Chapter 5: Comparable Companies Method
/0 Comments/in Valuations /by StaffChapter 4: Discounted Cashflow Method
/0 Comments/in Valuations /by StaffChapter 3: Net Asset Value Method
/0 Comments/in Valuations /by StaffChapter 2: Valuation requirements under Income Tax Act
/0 Comments/in Valuations /by StaffChapter 1: Valuation Fundamentals
/0 Comments/in Valuations /by StaffRoads to Riches: A snapshot of InvITs in India
/0 Comments/in Capital Markets, Corporate Laws, Financial Services, SEBI /by StaffSimrat Singh – corplaw@vinodkothari.com | finserv@vinodkothari.com
Introduction
An Infrastructure Investment Trust (InvIT) is a pooled investment vehicle designed to facilitate collective investment in infrastructure assets. It allows investors to earn returns from assets such as roads, power plants, and telecom towers without direct ownership. Structured as a trust, InvITs generate revenue through various avenues such as toll collections, power tariffs and lease payments etc depending upon the underlying asset class. This mode of investment provides investors with a stable income stream through regular dividends while offering potential capital appreciation.
InvITs attract both institutional and retail investors seeking long-term, predictable returns, making them a crucial instrument in bridging the funding gap for infrastructure development. By serving as an efficient alternative to traditional financing methods, they contribute significantly to the sector’s growth and sustainability.
This article explores the progress of InvITs in India, examining the key asset classes they encompass, emerging asset categories, and a brief overview of the regulatory framework governing their operations.
InvITs: Journey so far
Since the launch of India’s first InvIT, the IRB InvIT Fund, in March 2016, InvITs have evolved significantly. Since FY 2020, InvITs have mobilized a remarkable ₹129,267 crore, helping bridge a portion of the USD 1.4 trillion investment required in infrastructure to achieve India’s goal of a $5 trillion economy by 2030.
Source: SEBI’s statistics on Fund raising by REITs and InvITs
InvITs have emerged as a viable investment avenue for those seeking long-term, stable returns. Foreign investors hold a substantial share of equity in InvITs, reflecting the strong global interest in India’s infrastructure sector. However, retail participation remains limited due to a lack of awareness and high ticket size. As of September 30, 2024, the total AUM of InvITs stood at ₹5.87 lakh crore. Calculating returns on InvITs can be challenging, especially for privately placed InvITs, due to the lack of readily available data. However, when it comes to capital appreciation in publicly listed InvITs, returns have generally been unimpressive (a glimpse of this is shown in the chart below which has been prepared after analysing the listing price and the price as on 1.04.2024 of units of Public InvITs). This is primarily because investors in these units prioritize steady income through interest and dividend payments over capital gains. At this juncture, it will be interesting to note that out of the 25 registered InvITs in India, only 5 have had public issues.
Overview of asset classes under InvITs
Legally, any asset listed under the Ministry of Finance notification dated October 7, 2013, can be included in an InvIT. However, in practice, as of March 31, 2024, InvITs primarily manage assets worth ₹5.87 lakh crore in the following categories and in the following proportions:
Source: CareEdge Ratings
After reviewing the websites and placement memorandums of all the InvITs registered in India, we can categorize them based on the following asset classes in which they operate:
| Sr. No. | Name of InvIT | Underlying asset class |
| 1 | Digital Fibre Infrastructure Trust | Telecom & data transmission |
| 2 | Altius Infra Trust | |
| 3 | Capital Infra Trust | Roads |
| 4 | Highways Infra trust | |
| 5 | IRB InvIT Fund | |
| 6 | Shrem Invit | |
| 7 | Roadstar Infra Investment Trust | |
| 8 | Interise Trust | |
| 9 | Oriental InfraTrust | |
| 10 | Nxt-Infra Trust | |
| 11 | Maple Infrastructure Trust | |
| 12 | IRB Infrastructure Trust | |
| 13 | Indus Infra Trust | |
| 14 | Cube Highways Trust | |
| 15 | Athaang Infrastructure Trust | |
| 16 | Anantham Highways Trust | |
| 17 | Powergrid Infrastructure Investment Trust | Power transmission |
| 18 | IndiGrid Infrastructure Trust | |
| 19 | Energy Infrastructure Trust | Pipeline infrastructure |
| 20 | TVS Infrastructure Trust | Warehousing |
| 21 | NDR InvIT Trust | |
| 22 | Intelligent Supply Chain Infrastructure Trust | |
| 23 | Sustainable Energy Infra Trust | Renewable energy |
| 24 | Anzen India Energy Yield Plus Trust | |
| 25 | SchoolHouse InvIT | Educational infrastructure |
Revenue generation mechanisms by asset class
Telecom
Telecom InvITs, such as Digital Fibre Infrastructure Trust (DFIT) and Altius Infra Trust, generate revenue by leasing telecom infrastructure to operators. DFIT, for instance, owns and operates fiber optic networks leased to large companies like Reliance Jio. It also earns interest income from its 51% stake in Jio Digital Fibre Private Limited (JDFPL). Altius generates revenue through long-term Master Service Agreements (MSAs), including rental charges, location premiums and infrastructure expansion fees. These structured agreements ensure predictable cash flows, enhancing the financial resilience of telecom InvITs.
Power Transmission
One of the major players in this sector, Powergrid Infrastructure Investment Trust (PGInvIT) generates revenue through long-term Transmission Service Agreements (TSAs), typically spanning over 35 years. These agreements ensure stable income by collecting transmission charges from power distribution companies (DISCOMs) and state electricity boards. Revenue is pooled and managed by the Central Transmission Utility of India Limited, reducing counterparty credit risks and ensuring timely payments.
Road Infrastructure
One of the most popular and growing asset class, road InvITs generate income through:
- Toll Collections: Vehicles pay toll charges for road usage.
- Annuity payments: The government or contracting authority makes periodic payments for a specified period to ensure steady cash flows.
- Hybrid models: A combination of toll income and government annuities under the Hybrid Annuity Model.
For example, National Highways Infra Trust (NHIT), backed by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), monetizes highway assets under the Built-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model. NHIT raised ₹46,000 crore through InvIT issuances, providing investors with steady income while enabling NHAI to reinvest in new projects.
Warehousing
Warehousing InvITs in India generate revenue primarily through long-term lease agreements with logistics companies, e-commerce firms, and manufacturers. These leases often follow a triple net lease, ensuring stable cash flows.
- TVS Infrastructure Trust manages 10.6 million square feet of Grade A warehousing and leases these assets to major corporations such as Amazon and Nestlé.
- NDR InvIT Trust reported a 5.65% revenue growth in Q3 FY 2025, with a 98% occupancy rate.
- Intelligent Supply Chain Infrastructure Trust, sponsored by Reliance Retail, follows a similar leasing model.
Pipeline Infrastructure
As on date there is only one InvIT which operates pipeline assets and it generates revenue through tariff-based gas transportation fees, regulated by the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board. This InvIT secures long-term contracts and capacity reservation fees, ensuring stable revenue. They also benefit from interconnection fees with third-party pipelines, expanding income streams.
Educational Infrastructure
SchoolHouse InvIT, India’s first educational asset focused InvIT, earns revenue by leasing school and student housing properties to educational institutions under long-term agreements (15-30 years). The triple net-lease model, where tenants cover maintenance, property tax, and insurance, ensures minimal revenue leakage.
Overview of regulatory landscape for InvITs
The SEBI (Infrastructure Investment Trusts) Regulations, 2014 (‘InvIT Regulations’) categorize InvITs into three types. The key conditions related to their issuance, distribution, and borrowings are summarized in the table below:
| Feature | Public | Private Listed | Private Unlisted |
| Mode of initial offer | Public issue | Private placement | Private placement |
| Minimum asset value | Rs. 500 Cr. | Rs. 500 Cr. | Rs. 500 Cr. |
| Minimum initial offer size | Rs. 250 Cr. | Rs. 250 Cr. | Rs. 250 Cr. |
| Listing requirement | Mandatory | Mandatory | Not permitted |
| Minimum subscription in initial offer from any investor | INR 10,000 – INR 15,000 | INR 1 Crore / 25 Crore | INR 1 Crore / 25 Crore |
| Distribution requirement | At least 90% of NDCF ; at least once every six months | At least 90% of NDCF; at least once every year | At least 90% of NDCF; at least once every year |
| Permitted investors | Can invite funds from public as well (subject to minimum public float as per Reg 14(1A) | Institutional investors and body corporates, whether Indian or foreign | Institutional investors and body corporates, whether Indian or foreign |
| Borrowing limit | Up to 25% of asset value – no approval required More than 25% but up to 49% of asset value:Obtain credit ratingApproval of unit holders More than 49% but up to 70% of asset value:AAA ratingRecord of at least 6 distributions.Approval of unit holders. (75%) | As per trust deed | |
| Number of investors | Minimum 20 | Minimum 5 and maximum 1,000 | Minimum 5 and maximum 1,000 |
Lock-in requirements for sponsors.
To ensure that sponsors maintain a minimum stake in the investment, Regulation 12 of the InvIT Regulations outlines the following lock-in requirements based on a gliding platform approach.
| Minimum holding period | Lock-in requirement |
| For a period of 3 years from listing. (Units in excess of 15% to be locked in for a period of 1 year from listing) | 15% of total Units |
| From the beginning of 4th year and till the end of 5th year from the date of listing | 5% of total Units or Rs. 500 crores, whichever is lower |
| From the beginning of 6th year and till the end of 10th year from the date of listing | 3% of total Units of the InvIT or Rs. 500 crores, whichever is lower |
| From the beginning of 11th year and till the end of 20th year from the date of listing | 2% of total Units of the InvIT or Rs. 500 crores, whichever is lower |
| after completion of the 20th year from the date of listing | 1% of total Units of the InvIT or Rs. 500 crores, whichever is lower |
Applicability of the Listing Regulations, 2015
Regulation 26G of the InvIT Regulations specifies the applicability of certain provisions of the Listing Regulations to InvITs, with necessary modifications. These provisions includes:
- Constitution of the following:
- Audit Committee
- Nomination and Remuneration Committee
- Stakeholder Relationship Committee
- Risk Management Committee
- Limits on maximum number of Directorships
- Appointment and qualification of Independent Directors
Conclusion
InvITs have significantly transformed India’s infrastructure investment landscape, providing an alternative financing mechanism that bridges the funding gap while offering investors stable returns. Their evolution from road and power transmission assets to emerging categories like warehousing, pipeline infrastructure, and educational institutions highlights their growing versatility. Despite challenges such as limited retail participation and moderate capital appreciation in public InvITs, the segment continues to attract institutional investors, particularly foreign investors, signaling strong confidence in India’s infrastructure sector.
As the regulatory framework evolves to enhance transparency, governance, and investor confidence, InvITs are poised to play an even greater role in India’s economic growth. By enabling long-term capital infusion into essential infrastructure projects, they not only support the nation’s $5 trillion economy vision but also ensure sustainable development across key sectors. Looking ahead, increased awareness, improved accessibility, and regulatory refinements could unlock further potential for InvITs, making them a more attractive and robust investment avenue in the years to come.
Gains on sale of Zombie loans: RBI’s year-end bonus to banks
/0 Comments/in Banks, Capital Markets, Financial Services, NBFCs /by Staff– Vinod Kothari & Dayita Kanodia (finserv@vinodkothari.com)
“There is no such thing as government money – only taxpayer money.”
— Margaret Thatcher

RBI has introduced a significant amendment to the prudential treatment of Security Receipts (SRs) guaranteed by the Government of India through its latest circular dated March 29, 2025. What this amendment briefly means is, that for sale of bad loans to NARCL, funded by issue of sovereign-backed SRs, the banks may book a gain equal to the sale consideration minus the provisioned value of the bad loans. Interestingly, this treatment will be applied not only to transactions done after the amendment, but to existing SRs held by banks too.
By way of a background, National Asset Reconstruction Company Limited (NARCL), along with its sister body India Debt Resolution Company Ltd. (IDRCL), was created to clean up the legacy stressed assets with an exposure of Rs 500 crore and above in the Indian Banking system. A 2021 cabinet note approved the grant of GOI guarantee for the SRs issued by NARCL for the bad loans it will buy from banks. When banks sell bad loans to NARCL (or, for that matter, to any other ARCs), they put in 15% of their own funds, and for the balance, they issue a paper called SRs. While presumably the bad loans are to be bought at their fair value, given that the chunk of the value is funded by the issue of this paper, one may understand that the fair valuation is quite often an abstraction.
As per para 77 of the TLE Directions, in respect of the stressed loans transferred to the ARC, the transferors are required to carry the investment in their books on an ongoing basis, until its transfer or realization, at lower of the redemption value of SRs arrived based on the NAV as above, and the NBV of the transferred stressed loan at the time of transfer. Hence, there is no gain on sale booked at the time of the sale, even if the sale is at higher than the net book value.
However, the RBI made a specific amendment, targeted at NARCL SRs (as those are the only ones guaranteed by GOI), having the effect of saying that, in view of the GOI guarantee, banks holding the SRs may value them at their face value. As a result, banks may book the entire difference between the sale consideration of the bad loans, and the net-of-provisions value of the loans, as a gain on sale or reversal of the provision. Either way, the credit goes to P&L account.
Key Highlights of the Circular
There are, of course, several caveats to booking this gain on sale. First of all, let everyone understand that the loans have been languising in the books of the banks for several years, and therefore, they would have mostly slipped in the category of “doubtful assets”, requiring steep and progressively scaling-up provisions. Therefore, it is quite likely that the fair value, which may, in turn, be influenced by the likely value in case of a resolution plan or liquidation, or the value of the underlying secured assets, may be substantially higher than the provisioned value.
The circular makes the following crucial changes to the treatment of SRs guaranteed by the sovereign:
- Reversal of Excess Provision: When a loan is transferred to an ARC for a value higher than its Net Book Value (NBV), the excess provision can be reversed to the P&L account. However, this is permitted only if the sale consideration consists solely of (i) cash and (ii) SRs guaranteed by the Government of India.
- Deduction from regulatory capital: Despite allowing provision reversals or gain on sale, the RBI mandates that the non-cash component (SRs) must be deducted from Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 1) capital/Tier 1 Capital. Additionally, no dividends can be paid out of the SRs component, ensuring that banks do not distribute unrealized profits to shareholders. This means that the provision reversal or gain on sale will stay in the bank’s balance sheet as a non-distributable surplus. How long will this credit remain non-distributable? Since the government guarantee is valid only for 5 years, it is incumbent that NARCL will do either a resolution or liquidation of the borrower sooner than this period. Eventually, the SRs may receive cash distribution, either by way of realisation from the bad loans, or by way of the devolvement of the GOI guarantee, or both. Will the non-distributable credit become part of usual distributable profits when the value of the SRs is realised? While the circular does not give clarity on the subsequent treatment of the credit, our understanding says, yes.
- Periodic Valuation Based on NAV: The SRs will be periodically valued based on the Net Asset Value (NAV) declared by the ARC, derived from the recovery ratings of such instruments. Here once again, it is not clear whether the recovery ratings will be disregarding the underlying GOI guarantee. Logically, since the SRs are fully guaranteed, there is no reason for the rating to drop. But if the recovery ratings are done disregarding the guarantee, then the valuation of the SRs is bound to drop in the near future, making the FY 24-25 profit short-lived.
- Final Valuation of SRs: If SRs remain outstanding after the final settlement of the government guarantee or upon the expiry of the guarantee period, they will be valued at a nominal price of ₹1.
- Conversion of SRs: If the SRs are converted into another form of instrument as part of the resolution process, their valuation and provisioning will follow the provisions outlined under the Prudential Framework for Resolution of Stressed Assets dated June 7, 2019.
The Implications of RBI’s Move
The amendment, issued just 2 days to the end of the fiscal year, means a lot to the profit and loss accounts of the banks holding the SRs.
However, on a policy front, it leaves several questions to be answered. The loans were evidently bad to their core. If the loans had any value in the hands of the banks, the banks would have used the several tools in their arsenal to recover them. Not that ARCs were unknown to the banks, or that IBC was far away from them. Therefore, if the banks were tempted to sell them to NARCL, the only reason would have been that the sale consideration, to the extent of 85% in form of paper-against-paper, was attractive. This paper, in the form of the SRs, suddenly means a lot of value in what was all this while not turning into value at all.
Central Government guarantee of Rs.30,600 crore to back Security Receipts issued by NARCL for acquiring stressed loan assets has been approved by the Union Cabinet. NARCL proposes to acquire stressed assets of about Rs. 2 Lakh crore in phases through 15% Cash and 85% in SRs. IDRCL will be engaged for management and value addition once NARCL acquires the assets.
It may be noted that according to the FAQs released by the Ministry of Finance on the subject, such sovereign guarantee will incentivize quicker action on resolving stressed assets thereby helping in better value realization. The FAQs state that this approach will also permit freeing up of personnel in banks to focus on increasing business and credit growth. Further, it will bring about improvement in the bank’s valuation and enhance their ability to raise market capital.
GOI guarantee is essentially tax payer’s money, eventually to fill the gap left in recovering a bad loan. Of course the bad loan is money lent by a bank to a bad borrower. Therefore, indirectly, the cost of this bad lending is transferred to the taxpayers.
It is quite okay for the GOI to recapitalise banks, but is it okay for the RBI or GOI to insert an item on the P/L accounts of banks by converting an imaginary profit into value?
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De-jargonizer: Understanding key terms in Securitisation structures
/0 Comments/in Financial Services, Securitisation /by Staff– Financial Services Division (finserv@vinodkothari.com)
Introduction
The RBI’s regulatory framework for securitisation, the SSA Directions use several terms used in securitisation structures, some of which are aligned with global practices, while some not. In addition, the marketplace uses some so-very-Desi expressions. As transactions have started coming off the mould, it is important to understand some of the key terms and structural considerations, to help bring more innovation and evolution in the structures.
While we have in the past developed a general securitisation glossary for our readers, the said resource pertains to terms as they are used globally. However, this article aims to demystify key-securitisation related terminologies, specific to the Indian SSA Directions, shedding light on their relevance and practical applications. This pertains to concepts such as securitisation notes (PTCs), credit enhancement (CE), liquidity support, first loss facilities, subordinated tranches, and over-collateralisation are critical in structuring securitisation deals, determining the level of risk borne by different participants, and ensuring compliance with regulatory frameworks like those set forth by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and Basel III norms.
Key Components of Securitisation Exposure
- Securitisation Notes (PTCs)
These are the securities issued in a securitisation transaction, representing an interest in the underlying asset pool. They are structured into different tranches based on risk and return characteristics.
- Credit Enhancement (CE)
Credit enhancement is a mechanism designed to improve the credit profile of securitisation notes. CE can be achieved through various means, including:
- Cash collateral
- Subordination
- Excess spread
- Other forms of financial support like guarantees, overcollateralisation, etc.
- Tranches in Securitisation (Tranched Cover)
- Senior Tranche: The highest-rated tranche with the lowest risk exposure.
- Mezzanine Tranche: An intermediate tranche, often referred to in market parlance when there are three tranches. To learn more about Mezzanine tranches, see our explainer, here.
- Junior Tranche: The lowest-rated tranche that absorbs losses first.
Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D etc. : Used when there are more than three tranches.
In respect of computation of risk weights (the table of risk weights as provided under SSA Master Directions) senior tranche actually means the senior most, and the rest of all tranches are said to be junior tranches.
- First Loss Facility
The first loss facility is the first layer of protection against losses in a securitisation transaction. It absorbs losses before any other tranche. However, seemingly it does not include excess spread, as excess spread is not provided by the originator or a third party [Reference drawn to para 5(h) of SSA Master Directions]
- Equity Tranche
Though not explicitly defined, the Basel III Framework [para 712(ii)] describes the equity tranche as the one that absorbs first losses. However, RBI Regulations distinguish between equity tranche and first loss facility. Based on corporate finance principles, the equity tranche is the most junior tranche, with the right to sweep residual returns. As per regulatory provisions, the equity tranche appears to be one level above the first loss facility if such differentiation exists within a structure.
- Over-Collateralisation
Over-collateralisation refers to the excess value of assets transferred over the funding raised by the originator. It can serve as credit enhancement if subordinated but is not counted as part of the first loss facility.
- Underwriting Facility
The underwriting referred to in para 56 of the SSA Master Directions is the same as securities underwriting. In a securities underwriting arrangement, the underwriter is expected to acquire the securities and sell them in the market. The underwriter usually guarantees a certain extent of subscription, in case there is any shortfall, the underwriter takes up the shortfall itself.
Third party or the originator may act as underwriters to the issue of securitisation notes upon coming with specified conditions of this clause in addition to general conditions of clause 45. In case the conditions are not fulfilled, the underwriting facility shall be considered as credit enhancement,
- Liquidity Facility
A liquidity facility is provided with the intention to smoothen the timing difference between the receipt of cash flows from the underlying assets and the payments to be made to the investors. Thus, the same is to support temporary liquidity mismatches/gaps.
Liquidity facility is not credit enhancement. Some notable features are:
- The facility is to meet the temporary cash flow mismatches and not meeting the expenses of the securitisation or losses;
- Funding is to be made available to the SPV and not to the investors;
- Once the liquidity facility is drawn-down, the liquidity facility provider shall have priority of claims over future cash flows and shall be super senior to the claims of the senior investors.
Typically, liquidity facility takes the form of the following:
- Servicer advance: Here the servicer itself extends out of its own pocket to make payments as per the structure and subsequently the same is reimbursed from the collections made from the portfolio. The reimbursement to the servicer in this case becomes the priority as soon as the collections are made;
- Bank facilities: Here a revolving facility is opened with a bank. Drawdowns are made as and when need arises. This is common in case of pay-through structures.
- Cash collateral: This is the most common form of liquidity enhancement, though, India, cash collateral is used as a credit enhancement. Cash collateral is hard collateral to meet periodic delinquencies. Even though having cash collateral is the ideal situation for the investors, however, for the originator cash collateral leads to a negative carry.
9. Interest rate swaps/Currency swaps
In securitization, interest rate swaps (IRS) and currency swaps (CS) play a crucial role in managing interest rate and currency risks, respectively. These financial instruments help align the cash flows of the underlying assets with investor preferences or hedge against market fluctuations.
For instance, in a securitization structure where the underlying pool of loans carries a floating interest rate, but investors prefer fixed-rate returns, an interest rate swap can be employed to convert the floating-rate payments into fixed-rate payments, ensuring alignment with investor expectations. However, it is important to note that interest rate swaps do not serve as credit enhancements, as their purpose is not to cover shortfalls in investor payments but rather to mitigate interest rate risk.
Additionally, since the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) legally owns the underlying loan pool, any interest rate swap arrangements must be executed by the SPV to effectively manage interest rate exposure within the securitization structure.
In respect of currency swaps these are particularly useful in cross-border securitization when the underlying asset pool is denominated in one currency, but investors require payments in another. For example: Suppose a SPV securitizes a pool of auto loans in India denominated in Indian Rupees (INR) but attracts global investors who prefer to receive payments in U.S. Dollars (USD). Since the cash inflows are in INR but the SPV needs to make payments to investors in USD, it is exposed to foreign exchange risk. To mitigate this, the SPV enters a currency swap agreement with a bank or financial institution. Under this agreement, the SPV exchanges INR denominated cash flows for USD at a predetermined exchange rate.
- Tranched cover
For definition of tranched cover reference may be drawn to Basel: CRE 22, which defines “tranched cover” under para CRE 22.93 as: tranched cover is a mechanism of transfer of an exposure in one or more tranches to a protection seller or sellers. Further as per the definition of “tranched cover”some level of risk of the loan pool is required to be retained by the originator; and the risk transferred and the risk retained are of different seniority. Further as per the definition, tranched cover can only be provided for the senior tranches (eg second loss portion) or the junior tranche (eg first loss portion). Usually tranched covers are provided in the form of a guarantee issued by the protection seller or providing cash collateral by such a seller.
The graphic below shows the overall universe of securitisation exposure.
Figure: Summarizing the meaning of securitisation exposures
Other Resources
We have over the years developed several other resources on securitisation. Should the reader wish to understand this area better, reference may be had to below comprehensive resources
- Write-Ups and Reports
- Securitisation Primer (For a primer on the basic principles underlying securitisation.)
- Indian Securitisation Report, 2019 (For a holistic introduction to securitisation in India, the motivation for parties in a securitisation transaction, and regulatory framework for securitisation in India)
- Vikas Path: The securitised path to Financial Inclusion (2024) (For curated resources on securitisation and co-lending, including: securitisation mechanics, accounting, tax aspects, compliance, etc.)
- Taxation in Securitisation: A judicial overview
- Securitisation of MSME receivables in India
- Our securitisation resource centre: For other write-ups and material in this space
- Youtube Videos
- Regulatory representations and Advocacy
SEBI strictens RPT approval regime, ease certain CG norms for HVDLEs
/0 Comments/in Companies Act 2013, corporate governance, Corporate Laws /by StaffNotifies amendment as COREX timeline set to expire
– Team Corplaw | corplaw@vinodkothari.com
March 28, 2025 | Team Vinod Kothari & Company
Just before the expiry of the ‘Comply or Explain’ timeline of March 31, 2025 for HVDLEs, SEBI notified SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) (Amendment) Regulations, 2025 inserting a separate chapter viz. Chapter VA: Corporate Governance Norms for a Listed Entity which has listed its Non-Convertible Debt Securities effective from March 27, 2025. The proposal for amendments were made in the Consultation Papers of October 31, 2024 and February 8, 2023, and was approved by SEBI in the board meeting held on December 18, 2024. A summary of the changes notified, comparison of the new compliance requirements vis-à-vis the earlier norms have been captured in this write-up.
HVDLEs: Meaning, Applicability, Sunset Clause
The only criteria for being categorized as an HVDLE is the amount of outstanding value of listed non-convertible debt securities, which has now been revised from Rs. 500 crores or more to Rs. 1,000 crores or more. This upward revision is aligned with the criteria for being identified as a Large Corporate, i.e. outstanding long-term borrowing amounting to Rs. 1,000 crores or more, and has been introduced with the dual objective of tightening the regulatory regimes for debt listed entities while simultaneously promoting ease of doing business in the corporate bond market.
The provisions of the Chapter VA, a chapter exclusive to entities having listed only their non-convertible debt securities, the outstanding value of which is exceeding Rs. 1,000 crores, and not specified securities, shall apply with effect from April 1, 2025. Explanation(1) appended to Regulation 62C clarifies that HVDLEs shall be determined on basis of value of principal outstanding of listed debt securities as on March 31, 2025, irrespective of the date of notification of this amendment.
A doubt may arise arise with regards the applicability of this chapter to an entity whose outstanding value of NCDs exceeds the threshold during the year, i.e. after March 31, 2025 – the Explanation(2) to the same regulation makes it clear that such entity shall ensure compliance with the provisions of Chapter VA within six months from the date of such trigger and the disclosures of such compliance may be made in corporate governance compliance report on and from third quarter, following the date of the trigger.
However, the earlier conception of “Once an HVDLE, always an HVDLE” has now been removed with the introduction of a sunset clause, in Regulation 62C(2), which specifies that the provisions of this chapter shall cease to be applicable, after three consecutive years of the value of outstanding NCDs being below the Rs. 1,000 crores threshold, as determined on March 31 of any given year.
Related Party Transactions by HVDLEs
While the scope of RP and RPTs continue to be the same as defined in regulation 2(1) (zb) and (zc) respectively, the present amendment introduces a revised RPT approval regime for HVDLEs particularly for Material RPTs. The restriction for related parties to not vote to approve the material RPT, provided under regulation 23, resulted in impossibility of compliance for HVDLEs as most HVDLEs were closely held companies. Accordingly, SEBI introduced a two step approval process for material RPTs with first obtaining NOC from the debenture holders (of listed debt securities issued on or after April 01, 2025) not related to the issuer and holding at least more than 50% of the debentures in value, on the basis of voting including e-voting, followed with approval of shareholders through ordinary resolution. The provisions of Reg. 62K is applicable to RPTs entered into on or after April 1, 2025. Refer to our FAQs to understand the implications and manner of seeking approval.
While the other requirements are similar to corresponding requirements under regulation 23 for equity listed entities (for e.g., framing of policy, prior approval of audit committee, half yearly disclosures etc.), recent amendments made in December, 2024 in relation to ratification of RPTs and exemption from approval requirements of audit committee and shareholders have not been inserted in reg. 62K.
Prior to this amendment, so long the debt was continued to be serviced and the terms and conditions of borrowing was met, the debenture holders were not required to intervene in the regular operations of the company. If there was a covenant to that effect in the debenture subscription agreement or Debenture Trust Deed or terms of issue, in that case, irrespective of whether the RPT is material or immaterial, the borrowing entity was required to comply. With this amendment, the debenture holders will also have a say in corporate governance, especially in case of material RPTs pursuant to a provision of law. Other lenders extending term loan and other facilities, and who have a larger exposure on such companies, will not have this opportunity.
Differing requirements under CG norms for an HVDLE vis-a-vis an equity listed entity
The provisions of Reg. 16 to 27 of Chapter IV have been suitably modified and inserted in the context of HVDLEs in Chapter VA. While largely the flow of the provisions and requirements are aligned, there exists certain gaps in certain provisions. The tabular comparison below highlights the same (excluding those differences that are linked with market capitalization related requirements/ outstanding SR equity shares related requirements that only apply to equity listed entities):
| Particulars | Reqt. under Chapter IV for equity listed entities | Reqt. under Chapter VA for HVDLEs | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of IDs | Defined under Reg. 16(1)(b) | Reg. 62B (1) (b) refers to definition in Chapter IV and additionally provides for considering the NEDs other than nominee directors, in following listed entities: A body corporate mandated to constitute its board as per the law under which it is constituted; or Set up under public private partnership [PPP] model | In the case of the PPP model, the composition of the board is pre-decided or mutually decided between the public authority and private entity, hence the exemption. Further, for HVDLEs that are private limited companies, having IDs as per the criteria given under Chapter IV, becomes explicit. |
| Timeline for obtaining shareholders’ approval for board appointments | Reg. 17 (1C) To be obtained within 3 months from appointment or ensuing general meeting, whichever is earlier. Carve outs: Time taken for obtaining approval of regulatory, government or statutory authorities, shall be excluded.Provisions not applicable to appointment or re-appointment of a person nominated by a financial sector regulator, Court or Tribunal to the board of the listed entity | Reg. 62D To be obtained within 3 months from appointment or ensuing general meeting, whichever is earlier. Both the carve outs are not available for HVDLE. | The corrections made to corresponding provision in Reg. 17 (1D) vide LODR Third Amendment Regulations, 2024 have not been made in Chapter VA. The carve out under Reg. 62D (4) pertains to that sub-regulation and not the entire Reg. 62D. |
| Continuation of director on the board subject to shareholders’ approval once in every five years | Carve outs provided in provisos to Reg. 17 (1D): To the director appointed pursuant to the order of a Court or a Tribunal or to a nominee director of the Government on the board of a listed entity, other than a public sector company, or to a nominee director of a financial sector regulator on the board of a listed entity.To a director nominated by a financial institution registered with or regulated by RBI under a lending arrangement in its normal course of business or nominated by a SEBI registered DT under a subscription agreement for the debentures issued by the listed entity. | Carve outs in Reg. 62D (4) are broadly similar. Reg. 62D (4) additionally exempts director appointed under the public private partnership model/structure. | As composition is pre-decided or is as per mutual terms between the public authority and private entity. |
| Nature of listed entities considered and limits for maximum no. of directorships | Reg. 17A- LEs shall be cumulative of those whose equity shares are listed on a stock exchange and HVDLEs. Director in not more than 7 LEsID in not more than 7 LEsIf WTD/ MD in any LE, ID in not more than 3 LEs Further, to give sufficient time to all the listed entities to ensure compliance with the provision, a period of 6 months or till the time AGM is held from the date of applicability of the provision to the entity, whichever is later, has been provided. | Reg 62E provides the same limits. LEs shall be cumulative of those whose equity shares are listed on a stock exchange and HVDLEs. Carve out for directorships in PSUs and entities set up in PPP arrangements are not to be included. | In order to ensure that directors devote adequate time to listed entities including HVDLEs and in the interest of investor protection. |
| Composition of NRC, SRC and RMC | Reg. 19, 20 & 21:Each of the committees viz. Nomination and Remuneration Committee, Stakeholders Relationship Committee and Risk Management Committee (top 1000 based on market cap) are required to be constituted. | Reg. 62G – The functions of NRC may either be discharged by the board or by NRC.Reg. 62H – The functions of SRC may either be discharged by the board or by SRC.Reg. 62I – The functions of RMC may either be discharged by the board or by audit committee or by RMC. | In order to avoid the constitution of multiple committees by HVDLEs. |
| Exemption from prior approval of AC of the holding LE, in case, provisions of Reg 23 is applicable to the subsidiary | Reg 23(2)(d): Prior approval of the audit committee of the listed entity shall not be required for a related party transaction to which the listed subsidiary is a party but the listed entity is not a party, if regulation 23 and sub-regulation (2) of regulation 15 of these regulations are applicable to such listed subsidiary. | Reg 62K: Identical provisions, however, position is not clear where the subsidiary is also an HVDLE. | The exemption should be available even in case of an HVDLE subsidiary, as such a subsidiary will be required to independently comply with Regulation 62K, similar to that provided in Reg. 62K(6). |
| Exemption from approval of AC w.r.t. remuneration and sitting fees paid to Director, KMP and SMP (non-promoter) | Reg 23(2)(e): remuneration and sitting fees paid by the listed entity or its subsidiary to its Director, KMP and SMP (non-promote, shall not require approval of the audit committee provided that the same is not material. | No such carve out in Reg. 62K (3) | The amendments made in Reg. 23 vide LODR Third Amendment Regulations, 2024 have not been made in Reg. 62K. |
| Ratification of RPT | Reg 23(2)(f): The members of the audit committee, who are independent directors, may ratify related party transactions subject to the certain conditions and timelines | No such provisions are included in Reg. 62K (3) | The amendments made in Reg. 23 vide LODR Third Amendment Regulations, 2024 have not been made in Reg. 62K. |
| Omnibus approval proposed to be undertaken by subsidiary companies | Reg 23(3): Audit committee may grant omnibus approval for related party transactions proposed to be entered into by the listed entity or its subsidiary subject to the certain conditions | Reg 62K: Identical provisions, However, subsidiary companies of HVDLE are not included in the ambit of omnibus approval provisions for HVDLE | The amendments made in Reg. 23 vide LODR Third Amendment Regulations, 2024 have not been made in Reg. 62K. |
| Approval regime for material related party transactions | Reg 23(4): All material related party transactions and subsequent material modifications shall require prior approval of unrelated members. | Reg 62K(5): All material related party transactions and subsequent material modifications shall require prior NOC from the DT and the DT shall in turn obtain No-Objection/approval from the unrelated DH who hold atleast > 50% of the debentures in value, on the basis of present and voting including e-voting. 62K(6): approval of shareholders shall be required after obtaining NOC from DT, however, no restriction has been placed on shareholders that are RPs from voting to approve the resolution. | Several HVDLEs are closely held companies, holding a negligible portion of the equity or none at all, in which case the entity was not able to transact such RPTs because of ‘impossibility of compliance’ with the provisions of LODR Regulations. Therefore, taking cue from Sec. 186 (5), SEBI tried to address this issue by mandating NOC from debenture holders. |
| Exemption from Material RPT approval in case of listed subsidiaries | Reg 23(4): Available if regulations 23 and 15 (2) are applicable to such listed subsidiaries. | Reg 62K(6): Prior approval of the shareholders and NOC by DT of a HVDLE, shall not be required for a RPT to which the listed subsidiary is a party but the listed entity is not a party, if regulation 62K of these regulations is applicable to such listed subsidiary, however, position is not clear i.r.t. Listed subsidiary, if reg 23 is applicable to such subsidiary. | This situation is inverse for obtaining audit committee approval in case of HVDLE. In the context of equity listed entities, the exemption is not available in case of Material RPTs undertaken by an HVDLE subsidiary. |
| Exemption from AC & S/h approval requirements for certain RPTs | Reg 23(5): Following transactions are exempt from the applicability of approval provisions: (a) transactions entered into between two public sector companies;(b) transactions entered into between a holding company and its WOS (c) transactions entered into between two WOS of the LE(d) transactions which are in the nature of payment of statutory dues, statutory fees or statutory charges entered into between an entity on one hand and the Central Government or any State Government or any combination thereof on the other hand. (e) transactions entered into between a public sector company on one hand and the Central Government or any State Government or any combination thereof on the other hand. | Reg 62K(7): The exemptions are not identical:(i) under point (a) exemption available for government companies and not public sector companies;(ii) point (b) and (c) are identical(iii) point (d) and (e) are excluded. | The amendments made in Reg. 23 vide LODR Third Amendment Regulations, 2024 have not been made in Reg. 62K. |
| CG requirements with respect to subsidiary | Requirements of Reg. 24 apply to unlisted subsidiaries.Reg 24 (1) – appointment of atleast 1 ID of the parent listed entity on the board of the unlisted material subsidiary (whose turnover or net worth exceeds 20% of the consolidated turnover or net worth respectively, of the listed entity and its subsidiaries in the immediately preceding accounting year) Reg 24(2): Review of financial statements of the unlisted subsidiary by the audit committee of the listed entity.Reg 24(3): Review of board minutes of the unlisted subsidiary by the board of the listed entity. Reg 24(4): Review by the board of significant transactions/arrangements entered into by the unlisted subsidiary.Reg 24 (5): Shareholders’ approval for disposal of shares of material subsidiary whose turnover or net worth exceeds 10% of the consolidated turnover or net worth respectively, of the listed entity) resulting in reduction to less than or equal to 50% or cessation of control.Reg 24 (6): Shareholders’ approval for sale, disposal and leasing of assets of material subsidiary (whose turnover or net worth exceeds 10% of the consolidated turnover or net worth respectively, of the listed entity) | Reg 62L: All requirements apply only to unlisted material subsidiary (whose income or net worth exceeds 20% of the consolidated income or net worth respectively, of the listed entity and its subsidiaries in the immediately preceding accounting year) | CG requirement pertaining to subsidiary is relaxed for HVDLE in comparison to that of equity listed entity |
| Secretarial Audit and Secretarial Compliance (ASC) Report | Reg 24A: LE and its material unlisted Indian subsidiaries ((whose turnover or net worth exceeds 10% of the consolidated turnover or net worth respectively, of the listed entity) to undertake Secretarial audit by Peer Reviewed Secretarial Auditor. Further, the regulations also deal with tenure of appointment, rotation of secretarial auditors, eligibility, qualifications and disqualifications for appointment of a secretarial auditor, and prohibited services prescribed w.r.t Secretarial Auditors of the listed entity. ASC report to be submitted within 60 days from the end of FY by the listed entity. | Reg 62M: HVDLEs and its Indian material unlisted subsidiary (no definition provided) to undertake secretarial audit and annex the report in annual report. Further, HVDLEs to submit ASC report within 60 days. The requirement of peer reviewed CS to conduct Sec audit or issue ASC, tenure of appointment, rotation of secretarial auditors, eligibility, qualifications and disqualifications for appointment of a secretarial auditor, and prohibited services prescribed w.r.t Secretarial Auditors etc not applicable. | The amendments made in Reg. 24A vide LODR Third Amendment Regulations, 2024 have not been made in Reg. 62M. Further, the scope of material subsidiary is not provided as the definition under Reg. 16 and Reg. 62L may not apply unless expressly indicated. |
| Agreement pertaining to profit sharing or in connection with dealings in securities of the company | Reg 26(6): Any agreement entered into by the employees, KMP/director/promoter for himself/herself or on behalf of any other person with regard to compensation or profit sharing in connection with dealings in the securities of listed entity, requires prior approval by the board and public shareholders by way of ordinary resolution. Interested persons involved in the transaction are required to abstain from voting. | Reg 62O(5): The regulation is similar to that provided in Reg. 26(6) with the exception that there is no restriction for voting by the interested persons. | The amendments made in Reg. 26(6) vide LODR Third Amendment Regulations, 2024 have not been made in Reg. 62O. |
Other Amendments
Related Party Transactions by SME Listed entities
A listed entity which has listed its specified securities on the SME Exchange are not required to comply with the CG norms otherwise applicable to a Main Board listed entity which have either paid up capital exceeding Rs. 10 crore or net worth exceeding Rs. 25 crore). In order to plug the risk of siphoning of funds to related parties, as observed by SEBI in certain instances, the present amendment harmonizes and aligns the RPT norms applicability by extending it to SME listed entities other than those which have paid up capital not exceeding Rs. 10 crores and net worth not exceeding Rs. 25 crores. Further, considering the size of SMEs, the threshold limit for Material RPTs have been set to Lower of INR 50 Cr or 10% of annual consolidated turnover as per last audited financial statements. Where the provisions become applicable at a later date, SMEs will have 6 months time to ensure compliance. The provisions shall continue to apply till both the conditions w.r.t equity share capital and networth falls below the threshold and remains below the threshold for 3 consecutive FYs.
Business Responsibility and Sustainability Reporting
Regulation 34(2)(f) of the Listing Regulations so far required assurance of the BRSR Core Report, which has now been modified to term it as ‘assessment or assurance of the specified parameters’ to prevent unwarranted association with a particular profession (specifically audit profession). Assessment defined as third-party assessment undertaken as per standards notified by the Industry Standards Note on BRSR Core, developed in consultation with SEBI.
Similar modification has been reproduced for obtaining BRSR Core Report from Value Chain Partners of the Listed Entity, and a clause of voluntary disclosure of the same for HVDLEs has been added in Regulation 62Q(3).
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FAQs on Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report (BRSR)
