Commencement of certain sections under Companies (Amendment) Act, 2019

-Phase II

by Smriti Wadehra (smriti@vinodkothari.com)

The Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2019 was introduced on 25th July, 2019 which received President’s assent on 31st July, 2019 and became the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2019. The Companies (Amendment) Act, 2019 is a combination of Companies (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019 introduced on 21st February, 2019 and 9 out of 20 proposed changes which were proposed by the Ministry on 5th November, 2018. There were two additional amendments which were not covered by the Ordinance and proposed changes.

The Companies (Amendment) Act, 2019 notified 43 sections out of which 31 sections were effective from 2nd November, 2018. Other sections were to be notified by the Ministry by way of separate commencement notification. Accordingly, the Ministry on 14th of August, 2019 further notified 10 section to be effective from the date of notification. A brief synopsis of the amendments are provided below:

Section No. of Companies (Amendment) Act, 2019 Section No. of Companies Act, 2013 Particulars Amendment Impact / Rermarks Actionable for companies
6 26 Matters to be stated in prospectus 1.    Substitution of word “registration” with “filing” in sub-section (4), (5) and (6)

 

2.    Omission of Registrar’s power to not register a prospectus for non-fulfilment of requirements of section 26

 

Seems to be a change in the terminology.
7 29 Public offer of securities to be in dematerialised form 1.    Omission of word “public” in sub-section(1)(b)

 

2.    Insertion of new clause to provide such class or classes of unlisted companies as may be prescribed, the securities shall be held or transferred only in dematerialised form in the manner laid down in the Depositories Act, 1996 and the regulations made thereunder

Pursuant to the amendment, all companies falling under such class of companies as may be prescribed has to mandatorily issue securities only in demat form.

 

In the absence of the Rules, this change seems to include private companies, small companies and OPC as well. However, the new clause comes with a proviso that states that the Ministry will come out with revised Rules prescribing thresholds for companies (which may include private companies) which requires issuance compulsorily in dematerialized form.

 

Further, there remain certain other grey areas which shall be clear only once the revised Rules in this regard are out. These include:

·        whether this requirement will be made applicable only for new issues of capital by companies; or

·        Will require all existing shares also to be dematerialised.

 

However, whether the same will be applicable to companies having prescribed thresholds which may include private companies, small companies, section 8 companies, OPCs etc.

 

The actionables can be determined only once the Rules are in place.

 

8 35 Civil liability for mis-statements in prospectus

 

To give effect to the amendment introduced in section 26, the term registration has been substituted with filing in this section also.

 

Mere linking of amendment in different sections.
14- clause (i), (iii) and (iv) 90(4A), (9A) and (11) Register of significant beneficial owners in a company 1.    Every company has to  take necessary steps to identify an individual who is a significant beneficial owner in relation to the company and require him to comply with the provisions of this section

 

2.    Government to come out with Rules in this regard

 

The existing provisions casted an obligation on the SBO to come and declare to the reporting company, however, the amendment indicates that nin addition to sending BEN-4 notices to the shareholders, the reporting company may also be required to go out on an investigation spree even in cases where it does not have a reason to believe about the presence of an SBO.

 

Further, the amendment also indicates that the SBO Rules shall be revised in this regard which is expected to provide the clarity on the actionables.

SBO determination is a collaborative exercise which the Company and SBO has to ensure.

 

Accordingly, as a result of this change, companies may need to send letters, notices and any other type of correspondence in addition to those cases where it was obligated to send notices to entities holding more than 10% shareholding in the Company.

 

In any event, the medium and extent of this new exercise will be clear once the MCA comes out with revised rules in this regard.

Also, considering the commencement of the said amendment has been made effective from 14th August, 2019, surely the same is to be used by the companies for identification of subsequent SBO, if any, which are identified, as the first round of identification has already been done.

 

However, what necessary steps are to be taken by the Company for identification of SBO requires clarity.

 

20 132 Constitution of National Financial Reporting Authority 1.      NFRA to perform its functions through such divisions as may be prescribed;

 

2.      Each division of the National Financial Reporting Authority shall be presided over by the Chairperson or a full-time Member authorised by the Chairperson;

 

3.      There shall be an executive body of the National Financial Reporting Authority consisting of the Chairperson and full-time Members of such Authority for efficient discharge of its functions as specified in the section;

 

4.      NFRA may debar a member or firm:

I.     being appointed as an auditor or internal auditor or undertaking any audit in respect of financial statements or internal audit of the functions and activities of any company or body corporate; or

II.    performing any valuation as provided under section 247,

for a minimum period of 6 months or such higher period not exceeding 10 years as may be determined by the Authority

 

Amendment notifies constitution of NFRA
31 212 Investigation into affairs of Company by SFIO Pursuant to investigation report of SFIO, if fraud is reported, the Government may make an application to NCLT for disgorgement of profits/assets. Further, there will be unlimited personal liability on officers/person/entity benefitted

 

The amendment proposes disgorgement of properties of officers in default in case of corporate frauds.
33 241 Application to Tribunal for relief in cases of oppression, etc.

 

1.      Application for oppression has to be made before the Principal Bench of Tribunal by certain class of companies to be prescribed by Ministry;

 

2.      New sub-section (3) has been inserted which provides that where Central Govt is of the opinion that there exists:

a)     Fraud, misfeasance, negligence or default in management or breach of trust; or

b)     Business is not being conducted as per business principles

c)     Company is being managed by person who is likely to cause serious injury or damage to the business

d)     Business is being carried out with the intent to defraud creditors, members or any other person or prejudicial to public interest

The Government may initiate a case against such person and refer the same to the Tribunal and inquire into the case to record a decision as to whether or not such person is a fit and proper person to hold the office of director or any other office connected with the conduct and management of any company.

 

The law was silent of the fact that what does “matters prejudicial to public interest” with regard to section 242(2) means. The amendment list down matters where Central Government may make application against the Company to Tribunal for conducting business prejudicial to the interest of the Company.

 

The erstwhile provisions of section 398(1)(b) of the 1956 Act it was enough to establish that there was a likelihood of affairs being conducted in a prejudicial manner to the interest of Company. However, the amended provisions of Act clearly lays down situatiobs where interest of the Company can be prejudicial affected.

34 242 Powers of Tribunal

 

Pursuant to the application  made to Tribunal in sub-section 241(3), the Tribunal shall record its decision stating therein specifically as to whether or not the respondent is a fit and proper person to hold the office of director or any other office connected with the conduct and management of any company

 

Tribunal on application being made by Central Government determine whether oppression/mismanagement is being conducted in the Company and record reasons whether an officer is fit and proper for managing the Company.
35 243 Consequence of termination or modification of certain agreements

 

The person who is not a fit and proper person pursuant to sub-section (4A) of section 242 shall not hold the office of a director or any other office connected with the conduct and management of the affairs of any company for a period of 5 years from the date of the said decision. Further shall not be entitled to any compensation for loss of office.

 

However, CG may, with the leave of the Tribunal, permit such person to hold any such office before the expiry of the said period of five years.

Explicit prohibition on officers in default from holding similar office for a period of 5 years. –         
37 272 Petition for winding up

 

The amendment omits reference of clause (e) of section 271(1) from sub-section (3) of section 272.

 

The Registrar shall be entitled to present a petition for winding up under section 271, except on the grounds specified in clause (a) which provides that the Company must have resolved by way of a SR that the Company would be wound up by the Tribunal.

 

Reference of clause providing that Tribunal may file a petition under 272 if it is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that company should be wound up has been done away with.

 

 

38 398 Provisions relating to filing of applications, documents, inspection etc in electronic form.

 

The term “prospectus” has been omitted from clause (f) of sub-section (1) which provides for registration of prospectus by Registrar. Seems to be a change in the terminology.

Our other articles of interest can be read here –

  1. http://vinodkothari.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Biref-of-the-Companies-Amendment-Act-2017.pdf
  2. http://vinodkothari.com/2018/02/second-phase-of-enforcement-43-sections-of-companies-amendment-act-2017-comes-to-life/

GOI’s attempt to ease out liquidity stress of NBFCs and HFCs: Ministry of Finance launches Scheme for Partial Credit Guarantee to PSBs for acquisition of financial assets

Abhirup Ghosh  (abhirup@vinodkothari.com)

The Finance Minister, during the Union Budget 2019-20, promised to introduce a partial credit guarantee scheme so as to extend relief to the NBFC during the on-going liquidity crisis. The proposal laid down in the budget was a very broad statement and were subject to several speculations. At last on 13th August, 2019[1], the Ministry of Finance came out with a press release to announce the notification in this regard dated 10th August, 2019, laying down specifics of the scheme.

The scheme will be known by “Partial Credit Guarantee offered by Government of India (GoI) to Public Sector Banks (PSBs) for purchasing high-rated pooled assets from financially sound Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs)/Housing Finance Companies (HFCs)”, however, for the purpose of this write-up we will use the word “Scheme” for reference.

The Scheme is intended to address temporary asset liability mismatch of solvent HFCs/ NBFCs, owing to the ongoing liquidity crisis in the non-banking financial sector, without having to resort to distress sale of their assets.

In this regard, we intend to discuss the various requirements under the Scheme and analyse its probable impact on the financial sector.

Applicability:

The Scheme has been notified with effect from 10th August, 2019 and will remain open for 6 months from or until the period by which the maximum commitment by the Government in the Scheme is fulfilled, whichever is earlier.

Under the Scheme, the Government has promised to extend first loss guarantee for purchase of assets by PSBs aggregating to ₹ 1 lakh crore. The Government will provide first loss guarantee of 10% of the assets purchased by the purchasing bank.

The Scheme is applicable for assignment of assets in the course of direct assignment to PSBs only. It is not applicable on securitisation transactions.

Also, as we know that in case of direct assignment transactions, the originators are required to retain a certain portion of the asset for the purpose of minimum retention requirement; this Scheme however, applies only to the purchasing bank’s share of assets and not on the originators retained portion. Therefore, if due to default, the originator incurs any losses, the same will not be compensated by virtue of this scheme.

Eligible sellers:

The Scheme lays down criteria to check the eligibility of sellers to avail benefits under this Scheme, and the same are follows:

  1. NBFCs registered with the RBI, except Micro Financial Institutions or Core Investment Companies.
  2. HFCs registered with the NHB.
  3. The NBFC/ HFC must have been able to maintain the minimum regulatory capital as on 31st March, 2019, that is –
    • For NBFCs – 15%
    • For HFCs – 12%
  4. The net NPA of the NBFC/HFC must not have exceeded 6% as on 31st March, 2019
  5. The NBFC/ HFC must have reported net profit in at least one out of the last two preceding financial years, that is, FY 2017-18 and FY 2018-19.
  6. The NBFC/ HFC must not have been reported as a Special Mention Account (SMA) by any bank during year prior to 1st August, 2018.

Some observations on the eligibility criteria are:

  1. Asset size of NBFCs for availing benefits under the Scheme: The Scheme does not provide for any asset size requirement for an NBFC to be qualified for this Scheme, however, one of the requirement is that the financial institution must have maintained the minimum regulatory capital requirement as on 31st March, 2019. Here it is important to note that requirement to maintain regulatory capital, that is capital risk adequacy ratio (CRAR), applies only to systemically important NBFCs.

Only those NBFCs whose asset size exceeds Rs. 500 crores singly or jointly with assets of other NBFCs in the group are treated as systemically important NBFCs. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the benefits under this Scheme can be availed only by those NBFCs which – a) are required to maintained CRAR, and b) have maintained the required amount of capital as on 31st March, 2019, subject to the fulfilment of other conditions.

  1. Financial health of originator after 1st August, 2018 – The eligibility criteria for sellers state that the financial institution must not have been reported as SMA by any bank any time during 1 year prior to 1st August, 2018, the apparent question that arises here is what happens if the originator moves into SMA status after the said date. If we go by the letters of the Scheme, if a financial institution satisfies the condition before 1st August, 2018 but becomes SMA thereafter, it will still be eligible as per the Scheme. This makes the situation a little awkward as the whole intention of the Scheme was to facilitate financially sound financial institutions. This seems to be an error on the part of the Government, and it surely must not have meant to situations such as the one discussed above. We can hopefully expect an amendment in this regard from the Government.

Eligible assets

Pool of assets satisfying the following conditions can be assigned under the Scheme:

  1. The asset must have been originated on or before 31st March, 2019.
  2. The asset must be classified as standard in the books of the NBFC/ HFC as on the date of the sale.
  3. The pool of assets should have a minimum rating of “AA” or equivalent at fair value without the credit guarantee from the Government.
  4. Each account under the pooled assets should have been fully disbursed and security charge should have been created in favour of the originating NBFCs/ HFCs.
  5. NBFCs/HFCs can sell up to a maximum of 20% of their standard assets as on 31.3.2019 subject to a cap of Rs. 5,000 crore at fair value. Any additional amount above the cap of Rs. 5,000 crore will be considered on pro ratabasis, subject to availability of headroom.
  6. The individual asset size in the pool must not exceed Rs. 5 crore.
  7. The following types of loans are not eligible for assignment for the purposes of this Scheme:
    1. Revolving credit facilities;
    2. Assets purchased from other entities; and
  • Assets with bullet repayment of both principal and interest

Our observations on the eligibility criteria are as follows:

  1. Rating of the pool: The Scheme states that the pools assigned should be highly rated, that is, should have ratings of AA or equivalent prior to the guarantee. Technically, pool of assets are not rated, it is the security which is rated based on the risks and rewards of the underlying pools. Therefore, it is to be seen how things will unfold. Also, desired rating in the present case is quite high; if an originator is able to secure such a high rating, it might not require the assistance under this Scheme in the first place. And, the fact that the originators will have to pay guarantee commission of 25 bps. Therefore, only where the originators are able to secure a significantly lower cost from the banks for a higher rating, that would also cover the commission paid, will this Scheme be viable; let alone be the challenges of achieving an AA rating of the pool.
  2. Cut-off date of loan origination to be 31st March, 2019: As per the RBI Guidelines on Securitisation and Direct Assignment, the originators have to comply with minimum holding requirements. The said requirement suggests that an asset can be sold off only if it has remained in the books of the originator for at least 6 months. This Scheme has come into force with effect from 10th August, 2019 and will remain open for 6 months from the commencement.

Considering that already 5 months since the cut-off date has already passed, even if we were to assume that the loan is originated on the cut-off date itself, it would mean that closer to the end of the tenure of the Scheme, the loan will be 11 months seasoning. Such high seasoning requirements might not be motivational enough for the originators to avail this Scheme.

  1. Maximum cap on sell down of receivables: The Scheme has put a maximum cap on the amount of assets that can be assigned and that is an amount equal to 20% of the outstanding standard assets as on 31st March, 2019, however, the same is capped to Rs. 5000 crores.

It is pertinent to note that the Scheme also allows additional sell down of loans by the originators, beyond the maximum cap, however, the same shall depend on the available headroom and based on decisions of the Government.

Invocation of guarantee and guarantee commission

Guarantee commission

As already stated earlier, in order to avail benefits under this Scheme, the originator will have to incur a fee of 25 basis points on the amount guaranteed by the Government. However, the payment of the same shall have to be routed through the purchasing bank.

Invocation of guarantee

The guarantee can be invoked any time during the first 24 months from the date of assignment, if the interest/ principal has remained overdue for a period of more than 90 days.

Consequent upon a default, the purchasing bank can invoke the guarantee and recover its entire exposure from the Government. It can continue to recover its losses from the Government, until the upper cap of 10% of the total portfolio is reached. However, the purchasing bank will not be able to recover the losses if – (a) the pooled assets are bought back by the concerned NBFCs/HFCs or (b) sold by the purchasing bank to other entities.

The claims of the purchasing bank will be settled with 5 working days from the date of claim by the Government.

However, if the purchasing bank, by any means, recovers the amount subsequent to the invocation of the guarantee, it will have to refund the amount recovered or the amount received against the guarantee to the Government within 5 working days from the date of recovery. Where the amount recovered is more than amount of received as guarantee, the excess collection will be retained by the purchasing bank.

Other features of the Scheme

  1. Reporting requirement – The Scheme provides for a real-time reporting mechanism for the purchasing banks to understand the remaining headroom for purchase of such pooled assets. The Department of Financial Services (DFS), Ministry of Finance would obtain the requisite information in a prescribed format from the PSBs and send a copy to the budget division of DEA, however, the manner and format of reporting has not been notified yet.
  2. Option to buy-back the loans – The Scheme allows the originator to retain an option to buy back its assets after a specified period of 12 months as a repurchase transaction, on a right of first refusal basis. This however, is contradictory to the RBI Guidelines on Direct Assignment, as the same does not allow any option to repurchase the pool in a DA transaction.
  3. To-do for the NBFCs/ HFCs – In order to avail the benefits under the Scheme, the following actionables have to be undertaken:
    1. The Asset Liability structure should restructured within three months to have positive ALM in each bucket for the first three months and on cumulative basis for the remaining period;
    2. At no time during the period for exercise of the option to buy back the assets, should the CRAR go below the regulatory minimum. The promoters shall have to ensure this by infusing equity, where required.

[1] http://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=192618

Other Related Articles:

Government Guarantee for NBFC Pool Purchases by Banks: Analysis, questions, and gaps

[Updated as on 12th December, 2019]

By Financial Services Division, finserv@vinodkothari.com

The Finance Minister, during the Union Budget 2019-20, proposed to introduce a partial credit guarantee scheme so as to extend relief to NBFCs during the on-going liquidity crisis. The proposal laid down in the budget was a very broad statement. On 13th August, 2019[1], the Ministry of Finance came out with a Press Release to announce the notification in this regard, dated 10th August, 2019, laying down specifics of the scheme.

The Scheme, however, did not sail through, as literally no transactions was conducted under the Scheme until November, 2019. Various stakeholders[1] represented to the MOF to remove the bottlenecks in the structure. Subsequently, on 11th December, 2019, the Union Cabinet approved amendments[2] to the Scheme (Amendments).

The scheme,  known as “Partial Credit Guarantee offered by Government of India (GoI) to Public Sector Banks (PSBs) for purchasing high-rated pooled assets from financially sound Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs)/Housing Finance Companies (HFCs)”, is referred to, for the purpose of this write, as  “the Scheme”.

The Scheme is intended to address the temporary liquidity crunch faced by solvent HFCs/ NBFCs, so that such entities may refinance their assets without having to resort to either distress sale or defaults on account of asset-liability mismatches.

In this write-up we have tried to answer some obvious questions that could arise along with potential answers.

Scope of applicability

1.When does this scheme come into force?

The Scheme was originally introduced on 10th August, 2019 and has been put to effect immediately. The modifications in the Scheme were made applicable with effect from 11th December, 2019.

2. How long will this Scheme continue to be in force?

Originally, the Scheme was supposed to remain open for 6 months from the date of issuance of this Scheme or when the maximum commitment of the Government, under this Scheme, is achieved, whichever is earlier. However, basis the Amendments discussed above, the Scheme will remain open till 20th June, 2020 or till such date when the maximum commitment under the Scheme is achieved, whichever is earlier. The Amendments however, bestows upon the Finance Minister to extend the tenure by upto 3 months.

This signifies that the parties must complete the assignment and execution of necessary documents for the guarantee (see below) within the stipulated time period.

3. Who is the beneficiary of the guarantee under the Scheme – the bank or the NBFC?

The bank is the beneficiary. The NBFC is not a party to the transaction of guarantee.

4. Does a bank buying pools from NBFCs/HFCs (Financial Entities) automatically get covered under the Scheme?

No. Since a bank/ Financial Entities may not want to avail of the benefit of the Scheme, the Parties will have to opt for the benefit of the guarantee. The bank will have to enter into specific documentation, following the procedure discussed below.

5. What does the Bank have to do to get covered by the benefit of guarantee under the Scheme?

The procedural aspects of the guarantee under the Scheme are discussed below.

6. Is the guarantee specifically to be sought for each of the pools acquired by the Bank or is it going to be an umbrella coverage for all the eligible pools acquired by the Bank?

The operational mechanism requires that there will be separate documentation every time the bank wants to acquire a pool from a financial entity in accordance with the Scheme. There is no process of master documentation, with simply a confirmation being attached for multiple transactions.

7. How does this Scheme rank/compare with other schemes whereby banks may participate into originations done by NBFCs/HFCs?

The RBI has lately taken various initiatives to promote participation by banks in the originations done by NBFCs/ HFCs. The following are the available ways of participation:

  • Direct assignments
  • Co-lending
  • Loans for on-lending
  • Securitisation

Direct assignments and securitisation have been there in the market since 2012, however, recently, once the liquidity crisis came into surface, the RBI relaxed the minimum holding period norms in order to promote the products.

Co-lending is also an alternative product for the co-origination by banks and NBFCs. In 2018, the RBI also released the guidelines on co-origination of priority sector loans by banks and NBFCs. The guidelines provide for the modalities of such originations and also provide on risk sharing, pricing etc. The difficulty in case of co-origination is that the turnaround time and the flexibility that the NBFCs claimed, which was one of their primary reasons for a competitive edge, get compromised.

The third product, that is, loans for on-lending for a specific purpose, has been in existence for long. However, recent efforts of RBI to allow loans for on-lending for PSL assets have increased the scope of this product.

This Scheme, though, is meant to boost specific direct assignment transactions, but is unique in its own way. This Scheme deviates from various principles from the DA guidelines and is, accordingly, intended to be an independent scheme by itself.

The basic use of the Scheme is to be able to conduct assignment of pools, without having to get into the complexity of involving special purpose vehicles, setting enhancement levels only so as to reach the desired ratings as per the Scheme. The effective cost of the Financial Entities doing assignments under the Scheme will be (a) the return expected by the Bank for a GoI-guaranteed pool; plus (b) 25 bps. If this effectively works cheaper than opting for a similar rated pool on standalone basis, the Scheme may be economically effective.

A major immediate benefit of the Scheme may be to nudge PSBs to start buying NBFC pools. While the guarantee is effective only for 2 years that does not mean, after 2 years, the PSBs will either sell or sell-back the pools. Therefore, in ultimate analysis, PSBs will get comfortable with buying NBFC pools on direct assignment basis.

The Scheme may go to encourage loan pool transfers outside the existing DA discipline.

8. Is the Scheme an alternative to direct assignment covered by Part B of the 2012 Guidelines, or is it by itself an independent option?

While intuitively one would have thought that the Scheme is a just a method of risk mitigation/facilitation of the DA transactions which commonly happen between banks and Financial Entities, there are several reasons based on which it appears that this Scheme should be construed as an independent option to banks/ Financial Entities:

  1. This Scheme is limited to acquisition of pools by PSBs only whereas direct assignment is not limited to either PSBs or banks.
  2. This Scheme envisages that the pool sold to the banks has attained a BBB+ rating at the least. As discussed below, that is not possible without a pool-level credit enhancement. In case of direct assignments, credit enhancement is not permissible.
  3. Investments in direct assignment are to be done by the acquirer based on the acquirer’s own credit evaluation. In case of the Scheme, the acquisition is obviously based on the guarantee given by the GoI.
  4. There is no question of an agreement or option to acquire the pool back after its transfer by the originator. The Scheme talks about the right of first refusal by the NBFC if the purchasing bank decides to further sell down the assets at any point of time.

Therefore, it should be construed that the Scheme is completed carved out from the DA Guidelines, and is an alternative to DA or securitisation. The issue was clarified by the Reserve Bank of India vide its FAQs on the issue[3].

9. Is this Scheme applicable to Securitisation transactions as well?

Assignment of pool of assets can be happen in case of both direct assignment as well as securitisation transaction. However, the intention of the present scheme is to provide credit enhancements to direct assignment transactions only. The Scheme does not intend to apply to securitisation transactions; however, the credit enhancement methodology to be deployed to make the Scheme work may involve several structured finance principles akin to securitisation.

Risk transfer 

10. The essence of a guarantee is risk transfer. So how exactly is the process of risk transfer happening in the present case?

The risk is originated at the time of loan origination by the Financial Entities. The risk is integrated into a pool. Since the transaction is presumably a direct assignment (see discussion below), the risk transfer from the NBFC to the bank may happen either based on a pari passu risk sharing, or based on a tranched risk transfer.

The question of a pari passu risk transfer will arise only if the pool itself, without any credit enhancement, can be rated BBB+. Again, there could be a requirement of a certain level of credit enhancements as well, say through over-collateralisation or subordination.

Based on whether the share of the bank is pari passu or senior, there may be a risk transfer to the bank. Once there is a risk transfer on account of a default to the bank, the bank now transfers the risk on a first-loss basis to the GoI within the pool-based limit of 10%.

11. What is the maximum amount of exposure, the Government of India is willing to take through this Scheme?

Under this Scheme, the Government has agreed to provide 10% first loss guarantee to assets, amounting to total of ₹ 1 lakh crore. Here it is important to note that the limit of ₹ 1 lakh crore refers to the total amount of assets against which guarantee will be extended and not the total amount of guarantee. The maximum exposure that the Government will take under the Scheme is ₹ 10,000 crores (10% of ₹ 1 lakh crore). Both the amounts, Rs 1 lakh crore, as also Rs 10,000 crores, are the aggregate for the banking system as a whole.

12. What does 10% first loss guarantee signify?

Let us first understand the meaning for first loss guarantee. As the name suggests, the guarantor promises to replenish the first losses of the financier upto a certain level. Therefore, a 10% first loss guarantee would signify that any loss upto 10% of the total exposure of the acquirer in a particular pool will be compensated by the guarantor.

Say for example, if the size of pool originated by NBFC N is Rs. 1000 crores, consisting of 1000 borrowers of Rs. 1 crore each. Assume further that each of the loans in the pool are such that if a default occurs, the crystallised loss is 100% (that is, there is nil recovery estimated at the time of recognising the loan as a bad loan). We are also assuming that the loans in the pool are at least BBB+ rated; therefore, the pool gets a BBB+ rating.

Let us say this pool is sold by N to bank B. N retains a 10%  pari passu share of the pool – thereby, the amount of the assets transferred to the B is Rs 900 crores. Assume that the fair value is also Rs 900 crores – that means, B buys the pool at par by paying Rs 900 crores. Assume B gets the acquisition guaranteed under the Scheme.

After its acquisition by B, assume a loan goes bad (see discussion below), and therefore, N allocates a loss of Rs 90 lacs (assuming there is pari passu sharing of losses) to B. B will claim this money by way of a guarantee compensation from GoI. B will keep getting such indemnification from GoI until the total amount paid by GoI reaches Rs. 90 crores (10% of the guaranteed amount). This, based on our hypothetical assumption of each loan having the same size, will mean loss of 100 loans out of the 1000 loans in the pool.

On the other hand, if it was to be understood that the pool will have to be first credit enhanced at the level of N, to attain a credit rating of BBB+, then N itself may have to provide a first-loss support at the transaction level. This may be, say, by providing a subordination, such that the share of N in the transaction is subordinated, and not pari passu. In that case, the question of any risk transfer to B, and therefore, an indemnification by GoI, will arise only if the amount of losses on account of default exceed the level of first loss support provided by N.

13. When is a loan taken to have defaulted for the purpose of the Scheme?

Para D of the Scheme suggests that the loan will be taken as defaulted when the interest and/or principal is overdue by more than 90 days. It further goes to refer to crystallisation of liability on the underlying borrower. The meaning of “crystallisation of liability” is not at all clear, and is, regrettably, inappropriate. The word “crystallisation” is commonly used in context of floating charges, where the charge gets crystallised on account of default. It is also sometimes used in context of guarantees where the liability is said to crystallise on the guarantor following the debtor’s default. The word “underlying borrower” should obviously mean the borrower included in the pool of loans, who always had a crystallised liability. In context, however, this may mean declaration of an event of default, recall of the loan, and thereby, requiring the borrower to repay the entire defaulted loan.

14. On occurrence of “default” as above, will be the Bank be able to claim the entire outstanding from the underlying borrower, or the amount of defaulted interest/principal?

The general principle in such cases is that the liability of the guarantor should crystallise on declaration of an event of default on the underlying loan. Hence, the whole of the outstandings from the borrower should be claimed form the guarantor, so as to indemnify the bank fully. As regards subsequent recoveries from the borrower, see later.

15. Does the recognition of loss by the bank on a defaulted loan have anything to do with the excess spreads/interest on the other performing loans? That is to say, is the loss with respect to a defaulted loan to be computed on pool basis, or loan-by-loan basis?

A reading of para D would suggest that the claiming of compensation is on default of a loan. Hence, the compensation to be claimed by the bank is not to be computed on pool basis.

16. Can the guarantee be applicable to a revolving purchase of loans by the bank from the NBFC, that is, purchase of loans on a continuing basis?

No. The intent seems clearly to apply the Scheme only to a static pool.

17. If a bank buys several pools from the same NBFC, is the extent of first loss cover, that is, 10%, fungible across all pools?

No. The very meaning of a first loss cover is that the protection is limited to a single, static pool.

18. From the viewpoint of maximising the benefit of the guarantee, should a bank try and achieve maximum diversification in a pool, or keep the pool concentric?

The time-tested rule of tranching of risks in static pools is that in case of concentric, that is, correlated pools, the limit of first loss will be reached very soon. Hence, the benefit of the guarantee is maximised when the pool is diversified. This will mean both granularity of the pool, as also diversification by all the underlying risk variables – geography, industry or occupation type, type of property, etc.

19. Can or should the Scheme be deployed for buying a single loan, or a few corporate loans?

First, the reference to pools obviously means diversified pools. As regards pools consisting of a few corporate loans, as mentioned above, the first loss cover will get exhausted very soon. The principle of tranching is that as correlation/concentricity in a pool increases, the risk shifts from lower tranches to senior tranches. Hence, one must not target using the Scheme for concentric or correlated pools.

20. On what amount should the first loss guarantee be calculated – on the total pool size or the total amount of assets assigned?

While, as we discussed earlier, there is no applicability of the DA Guidelines in the present case, there needs to be a minimum skin in the game for the selling Financial Entity. Whether that skin in the game is by way of a pari passu vertical tranche, or a subordinated horizontal tranche, is a question of the rating required for attaining the benefit of the guarantee. Therefore, if we are considering a pool of say ₹ 1000 crores, the originator should retain at least ₹ 100 crores (applying a 10% rule – which, of course, will depend on the rating considerations) of the total assets in the pool and only to the extent the ₹ 900 crores can be assigned to the purchasing bank.

The question here is whether the first loss guarantee will be calculated on the entire ₹ 1000 crores or ₹ 900 crores. The intention is guarantee the purchasing banks’ share of cash flows and not that retained by the originator. Therefore, the first loss guarantee will be calculated on ₹ 900 crores in the present case.

Scope of the GoI Guarantee

21. Does the guarantee cover both principal and interest on the underlying loan?

The guarantee is supposed to indemnify the losses of the beneficiary, in this case, the bank. Hence, the guarantee should presumably cover both interest and principal.

22. Does the guarantee cove additional interest, penalties, etc.?

Going by Rule 277 (vi) of the GFR, the benefit of the guarantee will be limited to normal interest only. All other charges – additional interest, penal interest, etc., will not be covered by the guarantee.

23. How do the General Financial Rules of the Government of India affect/limit the scope of the guarantee?

Para 281 of the GFR provides for annual review of the guarantees extended by the Government. The concerned department, DFS in the present case, will conduct review of the guarantees extended and forward the report to the Budget Division. However, if the Government can take any actions based on the outcome of the review is unclear.

Bankruptcy remoteness 

24. Does the transaction of assignment of pool from the Financial Entity to the bank have to adhere to any true sale/bankruptcy remoteness conditions?

The transaction must be a proper assignment, and should achieve bankruptcy remoteness in relation to the Financial Entity. Therefore, all regular true sale conditions should be satisfied.

25. Can a Financial Entity sell the pool to the bank with the understanding that after 2 years, that is, at the end of the guarantee period, the pool will be sold back to the NBFCs?

Any sale with either an obligation to buyback, or an option to buy back, generally conflicts with the true sale requirement. Therefore, the sale should be a sale without recourse. However, retention of a right of first refusal, or right of pre-emption, is not equivalent to option to buy back. For instance, if, after 2 years, the bank is desirous of selling the pool at its fair value, the NBFC may have the first right of buying the same. This is regarded as consistent with true sale conditions.

26. If off-balance sheet treatment from IFRS/Ind-AS viewpoint at all relevant for the purpose of this transaction?

No. Off balance sheet treatment is not relevant for bankruptcy remoteness.

Buyers and sellers 

27. Who are eligible buyers under this Scheme?

As is evident from the title of the Scheme, only Public Sector Banks are eligible buyers of assets under this Scheme. Therefore, even if a Private Sector Bank acquires eligible assets from eligible sellers, guarantee under this Scheme will still not be available.

This may be keeping in view two points – first, the intent of the Scheme, that is, to nudge PSBs to buy pools from Financial Entities. It is a well-known fact that private sector banks are, as it is, actively engaged in buying pools. Secondly, in terms of GFR of the GoI, the benefit of Government guarantee cannot go to the private sector. [Rule 277 (vii)] Hence, the Scheme is restricted to PSBs only.

28. Who are eligible sellers under this Scheme?

The intention of the Scheme is to provide relief from the stress caused due to the ongoing liquidity crisis, to sound HFCs/ NBFCs who are otherwise financially stable. The Scheme has very clearly laid screening parameters to decide the eligibility of the seller The qualifying criteria laid down therein are:

  1. NBFCs registered with the RBI, except Micro Financial Institutions or Core Investment Companies.
  2. HFCs registered with the NHB.
  3. The NBFC/ HFC must have been able to maintain the minimum regulatory capital as on 31st March, 2019, that is –
    • For NBFCs – 15%
    • For HFCs – 12%
  4. The net NPA of the NBFC/HFC must not have exceeded 6% as on 31st March, 2019
  5. The NBFC/ HFC must have reported net profit in at least one out of the last two preceding financial years, that is, FY 2017-18 and FY 2018-19.
  6. The Original Scheme stated that the NBFC/ HFC must not have been reported as a Special Mention Account (SMA) by any bank during year prior to 1st August, 2018. However, the Amendment even allows NBFC/HFC which may have slipped during one year prior to 1st August, 2018 shall also be allowed to sell their portfolios under the Scheme.

29. Can NBFCs of any asset size avail this benefit?

Apparently, the Scheme does not provide for any asset size requirement for an NBFC to be qualified for this Scheme, however, one of the requirement is that the financial institution must have maintained the minimum regulatory capital requirement as on 31st March, 2019. Here it is important to note that requirement to maintain regulatory capital, that is capital risk adequacy ratio (CRAR), applies only to systemically important NBFCs.

Only those NBFCs whose asset size exceeds ₹ 500 crores singly or jointly with assets of other NBFCs in the group are treated as systemically important NBFCs. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the benefits under this Scheme can be availed only by those NBFCs which – a) are required to maintained CRAR, and b) have maintained the required amount of capital as on 31st March, 2019, subject to the fulfilment of other conditions.

30. The eligibility criteria for sellers state that the financial institution must not have been reported as SMA-1 or SMA-2 by any bank any time during 1 year prior to 1st August, 2018 – what does this signify?

As per the prudential norms for banks, an account has to be declared as SMA, if it shows signs of distress without slipping into the category of an NPA. The requirement states that the originator must not have been reported as an SMA-1 or SMA-2 any time during 1 year prior to 1st August, 2018, and nothing has been mentioned regarding the period thereafter.

Therefore, if a financial institution satisfies the condition before 1st August, 2018 but becomes SMA-1 or SMA-2 thereafter, it will still be eligible as per the Scheme. The whole intention of the Scheme is eliminate the liquidity squeeze due to the ILFS crisis. Therefore, if a financial institution turns SMA after the said date, it will be presumed the financial institution has fallen into a distressed situation as a fallout of the ILFS crisis.

Eligible assets

31. What are the eligible assets for the Scheme?

The Scheme has explicitly laid down qualifying criteria for eligible assets and they are:

  1. The asset must have been originated on or before 31st March, 2019.
  2. The asset must be classified as standard in the books of the NBFC/ HFC as on the date of the sale.
  3. The original Scheme stated that the pool of assets should have a minimum rating of “AA” or equivalent at fair value without the credit guarantee from the Government. However, through the Amendment, the rating requirement has been brought down to BBB+.
  4. Each account under the pooled assets should have been fully disbursed and security charge should have been created in favour of the originating NBFCs/ HFCs.
  5. The individual asset size in the pool must not exceed ₹ 5 crore.
  6. The following types of loans are not eligible for assignment for the purposes of this Scheme:
    1. Revolving credit facilities;
    2. Assets purchased from other entities; and
    3. Assets with bullet repayment of both principal and interest

Pools consisting of assets satisfying the above criteria qualify for the benefit of the guarantee. Hence, the pool may consist of retail loans, wholesale loans, corporate loans, loans against property, or any other loans, as long as the qualifying conditions above are satisfied.

32. Should the Scheme be deployed for assets for longer maturity or shorter maturity?

Utilising the Scheme for pools of lower weighted average maturity will result into very high costs – as the cost of the guarantee is computed on the original purchase price.

Using the Scheme for pools of longer maturity – for example, LAP loans or corporate loans, may be lucrative because the amortisation of the pool is slower. However, it is notable that the benefit of the guarantee is available only for 2 years. After 2 years, the bank will not have the protection of the Government’s guarantee.

33. If there are corporate loans in the pool, where there is payment of interest on regular basis, but the principal is paid by way of a bullet repayment, will such loans qualify for the benefit of the Scheme?

The reference to bullet repaying loans in the Scheme seems similar to those in DA guidelines. In our view, if there is evidence/track record of servicing, in form of interest, such that the principal comes by way of a bullet repayment (commonly called IO loans), the loan should still qualify for the Scheme. However, negatively amortising loans should not qualify.

34. Is there any implication of keeping the cut-off date for originations of loans to be 31st March, 2019?

As per the RBI Guidelines on Securitisation and Direct Assignment, the originators have to comply with minimum holding requirements. The said requirement suggests that an asset can be sold off only if it has remained in the books of the originator for at least 6 months. This Scheme has come into force with effect from 10th August, 2019 and will remain open till 30th June, 2020.

Already substantial amount of time has passed since the cut-off date, and even if we were to assume that the loan is originated on the cut-off date itself, it would mean that closer to the end of the tenure of the Scheme, the loan will be at least months seasoning as on the date of passing the Amendments. Such high seasoning requirements might not be motivational enough for the originators to avail this Scheme.

35. Is there is any maximum limit on the amount of loans that can be assigned under this Scheme?

Yes, the Scheme has put a maximum cap on the amount of assets that can be assigned and that is an amount equal to 20% of the outstanding standard assets as on 31st March, 2019, however, the same is capped to ₹ 5000 crores.

36. Is there a scope for assigning assets beyond the maximum limits prescribed in the Scheme?

Yes, the Scheme states that any additional amount above the cap of ₹ 5,000 crore will be considered on pro rata basis, subject to availability of headroom. However, from the language, it seems that there is a scope for sell down beyond the prescribed limit, only if the eligible maximum permissible limit gets capped to ₹ 5,000 crores and not if the maximum permissible limit is less than ₹ 5000 crores.

The following numerical examples will help us to understand this better:

Total outstanding standard assets as on 31st March, 2019 ₹ 20,000 crores ₹ 25,000 crores ₹ 30,000 crores
Maximum permissible limit @ 20% ₹ 4,000 crores ₹ 5,000 crores ₹ 6,000 crores
Maximum cap for assignment under this Scheme ₹ 5,000 crores ₹ 5,000 crores ₹ 5,000 crores
Amount that can be assigned under this Scheme ₹ 4,000 crores ₹ 5,000 crores ₹ 5,000 crores
Scope for further sell down? No No Yes, upto a maximum of ₹ 1,000 crores

37. When will it be decided whether the Financial Entity can sell down receivables beyond the maximum cap?

Nothing has been mentioned regarding when and how will it be decided whether a financial institution can sell down receivables beyond the maximum cap, under this Scheme. However, logically, the decision should be taken by the Government of India of whether to allow further sell down and closer towards the end of the Scheme. However, we will have to wait and see how this unfolds practically.

38. What are the permissible terms of transfer under this Scheme?

The Scheme allows the assignment agreement to contain the following:

  1. Servicing rights – It allows the originator to retain the servicing function, including administrative function, in the transaction.
  2. Buy back right – It allows the originator to retain an option to buy back its assets after a specified period of 12 months as a repurchase transaction, on a right of first refusal basis. Actually, this is not a right to buy back, it is a right of first refusal which the NBFC/ HFC may exercise if the purchasing bank further sells down the assets. See elsewhere for detailed discussion

Rating of the Pool

39. The Scheme requires that the pool must have a rating of BBB+ before its transfer to the bank. Does that mean there be a formal rating agency opinion on the rating of the pool?

Yes. It will be logical to assume that SIDBI or DFS will expect a formal rating agency opinion before agreeing to extend the guarantee.

40. The Scheme requires the pool of assets to be rated at least BBB+, what does this signify?

As per the conditions for eligible assets, the pool of assets to be assigned under this Scheme must have a minimum rating of “BBB+” or equivalent at fair value prior to the guarantee from the Government.

There may be a question of expected loss assessment of a pool. Initially, the rating requirement was pegged at “AA” or higher and there was an apprehension that the originators might have to provide a substantial amount of credit enhancement in order to the make the assets eligible for assignment under the Scheme. Subsequently, vide the Amendments, the rating has been brought down to BBB+. The originators may also be required to provide some level of credit enhancements in order to achieve the BBB+ rating.

Unlike under the original Scheme, where the rating requirement was as high as AA, the intent is to provide guarantee only at AA level, then the thickness of the guarantee, that is, 10%, and the cost of the guarantee, viz., 25 bps, both became questionable. The thickness of support required for moving a AA rated pool to a AAA level mostly is not as high as 10%. Also, the cost of 25 bps for guaranteeing a AA-rated pool implied that the credit spreads between AA and a AAA-rated pool were at least good enough to absorb a cost of 25 bps. All these did not seemed and hence, there was not even a single transaction so far.

But now that the rating requirement has been brought down to BBB+, it makes a lot of sense. The credit enhancement level required to achieve BBB+ will be at least 4%-5% lower than what would have been required for AA pool. Further, the spread between a BBB+ and AAA rated pool would be sufficient to cover up the guarantee commission of 25 bps to be incurred by the seller in the transaction.

Here it is important to note that though the rating required is as low as BBB+, but there is nothing which stops the originator in providing a better quality pool. In fact, by providing a better quality pool, the originator will be able to fetch a much lower cost. Further, since, the guarantee on the pool will be available for only first two years of the transaction, the buyers will be more interested in acquiring higher quality pools, as there could be possibilities of default after the first two years, which is usually the case – the defaults increase towards the end of the tenure.

Risk weight and capital requirements

41. Can the bank, having got the Pool guaranteed by the GoI, treat the Pool has zero% risk weighted, or risk-weighted at par with sovereign risk weights?

No. for two reasons –one the guarantee is only partial and not full. Number two, the guarantee is only for losses upto first 2 years. So it is not that the credit exposure of the bank is fully guaranteed

42. What will be the risk weight once the guarantee is removed, after expiry of 2 years?

The risk weight should be based on the rating of the tranche/pool, say, BBB+ or better.

Guarantee commission

43. Is there a guarantee commission? If yes, who will bear the liability to pay the commission?

As already discussed in one of the questions above, the Scheme requires the originators to pay guarantee commission of 25 basis points on the amount of guarantee extended by the Government. Though the originator will pay the fee, but the same will be routed through purchasing bank.

44. The pool is amortising pool. Is the cost of 25 bps to be paid on the original purchase price?

From the operational details, it is clear that the cost of 25 bps is, in the first instance, payable on the original fair value, that is, the purchase price.

Invocation of guarantee and refund

45. When can the guarantee be invoked?

The guarantee can be invoked any time during the first 24 months from the date of assignment, if the interest/ principal has remained overdue for a period of more than 90 days.

46. Can the purchasing bank invoke the guarantee as and when the default occurs in each account?

Yes. The purchasing bank can invoke the guarantee as and when any instalment of interest/ principal/ both remains overdue for a period of more than 90 days.

47. To what extent can the purchasing bank recover its losses through invocation of guarantee?

When a loan goes bad, the purchasing bank can invoke the guarantee and recover its entire exposure from the Government. It can continue to recover its losses from the Government, until the upper cap of 10% of the total portfolio is reached. However, the purchasing bank will not be able to recover the losses if – (a) the pooled assets are bought back by the concerned NBFCs/HFCs or (b) sold by the purchasing bank to other entities.

48. Within how many days will the purchasing bank be able to recover its losses from the Government?

As stated in the Scheme, the claims will be settled within 5 working days.

49. What will happen if the purchasing bank recovers the amount lost, subsequent to the invocation of guarantee?

If the purchasing bank, by any means, recovers the amount subsequent to the invocation of the guarantee, it will have to refund the amount recovered or the amount received against the guarantee to the Government within 5 working days from the date of recovery. However, if the amount recovered is more than amount of received as guarantee, the excess collection will be retained by the purchasing bank.

Modus operandi

50. What will be the process for a bank to obtain the benefit of the guarantee?

While the Department of Financial Services (DFS) is made the administrative ministry for the purpose of the guarantee under the Scheme, the Scheme involves the role of SIDBI as the interface between the banks and the GoI. Therefore, any bank intending to avail of the guarantee has to approach SIDBI.

51. Can you elaborate on the various procedural steps to be taken to take the benefit of the guarantee?

The modus operandi of the Scheme is likely to be as follows:

  1. An NBFC approaches a bank with a static pool, which, based on credit enhancements, or otherwise, has already been uplifted to a rating of BBB+ or above level.
  2. The NBFC negotiates and finalises its commercials with the bank.
  3. The bank then approaches SIDBI with a proposal to obtain the guarantee of the GOI. At this stage, the bank provides (a) details of the transaction; and (b) a certificate that the requirements of Chapter 11 of General Financial Rules, and in particular, those of para 280, have been complied with.
  4. SIDBI does its own evaluation of the proposal, from the viewpoint of adherence to Chapter 11 of GFR and para 280 in particular, and whether the proposal is in compliance with the provisions of the Scheme. SIDBI shall accordingly forward the proposal to DFS along with a specific recommendation to either provide the guarantee, or otherwise.
  5. DFS shall then make its decision. Once the decision of DFS is made, it shall be communicated to SIDBI and PSB.
  6. At this stage, PSB may consummate its transaction with the NBFC, after collecting the guarantee fees of 25 bps.
  7. PSB shall then execute its guarantee documentation with DFS and pay the money by way of guarantee commission.

52. Para 280(i)(a) of the GFR states that there should be back-to-back agreements between the Government and Borrower to effect to the transaction – will this rule be applicable in case of this Scheme?

Para 280 has been drawn up based on the understanding that guarantee extended is for a loan where the borrower is known by the Government. In the present case, the guarantee is extended in order to partially support a sale of assets and not for a specific loan, therefore, this will not apply.

Miscellaneous

53. Is there any reporting requirement?

The Scheme does provide for a real-time reporting mechanism for the purchasing banks to understand the remaining headroom for purchase of such pooled assets. The Department of Financial Services (DFS), Ministry of Finance would obtain the requisite information in a prescribed format from the PSBs and send a copy to the budget division of DEA, however, the manner and format of reporting has not been notified yet.

54. What are to-do activities for the sellers to avail benefits under this Scheme?

Besides conforming to the eligibility criteria laid down in the Scheme, the sellers will also have to carry out the following in order to avail the benefits:

  1. The Asset Liability structure should restructured within three months to have positive ALM in each bucket for the first three months and on cumulative basis for the remaining period;
  2. At no time during the period for exercise of the option to buy back the assets, should the CRAR go below the regulatory minimum. The promoters shall have to ensure this by infusing equity, where required.

 

[1] http://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=192618

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[1] Including Indian Securitisation Foundation

[2] https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1595952

[3] https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/FAQView.aspx?Id=131

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Home-buyers provisions in IBC: Putting square peg in round holes?

 Sikha Bansal

(resolution@vinodkothari.com)

The ruling of the Apex Court in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure vs. Union of India[1], comes as a breather for home-buyers (all and sundry), upholding the constitutional validity of the amendments brought out in section 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”).

Section 5(8) defines ‘financial debt’ as a debt alongwith interest, if any, which is disbursed against the consideration for the time value of money and includes “any amount raised under any other transaction, including any forward sale or purchase agreement, having the commercial effect of borrowing” [clause (f)]. An explanation was inserted[2], wherein “any amount raised from an allottee under a real estate project shall be deemed to be an amount having the commercial effect of a borrowing”. Read more

FAQs: NBFCs not to charge foreclosure / pre-payment penalties on floating rate term loans for Individual borrowers

-Kanakprabha Jethani and Julie Mehta

finserv@vinodkothari.com

 

RBI has vide notification[1] dated August 02, 2019 issued a clarification regarding waiver of foreclosure charges/ prepayment penalty on all floating rate term loans sanctioned to individual borrowers, as referred to in paragraph 30(4) of Chapter VI of Master Direction – Non-Banking Financial Company – Systemically Important Non-Deposit taking Company and Deposit taking Company (Reserve Bank) Directions, 2016 and paragraph 30(4) of Chapter V of Master Direction – Non-Banking Financial Company – Non-Systemically Important Non-Deposit taking Company (Reserve Bank) Directions, 2016.

As per the fair practice code, NBFCs cannot charge foreclosure charges/ pre-payment penalties on all floating rate term loans sanctioned to individual borrowers

RBI has further clarified that NBFCs shall not charge foreclosure charges/ pre-payment penalties on any floating rate term loan sanctioned for purposes other than business to individual borrowers, with or without co-obligant(s).

To understand its implication and for further understanding, please refer to the list of ‘frequently asked questions’ listed below:

Basic understanding

  1. What is pre-payment or foreclosure?

 Ans. Prepayment or foreclosure is the repayment of a loan by a borrower, in part or in full ahead of the pre-determined payment schedule.

However, the distinguishing factor is that pre-payment means early payment of scheduled instalments, while foreclosure means early payment of the entire outstanding amount leading to early closure of the loan term. To extend, pre-payment is partial in nature whereas foreclosure is the closure of the loan account before the due-date.

  1. How do foreclosure charges and pre-payment penalties differ?

Ans. Conceptually, both have the same meaning. The only difference is in the terminology as the charges levied at the time of foreclosure are termed as foreclosure charges and charges levied at the time of pre-payment of an instalment are termed as pre-payment penalties.

  1. What is a term loan?

Ans. A term loan means a loan for which the term for repayment is pre-determined. This is unlike a demand loan in which the borrower has to repay on demand of repayment by the lender.

  1. How is a floating rate term loan different from a fixed rate term loan?

Ans. A fixed-rate term loan refers to interest rates that remain locked throughout the loan period, while floating-rate term loan refers to interest rates that are subject to fluctuate owing to certain factors.

  1. How is floating rate determined?

Ans. Lenders determine the floating rate on the basis of certain base rate. Usually, the floating rate is some percentage points more than the base rate. Base rate is determined by taking into account the cost of funds of the lender.

  1. Where do we find such floating rate term loans?

Ans. Floating rates are generally found in loans of long-term as the cost of funds is likely to fluctuate in the long run. However, certain medium term loans also have floating interest rate depending upon the agreement between the lender and borrower.

  1. Can a borrower make pre-payment of a term loan?

 Ans. Courts have, in many cases, given judgements stating that in the absence of specific provision in the agreement between the lender and the borrower (Loan Agreement), the borrower has the inherent right to make pre-payment of a loan. This puts light on the principle that ‘every borrower has an inherent right to free himself from the loan’.[2]

In case a lender requires that the loan amount should not be prepaid, such a restriction must be expressly mentioned in the Loan Agreement.

  1. Can a lender levy foreclosure charges/pre-payment penalty?

Ans. Unlike the provisions relating to pre-payment of loan by the borrower, the provisions for levy of foreclosure charges/pre-payment penalties are largely governed by the terms of the Loan Agreement. A lender can levy only those charges which form part of the Loan Agreement.

If provisions for levy of foreclosure charges/pre-payment penalties are expressly mentioned in the Loan Agreement, the lender can levy such charges/penalty. In absence of such provision, the lender does not have the right to levy such charges/penalty.

Further, for entities regulated by RBI, it is mandatory to mention all kinds of charges and penalties applicable to a loan transaction in the loan application form.

  1. What happens on prepayment of loan?

 Ans. Pre-payment of loan amount by the borrower has dual-impact. One is saving of interest cost and the other is reduction in the loan period. When a borrower pre-pays the loan, huge interest cost is saved, specifically in case of personal loans, where the interest rates are quite high.

  1. Why are borrowers charged in event of pre-payment?

Ans. Lenders pre-determine a schedule in terms of the specified term of a loan, including the repayment schedule, and the interest expectation. An early prepayment disrupts this schedule and also means that the borrower has to pay lesser interest (since interest is calculated from the time the loan is disbursed, till it is repaid).

Pre-payment charges are used as a client retention tool to discourage borrowers to move to other lenders, who may offer better interest for transferring the outstanding amount. It puts a limitation to the number of choices a customer can have due to market competition.

To compensate for such loss, pre-payment charges exist.

  1. What is the rate at which pre-payment charges are imposed?

Ans. The rate is determined by the opportunity cost foregone due to pre-payment/foreclosure. The future cash flows are discounted at a relatively lower rate and accordingly imposed. The rate differs from bank to bank depending on their relevant factors and policies. For example: several banks charge early repayment penalties up to 2-3% of the principal amount outstanding.

  1. How do banks benefit from the pre-payment penalties?

Ans. The prepayment penalty is not charged with the motive to generate revenue, but to recover costs incurred due to mismatch in assets and liabilities. It is believed that when long-term loans are offered to borrowers, lending facility raises long-term deposits to match their assets and liabilities on their balance sheet. So when the loans are pre-paid with respect to their scheduled payments, lenders continue to have long-term deposits on their books, leading to a mismatch

  1. What are the other factors that need to be kept in mind for pre-payment or foreclosure of loan?

Ans. The applicable rate at which penalty shall be charged is a major factor as it should not result in higher cost to the borrower. Other factors include the process of undergoing pre-payment/foreclosure, lock-in period associated with the option, documentation etc.

  1. What has been clarified?

Ans. Earlier, the FPC provided that NBFCs shall not charge foreclosure charges/prepayment penalties from individuals on floating rate term loans.

The clarification that has been provided by the RBI is that the foreclosure charges/prepayment penalties shall not be charged floating rate term loans, provided to individuals for purposes other than business i.e. personal purposes loans

Applicability

  1. On whom will this restriction be applicable?

Ans. The change shall be applicable to all kinds of NBFCs, including systemically important as well as non-systemically important NBFCs who are into business of lending to individuals. However, NBFCs engaged in lending to non-individuals only are not required to comply with this requirement.

  1. What kinds of loans will be covered?

Ans. All floating rate term loans provided to individuals for purposes other than business shall be covered under the said restriction.

  1. How will the lender define that loan is for purposes other than business?

 Ans. Before extending loans, documentation and background checks are performed. This process includes specification of the purpose for which the loan is taken. This gives a clear picture of the nature of the agreement and helps distinguish between business purpose and personal purposes.

  1. Why is this restriction on floating rate term loans only and not on fixed rate terms loans?

 Ans. Fixed rate loans involve no fluctuations in interest rates in the entire loan term. Thus in case of pre-payment, the interest foregone can be computed and realised to evaluate pre-payment penalties to be imposed.

While floating rate loans involve fluctuations based on the underlying benchmark and thus interest foregone cannot be estimated. There lies no confirmation of the lender being in the loss position. There is no way to realise interest rate sulking or hiking. Thus there is no basis on which overall loss might be estimated. In response to this situation, restrictions are on floating rate term loans and not on fixed rate term loans.

  1. Are there any other entities under similar restriction?

 Ans. RBI has put restrictions, similar to this, on banks and Housing Finance Companies as well. Banks are not permitted to charge foreclosure charges / pre-payment penalties on home loans / all floating rate term loans, for purposes other than business, sanctioned to individual borrowers. HFCs are not permitted to charge foreclosure charges/ pre-payment penalties in case of foreclosure of floating interest rate housing loans or housing loans on fixed interest rate basis which are pre-closed by the borrowers out of their own sources.

  1. When does this clarification come to effect?

Ans. It is noteworthy that this is a clarification (and not a separate provision) issued by the RBI in respect of a provision which is already a part of RBI Master Directions for NBFCs. Therefore, this clarification is deemed to be in effect from the date the corresponding provision was issued by the RBI by way of a notification[3] i.e. August 01, 2014.

Implication

  1. What is the borrower’s perspective?

Ans. Borrower’s may choose to pre-pay due to their personal obligations/burden, or if they obtain their funds which were earlier stuck, or by borrowing from a cheaper source to repay. This waive off of penalty charges, might be a sign of relief to them as they would get out of the obligation of an existing loan arrangement by paying off early and save the compounding interests and explore from the other options available in the market.

  1. What will happen after such clarification?

Ans. Prior to this clarification, the provision seemed to be providing a safe shelter to individual borrowers where they could foreclose or pre-pay any loan taken by them. Sometimes, the borrowers misused this facility by availing funds at a lower cost from some other lender to pre-pay the loans of higher interest rate. This resulted in disruptions in the forecasts of lenders, sometimes also resulting in loss to the lender.

This clarification limits the benefit of pre-payment to loans of personal nature only which are not availed very frequently by a borrower and are generally prepaid when borrowers have genuine savings or capital inflows.

 

[1] https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=11647&Mode=0

[2] https://indiankanoon.org/doc/417200/

[3] http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=107879

Analysis of Companies (Amendment) Act, 2019