COVID- 19 AND DEBENTURE RESTRUCTURING

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-Munmi Phukon, Pammy Jaiswal and Richa Saraf (corplaw@vinodkothari.com)

ICRA has published a report on 23.04.2020[1], listing out some 328 entities[2] who have availed or sought a payment relief from the lending institutions or investors. The list also includes names of such entities that have received an in-principle approval from investors in their market instruments (like non-convertible debentures)- prior to the original due date- for shifting the original due date ahead, but where a formal approval from the investors was received either after the original due date or is still pending to be received.

Earlier, Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) had, vide circular no. SEBI/ HO/ MIRSD/ CRADT/ CIR/ P/ 2020/53 dated 30.03.2020[3], addressed to the credit rating agencies (CRAs), granted certain relaxation from compliance with certain provisions of the circulars issued under SEBI (Credit Rating Agencies) Regulations, 1999 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The circular stipulated that appropriate disclosures in this regard shall be made in the press release, seemingly, the report published by ICRA is a part of the disclosure requirement specified by SEBI.

In view of the COVID crisis, companies in large numbers are approaching investors or will be approaching investors for restructuring of the debentures, therefore, it becomes pertinent to discuss- how the restructuring is carried on? whether a meeting of debenture holders will be required to be convened? what will be the consequences if the restructuring is not done? and other related questions. Below we discuss the same.

Force Majeure– An Excuse to Default?

In financial terms, “default” means failure to pay debts, whether principal or interest. Under ISDA Master Agreement[4], failure by the party to make, when due, any payment is listed as an event of default and one of the termination events. However, the ISDA Master Agreement provides that in case of a force majeure event, payments can be deferred. Most of the standard agreements, contain specific clauses pertaining to force majeure, where the party required to perform any contractual obligation is required to intimate the other party as soon as it becomes aware of happening of any force majeure event. While in some cases, due to impossibility of performance, the agreement itself is frustrated; in some other cases, the obligations are merely deferred till the event persists.

Our article “COVID- 19 and The Shut Down: The Impact of Force Majeure” can be accessed from the link: http://vinodkothari.com/2020/03/covid-19-and-the-shut-down-the-impact-of-force-majeure/

Consequences of default- Rights available to debenture holders:

A debenture holder has several options available in case of default: (a) insolvency proceedings; (b) enforcement of security interest; (c) proceedings for recovery of debt due. Below we discuss the same:

– Right to call for meeting of debenture holders: Rule 18 (4) of the Companies (Share Capital and Debentures) Rules, 2014 stipulates that the meeting of all the debenture holders shall be convened by the debenture trustee on:

  • requisition in writing signed by debenture holders holding at least 1/10th in value of the debentures for the time being outstanding; or
  • the happening of any event, which constitutes a breach, default or which in the opinion of the debenture trustees affects the interest of the debenture holders.

– Right to make an application before NCLT: Section 71(10) of the Companies Act, 2013 provides that on failure of the company to redeem the debentures on the date of their maturity or failure to pay interest on the debentures when it is due, an application may be filed by any or all of the debenture holders or debenture trustee, seeking redemption of the debentures forthwith on payment of principal and interest due thereon.

– Application under IBC: Section 5(7) of IBC defines a “financial creditor” to mean any person to whom a financial debt is owed and includes a person to whom such debt has been legally assigned or transferred to, and Section 5(8) of IBC defines “financial debt” as a debt along with interest, if any, which is disbursed against the consideration for the time value of money and includes any amount raised pursuant to any note purchase facility or the issue of bonds, notes, debentures, loan stock or any similar instrument. Thus, debenture holders are treated as financial creditors for the purpose of IBC and may exercise all the rights as available to a financial creditor.

As per Section 6 of IBC-“Where any corporate debtor commits a default, a financial creditor, an operational creditor or the corporate debtor itself may initiate corporate insolvency resolution process in respect of such corporate debtor in the manner as provided under this Chapter”.  Accordingly, the debenture holders (whether secured or not) may apply for initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process against the company under Section 7 of IBC. In fact the Central Government has, vide notification no. S.O. 1091(E) dated 27th February, 2019, notified that such right may also be exercised by the debenture holder, through a debenture trustee.

– Right to enforce security interest: The right of foreclosure is a counter-part of right of redemption. Just like a company has a right of redeeming the security after payment of debt amount, a secured debenture holder has a right of foreclosure or sale in case of default in redemption. In the case of Baroda Rayon Corporation Limited vs. ICICI Limited[5] and in Canara Bank vs. Apple Finance Limited[6], Bombay High Court upheld the right of the debenture trustee to sell off the properties of the company for the benefit of the debenture holders.

Here, it is pertinent to understand how the debenture holders shall exercise the right of foreclosure. The law distinguishes between security interests based on the nature of the collateral. For instance, in case of security interests on immovable properties, Chapter IV of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies.  Further, the security interest, in case of secured debentures, can be enforced in the following manner: (a) In case the debenture holder is a bank/ financial institution, as per the provisions of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002; and (b) In case the debenture holder is not a bank/ financial institution, as per the common law procedures.

– Other remedies: Any default in the terms of the debentures is a breach of contract, and the debenture holder may sue the company for breach of contract as per the provisions of Contract Act, 1872, and further seek for compensation as per the terms of the debenture, or in absence of specific term in the agreement, compensation may be claimed as per the provisions of Section 73 of the Contract Act, 1872.

Issues cropping up due to COVID- 19 and the resolution thereof:

In view of the COVID pandemic one of the issue that was arising was that the issuers of debt instruments who were not able to fulfil the obligations as per the terms of the debentures or redeem the same on the maturity date were running to courts for seeking interlocutory reliefs, seeking to restrain the debenture holders from exercising any rights against the defaulting issuer. In the case of Indiabulls Housing Finance Ltd. vs. SEBI[7], the petitioner prayed for an ad interim direction to restrain any coercive action against it, with respect to the repayment to be made by it to its non-convertible debenture holders. In the said case, granting the prayer, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court directed maintenance of status quo with respect to the repayments to be made by the petitioner to the NCD holders.

Further, there was a lack of clarity on how rating and valuation of a security would be revised in view of the default or the restructuring? Therefore, SEBI has issued the following circulars:

  • SEBI, vide a circular no. SEBI/ HO/ MIRSD/ CRADT/ CIR/ P/ 2020/53 dated March 30, 2020[8], granted certain relaxation from compliance with certain provisions of the circulars issued under SEBI (Credit Rating Agencies) Regulations, 1999 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

With respect to recognition of default, the circular stipulates that CRAs recognize default  based  on  the guidance issued  vide  SEBI circular dated May 3, 2010[9] and November 1, 2016[10], however, based on its assessment, if the CRA is of the view that the delay  in  payment  of  interest/principle  has  arisen  solely  due  to  the  lockdown  conditions   creating   temporary   operational   challenges   in   servicing   debt, including due to procedural delays in approval of moratorium on loans by the  lending institutions, CRAs may not consider the same as a default event and/or  recognize default.

  • Further, SEBI has, vide its circular no. SEBI/HO/IMD/DF3/CIR/P/2020/70 dated 23.04.2020[11], reviewed certain provisions of  the  circular  dated  09.2019[12] issued under  SEBI  (Mutual  Funds)  Regulations,  1996. In the circular, SEBI has stipulated that based  on  assessment,  if  the valuation  agencies appointed  by Association of Mutual Funds in India are of the view that the delay in payment of interest/principal or extension of  maturity of  a  security  by  the  issuer has  arisen  solely  due  to  COVID-19 pandemic  lockdown  creating   temporary   operational   challenges   in   servicing   debt, then valuation  agencies may  not  consider  the  same as  a  default for the  purpose of valuation of money market or debt securities held by mutual funds.

Restructuring Process and the Formalities associated thereto:

In the context of COVID, the restructuring of debentures shall mean nothing but deferral of the date of redemption. The terms of the debentures, including the maturity date, etc is specified in the terms of issuance. The terms of issuance also provides how the variation in terms can be effectuated. Therefore, it is pertinent that to make any changes in terms of debentures, the relevant clauses in the issuance terms are considered.

In terms of Reg. 59 (2) of the SEBI LODR Regulations, 2015, any material modification to the structure of debentures in terms of coupon redemption etc. are required to approved by the Board of Directors and the debenture trustee (DT). Further, in terms of Reg. 59(1), prior approval of the stock exchange(s) shall also be required for such material modification which shall be given by the stock exchange(s) only after obtaining the approval of the Board and the DT.

In addition to the approval as aforesaid, in terms of Regulation 15(2)(b) of SEBI DT Regulations, DT is required to call a meeting of the debenture holders on happening of any event which in the opinion of the DT affects the interest of the holders. Similar provision is there in the Companies (Share Capital and Debenture) Rules, 2014 also [sub- rule (4) of Rule 18].

Unlike the requirements of obtaining shareholders’ consent by way of special/ ordinary resolution for various matters including variation of rights thereof, there is no explicit provision  for obtaining of a consent of the debenture holders for restructuring of the debentures under the Companies Act, 2013 (‘CA 13’). However, the provisions of SS 2 being, mutatis mutandis, applicable to a meeting of debenture holders also, all the provisions w.r.t convening/ conducting of general meeting such as, sending of notice, explanatory statement etc. as applicable to general meetings shall apply to the meeting of debenture holders.

However, looking at the current crisis situation, where calling of a physical meeting is not possible, and issuers will be required to hold the meeting of the debenture holders, in case consent by e-mail is not possible due to the large number of debenture holders, through video conferencing mode. The modalities for participation (like voting, two-way communication, recording, etc.) and other compliances related of sending of notices etc. may be in the manner clarified by the MCA Circular dated 13.04.2020[13].

In a nutshell, the procedural requirements to be followed for restructuring of debentures shall be as provided hereunder.

S. No

 

 Relevant Provisions Actionable/ Compliance Remarks
1. Regulation 50 (3) of LODR Regulations Prior intimation to the stock exchange (SE) for the meeting board of directors, at which the restructuring is proposed to be considered.

 

 2 working days in before the board meeting.

 

(excl. date of intimation and date of meeting)
2. Sec. 173 of CA 13 BM to be convened by the Company for proposed restructuring including the revised terms subject to approval of the stock exchanges and the debenture holders.

 

 Through VC considering the COVID 19 Guidelines issued by the Govt. Our FAQs in this regard may be found at : https://www.google.com/url?q=http://vinodkothari.com/2020/03/board-meetings-during-shutdown/&sa=D&source=hangouts&ust=1587820272757000&usg=AFQjCNEictCwK_-LNnlH7oiB1GMmdRzO6w

 
3. Regulation 59(2)(a) of LODR Regulations

 

 Obtain approval of the DT Before applying to SEs.
4. Regulation 59 of the Listing Regulations Seek prior approval from the stock exchange

 

 After taking the consent of the board of directors and DT.

 
5. Regulation 15(2) of DT Regulations, 1993 Separate meeting of debenture holders to be called for deferment in repayment due to liquidity crunch in the hour of crisis.

 

 The meeting may be called by the company itself or through the DT.

Since the scope of SS 2 issued by ICSI includes meetings of debenture holders also, the company will have to observe the requirements of SS 2 in convening the meeting of debenture holders. However, considering the current crisis situation, such meeting may be convened through VC facility as clarified by MCA Circular dated 13th April, 2020. Our FAQs in this regard may be found at http://vinodkothari.com/2020/04/general-meetings-by-video-conferencing-recognising-the-inevitable/

 
6. Regulation 51 (2) of the Listing Regulations Intimation to the stock exchanges being an action that shall affect payment of interest or redemption of NCDs

 

 

 ASAP but not later than 24 hours of Board decision.

 Documentation Requirements:

In usual circumstances, if any variation is carried out in the debenture terms, the parties enter into an addendum, amending the clauses contained in the debenture subscription agreement (and also, in the trust deed/ security documents, if required), however, given the current scenario and the lock down, it is not possible for parties to sign and execute the agreements. Since the restructuring already has the approval of the majority debenture holders, it is deemed that the resolution “overrides the terms of issuance”. Thus, in our view, the resolution passed by the debenture holders approving the restructuring should suffice, and modification in the agreements may not be required.

[1] https://www.icra.in/Rationale/ShowRationaleReport/?Id=94320

[2] The rating agency has stated that the list is not a comprehensive one, as information about some rated entities are not readily available as of now, and separate disclosures will be made w.r.t. such entities.

[3]https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/mar-2020/relaxation-from-compliance-with-certain-provisions-of-the-circulars-issued-under-sebi-credit-rating-agencies-regulations-1999-due-to-the-covid-19-pandemic-and-moratorium-permitted-by-rbi-_46449.html

[4] https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065696/000119312511118050/dex101.html

[5] 2002 (2) BomCR 608, (2002) 2 BOMLR 915, 2003 113 CompCas 466 Bom, 2002 (2) MhLj 322

[6] AIR 2008 Bom 16, (2007) 77 SCL 92 Bom

[7]https://images.assettype.com/barandbench/2020-04/6ec54849-0188-4fe3-a841-88c2861124d5/Indiabulls_vs_SEBI.pdf

[8]https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/mar-2020/relaxation-from-compliance-with-certain-provisions-of-the-circulars-issued-under-sebi-credit-rating-agencies-regulations-1999-due-to-the-covid-19-pandemic-and-moratorium-permitted-by-rbi-_46449.html

[9] https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/may-2010/guidelines-for-credit-rating-agencies_1467.html

[10]https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/nov-2016/enhanced-standards-for-credit-rating-agencies-cras-_33585.html

[11]https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/apr-2020/review-of-provisions-of-the-circular-dated-september-24-2019-issued-under-sebi-mutual-funds-regulations-1996-due-to-the-covid-19-pandemic-and-moratorium-permitted-by-rbi_46549.html

[12] https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/sep-2019/valuation-of-money-market-and-debt-securities_44383.html

[13] http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Circular17_13042020.pdf

 

Please click below for youtube presentation on the above topic:

 

Our other content related to COVID-19 disruption may be referred here: http://vinodkothari.com/covid-19-incorporated-responses/

Our other articles relating to restructuring on account of COVID-19 disruption may also be viewed here:

Consensual restructuring of debt obligations, due to COVID disruption, not to be taken as default, clarifies SEBI

Restructuring of debt securities not to be treated as default, clarifies SEBI

Our presentation can be viewed here – https://vinodkothari.com/2021/09/structuring-of-debt-instruments/

Loan products for tough times

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-Vinod Kothari (vinod@vinodkothari.com)

Economic recoveries in the past have always happened by increasing the supply of credit for productive activities. This is a lesson that one may learn from a history of past recessions and crises, and the efforts made by policymakers towards recovery. [See Appendix]

The above proposition becomes more emphatic where the disruption is not merely economic – it is widespread and has affected common life, as well as working of firms and entities. There will be major effort, expense and investment required for restarting economic activity. Does moratorium merely help?  Moratorium possibly helps avoiding defaults and insolvencies, but does not help in giving the push to economic activity which is badly needed. Entities will need infusion of additional finance at this stage.

The usual way governments and policy-makers do this is by releasing liquidity in the banking system. However, there are situations where the banking system fails to be an efficient transmission device for release of credit, for reasons such as stress of bad loans in the banking system, lack of efficient decision-making, etc.

In such situations, governments and central banks may have to do direct intervention in the market. Governments and central banks don’t do lending – however, they create institutions which promote lending by either banks or quasi-banks. This may be done in two ways – one, by infusion of money directly, and two, by ways of sovereign guarantee, so as to do credit risk transfer to the sovereign. The former method has the limit of availability of resources – governments have budgetary limitations, and increased public debt may turn counter-productive in the long-run. However, credit risk transfer can be an excellent device. Credit risk transfer also seems to be creating, synthetically, the same exposure as in case of direct lending by the sovereign; however, there are major differences. First, the sovereign does not have to go for immediate borrowings. Second and more important, the perceived risk transfer, where credit risk is shifted to the sovereign, may not actually hit in terms of credit losses, if the recovery efforts by way of the credit infusion actually bear fruit.

The write-up below suggests a product that may be supported by the sovereign in form of partial credit risk guarantee.

Genesis of the loan product

For the sake of convenience, let us call this product a “wrap loan”. Wrap-around mortgage loans is a practice prevalent in the US mortgage market, but our “wrap loan” is different. It is a form of top-up loan, which does not disturb the existing loan terms or EMI, and simply wraps the existing loan into a larger loan amount.

Let us assume the following example of, say, a loan against a truck or a similar asset:

Original Loan amount 1000000
Rate of interest 12%
Tenure 60 Months
EMIs ₹ 22,244.45
Number of months the loan has already run 24 Months
Number of remaining months of original loan term 36 Months
Principal outstanding (POS) on the date of wrap loan ₹ 6,69,724.82

For the sake of convenience, we have not considered any moratorium on the loan[1]. The customer has been more or less regular in making payments. As on date, he has paid 24 EMIs, and is left with 36. Now, to counter the impact of the disruption, the lender considers an additional loan of Rs 50000/-. Surely, for assessing the size of the wrapper loan, the lender will have to consider several things – the LTV ratio based on the increased exposure and the present depreciated value of the asset, the financial needs of the borrowers to restart his business, etc.

With the additional infusion of Rs 50000, the outstanding exposure now becomes Rs 719725/-. We assume that the lender targets a slightly higher interest for the wrapper part of the loan of Rs 50000, say 14%. The justification for the higher interest can be that this component is unsecured. However, we do not want the existing EMI, viz., Rs 22244/- to be changed. That is important, because if the EMIs were to go up, there will be increasing pressure on the revenues of the borrower, and the whole purpose of the wrap loan will be frustrated.

Therefore, we now work the increased loan tenure, keeping the EMIs the same, for recovering the increased principal exposure. The revised position is as follows:

POS on the date of wrap loan ₹ 6,69,724.82
Additional loan amount 50000
Interest on the additional loan 14%
Blended interest rate 12.139%
Revised loan tenure 39.39 months
total maturity in months (rounded up) 40 months
Number of whole months                        39 months
Fractional payment for the last month ₹ 8,664.67

Note that the blended rate is the weighted average, with interest at the originally-agreed rate of 12% on the existing POS, and 14% on the additional amount of lending. The revised tenure comes to 39.39 months, or 40 months. There will be full payment for 39 months, and a fractional payment in the last month.

Thus, by continuing his payment obligation for 3-4 more months, the borrower can get Rs. 50000/- cash, which he can use to restart his business operations.

The multiplier impact that this additional infusion of cash may have in his business may be substantial.

Partial Sovereign Guarantee for the Wrapper Loan

Now, we bring the key element of the structure. The lender, say a bank or NBFC, will generally be reluctant to take the additional exposure of Rs 50000, though on a performing loan. However, this may be encourage by the sovereign by giving a guarantee for the add-on loan.

The guarantee may come with minimal actual risk exposure to the sovereign, if the structure is devised as follows:

  • The sovereign’s portion of the total loan exposure, Rs 719725, is only Rs 50000, which is less than 10%. A safe limit of 10% of the size of the existing exposure may be kept, so that lenders do not aggressively push top-up loans.
  • Now, the sovereign’s portion, which is only Rs 50000/- (and in any case, limited to 10%), may either be a pari-passu share in the total loan, or may be structured as a senior share.
  • If it is a pari-passu share, the question of the liability for losses actually coming to the sovereign will arise at the same time as the lender. However, if the share of the sovereign is a senior share, then the sovereign will get to share losses only if the recoveries from the loan are less than Rs 50000.

The whole structure may be made more practical by moving from a single loan to a pool of loans. The sovereign guarantee may be extended to a pool of similar loans, with a prescription of a minimum number, maximum concentration per loan, and other diversity parameters. The moment we move from a single loan to a pool of loans, the sharing of losses between the sovereign and the originator will now be on a pool-wide basis. Even if the originator takes a first loss share of, say, 10%, and the sovereign’s share comes thereafter, the chances of the guarantee hitting the sovereign will be very remote.

And of course, the sovereign may also charge a reasonable guarantee fee for the mezzanine guarantee.

Since the wrapper loan is guaranteed by the sovereign, the lender may hope to get risk weight appropriate for a sovereign risk. Additional incentives may be given to make this lending more efficient.

Appendix

Economic recovery from a crisis and the role of increased credit supply: Some global experiences

  1. Measures by FRB during following the Global Financial Crisis:

‘The first set of tools, which are closely tied to the central bank’s traditional role as the lender of last resort, involve the provision of short-term liquidity to banks and other depository institutions and other financial institutions. A second set of tools involved the provision of liquidity directly to borrowers and investors in key credit markets. As a third set of instruments, the Federal Reserve expanded its traditional tool of open market operations to support the functioning of credit markets, put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative through the purchase of longer-term securities for the Federal Reserve’s portfolio.’[2]

  1. Liquidity shocks may cause reverse disruption in the financial chain:

‘During a financial crisis, such “liquidity shock chains” can operate in reverse. Firms that face tightening financing constraints as a result of bank credit contraction may withdraw credit from their customers. Thus, they pass the liquidity shock up the supply chain; that is, their customers might cut the credit to their customers, and so on…..Thus, the supply chains might propagate the liquidity shocks and exacerbate the impact of the financial crisis.’[3]

  1. Measures taken during Global Financial Crisis – US Fed publication – From Credit Crunches to Financial Crises:

Therefore, many of the policy remedies proposed to alleviate credit crunches were, in fact, used during the early stages of the 2008 financial crisis to mitigate potential credit availability problems. These remedies included capital infusions into troubled banks, the provision of liquidity facilities by the Federal Reserve, and, in the initial stress test, a primary focus on raising bank capital rather than allowing banks to shrink assets to maintain, or regain, required capital ratios.[4]

  1. Observations of Banca Italia on the 2008 Crisis

‘First, the effect of credit supply on value added is not detectable in the years before the great recession, indicating that credit supply is more relevant during an economic downturn. Second, the reduction in credit supply also explains the decline in employment even if the estimated effect is lower than that on value added. As a result, we can also detect a significant impact on labor productivity, while there is no effect on exports and on firm demographics. Third, the role of credit supply does vary across firms’ size, economic sectors, degree of financial dependence and, consequently, across geographical areas. Specifically, the impact is concentrated among small firms and among those operating in the manufacturing and service sectors. The impact is also stronger in the provinces that depend more heavily on external finance’[5]

 

[1] In fact, the wrap loan could have been an effective alternative to the moratorium

[2] https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_crisisresponse.htm

[3] http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/TradeFinancech01.pdf

[4] https://www.bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/Workingpapers/PDF/economic/cpp1505.pdf

[5] https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/temi-discussione/2016/2016-1057/en_tema_1057.pdf

 

Our other content relating to COVID-19 disruption may be referred here: http://vinodkothari.com/covid-19-incorporated-responses/

Our FAQs on moratorium may be referred here: http://vinodkothari.com/2020/03/moratorium-on-loans-due-to-covid-19-disruption/

Recent Reforms in Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code

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-Sikha Bansal & Megha Mittal

(resolution@vinodkothari.com) 

The past year has seen several reforms and amendments in the insolvency framework, be it enforcement of provisions for individual insolvency, or inclusion of FSPs under the insolvency regime. Additionally, Committees have been actively working on two extremely relevant aspects which presently the Code does not provide for- Group Insolvency and Cross Border Insolvency.

In our presentation (link given below) we have tried to collate the recent amendments and the workings of the Committee reports so as to provide a one-stop reference for  reforms as on Mar’20- see here

 

 

Restructuring of debt securities not to be treated as default, clarifies SEBI

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-Financial Services Division (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

Unprecedented crises call for unprecedented measures; the good thing is that all regulators are responding soon enough to the need for tweaking regulations, valuation rules, provisioning norms, accounting norms, and so on, to allow companies to adjust themselves to the new world that we are being ushered in.

SEBI has come up with a Circular no SEBI/HO/IMD/DF3/CIR/P/2020/70 dated 23rd April, 2020[1] (Circular), to the effect that mutual funds will not have to treat restructuring of a debt security as a case of “default”. With this, the funds have been able to avert having to make as much as 50% provision for what was deemed as a case of default.

It is notable that there have been court rulings whereby companies have evoked the “force majeure” clause to seek breather to repayment of debt securities[2].

Given the sensitiveness of the situation, this Circular has come as breather for a lot of financial sector entities, especially the ones actively engaged in securitisation, and ofcourse mutual funds. This write-up intends to first set a context to the Circular and then discuss the potential impact of the Circular.

Deemed Default in Case of Restructuring and Valuation Rules

A circular on valuation of money market and debt securities[3] issued by SEBI stated that “Any extension in the maturity of a money market or debt security shall result in the security being treated as “Default”, for the purpose of valuation”.

As per the valuation norm, mentioned above, mutual funds are required to take a haircut on the value of debt securities declared as default. In this regard, AMFI[4] has issued benchmarks for haircuts, based on which the valuation agencies are required to consider haircut as high as 50%, thereby reducing the value of the securities to half.

This circular turned out to be a major stumbling block for the mutual funds while extending the tenure of PTC transactions vis-à-vis the RBI’s moratorium on term loans in the wake of COVID 19 pandemic. The same has been discussed at length in the following section.

Restructuring of Pass Through Certificates

On March 27, 2020, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) introduced COVID-19 Regulatory Package[5]  which provided for moratorium on payment of instalments for term loans falling due between 1st March, 2020 and 31st May, 2020[6]. The moratorium has to be extended to all the loans, irrespective of whether they have been sold off by the originators by way of securitisation or direct assignment.

The moratorium as per the RBI’s framework, forced the originators to alter the payout structures originally agreed with the investors under PTC/ DA transactions, so as to pass on effect of moratorium to the investors as well. However, the problem arose when the matter was placed before mutual funds. The mutual funds are major investors in PTCs, representing approximately 43% of securitisation issuances in India[7]. The mutual funds became wary of any extension or modification in the terms of the PTCs, due to apprehensions on valuation losses due to reasons discussed earlier in this write-up.

This created a deadlock between the originators and mutual funds (as investors). On one hand, there was a pressure on the originators to extend moratorium across all the borrowers, on the other hand, the mutual funds were apprehensive in accepting the revised terms due to a potential valuation loss.[8]

Considering the situation, the SEBI issued the Circular to address the issues with respect to valuation of debt securities.

Restructuring of Debentures

Restructuring by deferral of the maturity is something that may be done in case of debentures as well. Debentures may have been (a) private placed; or (b) publicly offered. The former is the more common route for mutual funds to invest.

Any change in the terms of issue amounts to modification of rights of debenture-holders. There is no provision under the Companies Act or SEBI regulations dealing with modification of rights of debenture-holders. Therefore, such modification can be done subject to and in accordance with the terms of issue.

Typically, in case of private placement, the consent of debenture-holders, either directly or through the debenture trustees, is required to be obtained. On the part of the Company, the power to modify the terms usually reside with the Board of Directors or are delegated by the Board to a Committee or a person or persons.

In case of publicly offered debentures, in addition to obtaining the above mentioned consent, compliance with provisions of SEBI LODR Regulations is also required to be ensured.

How can Debenture Issuers Make Use of the SEBI Circular?

  • The restructuring must be solely on account of the COVID crisis. It should be possible to demonstrate that the asset pool or ALM arrangement, but for the impact of the crisis, was adequate enough to take care of the scheduled maturity of the bond.
  • It should be possible to demonstrate that the underlying asset cover still remains healthy, and conditions such as asset cover etc. are benign complied with.
  • The necessary formalities of obtaining required consents must have been done.

If these conditions are fulfilled, a bond issuer may be able to get the consent of the investors without the investors having to provide deep haircuts on account of a deemed default.

Specific Provisions of the Circular

  • An extension of term of a security would not be considered as a default only when the valuation agency is of a view that such delay in payment or extension of maturity has  arisen  solely  due  to  COVID-19 pandemic  lockdown  and/or  in  light  of  the  moratorium  permitted  by  the RBI.
  • In case of difference in the valuation of securities provided by two valuation agencies, the conservative valuation i.e. the lower of the two values shall be accepted.
  • The relief from attraction of provision of default shall be limited to the period the moratorium is in operation.
  • AMCs shall continue to be responsible for true and fairness of valuation of securities.

Conclusion

Due to the obvious outcome of reduction in value of the assets, the mutual funds, as investors of debentures or PTCs, had been rejecting the proposals of issuers/originators/servicers as the case maybe with respect grant of moratorium to the borrowers. Mostly the Mutual Funds which are major investors in PTCs have been denying the grant of moratorium benefit to the borrowers owing to the reduction in value of AUM that would follow. With introduction of this Circular, the problem of taking deep haircuts on the value on account of deemed default stand resolved.

Mutual Funds are now expected to give a green signal on grant of moratorium by lenders. This would help to finally meet the objective of providing relief to the country at the time of the current crisis.

 

 

 

 

[1] https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/apr-2020/review-of-provisions-of-the-circular-dated-september-24-2019-issued-under-sebi-mutual-funds-regulations-1996-due-to-the-covid-19-pandemic-and-moratorium-permitted-by-rbi_46549.html

[2] Our write-up dealing with Force Majeure clauses in agreements may be referred here: http://vinodkothari.com/2020/03/covid-19-and-the-shut-down-the-impact-of-force-majeure/

[3] https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/sep-2019/valuation-of-money-market-and-debt-securities_44383.html

[4] https://docs.utimf.com/v1/AUTH_5b9dd00b-8132-4a21-a800-711111810cee/UTIContainer/Standard%20Hair%20Cut%20matrix__AMFI20190606-110846.pdf

[5] https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=11835&Mode=0

[6] Our detailed FAQs relating to the moratorium may be viewed here: http://vinodkothari.com/2020/03/moratorium-on-loans-due-to-covid-19-disruption/

[7] http://vinodkothari.com/2020/01/shadow-banking-in-india/

[8] Issue discussed at length in a virtual conference organised by Indian Securitisation Foundation: Agenda and minutes may be referred on the following links:

http://vinodkothari.com/2020/04/virtual-conference-on-impact-of-rbis-moratorium-on-ptc-transactions/

http://vinodkothari.com/2020/04/minutes-of-the-isf-virtual-conference/

Extended meaning of “encumbrance” on promoter holdings in listed entities

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-SEBI’s Order in Yes Bank promoters indicates long arm of the provision 

Munmi Phukon | Partner | Vinod Kothari & Company

corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Introduction

While structuring of instruments like debentures, parties resort to various covenants in order to protect the interests of the investors and also to reflect the intent and purpose of the parties more specifically. One fairly commonplace practice with promoters of Indian listed companies to raise funds on the strength of their shareholding in their companies. It is often observed that, in structuring such transactions, companies find innovative ways of creating pseudo security interests on shares. Therefore, a careful analysis of the documentation entered into by the parties is required to conclude whether the covenants amount to creation of an encumbrance or not.

SEBI has recently dealt with such a case[1], in which SEBI throws some light on what could constitute an encumbrance for the purpose of SEBI (SAST) Regulations, 2011 (Regulations). SEBI considered the covenants mentioned in the debenture trust deed (DTD) executed by the promoter entities of the listed entity at the time of issuance of NCDs and held the promoters liable for non-disclosure of the encumbrance created on the shares held in the listed entity.

Legislative intent and purpose of the SAST Regulations

SAST Regulations are considered to be a social welfare legislation. The aim and intent of the Regulations is to protect the interest of the investors and ensuring market integrity. That is why, the Regulations recognise the importance of event based and periodic disclosures, specifically by the promoters of the entity, through Regulation 29 to 31 thereof. It has always been seen as a measure for ensuring better corporate governance which in turn enables the regulators and stock exchanges to monitor the transactions of the promoters.

Requirements related to encumbered shares under the Regulations

Transactions involving promoters’ shares are considered crucial in order to ensure transparency as regards the ownership/ control of the target company as well as price discovery of the shares in an informed manner. The genesis of the requirements of such disclosures arose in the beginning of 2009 when SEBI made it mandatory by amending the provisions of the erstwhile Regulations.

Later, similar requirements were provided in the revamped SAST Regulations vide Regulation 31 which requires the promoters to disclose about the shares of the target company encumbered by them on a yearly basis to the stock exchange(s) where the shares of the target company are listed and also to the target company. The promoters have also been mandated, by virtue of an amendment made in the said Regulation, to give declaration to the audit committee of the target company and the stock exchange(s) on a yearly basis about not having any encumbrance.

Further, SEBI vide its Circular dated 7th August, 2019[2] read with its Press Release-PR No.16/2019[3] requires the promoters to disclose to the stock exchange(s) and the target company, the detailed reasons for encumbrance if the combined encumbrance by the promoter along with PACs with him equals or exceeds, a) 50% of their shareholding in the target company; or b) 20% of the total share capital of the target company and also any positive changes therein thereafter within two working days from the creation of such encumbrance.

Furthermore, Regulation 29 requiring disclosure of acquisition/ disposal of shares of the target company by an acquirer on meeting certain threshold, interestingly, also provides that shares taken by way of encumbrance shall be treated as an acquisition, and shares given upon release of encumbrance shall be treated as a disposal and shall also require disclosure. In this context, it is pertinent to note if the pledgee/creditor gets voting rights also or has the right to cause the shareholder to vote as per the instructions of the creditor, the transaction would well amount to acquisition of control and hence, triggering the Regulation 3 as well.

The term ‘encumbrance’ under the Regulations

The term ‘encumbrance’ is defined under Regulation 28(3) of the SAST Regulations. Further, there has been an amendment to the existing definition w.e.f 29th July, 2019 vide SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) (Second Amendment) Regulations, 2019[4]. Evidently, the text of the existing definition signifies that it is an inclusive explanation and not an exhaustive one keeping the same open to different interpretations.

 

SEBI had tried to clarify the broad definition through its FAQs that, non- disposal undertaking (NDU) will be covered under the purview of ‘encumbrance’. The FAQs also clarified that NDUs may, inter alia, include the following:

“-     not encumbering shares to another party without the prior approval of the party with whom the shares have been encumbered;

  • non-disposal of shares beyond a certain threshold so as to retain control;
  • non-disposal of shares entailing risk of appropriation or invocation by the party with whom the shares have been encumbered or for its benefit.”

As mentioned above, the existing text of the definition has been expanded. As claimed by SEBI itself, the amendments have been made in the context of recent concerns w.r.t. promoter/ companies raising funds from Mutual Funds/ NBFCs through structured obligations, pledge of shares, non- disposal  undertakings,  corporate/  promoter guarantees and various other complex structures,  which reads as below:

“(3) For the purposes of this Chapter, the term “encumbrance” shall include,

  • any restriction on the free and marketable title to shares, by whatever name called, whether executed directly or indirectly;
  • pledge, lien, negative lien, non-disposal undertaking; or
  • any covenant,  transaction,  condition  or  arrangement  in  the  nature  of encumbrance,  by  whatever  name  called,  whether  executed  directly  or indirectly.”

Brief of the SEBI’s Order

The Order of SEBI seems to be an attempt of making an interpretation of certain clauses of the debenture trust deeds (DTDs) entered into by the promoter entities in the context of the then definition of ‘encumbrance’ provided u/r 28(3). SEBI found the following clauses in the DTDs and construed the same as creation of encumbrance on the shares of the listed company:

  • Maintenance of asset cover ratio at all times i.e. maintenance of equity shares held by the promoters in the listed entity, over and above the borrowing of the promoter.
  • In case of breach of the said condition, even though the debentures can be redeemed, however, only with an approval of the debenture holders for such early redemption;
  • The requirement of creation of security in favour of the DTs by way of exclusive pledge of the shares held by the promoter in the listed entity while availing any further borrowing and also with prior notice and giving of right of first refusal to the debenture holders;
  • Maintenance of borrowing cap at all times i.e. borrowing over the value of the shares held in the listed entity and the requirement of obtaining of a consent of the debenture holders in case of sell, disposal or encumbrance of the said shares.

SEBI contended that the covenants related to maintenance of asset cover/ borrowing cap at all times restrict the abilities of the borrowers/ promoters to dispose of the shares of the listed entity held by them. Therefore, the same should be considered as encumbrance for the purpose of Regulation 28(3). Further, the requirement of obtaining prior approval/ consent of the debenture holders before disposing of the shares tantamount to be a non- disposal undertaking as clarified vide the FAQs which include not encumbering shares to another party without prior approval of the party with whom the shares have been encumbered.

Meaning of ‘encumbrance’ in jurisprudence

In two passages in Salmon on Jurisprudence, 12th Edition, at Page 241 under the sub-heading “Rights in re propria and rights in re aliena” the learned author has stated thus:

“Rights may be divided into two kinds, distinguished by the civilians as Jura in re propria[5] and jura in re aliena[6]. The latter may also be conveniently termed encumbrances, if we use that term in its widest permissible sense. A right in re aliena or encumbrance is one which limits or derogates from some more general right belonging to some other person in respect of the same subject -matter. All other are jura in re propria.”

At Page 242 the learned author has observed as follows:

“it is essential to an encumbrance that it should in the technical language of our law, run with, the right encumbered by it. In other words, the document and the servant rights are necessarily concurrent. By time it is meant that an encumbrance must follow the encumbered right into the hands of new owners, so that a change of ownership will not free the right from the burden imposed upon it. If this is not so — if the right is transferable free from the burden — there is no true encumbrance.”

Thus, the true test of an encumbrance is the concurrence of the right with property – that the right attaches to property and travels along with it. Salmon has discussed encumbrances elaborately and mentions 4 types of encumbrances: leases, servitudes, security interests, and trusts. A lease confers a right to use the property. Servitude is a right to the limited use of the property such as the right of way or easements. Security interests (including mortgages) are encumbrances vested in a creditor. A trust is the obligation attached to property to hold it for the benefit of another.

Madras High Court also in the matter of M. Ratanchand Chordia And Ors. vs Kasim Khaleeli[7] held as below:

“The word “Encumbrances” in regard to a person or an estate denotes a burden which ordinarily consists of debts, obligations and responsibilities. In the sphere of law it connotes a liability attached to the property arising out of a claim or lien subsisting in favour of a person who is not the owner of the property. Thus a mortgage, a charge and vendor’s lien are all instances of encumbrances. The essence of an encumbrance is that it must bear upon the property directly and in-directly and not remotely or circuitously. It is a right in re aliena circumscribing and subtracting from the general proprietary right of another person. An encumbered right, that is a right subject to a limitation, is called servient while the encumbrance itself is designated as dominant.”

An analysis of the meaning of encumbrance

The following important features of encumbrances arise from the discussion above:

  • An encumbrance is a burden attached to property;
  • If it is a burden for the owner, it must be a benefit for the person holding the encumbrance. This also follows from the discussion by Salmond which has taken encumbrances to be jura in re propria, that is, rights over estate of someone else. That is, the burden created by the owner must be such which can operate as a benefit in the hands of the person holding the encumbrance;
  • The burden must necessarily be attached to the asset in question;
  • Since the essence of attachment or concurrence of the burden is that the burden will pass on a person acquiring the property, it necessarily follows that the burden must be on an ascertainable, identifiable property;
  • A mere restraint on sale or negative covenant is not an encumbrance. A leading English case law on whether a negative covenants “runs” with the property is Tulk v Moxhay(1848) 41 ER 1143. This classic ruling holds that a negative covenant is passable to the buyer of the property only where the parties intended the same to pass, and the burden “touches and concerns” the property. Here, a question of intent of parties will come in.

Different forms of quasi security interests on shares

Negative Lien or Negative Pledge

Negative Lien is used in banking parlance for a borrower to undertake not to create any charge on his property without the consent of the lender.

A negative pledge covenant does not give the negative pledgee a security interest or, in general, any other right in the debtor’s property.

It was held in Knott[8] that Negative Pledgee’s remedies are purely contractual and that the covenant confers no right in the property.

The generally accepted view as mentioned before is that the negative pledge does not create a proprietary or security interest and is therefore not registrable. [Tracy Hobbs, The Negative Pledge: A Brief Guide, 8(7) J.I.B.L.269 (1993)]

Springing Lien

A “springing lien” refers to lien granted in the future by a debtor (borrower or lessee) in favor of its creditors whereby the right conferred on the lender springs into a full-fledged lien or pledge either on the happening of certain events, or the discretion of the person holding the pledge.

Whether a so-called springing lien will amount to encumbrance or security interest will depend on intent of parties. If the debtor is free to deal with the subject matter before the trigger events that transform a springing lien into full-fledged lien have taken place, it cannot be said that the lien is an obligation attached to property. Therefore, it will not amount to encumbrance. However, if the lien comes attached with restrictions on sale, it will amount to encumbrance, because the combination of restriction on sale, and automatic attachment of a right on the asset that cannot be sold, in conjunction, will amount to a passable burden on property.

Conclusion

As discussed earlier, an encumbrance carries certain features along with it. A mere restraint on sale or negative covenant is not an encumbrance. Having said so, SEBI’s view in this context may not be in line with the jurisprudence of encumbrance.

However, it is seen that SEBI has been constantly endeavoring to expand the scope of the disclosure requirements, in the wake of various corporate governance failure recently witnessed by the country. SEBI, realizing the recent concerns w.r.t. promoters raising funds through structured obligations, pledge of shares, NDUs and various other complex structures and its impact on the corporate governance structures, had amended the meaning of encumbrance provided in Regulation 28(3). The said amendment has been made to include all such structures including any restriction on the free and marketable title to shares, by whatever name called, whether executed directly or indirectly or any covenant, transaction, condition or arrangement in the nature of encumbrance, by whatever name called, whether executed directly or indirectly.

Considering the amended definition of the term ‘encumbrance’, apparently, SEBI’s intent gets clearer that it wants to include all the possible arrangements/ structures which may carry a potential dilution in the promoter holding. The views held by SEBI are still open for a contest before the Securities Appellate Tribunal.

Read our related articles:

http://vinodkothari.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Article_on_Meaning_of_encumbrance_under_takeover_code.pdf

For more updates, please visit our website.

[1] https://www.sebi.gov.in/enforcement/orders/mar-2020/adjudication-order-in-respect-of-two-entities-in-the-matter-of-yes-bank-ltd-_46477.html

[2] https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/aug-2019/disclosure-of-reasons-for-encumbrance-by-promoter-of-listed-companies_43837.html

[3] https://www.sebi.gov.in/media/press-releases/jun-2019/sebi-board-meeting_43417.html

[4] https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/regulations/jul-2019/securities-and-exchange-board-of-india-substantial-acquisition-of-shares-and-takeovers-second-amendment-regulations-2019_43812.html

[5] Right over one’s own property

[6] Right over someone else’s property

[7] https://indiankanoon.org/doc/548843/

[8] Knott v. Shepherdstown Manufacturing Co. 5 S.E. 266 (W. Va. 1888)

Deemed public offers and private placement- searching the lost boundary!

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-Analysis of SAT ruling in the matter of Canning Industries Cochin Limited

Read our related write ups below –

Revised, stringent private placement framework becomes effective: a step-by-step guide to compliance

Revamping private placement mechanism

Comparison and Mapping of Rule 14 of PAS Rules dealing with Private Placement

Video lectures –

Further Issue of Shares | Overview of Basic Concepts

Lecture 2 | Private placement of securities | Power of 30 | Vinod Kothari & Company

Guidance on money laundering and terrorist financing risk assessment

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-Financial Services Division (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

Background

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) introduced an amendment[1] to Master Direction – Know Your Customer (KYC) Direction, 2016 (‘KYC Directions’)[2] requiring Regulated Entities (REs) to carry out money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) risk assessment exercises periodically. This requirement shall be applicable with immediate effect and the first assessment has to be carried out by June 30, 2020.

Carrying out ML and TF risk assessment is a very subjective matter and there is no thumb rule to be followed for the same. There is no uniformity on procedures of risk assessment, however, they may be guided by a set of broad principles. The following write-up intends to explore guidance principles enumerated by international bodies and suggest principles to be followed by financial institutions in India, specifically NBFCs, for carrying out risk assessment exercise.

Origin of the concept

The concept of ML and TF risk assessment arises from the recommendations of Financial Action Task Force (FATF). FATF has also provided detailed guidance on TF Risk Assessment[3]. Due to the inter-linkage between ML and TF, the guidelines also serve the purpose of guiding ML risk assessment. TF risk is defined as-

“A TF risk can be seen as a function of three factors: threat, vulnerability and consequence. It involves the risk that funds or other assets intended for a terrorist or terrorist organisation are being raised, moved, stored or used in or through a jurisdiction, in the form of legitimate or illegitimate funds or other assets.”

Global practices for ML/TF risk assessment

Based on FATF recommendations, many jurisdictions have prepared and published risk assessment procedures. India is yet to come up with the same.

For example, the National risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing[4] is the guidance published by the UK government. It provides sector specific guidance for risk assessment. The sector specific guidance is further granulated keeping in view the specific threats to certain parts of the sector.

The guidance provided by the Republic of Serbia[5] is a generalised one providing broad guidance to all sectors for risk assessment.

In Germany, financial institutions are classified on the basis of potential risk of ML/TF identified by them (considering the factors such as location, scope of business, product structure, customers’ profile and distribution structure) and the intensity of supervision by regulator is based on such risk categorisation.

Risk assessment process by NBFC

The risk assessment of a financial sector entity such as an NBFC, need not be complex, but should be commensurate with the nature and size of its business. For smaller or less complex NBFCs where the customers fall into similar categories and/or where the range of products and services are very limited, a simple risk assessment might suffice. Conversely, where the loan products and services are more complex, where there are multiple subsidiaries or branches offering a wide variety of products, and/or their customer base is more diverse, a more sophisticated risk assessment process will be required.

Based on the guiding principles provided by the FATF and specific guidance issued by FATF for banking and financial sector[6], the process of risk assessment by NBFCs may be divided into following stages:

Stage 1: Collection of information

The risk assessment shall begin with collecting of information on a wide range of variables including information on the general criminal environment, TF and terrorism threats, TF vulnerabilities of specific sectors and products, and the jurisdiction’s general AML capacity

The information may be collected externally or internally. In India, Directorate of Enforcement is the body which deals with ML and TF matters and has collection of information and list of terrorists. Further, the information may also be obtained from Central Bureau of Investigation.

Stage 2: Threat identification

Based on the information collected, jurisdiction and sector specific threats should be identified. Threat identification should be based on the risks identified on the national level, however, shall not be limited to the same. It should also be commensurate to the size and nature of business of the entity.

For individual NBFCs, it should take into account the level of inherent risk including the nature and complexity of their loan products and services, their size, business model, corporate governance arrangements, financial and accounting information, delivery channels, customer profiles, geographic location and countries of operation. The NBFC should also look at the controls in place, including the quality of the risk management policy, the functioning of the internal oversight functions etc.

Stage 3: Assessment of ML/TF vulnerabilities

This stage involves determination of the how the identified threats will impact the entity. The information obtained should be analysed in order to assess the probability of risks occurring. Based on the assessment, ML/TF risks should be classified as low, medium and high impact risks.

While assessing the risks, following factors should be considered:

  • The nature, scale, diversity and complexity of their business;
  • Target markets;
  • The number of customers already identified as high risk;
  • The jurisdictions the entity is exposed to, either through its own activities or the activities of customers, especially jurisdictions with relatively higher levels of corruption or organised crime, and/or deficient AML/CFT controls and listed by RBI or FATF;
  • The distribution channels, including the extent to which the entity deals directly with the customer or relies third parties to conduct CDD;
  • The internal audit and regulatory findings;
  • The volume and size of its transaction.

The NBFCs should complement this information with information obtained from relevant internal and external sources, such as operational/business heads and lists issued by inter-governmental international organisations, national governments and regulators.

The risk assessment should be approved by senior management and form the basis for the development of policies and procedures to mitigate ML/TF risk, reflecting the risk appetite of the NBFC and stating the risk level deemed acceptable. It should be reviewed and updated on a regular basis. Policies, procedures, measures and controls to mitigate the ML/TF risks should be consistent with the risk assessment.

Stage 4: Analysis of ML/TF threats and vulnerabilities

Once potential TF threats and vulnerabilities are identified, the next step is to consider how these interact to form risks. This could include a consideration of how identified domestic or foreign TF threats may take advantage of identified vulnerabilities. The analysis should also include assessment of likely consequences.

Stage 5: Risk Mitigation

Post the analysis of threats and vulnerabilities, the NBFC must develop and implement policies and procedures to mitigate the ML/TF risks they have identified through their individual risk assessment. Customer due diligence (CDD) processes should be designed to understand who their customers are by requiring them to gather information on what they do and why they require financial services. The initial stages of the CDD process should be designed to help NBFCs to assess the ML/TF risk associated with a proposed business relationship, determine the level of CDD to be applied and deter persons from establishing a business relationship to conduct illicit activity.

Focus on CDD procedure

While entering into a relationship with the customer, carrying out Customer Due Diligence (CDD) is the initial step. It is during the CDD process that the identity of a customer is verified and risk based assessment of the customer is done. While assessing credit risks, financial entities should also assess ML/TF risks. The CDD procedures and policies should suitably include checkpoints with respect to ML and TF.

The risk classification of the customer, as discussed above, should also be done based on the CDD carried out. The CDD procedure, apart from verifying the identity of the customer, should also go a few steps further to understand the nature of business or activity of the customer. Measures should be taken to prevent the misuse of legal persons for money laundering or terrorist financing.

In case of medium or high risk customers, or unusual transactions, the entities should also carry out transaction due diligence to identify source and application of funds, beneficiary of the transaction, purpose etc.

NBFCs should document and state clearly the criteria and parameters used for customer segmentation and for the allocation of a risk level for each of the clusters of customers. Criteria applied to decide the frequency and intensity of the monitoring of different customer segments should also be transparent. Further, the NBFC must maintain records on transactions and information obtained through the CDD measures. The CDD information and the transaction records should be made available to competent authorities upon appropriate authority.

Some examples of enhanced and simplified due diligence measures are as follows:

Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD)

  • obtaining additional identifying information from a wider variety or more robust sources and using the information to inform the individual customer risk assessment
  • carrying out additional searches (e.g., verifiable adverse media searches) to inform the individual customer risk assessment
  • commissioning an intelligence report on the customer or beneficial owner to understand better the risk that the customer or beneficial owner may be involved in criminal activity
  • verifying the source of funds or wealth involved in the business relationship to be satisfied that they do not constitute the proceeds from crime
  • seeking additional information from the customer about the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship

Simplified Due Diligence (SDD)

  • obtaining less information (e.g., not requiring information on the address or the occupation of the potential client), and/or seeking less robust verification, of the customer’s identity and the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship
  • postponing the verification of the customer’s identity
Ongoing CDD and Monitoring

Ongoing monitoring means the scrutiny of transactions to determine whether the transactions are consistent with the NBFC’s knowledge of the customer and the nature and purpose of the loan product and the business relationship.

Monitoring also involves identifying changes to the customer profile (for example, their behaviour, use of products and the amount of money involved), and keeping it up to date, which may require the application of new, or additional, CDD measures. Monitoring transactions is an essential component in identifying transactions that are potentially suspicious. Monitoring should be carried out on a continuous basis or triggered by specific transactions. It could also be used to compare a customer’s activity with that of a peer group. Further, the extent and depth of monitoring must be adjusted in line with the NBFC’s risk assessment and individual customer risk profiles

Reporting

The NBFCs should have the ability to flag unusual movement of funds or transactions for further analysis. Further, it should have appropriate case management systems so that such funds or transactions are scrutinised in a timely manner and a determination made as to whether the funds or transaction are suspicious. Funds or transactions that are suspicious should be reported promptly to the FIU and in the manner specified by the authorities. There must be adequate processes to escalate suspicions and, ultimately, report to the FI.

Internal Controls

Adequate internal controls are a prerequisite for the effective implementation of policies and processes to mitigate ML/TF risk. Internal controls include appropriate governance arrangements where responsibility for AML/CFT is clearly allocated and there are controls to test the overall effectiveness of the NBFC’s policies and processes to identify, assess and monitor risk. It is important that responsibility for the consistency and effectiveness of AML/CFT controls be clearly allocated to an individual of sufficient seniority within the NBFC to signal the importance of ML/TF risk management and compliance, and that ML/TF issues are brought to senior management’s attention.

Recruitment and Training

NBFCs should check that personnel they employ have integrity and are adequately skilled and possess the knowledge and expertise necessary to carry out their function, in particular where staff are responsible for implementing AML/CFT controls. The senior management who is responsible for implementation of a risk-based approach should understand the degree of discretion an NBFC has in assessing and mitigating its ML/TF risks. In particular, it must be ensured that the employees and staff have been trained to assess the quality of a NBFC’s ML/TF risk assessments and to consider the adequacy, proportionality and effectiveness of the NBFC’s AML policies, procedures and internal controls in light of this risk assessment. Adequate training would allow them to form sound judgments about the adequacy and proportionality of the AML controls.

Stage 6: Follow-up and maintaining up-to-date risk assessment

Once assessed, the impact of the risk shall be recorded and measures to mitigate the same should be provided for. The information that forms basis of the risk assessment process should be timely updated and the entire risk assessment procedure should be carried out in case of major change in the information.

The compliance officer of the NBFC should have the necessary independence, authority, seniority, resources and expertise to carry out these functions effectively, including the ability to access all relevant internal information. Additionally, there should be an independent audit function carried out to test the AML/CFT programme with a view to establishing the effectiveness of the overall AML/CFT policies and processes and the quality of NBFC’s risk management across its operations, departments, branches and subsidiaries, both domestically and, where relevant, abroad.

 

 

[1] https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=11873&Mode=0

[2] https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_ViewMasDirections.aspx?id=11566

[3] https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-Financing-Risk-Assessment-Guidance.pdf

[4] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/655198/National_risk_assessment_of_money_laundering_and_terrorist_financing_2017_pdf_web.pdf

[5] https://www.nbs.rs/internet/english/55/55_7/55_7_4/procena_rizika_spn_e.pdf

[6] http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Risk-Based-Approach-Banking-Sector.pdf

 

Our other write-ups on NBFCs may be viewed here: http://vinodkothari.com/nbfcs/

Write-rps relating to KYC and Anti-money laundering may also be referred:

Revised Guidelines on KYC & Anti-Money Laundering Measures for HFCs

Torrid time for NBFCs as FIU-IND lays down ‘High Risk’ classification

 

The Rise of Stablecoins amidst Instability

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-Megha Mittal

(mittal@vinodkothari.com) 

The past few years have witnessed an array of technological developments and innovations, especially in Fintech; and while the world focused on Bitcoins and other cryptos, a new entrant ‘Stablecoin’ slowly crept its way into the limelight. With the primary motive of shielding its users from the high volatility associated with cryptos, and promises of boosting cross-border payments and remittance, ‘Stablecoins’ emerged in 2018, and now have become the focal point of discussion of several international bodies including the Financial Standards Board (FSB), G20, Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO).

Additionally, the widespread notion that the desperate need of cross-border payments and remittances during the ongoing COVID-crisis may prove to be a defining moment for stablecoins, has drawn all the more attention towards the need of establishing regulations and legal framework pertaining to Stablecoins.

In this article, we shall have an insight as to what Stablecoins, (Global Stable Coinss) are, its modality, its current status of acceptance by the international bodies, and how the ongoing COVID crisis, may act as a catalyst for its rise.

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US Federal Reserve provides support to senior ABS securities

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Timothy Lopes, Executive, Vinod Kothari Consultants

finserv@vinodkothari.com

Measures to maintain and strengthen credit flow to consumers is an important part of regulatory initiatives to contain the effects of the COVID crisis. Asset-backed securities and structured finance instrument are recognised as important instruments that connect capital market resources with the market for loans and financial assets. Underscoring the relevance of securitization to the flow of credit to consumers, the US Federal Reserve has set up a USD 100 billion loan facility, called Term Asset-backed Securities Loan Facility, 2020 [TALF] for lending against asset backed securities, issued on or after 23rd March, 2020.

Note that equivalent of TALF 2020 was set up post the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) as well, in 2008[1].

It is also notable that global financial supervisors have attempted to help financial intermediaries stay firm, partly by helping structured finance transactions. The example of the Australian regulators setting up a Structured Finance Support Fund (SFSF)[2] is one such regulatory measure. Another example is the Canada Mortgage Bond Purchase Program initiated by the Bank of Canada[3].

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