Surviving the Squeeze: Liquidity Coverage Ratio for NBFC liquidity management
/1 Comment/in Financial Services /by Team Finserv– Siddharth Pandey, Assistant Manager | finserv@vinodkothari.com
Background
With the continuous growth and the emergence of large non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) in India, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has extended certain bank-level regulations to these institutions with the intention to make them manage their various risks. Among these various risks, liquidity risk is a critical one, which could lead to the breakdown of a financial institution, and if a contagion builds, it may affect the entire financial system too. No financial institution is entirely immune to it, even a well-performing NBFC with minimal NPAs could face a run on it if it experiences a liquidity crunch. The larger an institution, the greater impact its failure could have on the broader economy.
To address the above concerns, the RBI under the Para 89 read with Annex XXI of the Scale-Based Regulation (SBR) Directions[1] mandates certain large NBFCs (as discussed below) to maintain a Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR).
This article provides a practical guide to the LCR requirements under the SBR Directions, including the regulatory requirements to be followed, and tries to provide insights into its proper implementation by the NBFCs, subject to these norms.
Read more →A brief on the law and mechanics of CTC based Device Leasing
/0 Comments/in Financial Services /by Team Finserv– Aditya Iyer, Manager (Legal) | finserv@vinodkothari.com
I. Introduction to CTC Device Leasing
The economic device of purchasing an asset, and generating revenue by leasing it out is surely nothing new. However, through innovative leverage of accounting and tax norms, market participants devise offerings that continue to add novelty to this age-old practice. Today, there is an emerging business-opportunity with respect to leasing of electronic devices, which is gaining popularity due to associated tax benefits, short-tenures, and mass-market potential. In this article, we walk the reader through the quintessential features of this model, and the tax rules that make it possible.
Many are likely familiar with the CTC car-leasing model, which is considered a unique by-product of the Indian taxation system, and has been in vogue for several decades now. It entails a reduction in the employee’s taxable income due to the rules pertaining to valuation of perquisites [see Rule 3(2)(A) of the Income Tax Rules].
However, this arrangement is typically only made available to employees meeting a certain salary threshold, as it entails a significant financial contribution, and time commitment, on part of the employee (the time commitment is also of note here because it would require the employee to hold their position long enough to make pay-outs continuously for the tenure of lease).
As a result, the incentives and benefits associated with this CTC car leasing model do not percolate to employees who are not able to make said commitments/do not meet said thresholds.
Likely as a response to this market gap, there is now an emerging model of CTC leasing where the employer obtains a lease for electronics such as smartphones, laptops and tablets, and makes it available to the employees, while treating such lease payments as a part of the employee’s CTC. That is to say, the employer pays the lease rentals, but the same constitutes a part of the CTC – therefore, on a CTC basis, it is the employee who is actually paying the lease rentals. At the end of the lease tenure, the lessor may make the assets available to the employee for purchase at the residual value / other agreed value as specified in the contract. The leasing of such assets to the employer, and the making available of such assets by the employers, to the employees, will be referred to as CTC Device Leasing.
Much of the value associated with CTC Device Leasing is linked once again to the reduction in taxable income for the employee, for, in the absence of the same, the employee may simply obtain those assets through any prevailing EMI schemes (consider also the fact that these EMI schemes may offer more competitive interest rates due to the absence of GST component). However, in that case, the employee earns the gross CTC, and pays tax on the same. To illustrate:
Assume an employee’s agreed CTC is Rs 100,000 a month, and the employer arranges for him a top-class laptop costing Rs 1 lakh, paying lease rentals of Rs 12000 a month for a year. Since this payment of Rs 12000 is a part of the CTC, the employer will now have to pay a salary of Rs 88,000 a month, which is taxed as his salary. However, for the employer, the CTC is Rs 1 lakh. At the end of the 12-month rental period, the employee gets to own the laptop from the lessor.
II. Unpacking the CTC Device Leasing Model
a. Tax and GST Aspects
The reduction in the taxable income may be due to any one or more of the criteria mentioned under Rule 3(7) of the Income Tax Rules, and the legality of the same (i.e. whether that specific facility qualifies for the exemptions) would need to be evaluated on a case-to-case basis. However, generally speaking, reference in the case of mobile phone leasing (which is a common asset class being made available under this modell) is made to Rule 3(7)(ix) of the rules, read with Section 17 of the Income Tax Act, which would provide that
“Taxable value of perquisite shall be computed on the basis of cost to the employer (under an arm’s length transaction) less amount recovered from the employee. However, expenses on telephones including a mobile phone incurred by the employer on behalf of employee shall not be treated as taxable perquisite”[1]
Here, it becomes necessary to examine the burden on the employer under the device leasing model. In the CTC car-leasing model for instance, the employer remains “cost-agnostic”. Because under that model regardless of whether the benefit is given to the employee by deducting ‘x’ amount from their CTC component beforehand, or by paying said ‘x’ component to the employee, the financial obligation viz. expense for the employer remains unchanged. However, because in CTC car-leasing the employer is not able to claim ITC on the GST paid to the Lessor with the Lease rentals (due to it being blocked credit under Section 17(5) of the CGST Act), the cost is passed on to the employee, from whose salary along with lease rentals are also deducted the GST amount.
Under CTC Device Leasing, the employer is similarly cost-agnostic with the key difference being that employers are able to claim the ITC on the inputs (as it is not blocked credit). Hence, the employer would deduct only the actual lease rentals net-off from GST from the employee’s salary.
b. Residual Value considerations
As has been mentioned above, at the end of the lease tenure, the lessor typically would make the asset available to the employee for purchase basis its residual value. An important consideration here is that unless the lessor is a financial sector entity, they would usually not wish to keep a very low residual value (10% or below) lest the lease be considered a “financial lease” as per accounting norms, and thus eventually require the lessor to obtain an NBFC registration (as the transaction would be considered substantively a financing transaction, with the assets being financial assets, and income from the assets posing concerns with respect to the PBC criteria).
However, a higher residual value could also correspond to a decrease in the tax benefit for the employee, because the option to purchase the asset would be exercised post the lease tenure by the employee themselves, and such payout being made by the employee directly against the residual value, may not qualify for the exemptions under the Income Tax Rules. Hence, there is a delicate balance the lessors would have to maintain, to ensure viability of the business-model, while also ensuring that the structure remains compliant with tax law.
c. Trend-Cycling & Data Protection
One practical consideration here is that the tenure of the lease in CTC leasing models gives the employer an added employee-retention benefit. However, in the case of device leasing, the lease tenures may need to account for the “trend-cycles”, whereby younger workforce (in particular) may have a preference towards upgrading the device as and when newer models are released (for e.g. new iPhone models are typically released within a year of the previous launch). If the lease tenure exceeds this time-span, the facility may lose some of its charm.
Another consideration here, would pertain to the deletion of the employee’s data from the device, having regards to applicable data protection law, in case the employee does not exercise the purchase
option / the possession of device is transferred to another employee (for e.g. due to employee’s exit from the company).
III. Concluding Notes – Impact on Leasing Volumes and Industry in India
Because this model is in its nascent stage, it may be too soon to predict what its impact would be on leasing volumes in India. However, as the data captured in our report, available here, may reveal – the growth of leasing volumes in India has been very low. The use of leasing appears to be kept afloat by models such as CTC car leasing, and now maybe through device leasing.
However, one can surely expect this model to be popular with the lessors who would be able to enter the leasing space without making significant capital expenditures / taking on large borrowings, and to some extent may even be able to lease by obtaining the assets through their own funds rather than borrowings, and use the churn (due to the short tenure) to keep the leasing going.
[1] See CBDT Resource on Income Tax Rules, available at: https://incometaxindia.gov.in/_layouts/15/dit/pages/viewer.aspx?grp=rule&cname=cmsid&cval=103120000000007059&searchfilter= .
Waiver of dividend by shareholder: Whether generosity can become atrocity?
/0 Comments/in AGM, Companies Act 2013, corporate governance, Corporate Laws, SEBI /by Staff– Sikha Bansal, Senior Partner and Simrat Singh, Senior Executive | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Legal basis for dividend entitlement
The right of a shareholder to receive dividends is conferred under Section 123(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 (‘CA, 2013’). The corresponding obligations on the company are elaborated in Chapter VIII of the Act (Sections 123 to 127), read with the Companies (Declaration and Payment of Dividend) Rules, 2014. For listed companies, Regulations 42 and 43 of the Listing Regulations, 2015 further prescribe a few procedural requirements for declaration and payment of dividend.
However, neither the CA, 2013 nor the Listing Regulations, 2015 recognise a shareholder’s unilateral right to waive the dividend declared by the company.
Waiver by a shareholder – whether dependent on other shareholders
Although the statutory framework does not provide for a waiver, the relationship between the company and its shareholders can, to an extent, be governed by a contract, so long as such contract is not ultra vires the CA, 2013. It is a settled position that the Articles of Association (AoA) of a company form a contract between the company and its members and also inter-se among the members (see Naresh Chandra Sanyal v. Calcutta Stock Exchange Association1).
Subject to the provisions of the Companies Act the Company and the members are bound by the provisions contained in the Articles of Association. The Articles regulate the internal management of the Company and define the powers of its officers. They also establish a contract between the Company and the members and between the members inter se. The contract governs the ordinary rights and obligations incidental to membership in the Company
As per the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (‘Contract Act’), a proposal becomes a promise, only when it is accepted by the counterparty. A promise takes the form of an agreement which, if enforceable under law, becomes a contract. Therefore, there has to be assent from both the parties, in order to constitute a contract. Where one party only proposes, and the other does not accept, there is no question of a promise/agreement/contract.
Further, when a shareholder intends to waive his rights as to dividend – such a dividend foregone can be construed as a gratuitous transfer to the kitty of other shareholders – in essence, a gift. Under the settled principles of common law and as per section 122 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a gift is valid only when accepted by the recipient.
122. “Gift” defined.—“Gift” is the transfer of certain existing moveable or immoveable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee
XX
Therefore, for a waiver to operate as a gift benefiting others, it must be accepted by the general body of shareholders who stand to receive this “gift”. Therefore, without the express consent by other shareholders, a request of waiver of dividend by one shareholder cannot be acceded to.
Binding nature of promises under Contract Law
Section 37 of the Contract Act mandates that parties to a contract must perform or offer to perform their respective promises, unless such performance is excused under the Act or any other applicable law. Where under articles of association, a company agrees to declare and pay the dividend, the shareholders agree to receive the same in accordance with the provisions of the articles. Therefore, once a dividend is declared, the company is under a legal obligation to pay it and the shareholder is obligated to receive it. The shareholder cannot unilaterally waive this right unless such dispensation is as per law.
Here, it might also be relevant to discuss the peripheries of section 63 of the Contract Act, which provides that a promisee may waive or remit performance wholly or in part. But the spirit of this provision is to release the promisor of an obligation, not to impose an additional burden. In Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel v. Lalbhai Trikumlal Mills Ltd.2 it was held that a promisee may extend the time for the performance of the promise u/s 63 of the Contract Act. However, the promisor may choose not to accept the extended time if it will hamper the performance of his promise. Therefore, a promisor is not bound to accept any waiver of the promisee, he is allowed to weigh-in his/her own interests.
Therefore, section 63 does not operate without any boundaries.
Implications of unilateral waiver on the company
Dividend declaration is a strategic financial decision taken by the Board after considering multiple factors such as growth strategy, return on equity, share price impact, liquidity needs, and need for reserves. If a company provides this right to one shareholder, it may have to provide the same right to other shareholders. Therefore, a unilateral waiver by a shareholder could distort this delicate balance in several ways, as it may affect the equitable treatment of shareholders and also impact the company’s policy on retained earnings/general reserves.
Rebutting section 127 concerns
One may argue that Section 127 of the CA, 2013 which allows shareholders to give directions regarding the “manner of payment” of dividend, empowers them to waive their dividend. However, this is a misreading of the provision. Section 127 pertains to mode and timeline of payment, not the right to forgo the dividend altogether. Refusing to entertain a waiver does not constitute a violation of this section.
Closing thoughts
Thus, what appears to be an act of generosity might actually prejudice other shareholders and strain the company’s governance framework. Therefore, in our view, a shareholder seeking waiver of dividends may have a generous intent – however, that cannot happen without the approval of the general body of shareholders.
Cash in Hand, But Still a Loss?
/0 Comments/in Financial Services, NBFCs, RBI /by StaffRBI mails to NBFCs to disregard DLG in expected loss computation
– Vinod Kothari & Dayita Kanodia (finserv@vinodkothari.com)
Background
RBI has recently been directing NBFCs to compute ECL without factoring in the impact of DLGs obtained1. This stance appears to stem from the regulator’s perception that fintech-issued guarantees carry inherent risk and may expose NBFCs to potential losses.
As per Ind AS 109, Expected Credit Loss (ECL) model is used for the recognition and measurement of impairment on financial assets. ECL is a forward-looking approach that requires entities to recognize credit losses based on expectations of future defaults.
The Default Loss guarantee Guidelines (‘DLG Guidelines’) allow LSPs, (both regulated and unregulated) to provide DLG to the extent of 5% of the portfolio amount to the lender. The DLG Guidelines specify the forms in which such DLG can be obtained.
In terms of para 22 of the DL Guidelines,
“RE can accept DLG only in one or more of the following forms:
- Cash deposited with the RE;
- Fixed Deposit maintained with a Scheduled Commercial Bank with a lien marked in favour of the RE;
- Bank Guarantee in favour of the RE”
Accordingly, DLGs can only be obtained in fully funded forms thus eliminating any question of incurring credit loss on such guarantee.
RBI Directive to NBFCs
RBI has directed NBFCs to maintain ECL without giving effect to the DLGs obtained in accordance with the DLG Guidelines. In this respect, the following should be taken into consideration:
- A regulatory prescription, without a regulatory backing, and in fact, going against the regulation:
- There is a well-laid process for the RBI coming with a regulation, and in fact, now, the RBI has decided to come up with a consultation process, impact assessment etc before coming with a regulation.
- Dictating a certain treatment with respect to ECL is nothing short of a regulation – if this sort of generic requirements keep coming from the supervisors, then the very dividing line between supervision and regulation is lost.
- Let accounting standards prevail; auditors and accountants know what ECL to provide:
- Annex II of the SBR Directions provides that NBFCs shall follow applicable accounting standards. The ECL provisioning, known as impairment loss, comes from para 5.5.13 of Ind AS 109. The detailed requirements of how ECL is to be estimated has been laid in that standard.
- Admittedly, whether and how much ECL write down is required, and whether such ECL estimation does or does not give effect to a fully-funded guarantee, is a matter for the accountants and auditors to deal with. We find little reason for the regulator to step into what is clearly an accounting standard domain.
- If there is a funded guarantee, how can losses met by such guarantee be disregarded?
- As per DLG guidelines, the guarantee has to be either fully funded, or fully backed by bank guarantee. It is true that even if a credit loss is backed by a guarantee, it is merely shifting of the exposure – from the borrower to the guarantor. But in this case, the guarantee is equivalent to cash. If the lender has a cash collateral to back up the guarantee, there is no reason to not give the benefit of the same in ECL estimation.
- For example, if for a certain loan pool, the ECL estimation is 3.8%, and the lender has a guarantee of 5% backed by fixed deposits lien-marked to the lender, will the lender have any expected loss? The answer is negative. If the ECL estimation was, say, 6.8% and the guarantee is 5%, clearly the lender’s ECL will be 1.8%. Thus, there is no reason to disregard the funded guarantee while estimating ECL.
- If a company cannot incur loss to the extent of the guarantee, and it still creates an impairment loss, it is actually creating a reserve and not a provision, and therefore, compromising its true and fair view:
- The RBI expects lenders to disregard the guarantee and create ECL as if the guarantee did not exist. This will be like creating a loss where the losses actually cannot hit the lender. Therefore, the ECL becomes a reserve, and given that the entity is hitting the P/L with a loss that will not hit the lender, the entity is compromising its true and fair view.
- The RBI has reasons to have no trust on the fintechs for the guarantee they give, but it is fully funded.
In light of this, the RBI’s emails sent to various lenders are objectionable, and such emails create a precedent of creating a regulation without going through the regulatory process.
Accordingly, in our view, NBFCs should be allowed to follow their applicable accounting standards while computing the ECL provisions.
Our resources:
LISTING REGULATIONS ON SECURITISED DEBT INSTRUMENTS AND SECURITY RECEIPTS
/0 Comments/in Books, Securitisation /by StaffWe are pleased to unveil “Listing Regulations on Securitised Debt Instruments and Security Receipts”, an in-depth commentary on the SEBI (Issue and Listing of Securitised Debt Instruments and Security Receipts) Regulations. The book offers practitioners, market participants, and legal professionals a comprehensive understanding of the evolving regulatory landscape for listed securitised products in India.
Incorporating key regulatory updates, including SEBI’s Master Circulars and Exchange-level compliance requirements, this book not only deciphers the law but also contextualises it within the broader evolution of the securitisation market. With a focus on both regulatory interpretation and market practice, it serves as a valuable resource for anyone engaging with the growing ecosystem of securitised instruments in India.
In order to access the e-book, register your interest here.
Full Day Workshop On Leasing and Asset Backed Finance
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