diversify, while self-regulatory measures have reinforced borrower-level safeguards. The Survey notes early signs of stabilisation in asset quality and disbursement trends.
A recurring concern in the Survey is the lack of reliable tools to assess household income and repayment capacity. Many borrowers carry obligations beyond microfinance such as gold loans or agricultural credit that are not always visible at the point of lending. The Survey sees digital public infrastructure as a gradual solution. Wider use of digital payments, data sharing frameworks and account aggregators is expected to improve cash-flow assessment and reduce reliance on informal income proxies. Using all this information about its borrowers, the MFIs are expected to improve their credit assessment.
One of the Survey’s most important observations is its critique of how success in microfinance is measured. While private capital has helped scale the sector, growth-centric metrics can unintentionally encourage repeated lending without sufficient regard for borrower outcomes. The Survey argues for a shift towards welfare-oriented indicators such as income stability, reduction in distress borrowing and sustainable debt levels rather than portfolio size alone. In doing so, it challenges the assumption that more credit automatically translates into better outcomes.
The Survey neither dismisses microfinance nor romanticises it. It acknowledges its critical role in inclusion, while warning that unchecked expansion can weaken household balance sheets. Long-term sustainability, it suggests, depends less on how fast credit grows and more on how responsibly it is delivered. The Economic Survey’s message is simple: the future of microfinance lies in lending better, not lending more. For NBFC-MFIs, this means aligning growth with borrower capacity, using data more intelligently and treating household stability, not loan volumes, as the true measure of success.
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Climate Finance: domestic resources insufficient to bridge funding gaps
Economic Survey 2025-26 highlights the position of climate finance in India and developing countries
Anushka Ganguly, Executive | corplaw@vinodkothari.com
The relevance of climate finance in climate action cannot be undermined, since climate change mitigation and adaptation require large-scale mobilisation of financial resources. The Economic Survey 2025-26, tabled in Parliament by Union Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman on January 29, 2026, highlights that the current climate finance levels are inadequate for developing countries to achieve their climate goals. This climate funding gap is not a lack of ambition, rather, is imbibed in the structural weaknesses of the international financial system.
By 2030, developing economies are estimated to need USD 5–6 trillion1 for effective climate action. With that in mind, the following may be noted:
1.1. Challenges in mobilising private capital for climate finance
In 2023, global financial assets under management totalled USD 1.9 trillion, with private capital accounting for nearly USD 1.3 trillion3. Most of this private capital went to advanced economies, with China receiving another 30%, whereas other developing countries, excluding China, received merely around 15%. The reasons for such a gap include:
While the overall progress of the country towards the climate goals remain insufficient4, India has, over years, through policy initiatives and regulatory reforms, have mobilised climate finance to the extent that has resulted in a 36% reduction in emissions intensity since 2005 and achieved 50% non-fossil power capacity ahead of schedule. The policy initiatives taken include the following:
2.1. Bridging the gap domestically
Currently, around 83 per cent of India’s finance for mitigation and 98 per cent of finance for adaptation is sourced domestically, reflecting strong internal financing. While relying solely on domestic resources is insufficient to meet India’s overall climate investment needs, some steps towards strengthening the domestic financial system may include:
Conclusion
There is a wide disparity between the climate vulnerability and the funds available towards supporting the climate action. While policy incentives are being shaped towards mobilising domestic finance, an effective global response is required, particularly towards the developing countries. The global capital allocation needs to be mobilised towards areas where the investment needs for sustainable development are most pressing.
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Refer our detailed write-up on the topic titled as Bank-NBFC Partnerships for Priority Sector Lending: Impact of New Directions
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The framework for Integrated Ombudsman Scheme (IOS) constitutes a cornerstone of the RBI’s customer protection and grievance redressal mechanism across the financial sector. With the objective of providing customers a single, unified and accessible platform for redressal of complaints against Regulated Entities, the RBI introduced the Integrated Ombudsman framework.
The RBI has now introduced the Reserve Bank – Integrated Ombudsman Scheme, 2026 (“IOS 2026”), which supersedes the earlier Reserve Bank – Integrated Ombudsman Scheme, 2021 (“IOS 2021”). The new Scheme shall come into force with effect from July 1, 2026.
The IOS 2026 seeks to refine and reinforce the existing mechanism by expanding the scope of coverage, strengthening the powers of the Ombudsman, tightening procedural timelines, enhancing disclosure and reporting. The table below highlights and analyses the key changes introduced under IOS 2026 as compared to the IOS 2021, to enable stakeholders to assess the regulatory and operational impact of the revised framework.
| Provision | IOS 2021 | IOS 2026 | Analysis / Impact |
| Definition of “Customer” & “Deficiency in Service” | The term “Customer” was not defined. Limited definition for ‘Deficiency in Service’, largely linked to users/applicants of financial services. | ‘Customer’ means a person who uses, or is an applicant for, a service provided by a Regulated Entity. (Para 3(1)(h)) ‘Deficiency in Service’ now applicable across all services provided by Regulated Entities and not just restricted to financial services. (Para 3(1)(i)) | Broadens the scope of protection by covering all services offered by Regulated Entities, not just financial services. |
| Definition of “Rejected Complaints” | Not expressly defined | New definition introduced – complaints closed under Clause 16 of the Scheme. (Para 3(1)(o)) | Clarificatory in nature; definition is not used elsewhere in the Scheme |
| Power to Implead Other Regulated Entities | No explicit power | Ombudsman empowered to make other Regulated Entities a party to the complaint if such Regulated Entity has, by an act, negligence, or omission, failed to comply with any directions, instructions, guidelines, or regulations issued by the RBI. (Para 8(6)) | Expands investigative and adjudicatory powers of the RBI Ombudsman |
| Annual Report on Scheme Functioning | The Ombudsman was required to submit an annual report to the Deputy Manager of the RBI; however, the RBI was not obligated to publish it. | It has now been made mandatory for the RBI to publish an annual report on the functioning and activities carried out under the Scheme. (Para 8(7)) | Enhances transparency and public accountability of the Ombudsman framework |
| Interim Advisory | No express provision | Ombudsman expressly empowered, if deemed necessary and based on the circumstances of the complaint, to issue an advisory to the RE at any stage to take such action as may lead to full or partial resolution and settlement of the complaint. (Para 14(6)) | Enables interim reliefs/directions and more effective complaint handling. This would help in resolving disputes by settlement at any stage. IOS permits advisories i.e., communications from the Ombudsman advising REs to take actions for full or partial complaint resolution. Advisories are non-binding and serve as a pre-award tool to facilitate quicker settlements. |
| Principal Nodal Officer (PNO) – Change Reporting | Reporting obligation not specified | Any change in appointment or contact details of PNO must be reported to CEPD, RBI (prior to change or immediately post-change) (Para 18(2)) | Additional intimation requirement for regulated entities |
| Compensation – Consequential Loss | Capped at ₹20 lakh | Enhanced to ₹30 lakh (Para 8(3)) | Increases the limit of potential financial risk for Regulated Entities |
| Compensation – Harassment & Mental Anguish | Consolatory damages capped at ₹1 lakh | Increased to ₹3 lakh (in addition to other compensation) (Para 8(3)) | Compensation limit tripled |
| Limit on Amount in Dispute | No monetary cap | No change – still no limit (Para 8(3)) | Ombudsman continues to have wide jurisdiction irrespective of dispute value |
| Timeline for Filing Complaint | 1 year from RE’s reply; or 1 year + 30 days if no reply from RE | Complaint must be filed within 90 days from the expiry of the RE’s response timeline (30 days) or last communication, whichever is later. (Para 10(1)(g)) | Considerably tightens timelines; this would mean the customers must act swiftly |
| Guidance on Complaint Filing | Dispersed across the Scheme | Consolidated guidance provided in Part A of the Annexure along with Complaint Form. (Annex) | The guidance merely reiterates the points from the scheme that relate to admissibility of a valid complaint, but this is useful for the complainant as he will be aware of the complaint filing requirements and shall not be required to be thorough with the scheme itself |
| Modes of Filing Complaint | Specified the options to file a complaint through portal, email, or courier at CRPC. | Explicitly specified the email-ID of CRPC, and the address at which the complaint shall be couriered. (Para 6(2)) | Specification of the details for filing complaint |
| Data Consent in Complaint Form | No explicit consent requirement | Explicit consent for use of personal data mandatory. (Annex) | Aligns complaint process with evolving data protection and privacy standards |
| Categorisation of Complaints in complaint form | Limited classification | Detailed categorisation of complainant type and nature of complaint. (Annex) | Enables better routing, analytics, and faster resolution |
| Maintainability Check in Complaint Form | No upfront maintainability warning | Explicit note stating non-maintainable scenarios (court pending, advocate filing, etc.). (Annex) | Reduces frivolous filings and early-stage rejections |
| Appellate Authority | Executive Director in charge of concerned RBI department | Executive Director in charge of Consumer Education and Protection Department (CEPD) explicitly designated. (Para 3(1)(a)) | Clarificatory in nature |
| Introduced system-based validation | No such provision | Complaints received via portal, will undergo a system-based validation/check and will be rejected at the outset for being non-maintainable complaints. For the complaints received via e-mail and physical mode, CRPC will assess their maintainability under the Scheme. (Para 12(1)) | This would enhance the “gatekeeping” responsibility of the CRPC, which should speed up the process for valid complaints by weeding out inadmissible ones. |
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Manisha Ghosh, Senior Executive | finserv@vinodkothari.com
