SEBI – Page 22 – Vinod Kothari Consultants

Centralised database for Corporate Bonds & Debentures

June 5, 2021/0 Comments/in SEBI /by Staff

-SEBI’s new circular provides further ease of access of information

Payal Agarwal, Executive | Vinod Kothari and Company ( corplaw@vinodkothari.com )

Introduction

SEBI, the capital market regulator in India, has brought a series of amendments in the month of May, 2021 amending all the major regulations applicable to the entities under its regulatory ambit. The trend is still being continued by SEBI. This time, SEBI has brought a circular for streamlining the information available in the centralised database, in order to provide ease of access of information to the investors. In view of the same, the erstwhile circular dated 22^nd October, 2013 (2013 Circular) dealing with the centralised database for the corporate bonds/ debentures have been superseded by the circular dated 4^th June, 2021 (Circular). Through this Circular, some enhanced disclosure requirements are required to be ensured by the issuers, while responsibility is placed upon the shoulders of credit rating agencies and debenture trustees to verify the information given by the issuer as well as notify the discrepancies, if any to the stock exchanges.

Applicability

This Circular is applicable for all recognised stock exchanges, registered depositories, registered credit rating agencies, debenture trustees, and issuer of listed debt securities.

Further, this Circular is applicable for debt securities issued on or after 1^st August, 2021.

Financial transactions with promoter entities become part of CG disclosure

June 4, 2021/0 Comments/in LODR /by Staff

SEBI’s move to strengthen transparency

Pammy Jaiswal| Partner| Vinod Kothari and Company

corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Background

It has always been interesting to see how SEBI takes various steps to increase the level of transparency for augmenting the level of corporate governance in a listed company. Recently, SEBI notified the changes under the SEBI Listing Regulations on 6^th May, 2021, which contained several significant changes to enhance corporate governance (hereinafter referred to as CG), like specifying the scope of the risk management committee or intimation of recordings and transcripts for analyst meetings[1]. Following the said notification, SEBI, on 31^st May, 2021, came up with a circular[2] dealing with enhanced disclosures under CG report to be submitted to the stock exchange under Regulation 27 (2) of the SEBI Listing Regulations by adding Annexure IV to the existing formats.

The new requirement coming out from this circular is extremely significant since it aims at revealing almost all types of financial transactions (to say almost 24 types of permutations) which the company has entered into with its close connections and which may have the highest chances of involving any conflict of interest.

In this write up we have tried to critically discuss and examine the requirements emanating from the said circular.

Scope and time of applicability

Annexure IV which contains the new disclosures will have to be filed by the listed entities which have listed their specified securities.
The same is to be filed on a half yearly basis starting from the first half year 2021-2022, i.e., for the half year ended 30^th September, 2021.
While Regulation 27 (2) only talks about quarterly filings within 21 days from the end of the quarter, therefore, there is no explicit time period within which this new annexure will have to be filed with the exchange from the end of the half year.
The disclosure will not only cover the financial transactions undertaken during the half year ended 30^th September, 2021, but also cover all outstanding financial contracts which the entity has entered any time in the past.

Financial Permutations covered

Critical Aspects

While the format under the new annexure may seem to be simple in terms of presentation, however, it has various aspects related to it which needs to be discussed. Owing to the extent of disclosure required, listed companies will have to consider and understand every part under the format before feeding the details. Some points which need to be discussed include the actionable, the meaning of the entities controlled by the promoters, the meaning of direct and indirect accommodation, distinction between a LoC and a co-borrowing arrangement, and last but not the least the ‘affirmation’ on the economic interest of the company.

Actionable on the part of the listed entity

Identify the entities
- This identification process may reveal that companies have a large number of interested entities falling under these 4 types of entities.

Identify transactions
- After having prepared the list of entities that are included under the 4 categories, the next step will be to identify the financial transactions which include loan, guarantee or security in connection with the loan to the entities under the list.

Identify outstanding balances
- Once the entities and the transactions entered into with them have been identified, listed companies will have to identify the outstanding balance as on the date of the report.
- Since the transactions involve providing guarantee or security as well, there can be a situation that companies will have to look for both on and off-balance sheet items to come to the actual outstanding balance for the purpose of reporting.

Entities controlled by Promoters/ PG

While the meaning of the term promoter and PG is well defined under SEBI ICDR Regulations, the question that may arise is which entities will be considered to be controlled by the promoters or the PG. The meaning of control here has to be taken form SEBI Takeover Regulations, which defines it as a right to appoint majority of the directors or to control the management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or PAC, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements or in any other manner.

As per the definition of PG, entities which have a substantial stake (20%) held by the promoters or by common group pf shareholders are covered under the said definition of PG. However, if one has to identify the entities which are controlled by PG, it may cover even larger number of companies.

Ambit for covering directors and controlled entities for the purpose of disclosure

The ambit for making disclosures is very wide under Annexure IV. Therefore, it becomes imperative to pinpoint the entities related to the directors of the listed entity that are covered for the purpose of disclosure under the said Annexure. The same is represented below:

SEBI Listing Regulations refer to the definition of ‘relatives’ provided under Section 2(77) of the Companies Act, 2013.

In a situation where the directors do not have any direct control over the entity to whom the listed entity has extended the financial accommodation, but the control is with the relatives of such directors alone, the same should be enough to make the financial transaction be covered for the purpose of the disclosure under Annexure IV.

Leaving such transactions outside the disclosure will frustrate the whole intent of the said requirement since, it is very unlikely that a financial accommodation will be offered to an entity controlled by the director’s relative without any nexus or benefit to the directors altogether. There exists a possibility of the directors or their relatives indirectly gaining benefit or influencing transactions undertaken. Therefore, such transactions will also be required to be disclosed, given the intent of the disclosures.

Nature of book debt covered

As per the format of annexure IV, any other form of debt advanced is also required to be included for the purpose of the said disclosure. Looking at the intent of the disclosure, any book debt that is present in the books like merely selling of goods on credit should not be made part of this disclosure. In our view, only the book debt which has the color of an advance and which is in the nature to serve as a financial accommodation (for example selling of goods on credit for an unreasonable period of time or under unreasonable terms of understanding) is required to be disclosed.

Meaning of direct and indirect financial accommodation

As per the requirement, one of the biggest challenges for the listed entities will be to identify the connecting links or conduits through which these interested entities have been benefitted. Such transactions are generally camouflaged and put through layers to create smokescreen. These entities which are used to route the benefits to the interested parties are merely acting as a stopover. Therefore, it is extremely important to identify such transactions where there is a clear and direct nexus between flow of money from the listed entity to the intermediary and ultimately to the interested party. For instance, if a company raises preference share capital with the reason that it needs it for its own business operations, however, uses the funds so raised to on lend to another entity.

Difference between LoC and co-borrowing arrangement

The new requirement includes an LoC to be disclosed in the half yearly report. One needs to understand that providing a guarantee or giving an LoC by the listed company is nothing but to agree and provide financial accommodation to the borrower. It is significant to note that companies cannot disguise the LoC into a co-borrowing arrangement and therefore, avoid the disclosures to be made under Annexure IV.

Under a co-borrowing arrangement, if the listed entity is the co-borrower, then it should be getting the benefit or be a beneficiary of the loan being taken together with the interested party. Acting merely as a signatory to the co-borrowing agreement will make it no different from being considered as a guarantee or providing an LoC.

Affirmation for being in economic interest of listed company

One of most crucial and difficult part of the disclosure is the part requiring affirmation that loan (or other form of debt), guarantee / comfort letter (by whatever name called) or security provided in connection with any loan or any other form of debt is in the economic interest of the Company.

Some pointed issues under this are:

Who will give this affirmation?

The report on CG as per the SEBI circular (annex I, annex II and annex III) are required to be signed either by the compliance officer or the company secretary or the MD or CEO or CFO. However, Annex IV (which is the new requirement) requires the affirmation to be signed either by the CEO or CFO.

Further, the practicing professionals who provide their report on compliance with CG requirements and which has to be annexed with the CG report cannot be expected to dive into this question and scrutinize the reasoning provided by the company.

What will be the basis of this affirmation?

Further, it is imperative to note that the entities covered under this disclosure are mainly upstream entities which are either promoters or PG or controlled entities by them. Therefore, it becomes all the more difficult to justify the act of financial accommodation to be in the economic interest of the company. If it were a case of downstream accommodation (like subsidiaries, associates, joint ventures, etc.), it would have been much easier to form a basis to affirm that the same is serving the economic interest of the company since any profits in them will reflect in the consolidated financial results of the listed entity, however, the same reason cannot be for an upstream entity.

Also, merely earning an interest on loan granted or a commission on a guarantee or security or even on lending cannot act as a justification here since the earning interest or commission cannot be said to serve the economic interest of a company which is not even in the business of lending. Having said that listed NBFCs may have an upper hand in terms of providing justifications in this case.

• Whether the same needs to be reviewed by the Audit Committee as well?

Regulation 18 of the Listing Regulations read with Part C of Schedule II as well as section 177 of the Companies Act requires that the audit committee needs to scrutinize the inter-corporate loans and investments. While the same is required and covers loans, there does not seem to be any reason to exclude provision of security or extending guarantee since it is given in connection with loan.
The management needs to show the audit committee how does the transactions covered for the purpose of the said disclosure are in the economic interest of the Company.

Comparison between section 185 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Annexure IV

Section 185 of the Companies Act, 2013 (Act, 2013) deals with the provisions to provide loan and related services to directors or the interested entities. While section 185 is more from an angle of regulated provisions, the extent of casting restrictions on providing loan to directors or its connected parties is divided into two parts. One is completely prohibited (to directors and to firms where the director or his relative is partner) and the other one is restrictive, which means, financial accommodation can be given subject to prior approval of the shareholders.

The new disclosure requirement has several similarities with section 185 which are given below:

Basis of comparison	Section 185	Annex IV of SEBI Circular dated 31^st May, 2021
Services covered	Provision of loan, provision of guarantee or Letter of Comfort and providing security in connection with the loan	Similar
Mode	Direct as well as indirect	Similar
Entities covered	· director of company, or its holding company or any partner or relative of any such director; · any firm in which any such director or relative is a partner; o The aforesaid two bullets are completely prohibited · any private company of which any such director is a director or member; · any body corporate at a general meeting of which not less than twenty-five per cent. of the total voting power may be exercised or controlled by any such director, or by two or more such directors, together; · any body corporate, the Board of directors, managing director or manager, whereof is accustomed to act in accordance with the directions or instructions of the Board, or of any director or directors, of the lending company	Refer to figure 1 above.

While the format requires the financial accommodation made, if any, to the directors or their relatives or entities controlled by them, it will surely not include or have any disclosure relating to financing of directors since it is completely prohibited under section 185 of the Act, 2013.

Exclusions

The aforementioned disclosure shall exclude the reporting of any loan (or other form of debt), guarantee / comfort letter (by whatever name called) or security provided in connection with any loan or any other form of debt:

by a government company to/for the Government or government company
by the listed entity to/for its subsidiary [and joint-venture company whose accounts are consolidated with the listed entity.
by a banking company or an insurance company; and
by the listed entity to its employees or directors as a part of the service conditions.

While one of the exclusions is for a banking company, it is imperative note the following:
 SEBI (LODR) Regulation does not define the term “banking company” but the term “banks”.
 Section 5(c) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (‘BR Act’) defines banking company as: “banking company” means any company which transacts the business of banking in India;”
 Further, section 5(d) of the BR Act defines company as: “company” means any company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) and includes a foreign company within the meaning of section 591 of that Act;”
 Public sector banks like State Bank of India, being a body corporate, do not fall under the aforesaid definition of banking company. However, it is engaged in the business of banking and should therefore, be excluded.

Accordingly, clarity on the same is still awaited from SEBI.

Concluding remarks

As stated in the beginning, SEBI’s move to increase the standards for CG has been extremely interesting. Further, considering the fact that listed companies have a limited amount of time to arrange for huge amount of information, this circular needs the immediate attention of the listed entities.

[1] Our write up on the same can be viewed here

[2] To view the circular, click here

Our other articles on relevant topic can be read here – http://vinodkothari.com/2019/07/sebi-amends-format-of-compliance-report-on-corporate-governance/

SEBI revisits the concept of Promoter and Promoter Group

June 1, 2021/0 Comments/in SEBI /by Staff

Proposes shift from ‘promoter’ to ‘persons in control’

Ajay Kumar K V | Manager (corplaw@vinodkothari.com)

Introduction

The capital market watchdog, Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) has come out with a consultation paper on changing the concept of company ‘promoters’, and moving towards the idea of ‘person in control’. The proposal has come in the light of a drift from the conventional Indian ownership structure to the contemporary ownership structure where more than one person or persons controls an entity. The start-up ventures and the most celebrated ‘unicorns’ of the industry have substantial investment from Institutional investors and Private Equity players (‘PE firms’) who exercises control over the decision-making process through board representation and other means.

Further, SEBI has also proposed changes to the existing lock-in period requirements, streamlining disclosures of group companies, and rationalising the ‘Promoter Group’ definition in SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018 (‘ICDR’).

In this write-up, we have made an analysis of the concept of Promoter and Promoter Group, various obligations of the Promoter under SEBI Regulations, and the rationale for the shift from ‘Promoter and Promoter Group to ‘Person in Control’

Who is a Promoter?

Generally, any person who plays a major part in forming a company or establishing its business usually the prospective owners or directors of the company is regarded as a Promoter. They bring the business idea into existence and sets the vision and growth targets.

Promoter under Companies Act, 2013

Under the Companies Act, 2013, a promoter is a person who has been named as such in the prospectus or is identified by the company in the annual return filed every year. The definition also covers person(s) who has control over the affairs of the company, directly or indirectly whether in the capacity of a shareholder, director, or otherwise. Further, those person(s) in accordance with whose advice, directions, or instructions the Board of Directors of the company is accustomed to act, except in case of a person acting in a professional capacity, would also be considered as a promoter of a company.

Promoter under SEBI Regulations

The term ‘Promoter’ is defined under ICDR and various other SEBI regulations has the reference to the definition as given in ICDR.

Promoter under ICDR

The Regulation 2 (1) (oo) of ICDR defines the term ‘promoter’. The definition is similar to the definition in the Companies Act, 2013 and provides that a financial institution, scheduled commercial bank, foreign portfolio investor other than individuals, and the other specified body corporates shall not be deemed to be a promoter merely by holding 20% or more of the equity share capital of the issuer unless such person satisfies other requirements prescribed under the regulations.

Obligations on Promoters under SEBI Regulations

The identification of promoters is crucial in the listing process as the ICDR places substantial responsibilities on the Promoters. To ensure their ‘skin in the game’ after the IPO, the ICDR place various obligations on the promoters such as a 20% minimum shareholding in the post-issue share capital of the company and lock-in restriction of three years on such shareholding. There are also onerous disclosure requirements on promoters with respect to disclosures in the prospectus so that the general public has adequate information on the company for deciding whether to invest in the IPO or not.

However, being classified as a promoter of an investee company (Company) may not be favourable for a PE investor especially for those investors targeting the IPO as an exit route from the company. Therefore, it is vital for a PE investor to understand the key responsibilities and continuous disclosure requirements when classified as a promoter under the ICDR, including disclosure requirements relating to members of promoter group entities.

Figure – 1

Freezing of Promoter holding in case of default

Under Chapter XI, Regulation 98 of LODR provides that in case of contraventions of the provisions of LODR, the shareholding of promoter/promoter group may be frozen by the respective stock exchange(s), in the manner specified in circulars or guidelines issued by the Board in coordination with depositories.

Thus, the promoters are subject to such action by the SEBI or the stock exchange in case of contraventions which adds up to the responsibilities of the promoter/promoter group. They need to ensure that the entity is in compliance with all the rules & regulations even if they are not involved in the day-to-day management of the entity.

The concept of Promoter Group

Regulation 2 (1) (pp) of ICDR defines Promoter Group (‘PG’) based on the nature of the promoter i.e. if the promoter is an individual and if the promoter is a body corporate. The definition, essentially, includes the promoter and the relatives of the promoter (spouse, parents, brother, sister, or child of the person or of the spouse).

PG, if the promoter is an individual

PG, if the promoter is a body corporate

· a body corporate in which 20% or more of the equity share capital is held by the promoter or an immediate relative of the promoter and

· a firm or Hindu Undivided Family in which the promoter or any one or more of their relative is a member would fall under the promoter group category.

· a body corporate in which a body corporate as mentioned above holds 20% or more, of the equity share capital and

· a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) or firm in which the aggregate share of the promoter and their relatives is equal to or more than 20% of the total capital of the company.

· a subsidiary or holding company of such body corporate

· a body corporate in which the promoter holds 20% or more of the equity share capital; and/or

· a body corporate which holds 20% or more of the equity share capital of the promoter

· a body corporate in which a group of individuals or companies or combinations thereof acting in concert, which hold 20% or more of the equity share capital in that body corporate and such group of individuals or companies or combinations thereof also holds 20% or more of the equity share capital of the issuer and are also acting in concert

The promoter group will also include all persons whose shareholding is aggregated under the heading “shareholding of the promoter group” in the shareholding pattern of the company.

It should be noted that, under the proviso to the definition of the promoter group, financial institutions, scheduled bank, foreign portfolio investor other than individuals, mutual funds, and such other body corporates as provided, are not deemed to be promoter group merely by virtue of the fact that 20% or more of the equity share capital of the promoter is held by such person or entity. However, such entities will be treated as promoter group for the subsidiaries or companies promoted by them or for the mutual fund sponsored by them.

The SEBI has proposed to delete Regulation 2(1) (pp)(iii)(c) from the definition of prompter group in the case of a promoter being a body corporate. The sub-clause covers those entities in which a group of individuals or companies or a combination thereof holds 20% or more who are also holding 20% or more of the equity in the issuer. These entities could be unrelated and the financial objectives of the investors can also be different. Since the only factor connecting the two entities is the common financial investors, the data captured under the said sub-clause may not be a piece of fruitful information to the investors and in turn, adds up the compliance & disclosure burden on the listed entity.

There arises a situation where persons who are not involved with the business of the issuer are covered by the definition and are required to make disclosures merely by falling within the ambit of the definition. The said proposal of deletion of the clause will bring in much more meaningful data to the investors for better analysis and will also help the issuer in reducing its compliance burden.

The definition of promoter group under ICDR is referred to in various SEBI regulations as in the case of the definition of the promoter. The obligations of the promoter group are similar to those of the promoters in terms of continuous disclosures and compliances under various SEBI regulations.

Figure 2

The need for re-visiting the concept of Promoter

The recent studies show that institutional investors are gaining a notable share in the Indian capital market, especially in the space of Top 500 listed companies by market capitalisation. The OECD report[1] shows that institutional investors represent an estimated investment of close to USD 400 billion in the public equity market, which is around 30% of total market capitalisation in India. In the year 2018, the institutional investors held almost 34% of equity holding of the top 500 Indian listed companies by market capitalization[2].

Among the top 500 listed entities by market cap, there is a sharp increase in the shareholding by the institutional investors from 14% in 2001 to 26% in 2018.

The current growth of the Indian primary and secondary markets is also due to the growing number of foreign institutional investors who have made considerable investments in the listed and unlisted space.

Institutional ownership in Indian listed companies (2001-2018)[3]

The data shows that there is a considerable shareholding in listed companies that may not fall under the ‘promoter/promoter group’ instead appears under the ‘public’ category but is in a position to influence the management and the decision-making process.

Thus, to bring such entities and persons who are now outside the umbrella of the promoters for the benefit of the retail investors as well as to have better governance over such entities to be accountable under the various provision of the SEBI Regulations, a re-visit to the very definition of the promoter is necessary.

A paradigm shift from promoter to the person in control is essential because several businesses, including new age and tech companies, are non-family owned and/or do not have a distinctly identifiable promoter group. The typical Indian family-owned companies are slowly moving away from their “once a promoter, always a promoter” status with the change in their leadership.

Shifts in the pledge of Promoters’ shares (2001-2018)[4]

In India, the promoters of listed entities pledge their shares as collateral to secure finance from banks & financial institutions. The underlying risk factor on the pledging of promoter stake is that an instance of default would significantly affect the share prices thereby putting the market as well as the retail individual investors at potential losses.

The number of shares pledged shows an upward trend until 2016 across all listed companies. However, the market value of shares pledged has remained stable while the number of pledged shares shows a slight downward trend since 2013.

In the Financial Stability Report, December 2014” (2014), RBI stated, “a typical Indian company, the promoters pledge shares not for funding outside business ventures but for the company itself. Given the vulnerabilities in some promoter-led companies, pledging of promoters’ shares could pose risks to the financial stability.”

SEBI has made the disclosure framework in respect of pledge of shares as collateral more stringent through the SAST regulations and has also provided strict timelines for such disclosures by promoters and promoter group. The data is disseminated through the stock exchange for the benefit of the investors.

Shifts in directors who are Promoters (2001-2018)[5]

Due to the traditional family-owned business setup, the promoters also get a seat on the board of directors of the company. The above figure shows the paradigm shift in the board participation by promoters and the average proportion between promoter directors and non-promoter directors during the period 2001- 2018.

The SEBI has brought safeguards to protect the minority shareholders’ rights especially to cover the companies with promoters holding board positions. The Regulation 17 of the LODR provides that;

Where a regular non-executive chairperson of a listed entity is a promoter of the listed entity or is related to any promoter, at least half of the board of directors of the listed entity shall consist of independent directors.
The fees or compensation payable to executive directors who are promoters or members of the promoter group shall be subject to the approval of the shareholders by special resolution in the general meeting of the members where such fees or compensation exceeds the limits prescribed therein.

These are a few measures to ensure that the promoter directors do not get an undue advantage due to their ability to influence the decision-making process by the Board of directors of the company and an element of independence is involved in the Board process.

However, it is pertinent to note that, the restrictions are only attracted to the ‘promoters’ and persons ‘related to promoter’ of the company. A shift from ‘promoter’ to ‘person in control’ may cover those persons who are currently outside the ambit of the definition of ‘promoter’ but enjoys an element of influence on the entities.

SEBI discussion paper on Brightline Tests for the acquisition of ‘Control’^[6]

The SEBI had issued a discussion paper on Brightline Tests for Acquisition of ‘Control’ under SEBI Takeover Regulations in 2016, with the intent to decide whether a numerical threshold as the current practice or a principle-based test can be conducted to determine whether a person is in control of a listed entity.

The term ‘control’ implies the ability of a person or a group of persons acting with a common objective to influence the management and policy-making process of an entity. It can be said that such person(s) is(are) in the ‘driving seat’ with a substantial influence over the key business decision making, even without involving in the day-to-day affairs of the company.

The identification of control is undemanding in the instances where the rights arise from the shareholding/voting rights in the company. The real test of control in the cases of contractual agreements becomes complex and demands elaborate consideration of facts and circumstances of the case.

Therefore, the nature of the definition of control in such cases has to be based on a set of defined principles rather than the rules. In the matter of Subhkam Ventures (I) Pvt. Ltd.[7] the Hon’ble SAT, in its judgment dated January 15, 2010, rejected SEBI’s view stating that none of the clauses of the agreements, individually or collectively, demonstrated control in the hands of the acquirer wherein SEBI argued that the rights conferred upon the acquirer, through the agreements, amounted to ‘control’ over the target company.

The essence of the order was, control, according to the definition, is a proactive and not a reactive power. The test is whether the acquirer is in the ‘driving seat’.

The SEBI’s proposal for replacing the term ‘promoter’ with ‘person in control’ would change the current regulatory framework and will align with what was intended to be amended under SAST. However, the amended definition should exclude protective rights/ veto exercised by the acquirer that are participative in nature.

The concept of Control under various other Acts, Rules & Circulars

-The Insurance Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015 provides that control shall include the right to appoint a majority of the directors or to control the management or policy decisions including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements. Thus, the ambit of coverage of promoter under the Act is wide enough to include various types of business ownership structures.

-Consolidated FDI Policy Circular of 2020 has a similar definition as provided in the Insurance Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015.

-In Competition Act 2002, the concept of control includes controlling the affairs or management by one or more enterprises,

(a)either jointly or singly, over another enterprise or group;

(b)one or more groups, either jointly or singly, over another group or enterprise

-International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) also defines the principle of control and establishes control as the basis of determining which entities are consolidated in the consolidated financial statements. Under IFRS, the principle of control sets out the following three elements of control:

(a) power over the investee;

(b) exposure, or rights, to variable returns from involvement with the investee; and

Whether test applied for identifying SBO under CA, 2013 is of any relevance here?

The MCA vide its Notification dated June 13, 2018,[8] has enforced the provisions of amended Section 90 of the Companies Act, 2013 and also issued the Companies (Beneficial Interest and Significant Beneficial Interest) Rules, 2018 concerning Significant Beneficial Ownership (‘SBO’).

Meaning of SBO

The Significant Beneficial Owner is an individual who alone or together with or through one or more persons or trust, holds a beneficial interest (as prescribed under the SBO Rules) in the shares of a company or has the right to exercise, or the actual exercising of significant influence or control as defined in clause (27) of section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013.

The revised SBO rules have prescribed the following definition to SBO;

Often when it comes to investments the PE investors structure their investments into a Company through multi-layered entities, with the immediate holding entity of the Company will merely act as an investment vehicle and not a substantive entity.

The premise of SBO rules is to identify the natural person behind the entity. Therefore, to identify such natural persons exercising ultimate control over the Company, the SBO rules can be applied. However, the persons in control of the entity may be a natural person or a body corporate as mentioned above. Hence, the basic principle of SBO may not be useful to identify the latter, as the SBO rules have the primary objective of identifying money-laundering activities and their related provisions under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act of 2002.

The SEBI Board meeting held on 6^th August 2021, accepted the changes proposed in the consultation paper on ‘Review of regulatory framework for promoter, promoter group and group companies’. The table showing the proposals and the SEBI Board decision on the same is tabulated below:

Proposal	SEBI Consultation paper	SEBI Board decision
Reduction in lock-in periods for minimum promoter’s contribution and other shareholders for public issuance on the Main Board	The lock-in of promoters’ shareholding to the extent of minimum promoters’ contribution (i.e. 20% of post issue capital) shall be for a period of 18 months from the date of allotment in initial public offering (IPO)/further public offering (FPO) instead of existing 3 years, in the following cases: a) If the object of the issue involves only offer for sale b) If the object of the issue involves only raising of funds for other than for capital expenditure* for a project (more than 50% of the fresh issue size) c) In case of combined offering (Fresh Issue + offer for sale), the object of the issue involves financing for other than capital expenditure for a project (more than 50% of the issue size excluding OFS portion) * The term capital expenditure shall be clarified to include purchase of land, building and civil work, plant and machinery, miscellaneous fixed assets, technology etc.	Accepted
Lock-in of Promoter holding in excess of minimum promoter contribution	Further, in all the above-mentioned cases, the promoter shareholding in excess of minimum promoter contribution shall be locked-in for a period of 6 months instead of existing 1 year.	Accepted
Reduction in lock-in periods for other shareholders for public issuance	The entire pre-issue capital held by persons other than the promoters shall be locked-in for a period of 6 months from the date of allotment in the initial public offer as opposed to the existing requirement of 1 year.	The lock-in of pre-IPO securities held by persons other than promoters shall be locked-in for a period of 6 months from the date of allotment in IPO instead of existing 1 year. The period of holding of equity shares for Venture Capital Fund or Alternative Investment Fund (AIF) of category or Category II or a Foreign Venture Capital Investor shall be reduced to 6 months from the date of their acquisition of such equity shares instead of existing 1 year.
Rationalization of the definition of ‘Promoter Group’	Deletion of Regulation 2(1) (pp)(iii)(c) in the definition of promoter group	The definition of promoter group shall be rationalized, in case where the promoter of the issuer company is corporate body, to exclude companies having common financial investors
Streamlining the disclosures of group companies	Only the names and registered office address of all the Group Companies should be disclosed in the Offer Document. All other disclosure requirements like financials of top 5 listed/unlisted group companies, litigation etc., presently done in the Draft Red Herring Prospectus can be done away. However, these disclosures may continue to be made available on the websites of the listed companies.	The disclosure requirements in the offer documents, in respect of Group Companies of the issuer company, shall be rationalized to, inter-alia, exclude disclosure of financials of top 5 listed/unlisted group companies. These disclosures will continue to be made available on the website of the group companies.
Shifting from concept of ‘promoter’ to concept of ‘person in control’	To revisit the concept of promoter and shift to the concept of ‘person in control’ or ‘controlling shareholders’.	Agreed in-principle. To this effect, the Board, advised SEBI to: a) engage with other regulators to ascertain and resolve regulatory hurdles, if any. b) prepare draft amendments to securities market regulations and analyse impact of the same. c) further deliberate at the PMAC and develop a roadmap for implementation of the proposed transition.

Consequent to the acceptance of the proposals in the Board meeting, the SEBI notified Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements (Third Amendment) Regulations, 2021 on 13th August 2021, and the actionable for listed companies pursuant to the said amendment are;

The FAQs of CDSL on System Driven Disclosure in Securities Market also provides that In case of any subsequent update in the information about Promoters, members of the promoter group, director(s), designated persons, the listed company shall update the information with the designated depository on the same day.

Further, the disclosure requirements under various SEBI regulations as depicted in Figure 2 will not be applicable to such entities henceforth.

Conclusion

The Indian investor perception is evolving at a faster pace and the regulatory framework needs to align at the same pace. The move of SEBI in bringing a paradigm shift from ‘Promoter/Promoter group to ‘Person in control’ will have a substantial effect in the capital market as it would bring in considerable changes in various SEBI regulations like ICDR, LODR, SAST, PIT, etc., and would pave the way for the introduction of a more comprehensive framework for IPOs.

How will the regulator define the term ‘person in control’? Whether the existing framework in respect of SEBI SAST would be re-designed with a rule-based as well as a principle-based test of control as discussed in the discussion paper on ‘Brightline test’? these questions could interest us as we dig deeper into SEBI’s proposal.

[1] https://www.oecd.org/corporate/ownership-structure-listed-companies-india.pdf

[2] OECD (2019), OECD Equity Market Review of Asia 2019

[3] https://www.oecd.org/corporate/ownership-structure-listed-companies-india.pdf

[4] https://www.oecd.org/corporate/ownership-structure-listed-companies-india.pdf

[5] https://www.oecd.org/corporate/ownership-structure-listed-companies-india.pdf

[6] https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/1457945258522.pdf

[7] https://www.sebi.gov.in/satorders/subhkamventures.pdf

[8] https://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/CompaniesSignificantBeneficial1306_14062018.pdf

Our other article on the relevant article can be read here – http://vinodkothari.com/2020/12/sebi-proposes-liberal-provisions-for-promoter-reclassification/

Assessing the Viability of a Gold Spot Exchange in India

June 1, 2021/0 Comments/in Financial Services, SEBI /by Staff

-Megha Mittal

(mittal@vinodkothari.com)

The Securities and Exchange Board of India (‘SEBI’) has issued a consultation paper dated 19^th May, 2021, on proposed framework for Gold Exchange in India and draft SEBI (Vault Managers) Regulations, 2021 (‘Consultation Paper’), thereby seeking public comments on the framework for operationalising gold exchange and the regulation of intermediaries inter-alia Vault Managers.

While the idea of setting up a regulated gold exchange was highlighted in the Union Budget 2018-19 as well as in the Budget 2021-22, the Consultation Paper comes as the first concrete step towards bringing into operation a gold exchange for the Indian market. This comes in the backdrop of the fact that despite being the second largest consumer and importer of gold, India continues to be a price-taker – India does not play any significant role in influencing the global price-setting for the commodity. As such, the Consultation Paper envisages an entire ecosystem of trading and physical delivery of gold so as to create a transparent and robust market which paves the way for India to become a global price setter.

That being said, before delving into the procedural aspect, it is important to understand the fundamentals as to what are the objectives being aimed, what would the target market look like, and if at all the proposed framework would put the investors, the parties and the nation in a better place that is today.

‘Material Subsidiary’ under LODR Regulations: Understanding the metrics of materiality

May 20, 2021/1 Comment/in Corporate Laws, LODR, SEBI /by Staff

Barsha Dikshit | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Himanshu Dubey | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

The term ‘subsidiary’ or ‘subsidiary company’ as defined under the Companies Act, 2013^[1] (‘Act’) refer to a company in which a holding company controls the composition of the Board of directors or may exercise at least 51% of the total voting power either on its own or together with one or more of its subsidiaries. A company may have a number of subsidiaries; however, all of them may or may not have a material impact on the holding company or on the group at a consolidated level. Therefore, regulations sometimes require identification of such subsidiaries which may have a material impact on the overall performance of the holding company/group.

Though SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirement) Regulations, 2015 (‘SEBI LODR’), define the term ‘Material Subsidiary’ as a subsidiary, whose income or net worth exceeds ten percent (10%) of the consolidated income or net worth, respectively, of the listed entity and its subsidiaries in the immediately preceding accounting year, however, there remains confusion w.r.t. the criteria provided for determining the materiality of a subsidiary. For instance, whether a subsidiary having negative net worth exceeding 10% of the consolidated net worth of the listed company will be qualified as a material subsidiary? Or say if the net worth at the group level is negative, however the net worth of the subsidiary is positive, will that subsidiary be treated as a material subsidiary, etc.

Through this article the author has made an attempt to decode some of these puzzling issues relating to determination of materiality of a subsidiary.

The Concept of ‘Material Subsidiary’

In present day corporate world, operating through a network of subsidiaries and associates is quite common. Sometimes, it is a matter of corporate structuring discretion, and sometimes, it is purely a product of regulation – for example, overseas direct investment can be made only through subsidiaries or joint venture entities. While the listed subsidiaries are always under the observation of SEBI, an appropriate level of review and oversight is required by the board of the listed entity over its unlisted subsidiaries for protection of interests of public shareholders. The board of directors of a holding company cannot take a tunnel view and limit their perspective only to the company on whose board they are sitting. After all, subsidiaries operate with the resources of the parent, and therefore, what happens at subsidiaries and associates is of immediate relevance to the holding company. Accordingly, the obligation of the board of a listed entity with respect to its subsidiaries has been increased vide SEBI LODR Amendment Regulations, 2018 dated 9^th May, 2018[2], thereby reducing the threshold for determining materiality of a subsidiary to 10% (as opposed to the previous limit of 20%) of the consolidated income or net worth respectively, of the listed entity and its subsidiaries, in the immediately preceding accounting year.

Since the material subsidiaries have a considerable role in the overall performance of the holding company or the group as a whole, it is important to arrive at the correct interpretation of the term in line with the intent and purpose of the definition as well as the compliance requirements following it.

In terms of the definition provided under Regulation 16(1)(c) of SEBI LODR the triggers for determining materiality of a subsidiary are- Net Worth ^[3]and Turnover. That is to say, the pre-requisites for determining materiality of a subsidiary are:

It has to be a subsidiary, in terms of the definition provided under Act, 2013; and
Its income/net worth in the immediately preceding financial year exceeds 10% of the consolidated net worth of the listed company.

It is pertinent to note that the definition of material subsidiary currently provides for 10% or more impact on the consolidated turnover or net worth of the listed company/group, however, it does not specify whether the said impact has to be in positive or negative. It just says that the impact has to be 10% of the overall income/net worth. Since the turnover of a company cannot be negative, the focus has to be made on the later.

A parent company is required to prepare consolidated financial statement taking into account the performance of its subsidiaries. While a subsidiary, with a good performance and positive net worth/income can add on the overall growth of the group, the same can affect the overall performance of the group with its negative net worth, and if the said impact exceeds 10% of the income/net worth of the consolidated performance of the group, the said subsidiary will become material and shall require special attention of the parent company. Therefore, for the purpose of determining the ‘materiality’, one has to drop the minus sign of the net worth of the subsidiary or group and has to see the absolute term and the overall impact it has on the group. In other words, if a subsidiary is big enough to shake the performance of its holding company, it shall be qualified as a ‘material subsidiary’.

Let us take some illustrations to understand the definition provided under Reg. 16 (1) (c) of SEBI LODR:

Illustration 1:

XYZ Limited is a subsidiary of ABC Limited. In the FY 2019-20, the net worth of XYZ Limited was Rs. 50 Crs. and the consolidated net worth of ABC Limited company was Rs. 400 Crs., Whether XYZ Limited be considered as a material subsidiary of ABC Limited?

Yes. The contribution of XYZ Limited towards the consolidated net worth of ABC Limited is more than 10%, therefore XYZ Limited shall be consolidated as a ‘material subsidiary’ of ABC Limited.

Illustration 2:

Net worth of XYZ Limited in FY 2019-20 was Rs. (50) Crs., however, the consolidated net worth of ABC Limited was Rs. 400 Crs, will XYZ Ltd. be considered as a material subsidiary of ABC Ltd?

Yes. Irrespective of having a negative net worth, since XYZ Limited contributes more than 10% of the consolidated net worth of ABC Limited, XYZ Limited shall be considered as a ‘material subsidiary’ of ABC limited.

Illustration 3:

Net worth of XYZ Limited in FY 2019-20 was Rs. (50) crores, and the consolidated net worth of ABC Limited was Rs. (400) Crs., will XYZ Limited be considered as a material subsidiary of ABC Limited?

Yes. Even if the net worth at the subsidiary level and the consolidated level are negative, however, one has to see as to how much contribution the subsidiary has in the consolidated net worth of the holding company. Therefore, irrespective of having negative net worth, XYZ Limited shall be considered as a ‘material subsidiary’ of ABC limited.

Illustration 4:

Net worth of XYZ Limited in FY 2019-20 was Rs. 50 crores and the consolidated net worth of ABC Limited was Rs. (400) Crs., will that subsidiary be considered as a material subsidiary of ABC Limited?

Yes. In the given case, because of the positive net worth of the subsidiary the net worth of the holding company has contributed to reduce the negative net worth of the holding company by more than 10%. Therefore, the subsidiary, viz. XYZ Limited shall be considered as a material subsidiary of ABC Limited.

Illustration 5:

Net worth of XYZ Limited in FY 2019-20 was Rs. 30 Crs. and the consolidated net worth of ABC Limited was Rs. (400) Crs., will that subsidiary be considered as a material subsidiary of ABC Limited?

No. Even though the positive net worth of the subsidiary is contributing to reduce the negative consolidated net worth of the holding company, however, that contribution is less than 10%, therefore in this case, XYZ Limited shall not be considered as a ‘material subsidiary’ of ABC Limited.

Thus, for determining ‘materiality’ of a subsidiary, the emphasis should not be on whether net worth is positive or negative, rather the impact of its net worth or income on the overall consolidated performance of the listed entity is to be seen.

Special Situation in case of Regulation 24 (1)

In the SEBI LODR, the term ‘Material Subsidiary’ has been defined twice, i.e under regulation 16 (1)(c) and under regulation 24 (1). While the threshold for determining ‘materiality’ provided under regulation 16 (1) (c) is 10%, the one provided under reg. 24 (1) is 20%. The reason behind the said increase in the threshold is the higher level of impact the said subsidiary can make on the performance of the listed company/group. That is to say, when a subsidiary is ‘material’ it requires attention of the parent company, however when it becomes significantly material, such that it can give shock to the parent company with its performance, it requires higher attention. Therefore regulation 24 (1) requires those significantly material subsidiaries to have on independent director of the parent company in its board.

The need for an independent director can be established by the fact that they are expected to be ‘independent’ from the management and act as the fiduciary of shareholders. This implies that they are obligated to be fully aware of the conduct which is going on in the organizations and also to take a stand as and when necessary, on relevant issues.

The requirement of appointing independent director is applicable only in case of significantly material subsidiary (unlisted), whether incorporated in India or not, and not in case of material subsidiary.

Obligation of the Listed Entity with respect to its Material Subsidiary(ies)

Other than the obligations provided under Reg. 24 of SEBI LODR for the listed companies w.r.t. their subsidiaries, the following additional obligations are applicable in case of material subsidiaries:

Formulating Policy– The listed entity is required to formulate a policy for determining materiality of its subsidiaries, and shall disseminate the same on its website.
Appointment of Independent Director– Pursuant to Regulation 24(1) of the LODR, at least one (1) independent director of the listed entity is required to be a director on the board of an unlisted material subsidiary (with respect to this provision, material subsidiary has been defined with a threshold of 20% of the consolidated income or net worth).
Disposing of shares in Material Subsidiary – A listed company shall not dispose of shares in its material subsidiary resulting in reduction of its overall shareholding to less than 50% or cease to exercise control over subsidiary without passing special resolution in general meeting except in case where such divestment is made under a scheme of arrangement (duly approved by the Tribunal/ Court) or in case of resolution plan duly approved in terms of section 31 of IBC, 2016.
Selling, disposing and leasing of assets – Pursuant to Regulation 24(6) of the LODR, the sale or disposal or leasing of assets amounting to more than 20% of the assets of a material subsidiary (on an aggregate basis during a financial year), subject to certain exceptions, requires prior approval of the shareholders of the listed holding company by way of a special resolution.
Secretarial Audit: Pursuant to Regulation 24A of the LODR, all listed entities and their Indian unlisted material subsidiaries are required to undertake a secretarial audit and annex such reports to the annual report of the listed entity.

The discussion above can be summarised in the presentation below:

Role of Policy on determining Materiality of Subsidiary

The definition of ‘material subsidiary’ under regulation 16(1)(c) defines a subsidiary that is material to the listed entity and the explanation to the aforesaid provision allows the listed entity to formulate a policy for the same, i.e., a listed entity can develop criteria that is stricter than what has been provided in the Regulations. However, nothing has been provided regarding the contents of the Policy in the SEBI LODR. Therefore, the Policy is nothing but a replica of what has already been provided in the law, as in order to ensure compliance of the law, listed entities frames policy for determining materiality of subsidiaries based on the contents of the regulations. Thus, the requirement of the policy is limited to ensure compliance of the law.

Can a section 8 company be treated as ‘Material Subsidiary’?

Section 8 Company, as defines in the Act, 2013 are companies that are formed with an object of promoting commerce, art, science, sports, education, research, social welfare, religion, charity, protection of environment or any such other object. These companies are required to apply their profit, if any or other income in promoting their objects and are prohibited from payment of any dividend to its members. Whereas, the benchmark for satisfying the definition of ‘material subsidiary’ is contribution towards consolidated income or net worth of the holding company.

When we consolidate the holding company with a Section 8 company, it will however depict a wrong picture of the wealth of the holding company, as the holding company can never claim any right over the profits of a Section 8 Company. Therefore, the question of consolidation of section 8 with that the holding company does not arise.

Given that the income of a section 8 company cannot be consolidated with that of the listed company or can say that since the performance of a section 8 company has no role to play on the overall performance of the listed company, a section 8 company cannot be treated as a ‘material subsidiary’.

Concluding Remarks

The term “material subsidiary” has been prioritized over the years because of the impact it may have over the consolidated performance of the listed entity. The principle behind emphasizing absolute numbers of the net worth is the impact of the same on the consolidated figures. Any changes in the income/net worth of these material subsidiaries will be reflected proportionally on the listed entity since the net worth derived from the said material subsidiaries constitutes an integral part of the consolidated net worth of the listed entity. Accordingly, the listed entities should determine the materiality of its subsidiaries wisely and comply with the requirements of SEBI LODR as are applicable on the material subsidiaries.

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^[1] Section 2 (87) of the Act

[2] https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/regulations/may-2018/sebi-listing-obligations-and-disclosure-requirement-amendment-regulations-2018_38898.html

^[3] Section 2 (57) of the Act defines net worth as:

“Net worth” means aggregate value of the paid up share capital and all reserves created out of the profits and securities premium account, after deducting the aggregate value of the accumulated losses, deferred expenditure and miscellaneous expenditure not written off, as per the audited balance sheet, but does not include reserves created out of revaluation of assets, write-back of depreciation and amalgamation

AIF Second Amendment Regulations, 2021 – Regulated Steps towards Liberalised Investment

May 18, 2021/0 Comments/in Alternative investment Vehicles, Financial Services, SEBI /by Staff

-Megha Mittal (mittal@vinodkothari.com)

Amidst the various concerns addressed in the Board Meeting dated 25^th March, 2021,^[1] the Securities and Exchange of Board of India (‘SEBI’) extensively dealt with several issues identified with respect to Alternative Investment Funds (‘AIFs’), inter-alia a green signal to AIFs for investing in units of other AIFs; ambiguity regarding the scope of the term ‘start-up’; and the need for a code of conduct laying down guiding principles on accountability of AIFs, their managers and personnel, towards the various stakeholders including investors, investee companies and regulators.

Thus, with a view to target the issues in consideration, the Board proposed that the following amendments be introduced in the SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulation, 2012 (‘AIF Regulations’/ ‘Principal Regulations’)^[2] –

provide a framework for Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) to invest simultaneously in units of other AIFs and directly in securities of investee companies;
provide a definition of ‘start-up’ as provided by Government of India and to clarify the criteria for investment by Angel Funds in start-ups
prescribe a Code of Conduct for AIFs, key management personnel of AIFs, trustee, trustee company, directors of the trustee company, designated partners or directors of AIFs, as the case may be, Managers of AIFs and their key management personnel and members of Investment Committees and bring clarity in the responsibilities cast on members of Investment Committees; and
remove the negative list from the definition of venture capital undertaking.

The aforesaid proposals, put to the fore in view of the suggestions and requests received from several stakeholder groups like the domestic AIFs, global investors, and the regulatory bodies, have now been notified vide notification dated 5^th May, 2021, via the SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) (Second Amendment) Regulations, 2021^[3] (‘Amendment Regulations’). A key takeaway from the Amendment Regulations is the flexibility granted w.r.t. indirect investments by AIFs for investment in units of another AIF, however with some riders and possible gaps, as discussed below.

Below we summarise and discuss the amendments introduced vide the Amendment Regulations, and analyse its impact

Proposed revamping of provisions related to promoter & promoter group

May 12, 2021/0 Comments/in SEBI /by Staff

Social Stock Exchanges – Enabling funding for social enterprises the regulated way

May 10, 2021/0 Comments/in Capital Markets, SEBI /by Staff

By Sharon Pinto & Sachin Sharma, Corplaw division, Vinod Kothari & Company (corplaw@vinodkothari.com)

Background

The inception of the idea of Social Stock Exchanges (SSEs) in India can be traced to the mention of the formation of an SSE under the regulatory purview of Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) for listing and raising of capital by social enterprises and voluntary organisations, in the 2019-20 Budget Speech of the Finance Minister. Consequently, SEBI constituted a working group on SSEs under the Chairmanship of Shri Ishaat Hussain on September 19, 2019^[1]. The report of the Working Group (WG) set forth the framework on SSEs, shed light on the concept of social enterprises as well as the nature of instruments that can be raised under such framework and uniform reporting procedures. For further deliberations and refining of the process, SEBI set up a Technical Group (TG) under the Chairmanship of Dr. Harsh Kumar Bhanwala (Ex-Chairman, NABARD) on September 21, 2020^[2]. The report, made public on May 6, 2021[3], of the TG entails qualifying criteria as well as the exhaustive ecosystem in which such an SSE would function.

In this article we have analysed the framework set forth by the reports of the committees with the globally established practices.

Concept of SSEs

As per the report of the WG dated June 1, 2020^[4], SSE is not only a place where securities or other funding structures are “listed” but also a set of procedures that act as a filter, selecting-in only those entities that are creating measurable social impact and reporting such impact. Further the SSE shall be a separate segment under the existing stock exchanges. Thus, an SSE provides the infrastructure for listing and disclosure of information of listed social enterprises.

Such a framework has been implemented in various countries and an analysis of the same can be set forth as follows:

A. United Kingdom

The Social Stock Exchange (SSX) was formed in June 2013 on the recommendation of the report of Social Investment Taskforce. The exchange does not yet facilitate share trading, but instead serves as a directory of companies that have passed a ‘social impact test’. It thus provides a detailed database of companies which have social businesses. It facilitates as a research service for potential social impact investors.
Further, companies that are trading publically in the main board stock exchange, may list their securities on SSX, thus only for-profit companies can list on the SSX[5] It works with the support of the London Stock Exchange and is a standalone body not regulated by any official entity.
Social and environment impact is the core aim of SSX. To satisfy the same, companies are required to submit a Social Impact Report for review by the independent Admissions Panel composed of 11 finance and impact investing experts.
The disclosure framework comprises adherence to UK Corporate Governance Guidelines and Filing Annual Social Impact Reports determine the continuation of listing in SSX.

B. Canada

Social Venture Connection (SVX)[6] was launched in 2013. Like SSX, SVX is not an actual trading platform but it is a private investment platform built to connect impact ventures, funds, and investors. It is open only for institutional investors[7].
The platform facilitates listing of for-profit business, NPO, or cooperatives categorized as, Social Impact Issuers and Environment Impact Issuers. These entities are required to be incorporated in Ontario for at least 2 years and have audited financial statements available.
For listing, a for-profit business must obtain satisfactory company ratings through GIIRS, a privately administered rating system.
Issuer must conform to the SVX Issuer Manual. In addition to this reporting of expenditure and other financial transactions shall be done once capital is raised. Further the issuers are required to file financial statements annually in accepted accounting methods and shall not have any misleading information. Ratings are required to be obtained, however the provisions are silent on the periodicity of revision of ratings.

C. Singapore

Singapore has established Impact Exchange (IX) which is operated by Stock Exchange of Mauritius and regulated by the Financial Service Commission of Mauritius.
IX is the only SSE that is an actual public exchange. It is thus a public trading platform dedicated to connecting social enterprise with mission-aligned investment. Social enterprises, both for-profits and non-profits, are permitted to list their project. NGOs are allowed as issuers of debt securities (such as bonds).
Listing requirements on the exchange are enumerated into social and financial categories. Following comprise the social criteria for listing:

Specify social or economic impact as the reason for their primary existence.
Articulate the purpose and intent of the company in the form of a theory of change- basis for demonstrating social performance.
Commit to ongoing monitoring and evaluation of impact performance assessment and reporting.
Minimum 1 year of impact reports prepared as per IX reporting principles.
Certification of impact reports by an independent rating body 12 months prior listing.

Further the financial criteria entails the need for a fixed limit of minimum market capitalization, publication of financial statements and use of market-based approach for achieving its purpose.

D. South Africa

The ‘South Africa Social Exchange’ or SASIX[8], offers ethical investors a platform to buy shares in social projects according to two classifications: by sector and by province[9]. Guidelines for listing prescribe compliance with SASIX’s good practice norms for each sector.
In order to get listed, entities have to achieve a measurable social impact. The platform acts as a tool of research, evaluation and match-making to facilitate investments into social development projects
NGOs can also list their social projects on the exchange. Value of the projects is assessed and then divided into shares. Following project implementation, investors are given access to financial and social reports.
While social enterprises are required to have a social purpose as their primary aim, they are also expected to have a financially sustainable business model. The SASIX ceased functioning in 2017[10].

Key ingredients for a social enterprise

The report of the TG^[11] has categorised social enterprises into For Profit Enterprise (FPEs) and Not for Profit Organisation (NPOs). In order to qualify as a social enterprise the entities shall establish primacy of social impact which shall be determined by application of the following 3 filters:

On establishment of the primacy of social impact through the three filters as stated above, the entity shall be eligible to qualify for on-boarding the SSE and access to the SSE for fund-raising upon submitting a declaration as prescribed.

Qualifying criteria and process for onboarding

As per TG recommendation, an NPO is required to register on any of the Social Stock Exchange and thereafter, it may choose to list or not. However, an FPE can proceed directly for listing, provided it is a company registered under Companies Act and complies with the requirements in terms of SEBI Regulations for issuance and listing of equity or debt securities.

Further, the TG has recommended a set of mandatory criteria as mentioned below that NPOs shall meet in order to register.

A. Legal Requirements:

Entity is legally registered as an NPO (Charitable Trust/ Society/Section-8 Co’s).
Shall have governing documents (MoA & AoA/ Trust Deed/ Bye-laws/ Constitution) & Disclose whether owned and/or controlled by government or private.
Shall have Registration Certificate under 12A/12AA/12AB under Income Tax.
Shall have a valid IT PAN.
Shall have a Registration Certificate of minimum 3 years of its existence.
Shall have valid 80G registration under Income-Tax.

B. Minimum Fund Flows:

In order to ensure that the NPO wishing to register has an adequate track-record of operations.

Receipts or payments from Audited accounts/ Fund Flow Statement in the last financial year must be at least Rs. 50 lakhs.
Receipts from Audited accounts/ Fund Flow Statement in the last financial year must be at least Rs. 10 lakhs.

Framework for listing

Post establishment of the eligibility for listing and the additional registration criteria in case of NPOs, the social enterprises may list their securities in the manner discussed further. The listing procedures vary for NPOs and FPEs and is set forth as follows:

A. NPOs

NPO shall be required to provide audited financial statements for the previous 3 years and social impact statements in the format prescribed. Further the offer document shall comprise of ‘differentiators’ which shall help the potential investors to assess the NPOs being listed and form a sound and well-informed investment decision. A list of 11 such differentiators has been provided in the report of the TG.
Further in case of program-specific or project-specific listings, the NPO shall have to provide a greater level of detail in the listing document about its track record and impact created in the program target segment.
All the information submitted as part of pre-listing and post-listing requirements, shall be duly displayed on the website of the NPO.

B. FPEs

In case of an FPE, existing regulatory guidelines under various SEBI Regulations for listing securities such as equity, debt shall be complied with.
The differentiators will be in addition to requirements as mandated in SEBI Regulations in respect of raising funds through equity or debt.
Further, FPEs have been granted an option to list their securities on the appropriate existing boards. Thus the issuer may at their discretion list their debt securities on the main boards, while equity securities may be listed on the main boards, or on the SME or IGP.

Types of instruments

Depending on the type of organisation, SSEs shall allow a variety of financing instruments for NPOs and FPEs. As FPEs have already well-established instruments, these securities are permitted to be listed on the Main Board/IGP/SME, however visibility shall be given to such entities by identifying them as For Profit Social Enterprise (FPSE) on the respective stock exchanges.

Modes available for fundraising for NPOs shall be Equity (Section 8 Co’s.), Zero Coupon Zero Principal (ZCZP) bonds [this will have to be notified as a security under Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (SCRA)], Development Impact Bonds (DIB), Social Impact Fund (SIF) (currently known as Social Venture Fund) with 100% grants-in grants out provision and funding by investors through Mutual Funds. On the other hand, FPEs shall be able to raise funds through equity, debt, DIBs and SIFs.

While SVF is an existing model for fund-raising, the TG has proposed various changes in order to incentivise investors and philanthropists to invest in such instruments. In addition to change in nomenclature from SVF to SIF, minimum corpus size is proposed to be reduced from Rs. 20 Cr to Rs. 5 Cr. Further, minimum subscription shall stand at Rs. 2L from the current Rs. 1 Cr. The amendments shall also allow corporates to invest CSR funds into SVFs with a 100% grants-in, grants out model.

Disclosure and Reporting norms

Once the FPE or the NPO (registered/listed) has been demarcated by the exchange to be an SE, it needs to comply with a set of minimum disclosure and reporting requirements to continue to remain listed/registered. The disclosure requirements can be enlisted as follows:

For NPO:

NPO’s (either registered or listed) will have to disclose on general, governance and financial aspects on an annual basis.
The disclosures will include vision, mission, activities, scale of operations, board and management, related party transactions, remuneration policies, stakeholder redressal, balance sheet, income statement, program-wise fund utilization for the year, auditors report etc.
NPO’s will have to report within 7 days any event that might have a material impact on the planned achievement of their outputs or outcomes, to the exchange in which they are registered/listed. This disclosure will include details of the event, the potential impact and what the NPO is doing to overcome the impact.
NPO”s that have listed its securities will have to disclose Social Impact Report covering aspects such as strategic intent and planning, approach, impact score card etc. on annual basis.

For FPE:

FPE’s having listed equity/debt will have to disclose Social Impact Report on annual basis and comply with the disclosure requirements as per the applicable segment such as main board, SME, IGP etc.

Other factors of the SSE ecosystem

a. Capacity Building Fund

As per the recommendation of the WG, constitution of a Capacity Building Fund (CBF) has been proposed. The said fund shall be housed under NABARD and funded by Stock Exchanges, other developmental agencies such as SIDBI, other financial institutions, and donors (CSRs). The fund shall have a corpus of Rs. 100 Cr and shall be an entity registered under 80G, which shall make it eligible for receiving CSR donations pursuant to changes to Section 135/Schedule VII of Companies Act 2013. The role of the fund shall encompass facilitating NPOs for registration and listing procedures as well as proper reporting framework. These functions shall be carried out in the form awareness programs.

b. Social Auditors

Social audit of the enterprises shall compose of two components – financial audit and non-financial audit, which shall be carried out by financial or non-financial auditors. In addition to holding a certificate of practice from the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), the auditors will be required to have attended a course at the National Institute of Securities Markets (NISM) and received a certificate of completion after successfully passing the course examination. The SRO shall prepare the criteria and list of firms/institutions for the first phase soon after the formation of SSEs, and those firms/institutions shall register with the SRO.

c. Information Repositories

The platform shall function as a research tool for the various social enterprises to be listed, thus Information Repository (IR) forms an important component of the framework. It functions as an aggregator of information on NGOs, and provides a searchable electronic database in a comparable form. Thus it shall provide accurate, timely, reliable information required by the potential investors to make well informed decisions.

Conclusion

The social sector in India is getting increasingly powerful – this was evident during Covid-crisis based on the wonderful work done by several NGOs. Of course, all social work requires funding, and being able to crowd source funding in a legitimate and transparent manner is quintessential for the social sector. We find the report of the TG to be raising and addressing relevant issues. We are hoping that SEBI will now find it easy to come out with the needed regulatory platform to allow social enterprises to get funding through SSEs.

Our other article on the similar topic can be read here – http://vinodkothari.com/2019/09/social-stock-exchange-a-guide/