Guaranteed Emergency Line of Credit: Understanding and FAQs

-Financial Services Division (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

The Finance Minister has, in the month of May, 2020, announced a slew of measures as a part of the economic stimulus package for self-reliant India. Among various schemes introduced in the package, one was the Emergency Credit Line Guarantee Scheme (ECLGS, ‘Scheme’), which intends to enable the flow of funds to MSMEs. This is the so-called Rs 300000 crore scheme.

Under this Scheme the GoI, through a trust, will guarantee loans provided by banks and Financial Institutions (FIs) to MSMEs and MUDRA borrowers. The Scheme aims to extend additional funding of Rs. 3 lakh crores to eligible borrowers in order to help them through the liquidity crunch faced by them due to the crisis.

Based on the information provided by the Finance Minister about this Scheme, the press release issued in this regard and the scheme documents issued subsequently, we have prepared the below set of FAQs. There is also a set of FAQs prepared by NCGTC – we have relied upon these as well.

In brief, the Guaranteed Emergency Line of Credit [GECL] is a scheme whereby a lender [referred to as Member Lending Institution or MLI in the Scheme] gives a top-up loan of 20% of the outstanding facility as on 29th February, 2020. This top up facility is entirely guaranteed by NCGTC. NCGTC is a special purpose vehicle formed in 2014 for the purpose of acting as a common trustee company to manage and operate various credit guarantee trust funds.

[Vinod Kothari had earlier recommended a “wrap loan” for restarting economic activity – http://vinodkothari.com/2020/04/loan-products-for-tough-times/. The GECL is very close to the idea of the wrap loan.]

Essentially, the GECL will allow lenders to provide additional funding to business entities. The additional funding will run as a separate parallel facility, along with the main facility. The GECL loan will have its own term, moratorium, EMIs, and may be rate of interest as well. Of course, the GECL will share the security interest with the original facility, and will rank pari passu, with the main facility, both in terms of cashflows as in terms of security interest.

The major questions pertaining to the GECL are going to be about the eligible borrowers to whom GECL may be extended, and the allocation of cashflows and collateral with the main facility. Operationally, issues may also centre round the turnaround time, after disbursement, for getting the guarantee cover, and whether the guarantee cover shall be in batch-processed, or processed loan-by-loan. Similarly, there may be lots of questions about how to encash claims on NCGTC. Read more

PCG Scheme 2.0 for NBFC pooled assets, bonds and commercial paper

-Financial Service Division (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

The write-up below covers version 2.0 of the Partial Credit Guarantee Scheme [PCG Scheme, or PCGS, or simply, the Scheme; version 2 is referred to herein as PCG 2.0 for the sake of distinction from its earlier version, which we refer to PCGS 1.0].

PCGS 1.0 was announced by the Finance Minister, during the Union Budget 2019-20, introducing a partial credit guarantee scheme so as to extend relief to NBFCs during the on-going liquidity crisis. The proposal laid down in the Budget was a very broad statement. On 13th August, 2019 the Ministry of Finance came out with a Press Release to announce the notification in this regard, dated 10th August, 2019, laying down specifics of the scheme.

PCGS 1.0 was only a moderate success, as literally no transactions were conducted under the Scheme until November, 2019. Various stakeholders[1] represented to the MOF to remove the bottlenecks in the structure. Subsequently, on 11th December, 2019, the Union Cabinet approved amendments[2] to the Scheme (Amendments).

The scheme,  known as “Partial Credit Guarantee offered by Government of India (GoI) to Public Sector Banks (PSBs) for purchasing high-rated pooled assets from financially sound Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs)/Housing Finance Companies (HFCs)”, is referred to, for the purpose of this write, as  “the Scheme”.

PCGS 2.0 was introduced by the Finance Minister as a part of her Rs 20-lakh Crore stimulus package, announced on 13th May, 2020 to provide liquidity to NBFCs, HFCs and MFIs with low credit rating. The Union Cabinet approved the sovereign portfolio guarantee of up to 20% of first loss for purchase of Bonds or Commercial Papers (CPs) with a rating of AA and below (including unrated paper with original/ initial maturity of up to one year) issued by NBFCs/ MFCs/MFIs, by Public Sector Banks through an extension of the PCGS 1.0. PCGS 2.0 has been put in the form of FAQs as well as press-release on the website of the Ministry of Finance.

While PCGS 1.0 was intended to address the temporary liquidity crunch faced by solvent HFCs/ NBFCs, PCGS 2.0 is premised on the continuing problems faced by NBFCs/HFCs/MFIs. The Press Release of the GoI says: “COVID-19 crisis and consequent lockdown restrictions are likely to have a negative impact on both collections and fresh loan disbursements, besides a deleterious effect on the overall economy. This is anticipated to result not only in asset quality issues for the NBFC/ HFC/ MFI sector, but also low loan growth as well as higher borrowing costs for the sector, with a cascading effect on Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) which borrow from them. While the RBI moratorium provides some relief on the assets side, it is on the liabilities side that the sector is likely to face increasing challenges. The extension of the existing Scheme will address the liability side concerns. In addition, modifications in the existing PCGS will enable wider coverage of the Scheme on the asset side also. Since NBFCs, HFCs and MFIs play a crucial role in sustaining consumption demand as well as capital formation in small and medium segment, it is essential that they continue to get funding without disruption, and the extended PCGS is expected to systematically enable the same.”

 PCGS 2.0 covers both the asset side as well as the liability side. PCGS 1.0 was limited to the asset side, for guaranteeing the purchase of “pooled assets” from NBFCs. PCGS 2.0 covers the liability side as well – permitting banks to purchase CPs/ bonds issued by NBFCs/HFCs/MFIs (Finance Companies). Therefore, both the banks as well as Finance Companies will have to make a careful comparison between pool assignments, versus liability issuance. We intend to provide a comparative view of the same in our analysis below.

In this write-up we have tried to answer some obvious questions that could arise along with potential answers. This write-up should be read in conjunction with our earlier write ups on the PCGS 1.0 here.

Scope of applicability

  1. When does this scheme come into force?

The Scheme was originally introduced on 10th August, 2019 and has been put to effect immediately. The modifications in the Scheme were made applicable with effect from 11th December, 2019.

PCGS 2.0 was announced by the GoI vide a note dated 20th May, 2020.

  1. Currently, the Scheme has two distinct elements – purchase of asset pools, and purchase of CPs/bonds issued by finance companies. How do these different funding options compare for both the finance companies, and the investing banks?

PCGS 2.0 has added the CP/bond element into the Scheme basically for providing short-term, sovereign-guaranteed liquidity support for redeeming liabilities maturing within 6 months from the date of issue of the CP/bonds. Therefore, the CP/bond guarantee is essentially a liability management option.

On the other hand, the asset pool purchase gives ability to NBFCs to release liquidity locked in assets, and gives them long-term resources for on-lending.

CP is typically issued for a tenure upto 12 months. Bonds for the purpose of the Scheme are also short-term bonds, with a maturity of 9 to 18 months. Hence, in either case, the finance company is simply shifting its existing redemption liability by 9 to 18 months.

Asset pools will have a minimum rating requirement, whereas in case of short-term paper issuance, there is a maximum rating requirement. In fact, PSBs are allowed to purchase unrated paper as well, if the tenure is within 12 months.

A tabular comparison between pool purchases and paper purchase may run as follows:

Pool Purchases Paper Purchases
Nature of the transaction Sale of pool of loans by finance companies to PSBs. PSBs get a first loss guarantee from GoI Acquisition of a pool of CP/bonds (paper) by PSBs, issued by finance companies. PSBs get a first loss guarantee from GoI
Eligible finance companies NBFCs and HFCs. MFIs are not eligible MFIs are also eligible
Purpose/purport of the transaction The finance company refinances its pool, thereby releasing liquidity. The liquidity can be used for on-lending The purported use of the funding is for meeting an imminent liability redemption. The issuance of the paper is connected with liabilities maturing within next 6 months.

The liability itself may be either repayment of a term loan, redemption of any debt security, or otherwise.

Rating requirement Minimum rating of BBB+ Maximum rating of AA. Unrated paper also qualifies
Tenure of the loans/paper There is no stipulation of the tenure of the underlying loans. The guarantee is valid for a period of 24 months only. Paper should have maturity of 9 to 18 months.
Extent of cover by GoI 10% of the pool purchased by PSBs 20% of the portfolio of paper purchased by the PSBs
Ramp up period Loan pools may be acquired upto 31st March, 2021 Paper may be acquired within 3 months
Impact on asset liability mismatch Repayment of the pool is on a pass-through basis to the PSB. Hence, there is no ALM Repayment will be on a bullet maturity basis. Hence, there will be an ALM issue.
Bankruptcy remoteness Pool purchases take exposure on the underlying pool, and are therefore, bankruptcy-remote qua the NBFC. Paper purchase is paper issued by the NBFC and hence, the PSB takes exposure in the issuer.
  1. How long will this Scheme continue to be in force?

Originally, PCGS 1.0 was supposed to remain open for 6 months from the date of issuance of this Scheme or when the maximum commitment of the Government, under this Scheme, is achieved, whichever is earlier. However, basis the Amendments discussed above, the Scheme was extended till 20th June, 2020. The Amendments also bestowed  upon the Finance Minister power to extend the tenure by upto 3 months.

PCGS 2.0 has two distinct elements – (a) Purchase of Pooled assets; (b) Purchase of bonds/CPs issued by Finance companies. For Part (a), that is, purchase of pooled assets, the Scheme is now extended to 31st March, 2021. For purchase of paper by the PSBs, the PSB has to acquire the paper within 3 months of the announcement. Taking the announcement date of the Scheme to be 20th May, the paper should be acquired by the PSBs within 20th August, 2020.

  1. Who is the beneficiary of the guarantee under the Scheme – the bank or the NBFC?

The bank (and that too, PSB only) is the beneficiary. The NBFC is not a party to the transaction of guarantee. This is true both for pool purchases as well as paper purchases.

  1. Does a bank buying pools from NBFCs/HFCs (Financial Entities) automatically get covered under the Scheme?

No. Since a bank/ Financial Entities may not want to avail of the benefit of the Scheme, the Parties will have to opt for the benefit of the guarantee. The bank will have to enter into specific documentation, following the procedure discussed below.

  1. In case of Paper Purchases, is the guarantee applicable to paper issued by different finance companies?

Yes. The guarantee is for a portfolio of finance company paper acquired by the PSB. For example, a PSB buys the following paper issued by different finance companies:

X Ltd    bonds with maturity of 18 months      Rs 200 crores

Y Ltd    CP having maturity of 9 moths           Rs 100 crores

C Ltd   bonds having maturity of 12 moths    Rs 450 crores

D Ltd   CP having maturity of 6 months         Rs 50 crores

Total portfolio                                                  Rs 800 crores

The bank may get the entire paper, adding to Rs 800 crores, guaranteed by GoI. The guaranteed amount is Rs 800 crores, and the maximum loss payable by the GoI is 20%, that is, Rs 160 crores.

  1. What is the relevance of pooling of paper, in case of paper purchases?

In case of paper purchases, the guarantee is on a pool of paper, that is, on an aggregate basis. In all such aggregation transactions, unless the pool becomes granular, the first loss guarantee may become highly inadequate.

For example, in the illustration taken in Q5 above, the loss is limited to Rs 160 crores, being 20% of the guaranteed amount. If the bonds issued by C Ltd default, Rs 450 crores would be in default, while the guarantee by the GoI will be only upto Rs 160 crores.

In the same case, had the total portfolio of Rs 800 crores were, say, to consist of 10 issuances of Rs 80 crores each, 2 out of the 10 issuers will be fully covered by the guarantee. Though the conditions of a binomial distribution are inapplicable in the present case (as the pool has a high level of correlation risk), but the probability of more than 2 defaults in a pool of 10 issues seems much lower than the probability of a major issuer out of a non-granular pool defaulting. Hence, PSBs, in their own interest, may want to build up a granular pool consisting of several issuers.

Of course, the ramp up time for all that is highly inadequate – only 3 months from the scheme announcement. From past experience, it should be clear that that much time is lost even in dissemination of understanding  – from MOF to SIDBI to the PSBs, and more so because of communication difficulties in the present situation.

  1. What does the Bank have to do to get covered by the benefit of guarantee under the Scheme?

The procedural aspects of the guarantee under the Scheme are discussed below.

  1. Is the guarantee specifically to be sought for each of the asset pools acquired by the Bank or is it going to be an umbrella coverage for all the eligible pools acquired by the Bank?

The operational mechanism requires that there will be separate documentation every time the bank wants to acquire a pool from a financial entity in accordance with the Scheme. Hence it appears that the guarantee is for a pool from a specific finance company.

In case of paper purchases, the situation is different – there, the guarantee is for a pool of paper issued by different finance companies.

  1. How does this Scheme, relating to asset pool purchases, rank/compare with other schemes whereby banks may participate in originations done by NBFCs/HFCs?

The RBI has lately taken various initiatives to promote participation by banks in the originations done by NBFCs/ HFCs. The following are the available ways of participation:

  • Direct assignments
  • Co-lending
  • Loans for on-lending
  • Securitisation

Direct assignments and securitisation have been there in the market since 2012, however, recently, once the liquidity crisis came into surface, the RBI relaxed the minimum holding period norms in order to promote the products.

Co-lending is also an alternative product for the co-origination by banks and NBFCs. In 2018, the RBI also released the guidelines on co-origination of priority sector loans by banks and NBFCs. The guidelines provide for the modalities of such originations and also provide on risk sharing, pricing etc. The difficulty in case of co-origination is that the turnaround time and the flexibility that the NBFCs claimed, which was one of their primary reasons for a competitive edge, get compromised.

The third product, that is, loans for on-lending for a specific purpose, has been in existence for long. However, recent efforts of RBI to allow loans for on-lending for PSL assets have increased the scope of this product.

This Scheme, though, is meant to boost specific direct assignment transactions, but is unique in its own way. This Scheme deviates from various principles from the DA guidelines and is, accordingly, intended to be an independent scheme by itself.

The basic use of the Scheme is to be able to conduct assignment of pools, without having to get into the complexity of involving special purpose vehicles, setting enhancement levels only so as to reach the desired ratings as per the Scheme. The effective cost of the Financial Entities doing assignments under the Scheme will be (a) the return expected by the Bank for a GoI-guaranteed pool; plus (b) 25 bps. If this effectively works cheaper than opting for a similar rated pool on a standalone basis, the Scheme may be economically effective.

  1. How does this Scheme, relating to paper purchases, rank/compare with other schemes whereby PSBs may provide liquidity to NBFCs/HFCs/MFIs?

The Scheme should be compared with Special Liquidity Scheme for NBFCs/HFCs. From the skeletal details available [https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1625310], the Special Liquidity Scheme may allow an NBFC/HFC to issue debt instruments by a rating notch-up, based on partial guarantee given by the SPV to be set up for this purpose.

It may seem that the formation of the SPV as well as implementation of the Special Liquidity Scheme may take some time. In the meantime, if a finance company has immediate liquidity concerns for some maturing debt securities, it may use the PCG scheme.

However, a fair assessment may be that the PCGS 2.0 will be largely useful for pool purchases, rather than paper purchases. This is so because in case of paper purchases, the ramp up period of 3 months will elapse very soon, giving PSBs very little time to approach SIDBI for getting limits. In any case, the ramp up of the pool of paper has to happen first, before the PSB can get the guarantee. This may demotivate PSBs from committing to buy the paper issued by finance companies.

  1. Is the Scheme for Pool Purchases an alternative to direct assignment covered by Part B of the 2012 Guidelines, or is it by itself an independent option?

While intuitively one would have thought that the Scheme is a just a method of risk mitigation/facilitation of the DA transactions which commonly happen between banks and Financial Entities, there are several reasons based on which it appears that this Scheme should be construed as an independent option to banks/ Financial Entities:

  • This Scheme is limited to acquisition of pools by PSBs only whereas direct assignment is not limited to either PSBs or banks.
  • This Scheme envisages that the pool sold to the banks has attained a BBB+ rating at the least. As discussed below, that is not possible without a pool-level credit enhancement. In case of direct assignments, credit enhancement is not permissible.
  • Investments in direct assignment are to be done by the acquirer based on the acquirer’s own credit evaluation. In case of the Scheme, the acquisition is obviously based on the guarantee given by the GoI.
  • There is no question of an agreement or option to acquire the pool back after its transfer by the originator. The Scheme talks about the right of first refusal by the NBFC if the purchasing bank decides to further sell down the assets at any point of time.

Therefore, it should be construed that the Scheme is completely carved out from the DA Guidelines, and is an alternative to DA or securitisation. The issue was clarified by the Reserve Bank of India vide its FAQs on the issue[3].

  1. Is this Scheme applicable to Securitisation transactions as well?

Assignment of pool of assets can be happen in case of both direct assignment as well as securitisation transaction. However, the intention of the present scheme is to provide credit enhancements to direct assignment transactions only. The Scheme does not intend to apply to securitisation transactions; however, the credit enhancement methodology to be deployed to make the Scheme work may involve several structured finance principles akin to securitisation.

  1. In case of Paper Purchases, does the PSB have the benefit of security from underlying assets?

In case of CP, the same is unsecured; hence, the question of any security does not arise. In case of bonds, security may be obtained, but given the short-term nature of the instrument, and the fact that the security is mostly by way of a floating charge, the security creation may not have much relevance.

  1. Between a bond and a CP, what should a PSB/finance company prefer?

The obvious perspective of the finance company as well as the bank may be to go for the maximum tenure permissible, viz., 18 months. CP has a maturity limitation. Hence, the obvious choice will be to go for bonds.

  1. A finance company has maturity liabilities over the next few months. However, it has sufficient free assets also. Should it prefer to sell a pool of assets, or for a short-term paper issuance?

The question does not have a straight answer. In case the finance company goes for paper issuance, it keeps its assets still available, may be for using the same for a DA/securitisation transaction. However, from the viewpoint of flexibility in use of the funds, as also the elimination of ALM risk, a finance company should consider opting for the pool sale option.

16A. As per the Scheme documents pertaining to Paper Purchase, the issuance of Paper may be done for repaying liabilities. What is the construct of the term “liability”? Can it, for example, include payment to securitisation investors?

Securitisation is a self-liquidating liability which liquidates based on the pool cashflows. The issuer does not repay securitisation liability. However, the facility may otherwise be used for payment of any of the financial obligations of the issuer.

Risk transfer

  1. The essence of a guarantee is risk transfer. So how exactly is the process of risk transfer happening in case of pool purchases?

The risk is originated at the time of loan origination by the Financial Entities. The risk is integrated into a pool. Since the transaction is a direct assignment (see discussion below), the risk transfer from the NBFC to the bank may happen either based on a pari passu risk sharing, or based on a tranched risk transfer.

The question of a pari passu risk transfer will arise only if the pool itself, without any credit enhancement, can be rated BBB+. Again, there could be a requirement of a certain level of credit enhancements as well, say through over-collateralisation or subordination.

Based on whether the share of the bank is pari passu or senior, there may be a risk transfer to the bank. Once there is a risk transfer on account of a default to the bank, the bank now transfers the risk on a first-loss basis to the GoI within the pool-based limit of 10%.

  1. How does the risk transfer happen in case of paper purchase?

In case of paper purchase, the risk will arise in case of “failure to service on maturity”. As we discussed earlier, it is presumed that the paper will have a bullet maturity. Hence, if the finance entity is not able to redeem the paper on maturity, the PSB may claim the money from the GoI, upto a limit of 20% for the whole of the pool.

  1. Let us say, at the time of original guarantee for Paper Purchase, the Pool of paper had a total exposure of Rs 800 crores. Out of the same, Rs 100 crores has successfully been redeemed by the issuer. Is it proper to say that the guarantee now stands reduced to 20% of Rs 700 crores?

No. The guarantee is on a first loss basis for the whole pool, amounting to Rs 800 crores. Hence, the guaranteed amount will remain 20% of Rs 800 crores.

  1. What is the maximum amount of exposure, the Government of India is willing to take through this Scheme?

Under this Scheme, the Government has agreed to provide (a) 10% first loss guarantee to pool purchase; and (b) 20% guarantee for paper purchases. The total exposure of the Govt has been fixed at a cap of ₹ 10,000 crores.

With the 20% first loss cover in case of paper, it may be seem that the paper will eat the up the total capacity under the Scheme fast. However, as we have discussed above, we do not expect the paper purchases will materalise to a lot of extent in view of the ramp up time of 3 months.

  1. What does 10% first loss guarantee in case of Pool Purchase signify?

Let us first understand the meaning for first loss guarantee. As the name suggests, the guarantor promises to replenish the first losses of the financier upto a certain level. Therefore, a 10% first loss guarantee would signify that any loss upto 10% of the total exposure of the acquirer in a particular pool will be compensated by the guarantor.

Say for example, if the size of pool originated by NBFC N is Rs. 1000 crores, consisting of 1000 borrowers of Rs. 1 crore each. The terms of the guarantee say that the PSB may make a claim against the GoI once the PSB suffers a loss on account of the loan being 91 DPD or more.

Since the GoI is guaranteeing the losses suffered by the PSB, one first needs to understand the terms between the PSB and the finance company. Quite likely, the finance company will have to provide at least 2 pool level enhancements to lift the rating of the pool sold to the bank to the BBB+ level – excess spread, and some degree of over-collateralisation or first loss support. Hence, to the extent the loans in the pool go delinquent, but are taken care of by the excess spread present in the pool, or the over-collateralisation/first loss support available in the pool, there is no question of any loss being transferred to the PSB. If there is no loss taken by the PSB, there is no question of reaching out to the GoI for the guarantee. It is only when the PSB suffers a loss that the PSB will reach out to the GoI for making payment, in terms of the guarantee.

  1. When is a loan taken to have defaulted, in case of Pool Purchases, for the purpose of the Scheme?

Para D of the Scheme suggests that the loan will be taken as defaulted when the interest and/or principal is overdue by more than 90 days. It further goes to refer to crystallisation of liability on the underlying borrower. The meaning of “crystallisation of liability” is not at all clear, and is, regrettably, inappropriate. The word “crystallisation” is commonly used in context of floating charges, where the charge gets crystallised on account of default. It is also sometimes used in context of guarantees where the liability is said to crystallise on the guarantor following the debtor’s default. The word “underlying borrower” should obviously mean the borrower included in the pool of loans, who always had a crystallised liability. In context, however, this may mean declaration of an event of default, recall of the loan, and thereby, requiring the borrower to repay the entire defaulted loan. 

  1. On occurrence of “default” as above, will be the Bank be able to claim the entire outstanding from the underlying borrower, or the amount of defaulted interest/principal?

The general principle in such cases is that the liability of the guarantor should crystallise on declaration of an event of default on the underlying loan. Hence, the whole of the outstanding from the borrower should be claimed from the guarantor, so as to indemnify the bank fully. As regards subsequent recoveries from the borrower, see later.

  1. Does the recognition of loss by the bank on a defaulted loan have anything to do with the excess spreads/interest on the other performing loans? That is to say, is the loss with respect to a defaulted loan to be computed on pool basis, or loan-by-loan basis?

A reading of para D would suggest that the claiming of compensation is on default of a loan. Hence, the compensation to be claimed by the bank is not to be computed on pool basis. However, any pool-level enhancement, such as excess spread or over-collateralisation, will have to be exhausted first.

  1. Can the guarantee be applicable to a revolving purchase of loans by the bank from the NBFC, that is, purchase of loans on a continuing basis?

No. The intent seems clearly to apply the Scheme only to a static pool.

  1. If a bank buys several pools from the same NBFC, is the extent of first loss cover, that is, 10%, fungible across all pools?

No. The very meaning of a first loss cover is that the protection is limited to a single, static pool.

  1. What will the 20% first loss guarantee in case of Paper Purchase signify?

The meaning of first loss guarantee will be the same in case of Paper Purchases, as in case of Pool Purchases. The difference is clearly the lack of granularity in case of Paper purchases, as the exposure is on the issuer NBFC, and not the underlying borrower.

Hence, if the issuer NBFC fails to redeem the paper on maturity, the PSB shall be entitled to claim payment from the guarantor.

  1. From the viewpoint of maximising the benefit of the guarantee in case of Pool Purchase, should a bank try and achieve maximum diversification in a pool, or keep the pool concentric?

The time-tested rule of tranching of risks in static pools is that in case of concentric, that is, correlated pools, the limit of first loss will be reached very soon. Hence, the benefit of the guarantee is maximised when the pool is diversified. This will mean both granularity of the pool, as also diversification by all the underlying risk variables – geography, industry or occupation type, type of property, etc.

  1. Is the same principle of pool diversification applicable to a Paper purchase also?

Yes, absolutely. The guarantee is a tranched-risk cover, upto a first loss piece of 20%. In case of all tranched risk cover, the benefit can be maximised only if the risk is spread across a granular pool.

  1. Can or should the Scheme be deployed for buying a single loan, or a few corporate loans?

First, the reference to pools obviously means diversified pools. As regards pools consisting of a few corporate loans, as mentioned above, the first loss cover will get exhausted very soon. The principle of tranching is that as correlation/concentricity in a pool increases, the risk shifts from lower tranches to senior tranches. Hence, one must not target using the Scheme for concentric or correlated pools.

  1. In case of Pool Purchases, on what amount should the first loss guarantee be calculated – on the total pool size or the total amount of assets assigned?

While, as we discussed earlier, there is no applicability of the DA Guidelines in the present case, there needs to be a minimum skin in the game for the selling Financial Entity. Whether that skin in the game is by way of a pari passu vertical tranche, or a subordinated horizontal tranche, is a question of the rating required for attaining the benefit of the guarantee. Therefore, if we are considering a pool of say ₹ 1000 crores, the originator should retain at least ₹ 100 crores (applying a 10% rule – which, of course, will depend on the rating considerations) of the total assets in the pool and only to the extent the ₹ 900 crores can be assigned to the purchasing bank.

The question here is whether the first loss guarantee will be calculated on the entire ₹ 1000 crores or ₹ 900 crores. The intention is guarantee the purchasing banks’ share of cash flows and not that retained by the originator. Therefore, the first loss guarantee will be calculated on ₹ 900 crores in the present case.

Scope of the GoI Guarantee

  1. In case of Pool Purchases, does the guarantee cover both principal and interest on the underlying loan?

The guarantee is supposed to indemnify the losses of the beneficiary, in this case, the bank. Hence, the guarantee should presumably cover both interest and principal.

  1. Does the guarantee cove additional interest, penalties, etc.?

Going by Rule 277 (vi) of the GFR, the benefit of the guarantee will be limited to normal interest only. All other charges – additional interest, penal interest, etc., will not be covered by the guarantee.

  1. In case of Paper Purchases, what all does the guarantee cover?

Once again, the guarantee seems to be for the maturiing amount, as also the accumulated interest.

  1. How do the General Financial Rules of the Government of India affect/limit the scope of the guarantee?

Para 281 of the GFR provides for annual review of the guarantees extended by the Government. The concerned department, DFS in the present case, will conduct review of the guarantees extended and forward the report to the Budget Division. However, if the Government can take any actions based on the outcome of the review is unclear.

Bankruptcy remoteness

  1. Does the transaction of assignment of pool from the Financial Entity to the bank have to adhere to any true sale/bankruptcy remoteness conditions?

The transaction must be a proper assignment, and should achieve bankruptcy remoteness in relation to the Financial Entity. Therefore, all regular true sale conditions should be satisfied.

  1. Can a Financial Entity sell the pool to the bank with the understanding that after 2 years, that is, at the end of the guarantee period, the pool will be sold back to the NBFCs?

Any sale with either an obligation to buyback, or an option to buy back, generally conflicts with the true sale requirement. Therefore, the sale should be a sale without recourse. However, retention of a right of first refusal, or right of pre-emption, is not equivalent to option to buy back. For instance, if, after 2 years, the bank is desirous of selling the pool at its fair value, the NBFC may have the first right of buying the same. This is regarded as consistent with true sale conditions.

  1. If off-balance sheet treatment from IFRS/Ind-AS viewpoint at all relevant for the purpose of this transaction?

No. Off balance sheet treatment is not relevant for bankruptcy remoteness.

  1. Is the Pool Purchase transaction subject to bankruptcy risk of the issuer finance company?

Yes, absolutely. There is no bankruptcy remoteness in case of paper purchases.

Short term bond instrument regulations

  1. What are the specific regulations to be complied with in case of PAPER issuance?

The issuing NBFC/HFC will have to comply with the provisions of Companies Act, 2013. Additionally, depending on the tenure and nature of the PAPER, the regulations issued by RBI for money market instruments shall also be applicable.

  1. Given the current regulatory framework for short term instruments, is it possible to issue unrated instruments with maturity less than 12 months?

As per the RBI Master Directions for Money Market Instruments, the issuers is required to obtain credit rating for issuance of CP from any one of the SEBI registered CRAs. Further, it is prescribed that the minimum credit rating shall be ‘A3’ as per rating symbol and definition prescribed by SEBI.

Similarly, in case of NCD issuance with tenure upto one year, there is a requirement to obtain credit rating from one of the rating agencies. Further, the minimum credit rating shall be ‘A2’ as per rating symbol and definition prescribed by SEBI.

Buyers and sellers

  1. Who are eligible buyers under this Scheme?

Both in case of Pool Purchases as also Paper Purchases, only Public Sector Banks are eligible buyers of assets under this Scheme. Therefore, even if a Private Sector Bank acquires eligible assets from eligible sellers, guarantee under this Scheme will still not be available.

This may be keeping in view two points – first, the intent of the Scheme, that is, to nudge PSBs to buy pools from Financial Entities. It is a well-known fact that private sector banks are, as it is, actively engaged in buying pools. Secondly, in terms of GFR of the GoI, the benefit of Government guarantee cannot go to the private sector. [Rule 277 (vii)] Hence, the Scheme is restricted to PSBs only.

  1. Who are eligible sellers under the Scheme in case of Pool purchases?

The intention of the Scheme is to provide relief from the stress caused due to the ongoing liquidity crisis, to sound HFCs/ NBFCs who are otherwise financially stable. The Scheme has very clearly laid screening parameters to decide the eligibility of the seller. The qualifying criteria laid down therein are:

  • NBFCs registered with the RBI, except Micro Financial Institutions or Core Investment Companies
  • HFCs registered with the NHB
  • The NBFC/ HFC must have been able to maintain the minimum regulatory capital as on 31st March, 2019, that is –
    • For NBFCs – 15%
    • For HFCs – 12%
  • The net NPA of the NBFC/HFC must not have exceeded 6% as on 31st March, 2019
  • The NBFC/ HFC must have reported net profit in at least one out of the last two preceding financial years, that is, FY 2017-18 and FY 2018-19.
  • The Original Scheme stated that the NBFC/ HFC must not have been reported as a Special Mention Account (SMA) by any bank during the year prior to 1st August, 2018. However, the Amendment even allows NBFC/HFC which may have slipped during one year prior to 1st August, 2018 shall also be allowed to sell their portfolios under the Scheme.
  1. Who are eligible issuers under the Scheme in case of PAPER purchases?

The intention of the Scheme is to provide relief from the stress caused due to the ongoing liquidity crisis, the eligible issuers are as follow:

  • NBFCs registered with the RBI except Government owned NBFCs
  • All MFIs which are members of a Self-Regulatory Organisation (SRO) recognized by RBI shall be eligible for purchase of Bonds/ CPs.
  • HFCs registered with the NHB except Government owned HFCs.
  1. In case of pool purchases, can NBFCs of any asset size avail this benefit?

Apparently, the Scheme does not provide for any asset size requirement for an NBFC to be qualified for this Scheme, however, one of the requirements is that the financial institution must have maintained the minimum regulatory capital requirement as on 31st March, 2019. Here it is important to note that the requirement to maintain regulatory capital, that is capital risk adequacy ratio (CRAR), applies only to systemically important NBFCs.

Only those NBFCs whose asset size exceeds ₹ 500 crores singly or jointly with assets of other NBFCs in the group are treated as systemically important NBFCs. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the benefits under this Scheme can be availed only by those NBFCs which – a) are required to maintain CRAR, and b) have maintained the required amount of capital as on 31st March, 2019, subject to the fulfillment of other conditions.

  1. In case of issuance of bonds/commercial papers, is there a similar capital requirement?

There is no such condition in case of bond and CP issuance.

  1. In case of pool purchases, the eligibility criteria for sellers state that the financial institution must not have been reported as SMA-1 or SMA-2 by any bank any time during 1 year prior to 1st August, 2018– what does this signify?

As per the prudential norms for banks, an account has to be declared as SMA, if it shows signs of distress without slipping into the category of an NPA. The requirement states that the originator must not have been reported as an SMA-1 or SMA-2 any time during 1 year prior to 1st August, 2018, and nothing has been mentioned regarding the period thereafter.

Therefore, if a financial institution satisfies the condition before 1st August, 2018 but becomes SMA-1 or SMA-2 thereafter, it will still be eligible as per the Scheme. The whole intention of the Scheme is to eliminate the liquidity squeeze due to the ILFS crisis. Therefore, if a financial institution turns SMA after the said date, it will be presumed the financial institution has fallen into a distressed situation as a fallout of the ILFS crisis.

Eligible assets

  1. What are the eligible assets for the Scheme in case of Pool Purchases?

The Scheme has explicitly laid down qualifying criteria for eligible assets and they are:

  • The asset must have originated on or before 31st March, 2019.
  • The asset must be classified as standard in the books of the NBFC/ HFC as on the date of the sale.
  • The original Scheme stated that the pool of assets should have a minimum rating of “AA” or equivalent at fair value without the credit guarantee from the Government. However, through the Amendment, the rating requirement has been brought down to BBB+.
  • Each account under the pooled assets should have been fully disbursed and security charges should have been created in favour of the originating NBFCs/ HFCs.
  • The individual asset size in the pool must not exceed ₹ 5 crore.
  • The following types of loans are not eligible for assignment for the purposes of this Scheme:
    • Revolving credit facilities;
    • Assets purchased from other entities; and
    • Assets with bullet repayment of both principal and interest
    • Pools consisting of assets satisfying the above criteria qualify for the benefit of the guarantee. Hence, the pool may consist of retail loans, wholesale loans, corporate loans, loans against property, or any other loans, as long as the qualifying conditions above are satisfied.
  1. Should the Scheme be deployed for assets for longer maturity or shorter maturity?

Utilising the Scheme for pools of lower weighted average maturity will result into very high costs – as the cost of the guarantee is computed on the original purchase price.

Using the Scheme for pools of longer maturity – for example, LAP loans or corporate loans, may be lucrative because the amortisation of the pool is slower. However, it is notable that the benefit of the guarantee is available only for 2 years. After 2 years, the bank will not have the protection of the Government’s guarantee.

  1. If there are corporate loans in the pool, where there is payment of interest on regular basis, but the principal is paid by way of a bullet repayment, will such loans qualify for the benefit of the Scheme?

The reference to bullet repaying loans in the Scheme seems similar to those in DA guidelines. In our view, if there is evidence/track record of servicing, in form of interest, such that the principal comes by way of a bullet repayment (commonly called IO loans), the loan should still qualify for the Scheme. However, negatively amortising loans should not qualify.

  1. Is there any implication of keeping the cut-off date for originations of loans to be 31st March, 2019?

This Scheme came into force with effect from 10th August, 2019 and remained open till 30th June, 2020. The original Scheme also had this cut-off of 31st March, 2019.

Due to the extension, though the timelines have been extended by one year till 31st March, 2021, however, the cut off date has not changed. Therefore, in our view, this scheme will hold good only for long tenure loans, such as mortgage loans.

  1. Is there any maximum limit on the amount of loans that can be assigned under this Scheme?

Yes, the Scheme has put a maximum cap on the amount of assets that can be assigned and that is an amount equal to 20% of the outstanding standard assets as on 31st March, 2019, however, the same is capped to ₹ 5000 crores.

  1. Is there a scope for assigning assets beyond the maximum limits prescribed in the Scheme?

Yes, the Scheme states that any additional amount above the cap of ₹ 5,000 crore will be considered on pro rata basis, subject to availability of headroom. However, from the language, it seems that there is a scope for sell down beyond the prescribed limit, only if the eligible maximum permissible limit gets capped to ₹ 5,000 crores and not if the maximum permissible limit is less than ₹ 5000 crores.

The following numerical examples will help us to understand this better:

Total outstanding standard assets as on 31st March, 2019 ₹ 20,000 crores ₹ 25,000 crores ₹ 30,000 crores
Maximum permissible limit @ 20% ₹ 4,000 crores ₹ 5,000 crores ₹ 6,000 crores
Maximum cap for assignment under this Scheme ₹ 5,000 crores ₹ 5,000 crores ₹ 5,000 crores
Amount that can be assigned under this Scheme ₹ 4,000 crores ₹ 5,000 crores ₹ 5,000 crores
Scope for further sell down? No No Yes, upto a maximum of ₹ 1,000 crores

 

  1. When will it be decided whether the Financial Entity can sell down receivables beyond the maximum cap?

Nothing has been mentioned regarding when and how will it be decided whether a financial institution can sell down receivables beyond the maximum cap, under this Scheme. However, logically, the decision should be taken by the Government of India of whether to allow further sell down and closer towards the end of the Scheme. However, we will have to wait and see how this unfolds practically.

  1. What are the permissible terms of transfer under this Scheme?

The Scheme allows the assignment agreement to contain the following:

  • Servicing rights – It allows the originator to retain the servicing function, including administrative function, in the transaction.
  • Buy back right – It allows the originator to retain an option to buy back its assets after a specified period of 12 months as a repurchase transaction, on a right of first refusal basis. Actually, this is not a right to buy back, it is a right of first refusal which the NBFC/ HFC may exercise if the purchasing bank further sells down the assets. See elsewhere for detailed discussion

Rating of the Pool in case of Pool Purchases

  1. The Scheme requires that the pool must have a rating of BBB+ before its transfer to the bank. Does that mean there be a formal rating agency opinion on the rating of the pool?

Yes. It will be logical to assume that SIDBI or DFS will expect a formal rating agency opinion before agreeing to extend the guarantee. 

  1. The Scheme requires the pool of assets to be rated at least BBB+, what does this signify?

As per the conditions for eligible assets, the pool of assets to be assigned under this Scheme must have a minimum rating of “BBB+” or equivalent at fair value prior to the guarantee from the Government.

There may be a question of expected loss assessment of a pool. Initially, the rating requirement was pegged at “AA” or higher and there was an apprehension that the originators might have to provide a substantial amount of credit enhancement in order to the make the assets eligible for assignment under the Scheme. Subsequently, vide the Amendments, the rating has been brought down to BBB+. The originators may also be required to provide some level of credit enhancements in order to achieve the BBB+ rating.

Unlike under the original Scheme, where the rating requirement was as high as AA, the intent is to provide guarantee only at AA level, then the thickness of the guarantee, that is, 10%, and the cost of the guarantee, viz., 25 bps, both became questionable. The thickness of support required for moving a AA rated pool to a AAA level mostly is not as high as 10%. Also, the cost of 25 bps for guaranteeing a AA-rated pool implied that the credit spreads between AA and a AAA-rated pool were at least good enough to absorb a cost of 25 bps. All these did not seemed and hence, there was not even a single transaction so far.

But now that the rating requirement has been brought down to BBB+, it makes a lot of sense. The credit enhancement level required to achieve BBB+ will be at least 4%-5% lower than what would have been required for AA pool. Further, the spread between a BBB+ and AAA rated pool would be sufficient to cover up the guarantee commission of 25 bps to be incurred by the seller in the transaction.

Here it is important to note that though the rating required is as low as BBB+, but there is nothing which stops the originator in providing a better quality pool. In fact, by providing a better quality pool, the originator will be able to fetch a much lower cost. Further, since, the guarantee on the pool will be available for only first two years of the transaction, the buyers will be more interested in acquiring higher quality pools, as there could be possibilities of default after the first two years, which is usually the case – the defaults increase towards the end of the tenure.

Risk weight and capital requirements

  1. Can the bank, having got the Pool guaranteed by the GoI, treat the Pool has zero% risk weighted, or risk-weighted at par with sovereign risk weights?

No. for two reasons –one the guarantee is only partial and not full. Number two, the guarantee is only for losses upto first 2 years. So it is not that the credit exposure of the bank is fully guaranteed 

  1. What will be the risk weight once the guarantee is removed, after expiry of 2 years?

The risk weight should be based on the rating of the tranche/pool, say, BBB+ or better.

Guarantee commission

  1. Is there a guarantee commission? If yes, who will bear the liability to pay the commission?

As already discussed in one of the questions above, the Scheme requires the originators to pay guarantee commission of 25 basis points on the amount of guarantee extended by the Government. Though the originator will pay the fee, but the same will be routed through purchasing bank.

  1. The pool is amortising pool. Is the cost of 25 bps to be paid on the original purchase price?

From the operational details, it is clear that the cost of 25 bps is, in the first instance, payable on the original fair value, that is, the purchase price.

Invocation of guarantee and refund

  1. When can the guarantee be invoked in case of Pool Purchases?

The guarantee can be invoked any time during the first 24 months from the date of assignment, if the interest/ principal has remained overdue for a period of more than 90 days.

  1. When can the guarantee be invoked in the case of Paper Purchases?

There is no maximum time limit in case of Paper Purchases. Hence, the guarantee can be invoked upto maturity. The maximum maturity, of course, is limited to 18 months. 

  1. In case of Pool Purchases, can the purchasing bank invoke the guarantee as and when the default occurs in each account?

Yes. The purchasing bank can invoke the guarantee as and when any instalment of interest/ principal/ both remains overdue for a period of more than 90 days. 

  1. In case of PAPER Purchases, can the purchasing bank invoke the guarantee as and when the default occurs?

Assuming the instruments will have bullet repayment of principal, the answer is yes. 

  1. To what extent can the purchasing bank recover its losses through invocation of guarantee?

When a loan goes bad, the purchasing bank can invoke the guarantee and recover its entire exposure from the Government. It can continue to recover its losses from the Government, until the upper cap of 10% of the total portfolio is reached. However, the purchasing bank will not be able to recover the losses if – (a) the pooled assets are bought back by the concerned NBFCs/HFCs or (b) sold by the purchasing bank to other entities. 

  1. Within how many days will the purchasing bank be able to recover its losses from the Government?

As stated in the Scheme, the claims will be settled within 5 working days. 

  1. In case of pool purchase, what will happen if the purchasing bank recovers the amount lost, subsequent to the invocation of guarantee?

If the purchasing bank, by any means, recovers the amount subsequent to the invocation of the guarantee, it will have to refund the amount recovered or the amount received against the guarantee to the Government within 5 working days from the date of recovery. However, if the amount recovered is more than the amount received as guarantee, the excess collection will be retained by the purchasing bank. 

  1. In case of PAPER Purchase, what will happen if the purchasing bank recovers the amount lost, subsequent to the invocation of guarantee?

If the purchasing bank, by any means, recovers the amount subsequent to the invocation of the guarantee, it will have to refund the amount recovered or the amount received against the guarantee to the Government within 5 working days from the date of recovery. However, if the amount recovered is more than the amount received as guarantee, the excess collection will be retained by the purchasing bank.

Modus operandi

  1. What will be the process for a bank to obtain the benefit of the guarantee?

While the Department of Financial Services (DFS) is made the administrative ministry for the purpose of the guarantee under the Scheme, the Scheme involves the role of SIDBI as the interface between the banks and the GoI. Therefore, any bank intending to avail of the guarantee has to approach SIDBI.

  1. Can you elaborate on the various procedural steps to be taken to take the benefit of the guarantee?

The modus operandi of the Scheme is likely to be as follows:

  • An NBFC approaches a bank with a static pool, which, based on credit enhancements, or otherwise, has already been uplifted to a rating of BBB+ or above level.
  • The NBFC negotiates and finalises its commercials with the bank.
  • The bank then approaches SIDBI with a proposal to obtain the guarantee of the GOI. At this stage, the bank provides (a) details of the transaction; and (b) a certificate that the requirements of Chapter 11 of General Financial Rules, and in particular, those of para 280, have been complied with.
  • SIDBI does its own evaluation of the proposal, from the viewpoint of adherence to Chapter 11 of GFR and para 280 in particular, and whether the proposal is in compliance with the provisions of the Scheme. SIDBI shall accordingly forward the proposal to DFS along with a specific recommendation to either provide the guarantee, or otherwise.
  • DFS shall then make its decision. Once the decision of DFS is made, it shall be communicated to SIDBI and PSB.
  • At this stage, PSB may consummate its transaction with the NBFC, after collecting the guarantee fees of 25 bps.
  • In case of PAPER Purchase, the NBFC/HFC shall have to comply with the extant regulations for issuance of bonds/CPs, under Companies Act, 2013 and as issued by the regulators- RBI or NHB, as the case may be.
  • PSB shall then execute its guarantee documentation with DFS and pay the money by way of guarantee commission.
  1. Para 280(i)(a) of the GFR states that there should be back-to-back agreements between the Government and Borrower to effect to the transaction – will this rule be applicable in case of this Scheme?

Para 280 has been drawn up based on the understanding that guarantee extended is for a loan where the borrower is known by the Government. In the present case, the guarantee is extended in order to partially support a sale of assets and not for a specific loan, therefore, this will not apply.

Miscellaneous

  1. Is there any reporting requirement?

The Scheme does provide for a real-time reporting mechanism for the purchasing banks to understand the remaining headroom for purchase of such pooled assets. The Department of Financial Services (DFS), Ministry of Finance would obtain the requisite information in a prescribed format from the PSBs and send a copy to the budget division of DEA, however, the manner and format of reporting has not been notified yet. 

  1. What are to-do activities for the sellers to avail benefits under this Scheme?

Besides conforming to the eligibility criteria laid down in the Scheme, the sellers will also have to carry out the following in order to avail the benefits:

  • The Asset Liability structure should restructured within three months to have positive ALM in each bucket for the first three months and on cumulative basis for the remaining period;
  • At no time during the period for exercise of the option to buy back the assets, should the CRAR go below the regulatory minimum. The promoters shall have to ensure this by infusing equity, where required.

 

Other related articles-

Government Credit enhancement scheme for NBFC Pools: A win-win for all

GOI’s attempt to ease out liquidity stress of NBFCs and HFCs: Ministry of Finance launches Scheme for Partial Credit Guarantee to PSBs for acquisition of financial assets

Government credit enhancement for NBFC pools: A Guide to Rating agencies

http://vinodkothari.com/2019/09/partial-credit-guarantee-scheme/

 

[1] Including Indian Securitisation Foundation

[2] https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1595952

[3] https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/FAQView.aspx?Id=131

 

Bridging the gap between Ind AS 109 and the regulatory framework for NBFCs

-Abhirup Ghosh

(abhirup@vinodkothari.com)

The Reserve Bank of India, on 13th March, 2020, issued a notification[1] providing guidance on implementation of Indian Accounting Standards by non-banking financial companies. This guidance comes after almost 2 years from the date of commencement of first phase of implementation of Ind AS for NBFCs.

The intention behind this Notification is to ensure consistency in certain areas like – asset classification, provisioning, regulatory capital treatment etc. The idea of the Notification is not to provide detailed guidelines on Ind AS implementation. For areas which the Notification has not dealt with, notified accounting standards, application guidance, educational material and other clarifications issued by the ICAI should be referred to.

The Notification is addressed to all non-banking financial companies and asset reconstruction companies. Since, housing finance companies are now governed by RBI and primarily a class of NBFCs, this Notification should also apply to them. But for the purpose of this write-up we wish to restrict our scope to NBFCs, which includes HFCs, only.

The Notification becomes applicable for preparation of financial statements from the financial year 2019-20 onwards, therefore, it seems the actions to be taken under the Notification will have to be undertaken before 31st March, 2020, so far as possible.

In this article we wish to discuss the outcome the Notification along with our comments on each issue. This article consists of the following segments:

  1. Things to be done by the Board of Directors (BOD)
  2. Expected Credit Losses (ECL) and prudential norms
  3. Dealing with defaults and significant increase in credit risk
  4. Things to be done by the Audit Committee of the Board (ACB)
  5. Computation of regulatory capital
  6. Securitisation accounting and prudential norms
  7. Matters which skipped attention

1.   Things to be done by the BOD

The Notification starts with a sweeping statement that the responsibility of preparing and ensuring fair presentation of the financial statements lies with the BOD of the company. In addition to this sweeping statement, the Notification also demands the BOD to lay down some crucial policies which will be essential for the implementation of Ind AS among NBFCs and they are: a) Policy for determining business model of the company; and b) Policy on Expected Credit Losses.

(A) Board approved policy on business models: The Company should have a Board approved policy, which should articulate and document the business models and portfolios of the Company. This is an extremely policy as the entire classification of financial assets, depends on the business model of the NBFC. Some key areas which, we think, the Policy should entail are:

There are primarily three business models that Ind AS recognises for subsequent measurement of financial assets:

(a) hold financial assets in order to collect contractual cash flows;

(b) hold financial assets in order to collect contractual cash flows and also to sell financial assets; and

(c) hold financial assets for the purpose of selling them.

The assessment of the business model should not be done at instrument-by-instrument level, but can be done at a higher level of aggregation. But at the same time, the aggregation should be not be done at an entity-level because there could be multiple business models in a company.

Further, with respect the first model, the Ind AS states that the business model of the company can still be to hold the financial assets in order to collect contractual cash flows even if some of the assets are sold are expected to be sold in future. For instance, the business model of the company shall remain unaffected due to the following transactions of sale:

(a) Sale of financial assets due to increase in credit risk, irrespective of the frequency or value of such sale;

(b) Sale of cash flows are made close to the maturity and where the proceeds from the sale approximate the collection of the remaining contractual cash flows; and

(c) Sale of financial assets due to other reasons, namely, to avoid credit concentration, if such sales are insignificant in value (individually or in aggregate) or infrequent.

For the third situation, what constitutes to insignificant or infrequent has not been discussed in the Ind AS. However, reference can be drawn from the Report of the Working Group of RBI on implementation of Ind AS by banks[2], which proposes that there could be a rebuttable presumption that where there are more than 5% of sale, by value, within a specified time period, of the total amortised cost of financial assets held in a particular business model, such a business model may be considered inconsistent with the objective to hold financial assets in order to collect contractual cash flow.

However, we are not inclined to take the same as prescriptive. Business model of an entity is still a question hinging on several relevant factors, primarily the profit recognition, internal reporting of profits, pursuit of securitization/direct assignment strategy, etc. Of course, the volume may be a persuasive factor.

The Notification also requires that the companies should also have a policy on sale of assets held under amortised cost method, and such policy should be disclosed in the financial statements.

(B) Board approved policy on ECL methodology: the Notification requires the companies to lay down Board approved sound methodologies for computation of Expected Credit Losses. For this purpose, the RBI has advised the companies to use the Guidance on Credit Risk and Accounting for Expected Credit Losses issued by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)[3] for reference.

The methodologies laid down should commensurate with the size, complexity and risks specific to the NBFC. The parameters and assumptions for risk assessment should be well documented along with sensitivity of various parameters and assumptions on the ECL output.

Therefore, as per our understanding, the policy on ECL should contain the following –

(a) The assumptions and parameters for risk assessment – which should basically talk about the probabilities of defaults in different situations. Here it is important to note that the assumptions could vary for the different products that the reporting entity offers to its customers. For instance, if a company offers LAP and auto loans at the same time, it cannot apply same set of assumptions for both these products.

Further, the policy should also lay down indicators of significant increase in credit risk, impairment etc. This would allow the reporting entity in determining classifying its assets into Stage 1, Stage 2 and Stage 3.

(b) Backtesting of assumptions – the second aspect of this policy should deal with backtesting of the assumptions. The policy should provide for mechanism of backtesting of assumption on historical data so as to examine the accuracy of the assumptions.

(c) Sensitivity analysis – Another important aspect of this policy is sensitivity analysis. The policy should provide for mechanism of sensitivity analysis, which would predict the outcome based on variations in the assumptions. This will help in identifying how dependant the output is on a particular input.

Further, the Notification states that any change in the ECL model must be well documented along with justifications, and should be approved by the Board. Here it is important to note that there could two types of variations – first, variation in inputs, and second, variation in the model. As per our understanding, only the latter should be placed before the BOD for its approval.

Further, any change in the assumptions or parameters or the ECL model for the purpose of profit smothering shall seriously be frowned upon by the RBI, as it has clearly expressed its opinion against such practices.

2.   Expected Credit Losses (ECL) and prudential norms

The RBI has clarified that whatever be the ECL output, the same should be subject to a regulatory floor which in this case would be the provisions required to be created as the IRAC norms. Let us understand the situation better:

The companies will have to compute two types of provisions or loss estimations going forward – first, the ECL as per Ind AS 109 and its internal ECL model and second, provisions as per the RBI regulations, which has to be computed in parallel, and at asset level.

The difference between the two will have to be dealt with in the following manner:

(A) Impairment Reserve: Where the ECL computed as per the ECL methodology is lower than the provisions computed as per the IRAC norms, then the difference between the two should be transferred to a separate “Impairment Reserve”. This transfer will not be a charge against profit, instead, the Notification states that the difference should be appropriated against the profit or loss after taxes.

Interestingly, no withdrawals against this Impairment Reserve is allowed without RBI’s approval. Ideally, any loss on a financial asset should be first adjusted from the provision created for that particular account.

Further, the continuity of this Impairment Reserve shall be reviewed by the RBI going forward.

A large number of NBFCs have already presented their first financial statements as per Ind AS for the year ended 31st March, 2019. There were two types of practices which were followed with respect to provisioning and loss estimations. First, where the NBFCs charged only the ECL output against its profits and disregarded the regulatory provisioning requirements. Second, where the NBFCs computed provisions as per regulatory requirements as well as ECL and charged the higher amount between the two against the profits.

The questions that arise here are:

(a) For the first situation, should the NBFCs appropriate a higher amount in the current year, so as to compensate for the amount not transferred in the previous year?

(b) For the second situation, should the NBFCs reverse the difference amount, if any, already charged against profit during the current year and appropriate the same against profit or loss?

The answer for both the questions is negative. The provisions of the Notification shall have to be implemented for the preparation of financial statements from the financial year 2019-20 onwards, hence, we don’t see the need for adjustments for what has already been done in the previous year’s financial statements.

(B) Disclosure: The difference between the two will have to be disclosed in the annual financial statements of the company, format of which has been provided in the Notification[4]. Going by the format, the loss allowances created on Stage 1, Stage 2 and Stage 3 cases will have to be shown separately, similarly, the provisions computed on those shall also have to be shown separately.

While Stage 1 and Stage 2 cases have been classified as standard assets in the format, Stage 3 cases cover sub-standard, doubtful and loss assets.

Loss estimations on loan commitments, guarantees etc. which are covered under Ind AS but does not require provisioning under the RBI Directions should also be presented.

3.     Dealing with defaults and significant increase in credit risk

Estimation of expected losses in financial assets as per Ind AS depends primarily on credit risk assessment and identifying situations for impairment. Considering the importance of issue, the RBI has voiced its opinion on identification of “defaults” and “significant increase in credit risk”.

(A)Defaults: The next issue which has been dealt with in the Notification is the meaning of defaults. Currently, there seems to be a departure between the Ind AS and the regulatory definition of “defaults”. While the former allows the company to declare an account as default based on its internal credit risk assessments, the latter requires that all cases with delay of more than 90 days should be treated as default. The RBI expects the accounting classification to be guided by the regulatory definition of “defaults”.

 If a company decides not to impair an account even after a 90 days delay, then the same should be approved by the Audit Committee.

This view is also in line with the definition of “default” proposed by the BASEL framework for IRB framework, which is:

“A default is considered to have occurred with regard to a particular obligor when one or more of the following events has taken place.

 (a) It is determined that the obligor is unlikely to pay its debt obligations (principal, interest, or fees) in full;

 (b) A credit loss event associated with any obligation of the obligor, such as a charge-off, specific provision, or distressed restructuring involving the forgiveness or postponement of principal, interest, or fees;

 (c) The obligor is past due more than 90 days on any credit obligation; or

 (d) The obligor has filed for bankruptcy or similar protection from creditors.”

Further, the number of cases of defaults and the total amount outstanding and overdue should be disclosed in the notes to the financial statements. As per the current regulatory framework, NBFCs have to present the details of sub-standard, doubtful and loss assets in its financial statements. Hence, this disclosure requirement is not new, only the sub-classification of NPAs have now been taken off.

(B) Dealing with significant increase in credit risk: Assessment of credit risk plays an important role in ECL computation under Ind AS 109. Just to recapitulate, credit risk assessments can be lead to three possible situations – first, where there is no significant increase in credit risk, second, where there is significant increase in credit risk, but no default, and third, where there is a default. These three outcomes are known as Stage 1, Stage 2 and Stage 3 cases respectively.

 In case an account is under Stage 1, the loss estimation has to be done based on probabilities of default during next 12 months after the reporting date. However, if an account is under Stage 2 or Stage 3, the loss estimation has to be done based on lifetime probabilities of default.

Technically, both Stage 1 and Stage 2 cases would fall under the definition of standard assets for the purpose of RBI Directions, however, from accounting purposes, these two stages would attract different loss estimation techniques. Hence, the RBI has also voiced its opinion on the methodology of credit risk assessment for Stage 2 cases.

The Notification acknowledges the presence of a rebuttable presumption of significant increase in credit risk of an account, should there be a delay of 30 days or more. However, this presumption is rebuttable if the reporting entity has reasonable and supportable information that demonstrates that the credit risk has not increased significantly since initial recognition, despite a delay of more than 30 days. In a reporting entity opts to rebut the presumption and assume there is no increase in credit risk, then the reasons for such should be properly documented and the same should be placed before the Audit Committee.

However, the Notification also states that under no circumstances the Stage 2 classification be deferred beyond 60 days overdue.

4.   Things to be done by the ACB

The Notification lays down responsibilities for the ACB and they are:

(A) Approval of any subsequent modification in the ECL model: In order to be doubly sure about that any subsequent change made to the ECL model is not frivolous, the same has to be placed before the Audit Committee for their approval. If approved, the rationale and basis of such approval should be properly documented by the company.

(B) Reviewing cases of delays and defaults: As may have been noted above, the following matters will have to be routed through the ACB:

(a) Where the reporting entity decides not to impair an account, even if there is delay in payment of more than 90 days.

(b) Where as per the risk assessment of the reporting entity, with respect to an account involving a delay of more than 30 days, it rebuts that there is no significant increase in credit risk.

In both the cases, if the ACB approves the assumptions made by the management, the approval along with the rationale and justification should be properly documented.

5.   Computation of Regulatory Capital

The Notification provides a bunch of clarifications with respect to calculation of “owned funds”, “net owned funds”, and “regulatory capital”, each of which has been discussed here onwards:

(A) Impact of unrealised gains or losses arising on fair valuation of financial instruments: The concept of fair valuation of financial instruments is one of the highlights of IFRS or Ind AS. Ind AS 109 requires fair valuation of all financial instruments. The obvious question that arises is how these gains or losses on fair valuation will be treated for the purpose of capital computation. RBI’s answer to this question is pretty straight and simple – none of these of gains will be considered for the purpose of regulatory capital computation, however, the losses, if any, should be considered. This view seems to be inspired from the principle of conservatism.

 Here it is important to note that the Notification talks about all unrealised gains arising out of fair valuation of financial assets. Unrealised gain could arise in two situations – first, when the assets are measured on fair value through other comprehensive income (FVOCI), and second, when the assets are measured on fair value through profit or loss (FVTPL).

In case of assets which are fair valued through profit or loss, the gains or losses once booked are taken to the statement of profit or loss. Once taken to the statement of profit or loss, these gains or losses lose their individuality. Further, these gains or losses are not shown separately in the Balance Sheet and are blended with accumulated profits or losses of the company. Monitoring the unrealised gains from individual assets would mean maintenance of parallel accounts, which could have several administrative implications.

Further, when these assets are finally sold and gain is realised, only the difference between the fair value and value of disposal is booked in the profit and loss account. It is to be noted here that the gain on sale of assets shown in the profit and loss account in the year of sale is not exactly the actual gain realised from the financial asset because a part of it has been already booked during previous financial years as unrealised gains. If we were to interpret that by “unrealised gains” RBI meant unrealised gains arising due to FVTPL as well, the apparent question that would arise here is – whether the part which was earlier disregarded for the purpose of regulatory capital will now be treated as a part of capital?

Needless to say, extending the scope of “unrealised gains” to mean unrealised gains from FVTPL can create several ambiguities. However, the Notification, as it stands, does not contain answers for these.

In addition to the above, the Notification states the following in this regard:

  • Even unrealised gains arising on transition to Ind AS will have to be disregarded.
  • For the purpose of computation of Tier I capital, for investments in NBFCs and group companies, the entities must reduce the lower of cost of acquisition or their fair value, since, unrealised gains are anyway deducted from owned funds.
  • For any other category of investments, unrealised gains may be reduced from the value of asset for the purpose of risk-weighting.
  • Netting off of gains and losses from one category of assets is allowed, however, netting off is not allowed among different classes of assets.
  • Fair value gains on revaluation of property, plant and equipment arising from fair valuation on the date of transition, shall be treated as a part of Tier II capital, subject to a discount of 55%.
  • Any unrealised gains or losses recognised in equity due to (a) own credit risk and (b) cash flow hedge reserve shall be derecognised while determining owned funds.

(B) Treatment of ECL: The Notification allows only Stage 1 ECL, that is, 12 months ECL, to be included as a part of Tier II capital as general provisions and loss reserves. Lifetime ECL shall not be reckoned as a part of Tier II capital.

6.   Securitisation accounting and prudential norms

All securitisation transactions undergo a strict test of de-recognition under Ind AS 109. The conditions for de-recognition are such that most of the structures, prevalent in India, fail to qualify for de-recognition due to credit enhancements. Consequently, the transaction does not go off the books.

The RBI has clarified that the cases of securitisation that does not go off the books, will be allowed capital relief from regulatory point of view. That is, the assets will be assigned 0% risk weight, provided the credit enhancement provided for the transaction is knocked off the Tier I (50%) and Tier II (remaining 50%).

There are structures where the level of credit enhancement required is as high as 20-25%, the question here is – should the entire credit support be knocked off from the capital? The answer to this lies in the RBI’s Securitisation Guidelines from 2006[5], which states that the knocking off of credit support should be capped at the amount of capital that the bank would have been required to hold for the full value of the assets, had they not been securitised, that is 15%.

For securitisation transactions which qualify for complete de-recognition, we are assuming the existing practice shall be followed.

But apart from the above two, there can also be cases, where partial de-recognition can be achieved – fate of such transactions is unclear. However, as per our understanding, to the extent of retained risk, by way of credit enhancement, there should be a knock off from the capital. For anything retained by the originator, risk weighting should be done.

Matters which skipped attention

There are however, certain areas, which we think RBI has missed considering and they are:

  1. Booking of gain in case of de-recognition of assets: As per the RBI Directions on Securitisation, any gain on sale of assets should be spread over a period of time, on the other hand, the Ind AS requires upfront recognition of gain on sale of assets. The gap between the two should been bridged through this Notification.
  2. Consideration of OCI as a part of Regulatory Capital: As per Basel III framework, other comprehensive income forms part of Common Equity Tier I [read our article here], however, this Notification states all unrealised gains should be disregarded. This, therefore, is an area of conflict between the Basel framework and the RBI’s stand on this issue.

 

Read our articles on the topic:

  1. NBFC classification under IFRS financial statements: http://vinodkothari.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Article-template-VKCPL-3.pdf
  2. Ind AS vs Qualifying Criteria for NBFCs-Accounting requirements resulting in regulatory mismatch?: http://vinodkothari.com/2019/07/ind-as-vs-qualifying-criteria-for-nbfcs/
  3. Should OCI be included as a part of Tier I capital for financial institutions?: http://vinodkothari.com/2019/03/should-oci-be-included-as-a-part-of-tier-i-capital-for-financial-institutions/
  4. Servicing Asset and Servicing Liability: A new by-product of securitization under Ind AS 109: http://vinodkothari.com/2019/01/servicing-asset-and-servicing-liability/
  5. Classification and reclassification of financial instruments under Ind AS: http://vinodkothari.com/2019/01/classification-of-financial-asset-liabilities-under-ind-as/

 

[1] https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=11818&Mode=0#F2

[2] https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Content/PDFs/FAS93F78EF58DB84295B9E11E21A91500B8.PDF

[3] https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d350.pdf

[4] https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/content/pdfs/NOTI170APP130320.pdf

[5] https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=2723

Special Window Fund for Affordable Real Estate Segment: Achche Din for Home-buyers?

– Sikha Bansal and Priya Udita

(finserv@vinodkothari.com)

Relief has come to the builders of stalled housing project and distressed homebuyers in in the form of establishment of a ‘Special Window‘ fund by the Government to provide priority debt financing for the completion of stalled housing projects that are in the affordable and middle-income housing sector. See the press release here. The announcement came after this package was introduced on September 14 by the Finance Minister. The Government has also issued FAQs on the same, which can be viewed here.

The write-up discusses salient features of the plan.

KEY FEATURES OF THE FUND

  1. Fund will be set up as Category II-AIF (Alternative Investment Fund) with initial amount of Rs. 25,000 crores and registered with SEBI.
  2. The government acting as a sponsor shall infuse Rs. 10,000 crore and the remaining amount to be contributed by State Bank of India, Life Insurance Corporation of India and other institutions.
  3. Investors can be Government and other private investors including cash-rich financial institutions, sovereign wealth funds, public and private banks, domestic pension and provident funds, global pension funds and other institutional investors.
  4. The SBICAP Ventures Limited is proposed to the Investment Manager.
  5. Project declared as non-performing assets (NPAs) or which have been dragged to the NCLT for insolvency proceedings will be included. Apart from that any projects undergoing corporate insolvency resolution process before the NCLT will be considered for funding through the Special Window upto the stage where the resolution plan for such insolvency resolution process has not been approved / rejected by the committee of creditors. However, cases pending in the High Courts or Supreme Court will not be considered.
  6. The retail loans of the selected stalled projects will be restructured as per RBI Guidelines and bank board approved policies.
  7. The investments will be in the form of non-convertible debentures subject to legal, regulatory or other considerations.

Read more

SEBI’s Framework for listing of Commercial Papers

Munmi Phukon | Principal Manager, Vinod Kothari & Company

corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Introduction

SEBI on 22nd October, 2019 came out with a Circular to provide for the Framework for listing of Commercial Papers (CPs). The Circular is based on the recommendations of the Corporate Bonds & Securitization Advisory Committee (CoBoSAC) chaired by Shri H. R. Khan which was set up for making recommendations to SEBI on developing the market for corporate bonds and securitized debt instruments.

CPs are currently traded in OTC market though settled through the clearing corporations. Evidently, listing of CPs for trading in stock exchanges will enhance the investor participation which will in turn help the issuers to cope up with their short term fund requirements. SEBI’s current move in laying down the Framework is to ensure investor protection keeping in mind a prospective broader market for CPs. The Circular is mostly concerned about making elaborate disclosures at the time of submitting the application for listing and also some disclosures on a continuous basis post listing of the CPs.

As evident from the content of the Circular, some of the disclosure requirements proposed at the time of application for listing of the CPs are same as provided in the format of Letter of Offer as provided in the Operational Guidelines on CPs[1] (Operational Guidelines) prescribed by the Fixed Income Money Market and Derivatives Association of India (FIMMDA). However, there are certain additional requirements which are discussed in this article.

Disclosure requirements at the time of application for listing

Annexure I of the Circular provides for the disclosure requirements which the issuers are required to make at the time of submitting the application and the content of the same is quite elaborative which covers almost every aspect of an issuer. The broad segments of disclosures are as below:

General details of issuer
Under this heading, details such as, name, CIN, PAN, line of business group affiliation will be given. The issuer will also be required to give name of the managing director, CEO, CFO or president as chief executives. The disclosures are same as provided in the Operational Guidelines.

Details of directors
Details of current set of directors including inter alia their list of directorships and the details of any change in directors in the last 3 financial years and the current year shall be required to be disclosed.  Currently, the Operational Guidelines do not require these details.

Details of auditors
Details of current auditor and any change in directors in the last 3 financial years and the current year shall be required to be disclosed. Currently, the Operational Guidelines do not require these details.

Details of security holders
Under this category, the disclosure shall be made for top 10 equity shareholders, top 10 debt security holders and top 10 CP holders. However, the date of determination of the same has not been provided. Currently, the Operational Guidelines do not require these details.

Details of borrowings as at the end of latest quarter before filing of the application
Details of borrowings are divided into 3 parts-

a.      Details of debt securities and CPs. The Operational Guidelines require the details of CPs issued during last 15 months and also of the outstanding balance as on the date of offer letter.

b.      Details of other facilities such as secured/ unsecured loan facilities/bank fund based facilities, borrowings other than above, if any, including hybrid debt like foreign currency convertible bonds (FCCB), optionally convertible debentures / preference shares from banks or financial institutions or financial creditors. The details related to outstanding debt instruments and bank fund based facilities are same as provided in the Operational Guidelines however, it was silent on the hybrid instruments.

c.      Details of corporate guarantee or letter of comfort along with name of the counterparty on behalf of whom it has been issued, contingent liability including debt service reserve account (DSRA) guarantees/ any put option etc. Operational Guidelines do not require these details currently.

Information related to the concerned issue

The content is more or less similar to the details required to be provided in the Letter of Offer as provided in the Operational Guidelines. The additional requirements are as follows:

d.     Details of credit rating letter issued should not be older than one month on the date of opening of the issue and

e.      Copy of the executed guarantee.

Financial information
The stock exchanges shall be provided with the following financial information-

a.      Audited / Limited review of half yearly consolidated financial statements, if available;

b.      Financial statements along with auditor qualifications, if any, for last 3 years along with latest available financial results;

c.      Latest available quarterly financial results prepared under Regulation 33, if applicable;

d.     Latest audited financials not older than six months from the date of application. However, companies already complying with the Listing Regulations may submit unaudited financials with limited review.

The Operational Guidelines currently require the financial summary only of last 3 FYs to be provided in the letter of offer.

Material information
The following shall be disclosed-

a.      Details of all default/s and/or delay in payments of interest and principal of CPs, (including technical delay), debt securities, term loans, external commercial borrowings and other financial indebtedness including corporate guarantee issued in the past 5 financial years including in the current financial year.

b.      Ongoing and/or outstanding material litigation and regulatory strictures, if any.

c.      Any material event/ development having implications on the financials/credit quality including any material regulatory proceedings against the issuer/ promoters, tax litigations resulting in material liabilities, corporate restructuring event which may affect the issue or the investor’s decision to invest / continue to invest in the CP.

The disclosures in point (a) and (c) above are not required to be disclosed in the letter of offer as per Operational Guidelines.

Asset Liability Management (ALM) disclosures for NBFCs and HFCs

The Circular specifically provides for some additional disclosures for NBFCs and HFCs which are currently not required to be provided in the letter of offer prescribed by FIMMDA:

a.      NBFCs shall make disclosures as specified for NBFCs in SEBI Circular nos. CIR/IMD/DF/ 12 /2014[2], dated June 17, 2014 and CIR/IMD/DF/ 6 /2015, dated September 15, 2015. Further, “Total assets under management”, under the aforesaid Circular dated September 15, 2015 shall also include details of off balance sheet assets.

b.      HFCs shall make disclosures as specified for NBFCs in the said SEBI Circular no. CIR/IMD/DF/ 6 /2015, dated September 15, 2015, with appropriate modifications viz. retail housing loan, loan against property, wholesale loan – developer and others.

In terms of the SEBI Circular dated June 17, 2014, NBFCs are required to disclose the details with regards to the lending done by them, out of the issue proceeds of previous public issues, including details regarding the following:

a.      Lending policy;

b.      Classification of loans/advances given to associates, entities /person relating to Board, Senior Management, Promoters, Others, etc.;

c.      Classification of loans/advances given to according to type of loans, sectors, maturity profile, denomination, geographical classification of borrowers, etc.;

d.      Aggregated exposure to the top 20 borrowers with respect to the concentration of advances, exposures to be disclosed in the manner as prescribed by RBI in its guidelines on Corporate Governance for NBFCs, from time to time;

e.      Details of loans, overdue and classified as non-performing in accordance with RBI guidelines.

The Circular dated September 15, 2015 provides for the following additional disclosures:

a.      In case any of the borrower(s) of the NBFCs form part of the “Group” as defined by RBI, then appropriate disclosures shall be made as regards the name of the borrower, Amount of Advances /exposures to such borrower and Percentage of Exposure;

b.      A portfolio summary with regards to industries/ sectors to which borrowings have been made by NBFCs;

c.      Quantum and percentage of secured vis-à-vis unsecured borrowings made by NBFCs;

d.      Any change in promoter’s holdings in NBFCs during the last financial year beyond a particular threshold (RBI has prescribed such a threshold level at 26% at present).

Continuous disclosures after listing of CPs

Annexure II of the Circular provides for the disclosure requirements which shall be observed on a continuous basis. The details of such disclosures are broadly as below:

a.      Submission of financial results

i.          For issuers which are required to follow Chapter IV of SEBI LODR Regulations i.e. whose specified securities are listed, the financial results shall be in the format as prepared and submitted under Regulation 33. The issuers will also be required to disclose along with the financial results the additional line items as required under Regulation 52(4). This shall also apply to an issuer which is required to prepare financial results for the purpose of consolidated financial results in terms of Regulation 33;

·      The line items as provided under Regulation 52(4) are as below:

o  credit rating and change in credit rating (if any);

o  asset cover available, in case of non- convertible debt securities;

o  debt-equity ratio;

o  previous due date for the payment of interest/ dividend for non-convertible redeemable preference shares/ repayment of principal of non-convertible preference shares /non- convertible debt securities and whether the same has been paid or not; and,

o  next due date for the payment of interest/ dividend of non-convertible preference shares /principal along with the amount of interest/ dividend of non-convertible preference shares payable and the redemption amount;

o  debt service coverage ratio;

o  interest service coverage ratio;

o  outstanding redeemable preference shares (quantity and value);

o  capital redemption reserve/debenture redemption reserve;

o  net worth;

o  net profit after tax;

o  earnings per share:

 ii.          For issuers which are required to comply with provisions of Chapter V of the Regulations only i.e. whose NCDs/ NCPSs are only listed, the financial results shall be prepared and submitted as per regulation 52; and

iii.          Issuers who only have outstanding listed CPs shall prepare and submit financial results in terms of Regulation 52.

 

b.      Disclosure of material events

The issuers shall disclose the following details to the stock exchange(s) as soon as possible but not later than 24 hours from the occurrence of event (or) information:

i.          Details such as expected default/ delay/ default in timely fulfilment of its payment obligations for any of the debt instrument;

ii.          Any action that shall affect adversely, fulfilment of its payment obligations in respect of CPs;

iii.          Any revision in the credit rating;

iv.          A certificate confirming fulfilment of its payment obligations, within 2 days of payment becoming due.

c.      ALM Statements for issuers who are NBFCs/HFCs

NBFCs and HFCs will be required to simultaneously submit to the stock exchanges the latest ALM statements as and when they submit the same to respective regulator(s) viz RBI/NHB, as applicable.

d.     CEO/ CFO Certification

A certificate from the CEO/CFO shall be submitted by the issuers to the recognized stock exchange(s) on quarterly basis certifying that CP proceeds are used for disclosed purposes, and adherence to other listing conditions.

Conclusion

As mentioned above, the disclosure requirements as provided in the Circular are meant for assisting the investors in taking an informed decision. Since the requirements are new, it is expected that apart from the stock exchanges, FIMMDA/ RBI will also come out with the revised Operational Guidelines/ Directions in order to bring more clarity on this aspect.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] http://www.fimmda.org/modules/content/?p=1033
[2] https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/1403065620622.pdf

Partial Credit Guarantee Scheme

A Business Conclave on  “Partial Credit Guarantee Scheme” was organised by Indian Securitisation Foundation jointly with Edelweiss on September 16,2019 in Mumbai.

On this occasion, the presentation used by Mr. Vinod Kothari is being given here:

http://vinodkothari.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/partial-credit-enhancement-scheme-.pdf

 

We have authored few articles on the topic that one might want to give a read. The links to such related articles are provided below:

Government credit enhancement for NBFC pools: A Guide to Rating agencies

Vinod Kothari Consultants P Ltd (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

 

The partial credit enhancement (PCE) Scheme of the Government[1], for purchase by public sector banks (PSBs) of NBFC/HFC pools, has been discussed in our earlier write-ups, which can be viewed here and here.

This document briefly puts the potential approach of the rating agencies for rating of the pools for the purpose of qualifying for the Scheme.

Brief nature of the transaction:

  • The transaction may be summarised as transfer of a pool to a PSB, wherein the NBFC retains a subordinated piece, such that the senior piece held by the PSB gets a AA rating. Thus, within the common pool of assets, there is a senior/junior structure, with the NBFC retaining the junior tranche.
  • The transaction is a structured finance transaction, by way of credit-enhanced, bilateral assignment. It is quite similar to a securitisation transaction, minus the presence of SPVs or issuance of any “securities”.
  • The NBFC will continue to be servicer, and will continue to charge servicing fees as agreed.
  • The objective to reach a AA rating of the pool/portion of the pool that is sold to the PSB.
  • Hence, the principles for sizing of credit enhancement, counterparty (servicer) risk, etc. should be the same as in case of securitisation.
  • The coupon rate for the senior tranche may be mutually negotiated. Given the fact that after 2 years, the GoI guarantee will be removed, the parties may agree for a stepped-up rate if the pool continues after 2 years. Obviously, the extent of subordinated share held by the NBFC will have to be increased substantially, to provide increased comfort to the PSB. Excess spread, that is, the excess of actual interest earned over the servicing fees and the coupon may be released to the seller.
  • The payout of the principal/interest to the two tranches (senior and junior), and utilisation of the excess spread, etc. may be worked out so as to meet the rating objective, provide for stepped-up level of enhancement, and yet maintain the economic viability of the transaction.
  • Bankruptcy remoteness is easier in the present case, as pool is sold from the NBFC to the PSB, by way of a non-recourse transfer. Of course, there should be no retention of buyback option, etc., or other factors that vitiate a true sale.
  • Technically, there is no need for a trustee. However, whether the parties need to keep a third party for ensuring surveillance over the transaction, in form of a monitoring agency, may be decided between the parties.

Brief characteristics of the Pool

  • For any meaningful statistical analysis, the pool should be a homogenous pool.
  • Surely, the pool is a static pool.
  • The pool has attained seasoning, as the loans must have been originated by 31st March, 2019.
  • In our view, pools having short maturities (say personal loans, short-term loans, etc.) will not be suitable for the transaction, since the guarantee and the guarantee fee are on annually declining basis.

Data requirement

The data required for the analysis will be same as data required for securitisation of a static pool.

Documentation

  • Between the NBFC and the PSB, there will be standard assignment documentation.
  • Between the Bank and the GoI:
    • Declaration that requirements of Chapter 11 of the GFR have been satisfied.
    • Guarantee documentation as per format given by GOI

[1] http://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=192618

Other Related Articles :

Government Credit enhancement scheme for NBFC Pools: A win-win for all

Vinod Kothari (vinod@vinodkothari.com)

The so-called partial credit enhancement (PCE) for purchase of NBFC/HFC pools by public sector banks (PSBs) may, if meaningfully implemented, be a win-win for all. The three primary players in the PCE scheme are NBFCs/HFCs (let us collectively called them Originators), the purchasing PSBs, and the Government of India (GoI). The Scheme has the potential to infuse liquidity into NBFCs while at the same time giving them advantage in terms of financing costs, allow PSBs to earn spreads while enjoying the benefit of sovereign guarantee, and allow the GoI to earn a spread of 25 bps virtually carrying no risks at all. This brief write-ups seeks to make this point.

The details of the Scheme with our elaborate questions and answers have been provided elsewhere.

Modus operandi

Broadly, the way we envisage the Scheme working is as follows:

  1. An Originator assimilates a pool of loans, and does tranching/credit enhancements to bring a senior tranche to a level of AA rating. Usually, tranching is associated with securitisation, but there is no reason why tranching cannot be done in case of bilateral transactions such as the one envisaged here. The most common form of tranching is subordination. Other structured finance devices such as turbo amortisation, sequential payment structure, provisions for redirecting the excess spread to pay off the principal on senior tranche, etc., may be deployed as required.
  2. Thus, say, on a pool of Rs 100 crores, the NBFC does so much subordination by way of a junior tranche as to bring the senior tranche to a AA level. The size of subordination may be worked, crudely, by X (usually 3 to 4) multiples of expected losses, or by a proper probability distribution model so as to bring the confidence level of the size of subordination being enough to absorb losses to acceptable AA probability of default. For instance, let us think of this level amounting to 8% (this percentage, needless to say, will depend on the expected losses of respective pools).
  3. Thus, the NBFC sells the pool of Rs 100 crores to PSB, retaining a subordinated 8% share in the same. Bankruptcy remoteness is achieved by true sale of the entire Rs 100 crore pool, with a subordinated share of 8% therein. In bilateral transactions, there is no need to use a trustee; to the extent of the Originator’s subordinated share, the PSB is deemed to be holding the assets in trust for the Originator. Simultaneously, the Originator also retains excess spread over the agreed Coupon Rate with the bank (as discussed below).
  4. Assuming that the fair value (computation of fair value will largely a no-brainer, as the PSB retains principal, and interest only to the extent of its agreed coupon, with the excess spread flowing back to the Originator) comes to the same as the participation of the PSB – 92% or Rs 92 crores, the PSB pays the same to the Originator.
  5. PSB now goes to the GoI and gets the purchase guaranteed by the latter. So, the GoI has guaranteed a purchase of Rs 92 crores, taking a first loss risk of 10% therein, that is, upto Rs 9.20 crores. Notably, for the pool as a whole, the GoI’s share of Rs 9.20 crores becomes a second loss position. However, considering that the GoI is guaranteeing the PSB, the support may technically be called first loss support, with the Originator-level support of Rs 10 crores being separate and independent.
  6. However, it is clear that the sharing of risks between the 3 – the Originator, the GoI and the Bank will be as follows:
  • Losses upto first Rs 8 crores will be taken out of the NBFC’s first loss piece, thereby, implying no risk transfer at all.
  • Losses in excess of Rs 8 crores, but upto a total of Rs 17.20 crores (the GoI guarantee is limited to Rs 9.20 crores), will be taken by GoI.
  • It is only when the loss exceeds Rs 17.20 crores that there is a question of the PSB being hit by losses.
  1. Thus, during the period of the guarantee, the PSB is protected to the extent of 17.2%. Note that first loss piece at the Originator level has been sized up to attain a AA rating. That will mean, higher the risk of the pool, the first loss piece at Originator level will go up to protect the bank.
  2. The PSB, therefore, has dual protection – to the extent of AA rating, from the Originator (or a third party with/without the Originator, as we discuss below), and for the next 10%, from the sovereign.
  3. Now comes the critical question – what will be the coupon rates that the PSB may expect on the pool.
    1. The pool effectively has a sovereign protection. While the protection may seem partial, but it is a tranched protection, and for a AA-rated pool, a 10% thickness of first loss protection is actually far higher than required for the highest degree of safety. What makes the protection even stronger is that the size of the guarantee is fixed at the start of the transaction or start of the financial year, even though the pool continues to amortise, thereby increasing the effective thickness.
    2. Assume risk free rate is R, and the spreads for AAA rated ABS are R +100 bps. Assume that the spreads for AA-rated ABS is R+150 bps.
    3. Given the sovereign protection, the PSB should be able to price the transaction certainly at less than R +100 bps, because sovereign guarantee is certainly safer than AAA. In fact, it should effectively move close to R, but given the other pool risks (prepayment risks, irregular cashflows), one may expect pricing above R.
    4. For the NBFC, the actual cost is the coupon expected by the PSB, plus 25bps paid for the guarantee.
    5. So as long as the coupon rate of the pool for the NBFC is lower than R+75 bps, it is an advantage over a AAA ABS placement. It is to be noted that the NBFC is actually exposing regulatory and economic capital only for the upto-AA risk that it holds.

Win-win for all

If the structure works as above, it is a win-win for all:

  • For the GoI, it is a neat income of 25 bps while virtually taking no real risks. There are 2 strong reasons for this – first, there is a first loss protection by the Originator, to qualify the pool for a AA rating. Secondly, the guarantee is limited only for 2 years. For any pool, first of all, the probability of losses breaching a AA-barrier itself will be close to 1% (meaning, 99% of the cases, the credit support at AA level will be sufficient). This becomes even more emphatic, if we consider the fact that the guarantee will be removed after 2 years. The losses may pile up above the Originator’s protection, but very unlikely that this will happen over 2 years.
  • For the PSB, while getting the benefit of a sovereign guarantee, and therefore, effectively, investing in something which is better than AAA, the PSB may target a spread close to AAA.
  • For the NBFC, it is getting a net advantage in terms of funding cost. Even if the pricing moves close to AAA ABS spreads, the NBFC stands to gain as the regulatory capital eaten up is only what is required for a AA-support.

The overall benefits for the system are immense. There is release of liquidity from the banking system to the economy. Depending on the type of pools Originators will be selling, there may be asset creation in form of home loans, or working capital loans (LAP loans may effectively be that), or loans for transport vehicles. If the GoI objective of buying pools upto Rs 100000 crores gets materialised, as much funding moves from banks to NBFCs, which is obviously already deployed in form of assets. The GoI makes an income of Rs 250 crores for effectively no risk.

In fact, if the GoI gains experience with the Scheme, there may be very good reason for lowering the rating threshold to A level, particularly in case of home loans.

Capital treatment, rating methodologies and other preparations

To make the Scheme really achieve its objectives, there are several preparations that may have to come soon enough:

  • Rating agencies have to develop methodologies for rating this bilateral pool transfer. Effectively, this is nothing but a structured pool transfer, akin to securitisation. Hence, rating methodologies used for securitisation may either be applied as they are, or tweaked to apply to the transfers under the Scheme.
  • Very importantly, the RBI may have to clarify that the AA risk retention by Originators under the Scheme will lead to regulatory capital requirement only upto the risk retained by the NBFC. This should be quite easy for the RBI to do – because there are guidelines for securitisation already, and the Scheme has all features of securitisation, minus the fact that there is no SPV or issuance of “securities” as such.

Conclusion

Whoever takes the first transaction to market will have to obviously do a lot of educating – PSBs, rating agencies, law firms, SIDBI, and of course, DFS. However, the exercise is worth it, and it may not take 6 months as envisaged for the GoI to reach the target of Rs 1 lakh crores.


Other related articles:

An analysis of the Model Tenancy Act, 2019

1.      Introduction

In India, every state has its own law on tenancy matters. The matters, which are not covered by state legislations are governed by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“TPA”), which is central legislation dealing with the matters between tenants and landlords. However, it covers transaction between tenant and landowner in the form of a lease. Codified legislation dealing exclusively on rent related matters in the real estate market has been long ignored in India. Lack of an exclusive legal framework hampered the growth of rental housing segment and resulted in low investments in the rental housing sector. The draft Model Tenancy Act, 2015 was an effort made earlier to codify the law on tenancy. but majority of states never implemented the same. In Union Budget 2019, it was proposed that in order to promote rental housing, new tenancy laws will be formulated to remove the archaic laws currently in use. In furtherance to the said proposition, Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MHUA) released the draft Model Tenancy Act, 2019 (“MTA”) on July 10, 2019, which aims to regulate rental housing by a market-oriented approach while balancing interests of landowner and tenant at the same time. The article points out current problems of rental housing in India along with the issue that how MTA is going to compensate for these problems. It also presents an overview of MTA and loopholes present in it.

2.      Need for rental housing

Housing is one of the basic necessities of life. The rapid pace of urbanization in India has resulted in severe shortage of housing. People go for rental housing because  low-income or people are not ready to build their own house.In spite of government’s prime consideration to affordable housing, many poor households live in congested conditions, which indicates that housing is unaffordable for a large section of population, be it ownership or rental.

The Draft National Urban Rental Housing Policy, 2015 (“the Policy”) pointed out that there is a huge housing shortage in urban areas and on the other hand, there are massive stocks of vacant houses.[1]Possible reasons ascertained for vacant houses could be  low rental yield, fear of repossession, lack of incentives etc. The Policy defines rental housing as a property occupied by someone other than the owner, for which the tenant pays a periodic mutually agreed rent to the owner.[2] The policy suggested that if these vacant houses are made available for rental housing, then some, if not most of the urban housing shortage, could be addressed.[3] Hence, the need for rental housing can be understoodunder the following heads-

  1. An alternative to eliminate the problem of housing shortage in view of ever-increasing population of India.
  2. Prevention of future growth of slums by providing affordable housing to all.
  3. Rental housing could be turned as a steady source of income for the landlords, making investment in rental market attractive.

3.      Current problems of rental housing in India

Rental housing is a subject on which States have exclusive right to legislate. It is a state subject as mentioned under item 18 in List II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. Although, Central Government can guide the states as we have a quasi-federal structure in India, therefore, Central Government has power to make model law on rent control or tenancy.

At present, nearly every state has its own law governing matters relating to rental housing in their jurisdiction in the name of Rent Control Laws. However, these rent control laws are not adequate to satisfy the need for rental housing in true sense. Because, issues, such as lack of affordable housing, lack of investment in rental housing etc., are still present in the country.

The problems of rental housing in India, as present under different existing rent control laws, can be encapsulated as follow:

  1. Fixation of standard rent:

Existing rent control laws provide for standard rent or fair rent, which is calculated on the basis of cost of construction involved, when the premise was built and does not include present market value of the premise as a consideration to determine standard rent. This proves to be major disincentive for landlords and investors, who want to invest in rental market as it will give very low rate of return.

  1. Overstaying problem of tenants:

Existing rent control laws do not provide for any remedy for when tenants do not vacant the rent premises even after termination of the tenancy period. Therefore, landlords often fear that they might lose control on their premises and had to go long litigation process for recovering their premises.

  1. Reduced liquidity for landlords:

Freeze of availability of rental housing is evident in light of the long litigation proceedings relating to recovery of rental premises by the landlord or proceedings relating to eviction of tenants. When the proceedings are undergoing, it is difficult to rent out the premises which are lis pendens in court of law and thereby it reduces liquidity for landlords in the market.

  1. Security deposit:

From the point of view of tenants, it is unfair to give limitless amount to the landlords in the name of security deposit or pugree. Existing rent control laws do not provide for any upper cap as far as security deposit is concerned and tenants have to suffer in the hands of landlords, who demand lump sum amount as much as they want at the beginning of tenancy period. Because of this practice, poor households choose to live in slum areas as they cannot afford to give arbitrary amount of security deposit, which leads to lack of affordable housing in the Country.

  1. Landlord’s right to evict the tenant on false grounds:

It has been seen in many cases that landlords file false cases to evict tenants on the ground of non-payment of rent because most of the existing rent control laws do no mandate receipt of rent to be given by the landlord.

  1. Lease under Transfer of Property Act, 1882:

Section 105 of the aforesaid Act defines lease as “a lease of immoveable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. The transferor is called the lessor, the transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent.” It is to be noted that in case of a lease agreement, terms of the same cannot be changed until the expiry of the lease period unlike tenancy agreement. In practice, landlords often opt for tenancy agreement under rent control laws where they can execute tenancy on a month-to-month basis and can alter its terms.. However, in areas with high vacancy rate of rental premises, landlords choose for lease agreement under Section 105 and thereby make the use of rent control laws fatal. In addition, TPA and rent control laws do not mandate a written agreement to be executed, which is another problem to enforce the rights of either party to the oral agreement and leads to never-ending litigation proceedings in case of disputes.

  1. Leave and License Contract:

Apart from rent control laws and lease under the TPA, people often use leave and license contract as given under the Indian Easements Act, 1882. Section 52 of the said Act defines license as- “where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a license.” Hence, the licensor gives the license to the licensee to use the property, which includes usage same as applicable to rental market without transferring a specific interest in the immovable property. Thus, to execute a landlord-tenant relationship, there exist different contracts under the different names and different procedures, the ambiguities of which can be used by the landlord or tenant to influence the law as per their needs.

4.      Overview of MTA

MTA has been drafted with a view to balance the interests of the landowner and tenant and to provide for speedy dispute redressal by establishing adjudicatory bodies under MTA. It also tries to create an accountable and transparent environment for renting the premises and promotes sustainable ecosystem to various segments of society including migrants, professionals, workers, students and urban poor. To understand what MTA proposes for tenants and landlords, a brief overview has been presented here under the following heads-

4.1       Institutional framework – regulatory and judicial bodies-

Rent Authority-

Section 29 of MTA provides for the appointment of Rent Authority to be an officer who is

not below the rank of Deputy Collector. Rent Authority exercises same power as vested in Rent Court in the following matters-

  1. Upload details of tenancy agreement on a digital platform in the local vernacular or state language in the form prescribed and provide a unique identification number to the parties[4];
  2. Fix or revise the rent on an application by the landowner or tenant[5];
  3. Investigate the case and pass an order in case of deposit of rent by the tenant with the rent authority, if the landowner does not accept the rent[6];
  4. Allow the tenant, if requested, to vacate the premises if it becomes uninhabitable in absence of repairs by the landlord.[7]
  5. Conduct an inquiry and allow compensation or levy penalty in case of an application made to it by the landlord or tenant if any person cuts-off or withholds any essential supply or service in the premises occupied by the tenant or the landowner.[8]

Rent Court and Rent Tribunal-

Section 32 and 33 provides for the constitution of Rent Court and Rent Tribunal respectively. Section 34 gives exclusive jurisdiction to Rent Court and Rent Authority to hear and decide the applications relating to disputes between landowner and tenant and matters connected with and ancillary thereto. For speedy disposal of cases, Rent Court or Rent Tribunal has to dispose the case within 60 days from the date of receipt of the application or appeal and shall record the reasons in writing in case of disposal of case exceeds 60 days period.[9]Appeal from the orders of the Rent Court lies to the Rent Tribunal.[10] In addition, order of Rent Court or Rent Tribunal shall be executable by as a decree of a civil court.[11]Following reliefs can be given by the Rent Court[12]:

  1. Delivery of possession of the premises to the party in whose favor the decision is made;
  2. Attachment of bank account of the losing party for the satisfaction of the amount to be paid;
  3. Appoint any advocate or any other competent person including officers of the Rent Court or local administration or local body for the execution of the order.

4.2       Scope of coverage-

MTA applies to any premises, which is, let separately for residence or commercial or educational use except industrial use.[13] However, MTA does not provide what constitutes residence/commercial/educational/industrial use. Besides, MTA does not apply to the following premises[14]

  1. Hotel, lodging house, dharamshala or inn etc.;[15]
  2. Premises owned or promoted by-
    1. The Central/ State/ UT Government, or
    2. Local Authority, or
    3. Government undertaking or enterprise, or
    4. Statutory body, or
    5. Cantonment board;
  3. Premises owned by a company, university or organization given on rent to its employees as part of service contract;
  4. Premises owned by owned by religious or charitable institutions as may be specified by notification;
  5. Premises owned by owned by any trust registered under the Public Trust Act of the State;
  6. Premises owned by owned by Wakfs registered under the Wakf Act, 1995;
  7. Any other building specifically exempted in public interest through notification.

However, if the owner of any of the premises mentioned under in (b) to (g) wishes a tenancy agreement to be regulated under MTA, then he can inform the same to the Rent Authority.

4.3       Protection of landlord-

As stated above the prime object of the MTA is to eliminate the fear among landlords regarding repossession of their premises and increase the growth of investment in rental sector of the market. Keeping this view, MTA proposes to give protection to landlord in following manner-

  1. Subletting of rented premises cannot be effected without prior consent of landlord in
  2. writing along with disclosure of all details of sub-letting to landlord by the tenant. .[16]
  3. Landlord is allowed to make deduction from security deposit amount for any liability of the tenant.[17]
  4. Landlord is allowed to deduct the amount from the security deposit or can ask the amount payable from the tenant, in case the tenant refuses to carry out scheduled or agreed repairs in the premises.[18]
  5. Landlord can file an application to the Rent Authority against the tenant in case of cut-off or withhold of any essential supply or service in the premises by the tenant.[19]
  6. Landlord can evict the tenant on an application made to the Rent Court on any of the grounds mentioned under Section 21. These grounds are-
  7. Failure of agreement on rent payable;
  8. Failure of tenant to pay the arrears of rent in full and other charges payable unless the payment of the same within 1 month of notice being served on the tenant;
  9. Tenant has parted with the possession of whole or any part of the premises without obtaining the written consent of the landlord;
  10. Tenant has continued misuse of the premises even after receipt of notice from the landowner to stop such misuse;
  11. The premises are required by the landlord for carrying out any repairs, additions, alterations etc., which cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated unless re-entry of tenant has been pre-agreed between the parties;
  12. The premises or any part thereof are required by the landlord for carrying out any repairs, additions, alterations etc. for change of its use as a consequence of change of land use by the competent authority;
  13. Tenant has given written notice to vacate the premises and in consequence of that notice, the landlord has contracted to sell the accommodation or has taken any other step, as a result of which his interests would seriously suffer if he is not put in possession of that accommodation.
  14. In case of overstay of the tenant beyond tenancy period, the landlord is entitled to get compensation of double of the monthly rent for 2 months and 4 times of the monthly rent.[20]
  15. Landlord can make any construction or improvement to the rented premises after permission of the Rent Court obtained in this behalf.[21]
  16. Landlord is allowed to fix or revise the rent payable by the tenant, provided the same should be agreed by the tenant in the tenancy agreement.[22]

4.4       Protection of tenant-

MTA has not only given protection to landlords but balances the interests of the tenants as well. With this view, MTA proposes to give protection to landlord in the following manner-

  1. In the event of death of the tenant, his/her successors will have the same rights and obligations as agreed in tenancy agreement for the remaining period of the tenancy.[23]
  2. Rent cannot be increased during the tenancy period, unless the amount of increase or method for increase is expressly set out in the Tenancy Agreement.[24]
  3. Tenant is entitled to get refund of the security deposit amount at the time of vacating the premises after deduction of amount of liability, if any.[25]
  4. Tenant is entitled to get a written acknowledgment rent receipt by the landlord.[26]
  5. Where the landlord refuses to accept the rent, tenant may deposit it with the Rent Authority.[27]
  6. Tenant is allowed to deduct the amount from periodic rent, in case the landlord refuses to carry out the scheduled or agreed repairs in the premises.[28]
  7. Where the premises becomes uninhabitable and landlord refuses for repairs, thenthetenant has the right to vacate the premises after giving 15 days notice in writing to the landlord or with the permission of the Rent Authority, in case the.[29]
  8. Tenant can file an application to the Rent Authority against the landlord in case of cut-off or withhold of any essential supply or service in the premises by the landlord.[30]
  9. Tenant is entitled to get refund of such an advance amount and interest, in case of default, after deduction of rent and other charges in case of eviction proceedings initiated by the landlord under Section 21.[31]
  10. Tenant may give up possession of the premises on giving a one-month prior notice or notice as required under the tenancy agreement to the landlord.[32]

5.      How will the MTA help rental housing issue?

MTA recommends eradicating the existing rental housing problems by incorporating needful provisions. MTA has recognized the problems in existing rent control laws in its preamble as lack of growth of rental housing segment and lack of the landlords renting out their vacant premises. For better understanding of these needful provisions in MTA, a comparison of key provisions of existing rent control laws and MTA has been produced in Annexure A. In conclusion, the table suggests that MTA provides for market-oriented approach by leaving the fixation of rent amount on parties[33], who may fix or revise it considering current market value of the premises and thereby increasing the possibilities of high rate of return to the investors in the rental housing market. On the other hand, to remove the fear of the landlords of losing possession of the premises has been taken care by MTA by giving a remedy in form of compensation to the landlord[34].

6.      What do the state governments have to do?

As mentioned above, housing is a state subject and States have exclusive right to legislate upon it. MTA proposes only a model on how the issues relating to rental housing as existed under current laws relating to tenancy can be eliminated. It is completely on the states to adopt or not adopt MTA in their state. For better functioning of the rental housing in the state and to resolve the issues as point out above, state should adopt MTA. Moreover, States are free to make amendments in the proposed provisions in MTA while incorporating the same in their states.[35]

7.      What incentives will the state governments have for enacting the MTA?

MTA only proposes a model and States are under no obligation to enact MTA in their respective jurisdictions. Therefore, what the states will get for enacting MTA is equally an important question to consider. Section 46 of MTA provides that if any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions MTA, the State/UT Government may, by order, not inconsistent with the provisions MTA, remove the difficulty. Hence, any State enacting MTA is empowered to remove difficulty or amend the provision in their jurisdiction, if there arises any difficulty in implementation of the MTA.

Moreover, housing is one of the basic needs of life and raising the standard of living of its people is one of the primary duties of State as enshrined under the Article 47 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, States shall make every endeavor to resolve the issue of affordable housing in the best manner possible and MTA serves this objective well.

8.      Drawbacks of the MTA

Despite all the good attempts made in the provisions of MTA to remove the current problems relating to rental housing, MTA shortfalls on following grounds:

  1. Moreover, the term ‘Landlord’ covers ‘Lessor’ and the term ‘Tenant’ covers ‘Lessee’ in its definitions, but the MTA nowhere provides that it will override the provisions relating to Lease under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Therefore, usage of the term lessor/lessee would create conflict in practice since application of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is not clarified under the MTA .
  2. Lodging house and hotels are kept outside the scope of MTA. Therefore, application of the MTA to premises providing paying guest facilities is not clear.
  3. MTA provides for prospective application and gives no redress to tenancies, which are already in existence, prior to the commencement of MTA. Hence, position regarding existing tenancies is left untouched.
  4. Successor-in-interest has not been included in the definition of the term ‘tenant’ under Section 2 (m) of the MTA. However, Section 6 provides for successors of the tenant to come into the shoes of tenant in case of his/her death. This provision creates anomaly that after death of tenant, his/her successor-in-interest may deny acceptance of tenancy agreement on the ground that he/she is not covered within the definition of the term ‘tenant’.
  5. The term ‘rent’ is not defined under the Act, because of which, the form of rent payable is not clear, i.e. whether it has to be necessarily in cash or kind or crops or services rendered.
  6. The MTA does not address the situation in case of failure to execute tenancy agreement, failure to obtain consent of landowner for subletting, failure to refund security deposit at the time of taking over vacant possession of the premises by the landlord, failure to observe obligations imposed on parties. Although specific establishment of adjudicatory bodies has been provided under the MTA but the same results in increase of litigation matters before judicial bodies established under the MTA.
  7. MTA is open to be adopted by the States and does not necessarily impose application of its provisions to State.
  8. MTAdoes not talk about weak bargaining power of tenants and allows parties to agree on rent amount, which may cause prejudice to weaker sections of the society.
  9. MTA does not talk about over-riding effect of MTA on existing laws on tenancy, lease under the TPA, license under the Indian Easements Act, 1882 to uphold the objectives of the MTA.

9.      Conclusion

MTA is a welcoming step in rental matters relating to any premises. Establishment of the adjudicating authorities is going to lessen the burden on lower courts in the country in the matters relating to tenancy. However, application of the MTA would be interesting to see as to how many states actually implement MTA because it is only a model and not mandatory for states to adopt it.

 

 

Annexure-A

Comparison of Existing Rent Control Laws and MTA:

The author has tried to analyze some of the major existing rent control laws[36]in comparison with the MTA. The same has reproduced in a table form below:

Point of difference Existing Laws MTA Comments
Purpose of the Act 1.      Control of rent and protection of tenant from payment of rent more than the standard rent, and

2.      Protection of tenants from eviction,

 

It provides not only for protection of tenants but also provides for protection of landowners. Most of the existing rent control laws are tenant-centric; whereas MTA balances the interests of landowner and tenant.
Exemption  Premises belonging to the Government are exempted but no specific provision is present regarding exemption of religious or charitable premises and premises owned by a university except Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999.[37] MTA exempts any premises owned by the Government, religious or charitable institutions, and premises owned by a company, university or organization given on rent to its employees as part of service contract.[38] MTA applies to all kind of government occupied premises and publicly used premises unlike existing rent control laws.

 

Definition of ‘Landlord’ If the premises were let to a tenant then landlord means a person who-

1.      is receiving, or is entitled to receive the rent of any premises, or

2.      trustee, guardian or receiver, who is receiving or is entitled to receive rent, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, any other person who cannot enter into a contract (such as minor, person with unsound mind etc.).

 

If the premises were let to a tenant then landlord (Landowner/Lessor) means a person who[39]

1.      is receiving, or is entitled to receivethe rent of any premises,and

2.      includes successor-in-interest,

3.      trustee, guardian or receiver, who is receiving or is entitled to receive rent, on behalf of, or for the benefit of, any other person who cannot enter into a contract (such as minor, person with unsound mind etc.).

MTA covers Lessor within the term ‘Landlord’ and includes successor-in-interest unlike existing rent control laws.

 

Definition of ‘Premises’ Premises mean any building or part of a building rented out, and includes-

1.      Gardens, garages or outhouses, any furnituresupplied by the landlord,

2.      any fittings affixedto such building.

However, premises do not include hotel, lodging house.

 

 

Premises mean any building or part of a itrented out for the purpose of residence or commercial or educational use, (except for industrial use) and includes[40]

1.      the garden, garage or closed parking area, grounds and out-houses, appertaining to such building or part of the building,

2.      any fitting to such building or part of the building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof,

However, premises do not include hotel, lodging house, dharamshala or inn etc.[41]

State RCAs do not explicitly exclude industrial use, unlike MTA and do not specifically recognize a particular purpose of use of building to be cover within the term ‘premises’.
Definition of ‘Tenant’ Some of the rent control laws do not provide definition of term ‘tenant’. And others include tenant as a person-

1.      who is paying the rent, or

2.      deemed tenant, or

3.      sub-tenant,

4.      member of tenant’s family in case of death of tenant.

Tenant/Lesseemeans a person[42]

1.      by whom the rent is payable, or

2.      on whose behalf the rent is payable, and

3.      includes a sub-tenant,and

4.      any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy whether before or after the commencement of this Act.

However, tenant does not include any person against whom any order or decree for eviction has made.

MTA does not include successor-in-interest within the definition of tenant.
Standard rent Standard rent means a rent fixed by the Controller under rent control laws. No provision is made. MTA does not provide for the definition of the term ‘rent’.
Tenancy agreement It was not necessary and tenancy can be affected even without entering into tenancy agreement. It means a written agreement executed by the landowner and the tenant.[43] Moreover, it is mandatorycondition for a tenancy to come into effect.[44] MTA making the tenancy agreement mandatory unlike existing rent control laws.
Sub-letting No provision regarding prior written consent of landlord for sub-letting by tenant. Prior written consent of the landowner is madecompulsory.[45] More stringent provision.
Fixation of rent Rent fixed (standard rent) based on the value of land andcost of construction when built. The rent is the amount agreed between the landowner and the tenant as per the terms of the tenancy agreement.[46] Standard rent or fair rent concept has removed in MTA.
Increase in rent It is unilateral by the landlord with the approval of the controller. Revision of rent between the landowner and the tenant shall be as per the terms set out in the Tenancy Agreementor on a prior 3 months notice to the tenant.[47] Mutually agreed increase in rent is provided under MTA unlike rent control laws.
Temporary recovery of possession The landlord is entitled to get possession of the building, if bona fide, it is required by him to carry out repairs, alterations or additions, which cannot be carried out without the building being vacated, after which the building will again be offered to the tenant.

 

Rent Court may on an application made to it, make the order that the landlord is entitled to get possession of the premises or any part thereof on account of any repairs or rebuilding or additions or alterations or demolition, which cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated, provided that such re-possession has to be mutually agreed to between the landowner and the tenant and the new tenancy agreement has to submitted with the Rent Authority.[48] More requirements that are stringent have been put on the parties under MTA.
Deposit of rent Many of state rent control lawsdo not provide for deposit of rent lawfully payable to the landlord in respect of the building, before the authority as may be prescribed. Explicit provision provided for deposit of rent with the Rent Authority where the landowner does not accept the rent or refuses to give a receipt or if landowner does not accept the rent.[49] Transparency and accountability enabled provision.
Overstay of tenant No deterrent provision, therefore landlords fear to give their houses on rent, which in turn reduces the supply of renting houses in the market. It provides for compensation i.e. four times the rent, to the landlord.[50] MTA provides Remedy in favour of landlord.
Rent Receipt on payment of rent No provision. Every tenant is entitled to get a written receiptfrom the landowner for the amount paid to him.[51] Tenant friendly provision to eliminate abuse against tenants.
Security deposits No explicit provision existed for security deposits/ pugree in addition to rent. MTA provides for 2 months’ rent in residential property, 1-month rent in non-residential property as security deposit.[52] MTA provides elimination of abuse against tenants.
Inheritance of tenancy Order of inheritance has provided in most of the state RCAs. No order of successors has given in MTA.[53] MTA introduces more wide import in case of inheritance of tenancy.
Structural alteration to the rent premises Rent control laws provide for structural alteration without consent of tenant and increase rent. MTA provides for structural alteration to rent premises only if the same is provided in the  agreementwith the tenant and increase the rent.[54] Tenant friendly provision to eliminate abuse against tenants.
Adjudicatory Authority Controller or Civil Courts Rent Authority, Rent Court, Rent Tribunal[55] Specific adjudicatory bodies introduced in MTA for speedy disposal of rent related matters.

 

 

 

[1]Draft National Urban Rental Housing Policy, 2015, p 10.

[2]Id. At p 5.

[3]Id.

[4] Section 4 (4), MTA, 2019.

[5] Section 10, MTA, 2019.

[6] Section 14 (2), MTA, 2019.

[7] Section 15 (5), MTA, 2019.

[8] Section 20, MTA, 2019.

[9] Section 35 (2), MTA, 2019.

[10] Section 37, MTA, 2019.

[11] Section 36 (7), MTA, 2019.

[12] Section 38 (1), MTA, 2019.

[13] Section 2 (e), MTA, 2019.

[14] Section 3, MTA, 2019.

[15]Id.

[16] Section 7, MTA, 2019.

[17] Section 11 (2), MTA, 2019.

[18] Section 15 (3), MTA, 2019.

[19] Section 20, MTA, 2019.

[20] Section 22, MTA, 2019.

[21] Section 25, MTA, 2019.

[22] Section 8 & 9, MTA, 2019.

[23] Section 6, MTA, 2019.

[24] Section 9 (4), MTA, 2019.

[25] Section 11 (2), MTA, 2019.

[26] Section 13 (2), MTA, 2019.

[27] Section 14, MTA, 2019.

[28] Section 15 (4), MTA, 2019.

[29] Section 15 (5), MTA, 2019.

[30] Section 20, MTA, 2019.

[31] Section 23, MTA, 2019.

[32] Section 28, MTA, 2019.

[33] Section 8, MTA, 2019.

[34] Section 22, MTA, 2019.

[35] Section 46, MTA, 2019.

[36]Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999; Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958; Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control (Amendment) Act, 1960; The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997.

[37] Section 3, Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999.

[38] Section 3, MTA, 2019.

[39] Section 2(b), MTA, 2019.

[40] Section 2(e), MTA, 2019.

[41]Id.

[42] Section 2(m), MTA, 2019.

[43] Section 2(a), MTA, 2019.

[44] Section 4, MTA, 2019.

[45] Section 7 (1), MTA, 2019.

[46] Section 8, MTA, 2019.

[47] Section 9, MTA, 2019.

[48] Section 9 (6), MTA, 2019.

[49] Section 14 (1), MTA, 2019.

[50] Section 22, MTA, 2019.

[51] Section 13 (2), MTA, 2019.

[52] Section 11, MTA, 2019.

[53] Section 6, MTA, 2019.

[54] Section 9 (6), MTA, 2019.

[55] Chapter VI & VII, MTA, 2019.