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Inter-se Ranking of Creditors – Not Equal, but Equitable

-Megha Mittal, Associate and Prachi Bhatia, Legal Intern 

(resolution@vinodkothari.com)

Insolvency laws, globally, have propagated the principle of equitable distribution as the very essence of liquidation/ bankruptcy processes; and while, “equitable distribution” is often colloquially read as “equal distribution” the two terms hold significantly different connotations, more so in liquidation processes – an ‘equitable distribution’ simply means applying similar principles of distribution for similarly placed creditors.

Closer home in India, the preamble of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘Code’/ ‘IBC’) also upholds the principles of equitable distribution – thus balancing interests of all stakeholders under the insolvency framework. Judicial developments have also had a significant role in holding such equity upright[1]. However, in the recent order of the Hon’ble National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, in Technology Development Board v. Mr. Anil Goel[2], the Hon’ble NCLAT has refused to acknowledge the validity of inter-se rights of secured creditors once such security interest in relinquished in terms of section 52 of the Code.

In what may potentially jeopardize interests of a larger body of secured creditors, the Appellate Authority held that inter-se arrangements between the secured creditors, for instance, first charge and second charge over the same asset(s), would not hold relevance if such secured creditors choose to be a part of the liquidation process under the Code – thus placing all secured creditors at an equal footing. The authors humbly present that the instant order may not be in consonance with the established and time-tested principles of ‘equitable’ treatment of creditors. The authors opine that contractual priorities form the very basis of a creditor’s comfort in distress situations – as such, a law which tampers with such contractual priorities (which of course, are not otherwise hit by avoidance provisions) in those very times, will go on to defeat the commercial basis of such contracts and demotivate the parties. This, as obvious, cannot be a desired outcome of a law which otherwise delves on the objective of ‘promotion of entrepreneurship and availability of credit’. The authors have tried putting their perspective in this article.

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Failed Redemption of Preference Shares: Whether a Contractual Debt?

– Sikha Bansal, Partner and Megha Mittal, Associate (resolution@vinodkothari.com)

Preference shares, as the nomenclature suggests, represent that part of a Company’s capital which carries ‘preference´ vis-à-vis equity shares, with respect to payment of dividend and repayment of capital in case of winding up. However, the real position of preference shares may be quite baffling, given that the instrument, by its very nature, is sandwiched between equity capital and debt instruments.  Although envisaged as a superior class of shares, preference shareholders enjoy neither the voting powers vested with the equity shareholders (true shareholders) nor the advantages vested with debenture-holders (true creditors). As such, the preference shareholders find themselves suspended midway between true creditors and true shareholders – hence facing the worst of both worlds[1].

The ambivalence associated with preference shares is adequately reflected in the manner various laws deal with such shares – a preference share is a part of ‘share-capital’ by legal classification[2], but can be a ‘debt’ as per accounting classification[3]; similarly, while a compulsorily convertible preference share is classified as an ‘equity instrument’[4], any other preference share constitutes external commercial borrowing[5] under foreign exchange laws. Needless to say, the divergent treatment is owed to the objective which each legislation assumes.

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Secured Creditors under Insolvency Code : Searching for Equilibrium

This article has been published in IBBI’s annual publication named Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India – A Narrative, (2020). See here

Forced Contributions to Infructuous Liquidations: Understanding Regulation 2A

-Megha Mittal

(resolution@vinodkothari.com)

Since its inception, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“Code”), along with its regulations, has been subject to many reforms, some aimed at establishing new legal principles and some for removing difficulties faced during the insolvency resolution and/ or liquidation process; one such reform was the introduction of Regulation 2A[1] in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 (“Liquidation Regulations”), which provides for contribution by financial creditors of the corporate debtor to contribute towards liquidation costs, if so called upon by the liquidator.

In this article, we shall briefly understand the backdrop in which the said provision was introduced, throw light upon the extant provisions and then address the elephant in the room- is it obligatory upon the financial creditors to make such contribution when sought by the liquidator?

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Washout of Prior-period Claims in Resolution Plans: Rajasthan HC closes the door for pre-CIRP claims after revival of Corporate Debtor

Megha Mittal & Shreya Jain

resolution@vinodkothari.com

Colloquially referred to as a ‘rebirth’, a resolution plan is the revival route for the corporate debtor, free of its past liabilities and dues, paid in accordance with the approved plan. Having said so, it might be noted that resolution plans assume the status of a statutory binding contract once approved by the adjudicating authority. Recently, the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court, in Ultra Tech Nathdwara Cement Ltd., (formerly known as Binani Cements Ltd.) vs. Commissioner, Central Goods And Service Tax and Central Excise Commissionerate and Ors.[1], held that no demands can be raised by any statutory body, for a period prior to the approval and finalization of resolution plan, after the resolution plan is successfully implemented.

The details of the case have been discussed below.

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IBC threshold raised in Coronatic Disruption: Analysis and Implications

Megha Mittal & Shreya Jain

(resolution@vinodkothari.com)

Frivolous initiation of insolvency process, merely for recovery of dues has been a persistent concern- catalyst being the seemingly low threshold of Rs.1,00,000/-.While murmurs about  raising the threshold limit for initiating insolvency process have long been in the picture, the notification comes in the wake of recent outbreak of the novel COVID – 19 – the minimum default requirement now stands increased hundred times; from Rs. 1,00,000/- to Rs. 1,00,00,000.

Applicable from 24.03.2020, the Government, in exercise of its powers under section 4 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“Code”)[1] has specified Rs. 1,00,00,000 (Rupees One Crore) as the minimum amount of default for the purposes of triggering insolvency. Note that Rs. 1 Crore is the maximum threshold which the Central Government can prescribe under section 4.

The step has been widely touted as a relief for MSMEs in this time of crisis, however, this might have multiple implications. The authors have made a humble attempt to analyse its implications from a broader perspective, and if at such increase would be welcomed in absence of the ongoing crisis.

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