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The Detachment Dilemma: Cooling-off period for 2 term Independent Directors

Avinash Shetty, Manager l corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Table of contents
Introduction
Role of IDs
Appointment and Tenure
Cooling Off period
Conclusion

Introduction 

The year 2024 will witness one of the first and biggest board transitions when it comes to Independent Directors (“IDs”) serving for a decade in the Indian public companies, either listed or unlisted. This is because the applicability of Section 149 of the Companies Act, 2013 (“Act”)  became applicable from the 1st of April, 2014 wherein IDs were allowed to hold office for a maximum tenure of upto 5 consecutive years and be associated as such for not more than 2 such terms. The tenure of IDs held before the applicability of the Act was grandfathered.

Following the conclusion of the two terms on March 31, 2024 (or, if the appointment was effective till the 2024 AGM, then the AGM date), more than 130 IDs across nearly 75 companies have ceased their roles[1]. As of March 31, 2023, there were 198 companies within the NIFTY 500 that had 375 IDs whose tenure exceeded 10 years. Notably, 14 of these directors had served on their respective boards for 30 years or more.[2] As the maximum tenure for IDs is two consecutive terms of five years each, followed by a cooling-off period of 3 years, an extremely pertinent question comes up on the continued association of these outgoing IDs with such companies.

Role of IDs

If corporate governance is all about rising above the interests of limited stakeholders, IDs as an institution form the very lynchpin of corporate governance. IDs perform a number of critical functions, including but not limited to bringing independence,, expertise and objectivity to Board discussions, balancing stakeholder interests, and offering unbiased opinions during board discussions on issues such as risk management, related party transactions and board performance. Appointment and participation of IDs in decision-making proceedings have been kept at a higher pedestal as compared to other categories of directors when it comes to board independence and ensuring a proper mix of independent and non-independent directors. 

Several requirements are linked with appointment and presence of IDs under the Act as well as the SEBI Listing Regulations, including the following:

  • The presence of IDs is a must to constitute a quorum for the meetings of the Board of Directors of top 2000 listed entities.
  • The composition of the Audit Committee, Nomination and Remuneration Committee (“NRC”), Stakeholders Relationship Committee, and Risk Management Committee of listed entities must include IDs.
  • Only IDs have the power to approve Related Party Transactions (RPTs) of listed entities in Audit Committee meetings.
  • IDs of listed entities are required to be appointed to the Boards of their material subsidiaries[3].
  • IDs are also responsible for reviewing the performance of non-IDs and the Board as a whole.
  • Whistleblowers have direct access to the Chairman of Audit Committee, who is responsible for addressing their concerns/ grievances, including potential fraud allegations.
  • The committee of IDs is required to provide a report, which is to be filed with the stock exchange, recommending the draft scheme of arrangement, ensuring that the scheme is not detrimental to the shareholders of the listed entity and has compensated the eligible shareholders for fractional entitlement.[4]

Appointment and Tenure

The appointment of IDs on the Board of an unlisted public company requires an ordinary resolution to be passed by the shareholders and a special resolution in case of re-appointment, based on the recommendation of NRC and the approval of the Board.

In case of listed entities, the appointment and re-appointment of an ID on the Board will require the approval of shareholders by way of a special resolution. However, if the resolution for the appointment of an ID fails to be passed by a special resolution, it may still be considered passed if the following dual conditions are satisfied:

  1. There is an ordinary majority of all the shareholders, including the promoters and promoter group;
  2. There is an ordinary majority of the public shareholders, that is, disregarding the voting of the promoters and promoter group.

Cooling Off Period 

The cooling-off period for IDs is prescribed under the Act as well as Listing Regulations. It can be categorized as: (a) Pre-appointment cooling-off period and (b) Post -appointment cooling-off period.

Pre-appointment cooling-off period for an ID:

  1. The Act prohibits IDs from having any pecuniary relationship with the company, its group, their promoters or directors, during the present or past two preceding financial years preceding the appointment. However, remuneration as a director or any other transaction not exceeding 10% of IDs total income is permitted.
  1. The Listing Regulations are more stringent and require IDs to have no material pecuniary relationship with the company, its group, their promoters, or directors, during the present or past three financial years preceding the appointment, apart from remuneration.
  1. Further, the Act and Listing Regulations prohibit the appointment of a person as an ID if he/she is or has been a KMP or employee of the company or group entities during the past three financial years. However, relatives of employees other than KMPs are permitted to become IDs.
  1. The proposed IDs in the last three FYs should not be an employee, proprietor, or partner of :
    • Any legal or consulting firm that has had transactions with the company or group entities amounting to ten percent or more of the gross turnover of such firm.
    • A firm of auditors, company secretaries in practice, or cost auditors of the company or group entities.
  2. In respect of relatives of IDs:
    • They should not be indebted to the Company, its group, their promoters or directors beyond a specified amount, nor should they have given a guarantee or provided any security in connection with the indebtedness of any third person to these entities or individuals in the current or past three financial years.
    • The pecuniary transaction or holding of securities by relatives in the listed entity or its group should not exceed 50 lakh rupees or two percent of the paid-up capital during the current or past three financial years, nor should they have any other pecuniary transaction or relationship with these entities amounting to two percent or more of their gross turnover or total income.

Post-appointment cooling-off period for an  ID:

Unlike the pre-appointment cooling-off period which is evaluated and examined almost every year irrespective of whether there is a new appointment or not, the post-appointment cooling-off period has assumed a never-before noteworthiness. The obvious reason is as mentioned above, i.e. due to the first mega ID transitions on the board of a significant number of IDs in public companies. The relevant extract of Section 149(11) of Act which lays down the requirement is reproduced below:

“(11) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (10), no independent director shall hold office for more than two consecutive terms, but such independent director shall be eligible for appointment after the expiration of three years of ceasing to become an independent director:

Provided that an independent director shall not, during the said period of three years, be appointed in or be associated with the company in any other capacity, either directly or indirectly.”

Going by the language of the law, it seems an ID who has completed two consecutive terms of 5 years cannot be associated with the company in any manner during the cooling-off period. Further, it is understood that the provisions start with a generic reference by saying “no director” but then become specific to say “such independent director”. However, in the proviso, the reference again becomes generic. Also the phrase “any other capacity” is broad, barring any possible positions such as a consultant or an adviser. These positions cannot be occupied indirectly too, the term “indirectly” seems to include the appointment of any company or firm where the ID has a substantial stake. The possible intent of these provisions is that the IDs should not exploit their past relationship with the company (during the time of being an ID) to gain an advantage after their term, as this may create a conflict of interest with their duties as an ID.

This is one possible view, and obviously, a conservative one. This view is premised on the principle that the association of the ID in any form is likely to get his some pecuniary interest, and this continuing pecuniary interest during the cooling off is alien to the whole principle of cooling off. Hence, the cooling off is like sampoorna vairagya.

There is another view, however. This view seeks to connect the cooling off with the “come back director”. That is, the ID who intends to come back after the 3 years’ cooling off and occupy the position as an ID should maintain abstinence during the cooling off. However, for the one who is content at not coming back, there should be no objection to the ID occupying a position other than as an ID.

This interpretation is based on the interpretation of the language of the proviso to Section 149(11). Since, the language of the proviso – it does not say “such independent director shall not”; instead, it says “an independent director shall not”. Therefore, the bar in the proviso is an independent bar, and not a mere qualification of the cooling off period itself.[5]

There are merits in both the views. The first view is grounded on the principle that indispensability is fatal to independence. If the ID during his term creates a continuing necessity of his services, his independence is bound to be questioned. The ID serves limited stint, during which he serves the company with objectivity and independence, and once his twin terms are over, he should allow the inevitable – a change. After all, what could be the justification for the company to lean on him to the extent of needing his services even during cooling-off?

The other view is based on the possibility of the ID having developed an understanding of the company’s business model and its functioning to the extent that losing his association after 10 years will be adverse to the company’s interest. After all, he does not intend to come back as an ID even after 3 years.

A question comes – can the ID offer one-off consulting services or professional advice to the company during the cooling off? Offering of professional advisory services, without any fixed relationship or commitment, is allowed pre, during and post retirement. As the safe harbour provision under the Act and Listing Regulations allows IDs to have a pecuniary relationship with the company and its group entities upto 10% of their total income, in addition to their remuneration.

Since the word in the proviso is “associate himself with the company in any other capacity”, a person offering one-off professional services does not have an “association”.

The real issue is not professional services. Quite often, these IDs are actually transitioned to other roles in the companies.  For example, the erstwhile ID is appointed as NED, or, in some cases, ED. As regards the change of role into an ED, Listing Regulations mandate a cooling-off period of one year for the transition of IDs who have resigned from the Board and then joined as an executive director or WTD in the same company,  holding, subsidiary, associate company or any company belonging to the promoter group. SEBI in its Board Meeting[6] noted that there could be valid reasons for an ID to transition to an ED or WTD, such instances where an ID knows that he/she may move to a larger role in the company in the near future, may practically lead to a compromise in their independence.

Cooling-off period in foreign jurisdictions

As far as the cooling-off restrictions in foreign jurisdictions are concerned, one can only notice the pre-appointment cooling-off period and not vice-versa. Some of these have been discussed below:

  1. The UK Corporate Governance Code, 2018[7] provides the cooling-off condition for the appointment of a non-executive director. The director should not have been an employee of the company or group in last five years; have no material business relationship with the company, either directly or indirectly in last three years; and has not served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their first appointment. However, provisions are required to be followed on a ‘comply or explain’ basis.
  1. The NASDAQ [8]and NYSE[9] Listing Standards restrict a person from being appointed as an ID, if they have been an employee of the listed company or had a material relationship with the listed company in the past three years.
  1. The Luxembourg Stock Exchange Principles[10] sets out the criteria to be considered by companies for appointment of ID which requires the director to not be an executive or MD of the company or an associated company in the last five years; should not be an employee in last three years; and has not served on the board for more than twelve years as non-executive or supervisory director.
  1. The SGX Code of Corporate Governance 2018[11] requires that an ID must not have served as a director or employed in the same company or related corporations for the past three financial years.

Conclusion

The provisions around the pre-appointment cooling-off period are pretty clear in terms of being interpreted and examined, however, that does not seem to be the case for the post-appointment cooling-off period where the letters of law suggest a complete exile for the outgoing ID as far as the concerned public company is concerned. However, the practice by the corporates tends to suggest otherwise. Several companies can be found to have allowed the continued association of their ex-IDs in some sort of other positions so as to avail some sort of services whether in consulting or anything like. Eventually, there is also a conscience call for the ID – can he be said to have compromised his independence, if he nurtures an interest in the company after he demits his office.


[1] https://www.business-standard.com/industry/news/from-ril-to-adani-power-top-firms-see-cessation-of-independent-directors-124040400939_1.html

[2] https://cdn.vahura.com/site/media/docs/the-great-board-refresh-2024-roundtable/The-2024-Board-Refresh-Report-by-IiAS.pdf?v=1696864425

[3] “material subsidiary” shall mean a subsidiary, whose income or net worth exceeds twenty percent of the consolidated income or net worth respectively, of the listed entity and its subsidiaries in the immediately preceding accounting year.

[4] Reg. 37 of LODR r/w SEBI Scheme Circular

[5] Corporate Governance – Miles travelled and miles to go – Vinod Kothari & Company, 2024

[6] https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/meetingfiles/jul-2021/1626155485805_1.pdf

[7] https://media.frc.org.uk/documents/UK_Corporate_Governance_Code_2018.pdf

[8] https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/nasdaq/rules/Nasdaq%205600%20Series

[9] https://nyseguide.srorules.com/listed-company-manual/09013e2c8503fca9

[10] https://www.luxse.com/regulation

[11] https://rulebook.sgx.com/rulebook/board-matters-1

Growing relevance of Audit Committee and IDs

For boosting corporate governance framework

– Pammy Jaiswal, Partner | pammy@vinodkothari.com

Background

In the era where the regulators are constantly bringing amendments to secure the stake and protect the interest of shareholders (including the stakeholders), it becomes imperative to understand the role, function and relevance of one such board committee being the ‘Audit Committee’ (hereinafter referred to as the ‘AC’) which has been given the responsibility to oversee and monitor several crucial matters after the board of directors. These functions are in the nature to ensure transparency and accountability (pillars of corporate governance) to a large extent. It has been seen in several cases in the past that lapses on the part of this committee often leads to major scams and corporate scandals.

In this paper, the author has tried to explain the idea and intent of the law makers behind introducing the concept of the AC, its expected role and function in ensuring and boosting corporate governance given the terms of reference suggested under applicable laws in India with a brief global comparison.

The entire Paper as was published by SSRN can be read here

SEBI LODR amendments: Minority say in independent directors, added regulations for debt issuers

Pammy Jaiswal | Partner | Vinod Kothari and Company (pammy@vinodkothari.com)

Background

Following the various recommendations provided by the Primary market Advisory Committee (PMAC), SEBI in its board meeting held on 30th September, 2022 discussed several proposals including the agenda to review the process for independent directors’ (IDs) appointment, re-appointment or removal,  introducing the need to appoint a monitoring agency for overseeing the utilisation of the issues proceeds from the preferential issue and the qualified institutional placements (‘QIP’), requirement of obtaining NoC from SEBI for schemes of arrangement involving such companies which have listed their Non-Convertible Securities (‘NCS’) and several other changes dealing with disclosures and financial results for NCS listed entities. Our snippet covering the aforesaid board decisions may be viewed here.

These proposals have been notified, as the SEBI Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) (Sixth Amendment) Regulations, 2022 (LODR 6th Amendment Regulations) have come into effect vide Notification dated 14th November, 2022 (‘Effective Date’). Our snippet covering the amendments may be viewed here.

Read more

SEBI rationalizes ID appointment and removal process for first term Re-appointment process to be rationalized post amendment in CA, 2013

– Kaushal Shah, Executive | kaushal@vinodkothari.com

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Read our related resources :

  1. SEBI LODR amendments: Minority say in independent directors, added regulations for debt issuers
  2. SEBI notifies amendments in LODR for NCS entities Scheme of Arrangement | Submission of financial results & line items | Transfer to IPEF for unclaimed NCS amounts by body corporate

LODR changes on Independent Directors – Things to do before 1st Jan., 2022

– CS Aisha Begum Ansari | CS Pieyusha Sharma | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

SEBI (LODR) (3rd Amendment) Regulations, 2021 | Corrigendum dated August 6, 2021

NSE Circular dated December 22, 2021 | BSE Circular dated December 22, 2021

Detailed write-ups:

1.Recent amendments relating to independent directors

2.SEBI notifies substantial amendments in Listing Regulations

3.New year brings stricter norms for appointment of IDs

4.FAQs on recent amendments under the Listing Regulations

Scope of Proxy Advisors to issue general voting guidelines

Sharon Pinto, Manager, corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Introduction

The right to vote on decisions of the Company is one of the most significant rights of the investors. Proxy advisors are entities that enable shareholders to function this right effectively. They undertake research on corporate governance practices across various entities and formulate their policies in order to establish benchmarks of the best practices. Based on the said benchmarks, the proxy advisors also provide voting recommendations to the client investors. SEBI had formulated a working group[1] for determining issues relating to proxy advisors in November, 2018 and reviewing the existing provisions of SEBI (Research Analysts) Regulations, 2014 (‘SEBI Regulations’), that govern proxy advisory entities in India.

We have in our previous articles deliberated the concept of proxy advisors and their role in corporate democracy[2] as well as analysed the above-mentioned report of the working group[3] [4]. In recent times, there has been huge hue and cry regarding the certain voting recommendations put forth by proxy advisors. As the advisors have significant influence over institutional investors and may thus affect the voting results, it is necessary to understand the legal ambit of such guidelines and recommendations issued by these entities.

In this article we have discussed the scope of proxy advisors while ascertaining the legal validity of their opinions. The guidelines issued on re-appointment of ID have been discussed in a separate article.

Scope of Proxy Advisors

  1. International practices

1.USA

Investment advisors are required to be registered with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) under the Investment Adviser Act of 1940 and Rules[5] made thereunder. Rule 204A-1 of the said Act has prescribed that the investment advisors establish, maintain and enforce a written code of ethics that, at a minimum, includes:

“(1) A standard (or standards) of business conduct that you require of your supervised persons, which standard must reflect your fiduciary obligations and those of your supervised persons;

(2) Provisions requiring your supervised persons to comply with applicable Federal securities laws;

(3) Provisions that require all of your access persons to report, and you to review, their personal securities transactions and holdings periodically as provided below;

(4) Provisions requiring supervised persons to report any violations of your code of ethics promptly to your chief compliance officer or, provided your chief compliance officer also receives reports of all violations, to other persons you designate in your code of ethics; and

(5) Provisions requiring you to provide each of your supervised persons with a copy of your code of ethics and any amendments, and requiring your supervised persons to provide you with a written acknowledgment of their receipt of the code and any amendments.”

Institutional Shareholder Services (‘ISS’) is a registered investment advisor which provides general proxy voting guidelines[6] on various resolutions put forth at the meetings of investors. However, the following disclaimer forms part of the document:

“The Information has not been submitted to, nor received approval from, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission or any other regulatory body. None of the Information constitutes an offer to sell (or a solicitation of an offer to buy), or a promotion or recommendation of, any security, financial product or other investment vehicle or any trading strategy, and ISS does not endorse, approve, or otherwise express any opinion regarding any issuer, securities, financial products or instruments or trading strategies.”

Similar guidelines and policies have been issued by Glass Lewis & Co.[7] stating that these proxy voting guidelines are grounded in corporate governance best practices, which often exceed minimum legal requirements. Accordingly, unless specifically noted otherwise, a failure to meet these guidelines should not be understood to mean that the company or individual involved has failed to meet applicable legal requirements.

  1. Australia

Proxy advisers in Australia hold Australian financial services (AFS) licenses for only a portion of the services they provide – giving advice to wholesale investors on votes that relate to dealings in financial products. Providing voting recommendations on other matters (such as director elections and remuneration reports) does not require an AFS licence.

Further, as per the provisions of Section 912A of the Corporations Act, 2001 proxy advisors shall:

  • do all things necessary to ensure that the financial services are provided efficiently, honestly and fairly;
  • have adequate arrangements in place for the management of conflicts of interest that may arise wholly, or partially, in relation to activities undertaken in the provision of financial services;
  • have adequate resources (including financial, technological and human resources) to provide the financial services and to carry out supervisory arrangements;
  • maintain the competence to provide those financial services.

ASIC in its ‘Review of proxy advisor engagement practices’[8] has stated that a draft report shall be provided to the Company for fact-checking or where clarification is sought from the company, proxy advisers should endeavour to provide sufficient time for the company to consider the request and respond. Further, if it is intended that a draft report will be provided to the subject company, proxy advisers may wish to consider doing this in a controlled way, for example, without communicating recommendations or opinions that would be included in the final report. This may reduce disagreements between proxy advisers and companies as to whether errors reported by companies relate to fact or opinion. In case proxy advisors propose to recommend ‘against’ recommendations, ASIC has recommended that they shall notify companies of such recommendations and explain the reasons for those recommendations, to assist companies in understanding concerns held by the proxy adviser and responding to investors in the context of those concerns.

Further, proxy advisors are recommended to disclose the following in their reports:

  1. the nature, extent and outcome of engagement with the subject company;
  2. a summary of the subject company’s view on a particular issue where that view is different from the proxy adviser’s, or any additional information that has been provided by the company as a result of engagement.

At present, there is no prior engagement of the proxy advisors with the client. Similar provisions have been stated under SEBI Regulations and procedural guidelines which are applicable to proxy advisors operating in India, which state that the report shall be provided to the company and the client at the same time.

However, as per the consultation paper issued by The Treasury in April 2021[9], it has been recommended that the proxy advisors in Australia shall provide the report to the corporate entities prior to issuing of the same to clients. Further, communication with the company prior to issue of report in order to diminish any factual errors or mis-interpretation has also been proposed.

  1. Europe

The discussion paper on proxy advisory industry[10] issued by European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA), state that European proxy advisors generally tend not to develop their own guidelines but follow client’s policies or general recommendations. The voting policies and guidelines prepared are based on the relevant corporate governance standards. In the majority of cases these policies are usually formulated through a bottom-up process where information is collected from a diverse range of market participants (including issuers) through multiple channels. This policy can be fully adapted to local circumstances in a given country, or can incorporate more general beliefs about what constitutes good governance. Corporate governance codes, listing rules, company law, local regulations, new market trends, practices and academic research are used to create a set of guidelines against which corporate disclosures can be benchmarked. Moreover, it is a common practice for proxy advisors to integrate feedback from clients and, if available, issuers.

It further states that, certain proxy advisor may hold roundtables with various industry groups or other experts are also a way of receiving information and hearing different perspectives. Some proxy advisors are open for discussion about their policies and guidelines throughout the year while others are only open for discussion after the general meeting session. Proxy advisors, have to make sure voting policies and guidelines are sufficiently flexible to be applicable to the circumstances of each jurisdiction, sector and issuer. There may be issues arising on the accuracy, independence and reliability of the ultimate voting recommendations/proxy advice.

  1. United Kingdom

Proxy advisors that have their registered office or head office in United Kingdom or European Economic Area or in Gibraltar or provide proxy advisor services through an establishment located in the United Kingdom, are governed by the Proxy Advisors (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulations, 2019[11].

Following are the some of the provisions prescribed under the said regulations:

  • Where proxy advisors provide services in accordance with a code of conduct, they shall disclose the following:
  1. a reference to the code of conduct, by means of which any person may readily view it;
  2. a report on the manner in which the code of conduct has been applied; and
  3. in case of any deviation from any of the recommendations contained in the code of conduct, a statement which specifies the recommendations concerned, explains the reason for departing from them, and indicates any measures adopted instead of them.

Further, where the proxy advisors where no such code of conduct has been adopted, the proxy advisors must provide a clear and reasonable explanation for not doing so.

  • The proxy advisors are also required to provide the following disclosure w.r.t. assurance about accuracy and reliability of information:
  1. the essential features of the methodologies and models applied for the provision of those services;
  2. the main sources of information used for the provision of those services;
  3. the procedures put in place to ensure that firm’s research, advice and voting recommendations are of an adequate quality and are prepared by staff who are suitably qualified to prepare them;
  4. whether national market, legal, regulatory and company-specific conditions have been taken into account, if yes how;
  5. the essential features of the voting policies applied for each market;
  6. whether there is a dialogue with the company which is the object of research, advice or voting recommendations, or with persons who have a stake in that company, if yes, the extent and nature of the dialogue; and
  7. policy regarding the prevention and management of potential conflicts of interest.
  • Functioning of proxy advisors in India

Proxy advisors are governed by SEBI Regulations. The entities functioning as proxy advisors or research analysts are required to obtain a certificate of registration from the Board under these regulations. The regulations have stipulated the following w.r.t. contents of the report published by the advisory firms:

  1. Research analyst or research entity shall take steps to ensure that facts in its research reports are based on reliable information and shall define the terms used in making recommendations, and these terms shall be consistently used.
  1. Research analyst or  research  entity that  employs  a  rating  system  must  clearly  define the meaning  of  each  such  rating  including  the  time  horizon  and    benchmarks  on  which  a  rating  is based.
  2. If a research report contains either a rating or price target for subject company’s securities and the research analyst or research entity has assigned a rating or price target to the securities for at least one  year,  such  research  report  shall  also  provide  the  graph  of  daily  closing  price  of  such securities for the period assigned or for a three-year period, whichever is shorter.

Further, the procedural guidelines issued by SEBI for proxy advisors[12] states that the report of the proxy advisors shall be shared with its clients and the company at the same time. The timeline for receiving comments from the Company may be defined by the proxy advisors and all comments/clarifications received from the company, within timeline, shall be included as an addendum to the report. It also states that if the company  has  a  different  viewpoint  on  the  recommendations  stated  in  the  report  of  the  proxy advisors, then proxy advisors, after taking into account the said viewpoint, may either revise the recommendation in the addendum report or issue an addendum to the report with its remarks, as considered appropriate.

Similar to the regulatory provisions in USA, the proxy advisors registered in with SEBI shall abide by the code of conduct prescribed under Regulation 24 of SEBI Regulations.

As the views of proxy advisors are based on the best corporate governance practices and research thereon, they are required to clearly  disclose  in  their  recommendations the  legal requirement  vis-a-vis higher  standard  they  are  suggesting if  any, and  the rationale behind the  recommendation  of higher standards.

Legal position of guidelines issued by proxy advisors

  1. Research oriented

Proxy advisors undertake extensive research of the corporates to determine and set benchmarks. As evident from the global scenario and the working of proxy advisors in India as discussed above, one can opine that such guidelines are formed on the basis of the research undertaken by the said entities.

2.Interpretation of law

The said guidelines are a manifestation of the best governance practices that the companies may strive to achieve, which may at times exceed the prescribed legal requirements. They form the basis of opinions of the proxy advisory firms and are specifically the views of the issuing firms. Thus, the opinions of the advisory firms may be subject to other interpretations.

3.Generality of policies

Due to the generality of the guidelines issued, certain factual or practical factors may not be considered if the said guidelines are applied to the agenda items of various companies. The case to case specific factors, company or director backgrounds, etc may not be considered while applying the policies and hence may not depict a comprehensive view of the decision of the company.

4. Lack of overview by regulator

Since, these guidelines are not subject to approval of regulators, they are solely the opinions of the proxy advisory firms. Hence, a deviation from these guidelines cannot be construed as non-compliance of the prescribed laws. There is thus a need for including a statement to the said effect to establish a comprehensive standing of the recommendation or guidelines issued.

Safeguards against misleading statements

The procedural guidelines[13] issued by SEBI state that in case the proxy advisors have provided their recommendation based on higher standard, the rationale and such higher standard along with the legal requirement shall be clearly stated in the report published. Further, they shall provide their to the clients and the company simultaneously and are required to add as an addendum to their report, the comments and clarification received by the company in case of difference of opinions.

The report of the Working Group stated above recommended that if the proxy advisors have a different interpretation from the company and the same is not on the basis of factual errors, the proxy advisors are not obligated to publish both view-points, in case the company has enough resources to publish their response.

In case of any dispute arising between the proxy advisor and the corporate, which is a violation of the code of conduct prescribed under the SEBI (Research Analyst) Regulations, 2014, the same may be referred to SEBI. However, the same shall not be a means to refute the interpretation of the proxy advisor, rather only cases of misuse of power in violation of the said code of conduct can be reported to SEBI. However, there is no statutory requirement prescribed for including a disclaimer in the report of the proxy advisor stating that the views mentioned in the report are solely of the advisory firm and there may exist other interpretations as the said report is not sanctioned by any regulator.

Conclusion

It is necessary that the investors take an independent view bearing into mind the scope of the guidelines while considering the voting recommendations of the proxy advisors. They must also be aware of the scope of policies issued by the advisory firms. While the concept of proxy advisors acts as a tool for strengthening corporate governance and enabling investors to take sound investment decisions, there is a need for establishing better safeguards for portraying a clear picture to the investors so that they may formulate independent views.

[1]https://www.sebi.gov.in/reports/reports/jul-2019/report-of-working-group-on-issues-concerning-proxy-advisors-seeking-public-comments_43710.html

[2]http://vinodkothari.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Dance_of_Corporate_democracy-_rise_of_proxy_advisors-1.pdf

[3] http://vinodkothari.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/SEBI-prescribes-stricter-regime-for-proxy-advisors.pdf

[4]http://vinodkothari.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/SEBI-revisits-the-regulatory-framework-for-Proxy-Advisors.pdf

[5]https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=e0ff318417c1a2b70a9ea2ce5f0307aa&mc=true&node=pt17.5.275&rgn=div5

[6] https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/asiapacific/Asia-Pacific-Regional-Voting-Guidelines.pdf

[7] https://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/US-Voting-Guidelines-GL.pdf?hsCtaTracking=7c712e31-24fb-4a3a-b396-9e8568fa0685%7C86255695-f1f4-47cb-8dc0-e919a9a5cf5b

[8] https://www.asic.gov.au/media/4778954/rep578-published-27-june-2018.pdf

[9] https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-04/c2021-169360_consultation_paper.pdf

[10] https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2012-212.pdf

[11] https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/926/made

[12] https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/aug-2020/procedural-guidelines-for-proxy-advisors_47250.html

[13] https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/aug-2020/procedural-guidelines-for-proxy-advisors_47250.html

Registration Process for IDs: All You Need to Know

Updated as on December 27, 2020

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