INR Non-deliverable Derivatives barred; Added Bar for Related Parties

RBI’s 1st April circular bars Banks from INR-derivatives, with “related parties”, giving an Ind AS meaning to the term

In a move to maintain the integrity of INR in the evolving market conditions and avoid a potential misuse of intra-group structures to bypass regulatory constraints, the RBI has issued revised instructions on Risk Management and Inter-Bank Dealings

Bar on non-deliverable INR derivatives:

Considering the prevailing situation in the currency market, RBI has prohibited banks from entering into derivatives involving INR on non-deliverable basis.

The bar extends to rebooking of any derivative contract, whether deliverable or non deliverable, entered before 1st April, maturing after this date.

Fx-Derivatives contracts involving INR: not permitted with related parties 

The instructions prohibit any form of foreign exchange derivative contract involving INR with their related parties. Note that, the bar is not limited to “non-deliverable” contracts, rather, extends to all forex derivative contracts involving INR. This complete bar is likely to impact the financial markets where it is quite common to undertake such derivative transactions with related parties, more particularly, in banking groups constituting one or more financial sector entities (including NBFCs, insurance entities etc.). 

What is even more interesting is that the meaning of “related party” for this purpose is drawn from Ind AS. Banks in India are currently not following Ind AS, and therefore, they maintain a list of related parties as per IGAAP, viz., AS 18. However, the Circular explicitly refers to Ind AS 24 or equivalent international standards. This, therefore, requires immediate action on the part of banks to draw a list of related parties, not on the basis of the accounting standards applicable to them (AS-18), but, on the basis of the widely recognised IAS-24 (Ind AS 24 in the Indian context). 

The instructions refer to Indian Accounting Standard (Ind AS) 24 – Related Party Disclosures or International Accounting Standard (IAS) 24 – Related Party Disclosures or any other equivalent accounting standards. The reference thus, is not of “applicable accounting standards”, but of “equivalent accounting standards”, meaning thereby, that banks would be required to draw their list of related parties based on Ind AS 24 or its equivalent based on the country whose accounting standards are being followed by the bank in question. For instance, a foreign bank incorporated in the US will draw its definition of related party from US GAAP (ASC 850) being the equivalent of IAS 24. 

Rethinking Repayment Recurrence: EMIs, EWIs or EDIs

Manisha Ghosh, Assistant Manager | finserv@vinodkothari.com

Introduction

In the world of finance, where EMIs reign is supreme, a quiet revolution is brewing. For decades, the EMI—a fixed, predictable monthly payment—has been the default repayment option in case of loans.  This repayment model aligns well with the cash-flow profile of salaried borrowers, whose income is credited at predictable monthly intervals. A fixed monthly outflow is therefore rational and manageable for the borrower. But what happens when there are borrowers who don’t live by the calendar?

In India there also exists a substantial segment of borrowers with fluctuating income streams such as taxi drivers, gig workers, small traders, daily wage earners, contract-workers, etc. Their earnings are typically received on a daily or near-daily or weekly basis and may fluctuate based on demand, seasonality, or operational variables. For such a category of borrowers, imposing a lump-sum monthly repayment obligation may create liquidity stress. People with irregular income may find it difficult to set aside a large lump sum to honor the obligation on the due date, even if their total earnings over the month are sufficient. As a result, they may lead to missed payments not because they lack income or resources, but because their cash flow does not align with the repayment schedule.

To address this structural mismatch between income frequency and repayment frequency, banks and NBFCs have been exploring the option of Equated Daily Instalments (“EDIs”). Under an EDI structure, the repayment obligation is broken into smaller, more frequent daily amounts, theoretically aligning repayment with the borrower’s earning cycle and smoothing liquidity issues.

Regulatory Landscape

There is no regulatory prohibition under the RBI framework preventing lenders from offering daily repayment options in their loan products. In fact, the RBI’s Key Fact Statement (KFS) format prescribed under the Responsible Lending Conduct Directions acknowledges not only EMIs but has referred to the term Equated Periodic Instalments (‘EPI’), which has a broader meaning.

The use of the term EPI indicates that repayment need not necessarily be structured on a monthly basis. Rather, lenders are permitted to determine an appropriate repayment frequency whether daily, weekly, fortnightly, or monthly depending on the loan product and borrower profile. The repayment frequency is arrived at by considering the source of income, cashflows of the borrower; this ensures that servicing of such loans is aligned with the borrower’s income profile and does not create any undue financial burden or pushes the borrower towards a debt trap.

Suitability of the Lending Product

Irrespective of the repayment frequency, the issue of fairness in lending still needs to be examined. In case a borrower is required to make repayments every single day, any small disruption in income will be considered as a default and have an immediate impact on the borrower’s performance. For example, if the borrower falls sick or is unable to work for a few days, their daily income may stop. In such a case, they may miss one or more installment payments. Since the due date arises daily under an EDI structure, even one missed payment can start the DPD count, and the delay will continue to add up to the repayment obligation until the payment is made.

This situation will have adverse implications not just for the borrower but also for the lender. The borrower’s credit record may worsen quickly, even if the income disruption is temporary. At the same time, the lender may see rising delinquencies in its portfolio.

While EDIs may help in synchronising repayment with daily income, they provide very little cushion to borrowers in case of unforeseen and unexpected events resulting in default in repayment. Lenders may instead consider a weekly repayment model, where borrowers can collect and accumulate their daily earnings and repay the lender on a weekly basis. 

A weekly installment structure provides the borrower with a limited but meaningful cushion. If the borrower is unable to earn on a particular day, they still have the remaining days of the week to generate income and arrange the repayment amount. This flexibility reduces the likelihood of an immediate default and offers a more balanced approach between daily and monthly repayment models. 

Operational Flexibility for Lender

From an operational perspective, daily repayments also create practical challenges. The lender would need to monitor DPD status every day, carry out daily accounting entries, and reconcile payments continuously. For a large number of borrowers, this can become difficult and resource-intensive. Further, if collections are done manually or through agents, missed payments may require daily follow-ups. This increases recovery costs and may create borrower stress or reputational risks for the lender.

Having said that, this kind of arrangement is restricted under the digital lending regulations. Paragraph 10(2) of the RBI (NBFC- Credit Facilities) Directions, 2026 mandates that all loan servicing and repayments must be executed directly by the borrower into the regulated entity’s bank account. The framework expressly prohibits the use of pass-through or pool accounts of any third party, including those of a Lending Service Provider (‘LSP’). 

Accordingly, under the current digital lending regime, repayments cannot be routed through an intermediary. This makes such a model difficult to implement for loans that are originated digitally.

Conclusion

The choice of repayment frequency should not be driven by convention alone, but by the borrower’s income pattern and capacity to absorb short-term shocks. EDIs attempt to bridge this gap, but a rigid daily obligation can expose borrowers to immediate default in the event of even minor income disruptions.

At the same time, daily repayment structures increase operational and monitoring burdens for lenders. Therefore, the focus should be on designing repayment models that balance flexibility with discipline. Structures such as weekly repayments, grace periods, or limited flexibility mechanisms may provide a more sustainable balance. Ultimately, a well-designed repayment model protects both borrower credit health and lender portfolio quality, reinforcing the broader principles of responsible and fair lending.

RBI’s 3-month breather for new rules on capital market exposures

At the fag end of the financial year, just before the Amendment Directions on Capital Market Exposures (originally issued on 13th February, 2026) were to become effective, the 30th March 2026 Press Release by RBI has the effect of deferring the applicability of and substituting the same with Revised Amendment Directions to address certain representations from the stakeholders. 

Revised Applicability Date: 

  • Effective from 1st July 2026 instead of 1st April 2026
  • Banks may opt for early adoption in its entirety

This would mean an additional window of 3 months towards implementation of the revised rules on capital market exposures. 

Acquisition Finance: clarifications on mergers and amalgamation, on-lending for acquisition permitted: target not to be a financial entity

  • Mergers and amalgamations permitted within acquisition finance, definition amended [Para 4(1)(ia)]
    • This is a clarificatory change
  • Target can be non-financial entity only [Para 170A]
    • Restriction extends to indirectly acquiring control over financial entities who are subsidiaries/ JV of target entity [proviso to Para 170B]
    • Earlier Directions referred to restriction on the Acquiring entity as a financial entity, the Revised Directions extends the restrictions on the target company too, thus limiting the scope of companies that may be acquired through 
  • On-lending by Acquiring entity to subsidiaries for acquiring control permitted [Para 170E(2)]
    • Earlier, lending was permitted to subsidiary/ SPV based on strength of Acquiring company by the bank, now, the Revised Directions further permit on-lending by the Acquiring entity to its subsidiary
  • Potential synergies to be collectively met for all companies of a group acquired pursuant to acquisition finance [Para 170B]
  • Lending to subsidiary/ SPV based on strength of Acquiring company, corporate guarantee to be provided by Acquiring company

Capital Market Intermediaries: relief that does not last long

  • Bank financing for proprietary trading permitted subject to 100% collateral in the form of cash and cash equivalents [third proviso to Para 219ZA]
    • While the proviso enables bank finance, in view of the 100% liquid security requirements, the industry participants does not seem to consider this a favourable change towards meeting the working capital requirements. However, the 3-months’ breather may be considered a favourable step. 
  • For non-debt Mutual Funds, intraday facilities secured by guaranteed receivables not to be considered as Capital Market Exposure
    • Receivables guaranteed on account of maturity proceeds of G Secs, T-Bills, SDL, or interest from G-Sec and SDLs held by such mutual funds, or maturity proceeds of TREPS from CCIL

Lending to individuals: limits to be monitored at banking system level

  • Cap of Rs. 1 crore on lending against eligible securities and Rs. 25 lacs for IPO/ FPO/ ESOP financing to be applicable at banking system level
    • While the borrower-level limits stand increased on an individual basis, the application of such limits at a banking system level will ensure that excessive borrowings are not done by an individual borrower for capital market dealings

See a detailed article on the Amendments on Capital Market Exposures here.

RBI Directions on Lending to Related Parties: Frequently Asked Questions

Team Corplaw | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Other resources:

  1. Lending to your own: RBI Amendment Directions on Loans to Related Parties
  2. Navigation Roadmap through New Consolidated RBI Directions – Presentation
  3. Representation for issues related to RBI (Commercial Banks – Credit Risk Management)(Amendment) Directions, 2026

CareEdge Award for Structured Finance Instruments

Last date of application: 16th April, 2026

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Webinar on Corporate Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026

Register here: https://forms.gle/1iR2xaFKGBU1kRJ3A

Read our brief analysis of the proposals here:

Corporate Laws Amendment Bill: Easing, Streamlining and  Updating the Regulatory Framework 

Corporate Laws Amendment Bill: Recognizing LLPs in IFSCA, decriminalisation  and easing compliances for AIF LLPs

CGTMSE Risk Shield for MFI Lending 

-Vinod Kothari and Chirag Agarwal | finserv@vinodkothari.com

The National Credit Guarantee Trust Company (NCGTC), under the Department of Financial Services, has floated a scheme which will guarantee lending upto ₹20000 crores by banks and financial institutions (Member Lending Institutions or MLIs), for taking incremental loan exposure to MFIs. The Scheme intends to nudge bank lending to MFIs, as the former has shunned away in view of the perceived risk of the sector in the recent past. The NCGTC takes 70% – 80% risk of default of the bank loans to the MFIs, provided the lending is done accordingly with the conditions of the Scheme.

Among the conditions, the MFI must lend at least at 1% lower than the average lending rate over the last 6 months, and the MLI must lend at no more than 2% over the benchmark rate (MCLR or EBLR as applicable). 

In our view, the Scheme has following outcome expectations:

  • Given the credit risk transfer to the extent of 70% – 80% (depending on the 3 sizes of MFIs), the credit risk aversion as also the credit risk premium, should significantly come down.
  • In view of the credit risk transfer, the risk weight for capital adequacy also comes to zero for the guaranteed portion, resulting into significant capital relief for the MLI
  • Since the Scheme can be utilised only for incremental lending, and that too, at a cheaper rate, there may be downward pressure on lending rates, resulting in a demand-side push. The latter is quite important, as reduced lending volumes in the MFI sector are quite often the cause of higher defaults as well.
  • Overall, the environment of sectoral aversion would change.

Essential Features of the Scheme

Who are MLIs?

  • Schedule Commercials Banks
  • AIFIs

What type of loans are covered under the Scheme?

  • Funding provided by the MLIs to MFIs for on-lending to microfinance borrowers

What is the interest cap under the Scheme?

  • Loans sanctioned by MLIs to NBFC-MFIs/MFIs is capped at EBLR or 1 Year MCLR + 2% per annum
  • Loans by NBFC- MFIs/MFIs to microfinance borrowers is capped at 1% below the average rate of their lending in past 6 months.

What is the cap on tenure of loans under the Scheme?

  • Maximum tenure of the loan provided by MLI to MFIs shall be 3 years (1-year moratorium plus 2 years for loan repayment).

Conditions for MLIs to get benefits under the Scheme:

  • At least 5% of the total loan amount under the Scheme shall be sanctioned to small-sized MFIs, & 10% to medium-sized MFIs.
  • The maximum amount of loan which can be sanctioned by MLIs to MFIs shall be capped at 20% of the Assets Under Management (AUM) of respective MFI subject to maximum of ₹100 crore to small size, ₹200 crore to medium size and ₹300 crore to large size MFIs
  • MFIs shall be classified as small, medium and large based on their AUM as follows:
    • Small MFIs – Less than 500 crores
    • Medium MFIs – Rs.500 crores to less than Rs. 2000 crores
    • Large MFIs -Rs. 2000 crores or more

Maximum coverage under the guarantee:

  • 70% to Large MFIs, 75% to Medium MFIs & 80% to Small MFIs of the amount in default for a maximum period of 3 years

Guarantee Fee:

  • MLIs shall pay to NCGTC Guarantee Fee at 0.5% of the sanction amount (first year) and outstanding amount (thereafter).

Claim Process:

  • MLI shall submit a claim on an annual basis (once every year) in respect of the amount in default.

The Case For Regulating Private Credit Funds

Simrat Singh | Finserv@vinodkothari.com

Private credit is, in essence, shadow banking without corresponding discipline. Market reports indicate that Private Credit in India (and globally) is beginning to show signs of stress. Several global private credit fund managers have reportedly frozen withdrawals amid rising investor withdrawals. Given that private credit by its very nature is supposed to be illiquid, even a modest redemption pressure may hamper the ability of the fund manager to honor the withdrawals. Although this type of liquidity risk is limited in Indian private credit funds since they are usually close-ended category II funds in which investors are mandated to stay invested throughout the tenure of the fund. However, other risks such a opacity still loom. An equally important issue is the regulatory asymmetry, with private credit funds being regulated far less stringently than banks, NBFCs and other comparable lending institutions. Private credit funds take money from investors and lend to businesses; so do banks and NBFCs. Both carry systemic risks and can trigger panic on failure. Yet, only one is properly regulated. 

In our earlier write-up on private credit funds we tried to list down the differences between regulated entities and these funds, a distinction which highlights the scarcity of controls and oversight in a lending fund that is expected in a lending vehicle. Notable examples include no uniform credit appraisal, no standardised reporting of performance of borrowers, no CRAR-like minimum capital requirement, no interest rate risk model etc. One may argue that the very absence of these requirements is what makes private credit funds tailor their deals according to the needs of the investee company; payment-in-kind, income-aligned repayment schedules are some of the examples. However, the absence of discipline also introduces opacity and potential systemic risks. Regulators globally have flagged these lending vehicles due to their opacity and market-wide risk (eg. RBI pointed out the systemic risk of private credit in its June 2024 Financial Stability Report). However, no action/mitigation measure has been taken as of now. In our view, atleast provisioning and NPA reporting-like safeguards should be there in such vehicles.

Note that these funds are not completely unregulated, SEBI AIF Regulations contain some safeguards such as concentration cap, valuation norms, no leverage at fund level etc. but these are generic safeguards and are not made keeping in mind the risks involved in a lending-based fund vehicle. 

The case for regulatory intervention, therefore, is not about imposing bank-like rigidity, but about ensuring appropriate discipline for bank-like activities. Whether such oversight should fall within the domain of the RBI, given its expertise in regulating lending institutions, remains an open question. The more immediate concern is that these entities continue to operate outside a robust prudential framework. Importantly, the relatively small share of private credit funds in overall corporate lending (currently less than 2%) should not serve as a justification for regulatory inaction. Risks do not become relevant only at scale; by the time they do, the cost of inaction is often far greater. It is therefore for regulators to move beyond a form-based approach and adopt a substance-based framework for such lending vehicles.