ECL Framework for Banks: Key Highlights
See our article A[U]n Expected Injury: ECL is here, likely to hurt bank profits and retained earnings in FY28 for an in-depth analysis.
See our article A[U]n Expected Injury: ECL is here, likely to hurt bank profits and retained earnings in FY28 for an in-depth analysis.
Team Finserv | finserv@vinodkothari.com
The new ECL framework marks a major regulatory shift for India’s banking sector; it has been long overdue, and therefore, there was no case that the RBI could have deferred it further; pleadings to defer the implementation were rejected by the regulator. It comes coupled with regulatory floors for provisions, which would cause a major increase in provisioning requirements over the earlier requirements. Our assessment, on a very conservative basis, is that the first hit to Bank P/Ls will be at least Rs 60000 crores in the aggregate.
This is in addition to fair valuation requirement on upfront adoption, as on 1st April, 2027. While a vaguely worded part in para 19 was inserted on suggestions of the stakeholders, if interest rates have moved up since the date of the original loan, there will be almost a sure case of upfront valuation loss, which will eat up retained earnings.
RBI had come up with a draft framework on ECL pursuant to the Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies, wherein it indicated its intention to replace the extant framework based on incurred loss with an ECL approach. The final regulations were notified on 26th April and are applicable w.e.f 1.04.2027 i.e., for FY 27-28. The manner of implementation will be that all loans as on 1st April 2027 will be fair valued, and all new loans/financial instruments originated or acquired on or after 1st April 2027 will be subject to ECL provisions. See the highlights of the final regulations here.
A major impact that the directions will have on the Banking sector is the need to maintain increased provisioning pursuant to a shift from an incurred loss framework to the ECL framework. Under the earlier framework, banks made provisions only after a loss has incurred, i.e., when loans actually turn non-performing. The newECL model, however, requires banks to anticipate potential credit losses and set aside provisions for such anticipated losses.
Banks presently classify an asset as SMA1 when it hits 30 DPD, and SMA2 when it turns 60. Both these, however, are standard assets, which currently call for 0.4% provision. Under ECL norms, both these will be treated as Stage 2 assets, which calls for a lifetime probability of loss, with a regulatory floor of 5%. Thus, the differential provision here becomes 4.6%.
Once an asset turns NPA, the present regulatory requirement is a 15% provision; the ECL framework puts these assets under Stage 3, where the regulatory minimum provision, depending on the collateral and ageing, may range from 25% to 100%. Our Table below gives a more granular comparison.
| Type of asset | Asset classification | Existing requirement | New requirement w.e.f 1.04.2027 | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Farm Credit, Loan to Small and Micro Enterprises | SMA 0 | 0.25% | 0.25% | – |
| SMA 1 | 0.25% | 5% | 4.75% | |
| SMA 2 | 0.25% | 5% | 4.75% | |
| NPA | 15% | 25%-100% based on Vintage | 10%-85% based on Vintage | |
| Commercial real estate loans | SMA 0 | 1% | Construction Phase -1.25% Operational Phase – 1% | Construction Phase -0.25% Operational Phase – Nil |
| SMA 1 | 1% | Construction Phase -1.8125% Operational Phase – 1.5625% | Construction Phase -0.8125% Operational Phase – 0.5625% | |
| SMA 2 | 1% | Construction Phase -1.8125% Operational Phase – 1.5625% | Construction Phase -0.8125% Operational Phase – 0.5625% | |
| NPA | 15% | 25%-100% based on Vintage | 10%-85% based on Vintage | |
| Secured retail loans, Corporate Loan, Loan to Medium Enterprises | SMA 0 | 0.4% | 0.4% | – |
| SMA 1 | 0.4% | 5% (0.4% for loans against FD, NSC, LIC and KVP) (2.5% for direct exposures to/guaranteed by State Governments) | 4.6% No change for loans against FD, NSC, LIC and KVP | |
| SMA 2 | 0.4% | 5%(0.4% for loans against FD, NSC, LIC and KVP) (2.5% for direct exposures to/guaranteed by State Governments) | 4.6% No change for loans against FD, NSC, LIC and KVP | |
| NPA | 15% | 25%-100% based on Vintage 10%-100% for loans against FD, NSC, LIC and KVP and for direct exposures to/guaranteed by State Government) | 10%-85% based on Vintage | |
| Exposures under various schemes of Credit Guarantee Fund Trust for Micro andSmall Enterprises (CGTMSE), Credit Risk Guarantee Fund Trust for Low IncomeHousing (CRGFTLIH) and National Credit Guarantee Trustee Company Ltd (NCGTC) | SMA 0 | 0.4% | 0.25% | 0.15% |
| SMA 1 | 0.4% | 0.25% | 0.15% | |
| SMA 2 | 0.4% | 0.25% | 0.15% | |
| NPA | No provision for the guaranteed portion. NPA provisioning as per extant guidelines for the portion outstanding in excess of the guarantee (Only when the Governmentrepudiates its guarantee when invoked) | 10%-100% based on vintage for secured and guaranteed portion 25%-100% based on vintage for unsecured and unguaranteed portion (Only if the claims are not settled with ninety datesfrom the due date of the loan) | ||
| Home Loans | SMA 0 | 0.25% | 0.25% | 0.15% |
| SMA 1 | 0.25% | 1.5% | 1.25% | |
| SMA 2 | 0.25% | 1.5% | 1.25% | |
| NPA | 15% | 10%-100% based on Vintage | (-)5% – 85% based on Vintage | |
| LAP | SMA 0 | 0.4% | 0.4% | – |
| SMA 1 | 0.4% | 1.5% | 1.1% | |
| SMA 2 | 0.4% | 1.5% | 1.1% | |
| NPA | 15% | 10%-100% based on Vintage | (-)5% – 85% based on Vintage | |
| Unsecured Retail loan | SMA 0 | 0.4% | 1% | 0.6% |
| SMA 1 | 0.4% | 5% | 4.6% | |
| SMA 2 | 0.4% | 5% | 4.6% | |
| NPA | 25% | 25%-100% based on Vintage | 0%-75% based on Vintage |
The actual impact of such additional provisioning will be a hit of more than 3% to the profit of banks. Based on the RBI Financial Stability Report of FY 24-25, the current level of SMA and NPA is estimated to be ₹3,78,000 crores (2%) and ₹4,28,000 crores (2.3%), respectively.
Accordingly, an additional provision of approximately ₹ 18,000 crores (4.6% of SMA volume) and ₹ 42,000 crores (10% of NPA volume) will be required for SMA and NPA respectively, leading to a total impact of at least ₹60,000 crores. This estimate has been arrived at by considering the % of NPAs and SMA-1 & SMA-2 portfolios of banks. The actual impact may be higher, as lot of loans may be unsecured, and may have ageing exceeding 1 year, in which case the differential provision may be higher.
It may be noted that while the draft directions allow Banks to add back the excess ECL provisioning to the CET 1 capital, it does not neutralize the immediate profitability impact, as the additional provisions would still flow through the profit and loss account.
How do we expect banks to smoothen this hit that may affect the FY 27-28 P/L statements? We hold the view that it will be prudent for banks, who have system capabilities, to estimate their ECL differential, and create an additional provision in FY 25-26, or do technical write-offs.
Effective Interest Rate requirement applies to all loans effective 1st April, 2027
ECL does not come alone; it comes along with the Ind AS 109 companion – the requirement to compute effective interest rate (EIR) for all financial assets and financial instruments. How does EIR requirement differ from the existing rate of interest/internal rate of return approach? Because EIR has the impact of amortising loan acquisition costs or upfront fees. Currently, banks could have taken the upfront earnings such as processing or origination fees/costs directly to revenue – these will now have to part of the EIR computation. More than impacting the profit number, EIR creates a significant impact on loan management systems, as it results in dual computations – the accounting balances and the customer LMS balances are likely to be different.
Upfront recognition of fair value changes
Para 19 requires that on 1st April, 2027, that is, the date of first adoption, all financial assets and instruments will be fair valued, and the fair value changes (gains or losses) will be adjusted against retained earnings. This is consistent with the principles of first time adoption of Ind AS.
On stakeholder representation, the RBI added this part to Para 19:
Where facts and circumstances indicate that the transaction has been undertaken on terms such that the fair value of the financial asset is not materially different from its carrying cost, the same shall be presumed to be the best evidence of fair value.
What does this imply? If the terms of the financial facility have remained the same, does it mean no fair valuation has to be done? Surely no, at least in our opinion. Any fair value change in fixed rate instruments happens for two reasons: change in credit spreads (rating changes, credit quality changes, etc), or change in rate of interest. If there is a facility extended, say at a rate of interest of 8%, whereas the prevailing rate of interest for a borrower of similar credit standing has moved up to 10%, will there be a fair value decrease? Surely yes.
There are lots of loans which were extended during Covid or periods of low interest rates, which are still continuing. In all such cases, fair value losses are imminent.
The meaning of the para above can only be that if the terms of the original facility are similar to what they would currently be, then the fair value will not have to be computed.
See our other resources:
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Simrat Singh and Jeel Ranavat | Finserv@vinodkothari.com
The RBI has proposed an overhaul of the existing prepaid payment instruments (PPI) framework through its draft Master Direction, 2026. The changes aim to, inter-alia, simplify classification, tighten cash usage, restrict cross border payments etc. In this note, we discuss some of the key proposals of the draft master directions.
Two overarching categories are proposed:
With a view to curb ‘loan-loaded PPIs’, it is proposed that credit cards can now be used only for Special Purpose PPIs, while General Purpose PPIs are limited to bank account debit, cash or another PPI. This signals a clear intent to ring-fence credit-backed spending to specific use cases. See our resource around loan loaded PPIs here.
The draft introduces a procedural clarification by requiring non-bank PPI applicants to submit a certificate from their statutory auditor confirming compliance with the minimum net worth criteria of ₹5 Crores. While the threshold itself remains unchanged, earlier a CA certificate was required; the draft now specifically mandates certification by the statutory auditor in a prescribed format..
Cash usage sees the biggest tightening. Cash loading for Full-KYC PPIs is reduced from ₹50,000 to ₹10,000 per month, pushing higher-value transactions towards bank-linked digital modes. The move appears designed to curb anonymity and improve traceability.
Peer-to-peer transfer (i.e. transfer to another person’s bank account or PPI) limits have been standardised. Instead of differentiated limits based on beneficiary registration, a flat cap of ₹25,000 per month is now proposed.
While earlier regulations relied on outstanding balance caps, the draft introduces an explicit ₹2 lakh monthly debit limit for Full-KYC PPIs. In substance, this aligns with the existing ceiling but adds clarity on usage.
Banks issuing PPIs will no longer require prior approval if they are already qualified to issue debit cards. A prior intimation to RBI will be sufficient, allowing faster product launches. This acknowledges that regulated banks already meet baseline prudential standards.
This significantly reduces time-to-market and reflects regulatory reliance on the existing prudential and compliance standards applicable to banks. The change is expected to enhance agility, support faster product innovation, and strengthen banks’ participation in the digital payments ecosystem.
For non-bank issuers, the process is simplified with perpetual authorisation and removal of the explicit in-principle approval stage. The timeline for submission post-regulatory NOC is also relaxed to 45 days from the earlier requirement of 30 days. The draft is silent on the earlier requirement of submitting a System Audit Report (SAR) at the time of authorisation. However, an IS Audit report is proposed to be submitted annually by the issuer.
The draft revises the methodology for computing interest on the core portion by moving from a fortnightly to a monthly calculation framework. Instead of averaging 26 lowest fortnightly balances, issuers will now compute the average of 12 lowest monthly outstanding balances, with the minimum one-year operational requirement continuing. This change appears to be a pragmatic step towards operational simplification, reducing computational intensity while aligning the framework with more conventional monthly cycles. While the earlier explicit restriction on availing loans against such deposits is not reiterated, the fiduciary nature of PPI funds implies that pledging or leveraging customer balances would, in our view, remain impermissible.
In contrast to tightening elsewhere, the framework for foreign users is expanded. The UPI One World wallet will now be available to all foreign nationals and NRIs, with a higher ₹5 lakh monthly usage limit.
This step is aimed at making UPI more accessible to international users, especially inbound travellers who often face challenges in using domestic payment systems. By enabling seamless, wallet-based access to UPI, the framework improves convenience and enhances the overall payment experience in India.
A key change is the blanket removal of cross-border transaction capability for PPIs. Earlier, AD-1 bank issued PPIs could be used for limited overseas transactions. The draft eliminates this entirely, narrowing the scope of PPIs.
Closed system PPIs continue to remain outside regulation but marketplaces are explicitly excluded from claiming this status. The definition of “merchant” has been broadened, removing the requirement of contractual acceptance. Small PPIs will now expire after 24 months with mandatory balance transfer in case the same has not been converted into Full-KYC PPI, instead of merely restricting further credits.
See our existing resources on PPI:
– Vinod Kothari & Chirag Agarwal | finserv@vinodkothari.com
Volumes of securitisation (which, of course, have always included bilateral assignments or so-called DA transactions) fell by 6% in FY 26, if the origination volume by Reliance group entities in the first half were to be excluded. However, the market has shown more originator diversity, with an increasing share of smaller issuers, including those tasting the market for the first time.

The dip in volumes is because of the larger issuers who were prominently absent or subdued – Shriram Finance as the largest issuer having raised on-balance sheet liquidity, and banking companies. However, the share of gold loans went up sharply, largely due to the sharp increase in gold prices and gold lending, Microfinance companies went more for securitisation, rather than direct assignment transactions.
For anyone studying the Indian securitisation market, it is important to note the following:
Overall, in a stressful global scenario, securitisation has stood firm. Non financial sector entities have shown increasing willingness to tap the market. Of course, SEBI regulations have to be more enabling.
Below, we give a detailed overview of the securitisation market, including a discussion on the asset classes.
Securitisation volumes have been largely driven by NBFCs, which recorded a 30% year-on-year increase in value. In contrast, originations by banks have declined significantly.
Among asset classes, vehicle loans (including commercial vehicles and two-wheelers) accounted for 50% of securitisation volumes (vs 47% in the corresponding period last fiscal). Mortgage-backed loans accounted for about 28% of securitisation volume (vs 37% in the last FY).
Vehicle loan-backed securitisations dominated the market, both in terms of number of deals and total value, reaffirming the sector’s strong position. This is consistent with the growth trend in vehicle loan originations during FY 25.
In addition to vehicle loans, originators also securitised receivables from a diverse set of underlying asset classes during Q4, including:
The continued diversification in underlying asset classes highlights the evolving maturity of India’s securitisation market and growing investor appetite across segments. The break-up of securitisation volumes across various asset classes have been presented below:

Securitisation of Vehicle Loans
The issuance volume for vehicle loan securitisation during FY26 was approximately ₹1.26 lakh crores. Most of the transactions were structured as single-tranche issuances. However, a few exceptions featured more layered structures comprising senior and equity tranches, or senior, mezzanine, and equity tranches.
In terms of credit ratings, the tranches were rated between A- and AAA. Notably, the senior tranches in the majority of transactions received high investment-grade ratings, typically falling within the AA+ to AAA range. This indicates strong investor confidence and reflects the underlying credit quality of the asset pools, supported by adequate credit enhancement mechanisms.
Further, replenishing structures were also observed commonly during FY26. These variations indicate growing sophistication in transaction structuring within the vehicle loan securitisation space, aimed at catering to different investor preferences, improving credit protection, and aligning with originator risk appetite. As the market matures, further innovation in structuring and risk mitigation features can be expected.
In terms of credit enhancements, most vehicle loan securitisation transactions during the last quarter of FY26 featured: cash collateral (CC) and overcollateralisation (OC), with the Excess Interest Spread (EIS) serving as the first layer of loss absorption.
Securitisation of Microfinance Loans
During FY26, the MFI sector has seen a revival after a period of stress during FY 25 and FY 24. This has been due to better credit underwriting of lenders, improving performance trends and granular pool characteristics. Further, after a period of stress, the lenders relied on time-tested borrowers rather than exploring new markets leading to higher average ticket size of loans. This has led to a growth in the volumes of securitisation of microfinance loans during FY26. The PTC issuance volume of microfinance institutions increased to 14% of total PTC issuance in FY26 from 6% of total PTC issuances in FY25. Most of the transactions were structured as a single tranche securitisation.
Further, most microfinance loan securitisation transactions during the quarter featured credit enhancement through two primary mechanisms: CC and overcollateralisation OC, with the EIS serving as the first layer of loss absorption.
Securitisation of pool of loans backed by Home Loans & LAP
The volume of mortgage backed securitisation has been low both in terms of number as well as in terms of amount of issuance. As compared to FY25, the total MBS issuances dropped to 28% of total issuance from 37%. The transactions featured a common waterfall matrix and had received an overall rating of AAA.
In terms of credit enhancement, CC and OC has been provided as a credit enhancement with the EIS serving as the first layer of loss absorption.
Securitisation of Gold Loans
Gold loan securitisation volumes in H2FY26 stood at approximately ₹18,500 crore, significantly higher than the ₹5,000 crore recorded for the whole of FY25.
The jump in gold lending securitisation may be due to increase in gold prices and resultant increase in the value of the collateral. As a result of this valuation spike, average ticket sizes have increased, indicating that as gold valuations rise, consumers are leveraging higher-value loans to meet their financing needs. Another reason for the increased origination may be removal of LTV restriction in case of income generating gold loans.
Securitisation of Unsecured Loans
As per rating rationales published by Care the securitisation volumes of unsecured loans (both personal and business) increased during FY26. Investors in unsecured loan transactions, are preferring the PTC route, due to the support provided by external enhancement. CC and OC have also been provided as a credit enhancement with the EIS serving as the first layer of loss absorption.
Team Corplaw | corplaw@vinodkothari.com
Other resources:
Subhojit Shome | Finserv@vinodkothari.com
The RBI on March 10, 2026 introduced the Reserve Bank of India (Commercial Banks – Prudential Norms on Capital Adequacy) Third Amendment Directions, 2026 (“Amendment”). The Amendment mainly aims to:
The notable items included in the Amendment are as follows:
A commercial bank needs to comply with the capital adequacy ratio requirements at two levels – the standalone (solo) level and the consolidated (group) level. For capital adequacy at consolidated level, all banking and other financial subsidiaries except the subsidiaries engaged in insurance and any non-financial activities (both regulated and unregulated) need to be fully consolidated. The Amendment provides that for computation of capital requirement on a consolidated basis, a bank shall consider the CCR exposures of all such entities.
The amendment substantially replaces the table (Table 16) containing the add-on factors used to calculate potential future exposure for derivative contracts.
Banks must apply “add-on factors” based on the nature of the contract and the remaining maturity. The revised table is as follows:

The Amendment notes that if a derivative contract settles exposure periodically and gets reset to zero value after such settlement then banks should treat the remaining maturity as the time until the next reset date, not the full life of the contract. This remaining maturity (“residual maturity”) should be used to pick the Add-on Factor. For interest rate contracts, however, which have residual maturities of more than one year and meet the aforementioned reset criteria, the add-on factor shall be subject to a floor of 0.50 per cent. The Amendment provides for a lower floor for interest rate contracts compared to that specified previously (1.0 per cent).
The Amendment notes that if a bank is a clearing member of an exchange or clearing corporation it must calculate and maintain CCR capital charge, as per the extant norms, for equity and commodity derivatives cleared for clients.
The Amendment clarifies what is included under the terms Precious Metals and Other Commodities in Table 16.
| Precious Metals | Other Commodities |
| – Silver – Platinum – Palladium | – Energy contracts – Agricultural commodities – Base metals (e.g., aluminium, copper, zinc) |
If a bank trades through a Qualifying Central Counterparty (QCCP), the exposure should get a 2% risk weight. This applies when the bank:
However, no capital is required if:
Dayita Kanodia and Simrat Singh | finserv@vinodkothari.com
RBI on March 10, 2026 issued the Reserve Bank of India (Commercial Banks – Prudential Norms on Declaration of Dividend and Remittances of Profits) Directions, 2026 (‘Dividend Directions’). Earlier, a draft was issued on January 6, 2026 seeking comments from stakeholders. The Dividend Directions replaces the existing directions entirely and introduces concepts like Adjusted PAT, CET1-based dividend bucket framework and prescribes a list of ‘ineligible profits’ for the payment of dividend.
This article discusses the key changes in the regulatory requirements for the payment of dividends by banks.
Dividend has to be paid as a percentage of adjusted PAT. Adjusted PAT is the PAT of the financial year for which the dividend is proposed to be paid minus 50% of Net NPA as on March 31 of the financial year for which the dividend is to be paid. By linking dividend payouts with asset quality, the framework ensures that banks with higher stressed assets retain a larger portion of earnings rather than distributing them as dividends.
Under the earlier directions, whether a bank could declarate dividend or not depended, inter-alia, on a matrix combining CRAR and NNPA ratios and the maximum dividend payout ratio was capped at 40% of net profit, depending on capital adequacy and asset quality.
The Dividend Directions replace the earlier CRAR-NNPA based matrix with a CET1 capital ratio bucket framework. Under the new system, banks fall within the various ranges of CET1 capital buckets (10 in total), each prescribing the maximum percentage of dividend that may be declared out of Adjusted PAT. At the same time, the overall dividend distribution is capped at 75% of PAT.
An illustration of the computation of the maximum permissible dividend payable is shown below:
| (₹ in crores) | |
| Total Assets | 500000 |
| PAT | 3000 |
| Net NPA (NPA – Prov) | 500 |
| Adjusted PAT (PAT – 50%* NNPA) | 2,750 |
| CET 1 Capital (end of PY) | 12% |
| Dividend allowed (new directions) [max of (30%*Adj. PAT) or (75% of PAT)] | 825 |
| Dividend allowed (erstwhile directions) (35%*PAT) | 1050 |
The Directions identify 4 kinds of profits that cannot be used for payment of dividends or remittance of profits:
The earlier directions required banks to maintain CRAR of at least 9% for the preceding two financial years and the relevant financial year, along with an NNPA ratio below 7%, and permitted dividends only out of current year profits.
The revised framework removes the NNPA threshold and historical CRAR requirements and instead adopts a simple prudential condition, ie., Banks must be in compliance with regulatory capital requirements and must continue to remain compliant even after the proposed dividend payment. In addition, the bank must have a positive Adjusted PAT for the relevant financial year in which the dividend has to be paid.
The Dividend Directions require the Board to evaluate certain factors before approving the declaration of dividend. In particular, the Board must consider RBI supervisory findings relating to divergence in asset classification and NPA provisioning, the statutory auditor’s report including any modified opinion or emphasis of matter, the bank’s current and projected capital position vis-à-vis regulatory capital requirements and the bank’s long-term growth plans.
Dividend has been clarified to mean to include interim dividend as well. Further, it shall consider dividend payable on equity shares and excludes dividend on Perpetual Non-Cumulative Preference Shares (PNCPS). Dividend payable on compulsorily convertible preference shares will, however, be included.
A bank paying dividend or remitting profits to the head office will be required to report details as per the format prescribed under Annex II of the Dividend Directions. The report is required to be furnished to the DoS within a fortnight of declaration of dividend / remitting profits to head office. Earlier, such a report was required to be furnished to the DoR.
Vinod Kothari & Chirag Agarwal | finserv@vinodkothari.com
RBI had earlier directed NBFCs to compute expected credit loss (ECL) without considering the impact of any default loss guarantees (DLGs) obtained from its lending service provider (LSP). We had published a short note explaining why this position was debatable (See our article on the topic here) and had also made a formal representation to RBI on the issue.
Back to the present, RBI has issued an amendment to the IRACP Directions, 2025 (dated February 13, 2026), permitting lenders to factor in DLG while determining provisions under the ECL framework across all stages.
Further, RBI has also specified that upon every event of invocation of DLG, the DLG cover reduces to the extent of invocation. Accordingly, REs shall recompute their ECL provisioning requirements across stages, after duly adjusting for the reduced DLG cover.
With these clarifications now in place, the next question that arises is: How should Regulated Entities (REs) appropriately factor DLG into their ECL computations? The article below discusses the above question at length.
Let us understand this in simple terms. Suppose a lender estimates that the expected loss on a loan pool is 3.8%. If the lender has received a guarantee of 5%, backed by fixed deposits that are lien-marked in its favour. The guarantee is sufficient to cover the expected loss. In such a case, effectively, the lender does not expect to bear any loss. On the other hand, if the expected loss is 6.8% and the guarantee covers only 5%, then the lender’s net expected loss would be the balance 1.8%.
However, this adjustment assumes that the guarantee will actually be honoured when required. A guarantee does not, however, eliminate risk completely; it merely shifts the risk of default or loss from the borrower to the guarantor, up to the guaranteed amount.
The DLG guidelines specify the forms in which a DLG can be obtained. DLG can be accepted in any one of the following forms:
Accordingly, DLG can only be obtained in fully funded forms, thus eliminating any question of incurring credit loss on such a guarantee. Does that mean that even in case of insolvency of the DLG provider the lender will have the right to invoke the guarantee? The answer to this is negative. Because unlike in the case of bankruptcy-remote SPV, the guarantor is an operating entity, and is prone to the risk of insolvency.
In case of initiation of insolvency proceedings, all the assets of an insolvent entity form part of the insolvency administration/liquidation estate and are beyond the reach of the creditors. The proceeds from the realisation of assets are paid to the creditors in accordance with the waterfall mechanism as specified under section 53 of the IBC, 2016 .
Accordingly, it becomes important to determine how each permitted form of DLG would be treated in the event of insolvency of the DLG provider.
So, even if the DLG is structured as a funded guarantee, the actual invocation can become complicated if the DLG provider goes into insolvency before such invocation. In such a situation, the lender may not be able to simply invoke the guarantee and take the money. Instead, it may have to submit its claim and wait for distribution under the insolvency process, where payments are made in the statutory priority order.
Under the waterfall mechanism, secured creditors rank alongside workmen’s dues. Now, in most DLG structures, the guarantor is a fintech entity or a co-lender. These entities typically do not have significant workmen-related liabilities. This may mean that the lender’s priority position is relatively stronger.
Further, the actual invocation process of the DLG should also be considered. For instance, cash held with the lender can be easily invoked and adjusted as compared to a lien-marked FD or bank guarantee, where there could be procedural delays.
Illustration: Consider a loan pool of ₹100 crore where the gross ECL rate is estimated at 6.8% (for the static pool covered by the guarantee), resulting in a gross ECL of ₹6.8 crore. The lender has a DLG cover of 5% of the pool (₹5 crore), structured as a lien-marked fixed deposit provided by a fintech sourcing partner. While the DLG is funded, there remains a risk that the guarantor may become insolvent. The first relevant question here is whether we will take a probability of default (PD) as per Stage 1 (12 months PD), or Stage 2/3 (lifelong PD). While the guarantor in question is not in default at all, however, given that the 6.8% ECL is a combination of Stage 1 as well as Stage 2/3 loans, in our view, the PD for the guarantor, to remain conservative, should be the lifelong PD over the tenure of the loans. Let us assume a 20% Probability of Default (PD) for the guarantor. Next question is assessment of Loss Given Default (LGD). As discussed above, the lender has the benefit of full security in form of lien on the fixed deposit, however, there may be depletion of the same on account of first priority in the waterfall, that is, costs of insolvency and bankruptcy process. On a conservative basis, we may, therefore, assume a 10% LGD. Thus, the expected loss on the DLG cover would therefore be 20% × 10% = 2%.
As a result, the ECL computation may now be:
= 5%*2% + 1.8% = 1.9%
Based on the aforesaid discussion, in our view, while the guarantee is funded the lender may have to adjust the probability of default to factor in the risk of insolvency, particularly where the guarantee is funded in the form of a cash deposit or a lien marked FD.
Which funded form of DLG is most suited?
As per the analysis, the various options of funded DLG can be ranked basis the maximum consideration allowable for ECL computation:
However, given that there will not be a sizable or material difference in the quantum of counter guarantee risk, the selection of the options for ECL computation may not be significant.
One of the ways to mitigate the risk of insolvency is by structuring the guarantee in such a way that the guarantee may be invoked upon the occurrence of an adverse material change in the financial condition of the guarantor. In other words, other than the occurrence of losses in the pool, if there are events of default such as adverse material change, insolvency of the guarantor etc., the lender may invoke the guarantee.
Early invocation upon identifiable stress on the part of the guarantor could help the lender realise the guarantee amount before the commencement of insolvency proceedings.
However, such clauses must be appropriately incorporated and drafted in the DLG agreement to ensure the following:
RBI has also provided a clarification that upon every event of invocation of DLG, the DLG cover reduces to the extent of invocation. Accordingly, REs would be required to recompute their ECL provisioning requirements across stages, after duly adjusting for the reduced DLG cover.
Pool-based guarantees presuppose that the pool is static. This is purely intuitive because if the pool is dynamic, new loans will continue to enter the pool, and therefore, the guarantor’s exposure will keep spreading over a continuing flow of new loans.
Where the pool is static, the loans gradually get repaid (amortised) over time. As borrowers repay their instalments, the outstanding amount of the loan pool keeps reducing. Since the exposure is shrinking, the ECL on that pool will also typically reduce over time, assuming normal performance. Therefore, whether the utilisation of the DLG on account of pool defaults may cause the ECL computation to increase? This may be so for 2 reasons: one, usual terms of DLG invocation will be the full amount of the defaulted loan will be recovered (due to escalation of the entire principal outstanding). Thus, while the performing loans amortise over time, the non-performing loans are fully recovered once they reach “default”, causing the utilisation of the DLG to run faster than the amortization of the performing loans. Second reason is that once the pool actually starts defaulting, there may be a reason to provide higher estimates of probability of default as well.
Para 36A of the IRAC Directions read with the principles under Ind AS 109 provides that credit enhancements may be considered while computing ECL only where such enhancements are “integral to the contractual terms.” The expression “integral to the contractual terms” is taken from the definition of “credit loss” in Ind AS 109. Credit losses are measured after considering the expected cashflows from an asset. Those cashflows will factor in the recovery of any collateral, or credit enhancements, as long as the said credit enhancement is integral to the contractual terms.
What exactly is the meaning of “integral to the contractual terms”? Are we expecting the guarantee (DLG in the present case) to be a part of the terms of the loan contract? That would never be the case, as the so-called guarantee (which may legally be regarded as an indemnity contract) is a bilateral contract between the lender and the DLG provider. Neither is the borrower aware of the guarantee, nor is it desirable to have the borrower know of the guarantee, for obvious reasons.
IFRS 9 uses the same language. US ASC has more elaborate discussion on this. Para 326-20-30-12 says:
The estimate of expected credit losses shall reflect how credit enhancements (other than those that are freestanding contracts) mitigate expected credit losses on financial assets, including consideration of the financial condition of the guarantor, the willingness of the guarantor to pay, and/or whether any subordinated interests are expected to be capable of absorbing credit losses on any underlying financial assets. However, when estimating expected credit losses, an entity shall not combine a financial asset with a separate freestanding contract that serves to mitigate credit loss. As a result, the estimate of expected credit losses on a financial asset (or group of financial assets) shall not be offset by a freestanding contract (for example, a purchased credit-default swap) that may mitigate expected credit losses on the financial asset (or group of financial assets)
There has been a significant discussion on whether the benefit of a guarantee or credit enhancement which is not a part of the contractual terms of the loan can be factored in ECL computation. From discussions before the IASB, as back as in 2018, two conditions for recognising the benefit of credit enhancements were discussed:
The second condition is easy to understand. For example, if the risk of default is hedged by a credit default swap, the value of the same, amounting to a derivative, is separately recognised. Hence, the question of factoring the same while computing ECL does not arise. However, the first condition, relating to contractual terms of the asset, still remains vague.
One may try to get some clues in the US FASB discussions, where para 326-20-30-12 has been interpreted in technical interpretations. In addition, there is a definition of “freestanding contracts” under the Glossary of ASC 326:
A freestanding contract is entered into either:
a. Separate and apart from any of the entity’s other financial instruments or equity transactions
b. In conjunction with some other transaction and is legally detachable and separately exercisable.
The “forming integral part of the contractual terms” does not warrant the principal contract to provide for the guarantee or the credit enhancements. Insisting on the same will be counter-intuitive, except in case of trilateral contracts. However, the conditions indicate that the guarantee or credit enhancement integrates and becomes an inseparable part of the underlying loan or group of loans. For example, if the group of loans was to be transferred, is it such that the benefit of the guarantee may stay iwth the originator and loans may be transferred, or the guarantee travels along with the loans? If the latter is the case, there is no doubt that in reality, the guarantee has become an embedded part of the loan transaction.
Another factor may be the contractual association between the loan cashflows and the payout from the credit enhancements. Some relevant considerations:
The presence of these factors will suggest the integration or embedding of the guarantee into the contractual cashflows from the loans.
While the recent amendment by the RBI brings welcome clarity by allowing DLG to be factored into ECL computation, lenders must approach this carefully and realistically. A DLG can reduce the expected loss, but it does not make the risk disappear, as the DLG provider itself faces the risk of insolvency. The form of the guarantee, its enforceability, and the possibility of invocation- all of these matter in assessing the true level of protection. REs should not treat DLG as a mechanical deduction from ECL, but as a risk mitigant that requires thoughtful evaluation, continuous monitoring, and recalibration as the pool amortises and the cover reduces.
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