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Indian Securitisation in FY26: Securitised Paper Volumes grow, with originator and asset diversity 

– Vinod Kothari & Chirag Agarwal | finserv@vinodkothari.com

Volumes of securitisation (which, of course, have always included bilateral assignments or so-called DA transactions) fell by 6% in FY 26, if the origination volume by Reliance group entities in the first half were to be excluded. However, the market has shown more originator diversity, with an increasing share of smaller issuers, including those tasting the market for the first time.

The dip in volumes is because of the larger issuers who were prominently absent or subdued – Shriram Finance as the largest issuer having raised on-balance sheet liquidity, and banking companies. However, the share of gold loans went up sharply, largely due to the sharp increase in gold prices and gold lending, Microfinance companies went more for securitisation, rather than direct assignment transactions.

For anyone studying the Indian securitisation market, it is important to note the following:

  • Reported volumes in India include direct assignments, which, in international parlance, are not “securitisation” (pure bilateral loan sales). However, in India, traditionally, DA has been a close and quick proxy for securitisation, and hence, mostly included. In FY 26, the split of DA/PTC volumes shows PTC transactions having gained in proportion. One rating agency1 reports an increase of PTC volume percentage from 54% to 60%; another one2 shows the increase from 48% to 52%.
  • Indian transactions mostly show LAP transactions as a part of MBS, whereas what the world reports as RMBS is quite small in India. Last year, there was a prominent transaction by LIC Housing Finance, through the NHB-promoted RDCL. There was no RDCL issuance this year. It seems that RMBS volume was either too small to be reportable, or was completely absent.
  • Microfinance sector has been under some stress in the recent past; however, MFIs have increasingly resorted to PTC issuances, with small deal sizes. Some deal sizes are even below 100 crores. This is indicating greater diversity of issuers, and of course, yields and ratings.
  • The market also seems to be showing larger acceptance for lower rated securities i.e., BBB+.

Overall, in a stressful global scenario, securitisation has stood firm. Non financial sector entities have shown increasing willingness to tap the market. Of course, SEBI regulations have to be more enabling.

Below, we give a detailed overview of the securitisation market, including a discussion on the asset classes. 

NBFCs vs Banks

Securitisation volumes have been largely driven by NBFCs, which recorded a 30% year-on-year increase in value. In contrast, originations by banks have declined significantly.

Recent Securitisation Structures in India – A Mix of Tradition and Innovation

Among asset classes, vehicle loans (including commercial vehicles and two-wheelers) accounted for 50% of securitisation volumes (vs 47% in the corresponding period last fiscal). Mortgage-backed loans accounted for about 28% of securitisation volume (vs 37% in the last FY). 

Vehicle loan-backed securitisations dominated the market, both in terms of number of deals and total value, reaffirming the sector’s strong position. This is consistent with the growth trend in vehicle loan originations during FY 25.

In addition to vehicle loans, originators also securitised receivables from a diverse set of underlying asset classes during Q4, including:

  1. Microfinance Loans
  2. Secured Business Loans
  3. Unsecured Business Loans
  4. Home Loans
  5. Unsecured Personal Loans
  6. Gold Loans

The continued diversification in underlying asset classes highlights the evolving maturity of India’s securitisation market and growing investor appetite across segments. The break-up of securitisation volumes across various asset classes have been presented below:

Securitisation of Vehicle Loans

The issuance volume for vehicle loan securitisation during FY26 was approximately ₹1.26 lakh crores. Most of the transactions were structured as single-tranche issuances. However, a few exceptions featured more layered structures comprising senior and equity tranches, or senior, mezzanine, and equity tranches.

In terms of credit ratings, the tranches were rated between A- and AAA. Notably, the senior tranches in the majority of transactions received high investment-grade ratings, typically falling within the AA+ to AAA range. This indicates strong investor confidence and reflects the underlying credit quality of the asset pools, supported by adequate credit enhancement mechanisms. 

Further, replenishing structures were also observed commonly during FY26. These variations indicate growing sophistication in transaction structuring within the vehicle loan securitisation space, aimed at catering to different investor preferences, improving credit protection, and aligning with originator risk appetite. As the market matures, further innovation in structuring and risk mitigation features can be expected.

In terms of credit enhancements, most vehicle loan securitisation transactions during the last quarter of FY26 featured: cash collateral (CC) and overcollateralisation (OC), with the Excess Interest Spread (EIS) serving as the first layer of loss absorption.

Securitisation of Microfinance Loans

During FY26, the MFI sector has seen a revival after a period of stress during FY 25 and FY 24. This has been due to better credit underwriting of lenders, improving performance trends and granular pool characteristics. Further, after a period of stress, the lenders relied on time-tested borrowers rather than exploring new markets leading to higher average ticket size of loans. This has led to a growth in the volumes of securitisation of microfinance loans during FY26. The PTC issuance volume of microfinance institutions increased to 14%  of total PTC issuance in FY26 from 6% of total PTC issuances in FY25. Most of the transactions were structured as a single tranche securitisation. 

Further, most microfinance loan securitisation transactions during the quarter featured credit enhancement through two primary mechanisms: CC and overcollateralisation OC, with the EIS serving as the first layer of loss absorption.

Securitisation of pool of loans backed by Home Loans & LAP

The volume of mortgage backed securitisation has been low both in terms of number as well as in terms of amount of issuance. As compared to FY25, the total MBS issuances dropped to 28% of total issuance from 37%. The transactions featured a common waterfall matrix and had received an overall rating of AAA. 

In terms of credit enhancement, CC and OC has been provided as a credit enhancement with the EIS serving as the first layer of loss absorption. 

Securitisation of Gold Loans

Gold loan securitisation volumes in H2FY26 stood at approximately ₹18,500 crore, significantly higher than the ₹5,000 crore recorded for the whole of FY25.

The jump in gold lending securitisation may be due to increase in gold prices and resultant increase in the value of the collateral. As a result of this valuation spike, average ticket sizes have increased, indicating that as gold valuations rise, consumers are leveraging higher-value loans to meet their financing needs. Another reason for the increased origination may be removal of LTV restriction in case of income generating gold loans.

Securitisation of Unsecured Loans

As per rating rationales published by Care the securitisation volumes of unsecured loans (both personal and business) increased during FY26. Investors in unsecured loan transactions, are preferring the PTC route, due to the support provided by external enhancement. CC and OC have also been provided as a credit enhancement with the EIS serving as the first layer of loss absorption.

Related articles: 

  1. Secure with Securitisation: Global Volumes Expected to Rise in 2025
  2. India securitisation volumes 2024: Has co-lending taken the sheen?
  3. Indian securitisation enters a new phase: Banks originate with a bang
  4. Securitisation: Indian market grows amidst global volume contraction
  1. Crisil report on securitisation volumes: https://www.crisilratings.com/en/home/newsroom/press-releases/2026/04/securitisation-deal-value-peaks-to-rs-2-55-lakh-crore-in-fiscal-2026.html ↩︎
  2. Care report on securitisation volumes
    https://www.careratings.com/uploads/newsfiles/1775801608_FY26%20Retail%20Securitisation%20at%20Rs%202.53%20Trillion%20First%20Dip%20PostPandemic.pdf ↩︎

RBI Directions on Lending to Related Parties: Frequently Asked Questions

Team Corplaw | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Other resources:

  1. Lending to your own: RBI Amendment Directions on Loans to Related Parties
  2. Navigation Roadmap through New Consolidated RBI Directions – Presentation
  3. Representation for issues related to RBI (Commercial Banks – Credit Risk Management)(Amendment) Directions, 2026

Treatment of Counterparty Credit Risk – RBI Revises Directions for Banks

Subhojit Shome | Finserv@vinodkothari.com

The RBI on March 10, 2026 introduced the Reserve Bank of India (Commercial Banks – Prudential Norms on Capital Adequacy) Third Amendment Directions, 2026 (“Amendment”). The Amendment mainly aims to:

  • Clarify how banks should calculate Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR) for derivative and similar transactions.
  • Align Indian capital adequacy rules with international standards (like Basel III Framework).
  • Ensure banks maintain adequate capital for risks arising from derivative exposures.

The notable items included in the Amendment are as follows:

CCR must be calculated on a consolidated basis

A commercial bank needs to comply with the capital adequacy ratio requirements at two levels – the standalone (solo) level and the consolidated (group) level. For capital adequacy at consolidated level, all banking and other financial subsidiaries except the subsidiaries engaged in insurance and any non-financial activities (both regulated and unregulated) need to be fully consolidated. The Amendment provides that for computation of capital requirement on a consolidated basis, a bank shall consider the CCR exposures of all such entities.

Add-on Factors for Derivative Contracts

The amendment substantially replaces the table (Table 16) containing the add-on factors used to calculate potential future exposure for derivative contracts.

Banks must apply “add-on factors” based on the nature of the contract and the remaining maturity. The revised table is as follows:

Clarification on Resetting Contracts

The Amendment notes that if a derivative contract settles exposure periodically and gets reset to zero value after such settlement then banks should treat the remaining maturity as the time until the next reset date, not the full life of the contract. This remaining maturity (“residual maturity”) should be used to pick the Add-on Factor. For interest rate contracts, however, which have residual maturities of more than one year and meet the aforementioned reset criteria, the add-on factor shall be subject to a floor of 0.50 per cent. The Amendment provides for a lower floor for interest rate contracts compared to that specified previously (1.0 per cent).

Capital Requirement for Clearing Members

The Amendment notes that if a bank is a clearing member of an exchange or clearing corporation it must calculate and maintain CCR capital charge, as per the extant norms, for equity and commodity derivatives cleared for clients.

Clarification of Commodity Categories

The Amendment clarifies what is included under the terms Precious Metals and Other Commodities in Table 16.

Precious MetalsOther Commodities
– Silver
– Platinum
– Palladium
– Energy contracts
– Agricultural commodities
– Base metals (e.g., aluminium, copper, zinc)

Risk Weight for Exposure to Clearing Houses

If a bank trades through a Qualifying Central Counterparty (QCCP), the exposure should get a 2% risk weight. This applies when the bank:

  • Trades for itself, or
  • Clears trades for clients and is liable for client losses if the QCCP defaults.

However, no capital is required if:

  • The bank has no legal obligation to compensate the client, and
  • The bank has a written legal opinion confirming this position.

Profit, Prudence and Payouts: New RBI Regulation for Dividends by Banks

Dayita Kanodia and Simrat Singh | finserv@vinodkothari.com

RBI on March 10, 2026 issued the Reserve Bank of India (Commercial Banks – Prudential Norms on Declaration of Dividend and Remittances of Profits) Directions, 2026 (‘Dividend Directions’). Earlier, a draft was issued on January 6, 2026 seeking comments from stakeholders. The Dividend Directions replaces the existing directions entirely and introduces concepts like Adjusted PAT, CET1-based dividend bucket framework and prescribes a list of ‘ineligible profits’ for the payment of dividend. 

This article discusses the key changes in the regulatory requirements for the payment of dividends by banks.

Adjusted PAT: A risk-adjusted base for dividend distribution

Dividend has to be paid as a percentage of adjusted PAT. Adjusted PAT is the PAT of the financial year for which the dividend is proposed to be paid minus 50% of Net NPA as on March 31 of the financial year for which the dividend is to be paid. By linking dividend payouts with asset quality, the framework ensures that banks with higher stressed assets retain a larger portion of earnings rather than distributing them as dividends.

Maximum Permissible Dividend Payable

Under the earlier directions, whether a bank could declarate dividend or not depended, inter-alia, on a matrix combining CRAR and NNPA ratios and the maximum dividend payout ratio was capped at 40% of net profit, depending on capital adequacy and asset quality. 

The Dividend Directions replace the earlier CRAR-NNPA based matrix with a CET1 capital ratio bucket framework. Under the new system, banks fall within the various ranges of CET1 capital buckets (10 in total), each prescribing the maximum percentage of dividend that may be declared out of Adjusted PAT. At the same time, the overall dividend distribution is capped at 75% of PAT.

An illustration of the computation of the maximum permissible dividend payable is shown below:

(₹ in crores)
Total Assets500000
PAT3000
Net NPA (NPA – Prov)500
Adjusted PAT (PAT – 50%* NNPA)2,750
CET 1 Capital (end of PY)12%
Dividend allowed (new directions) [max of (30%*Adj. PAT) or (75% of PAT)]825
Dividend allowed (erstwhile directions) (35%*PAT)1050

Ineligible Profits for the payment of dividends

The Directions identify 4 kinds of profits that cannot be used for payment of dividends or remittance of profits:

  1. Extra-ordinary or exceptional profits: banks cannot distribute one-time or abnormal profits. The definition of exceptional profits has to be taken from the applicable accounting standards. Banks will therefore have to ascertain the items which lead to extraordinary profits and exclude them while declaring dividends. Any profits from activities or transactions that are not in the ordinary course of business will therefore have to be excluded. 
  2. Overstatement of PAT flagged by auditor: If the audit report contains a modified opinion indicating overstatement of PAT, the overstated portion cannot be used for dividend payments.
  3. Unrealised gains on level 3 financial instruments: RBI (Commercial Banks – Classification, Valuation and Operation of Investment Portfolio) Directions, 2025 provides that dividends cannot be paid out of net unrealised gains recognised in the Profit and Loss Account arising on fair valuation of Level 3 investments on its Balance Sheet. The same has now been specified under the Dividend Directions as well. 
  4. Reversal of excess provisions or unrealised gains from transfer of loans/ SRs guaranteed by GoI: In terms of the RBI (Commercial Banks – Transfer and Distribution of Credit Risk) Directions, 2025, the non cash component of the excess provision remaining with the bank at the time of transfer (Excess provision minus cash received as consideration for transfer) cannot be used for the payment of dividend. Further, with respect to the SRs guaranteed by the GOI, it has been provided that any unrealised gain recognised in the Profit and Loss Account on account of fair valuation of such SR investments shall be deducted from CET 1 capital, and no dividends can be paid out of such unrealised gains. 

Changes in Eligibility Criteria

The earlier directions required banks to maintain CRAR of at least 9% for the preceding two financial years and the relevant financial year, along with an NNPA ratio below 7%, and permitted dividends only out of current year profits. 

The revised framework removes the NNPA threshold and historical CRAR requirements and instead adopts a simple prudential condition, ie., Banks must be in compliance with regulatory capital requirements and must continue to remain compliant even after the proposed dividend payment. In addition, the bank must have a positive Adjusted PAT for the relevant financial year in which the dividend has to be paid. 

Other Relevant Changes

Board Oversight

The Dividend Directions require the Board to evaluate certain factors before approving the declaration of dividend. In particular, the Board must consider RBI supervisory findings relating to divergence in asset classification and NPA provisioning, the statutory auditor’s report including any modified opinion or emphasis of matter, the bank’s current and projected capital position vis-à-vis regulatory capital requirements and the bank’s long-term growth plans. 

Definition of Dividend

Dividend has been clarified to mean to include interim dividend as well. Further, it shall consider dividend payable on equity shares and excludes dividend on Perpetual Non-Cumulative Preference Shares (PNCPS). Dividend payable on compulsorily convertible preference shares will, however, be included. 

Reporting Mechanism

A bank paying dividend or remitting profits to the head office will be required to report details as per the format prescribed under Annex II of the Dividend Directions. The report is required to be furnished to the DoS within a fortnight of declaration of dividend / remitting profits to head office. Earlier, such a report was required to be furnished to the DoR. 

Factoring DLG into ECL: Relief, But Not A Free Pass

Vinod Kothari & Chirag Agarwal | finserv@vinodkothari.com

RBI had earlier directed NBFCs to compute expected credit loss (ECL) without considering the impact of any default loss guarantees (DLGs) obtained from its lending service provider (LSP). We had published a short note explaining why this position was debatable (See our article on the topic here) and had also made a formal representation to RBI on the issue. 

Back to the present, RBI has issued an amendment to the IRACP Directions, 2025 (dated February 13, 2026), permitting lenders to factor in DLG while determining provisions under the ECL framework across all stages.

Further, RBI has also specified that upon every event of invocation of DLG, the DLG cover reduces to the extent of invocation. Accordingly, REs shall recompute their ECL provisioning requirements across stages, after duly adjusting for the reduced DLG cover.

With these clarifications now in place, the next question that arises is: How should Regulated Entities (REs) appropriately factor DLG into their ECL computations? The article below discusses the above question at length.

How to factor in DLG in ECL computation?

Let us understand this in simple terms. Suppose a lender estimates that the expected loss on a loan pool is 3.8%. If the lender has received a guarantee of 5%, backed by fixed deposits that are lien-marked in its favour. The  guarantee is sufficient to cover the expected loss. In such a case, effectively, the lender does not expect to bear any loss. On the other hand, if the expected loss is 6.8% and the guarantee covers only 5%, then the lender’s net expected loss would be the balance 1.8%.

However, this adjustment assumes that the guarantee will actually be honoured when required. A guarantee does not, however, eliminate risk completely; it merely shifts the risk of default or loss from the borrower to the guarantor, up to the guaranteed amount.  

DLG & bankruptcy remoteness

The DLG guidelines specify the forms in which a DLG can be obtained. DLG can be accepted in any one of the following forms:

  • Cash deposited with the RE; 
  • Fixed Deposit maintained with a Scheduled Commercial Bank with a lien marked in favour of the RE; 
  • Bank Guarantee in favour of the RE

Accordingly, DLG can only be obtained in fully funded forms, thus eliminating any question of incurring credit loss on such a guarantee. Does that mean that even in case of insolvency of the DLG provider the lender will have the right to invoke the guarantee? The answer to this is negative. Because unlike in the case of bankruptcy-remote SPV, the guarantor is an operating entity, and is prone to the risk of insolvency.

In case of initiation of insolvency proceedings, all the assets of an insolvent entity form part of the insolvency administration/liquidation estate and are beyond the reach of the creditors. The proceeds from the realisation of assets are paid to the creditors in accordance with the waterfall mechanism as specified under section 53 of the IBC, 2016 . 

Accordingly, it becomes important to determine how each permitted form of DLG would be treated in the event of insolvency of the DLG provider.

  • Cash deposited with RE: The cash deposited with the lender is actually a liability held in the books till the same is invoked. As per Section 36 of IBC 2016, assets that may or may not be in possession of the corporate debtor including but not limited to encumbered assets form part of the liquidation estate. Accordingly, cash deposited by the DLG provider with RE would form part of the liquidation estate of the guarantor.
  • Lien marked FD: Similar to cash deposited with RE, the lien marked FD will also form part of the liquidation estate.
  • Bank Guarantee: In the case of a bank guarantee, the credit exposure effectively shifts from the original guarantor to the issuing bank. Given that scheduled commercial banks are subject to stringent regulation and supervision, the risk of insolvency in banks is generally remote. Accordingly, the probability of default in such a structure is unlikely to be impacted.

So, even if the DLG is structured as a funded guarantee, the actual invocation can become complicated if the DLG provider goes into insolvency before such invocation. In such a situation, the lender may not be able to simply invoke the guarantee and take the money. Instead, it may have to submit its claim and wait for distribution under the insolvency process, where payments are made in the statutory priority order. 

Under the waterfall mechanism, secured creditors rank alongside workmen’s dues. Now, in most DLG structures, the guarantor is a fintech entity or a co-lender. These entities typically do not have significant workmen-related liabilities. This may mean that the lender’s priority position is relatively stronger. 

Further, the actual invocation process of the DLG should also be considered. For instance, cash held with the lender can be easily invoked and adjusted as compared to a lien-marked FD or bank guarantee, where there could be procedural delays. 

Illustration: Consider a loan pool of ₹100 crore where the gross ECL rate is estimated at 6.8% (for the static pool covered by the guarantee), resulting in a gross ECL of ₹6.8 crore. The lender has a DLG cover of 5% of the pool (₹5 crore), structured as a lien-marked fixed deposit provided by a fintech sourcing partner. While the DLG is funded, there remains a risk that the guarantor may become insolvent. The first relevant question here is whether we will take a probability of default (PD) as per Stage 1 (12 months PD), or Stage 2/3 (lifelong PD). While the guarantor in question is not in default at all, however, given that the 6.8% ECL is a combination of Stage 1 as well as Stage 2/3 loans, in our view, the PD for the guarantor, to remain conservative, should be the lifelong PD over the tenure of the loans. Let us assume a 20% Probability of Default (PD) for the guarantor. Next question is assessment of Loss Given Default (LGD). As discussed above, the lender has the benefit of full security in form of lien on the fixed deposit, however, there may be depletion of the same on account of first priority in the waterfall, that is, costs of insolvency and bankruptcy process. On a conservative basis, we may, therefore, assume a 10% LGD. Thus, the expected loss on the DLG cover would therefore be 20% × 10% = 2%. 

As a result, the ECL computation may now be:

= 5%*2% + 1.8% = 1.9%

Based on the aforesaid discussion, in our view, while the guarantee is funded the lender may have to adjust the probability of default to factor in the risk of insolvency, particularly where the guarantee is funded in the form of a cash deposit or a lien marked FD. 

Which funded form of DLG is most suited?

As per the analysis, the various options of funded DLG can be ranked basis the maximum consideration allowable for ECL computation:

  1. Bank guarantee:  Being bankruptcy remote and easiest to invoke
  2. Cash deposit: May have to consider the risk of guarantor’s bankruptcy but the invocation would be easier
  3. Lien marked Fixed Deposit: May have to consider the risk of guarantor’s bankruptcy and invocation may involve procedural delays

However, given that there will not be a sizable or material difference in the quantum of counter guarantee risk, the selection of the options for ECL computation may not be significant. 

Can we help this situation?

One of the ways to mitigate the risk of insolvency is by structuring the guarantee in such a way that the guarantee may be invoked upon the occurrence of an adverse material change in the financial condition of the guarantor. In other words, other than the occurrence of losses in the pool, if there are events of default such as adverse material change, insolvency of the guarantor etc., the lender may invoke the guarantee.

Early invocation upon identifiable stress on the part of the guarantor could help the lender realise the guarantee amount before the commencement of insolvency proceedings.

However, such clauses must be appropriately incorporated and drafted in the DLG agreement to ensure the following:

  • A clear definition of “adverse material change”
  • Identifiable trigger events
  • Clarity on invocation mechanism

Impact of DLG invocation on ECL computation 

RBI has also provided a clarification that upon every event of invocation of DLG, the DLG cover reduces to the extent of invocation. Accordingly, REs would be required to recompute their ECL provisioning requirements across stages, after duly adjusting for the reduced DLG cover.

Pool-based guarantees presuppose that the pool is static. This is purely intuitive because if the pool is dynamic, new loans will continue to enter the pool, and therefore, the guarantor’s exposure will keep spreading over a continuing flow of new loans. 

Where the pool is static, the loans gradually get repaid (amortised) over time. As borrowers repay their instalments, the outstanding amount of the loan pool keeps reducing. Since the exposure is shrinking, the ECL on that pool will also typically reduce over time, assuming normal performance. Therefore, whether the utilisation of the DLG on account of pool defaults may cause the ECL computation to increase? This may be so for 2 reasons: one, usual terms of DLG invocation will be the full amount of the defaulted loan will be recovered (due to escalation of the entire principal outstanding). Thus, while the performing loans amortise over time, the non-performing loans are fully recovered once they reach “default”, causing the utilisation of the DLG to run faster than the amortization of the performing loans. Second reason is that once the pool actually starts defaulting, there may be a reason to provide higher estimates of probability of default as well.

Integral part of the contractual terms: Is DLG required to form part of the loan agreement? 

Para 36A of the IRAC Directions read with the principles under Ind AS 109 provides that credit enhancements may be considered while computing ECL only where such enhancements are “integral to the contractual terms.”  The expression “integral to the contractual terms” is taken from the definition of “credit loss” in Ind AS 109. Credit losses are measured after considering the expected cashflows from an asset. Those cashflows will factor in the recovery of any collateral, or credit enhancements, as long as the said credit enhancement is integral to the contractual terms.

What exactly is the meaning of “integral to the contractual terms”? Are we expecting the guarantee (DLG in the present case) to be a part of the terms of the loan contract? That would never be the case, as the so-called guarantee (which may legally be regarded as an indemnity contract) is a bilateral contract between the lender and the DLG provider. Neither is the borrower aware of the guarantee, nor is it desirable to have the borrower know of the guarantee, for obvious reasons. 

IFRS 9 uses the same language. US ASC has more elaborate discussion on this. Para 326-20-30-12 says:

The estimate of expected credit losses shall reflect how credit enhancements (other than those that are freestanding contracts) mitigate expected credit losses on financial assets, including consideration of the financial condition of the guarantor, the willingness of the guarantor to pay, and/or whether any subordinated interests are expected to be capable of absorbing credit losses on any underlying financial assets. However, when estimating expected credit losses, an entity shall not combine a financial asset with a separate freestanding contract that serves to mitigate credit loss. As a result, the estimate of expected credit losses on a financial asset (or group of financial assets) shall not be offset by a freestanding contract (for example, a purchased credit-default swap) that may mitigate expected credit losses on the financial asset (or group of financial assets)

There has been a significant discussion on whether the benefit of a guarantee or credit enhancement which is not a part of the contractual terms of the loan can be factored in ECL computation. From discussions before the IASB, as back as in 2018, two conditions for recognising the benefit of credit enhancements were discussed:

  1. part of the contractual terms; and
  2. not recognised separately by the entity.

The second condition is easy to understand. For example, if the risk of default is hedged by a credit default swap, the value of the same, amounting to a derivative, is separately recognised. Hence, the question of factoring the same while computing ECL does not arise. However, the first condition, relating to contractual terms of the asset, still remains vague.

One may try to get some clues in the US FASB discussions, where para 326-20-30-12 has been interpreted in technical interpretations. In addition, there is a definition of “freestanding contracts” under the Glossary of ASC 326:

A freestanding contract is entered into either:

a. Separate and apart from any of the entity’s other financial instruments or equity transactions

b. In conjunction with some other transaction and is legally detachable and separately exercisable.

The “forming integral part of the contractual terms” does not warrant the principal contract to provide for the guarantee or the credit enhancements. Insisting on the same will be counter-intuitive, except in case of trilateral contracts. However, the conditions indicate that the guarantee or credit enhancement integrates and becomes an inseparable part of the underlying loan or group of loans. For example, if the group of loans was to be transferred, is it such that the benefit of the guarantee may stay iwth the originator and loans may be transferred, or the guarantee travels along with the loans? If the latter is the case, there is no doubt that in reality, the guarantee has become an embedded part of the loan transaction.

Another factor may be the contractual association between the loan cashflows and the payout from the credit enhancements. Some relevant considerations:

  • Is the guarantee specific to the contractual cashflows from the loans?
  • Does the guarantor pay what the original loan asset would have paid, or pays independent of the contractual cashflows?
  • If the lender subsequently recovers the cashflows from the asset, is the payout from the guarantee restored back to the guarantor?

The presence of these factors will suggest the integration or embedding of the guarantee into the contractual cashflows from the loans.

Conclusion

While the recent amendment by the RBI brings welcome clarity by allowing DLG to be factored into ECL computation, lenders must approach this carefully and realistically. A DLG can reduce the expected loss, but it does not make the risk disappear, as the DLG provider itself faces the risk of insolvency. The form of the guarantee, its enforceability, and the possibility of invocation- all of these matter in assessing the true level of protection. REs should not treat DLG as a mechanical deduction from ECL, but as a risk mitigant that requires thoughtful evaluation, continuous monitoring, and recalibration as the pool amortises and the cover reduces.

See our other resources:

  1. Expected credit losses on loans: Guide for NBFCs;
  2. Expected to bleed: ECL framework to cause ₹60,000 Cr. hole to Bank Profits;
  3. Impact of restructuring on ECL computation.

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From Consent to Compensation: RBI’s Draft Directions for REs on Sales Practices


Highlights

  • Mis-selling, among others, will include selling an unsuitable financial product; consequences include compensation                                                                                                                               
  • Prohibition on Compulsory Bundling, eg., sale of insurance policy along with a loan
  • Explicit consent, wherever required, to be based on unambiguous affirmative action
  • Bank to do a due-diligence of a third party financial product that it markets, to avoid reputational risk
  • DSAs and DMAs of banks to come for tighter scrutiny; with undertaking for compliance with bank’s code and disciplinary action upon violation
  • Pricing difference, if any, between directly marketed bank products and indirectly (through agents) to be disclosed
  • Banks to take after-sale feedback from customers, and make necessary amendments in selling practices
  • Dark patterns not be used by regulated entities; periodic audit mandated
  • Controls over incentives favouring mis-selling

Read more

IT Outsourcing Under the RBI’s 2025 Directions: What Has Changed?

By Archisman Bhattacharjee & Avikal Kothari | Finserv@vinodkothari.com  

Introduction

On November 28, 2025, the Reserve Bank of India (“RBI”) issued the Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Managing Risks in Outsourcing) Directions, 2025 (“Outsourcing Directions”), thereby repealing the erstwhile directions governing IT outsourcing and financial services outsourcing. For the purposes of this article, our discussion is confined to Chapter IV of the Outsourcing Directions, which specifically deals with outsourcing of information technology (“IT”) services. While the Outsourcing Directions largely represent a consolidation of the existing regulatory framework as also clarified by the RBI in its Consolidation of Regulations – Withdrawal of Circulars dated November 28, 2025, they also provide enhanced clarity and structure to the regulatory expectations applicable to IT outsourcing arrangements of NBFCs. This article seeks to examine whether, and to what extent, any additional or expanded obligations have been introduced by the RBI under the consolidated framework.

Applicability

Chapter IV of the Outsourcing Directions, dealing with IT services outsourcing is applicable on NBFC-ML and above, which was also the case for the Erstwhile IT Outsourcing Directions

Transitional Timeline for Compliance of Existing IT Outsourcing Arrangements

The erstwhile IT Outsourcing Directions had become applicable with effect from October 1, 2023. Under the Outsourcing Directions, the RBI has now prescribed a specific transition mechanism for existing IT outsourcing arrangements. In this regard, para 2 of the Outsourcing Directions provides that:

“These Directions shall come into force with immediate effect

Provided that for Non-Banking Financial Companies covered under the scope of these Directions, as mentioned in paragraph 3, their existing Information Technology (IT) outsourcing agreements, regardless of whether they are due for renewal on or after the effective date of these Directions, shall comply with the provisions of these Directions either at the time of renewal or by April 10, 2026, whichever is earlier.”

Given that the Outsourcing Directions are primarily in the nature of a consolidation exercise and do not introduce materially new obligations, the timeline up to April 10, 2026 appears to be intended to provide NBFCs with a reasonable window to align their existing IT outsourcing agreements with the consolidated framework. Accordingly, NBFCs should utilise this transition period to review, amend, and, where necessary, renegotiate their existing IT outsourcing contracts to ensure full compliance with the Outsourcing Directions within the prescribed timeline.

Against this backdrop, it becomes important to examine the substantive requirements laid down under Chapter IV of the Outsourcing Directions in relation to outsourcing of IT services to third-party vendors. The following section discusses the key regulatory expectations and compliance obligations applicable to NBFCs when engaging third-party service providers for IT outsourcing.

  1. Expanded scope of Service Provider Definition

The definition of “service provider” as defined under paragraph 58(3) of the Outsourcing Directions is expansive and extends beyond the primary contracting entity to include sub-contractors, third-party vendors, and entities forming part of the service delivery chain. Further the Outsourcing Directions under paragraph 58(4)have also now defined the term “sub-contractor” to mean:

“… those providing material / significant IT services to the service provider and is specific to the material / significant IT services arrangement that the NBFC has entered into with the service provider”

Accordingly, a sub-contractor that provides material or significant IT services to a service provider, where such services are critical to the delivery of the outsourced arrangement to the NBFC, would also fall within the ambit of the Outsourcing Directions. For instance, where an NBFC avails a SaaS solution from a third-party service provider, any entity that supplies core software or technology to such SaaS provider, without which the service cannot be effectively rendered, may be regarded as a material service provider for the purposes of the Outsourcing Directions. 

While the erstwhile IT Outsourcing Directions did prescribe certain obligations in respect of sub-contractors (and the obligations of NBFCs vis-à-vis their primary service providers largely remain unchanged under the Outsourcing Directions), the current framework introduces greater clarity on who qualifies as a “sub-contractor.”

Actionables for NBFCs:
NBFCs should reassess their existing IT outsourcing landscape to identify all arrangements that fall within the expanded scope, including indirect or layered service delivery models. Vendor inventories should be updated to capture not only primary service providers but also material sub-contractors and supply-chain entities involved in the provision of IT services.  Furthermore, NBFCs are advised suitably amend its existing policies to clearly specify the framework and criteria for identification of sub-contractors. This may, inter alia, include requiring service providers to furnish a list of their appointed sub-contractors along with details of the functions performed by each, and undertaking an assessment, in consultation with the relevant service provider, to determine whether such sub-contractors are material or non-material.

  1. Audit and Due Diligence 

The Outsourcing Directions require NBFCs to conduct risk-based due diligence of IT service providers, this includes tracking system performance, uptime, service availability, Service Level Agreement,  compliance and incident response on an ongoing basis. Regular risk-based audits of service providers, including sub-contractors, have been formalised, with an option to rely on pooled audits or recognised third-party certifications, though this does not dilute the NBFC’s responsibility for data security and system availability. NBFCs must also periodically review the financial and operational strength of service providers to identify any deterioration in performance, security or resilience. Access rights have been strengthened, requiring service providers to provide unrestricted access to relevant data and premises for NBFCs, auditors and regulators. 

Actionables for NBFCs:

NBFCs should strengthen vendor due diligence processes and establish mechanisms for periodic review of service providers. Oversight frameworks should extend to subcontractors and material supply-chain entities, with clear accountability resting on the primary service provider. Overall, the changes make due diligence an ongoing obligation rather than a one-time exercise, requiring NBFCs to strengthen internal monitoring structures, audit planning and vendor risk management practices. 

Further, considering that the RBI has mandated compliance of the agreements with the Outsourcing Directions by April 10, 2026, it is advisable for NBFCs to undertake a comprehensive review of the service level agreements and other contractual arrangements executed with all its material IT vendors to ensure alignment with the requirements set out under paragraphs 33, 34, 73 and 74 of the Outsourcing Directions.

Additionally, prior to April 10, 2026, NBFCs are suggested to conduct audits of its material service providers to verify:

  1. compliance with the contractual obligations agreed between the NBFC and the respective vendor; and
  2. adherence by such vendors to the applicable requirements prescribed under the IT outsourcing framework.

Alternatively, the Company may also rely on globally recognised third-party certifications made available by the service provider in lieu of conducting independent audits.

Where, based on such review or audit, the NBFC forms the view that a vendor is not in compliance with the contractual terms or applicable regulatory requirements, the NBFC should require the vendor to implement corrective action within defined timelines and, where necessary, amend or renegotiate the existing agreements to ensure alignment with the Outsourcing Directions. 

Further, the NBFC should appropriately document such reviews, audits, and remediation measures and place the same before the senior management, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 78 of the Outsourcing Directions, and/or before such a committee as may be identified under the NBFC’s IT Outsourcing Policy. Any material or adverse developments should also be escalated to the Board in alignment with the requirements of paragraph 78 of the Outsourcing Directions.

In cases where remediation or contractual modification is not feasible, the Company should maintain an exit plan/exit strategy, including identification of alternate service providers and/or arrangements for bringing the outsourced services in-house, so as to ensure continuity of critical operations and minimal disruption to customers.

Conclusion

The Outsourcing Directions mark a significant step by the RBI towards consolidating and strengthening the regulatory framework governing IT outsourcing by NBFCs. While the underlying obligations remain broadly consistent with the erstwhile regime, the transition period up to April 10, 2026 provides NBFCs with a critical opportunity to holistically reassess their IT outsourcing arrangements, rationalise vendor ecosystems, and embed robust contractual, operational, and governance safeguards. NBFCs that proactively undertake structured reviews, strengthen vendor risk management, and institutionalise ongoing monitoring mechanisms will be better positioned not only to achieve regulatory compliance but also to enhance operational resilience and customer trust.

Ultimately, IT outsourcing under the Outsourcing Directions is no longer a purely contractual or procurement function—it is a core governance and risk management responsibility. Treating it as such will be essential for NBFCs navigating an increasingly digital and interconnected financial services ecosystem.

See our other resources:

  1. RBI regulates outsourcing of IT Services by financial entities
  2. IT Governance: Upgrade needed by April 01, 2024
  3. https://vinodkothari.com/2023/11/it-governance-risk-control-and-assurances-practices-directions-2023/

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