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Regulator’s February Bonanza: RBI’s  Sweet Surprises for NBFCs

Team Finserv | finserv@vinodkothari.com

The Budget 2026 may not have brought any significant regulatory amendments or reliefs for the financial sector entities, however, the regulator has proposed a box full of surprises for the regulated entities. The Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies dated February 6, 2026 has proposed various significant changes. The measures span a wide spectrum, from exempting Type 1 NBFCs (with no public funds and no customer interface) from registration, to stricter norms on sale of third-party products, a harmonised recovery agent framework, permission for bank lending to REITs and an increase of collateral-free loan limits for MSMEs, among others. While the detailed guidelines for each of the proposals are yet to be issued, we provide a quick snapshot and implications of these proposals.

1.    Exemption from RBI registration for  Type 1 NBFCs upto Rs 1000 crores in assets

After several years of regulatory supervision over investment companies and small size NBFCs, the RBI has proposed to exempt NBFCs having no public funds and customer interface, with asset size not exceeding ₹1000 crore, from the requirement of registration. This will bring such NBFCs, which are commonly referred to as Type 1 NBFCs, outside the purview of RBI supervision, compliance and reporting requirements.

Earlier, access to public funds and customer interface were factors for applicability of several regulations, but not for complete exemption.

What is Customer Interface[1]

Para 6(4) of under the RBI (NBFCs – Registration, Exemptions and Framework for Scale Based Regulation) Directions, 2025 (“RBI Master Directions”) defines customer interface as  “interaction between the NBFC and its customers while carrying on its business”

In essence, customer interface exists where an NBFC directly deals with customers in the course of its business, such as sourcing borrowers, communicating loan terms, collecting repayments, or addressing grievances. The concept focuses on direct dealing/direct public engagement between the NBFC and its customers in the conduct of its business.

Entities engaged in capital market transactions such as trading in shares, investments etc are not seen as having customer interface.

As to whether lending intragroup results in customer interface, the question is contentious – see our article here. .

Currently, NBFCs that do not have any customer interface are exempt from the fair lending practice norms, KYC norms, CIC reporting requirements are such other customer centric compliances.

What is “Public Funds”

Public funds is defined under RBI Master Directions as “includes funds raised either directly or indirectly through public deposits, inter-corporate deposits, bank finance and all funds received from outside sources such as funds raised by issue of Commercial Papers, debentures etc. but excludes funds raised by issue of instruments compulsorily convertible into equity shares within a period not exceeding five years from the date of issue.”

The expression public funds is much wider than public deposits; public deposits are only one part of it. Public funds broadly mean all funds raised by an NBFC from sources other than its own or self-funds. The definition is inclusive and covers multiple forms of debt funding, while also leaving room for other similar sources. Importantly, public funds are to be understood in contrast with self-funds, such as equity capital, which represent ownership and not fundraising. Funds raised from group entities are generally not regarded as public funds; however, if a group entity merely acts as a conduit for funds raised from the outside sources, such funds will still carry the character of public funds due to the direct and clear nexus with the public source.

The use of public funds is a key trigger for prudential regulation, as the RBI seeks to ensure safety and stability where public money is involved. In the absence of access to public funds, NBFCs are exempted from complying with prudential regulations,  liquidity risk management framework and LCR norms.

Why Customer Interface and Public Funds Are Important

The RBI uses customer interface and public funds as risk filters to determine the extent of regulatory oversight required for an NBFC. Entities that neither deal with external customers nor raise public funds are considered to pose minimal consumer and systemic risk.

In line with this risk-based approach, the RBI has proposed to exempt NBFCs with no customer interface and no public funds, and with asset size not exceeding ₹1,000 crore, from the requirement of registration.

2.    No mis-selling of third party Financial Products

Banks and NBFCs routinely distribute third-party products alongside extending their core financial services. Such distribution is undertaken both through physical branches and through digital lending applications and platforms. It has, however, been frequently observed that certain banks and NBFCs take undue advantage of borrowers by using deceptive practices and dark patterns to sell third party products.

Dark patterns are tricky user interfaces “that benefit an online service by leading users into making decisions they might not otherwise make. Some dark patterns deceive users while others covertly manipulate or coerce them into choices that are not in their best interests[2]. Hence, there comes a need to regulate the same. The Central Consumer Protection Authority (“CCPA”), issued the Guidelines for Prevention and Regulation of Dark Patterns, 2023 to regulate such practices.

Digital lenders themselves may quite often be employing practices such as:

  • Drip pricing: elements of pricing which are not disclosed.
  • BNPL offerings: Please make it clear that after the so-called free credit period, if you choose to convert the purchase into financing, the same will start incurring interest. Give the offer to pay and avoid interest.
  • Adding subscriptions, donations or other discretionary items with EMIs or borrower payouts, if they are pre-ticked
  • Repeated and persistent messages or calls to avail credit facility Reduced ROI for a limited period to create false demand
  • Not opting for insurance in case of asset finance is shown as shaming the borrower of agreeing to keep the asset unsecured
  • Pressuring the borrower to share personal information like Aadhaar or credit card details, even when the information is not mandatory
  • Hiding the cancellation option to opt out of the loan/ close the loan during the cooling off period

Accordingly, there is a felt need to ensure that third party products and services that are being sold at the bank counters or lending platforms are suitable to customer needs and are commensurate with the risk appetite of individual clients. It has therefore been decided to issue comprehensive instructions to REs on advertising, marketing and sales of financial products and services. The draft instructions in this regard shall be issued shortly for public consultation.

3.    Proposed comprehensive regulation for Recovery Agents

RBI has, from time to time, reminded lenders that they shall remain fully responsible for activities outsourced by them and, accordingly, are accountable for the conduct of their service providers, including recovery agents. In particular, the regulator has emphasised that lenders must ensure that neither they nor their agents engage in any form of intimidation or harassment, whether verbal or physical, during debt recovery.

While detailed guidelines governing the conduct of recovery agents are prescribed for HFCs, similar comprehensive guidelines are currently not specifically extended to NBFCs. RBI has now proposed that it will harmonise all the extant conduct-related instructions on engagement of recovery agents and other aspects related to the recovery of loans for all regulated entities.


An important requirement for recovery agents was with respect to the training of recovery agents. The recovery agents engaged by HFCs are required to undergo the training as prescribed by Indian Institute of Banking and Finance (IIBF) and obtain the certificate from the institute. If such training and certification requirements for recovery agents are extended to NBFCs, it will increase compliance and operational costs due to training expenses, certification fees, and time invested in upskilling agents. NBFCs may also need to strengthen their internal processes for onboarding, monitoring, and periodic re-certification of recovery agents. However, while this may raise short-term costs, it is likely to improve the quality of recoveries, reduce customer complaints and conduct risk, and strengthen long-term operational discipline.

4.    Deregulated branch expansion

As per the RBI Branch Authorisation Directions, NBFC-ICCs engaged in the business of lending against gold collateral are required to obtain prior approval of the RBI to open branches exceeding 1,000. Further, deposit-taking NBFCs and HFCs are required to inform the RBI and NHB, respectively, before opening any branch.

RBI has proposed to dispense with the requirement of prior approval or intimation for opening branches by such NBFCs. The change is likely to reduce hurdles in opening new branches for gold loan NBFCs, allowing them to expand more quickly and grow their operations.

Type of NBFCErstwhile RequirementProposed Requirement
Deposit Taking NBFCsPrior Intimation for the opening of branchesNo need for prior intimation
HFCsPrior Intimation to NHB before opening any branchNo need for prior intimation
NBFC-ICC (involved in gold lending)Prior approval is required for branches exceeding 1000No need for prior approval

The draft amendment directions have been issued here.

5.    Bank Lending to REITs permitted

Banks were originally not permitted to lend to either InvITs or REITs, as these vehicles were created to refinance banks’ exposures in completed projects using market-based investor funds. While bank lending to InvITs was later allowed, subject to a prudential framework prescribed by the RBI. Banks must have a Board-approved policy governing InvIT exposures, covering appraisal, sanctioning, internal limits, and monitoring.

Prior to lending, banks are required to assess critical parameters including sufficiency of cash flows at the InvIT level, ensure that the combined leverage of the InvIT and its underlying SPVs remains within approved limits, and continuously monitor SPV performance, as the InvIT’s repayment capacity depends on these SPVs; banks must also consider the legal aspects of lending to trust structures, particularly enforcement of security. Lending is permitted only where none of the underlying SPVs with existing bank loans is facing financial difficulty, and any bank finance used by InvITs to acquire equity in other entities must comply with existing RBI restrictions.Lending to REITs, however, continued to be prohibited.

Regulatory Cap on Bank Investment in REITs/InvITs:

  • A bank shall not invest more than 10% of the unit capital of any single REIT or InvIT.
  • Such investment shall be within the overall ceiling of 20% of the bank’s net worth applicable to all direct investments in shares, convertible bonds/debentures, units of equity-oriented mutual funds, and exposures to AIFs.

In view of the strong regulatory, disclosure, and governance framework applicable to listed REITs, it is now proposed to permit commercial banks to lend to REITs, subject to appropriate prudential safeguards. At the same time, the existing lending framework for InvITs will be harmonised with the safeguards proposed for REITs to ensure consistency and parity across both structures.

The proposal allows banks to lend to REITs within a well-defined risk framework, ensuring financial stability is not compromised. The proposal brings regulatory consistency between REITs and InvITs, creating a more uniform and predictable regime. At the same time, it enables efficient recycling of capital from completed real estate and infrastructure projects, supporting new lending without adding significant systemic risk.

  • Review of the Business Correspondent Guidelines

A Business Correspondent (‘BC’) acts as an extension of a bank itself, to provide banking related services in areas which do not have access to such services. The intent of the BC model is financial inclusion, in order to connect everyone to the banking system. The scope includes among other things, creating awareness about savings and other products and education and advice on managing money and debt counselling, processing and submission of applications to banks, etc.

The activities to be undertaken by the BCs would be within the normal course of the bank’s banking business, but conducted through the BCs at places other than the bank premises/ATMs. Thus, the scope would not just be limited to marketing, sourcing and distribution of financial products, rather, it would be extended to provide banking services to the customers from the place of business of the BC.

Business Correspondents have been functioning as critical enablers of last mile access to financial services, particularly in respect of underserved, rural, and remote locations.  Presently, BCs are regulated through RBI (Commercial Banks – Branch Authorisation) Directions, 2025. The Directions outline the eligibility criteria, due diligence requirements, oversight and monitoring, scope of activities, etc for engaging a Business Correspondent by banks.

RBI had set up a committee, consisting of officials from RBI , Department of Financial Service, Indian Banking Association and NABARD, to comprehensively examine their operations and make suitable recommendations for enhancing their efficiency. Discussions were held on action points of the previous meeting, Geotagging of BCs, Development of BC portal, Penalties imposed by banks on CBCs, Caution Money required from CBCs, BC Remuneration, participation of women in BC workforce etc.

Based on the Committee’s recommendations, the related regulatory guidelines are being reviewed, and the draft amendment directions will be issued shortly.

7.    Collateral free loan limit for MSEs doubled to Rs 20 lacs

In 2010, following the RBI Working Group’s report (released March 6, 2010) on the Credit Guarantee Scheme (CGS) under CGTMSE, RBI mandated banks via circular in May 2010 to provide collateral-free business loans up to Rs. 10 lakh to Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs).

A collateral-free business loan is an unsecured loan for business needs, requiring no pledge of assets like house, car, or property as mortgage until repayment backed by CGTMSE guarantee cover.

MSEs are defined under the MSMED Act, 2006 and require mandatory Udyam Registration for eligibility, bank loans, priority sector benefits, and CGTMSE coverage—along with no blacklisting, viable project, and engagement in approved manufacturing/service/retail activities. Classifications:
Micro enterprise  (investment in plant/machinery ≤ Rs. 2.5 crore; turnover ≤ Rs. 10 crore);
Small enterprise  (investment ≤ Rs. 25 crore; turnover ≤ Rs. 100 crore); and
Medium enterprise  (investment ≤ Rs. 125 crore; turnover ≤ Rs. 500 crore).​
Banks must enforce this at branches, linking CGS/CGTMSE usage to staff evaluations for strict compliance. This remains the existing statutory requirement for MSE lending.

RBI has decided to raise the collateral-free loan limit for MSEs  from Rs. 10 lakh to Rs. 20 lakh, applicable to loans sanctioned or renewed on or after April 1, 2026, aiming to improve formal credit access, entrepreneurial activity, and last-mile delivery for collateral-scarce MSEs.

This policy shift represents a watershed moment for India’s grassroots economy, effectively doubling the financial runway for the nation’s most resilient entrepreneurs. By aligning with the PMMY ceiling, the policy ensures that a business’s potential rather than a proprietor’s personal property dictates its growth.  This extra funding allows small businesses to move beyond daily expenses and finally invest in better machinery or technology to compete. Furthermore, it opens doors for women and young owners who may not own property to get formal bank support based purely on their performance. Ultimately, this change encourages more businesses to register officially, clearing the path for millions of small units to scale up and create more jobs without the fear of losing personal assets.

8.    Total Return Swaps on Corporate Bonds

A Total Return Swap (TRS) is a derivative contract where a protection buyer exchanges the variable total return of an asset for a fixed return, shielding them from volatility. In this setup, the protection buyers swap the “total return” from the asset pool, with a return computed at a fixed spread on a base rate, say LIBOR. Protection sellers in a TRS guarantee a prefixed spread to protection buyers, who in turn, agree to pass on the actual collections and actual variations in prices on the credit asset to protection sellers. Essentially, the protection seller gains market exposure without a large upfront investment, while the protection buyer hedges their risk. Since protection sellers receive the total return from the asset, protection sellers also have the benefit of upside, if any, from the reference asset.

In India, the corporate bond market has historically lacked deep liquidity. To solve this, the Union Budget 2026 and the RBI have proposed introducing TRS specifically for corporate bonds and credit indices.

This development is a strategic shift toward “capital-efficient” investing. For business professionals, this means institutional investors can now gain exposure to corporate debt or hedge their existing bond portfolios without locking up massive amounts of capital on their balance sheets. By allowing the market to trade the “risk” and “returns” of bonds separately from the bonds themselves, the RBI aims to boost liquidity and make it easier for companies across various credit ratings to raise funds. Ultimately, this reform bridges a critical gap in India’s financial ecosystem, transforming the corporate bond market into a more active, transparent, and globally competitive space.

The draft amendment directions have been issued here.

  • Voluntary Retention Route subsumed into FPI investment limits

Voluntary retention route for investment bonds and G-secs has been merged and made a part of the limit assigned for regular investments by FPIs; as a result, FPIs that commit to keep funds for at least 3 years may escape the minimum residual maturity requirement and the limits on investment in a bond issue by a single FPI. This introduces significant flexibility for those FPIs that are sure of staying invested in India for a long term, avoiding opportunism while granting them significant flexibility.

According to the Master Direction – Reserve Bank of India (Non-resident Investment in Debt Instruments) Directions, 2025, there are 5 channels of investments in debt instruments by non-resident investors.  Under the VRR Route, FPIs are granted various operational exemptions, easing the investment process.  VRR was introduced to encourage long term FPI investment in Indian debt markets by offering a dedicated investment channel with greater flexibility.

Given the strong utilisation of the VRR limits and to improve predictability and ease of doing business, the RBI has now decided to subsume VRR investments within the overall FPI investment limits under the General Route, while also providing additional operational flexibilities to FPIs investing through the VRR.

The detailed mechanism governing such limits has been notified here.


[1] Refer to our detailed write up on this topic- https://vinodkothari.com/2025/09/all-in-the-group-and-still-a a-customer/

[2] Arvind Narayanan and Others, March 2020

Strengthening India’s Corporate Bond Market: A Look at NITI Aayog’s Recommendations

Simrat Singh | finserv@vinodkothari.com

India’s aspiration to become a US $30 Trillion economy by 2047 rests on its ability to mobilise long-term, stable and affordable capital. Debt capital can be an attractive source for this. While banks have historically been the backbone of credit intermediation in India, a bank-dominated financial system may be inadequate to meet the financing needs of a developing country like India which includes long-gestation exposures to infrastructure, climate transition, manufacturing and other emerging sectors. Recognising this constraint, NITI Aayog’s report on Deepening the Corporate Bond Market in India (‘Report’) lays out reforms to develop corporate bonds as another major tool for mobilising long-term low-cost capital. 

In this note we highlight some of the reforms being advocated in the Report.

Key Thrust Areas of Reforms:

Regulatory Efficiency 

A central theme of the Report is the need to reduce regulatory friction arising from fragmented and overlapping oversight by SEBI, RBI and the MCA for corporate bonds. Inconsistent treatment of similar bonds, procedural complexity, overlapping disclosures and different approval timelines are identified as major constraints, particularly for public issuances and lower-rated issuers. A specific concern highlighted is issuer-based regulation: bonds issued by banks and NBFCs are regulated by the RBI, while similar bonds issued by non-financial corporates fall under SEBI and MCA oversight. This results in different disclosure standards and compliance processes for similar bonds

To combat this, first, the Report calls for stronger inter-regulatory coordination and recommends measures such as mutual recognition of disclosures, a joint regulatory help desk/single point of contact as well as joint circulars detailing the jurisdictions of each regulator – essentially a centralised coordination mechanism involving SEBI, RBI, MCA and the Ministry of Finance.

Second, the Report emphasises the need to rationalise disclosure norms for public bond issuances, which are significantly more onerous than those applicable to private placements. This asymmetry has led to an overwhelming reliance on private placements, which account for nearly 98% of corporate bond issuances in India (p. 25). Drawing on global practices, the Report recommends a differentiated disclosure regime for well-compliant issuers (p. 66). Specific reforms include extending the validity of offer documents from one year to two or three years, removing ISIN-wise issuance constraints, simplifying PAS-2 and Information Memorandum filings through digital automation on the MCA portal, and introducing a “Well-Known Seasoned Issuer” framework to enable fast-track access to public bond markets for reputed issuers.

Third, the Report stresses the need for regulatory clarity for hybrid instruments, including covered bonds1, securitised debt and infrastructure-linked securities. Many instruments used globally to fund long-term assets do not fit neatly within India’s regulator-specific silos. Jurisdictional ambiguity (which regulator oversees which instrument?) and the absence of standardised regulatory treatment have impeded market development. The Report recommends clearly defined frameworks to facilitate market clarity. In this context, it also highlights tax distortions; for instance, SDIs2 currently attract significantly higher TDS than corporate bonds. The Report states that SDIs are taxed at a higher rate than corporate bonds which prevents securitisation of bonds. However, effective 1.04.2025, SDI TDS rates are aligned with bond rate; both at 10% (See section 194LBC of Tax Act).

Market Infrastructure and Liquidity

Bonds are heterogeneous instruments, varying by type of issuer, tenor, covenants and structure. Unlike equities, electronic order matching alone cannot ensure immediacy of execution or continuous liquidity in the secondary market, particularly in lower-rated or infrequently traded bonds. Despite progress through electronic platforms such as RFQ for secondary trading and EBP for primary issuance, trading volumes remain shallow and concentrated in highly rated bonds.

The Report recommends expanding electronic trading, enhancing post-trade reporting (to improve price discovery) and increasing the proportion of trades settled on a Delivery-versus-Payment (DVP) basis3. Absence of a robust market-making ecosystem is seen as a major constraint on secondary-market liquidity (pp. 22, 36, 106). Limited risk appetite and balance-sheet constraints deter intermediaries from providing continuous two-way quotes, especially in lower-rated and longer-tenor bonds.

To address this, the Report recommends enabling market-making through regulatory incentives and improved access to repo markets. In particular, the creation of a standing repo facility by RBI for high rated corporate bonds would allow market makers4 to monetise inventories efficiently and support continuous liquidity provision. While corporate bonds are included in the RBI’s list of repo-eligible instruments, their treatment differs materially from Government securities (G-Secs). Repos in G-Secs are exempt from CRR and SLR computation which means Banks can access funds through G-Sec repos without providing SLR and CRR on those funds. In contrast, cash raised through repos backed by corporate bonds is treated as a liability for CRR and SLR purposes, hence banks have to provide CRR and SLR on the resulting liquidity. Also, unlike G-Secs, which are centrally cleared and settled through CCIL, corporate bond repos lack a single, standardised clearing and settlement mechanism; they are cleared through F-TRAC and stock exchanges. The result is that the volume of corporate bond repo is negligible (exact data on corporate bond repo could not be sourced).

The Report also flags structural weaknesses in the credit rating ecosystem, including rating inflation, conflicts of interest under the issuer-pays model, and excessive regulatory reliance on ratings (p. 71). Strengthening governance standards is the key recommendation for credit ratings. To improve credit rating access for smaller issuers, the Report suggests exploring alternative credit assessment models, including technology-driven frameworks using GST-returns and other turnover based data and digital transaction histories.

Further, the Report recommends strengthening the existing framework requiring large corporates to raise a portion of incremental borrowings through debt securities (LCB Framework)5. Proposed enhancements include increasing the minimum market borrowing requirement and progressively extending the framework to smaller corporates with lower thresholds.

Drawing on the IMF’s FSAP 2025, the Report also recommends allowing high-quality corporate bonds to be used as collateral in RBI’s repo operations. International experience from the ECB, Bank of Japan, and Reserve Bank of Australia suggests that such measures can enhance secondary-market liquidity and broaden the investor base, subject to appropriate safeguards.

Equally important is the creation of a government-backed, centralised corporate bond data repository. Fragmented data across regulators and exchanges currently hampers price discovery and covenant monitoring. A unified, real-time repository is recommended to improve transparency for issuers, investors, and regulators.

Innovation in Instruments and Market design

The Report makes it clear that regulatory reforms alone are insufficient; product and market innovation are essential to expand depth and distribute risk. India’s bond market remains narrow not only due to investor risk aversion but also due to the limited availability of instruments aligned with diverse risk–return preferences and long-gestation financing needs. Green bonds, sustainability-linked bonds6, and transition bonds are identified as important instruments for financing climate action and infrastructure. However, the absence of a standardised green taxonomy and concerns around greenwashing have constrained growth. The Report, therefore, recommends establishing clear definitions, disclosure standards and verification frameworks to ensure credibility and scale ESG-oriented bond markets.

The Report proposes institutionalising a dedicated class of Corporate Bond Dealers (CBDs), modelled on the U.S. primary dealer system. Eligible banks, NBFCs and other financial institutions would be required to provide continuous two-way quotes, supported by incentives such as capital relief on bond inventories and access to RBI refinance and repo facilities. Enhanced market surveillance, real-time trade reporting, price dissemination and inventory disclosures are also recommended.

Investor and Issuer Participation

Broadening the investor base is identified as another critical reform pillar. Long-term institutional investors such as insurance companies, pension funds and provident funds are natural holders of long-duration bonds, yet regulatory investment norms constrain exposure only to higher-rated securities. The Report recommends a calibrated relaxation of these norms.

For retail investors, the Report proposes lowering minimum investment thresholds (from existing ₹ 10,000), increasing retail quotas in public bond issuances, particularly for tax-free and ESG-linked bonds7, and simplifying TDS provisions to address tax inefficiencies in secondary market trades. OBPPs have been acknowledged to contribute to secondary market liquidity, however, the volumes are low. Further, there is no mention of concerns w.r.t downselling through OBPPs which was recently highlighted by SEBI8

On the issuer side, India’s corporate bond market remains heavily concentrated among AAA and AA-rated entities. To address this imbalance, the Report advocates scaling up credit enhancement mechanisms such as PCEs and support from development finance institutions. It also highlights the need to promote longer-tenor issuances, especially for infrastructure and climate-linked projects, where asset lives significantly exceed typical corporate bond maturities. In this context, it is noteworthy that NITI Aayog has cited our resource, “Partial Credit Enhancement: A Catalyst for Boosting Infrastructure Bond Issuances?”, in the Report while discussing the role of partial credit enhancement mechanisms in deepening the corporate bond market (pp. 75 and 99). Further, regulatory subsidies for first-time or low-volume issuers and pooled issuance platforms to facilitate market access for smaller issuers is also recommended (pp. 65, 75).

The Report recognizes that CDS are underdeveloped. Currently, CDS can be purchased only by investors who already own the underlying bond, which prevents trading in the CDS market. Further, only single-name CDS are permitted, which means a separate CDS contract is required for each issuer, unlike global markets such as the U.S., where index CDS allows one CDS to cover a basket of bonds. Lastly, there is a limit on FPI investors providing CDS which is 5% of the outstanding corporate bond market. These restrictions have resulted in limited CDS protection. The Report also recommends bigger NBFCs to act as CDS market makers

Conclusion

NITI Aayog’s recommendations envisage a corporate bond market that evolves from a supplementary funding channel into a core pillar of India’s financial system. If implemented in a coordinated manner, these reforms could expand the market to ₹100–120 trillion by 2030, improve financial stability, and channel long-term capital into productive investment. The real challenge, however, lies in execution, particularly in achieving sustained regulatory coordination and market-making capacity. Addressing these constraints will be critical if corporate bonds are to play a meaningful role in financing India’s long-term growth and infrastructure ambitions under the vision of Viksit Bharat by 2047.

See our other resources on bonds

  1. Bond Credit Enhancement Framework: Competitive, rational, reasonable
  2. Demystifying Structured Debt Securities: Beyond Plain Vanilla Bonds
  3. Bond market needs a friend, not parent
  4. SEBI Securitisation Regulations: Track Record, Risk retention and Investment size among several new requirements
  5. Mandatory listing for further bond issues
  6. NHB’s PCE Scheme for HFCs
  7. Corporate Bonds and Debentures
  1. Covered bonds are secured debt instruments backed by a segregated pool of high-quality assets, offering investors dual recourse to both the issuer and the underlying assets. May refer to our resource on covered bonds. ↩︎
  2. May refer to our book Listing Regulations on Securitised Debt Instruments and Security Receipts ↩︎
  3. DVP is a settlement mechanism in which the transfer of securities and funds occurs simultaneously, eliminating counterparty and settlement risk
    ↩︎
  4.  May refer to our resource ‘Bond issuers set to become Market Maker to enhance liquidity’ ↩︎
  5. May refer to our resource ‘Mandatory bond issuance by Large Corporates: FAQs on revised framework’ ↩︎
  6. May refer to our resources ‘Sustainability or ESG Bonds’ and ‘From Rooftops to Ratings: India’s Green Securitisation Debut’ ↩︎
  7. May refer to our resource ESG Debt Securities: Framework for Issuance and Listing in India ↩︎
  8. May refer to our resource “Downstreamed through intermediaries: Deemed public issue concerns for privately placed debt” ↩︎