Perched at the Peak: Compliance Officer as CXO

– Do LODR changes force all companies to change their org structures?

– Vinita Nair, Senior Partner (corplaw@vinodkothari.com)

This version: 3rd April, 2025 (Updated as per SEBI Circular dated 1st April, 2025)

With the enforcement of recent amendments in LODR Regulations effective December 12, 2024 a qualified company secretary appointed as a Compliance Officer (‘CO’) is required to be an officer, who is in whole-time employment of the listed entity, not more than one level below the board of directors, designated as a Key Managerial Personnel (‘KMP’) and form part of senior management.

Listed entities now face the question of whether this entails a re-look at the organisation structure, hierarchy, profile of the CO? Whether the board of directors needs to be sensitised of this requirement and the impact, if any?

Watch our YouTube video on the same here.

Scope of “compliance”

The Basel paper of 2005 gives clarity on what is compliance, and the ambit of compliance function.  First of all, the scope of the word “compliance” is not limited to laws and regulations only. “Compliance laws, rules and standards have various sources, including primary legislation, rules and standards issued by legislators and supervisors, market conventions, codes of practice promoted by industry associations, and internal codes of conduct applicable to the staff members of the bank. For the reasons mentioned above, these are likely to go beyond what is legally binding and embrace broader standards of integrity and ethical conduct.”

The compliance function is a cornerstone of an entity’s governance, internal control, and risk management framework. It includes the systems, procedures, and organisational infrastructure required to ensure:

  1. Compliance with all statutory and regulatory requirements;
  2. Maintenance of high standards of market conduct;
  3. Implementation of effective systems for managing conflicts of interest;
  4. Fair treatment of customers;
  5. Delivery of suitable and high-quality customer service;
  6. Compliance with the various codes of conducts (including the voluntary ones) and their own internal rules, policies and procedures.

Appointment of Compliance Officers (‘COs’)

Appointment of COs is required under different statutes. In case of listed entities, for the purpose of ensuring compliance with securities law, appointment of CO is specified in the initial listing regulations viz. SEBI ICDR[1], SEBI ILNCS[2] Regulations and the responsibility of CO for continuous listing requirement is included in the common obligations under LODR. In case of LODR the person is required to be a qualified Company Secretary (‘CS’) and in case of ILNCS, the CS of the issuer is required to be the CO. Similarly, the requirement under the Listing Agreement[3] was to appoint the CS of the issuer as the CO.

SEBI PIT Regulations (applicable to a listed entity as well as an intermediary/ fiduciary) requires appointment of a senior officer, who is financially literate and is capable of appreciating requirements for legal and regulatory compliance under PIT regulations as the CO, who reports to the board of directors and ensures compliance of policies, procedures, UPSI preservation, implementation of codes etc, under the overall supervisions of the board of directors.

Additionally, Banks, NBFCs, Insurance companies, SEBI registered intermediaries, etc all are required to appoint CO as per laws specifically applicable to the company operating in that particular sector.

Whether one person can serve as CO for each of the above requirements? This is surely feasible, unless there is an express bar. For e.g., in case of banking regs/ NBFCs regs, there is a bar on dual hatting – that is, the CO as per those laws should not be dealing with any other line function. 

Position of CO under LODR post amendment

It may be contended that the role of a CS is a mix of compliance and ministerial functions. He/ she may be tasked with several other functions as well – depending on the organization. The provision of the LODR Regs is obviously not concerned with either other functions performed by the CO, nor with other compliance roles.

The intent of the provision, as we read it, is that the compliance function pertaining to LODR Regs is directly discharged by the CO under the supervision of the board of directors. The board has the supervisory responsibility, and the CO has the executive responsibility. The provision is intended to attach significance to the organisation-wide role of compliance function.

As observed from the report of the Expert Committee, recommendations were made for strengthening the position of the CO. The challenge faced by the CO, despite forming part of ‘senior management’, was inability to advise the management to act in accordance with the law and being in a position to get influenced by other people in senior management due to the reporting structure. Therefore, the suggestion was for appropriate positioning to get adequate power, commensurate with the responsibilities cast upon the CO, to be able to advise the management on points of law and ensure effective discharge of statutory duties and responsibilities.

In the light of above, the regulations now clarify the position of the CO by having them one level below the board of directors. Here the intent of the regulator, in our reading, did not seem to define the organisational structure, but to clear the path for the CO for effective discharge of its responsibilities. In our view, the amendment results in fixing the responsibility of the CO and that the CO, now, cannot shirk its responsibility or cannot take the pretext of being a junior person, having no power or access, having a reporting line limited to someone in senior management. It now provides the CO with straight access to the board of directors, when it comes to ensuring compliance with LODR requirements. To the extent of the compliance function the CO will now be directly accountable to the board.

The way we read this requirement is that it certainly attaches significance to the compliance function, and therefore, may result in repositioning of compliance officers in the organization hierarchy. But is the law concerned with organisation hierarchy, designations, scales, ranks, etc? In our view, the objective of the law is attained by a functional reporting line to the board. This is also evident from SEBI’s analysis of the suggestions/ comments received,[4] that the objective is to empower COs to perform their duties and discharge their responsibilities effectively. Some companies do have the practice of having a CO report to the Managing Director / CEO. However, it is for the listed entity to decide the reporting structure of its KMPs and senior management while ensuring compliance with the regulatory requirements.

However, SEBI has issued a Circular dated April 1, 2025, where SEBI states: it  is  clarified  that  the  term  ‘level’  used  in  regulation  6(1)  refers  to  the position of the Compliance Officer in the organization structure of the listed entity. Therefore, ‘one level  below  the  board  of  directors’  means  one level  below  the  Managing  Director  or Whole-time Director (s) who are part of the Board of Directors of the listed entity.” After issuing this Circular, SEBI staff has also issued two Informal Guidance letters, being for DCB Bank Ltd and Pakka Ltd

Hence, SEBI seems to be clearly opining that SEBI is intending the organisational hierarchy of the entities to also be adjusted to reflect the CO’s position at one level below the board.

Reporting structure of CO post amendment

Organizational hierarchy is a matter of many things. Regular reporting structure for the various functions that a position has:  lines of authority and responsibility, scales and other benefits related to the scale, promotion policies, regular administrative roles such as approval of claims, benefits, etc

The CO stands empowered to manage the compliance function independently and without fear, and to that extent the CO needs to report to the board. However, boards meet infrequently. The company may or may not have an MD/ WTD – it may be working with a CEO/president reporting to the board. It is quite possible in an organisation to have one or more WTDs who report to the MD. There are several officers who report to the MD but their level in the organisation is not the same as those of other seniors placed at one level below the board. In such cases, whether the CO reporting to an MD is a sufficient compliance? SEBI’s IG, specifically in the matter of DCB Bank Ltd , seems to answer in the negative. Therefore, SEBI suggests the organisational levels also to align to the expected reporting lines. Therefore, the amendment, seen in the SEBI’s circular of 1st April,  is concerned with both reporting lines as well as organisational hierarchy of the CO. Irrespective of the SEBI Board agenda dated 30th September, 2024 stating that organisational structure is an internal matter for companies, “…it is for the listed entity to decide the  reporting  structure  of  its  KMPs  and  senior  management  while ensuring compliance with the regulatory requirements”,  it seems that the regulator has done so in the 1st April 2025 circular. Although, in general, the organisational hierarchy usually corresponds to and is commensurate with functional hierarchy; however, the law has sought to interfere with the organisational structure.

CS as CO under LODR

Does the amendment necessitate a relook on whether the CS can continue as CO? The answer to this also seems negative, as law only prescribes who can be the CO. SEBI has also clarified that the CO and CS may be different persons. While law admits having different persons occupying the position, practically, it seems less feasible in view of the overlap and interconnectedness in the functions discharged by a CS in terms of Companies Act, 2013 and by a CO under LODR.

Actionable for listed entities

The amendment is certainly required to be sensitised to the board of directors. However, do the regulations expect companies across the country to revisit their organisational structures? SEBI has expressed its views in the 1st April, 2025 circular. Therefore, listed entities need to evaluate if the functional level and organisational level of the CO is in line with the regulatory requirements and expectations. If no, listed entities may want to revisit the same.

Power brings onus

Everyone may also readily understand that SEBI’s intent in empowering the CO is not just to confer a new power, but to be able to hold the CO answerable for any compliance gaps. Therefore, if it is a new cap that the CO is donning, the cap is made of flowers and nettles both.


[1] Reg 23 (8) ICDR – The issuer shall appoint a compliance officer who shall be responsible for monitoring the compliance of the securities laws and for redressal of investors’ grievances.

[2] Reg 27 (4) of ILNCS – The lead manager(s) shall ensure that the draft offer document clearly specifies the names and contact particulars including the postal and email address and telephone number of the compliance officer who shall be a Company Secretary of the issuer.

[3] The requirement was notified on May 18, 1999 pursuant to the recommendations of the Accounting Standards Committee constituted by SEBI under the Chairmanship of Shri Y. H. Malegam to the effect that Compliance officer to be appointed by Listed companies in Compliance  with Circular No. SMD/POLICY/CIR-06/98 dated February, 12, 1988 (every company shall appoint a Senior Officer as Compliance Officer) shall  be the Company Secretary of the Company.

[4] Agenda of SEBI BM dated September 30, 2024 [Clause (iii) (a) of Para 28.3.2].


Other Resources on LODR:

  1. Webinar: Online workshop on SEBI LODR 3rd Amendment Regulations 2024
  2. Youtube video: Position of Compliance Officer: Analysing ‘one level below the board’
  3. The Load of LODR: Listing regulations become more prescriptive
  4. Presentation on LODR 3rd Amendment Regulations, 2024

Presentation on LODR 3rd Amendment Regulations, 2024


Loader Loading…
EAD Logo Taking too long?

Reload Reload document
| Open Open in new tab

Download as PDF [673.91 KB]

Read our other resources:

  1. The Load of LODR: Listing regulations become more prescriptive
  2. Webinar: Online workshop on SEBI LODR 3rd Amendment Regulations 2024
  3. Youtube video: Position of Compliance Officer: Analysing ‘one level below the board’
  4. Perched at the Peak: Compliance Officer as CXO

LODR Resource Centre

Online workshop on SEBI LODR 3rd Amendment Regulations, 2024

Participation is free. Register here – https://forms.gle/HsahWP3YmWnVXmRL7

The Load of LODR: Listing regulations become more prescriptive

SEBI notifies changes that take immediate effect

– By Team Corplaw (corplaw@vinodkothari.com)

– Updated as on 24.01.2025

Please find details about our workshop on the same here: https://vinodkothari.com/2024/12/online-workshop-on-sebi-lodr-3rd-amendment-2024/

Loader Loading…
EAD Logo Taking too long?

Reload Reload document
| Open Open in new tab

Download as PDF [289.04 KB]


Other Resources on LODR:

  1. Webinar: Online workshop on SEBI LODR 3rd Amendment Regulations 2024
  2. Youtube video: Position of Compliance Officer: Analysing ‘one level below the board’
  3. Presentation on LODR 3rd Amendment Regulations, 2024
  4. Perched at the Peak: Compliance Officer as CXO

Share-hawkers of digital era: Legality of platforms offering unlisted shares

SEBI cautions investors from transacting in securities of unlisted public companies on electronic platforms

– Burhanuddin Kholiya (corplaw@vinodkothari.com)

From rental rooms to cabs to domestic furniture, almost everything is made available using technological aggregators. But the moment one tries to sell securities on public platforms, the chances of potential investors being duped by dream merchants increase – something which regulators have very carefully barred over the years. Hence, unless it is a recognised stock exchange, making securities available on public platforms constitutes “offer for sale”. Sometimes, people look at the number of investors as less than 200 and tend to argue that is not a deemed public offer, but it is important to understand that if the offer has gone to people in general, the actual number of investors who bite the bait does not matter.

Many platforms encourage investments in unlisted or pre-IPO stocks. At times bunching either securities or investors. SEBI, in its press release dated December 9, 2024, warned investors against transacting on such platforms, emphasizing the risks involved and clarifying that these platforms operate outside SEBI’s regulatory framework. 

Regulatory framework for platforms:

On the intermediaries front, stock brokers are permitted to deal only on recognised stock exchanges and are prohibited from facilitating trading outside these exchanges. In 2022, SEBI extended its regulatory framework to Online Bond Platform Providers (‘OBPP’) by mandating them to register as stock brokers in the debt segment and restricted their offerings to  listed debt securities or debt proposed to be listed through a public offering. Only recognized stock exchanges are authorised to provide a platform for fund raising  and  trading  in  securities  of  “to  be  listed”  and  “listed”  companies.

Apart from above, today, numerous platforms have emerged offering unlisted securities to the public at large. However, being unregulated, it poses significant risks to investors. While SEBI’s mandate may not extend to unlisted securities, it continues to caution investors about platforms dealing with such securities. Recognizing the potential risks and lack of oversight, SEBI and the Registrar of Companies (ROC) have issued several orders against platforms offering unlisted securities to the public. These actions aim to protect investors from being misled and address violations of private placement & public issue related provisions under the Companies Act, 2013. 

Modus Operandi of unlisted share brokers

Unlisted securities are primarily traded by way of a transfer. Traditionally, the transfer of securities is a private arrangement between two identified parties, namely the transferor and the transferee, who explicitly agree on the sale and purchase of a fixed number of securities. 

The key distinction between transfer of securities and public offer of securities lies in the pre-identification of parties, exclusive offer and defined terms. 

Therefore, when securities are offered for sale to unidentified persons without limiting the number of purchasers, this could effectively constitute an indirect public offer (which also includes an offer for sale). 

As pointed out above, many unregistered platforms offering unlisted securities have emerged. These platforms often target unidentified persons and provide no limit on the number of purchasers, effectively transforming such offers into indirect public offers in the form of “offer for sale”.

Listing securities for sale on a publicly accessible platform may, intentionally or unintentionally, transform a private arrangement into an offer resembling a public offer. Unlike private transfers, public offers are subject to stringent regulatory requirements, such as issuing prospectus, detailed disclosures, and continuous regulatory oversight. Failing to adhere to these requirements could undermine investor protection and market integrity.

Structuring of Transactions as “Secondary Sale” 

The practice of structuring transactions as secondary sales is an innovative strategy employed by fintech platforms to broaden market access while navigating regulatory challenges. However, this approach raises significant concerns about compliance, investor protection, and market integrity. Striking a balance between innovation and regulatory compliance is essential to establish a transparent, fair, and robust investment ecosystem.

In this model, a fintech platform, operating through its legal entity, subscribes to securities offered via private placement by a company. Often, these platforms are the sole or principal investors in such placements. Once the securities are acquired, the platform lists them on its portal as available for investment by way of  transfers from itself to individual investors, presenting them as secondary market transactions ostensibly outside the scope of public offer regulations. The interface almost resembles a broking app, where one can click and ‘buy 1 share’ instantly.

In some cases, the platform and the warehousing entity are separate. Additionally, some platforms claim that the transferors comprise of promoters, employees, KMPs of those enlisted public companies.

Motivations behind structuring as Secondary Sale are twofold:

1.     Avoiding Public Offer Regulations:

Public offers of securities are subject to extensive regulatory oversight, including stringent disclosure requirements and mandatory listing. By structuring transactions as secondary sale, platforms consider to bypass these regulations.

2.     Enabling Retail Investor Access:

Structuring investments as secondary sale allows platforms to make securities available to retail investors who might otherwise be ineligible to participate in private placements.

Making securities available to large number of unverified investors 

As discussed earlier, an offer that can be accepted by anyone effectively qualifies as a public offer, regardless of how it is officially labeled. In contrast, private placements are designed for a limited, pre-identified group of investors and are subject to stricter regulatory controls to maintain their exclusivity.

Fintech platforms, however, challenge this distinction by leveraging technology to make securities accessible to a broad audience of unverified users, thereby creating a regulatory gray area. By listing securities on their portals—accessible to anyone who registers—these platforms effectively transform private placements into publicly available investment opportunities.

Moreover, these platforms often lack stringent verification processes to ensure that users meet the criteria for accredited or eligible investors. Instead, they use digital advertising, user-friendly applications, and social media campaigns to promote investment opportunities, indirectly engaging in general solicitation. This practice, while sometimes technically compliant, directly conflicts with the principles governing private placements, which prohibit public solicitation.

These practices raise significant concerns regarding investor protection and compliance with the existing regulatory framework. By making securities easily accessible to a wide, largely unverified audience, fintech platforms blur the line between private and public offerings. This not only undermines the purpose of private placement regulations but also exposes retail investors to potential risks without the safeguards typically associated with public offers.

While fintech platforms argue that their practices promote financial inclusion and innovation, they also highlight the urgent need for regulatory clarity. Striking a balance between fostering innovation and ensuring compliance is critical to maintain market integrity and protect investors.

Pricing Mechanism: Misalignment with Market Practices

Fintech platforms often claim that the pricing of unlisted shares is driven by demand and supply, similar to listed securities. However, this approach diverges significantly from standard practices for valuing privately placed securities, which typically rely on Fair Market Value (FMV) mechanisms.

Unlisted securities, being inherently illiquid and less transparent, are usually valued based on financial fundamentals, such as earnings, book value, or discounted cash flows, rather than speculative demand and supply dynamics. The reliance on a demand-supply pricing mechanism for illiquid securities can result in significant price distortions. Prices may be artificially inflated or deflated, often without any material change in the underlying company’s fundamentals.

This speculative approach to pricing can mislead investors into believing that the listed price represents a fair valuation of the security. In reality, such pricing mechanisms expose investors to risks of overvaluation or mispricing, especially in the absence of robust valuation methodologies.

Furthermore, the process for investors seeking to liquidate their unlisted shares on these platforms is often vague and lacks the transparency necessary for informed decision-making. Without clear guidelines on how prices are determined or how liquidity is managed, investors may face challenges in accurately assessing the risks and returns associated with their investments.

Violation of private placement & public issue norms 

The aforementioned two modes of issuance differs from each other on various parameters:

ParametersPrivate PlacementPublic Offer
MeaningOffer or invitation to a select group of persons to subscribe to securities, excluding the general public.Includes IPO or FPO of securities to the public or an offer for sale of securities by an existing shareholder through issue of prospectus.
Who can invest?Restricted to pre-identified investors addressed in the private placement offer-cum-application letter.Open to the public at large.
Maximum number of investors200 persons in a financial year, excluding QIBs and employees offered securities pursuant to ESOP scheme under Section 62 (1) (b) of CA, 2013.No maximum limit on number of investors.
Offer CommunicationCommunicated directly to the identified investor; cannot be advertised to the general public.Communicated via advertisements, circulars, or a prospectus to the public.
ProcessConducted via a private placement offer-cum-application, adhering to specific conditions outlined in Section 42 of Act.Requires a prospectus with mandatory disclosures and regulatory oversight, governed by SEBI (ICDR) Regulations, 2018

In terms of Section 25(2) of CA, 2013 a private placement will be considered as securities being offered for sale to the public if it is shown that an offer of the securities or any of them was made within 6 months after the allotment or agreement to allot; or on the date when offer was made, the consideration was not received by the company in respect of the securities. Therefore, subscribing to private placement merely with the intent to warehouse temporarily and downsell to the public will attract the public issue norms. Penal provisions for flouting private placement norms, not following public issue norms are quite stringent. 

Conclusion

While securities of public companies are freely transferable, it cannot be traded on unregulated platforms. The fintech platform’s current modus operandi raises concerns about pricing practices, process transparency, and regulatory compliance. SEBI’s advisory underscores the need for vigilance, as these platforms often lack regulatory oversight, investor safeguards, and transparency. Unlike public issues, which ensure grievance redressal mechanisms like SCORES and SMART ODR transactions on these platforms leave investors without formal recourse. The numerous platforms offering unlisted equity shares need to revisit in view of SEBI’s caution letter.

Technical hiccups in payments: Is it a default and impact the credit rating?

SEBI Circular prescribes uniform approach to be ensured by CRAs

Vinita Nair, Senior Partner & Palak Jaiswani, Manager | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Default in payment of interest or redemption amounts has far reaching repercussions for an issuer of debt securities. A delay of 1 day even of 1 rupee (of principal or interest) from the scheduled repayment date is considered as default in terms of SEBI Master Circular for Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) and the same triggers an immediate downgrade of the rating of the issuer. After a default is cured and the payments are regularized, the CRA would generally upgrade the rating from default to non-investment grade after a period of 90 days based on the satisfactory performance by the company during this period.

Inability on the part of the issuer to ensure payment in case of incorrect bank details or dormant a/c of the debenture holders resulting in bounce back of the amounts intended to be credited is a common phenomenon experienced by issuers especially in case of servicing publicly issued debentures involving retail investors. Till date, these were considered as technical default and dealt with by the CRAs in accordance with the policies framed by it. Unlike a financial default, where the issuer fails to make payments due to insufficient funds, technical defaults occur despite the issuer having sufficient funds to fulfill its payment obligations. 

SEBI Circular dated November 18, 2024 issued in line with the recommendations of the working group for CRAs for EoDB provides guidance on the manner of identification of technical default and verification and disclosures to be ensured by CRAs thereafter. In terms of the SEBI Circular, failure to remit payment due to absence of correct information or due to incorrect or dormant investor account furnished by the investor(s) or due to notice/ instruction received from a government authority to freeze the account of investor(s) will be considered as technical default.

Is technical default a default?

According to SEBI Listing Regulations, a “default” occurs when there is non-payment of interest, dividend, or principal amount on the pre-agreed date, recognized at the first instance of delay. Default is triggered when the issuer fails to pay due to insufficient funds. In contrast, a technical default happens when payment is delayed due to factors like incorrect bank account details or frozen accounts, despite the issuer having adequate funds. The Working Group also highlighted in the SEBI Circular, that instances mentioned above (as technical default) arise where the non-payment is due to reasons beyond the control of the issuer.

It is also to be considered that similar technical issues arise in case of payment of dividends, wherein the Company is unable to credit the amount in the bank account of the members due to incorrect account details provided by them. However, such cases are not treated as default.

While the term used the word ‘default’, it is actually a case of technical delay

Impact on credit ratings

CRA Master Circular requires CRAs to closely monitor the servicing of debt obligations by the issuer and review the ratings, through various modes: 

  1. stock exchange intimations made by the issuer- Regulation 57 of Listing Regulations requires issuers to inform stock exchanges on the status of payment (interest/redemption) within one working day from the due date;
  2. payment status intimated by the debenture trustees (para 3 of Chapter VIII of DT Master Circular and para 28.2.1 of CRA Master Circular);
  3. no default statements submitted by issuer on a monthly basis (para 9.3.1 of CRA master Circular)

Credit ratings reflect the creditworthiness of an issuer. Defaults trigger a downgrade to the default grade, significantly affecting the issuer’s reputation. For issuers having multiple ISINs, there may be numerous instances of technical delays, but the same does not indicate financial distress on the part of the issuer. Treating technical delays as default will lead to unjustified rating downgrades and have a negative impact on the issuer’s reputation. Technical delays, caused by factors like incorrect account details or frozen accounts, do not reflect the issuer’s financial health and cannot be treated at par with financial default.

The SEBI Circular omits the term “technical default” from the scope of policy in respect of the upgrade of default rating to investment grade rating framed by CRAs and highlights the instances of non-payment due to reasons beyond the issuer’s control. 

Steps to be followed by CRAs for technical defaults:

Conclusion:

While the SEBI Circular gives clarity on the treatment of technical defaults and obligations of the CRA in this regard, clear actionable on the part of the issuer has not been specified. Therefore, in those instances, the issuer should provide the above details to the CRA for onward disclosure. Further, the details to be provided under Reg. 57 inter alia requires providing ‘reasons for non-payment/ delay in payment’. The feasibility of reporting the same in case of technical defaults is not clear as several times the issuer becomes aware of the failure to credit the amount after 1-2 days.

Our related resources:

  1. Enhanced role of CRAs in technical defaults by issuers
  2. Regulating ESG Rating Providers in India

Stamp duty on amalgamation with subsidiaries: Clash of court rulings

– Payal Agarwal, Associate (payal@vinodkothari.com)

The confusion around stamp duty implications arise time and again on account of the same being a ‘state’ subject. In the context of amalgamation, the complexity is  heightened due to the presence of certain notifications issued by the Central Government in the pre-independence era, the validity of which is ambiguous as on date. There have been a plethora of judgements, including, by the Apex Court, to clarify that an order of amalgamation is an instrument of conveyance, and hence, covered by Article 23 of Schedule I under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (such other Article as may be relevant as per the respective State laws on stamp duty). 

However, vide the two notifications issued by the Central Government in 1937 (hereinafter referred to as the “1937 Circulars”), certain exemptions were  extended on the stamp duty implications on amalgamation upon satisfaction of certain conditions. Here, it is to be noted that the first notification dated 16th January, 1937 has been withdrawn w.e.f. 1st June, 2011 by the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi NCT. The second notification dated 25th December, 1937 applies only to the province of Delhi. No official notification has been issued w.r.t. the repeal of the second notification. However, the exemptions provided under the said notification has also not been made a part of the amended Schedule I issued to the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as also, the Schedule w.r.t. stamp duty as adopted by various states. In view of the same, a question exists on the validity of the exemptions given under the 1937 Circular. 

The matter has also been made a part of certain judicial pronouncements. In this article, we attempt to discuss the same. 

Exemptions provided under the 1937 Circular

The first 1937 Circular provides an exemption from stamp duty implications in the following manner (text extracted from the rulings discussed below): 

“To remit the stamp duty chargeable under Article 23 and 62 of Schedule 1 to the said Act on instruments evidencing transfer of property between companies limited by shares as defined in the Indian Companies Act, 1913 in cases –

(i) Where at least 90 per cent of the issued share capital of the transferee company is in the beneficial ownership of the transferor company, or

(ii) Where the transfer takes place between a parent company and a subsidiary company one of which is the beneficial owner of not less than 90 per cent of the issued share capital of the order, or

(iii) Where the transfer takes place between two subsidiary companies in each of which not less than 90 per cent of the share capital is in the beneficial ownership of a common parent company:

Provided that in each case a certificate is obtained by the parties from the officers appointed in this behalf by the Local Government concerned that the conditions above prescribed are fulfilled.”

In the context of Delhi, the said circular was withdrawn, although exemption was provided on similar lines, except that the reference to “stamp duty chargeable under Article 23 and 62 of Schedule 1 to the said Act” is not included in the said second 1937 Circular. The second 1937 Circular reads as below:

Instrument evidencing transfer of property between companies limited by shares as defined in the Indian Companies Act, 1913, in a case where:

(i) at least 90 per cent of the issued share capital of the transferee company is in the beneficial ownership of the transferor company, or

(ii) where the transfer takes place between a parent company and a subsidiary company one of which is the beneficial owner of not less than 90 per cent of the issued share capital of the other, or

(iii) where the transfer takes place between two subsidiary companies of each of which not less than 90 per cent of the share capital is in the beneficial ownership of a common parent company:

Provided that a certificate is obtained by the parties to the instrument from the officer appointed in this behalf by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi that the conditions above prescribed are fulfilled.”

Validity of the exemptions provided under the 1937 Circulars 

The question w.r.t. the validity of the 1937 Circulars, in the state of Delhi, was examined by the Delhi High Court in the matter of Delhi Towers Limited vs GNCT of Delhi, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3959. In this regard, reference is made to Article 372 of the Constitution of India, which provides that “….all laws in force in the territory of India, immediately after the commencement of the Constitution shall continue to be in force therein, until altered or repealed or amended by a competent legislature or any other competent authority.” 

The principle as stated in the said ruling is based on various authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court on the effect of Article 372 of the Constitution. Based on the same, the following principle can be drawn w.r.t. the validity and continuance of a pre-independence existing law: 

“The binding legal principle laid down in the above precedents thus is that applicability of a pre-constitution law is not conditional upon the making of an adaptation or a modification in the post-constitution law for its continued applicability. A pre- constitution law also does not require a specific adoption as has been urged on behalf of the respondent herein. Repeal thereof however has to be specific.”

The Delhi High Court, thus, concluded that the notification dated 25th of December, 1937 is applicable and binding. Reference was also made to a previous judgment of the Delhi High Court in the context of January 1937 Circular in the matter of Sandy Estates Ltd. vs. Landbase India Ltd., 1997 VI AD (Delhi) 981, wherein the validity of said circular was upheld.   

Recently, in Ambuja Cement Ltd. vs Collector of Stamps, Delhi, decided on 6th November, 2024, the validity of the 1937 Circular has been upheld with reference to the decision of the High Court in Delhi Towers Ltd (supra).  

Whether the 1937 Circular is valid only in Delhi or applies to other states as well? 

It is to be noted that the second 1937 Circular explicitly applies to the province of Delhi and has no relevance for other states. However, the explicit withdrawal of the first 1937 Circular vide the 2011 notification was also limited to the province of Delhi, therefore, going by the principles laid down in Delhi Towers Ltd (supra) w.r.t. pre-constitution laws, the same cannot be considered to have been withdrawn, without any express stipulation in this regard. 

In Gemini Silk Limited vs Gemini Overseas Limited, (2003)114 CompCas92, the validity of the 1937 Circular was upheld by the Calcutta High Court. However, post the passage of a decade from the above order, in another ruling by the same Court, in the matter of Emami Biotech Limited, (2012)170 CompCas212 (Cal), it was held that the benefit under the 1937 Circular is no longer available.  This was based on the premise that the 1937 Circular pertained to Article 23 of Schedule I, however, vide a state amendment, the said Article, pertaining to ‘conveyance’ has been shifted to Schedule IA. 

“The State says that Article 23, which applies to a conveyance, does not figure in Schedule I to the Stamp Act applicable in this State (West Bengal). Indeed, Article 23 which is relevant for the present purpose, falls under Schedule IA as relevant in this State. There can be no manner of doubt that in Article 23 no longer forming a part of Schedule I to the Stamp Act as applicable in this State and being included in Schedule IA thereto, the benefit under the 1937 notification is no longer available as the State Legislature by an overt act has taken it outside the purview of Schedule I without the State Government having extended the remission under the 1937 notification.” 

Rationale behind exemptions under 1937 Circular

The exemptions under the 1937 Circular pertain to such business restructuring where at least 90% of the shareholding remains common, that is, the companies are under the same ownership and control. Such arrangements, in effect, do not result in any “conveyance”, since there is no movement of property from one person to another, rather, the transfer rather results in changing the indirect ownership of assets into a direct ownership in most cases. 

There are a number of exemptions under other applicable laws for transactions between a holding company and its wholly owned subsidiary. For instance, a fast-track approval process is specified for mergers between holding and wholly-owned subsidiary under the Companies Act; related party transactions between holding and wholly-owned subsidiaries are exempt from approval requirements; 

In Associated Clothiers Ltd. vs Union of India, AIR 1957 P&H 261, the intent of the 1937 Circular has been expressed in the following manner: 

“The notification of 1937 is designed to facilitate reconstruction of a company or amalga-mation of two companies which are more or less under the same ownership so that they should be able to re-arrange their affairs without being saddled with liability for payment of stamp duties…”

Therefore, in view of the intention of the exemptions covered under the 1937 Circular, there does not seem to be a reason to withdraw the exemptions through specific State amendments or otherwise. 

SEBI proposals to ease overheated SME IPO market

SEBI proposes amendments in ICDR and LODR Regulations owing to recent concerns around SME listing 

– Sakshi Patil, Executive and Sourish Kundu, Executive| corplaw@vinodkothari.com 

SME IPOs are constantly increasing at an evergrowing rate, with 31 companies listed on SME in FY 21-22 to a total of 138 companies listed in FY 23-24, and 117 companies already listed on SME as of the current FY (till 15th October, 2024) on NSE alone. Not only the number of SME IPOs, the investor participation in such IPOs has also increased substantially, with the applicant to allotted investor ratio from 4X in FY 22 to 46X in FY23 and 245X in FY24. A data on the SME listings during the current and previous FY suggests that, while majority of listed SMEs have booked listing gains, approx 20-30% of such entities have subsequently witnessed a price drop (39 out of 224 companies listed on NSE, 26 out of 91 companies listed on BSE1).

The recent surge in SME IPOs over the last few years, including substantial investor participation in such IPOs, coupled with the recent regulatory concerns w.r.t. diversion of issue proceeds, funding to shell companies, misinflation of revenues etc. has required a re-look into the existing regulatory universe under which SMEs are listed and operate post listing. In August 2024, an advisory was also issued by SEBI regarding investment in the securities of entities listed on SMEs. NSE rolled out stricter eligibility criteria effective September 1, 2024. Greater emphasis on positive cashflow pre listing (w.e.f. Sept 1), capping of 90% over issue price during special pre-open session for SME IPO (w.e.f. July 4) signal the emphasis for investor protection. Following the same, a Consultation Paper has been issued by SEBI, proposing amendments to the provisions of ICDR and LODR Regulations, with a view to strengthen the pre and post-listing requirements for SMEs. Key proposals include restricting the access of SME Exchange to informed investors, and ensuring such IPOs serve the original purpose of making finance available to SMEs for their business growth, and not for funding the promoters’ requirements. 

A brief of the 27 proposals, as against the existing requirements and our comments are presented below: 

Particulars Existing requirementProposal under CPRationale and Our Comments
Stricter eligibility conditions for SME IPO
Ineligibility conditions for IPO (Proposal 8)Currently based on PromotersDirectors Selling shareholders in some cases.To be extended to promoter group as well. SME companies are closely held by promoter and promoter groups. Hence, any action against the promoter group may also have a significant bearing on the issuer.
Additional eligibility requirements for SME IPO(Proposal 9A & 9B)Firm/ LLP converted into company can apply for IPO without any cooling period – track record requirements are considered on a combined basis.Co. which has been converted from LLP or partnership firm, shall be in existence for at least 2 yrs, with restated financial statements post conversion drawn in accordance with Schedule III of CA, 2013.Cooling off of 2 years in case of change of promoter, or introduction of new promoter acquiring 50% or more shareholding prior to filing of DRHP. Helps in bringing a clearer picture of financial position post conversion. Cooling period in case of change in promoter is to bring steadiness in IPO.Track record should be based on the effective management of new promoter(s) and not past promoter(s).
Operating profits (EBIDTA)(Proposal 11)Positive.Rs. 3 cr for at least 2 out of 3 immediately preceding FYs.To ensure financial viability of the company. 
Our Comments: NSE additionally mandates  positive Free cash flow to Equity (FCFE) for at least 2 out of 3 financial years preceding the application.
Conversion of Pre-IPO outstanding convertible securities before IPO(Proposal 20)Conversion not mandatory Conversion mandatory In line with the requirement for Main Board IPO. Provides clarity to investors on the company’s capital structure before they invest.
Structure of IPO and allotment
Minimum issue size(Proposal 10)Not specified Rs. 10 crTo ensure companies with significant growth potential access the market.Loans and alternative funding sources typically cater to smaller amounts.Is aligned with BSE’s and NSE’s requirement for Main Board listing.
Offer for sale(Proposal 4A & 4B)No restriction Dual limits proposedOFS restricted upto 20% of issue size and for selling shareholders, OFS shall not exceed 20% of pre-issue shareholding on a fully diluted basis.To prevent use of SME listing for dilution of promoter stake. 
Face value(Proposal 12)Not Specified Rs. 10/- per share for existing issued capital and proposed new shares to be issued. To enable better comparison amongst various issuers. 
Minimum application size (Proposal 1)Rs. 1 lakh Rs. 2 lakh with existing minimum allocation of 35% (book-build issue)/ 50% (fixed price issue) to RIIs, ORRs. 4 lakh (resulting in deletion of RII category for minimum allocation requirements).Limit participation of retail investors (bidding for upto Rs. 2 lakhs) to protect interest of smaller retail investors;Attract investors with  risk taking appetite; Enhance the overall credibility of the SME segment.
Minimum no. of allottees (Proposal 3)50 200To ensure sizeable no. of investors Provide liquidity 
Allotment methodology for Non – institutional investors (NII) category (Proposal 2)Proportional allotment for NIIsDraw of lots for minimum bid lot to NIIs divided into 2 categories: 
⅓ rd of allocation for application size upto 10L⅔ rd of allocation for application size exceeding 10L 
Align allocation methodology with Main Board IPO; Proportional allotment may encourage over-leveraging, over statement of interest and thus at times encourage mispricing.
Objects of issue & utilisation of proceeds
Raising funds for General corporate purpose (GCP) and unidentified acquisition (Proposal 7A & 7B)GCP < – 25% of issue sizeGCP + unidentified acquisition < – should not exceed 35% of issue sizeGCP restricted to  lower of 10% of issue size or Rs. 10 cr;Prohibition on raising funds for unidentified acquisition To reduce the risk of misuse of issue proceeds 
Repayment of loan of promoter/ promoter group as an object of issue(Proposal 14)No express prohibition.Not allowedTo ensure that funds raised through IPO are used for business growth, not for repayment of promoters’ liabilities 
Funding for working capital (Proposal 15)No specific requirementMandatory statutory auditor certificate on a half-yearly basis for use of working capital funds raised exceeding Rs. 5 Crore, with disclosure of the same in financial statements.Ensures that working capital funds are appropriately used 
Our Comments: The requirement of statutory auditor’s certificate is proposed to be made mandatory for all SME IPOs where a monitoring agency is not required to be appointed (see below). A specific mandate for working capital monitoring may not serve any additional purpose. 
Monitoring of issue proceeds (Proposal 5A, 5B & 5C)Monitoring agency mandatory if issue size >100 crMonitoring agency mandatory if: Issue size >20 cr ORObject of issue includes:funding subsidiary, repay loans/ borrowing of the subsidiary investment in JV/ subsidiaryacquisition
In other cases, utilization certificate from statutory auditor on half-yearly basisPlace before AC and board Submit to stock exchange
Reduce risk of misuse or diversionBring more transparency for investors and accountability for issuer 
Our Comments: Presently, Reg 32(5) of LODR requires statutory auditors to certify the statement w.r.t. Utilisation of funds on an annual basis. The proposal will additionally require the same to be done on a half-yearly basis, in cases where a monitoring agency is not required to be appointed. 
Disclosure of sources in case of requirement of having firm arrangement of finance for a project(Proposal 16) No such requirement Sanction letter to be disclosed in draft offer document and offer document where partial funding is by bank/NBFCs.Additional diligence and disclosure for investors w.r.t. project appraisal by financial institutions. 
Exit opportunity for dissenting shareholders in case of change in objects(Proposal 23)No specific provision Post-listing exit opportunity for dissenting shareholders in case of changes in the objects or terms, in line with Main Board provisionsProtects the interests of dissenting shareholders, ensuring they have an exit option in case of significant changes post-listing.
Promoter contribution and lock-in requirements
Lock-in of promoter holding(Proposal 6A & 6B)Minimum Promoter Contribution (MPC) – 3 yrs Excess holding – 1 yrMPC – 5 yrsExcess –  Lock in on 50% to be released after 1 yr and;For remaining 50% to be released after 2 yrs.To ensure that entire holding is not diluted post the lock in periodTo ensure promoter continues to have skin in game till company is on SME Exchange 
Securities ineligible for MPC(Proposal 24)No clarification w.r.t. adjustment of price for corporate action Price per share for determining MPC eligibility should be adjusted for corporate actions (e.g., bonus, stock split)Clarifies the pricing mechanism and ensures fairness in determining MPC eligibility, preventing manipulation through corporate actions.
Other additional disclosures
Disclosure of senior level management(Proposal 17)KMP and SMP details are required to be disclosed in offer documentDisclosure of senior-level employees (e.g., head of sales, plant head, etc.), with their experiencesAdditional disclosure on ESIC/EPF detailsSite visit by merchant banker to form part of DD report and included in material inspection documents in offer document.Better disclosure w.r.t. Employee strength of the company 
Merchant banker fees(Proposal 18)No requirement to disclose issue related fees Merchant banker fees, by any name, to be disclosed in RHPIncreased transparency – presently such costs exceeds 30-40% of issue size, defeating the primary purpose of fundraising  
Public comments on DRHP (Proposal 19)No requirement. At least 21 days’ for public comments; Disclose on website of SEs and lead managers;Public announcement in 3 newspapers – English, Hindi and regional. Allows the public to provide feedback during draft offer document stage instead of opening of offer
Due diligence certificate by merchant banker(Proposal 21)Required at the time of submission of offer document to SEs. Mandatory submission to SE at the time of filing draft offer document.Ensures that the due diligence process is completed and certified before the public sees the draft offer document.
Migration to Main Board
Migration from SME to Main Board(Proposal 13)Post-issue face value of capital > Rs. 25 crores pursuant to fresh issue. Where listed SME is not eligible to migrate, fund raising to be still permitted beyond Rs. 25 crores, subject to compliance with corporate governance norms and disclosure requirements under LODR. Ensures that company can remain listed on SME platform having post issue face value  more than 25cr with light touch of regulations applicable to them related to LODR
Corporate Governance Requirements
Related Party Transactions(Proposal 25)Exempt from Reg 23 pursuant to Reg 15(2)(b).
Compliance as per Companies Act applicable: Meaning of RP [as per section 2(76)]Approval of AC (for all RPTs)Approval of Board (for specified transactions if not in ordinary course or arm’s length)Approval of shareholders (for material RPTs requiring board approval as above)
Reg 23 to be made applicable to SME listed entities.De minimis exemption continues for smaller listed entities [Reg 15(2)(a)]Material RPTs based on turnover thresholds (10% of annual consolidated turnover)Absolute limits of Rs. 1000 crores not applicable.Enhanced requirements to mitigate risk of circular transactions and abusive RPTs
Quarterly corporate governance report [Reg 27](Proposal 26)Not applicableQuarterly disclosure w.r.t. composition and meetings of the board and its committees to the stock exchange(s) Harmonize  disclosure requirements for SME and Main Board entitiesEnhancing transparency on functioning of board and committee Our comments: The CP mentions about disclosure of board and committees, however, it is not clear as to whether the other disclosures as are applicable to Main Board entities under the corporate governance report, is also proposed to be extended to SMEs
Periodic filings to stock exchanges(Proposal 27Half yearly filing of:: Shareholding pattern [Reg 31], Statement of deviation(s) or variation(s) [Reg 32],Financial Results [Reg 33]To be made on a quarterly basis, at par with Main Board listed entities. Reflects the financial health and fund utilization by companies;
Aligned with requirements applicable to the Main Board.

Our related resources:

  1. NSE tightens eligibility criteria for SME listing on NSE Emerge
  2. BSE and NSE SME Exchange Platforms: Big Opportunities for Small Companies and growing India
  3. The basics of bringing an IPO
  1.  Based on market data as on 15th October, 2024. Taken from SEBI CP
    ↩︎

Enhanced role of CRAs in technical defaults by issuers

– Palak Jaiswani, Manager & Simrat Singh, Executive | corplaw@vinodkothari.com


Read more