Inherent inconsistencies in quantitative conditions for capital relief

Abhirup Ghosh

abhirup@vinodkothari.com

– Updated as on 16th June, 2020

On 8th June, 2020, RBI issued the Draft Framework for Securitisation of Standard Assets taking into account existing guidelines, Basel III norms on securitisation by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as well the Report of the Committee on the Development of Housing Finance Securitisation Market chaired by Dr. Harsh Vardhan.

With this, one of the main areas of concern happens to be capital relief for securitisation. The concerns arise not just for new exposures but also existing securitisation exposures, as Chapter VI (dealing with Capital Requirements) shall come into immediate effect, even for the existing securitisation exposures.

Earlier, due to the implementation of Ind-AS, concerns arose with respect to capital relief treatment as most of the securitisation exposures did not qualify for derecognition under Ind-AS. However, on March 13, 2020, RBI came out with Guidance on implementation of Ind-AS, which clarified the issue by stating that securitised assets not qualifying for derecognition under Ind AS due to credit enhancement given by the originating NBFC on such assets shall be risk weighted at zero percent. However, the NBFC shall reduce 50 per cent of the amount of credit enhancement given from Tier I capital and the balance from Tier II capital.

Once again, the issue of capital relief arises as the draft guidelines may cause an increase in capital requirements for existing exposures.

Capital requirement under the Draft Framework

The Draft Framework lays down qualitative as well as quantitative criteria for determining capital requirements. As per Para 70, lenders are required to maintain capital against all securitisation exposure amounts, including those arising from the provision of credit risk mitigants to a securitisation transaction, investments in ABS or MBS, retention of a subordinated tranche, and extension of a liquidity facility or credit enhancement. For the purpose of capital computation, repurchased securitisation exposures must be treated as retained securitisation exposures.

The general provisions for measuring exposure amount of off-balance sheet exposures are laid down under para 71-78 of the Draft Framework.

The quantitative conditions are however, laid down in paragraphs 79 (a) and (b). The intention here is to delve into the impact of the quantitative conditions only, keeping aside the qualitative conditions for the time being.

Substantial transfer of credit risk:

The first condition (79(a)) is that significant credit risk associated with the underlying exposures of the securities issued by the SPE has been transferred to third parties. Here, significant credit risk will be treated as having transferred if the following conditions are satisfied:

  1. If there are at least three tranches, risk-weighted exposure amounts of the mezzanine securitisation positions held by the originator do not exceed 50% of the risk-weighted exposure amounts of all mezzanine securitisation positions existing in this securitisation;
  2. In cases where there are no mezzanine securitisation positions, the originator does not hold more than 20% of the exposure values of securitisation positions that are first loss positions.

Taking each of the two points at a time.

The first clause contemplates a securitisation structure with at least three tranches – the senior, the mezzanine and the equity. Despite the presence of three tranches, the condition for risk transfer has been pegged with the mezzanine tranche only, however, nothing has been discussed with respect to the thickness of the mezzanine tranche (though the draft Directions has prescribed a minimum thickness for the first loss tranche).

If the language of the draft Directions is retained as is, qualifying for capital relief will become very easy. This can be explained with the help of the following example.

Suppose a securitisation transaction has three tranches, the composition and proportion of which has been provided below:

Tranche Rating Proportion as a part of the total pool Retention by the Originator Effective retention of interest by the Originator
Senior Tranche – A AAA 85% 0% 0%
Mezzanine Tranche – B AA+ 5% 50% 2.5%
Equity/ First Loss Tranche – C Unrated 10% 100% 10%
        12.5%

As may be noticed, both the senior and mezzanine are fairly highly rated as the junior most tranche has a considerable amount of thickness and represents a first loss coverage of 10%. Additionally, it also retains 50% of the Mezzanine tranche. Therefore, effectively, the Originator retains 12.5% of the total pool, yet it will qualify for the capital relief, by virtue of holding upto 50% of the Mezzanine tranche, despite retaining 10% in the form of first loss support.

The second clause contemplates a situation where there are only two tranches – that is, the senior tranche and the equity tranche. The clause says that in absence of a mezzanine tranche, the retention of first loss by the Originator should not be more than 20% of the total first loss tranche.

Given the current market conditions, it will be practically impossible to find an investor for the first loss tranche, hence, the entire amount will have to be retained by the Originator. Also, it is very common to provide over-collateral or cash collateral as first loss supports in case of securitisation transactions, even in such cases a third party’s participation in the first loss piece is technically impossible.

Also, there is a clear conflict between this condition and para 16 of the draft Directions, which gives an impression that the first loss tranche has to be retained by the originator itself, in the form of minimum risk retention.

Therefore, in Indian context, if one were to take a holistic view on the conditions, they are two different extremes. While, in the first case, capital relief is achievable, but in the second case, the availing capital relief is practically impossible. This will make the second condition almost redundant.

In order to understand the rationale behind these conditions, please refer to the discussion on EU Guidelines on SRT below.

Impact on the existing transactions

As noted earlier, this part of the draft Directions shall be applicable on the existing transactions as well. Here it is important to note that currently, most of the transaction structures in India either have only one or two tranches of securities, and only a fraction would have a mezzanine tranche. In all such cases, the entire first loss support comes from the Originator. Therefore, almost none of the transactions will qualify for the capital relief.

In the hindsight, the originators have committed a crime which they were not even aware of, and will now have to pay a price.

The moment, the Directions are finalised, the loans will have to be risk-weighted and capital will have to be provided for.

This will have a considerable impact on the regulatory capital, especially for the NBFCs, which are required to maintain a capital of 15%, instead of 9% for banks.

Thickness of the first loss support:

This requirement states that the minimum first loss tranche should be the product of (a) exposure (b) weighted maturity in years and (c) the average slippage ratio over the last one year.

The slippage ratio is a term often used by banks in India to mean the ratio of standard assets slipping to substandard category. So, if, say 2% of the performing loans in the past 1 year have slipped into NPA category, and the weighted average life of the loans in the pool is, say, 2.5 years (say, based on average maturity of loans to be 5 years), the minimum first loss tranche should be [2% * 2.5%] = 5% of the pool value.

In India, currently the thickness of the first loss support depends on the recommendations of the credit rating agencies (CRAs). Typically, the thresholds prescribed by the CRAs are thick enough, and we don’t foresee any challenge to be faced by the financial institutions with respect to compliance with this point.

EU’s Guidelines on Significant Risk Transfer

The guidelines for evidencing significant risk transfer, as provided in the draft Guidelines, are inspired from the EU’s Guidelines on Significant Risk Transfer. The EU Guidelines emphasizes on significant risk transfer for capital relief and states that a high level, the capital relief to the originator, post securitisation, should commensurate the extent of risk transferred by it in the transaction. One such way of examining whether the risk weights assigned to the retained portions commensurate with the risk transferred or not is by comparing it with the risk weights it would have provided to the exposure, had it acquired the same from a third party.

Where the Regulatory Authority is convinced that the risk weights assigned to the retained interests do not commensurate with the extent of risk transferred, it can deny the capital relief to the originator.

Under three circumstances, a transaction is deemed to have achieved SRT and they are:

  1. Where there is a mezzanine tranche involved in the structure: the originator does not retain more than 50% of the risk weighted exposure amounts of mezzanine securitisation positions, where these are:
  • positions to which a risk weight lower than 1,250% applies; and
  • more junior than the most senior position in the securitisation and more junior than any position in the securitisation rated Credit Quality Step 1 or 2.
  1. Where there is no mezzanine tranche involved in the structure: the originator does not hold more than 20% of the exposure values of securitisation positions that are subject to a deduction or 1,250% risk weight and where the originator can demonstrate that the exposure value of such securitisation positions exceeds a reasoned estimate of the expected loss on the securitised exposures by a substantial margin.
  2. The competent authority may grant permission to an originator to make its own assessment if it is satisfied that the originator can meet certain requirements.

In case, the originator wishes to achieve SRT with the help of 1 & 2, the same has to be notified to the regulator. If as per the regulator, the risk weights assigned by the originator does not commensurate with the risks transferred, the firms will not be able to avail the reduced risk weights.

Underlying assumptions behind the SRT conditions

The underlying assumptions behind the SRT conditions have been elucidated in the EU’s Discussion Paper on Significant Risk Transfer in Securitisation.

  1. Mezzanine test: This is applicable where the transaction has a mezzanine tranche. Usually the first loss tranches are meant to cover up the expected losses in a pool and the mezzanine tranches are meant for covering up the unexpected losses, irrespective of whether the equity/ first loss tranche is retained by the originator or sold off to a third party. The mezzanine test is indifferent with regard to the retention or transfer to third parties of securitisation positions mainly or exclusively covering the EL — given potential losses on these tranches are already completely anticipated through the CET1 deduction/application of 1250% risk weight if they are retained.
  2. First loss test: This is applicable where the transaction does not have a mezzanine tranche. In such a situation, the first loss tranche is expected to cover up the entire expected and unexpected losses. This is clear from the language of the EU SRT guidelines which states, that the securitisation exposure in the first loss tranche must be substantially higher than the expected losses on the securitisation exposure. In this case, due to the pari passu allocation of the actual losses to holders of the securitisation positions that are subject to CET1 deduction/1250% risk weight (irrespective of whether these losses relate to the EL or UL), the first loss test may effectively require the originator to transfer also parts of the EL, depending on the specific structure of the transaction and, in particular, on which portion of the UL is actually covered by the positions subject to CET1 deduction/1250% risk weight

The following graphics will illustrate the conditions better:

In figure 1, the mezzanine tranche is thick enough to cover the entire unexpected losses. If in the present case, 50% of the total unexpected losses are transferred to a third party, then the transaction shall qualify for capital relief.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Unlike in case of figure 1, in figure 2, the mezzanine tranche does not capture the entire unexpected losses. The thickness of the tranche is much less than what it should have been, and the remaining amount of unexpected losses have been included in the first loss tranche itself.

In the present case, even if the mezzanine tranche does not commensurate with the unexpected losses, the transaction will still qualify for capital relief, because, if the first loss tranche is retained by the originator, it will have to be either deducted from CET1/ assign risk weights of 1250%

 

 

 

In figure 3, there is no mezzanine tranche. In the present case, the first loss tranche covers the entire expected as well as the unexpected losses. In order to demonstrate a significant risk transfer, the originator can retain a maximum of 20% of the securitisation exposure.

 

 

 

 

Conclusion

Currently, the draft Directions do not provide any logic behind the conditions it inserted for the purpose of capital relief, neither are they as elaborate as the ones under EU Guidelines. Some explicit clarity in this regard in the final Directions will provide the necessary clarity.

Also, with respect the mezzanine test, in the Indian context, the condition should be coupled with a condition that the first loss tranche, when retained by the originator, must attract 1250% risk weights or be deducted from CET 1. Only then, the desired objective of transferring significant risks of unexpected losses, will be achieved.

Further, as pointed out earlier in the note, there is a clear conflict in the conditions laid down in the para 16 and that in the first loss test in para 79, which must be resolved.

Comparison on Draft Framework for sale of loans with existing guidelines and task force recommendations

On 8th June, 2020, RBI issued the Draft Comprehensive Framework for Sale of loan exposures for public comments. This draft framework has brought about major changes in the regulatory framework governing direct assignment. One of the major changes is that the framework has removed MRR requirements in case of DA transactions. The framework covers both Sale of Standard Assets as well as stressed assets in separate chapter. We shall be coming up with a separate detailed analysis of sale of stressed assets under the draft framework.
In continuation of our earlier brief write-up titled Originated to transfer – new RBI regime on loan sales permits risk transfer, here we bring a point by point comparative along with our comments on the changes. Further, we have covered the Draft Directions on sale of loans in a Presentation on Draft Directions Sale of Loans.

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Webinar on Securitisation and sale of standard assets: The evolving regulatory regime

2 hours of talk and discussion on

12th June, 2020, from 11.30 to 13.30 hrs

By

Vinod Kothari

See details here – http://vinodkothari.com/webinar-on-securitisation-and-sale-of-standard-assets/

Comparison of the Draft Securitisation Framework with existing guidelines and committee recommendations

On 8th June, 2020, RBI issued the Draft Framework for Securitisation of Standard Assets for public comments. This draft Framework has brought about major changes in the regulatory framework governing securitisation. This framework on one hand, brings with itself a few new concepts to securitisation and alters the existing framework on the other. The capital requirements are aligned with that of Basel framework for securitisation, besides the minimum quantitative threshold. We have come up with a detailed analysis of capital requirements under the draft framework in another write up titled ‘Inherent inconsistencies in quantitative conditions for capital relief‘.
In continuation of our earlier brief write-up titled New regime for securitisation and sale of financial assets, here we bring a point by point comparative along with our comments on the changes. Further, we have covered the Draft Directions on securitisation in a Presentation on Draft Directions on Securitisation of Standard Assets. 

Read more

Originated to transfer- new RBI regime on loan sales permits risk transfers

Team, Vinod Kothari Consultants P. Ltd.

finserv@vinodkothari.com

Major changes have been proposed by the RBI in the regime on what has become a major part of the business model of NBFCs and MFIs in the country – direct assignments (DAs). We have separately dealt with the Draft Directions on Securitisation of Standard Assets in a write up titled “New regime for securitisation and sale of financial assets

The term DA is so very typical of the Indian scene – globally, the practice of loan trading, loan sales or so-called whole-loan transfers has largely been out of the regulatory domain. However, in India, the motivation to shift from securitisation to DAs were partly the RBI Guidelines of 2006 which regulated securitisation but did not regulate DAs, and partly, the tax issues on securitisation that began prominent around 2011-12 or so. However, the DA model has, over the years, been a sizeable part of securitisation volumes in India, and is the mainstay of transfer of priority-sector loans from NBFCs to banks. Now that NBFCs have been permitted a major push for MSE lending by several GoI schemes, NBFCs are eagerly looking for another round of DA drive, and therefore, it is important to see whether the proposed regulatory regime for loan sales will facilitate NBFC-originated loans to end up on the books of banks and other investors.

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New regime for securitisation and sale of financial assets

Team, Vinod Kothari Consultants

finserv@vinodkothari.com

On Monday, 8th June, 2020, the RBI released, for public comments, two separate draft guidelines, one for securitisation of standard assets, and the other for sale of loans. Once implemented, these guidelines will replace the existing regulatory framework that has stood ground, in case of securitisation for the last 14 years, and 8 years in case of direct assignment. We have separately dealt with the Draft Directions on Securitisation of Standard Assets in a write up titled “Originated to transfer- new RBI regime on loan sales permits risk transfers

Read more

Leasing: The way forward in the post COVID-19 world

Timothy Lopes, Senior Executive, Vinod Kothari Consultants

finserv@vinodkothari.com

The leasing market has always proven to be strong and growing in emerging as well as developed markets through all stages of an economic cycle. According to a US country survey report by White Clarke Group, the US equipment finance industry at the end of 2018 was roughly US$ 900 billion. This was expected to grow at around 3.9% during 2019.

COVID-19 has disrupted businesses and entities as much as it has affected personal lives. As businesses learn to live the new normal, there have to be lot of realization for acquisition of capital assets in time to come. Businesses will arguably find it much easier to connect their payment obligations to their own revenues, so as to have minimum stress and maximum focus on operations.

Demand for capital equipment, vehicles, software, etc. would have slowed down owing to covid disruption. This lower demand results from lower cash in hand to fund any outright equipment purchases. Going forward too, post the COVID-19 scenario, “buying” equipment, etc. would not be a feasible option.

Leasing on the other hand, has in the past proven to be a strong financing alternative even at times of a depression. During the great depression back in the 1930’s, companies that resorted to leasing out equipment and software performed rather well in stress scenarios. To take an example of IBM Corporation, which then derived well over half of its income from leasing, and of United Shoe Machinery Corporation, which distributed virtually all its machine products through leases while the US GDP took a major hit during the 1930-1935 period.

Figure – Leasing during the great depression (1930)

Source: Lease Financing and Hire Purchase, Fourth Edition 1996 by Vinod Kothari

 

Source: Bureau of Economic Affairs, US Department of Commerce

Under leasing plans, since the buyer does not have to put in any capital investment, he may be able to acquire equipment even during a period of depression. Thus, leasing serves to maintain the growth of a manufacturer’s sales during depressionary climate.[1]

Post COVID-19 scenario – Could leasing be the way forward?

Presently, the global economy has entered into recession which may be comparable to the situation back in the 1930s. It is unlikely that companies would be looking to purchase assets during the post COVID-19 scenario owing to several stress factors.

Thus, leasing equipment/ software/ vehicles, etc. should be the way to go during the depression scenario. Leasing allows one to structure the payments in such a way that the cashflows arising from the asset/ equipment will itself service the rentals associated with the asset/ equipment, which is the likely factor to increase the propensity to finance through leasing.

Properly structured, lease transactions have the potential to turn assets into services – enabling users to get to use assets without having to lock capital therein. It is our belief that leasing provides the way for users of capital equipment to acquire assets, keeping their businesses asset-light.

Further, according to a survey done on the impact of COVID-19 on lease financing by Equipment Leasing & Finance Foundation (ELFF), over the next four months, none of the respondents expect more access to capital to fund equipment acquisitions, while some of the survey respondents believe demand for leases and loans to fund capital expenditures (capex) will increase over the next four months.

The Monthly Confidence Index (MCI) for the Equipment Finance Industry, for the month of May, 2020 was at 25.8%, up from 22.3% in April, 2020.

Further, another report by ELFF suggests that capital investment will suffer due to the pandemic. Leasing, however, would enable the buyer to acquire an asset while not having to put in any capital investment.

Global leasing trends

Leasing volumes have seen strong growth across geographies over the 2002-2018 period. This is reflected by the volumes in major regions reported by the White Clarke Group: Global Leasing Report 2020 shown below –

Conclusion

Leasing would be a feasible solution in the upcoming recovery period. The cashflows generated from the asset on lease would service the rentals on the asset, thereby having the asset finance itself, considering that no one would be willing to put in any major capital investment in the times to come.

In India, the penetration of leasing has been fraction of a percentage, compared to global levels, where average penetration has been upwards of 20% consistently. Several factors, including tax disparities, have been responsible.

With innovation as the working tool, solutions may be designed to provide customers with effective asset acquisition solutions.

See our resources on leasing here –

http://vinodkothari.com/leasehome/

[1] Source – Lease Financing and Hire Purchase, Fourth Edition 1996 by Vinod Kothari

 

Implications of IBC Ordinance, 2020- Quick Round up

Resolution Division, 

(resolution@vinodkothari.com)

The President today signed in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2020 [‘Ordinance’] to implement the already-talked-about abatement of IBC filings for the period of the COVID disruption, and accordingly, amend the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 [‘Code’]. We analyse the Ordinance in quick bullet points –

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New CSR avenues, innovative bonds and much more in the Social Stock Exchange package!

Timothy Lopes, Executive, Vinod Kothari Consultants

finserv@vinodkothari.com

– with updates as on 30-07-2022

In the Union Budget of 2019-2020 the Hon’ble Finance Minister proposed “to initiate steps towards creating an electronic fund raising platform – a Social Stock Exchange (‘SSE’) – under the regulatory ambit of Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) for listing social enterprises and voluntary organizations working for the realization of a social welfare objective so that they can raise capital as equity, debt or as units like a mutual fund.”

A Working Group was subsequently formed on 19th September, 2019 to recommend possible structures and mechanisms for the SSE. We have tried to analyse and examine what the framework would look like based on global SSEs already prevalent in a separate write up.

On 1st June, 2020, the Working Group on Social Stock Exchange published its report for public comments. In this write up we intend to analyse the recommendations made by the working group along with its impact.

The idea of a Social Stock Exchange

Social enterprises in India exist in large numbers and in several legal forms, for e.g. trusts, societies, section 8 companies, companies, partnership firms, sole proprietorships, etc. Further, a social enterprise can be either a For-Profit Enterprise (‘FPE’) or a Non-Profit Enterprise (‘NPO’). The ultimate objective of these enterprises is to create a social impact by carrying out philanthropic or sustainable development activities.

Certain gaps exist for social enterprises in terms of funding, having a common repository able to track these entities and their performance. The sources of funding for social enterprises have been philanthropic funding, CSR, impact investing, government agencies, etc.

Funding is important in terms of the effectiveness of NPOs in creating an impact. The funding, however, is contingent upon demonstration of impact or outcomes.

Here comes the idea and role of a social stock exchange. An SSE proposed to be set up is intended to fill the gaps not only in terms of funding, but also to put in place a comprehensive framework that creates standards for measuring and reporting social impact.

Who is eligible to be listed on the SSE?

The SSE is intended for listing of social enterprises, whether for-profit or non-profit. Listing would unlock the funds from donors, philanthropists, CSR spenders and other foundations into social enterprises.

There is no new legal form recommended by the working group which a social enterprise will have to establish in order to get listed. Rather, the existing legal forms (trusts, societies, section 8 companies, etc.) will enable a NPO or FPE to get listed through more than one mode.

Is there any minimum criteria for listing on the SSE?

In case of NPOs, the minimum reporting standards recommended to be implemented, require the NPO to report that it has received donations/contributions of at least INR 10,00,000 in the last financial year.

Further, in case of FPEs, it must have received funding from any one or more of the impact investors who are members of the Impact Investors Council. Certain eligibility conditions for equity listings would also apply in case of FPEs, as per the SEBI’s Issue of Capital, Disclosure Requirements (ICDR).

The working group has requested SEBI to look into the following aspects of eligibility and recalibrate the existing thresholds in the ICDR:

  • Minimum Net Worth;
  • Average Operating Profit;
  • Prior Holding by QIBs, and;
  • Criteria for Accredited Investor (if a role for such investors is envisaged).

Listing, compliance and penalty provisions must be aptly stringent to prevent any misuse of SSE platform by FPEs.

What is a social enterprise? Is the term defined?

Social enterprises broadly fall under two forms – A For-Profit Enterprise and a Non-Profit Enterprise.

For-Profit Enterprise – A FPE generally has a business model made to earn profits but does so with the intent of creating a social impact. An example would be creating innovative and environmental friendly products. FPEs are generally in the form of Companies.

Non-Profit Enterprise – NPOs have the intention of creating a social impact for the better good without expecting any return on investment. These are generally in the form of trusts, societies and Section 8 companies. These entities cannot issue equity. The exception to this is a section 8 company which can issue equity shares, however, there can be no dividend payment.

The working group defines a social enterprise as a class or category of enterprises that are engaging in the business of “creating positive social impact”. However, the group does not recommend a legal/regulatory definition but recommends a minimum reporting standard that brings out this aspect clearly, by requiring all social enterprises, whether they are FPEs or NPOs, to state an intent to create positive social impact, to describe the nature of the impact they wish to create, and to report the impact that they have created. There will be an additional requirement for FPEs to conform to the assessment mechanism to be developed by SEBI.

Therefore, an enterprise is “social” not by virtue of satisfying a legal definition but by virtue of committing to the minimum reporting standard.

Since there would be no legal definition to classify as a social enterprise, a careful screening process would be required in order to enable only genuine social enterprises to list on the exchange.

Who are the possible participants of the SSE?

What are the instruments that can be listed? What are the other funding structures? What is the criteria for listing?

In case of Section 8 companies, there is no restriction on issue of shares or debt. However, there is no dividend payment allowed on equity shares. Further, there is no real regulatory hurdle in listing shares or debt instruments of Section 8 companies. However, so far listing of Section 8 companies is a non-existent concept, as these avenues have not been utilized by Section 8 companies apparently due to their inherent inability to provide financial return on investments.

The working group recognises that trusts and societies are not body corporates under the Companies Act, and hence, in the present legal framework, any bonds or debentures issued by them cannot qualify as securities under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act 1956 (SCRA).

In this regard the working group suggests introducing a new “Zero Coupon Zero Principal” Bond to be issued by these entities. The features and other specifics of these bonds are discussed further on in this write up.

Further, it is recommended that FPEs can list their equity on the SSE subject to certain eligibility conditions for equity listings as per the SEBI’s Issue of Capital, Disclosure Requirements (ICDR) and social impact reporting.

Funding structures and other instruments are discussed further on in the write up.

What are the minimum reporting standards?

One of the important pre-requisites to listing on the SSE is to commit to the minimum reporting standards prescribed. The working group has laid down minimum reporting standards for the immediate term to be implemented as soon as the SSE goes live. The minimum reporting standards broadly cover the areas shown in the figure below –

The details of the minimum reporting standard are stated in Annexure 2 to the working group report. The working group states in its report that over time, the reporting requirements can begin to incorporate more rigour in a graded and deliberate manner.

Overall, it seems as though the reporting framework at the present stage is sufficient to measure performance and identify truly genuine social enterprises. The framework sets a benchmark for reporting by NPOs and FPEs and will provide the requisite comfort to investors.

Innovative bonds and funding structures

The SSE’s role is clearly not limited to only listing of securities and trading therein. The working group has recommended several innovative funding mechanisms for NPOs that may or even may not end up in creation of a listable security. Following are the highlights of the proposed structures –

1. Zero coupon zero principal bonds –

The exact modalities of this instrument are yet to be worked out by SEBI.

2. Mutual Fund Structure –

  • Under this structure, a conventional closed-ended fund structure is proposed wherein the Mutual Fund acts as the intermediary and aggregates capital from various individual and institutional investors to invest in market-based instruments;
  • The returns generated out of such fund is will be channelled to the NPOs who in turn will utilise the funds for its stated project;
  • The principal component will be repaid back to the investors, while the returns would be considered as donations made by them;
  • There could also be a specific tax benefit arising out of this structure;
  • The other benefit of this structure is that the role of the intermediary can be played by existing AMCs.

3. The Social/ Development Impact Bond/ Lending Partner Structure –

These bonds are unique in a way that they returns on the bonds are linked to the success of the project being funded. This is similar to a structured finance framework involving the following –

  • Risk Investors/ Lenders (Banks/ NBFCs) – Provide the initial capital investment for the project;
  • Intermediary – Acts as the intermediating body between all parties. The intermediary will pass on the funds to the NPO;
  • NPO (Implementing Agency) – will use the funds for achieving the social outcomes promised;
  • 3rd party evaluator – An independent evaluator who will measure and validate the outcomes of the project;
  • Outcome Funder – Based on the third party evaluation the outcome funders will pay the Principal and Interest to the risk investors/ lending partners in case the outcome of the project is successful. In case the outcome is not successful the outcome funders have the option to not pay the risk investors/ lending partners.

Although banks may not be looking into risky lending, the structure provides incentive to the bank in the form of Priority Sector Lending (PSL) qualification. In order to meet their PSL targets, banks may choose to lend under this structure.

4. Pay-for-success through grants –

This structure is where a new CSR aspect comes in. The working group recommends a structure which is similar to the pay-for-success structures stated earlier however, this required the CSR arm of a Company to select the NPO for implementation of the project. The CSR funds are then kept in an escrow account earmarked for pay-for-success, for a pre-defined time period over which the impact is expected to be created (say 3 years).

The initial capital required by the NPO to achieve the outcomes, will be provided by an interim funding partner (typically a domestic philanthropic organization, and distinct from the third-party evaluator).

If the CSR funder finds that the NPO has achieved the outcomes, then it pays out the CSR capital from the escrow account partly to the interim funding partner (similar to the earlier mentioned pay-for success structures), and partly to the NPO in the form of an accelerator grant up to 10% of the program cost in case the NPO exceeds the pre-defined outcome targets. The grant to the NPO is designed to provide additional support for non-programmatic areas such as research, capacity building, etc.

If the CSR funder finds that the NPO has not achieved the outcomes, then it either rolls over the CSR capital in the escrow account (if the pre-defined time period is not yet over), or routes the CSR capital to items provided under Schedule 7 of the Companies Act such as the PM’s Relief Fund (if the pre-defined time period is over).

An avenue for Corporate Social Responsibility

The implementation of the SSE will provide a new platform, not just for CSR spending but also a trading platform for trading in a “CSR certificates” between corporates with excess CSR expenditure and those with a deficit in a particular year.

Investment in securities listed on the SSE are likely to qualify as CSR expenditure. However, necessary amendments in the Companies Act, 2013 will also be required to permit the same to qualify as CSR expenditure. The working group has made the necessary policy recommendations in its report.

Trading platform for CSR spending –

India is one of the only countries that has mandated CSR spending. In a particular year, a Company may fail to meet its required spending obligations owing to several reasons. The High Level Committee on CSR had recommended the transfer of unspent CSR funds to a separate account and the said amount should be spent within 3 years from the transfer failing which the funds would be transferred to a fund specified in Schedule VII. The necessary provisions were inserted by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2019, however, the same is yet to be notified.

The working group has proposed a new model that could solve the issue of unspent CSR funds. It is recommended that CSR Certificates [may be negotiable instruments, somewhat similar to Priority Sector Lending Certificates (PSLCs)], be enabled to be bought and sold on a separate trading platform. This will allow Companies which have unspent CSR funds to transfer these funds to those Companies that have spent excess for CSR in a particular year. This in turn motivates Companies to spend more than the minimum required CSR amount in a particular year.

The certificates are recommended to have a validity of 3-5 years but may be used only once. In order to avoid any profit making on excess CSR spends, it is recommended that these transactions must involve only a flat transaction fee that gets charged to the platform and involves actual transfer of funds.

Further, the working group has recommended that If the platform as described above succeeds in facilitating the trading of CSR certificates, the government might then consider licensing private platforms that provide an auction mechanism for the trading of CSR certificates (similar to the RBI’s licenses for Trade Receivables Discounting Systems or TReDS). However, this would require additional clarifications on whether CSR certificates must have the status of negotiable instruments or not and on how companies are to treat any profits from the sale of such certificates.

Conclusion

The recommendations of the working group has given an expanded role to the SSE. The working group also attempted to address the role of the SSE in terms of COVID-19 by proposing the creation of a separate COVID-19 Aid Fund to activate solutions such as pay-for-success bonds which can be used to provide loan guarantees to NBFC-MFIs that wish to extend debt moratoriums to their customers.

Necessary changes in law have also been recommended, while several other tax incentives have been recommended by the working group.

The SSE framework seems to be interesting in the Indian context. Nevertheless, the implementation of the same is yet to be seen.

Developments taken place since the WG report

Subsequent to the Working Group Report published on 1st June, 2020, several developments have taken place relating to a framework for SSE. A Technical Group on SSE was constituted by SEBI on 21st September, 2020 which submitted its report on 6th May, 2021[1].

The key recommendations of the Technical Group (which built upon the recommendations of the WG) included recommendations relating to eligibility of social enterprise for SSE, on-boarding of NPOs and FPEs, various instruments available for NPOs and FPEs, offer document content for social enterprises, social venture funds, capacity building fund, social auditors, information repositories and disclosures on SSE.

Our article on the recommendations of the Technical Group can be viewed here.

Public comments were invited and received on the report of the Technical Group. Subsequent to this, SEBI in its Board meeting dated 28th September, 2021, discussed the agenda relating ‘Framework for Social Stock Exchange’[2] which was considered and approved and amendments to several regulations were proposed. Further, SEBI in its Board meeting dated 15th February, 2022, discussed the agenda relating to ‘Regulatory Framework for Social Stock Exchanges’[3] which was also considered and approved.

On 15th July, 2022[4], the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-clause (iia) of clause (h) of section 2 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (‘SCR Act’) declared “zero coupon zero principal instruments” as “securities” for the purpose of the SCR Act.

Further, pursuant to these developments, on 25th July, 2022, SEBI has amended the following regulations to lay down a framework for SSE –

  1. Securities and Exchange Board of India (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015[5];
  2. Securities and Exchange Board of India (Alternative Investment Funds), 2012[6];
  3. Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018[7].

Amendments to other Acts (as proposed in the Working Group and Technical Group reports) that fall outside the purview of SEBI, such as the Companies Act, 2013, Income Tax Act, 1961, etc. are yet to be made.

[1] https://www.sebi.gov.in/reports-and-statistics/reports/may-2021/technical-group-report-on-social-stock-exchange_50071.html

[2] https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/meetingfiles/oct-2021/1633606607609_1.pdf

[3] https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/meetingfiles/feb-2022/1645691296343_1.pdf

[4] https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/gazette-notification/jul-2022/declaration-of-zero-coupon-zero-principal-instruments-as-securities-under-the-securities-contracts-regulation-act-1956_60875.html

[5] https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/regulations/jul-2022/securities-and-exchange-board-of-india-listing-obligations-and-disclosure-requirements-fifth-amendment-regulations-2022_61169.html

[6] https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/regulations/jul-2022/securities-and-exchange-board-of-india-alternative-investment-funds-third-amendment-regulations-2022_61156.html

[7] https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/regulations/jul-2022/securities-and-exchange-board-of-india-issue-of-capital-and-disclosure-requirements-third-amendment-regulations-2022_61171.html