Partial credit enhancement scheme gets off to a flying start

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Abhirup Ghosh

abhirup@vinodkothari.com

The Government of India, with an intent to infuse liquidity in the financial sector, in the Union Budget, 2019, proposed to provide partial credit guarantee for sale of high quality assets of good NBFCs/ HFCs to public sector banks. Subsequently, on 10th August 2019, the FinMin launched the scheme[1].

Initially, there were various ambiguities in the scheme, however, later on, the same were clarified by the Government and the Reserve Bank of India. The start had to be slow and it took almost a month to figure things out and keep the systems in place, meanwhile an industry forum was also organised by the Indian Securitisation Foundation and Edelweiss Group to deliberate on the various issues surrounding the matter. However, close to the end of the second quarter, the product gained traction and reported volume of close Rs. 17,000 crores have already been done, with another Rs. 15,000 crores worth deals in the pipeline.

This has come as a relief for all the financial sector entities, as the banks are now keen to look at NBFC assets, considering that – a) the pool of loans are of good quality[2], b) additionally, the GOI will provide a first loss guarantee on the pool of assets. AA rating is itself treated as a good rating and with an additional sovereign guarantee over that, the transaction technically becomes risk free in the hands of the purchasing bank.

As per market sources, majority of the transactions are being priced in the range of 9%-10%.  Considering the level of stress the financial sector is going through, the transactions are being priced decently.

Some ambiguities still linger on

Though the transactions are being processed seamlessly, however, some ambiguities with respect to accounting treatment of the transaction are still worrying the financial institutions. The transaction being a mix of securitisation and direct assignment transaction throws new challenges. One of the key issues in case of any direct assignment/ securitisation transaction is whether the transaction would result in de-recognition of financial assets from the books of the originator. The de-recognition principles are laid down in Para 3.2 of Ind AS 109. These principles allow an entity to remove financial assets from its books either based on substantial transfer of risks and rewards, or based on a surrender of control. If the risks and rewards are substantially retained, de-recognition is denied. While the conditions of assessing whether there has been a substantial transfer of risks and rewards are subjective, there is substantial amount of global guidance on the subject.

Since Indian securitisation transactions involve credit enhancements normally to the extent of AAA-ratings, and sweep all residual excess spread, most of the securitisation transactions as currently done fail to transfer risks and rewards in the pool of assets, and consequently, do not lead to de-recognition of financial assets. However, in case of direct assignment transactions, the transfer of assets presumably leads to pari passu transfer of risks and rewards in the assets. Therefore, the same leads to de-recognition of assets transferred by the originator to the buyer.

In case of transfers under this Scheme, the assets must be rated as high as AA, which is impossible to achieve unless there is a tranching of pool done. This signifies that the first loss support to the pool would come from the originator or from a third party. There is certainly a strong element of risk retention by the originator. Correspondingly, the excess spread is also retained by the originator. However, whether the same would be regarded as “substantially all the risks and rewards” in the pool is still questionable. The very need for a sovereign guarantee signifies that there is a left over risk which requires to be covered by the Government guarantee..

Therefore, the transaction seems to be splitting the overall risks of the pool into 3 pieces – partially, retention by the originator, partially going to the GoI, and the remaining or super-senior part, going to the bank. It may be noted that if there is a significant transfer of risks, then it may not be separately necessary to establish a transfer of rewards as well, as risks and rewards are concomitant.

This, however, is subject to interpretation and there is a strong likelihood of different opinions in this regard. One shall have to wait for the finalisation of quarterly accounts of the major financial institutions to understand the direction in which the industry is inclined to.

The other ambiguity that continues is regarding the guarantee commission. On the apparent reading of the scheme, it seems that guarantee commission to be paid to the GOI, has to paid annually, however, another school of thought believes that the guarantee commission will have to be paid only once during the lifetime of the transaction. A clarification in this regard from the GOI will be very helpful.

Impact on other structured finance transactions

Interestingly, this scheme has, so far, not hampered the otherwise booming securitisation industry. The first half of the FY 2020 has reported recorded approximately Rs 1 lakh crores worth transactions, which is 48% year on year growth.

[1] http://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=192618

[2] As per the Scheme, the pool should be highly rated. It should be rated at least AA even before the government guarantee.

Sale assailed: NBFC crisis may put Indian securitisation transactions to trial

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-By Vinod Kothari (vinod@vinodkothari.com)

Securitisation is all about bankruptcy remoteness, and the common saying about bankruptcy remoteness is that it works as long as the entities are not in bankruptcy! The fact that any major bankruptcy has put bankruptcy remoteness to challenge is known world-over. In fact, the Global Financial Crisis itself put several never-before questions to legality of securitisation, some of them going into the very basics of insolvency law[1]. There have been spate of rulings in the USA pertaining to transfer of mortgages, disclosures in offer documents, law suits against trustee, etc.

The Indian securitisation market has faced taxation challenges, regulatory changes, etc. However, it has so far been immune from any questions at the very basics of either securitisability of assets, or the structure of securitisation transactions, or issues such as commingling of cashflows, servicer transition, etc. However, sitting at the very doorstep of defaults by some major originators, and facing the spectrum of serious servicer downgrades, the Indian securitisation market clearly faces the risk of being shaken at its basics, in not too distant future.

Before we get into these challenges, it may be useful to note that the Indian securitisation market saw an over-100% growth in FY 2019 with volumes catapulting to INR 1000 billion. In terms of global market statistics, Indian market may now be regarded as 2nd largest in ex-Japan Asia, only after China.

Since the blowing up of the ILFS crisis in the month of September 2018, securitisation has been almost the only way of liquidity for NBFCs. Based on the Budget proposal, the Govt of India launched, in Partial Credit Guarantee Scheme, a scheme for partial sovereign guarantee for AA-rated NBFC pools. That scheme seems to be going very well as a liquidity breather for NBFCs. Excluding the volumes under the partial credit enhancement scheme, securitisation volumes in first half of the year have already crossed INR 1000 billion.

In the midst of these fast rising volumes, the challenges on the horizon seem multiple, and some of them really very very hard. This write up looks at some of these emerging developments.

Sale of assets to securitisation trusts questioned

In an interim order of the Bombay High court in Edelweiss AMC vs Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited[2], the Bombay High court has made certain observations that may hit at the very securitisability of receivables.  Based on an issue being raised by the plaintiff, the High Court has directed the company DHFL to provide under affidavit details of all those securitisation transactions where receivables subject to pari passu charge of the debentureholders have been assigned, whether with or without the sanction of the trustee for the debentureholders.

The practice of pari passu floating charge on receivables is quite commonly used for securing issuance of debentures. Usually, the charge of the trustees is on a blanket, unspecific common pool, based on which multiple issuances of debentures are covered. The charge is usually all pervasive, covering all the receivables of the company. In that sense, the charge is what is classically called a “floating charge”.

These are the very receivables that are sold or assigned when a securitisation transaction is done. The issue is, given the floating nature of the charge, a receivable originated automatically becomes subject to the floating charge, and a receivable realised or sold automatically goes out of the purview of the charge. The charge document typically requires a no-objection confirmation of the chargeholder for transactions which are not in ordinary course of business. But for an NBFC or an HFC, a securitisation transaction is a mode of take-out and very much a part of ordinary course of business, as realisation of receivables is.

If the chargeholder’s asset cover is still sufficient, is it open for the chargeholder to refuse to give the no-objection confirmation to another mode of financing? If that was the case, any chargeholder may just bring the business of an NBFC to a grinding halt by refusing to give a no-objection.

The whole concept of a floating charge and its priority in the event of bankruptcy has been subject matter of intensive discussion in several UK rulings[3]. There have been discussions on whether the floating charge concept, a judge-made product of UK courts, can be eliminated altogether from the insolvency law[4].

In India, the so-called security interest on receivables is not really intended to be a security device – it is merely a regulatory compliance with company law rules under which unsecured debentures are treated as “deposits”[5]. The real intent of the so-called debenture trust document is maintenance of an asset cover, which may be expressed as a covenant, even otherwise, in case of an unsecured debenture issuance. The fact is that over the years, the Indian bond issuance market has not been able to come out of the clutches of this practice of secured debenture issuance.

While bond issuance practices surely need re-examination, the burning issue for securitisation transactions is – if the DHFL interim ruling results into some final observations of the court about need for the bond trustee’s NOC for every securitisation transaction, all existing securitisation transactions may also face similar challenges.

Servicer-related downgrades

Rating agencies have recently downgraded two notches from AAA ratings several pass-through certificate transactions of a leading NBFC. The rationale given in the downgrade action, among other things, cites servicer risks, on the ground that the originator has not been able to obtain continuous funding support from banks. While absence of continuing funding support may affect new business by an NBFC, how does it affect servicing capabilities of existing transactions, is a curious question. However, it seems that in addition to the liquidity issue, which is all pervasive, the rating action in the present case may have been inspired by some internal scheme of arrangement proposed by the NBFC in question.

This particular downgrades may, therefore, not have a sectoral relevance. However, what is important is that the downgrades are muddying the transition history of securitisation ratings. From the classic notion that securitisation ratings are not susceptible to originator-ratings, the dependence of securitisation transactions to pure originator entity risks such as internal funding strengths or scheme of arrangement puts a risk which is usually not considered by securitisation investors. In fact, the flight to securitisation and direct assignments after ILFS crisis was based on the general notion that entity risks are escaped by securitisation transactions.

Servicer transitions

The biggest jolt may be a forced servicer transition. In something like RMBS transactions, outsourcing of collection function is still easy, and, in many cases, several activities are indeed outsourced. However, if it comes to more complicated assets requiring country-wide presence, borrower franchise and regular interaction, if servicer transition has to be forced, the transaction will be worse than originator bankruptcy.

Questions on true sale

The market has been leaning substantially on the “direct assignment” route. Most of the direct assignments are seen by the investors are look-alikes and feel-alikes of a loan to the originator, save and except for the true-sale opinion. Investors have been linking their rates of return to their MCLR. Investors have been viewing the excess spread as a virtual credit support, which is actually not allowed as per RBI regulations. Pari-passu sharing of principal and interest is rarely followed by the market transactions.

If the truth of the sale in most of the direct assignment transactions is questioned in cases such as those before the Bombay High court, it will not be surprising to see the court recharacterise the so-called direct assignments as nothing but disguised loans. If that was to happen in one case of a failed NBFC, not only will the investors lose the very bankruptcy-remoteness they were hoping for, the RBI will be chasing the originators for flouting the norms of direct assignment which may have hitherto been ignored by the supervisor. The irony is – supervisors become super stringent in stressful times, which is exactly where supervisor’s understanding is required more than reprimand.

Conclusion

NBFCs are passing through a very strenuous time. Delicate handling of the situation with deep understanding and sense of support is required from all stakeholders. Any abrupt strong action may exacerbate the problem beyond proportion and make it completely out of control. As for securitisation practitioners, it is high time to strengthen practices and realise that the truth of the sale is not in merely getting a true sale opinion.

Other Related Articles:

[1] For example, in a Lehman-related UK litigation called Perpetual Trustees vs BNY Corporate Trustee Services, the typical clause in a synthetic securitisation diverting the benefit of funding from the protection buyer (originator – who is now in bankruptcy) to the investors, was challenged under the anti-deprivation rule of insolvency law. Ultimately, UK Supreme Court ruled in favour of securitisation transactions.

[2] https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-365465.pdf. Similar observations have been made by the same court in Reliance Nippon Life AMC vs  DHFL.

[3] One of the leading UK rulings is Spectrum Plus Limited, https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2005/41.html. This ruling reviews whole lot of UK rulings on floating charges and their priorities.

[4] See, for example, R M Goode, The Case for Abolition of the Floating Charge, in Fundamental Concepts of Commercial Law (50 years of Reflection, by Goode)

[5] Or partly, the device may involve creation of a mortgage on a queer inconsequential piece of land to qualify as “mortgage debentures” and therefore, avail of stamp duty relaxation.

UPDATE: No GST input if supplier doesn’t upload details of output: GST Council amends CGST rules to curb ineligible credit availing

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-Rahul Maharshi

(rahul@vinodkothari.com) (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

The GST council in its 37th Meeting held on 20th September, 2019, had proposed to make amendments in the CGST Rules, 2017 (“Rules”) pertaining to matters relating to the extension of due date of filing of GSTR-3B GSTR-1 as well as voluntary requirement of filing of GST Annual return for registered person whose aggregate turnover is less than Rs. 2 crores.

One of the major amendment proposed was to restrict the claiming of input tax credit by the recipient, in case of mismatch in details uploaded by the supplier, to the extent of 20% over and above the value of uploaded details by the supplier.

The above proposed amendment has been brought into force through notification 49/2019- Central Tax   [1] whereby the input credit availed by a registered person, the details of which have not been uploaded by the suppliers vide GSTR-1, the same should not exceed 20% of the eligible credit that has been uploaded by the suppliers.

As per the insertion in the CGST rules, 2017, viz. sub-rule (4) of rule 36:

“(4) Input tax credit to be availed by a registered person in respect of invoices or debit notes, the details of which have not been uploaded by the suppliers under sub-section (1) of section 37, shall not exceed 20 per cent. of the eligible credit available in respect of invoices or debit notes the details of which have been uploaded by the suppliers under sub-section (1) of section 37.”

For example, as per the books of the recipient, there is an input tax credit of Rs. 5,000 for a particular month from a particular supplier against 5 tax invoices having the GST component of Rs. 1,000 each.  Post the amendment, the following scenarios shall arise:

Case-1: In case the supplier has uploaded all 5 invoices:

In case the supplier has duly uploaded the details of all the 5 invoices through filing the GSTR-1 for the particular month, the auto-populated GSTR-2A will have the details of all such invoices and accordingly the recipient will be eligible to claim the input tax credit of all 5 invoices

Case-2: In case the supplier has uploaded 3 invoices:

In case the supplier has uploaded less than 5 invoices, i.e. 3 invoices having GST component of Rs. 3,000, the recipient will be eligible to claim input tax credit at a maximum of Rs. 3,600 (viz. 3,000+20% of 3,000= 3,600).

Case-3: In case the supplier has not uploaded any invoice:

In case the supplier has not uploaded any invoice in the GSTR-1 of the respective month, the recipient will not be eligible to claim the input tax credit in that particular month. However, the recipient may claim the input as soon as the supplier uploads the details in the GSTR-1 and corresponding details reflect in the auto-populated GSTR-2A.

As a result of the said amendment, the recipient will be required to monitor the duly uploading of the invoices by the supplier in a more stringent manner, since omission of the same will result in reduction in claiming of input tax credit by the recipient.

Also, an important point of concern will be the change in accounting of the input tax credit in the books of the recipient. The excess claim over 20% of the eligible input tax credit will require allocation against the invoices of which the input tax credit would pertain to.

Continuing the above example viz. Case 2, where the supplier has uploaded 3 invoices, how will the recipient allocate the said portion of 20% viz. Rs. 600 if the recipient claims input tax credit at the excess of 20%. The recipient has to allocate the said amount against portion of particular invoices.

The above move may be seen as a way to monitor the claiming of inputs by the recipients as well as a check on the supplier for uploading the returns on a regular basis. However, there are pertinent issues which require further clarification from the department.

 

[1] http://www.cbic.gov.in/resources//htdocs-cbec/gst/notfctn-49-central-tax-english-2019.pdf;jsessionid=15BA096E92769114F368D806E28B8FF5

Lenders’ piggybacking: NBFCs lending on Fintech platforms’ guarantees

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-Vinod Kothari

(vinod@vinodkothari.com)

Among the disruptive Fintech practices, app-based lending is certainly notable. The scenario of an app-based lending is somewhat like this – a prospective borrower goes to an app platform, fills up some information. At the background, the app collects and collates the information including credit scores of the individual, may be the individual’s contact bases in social networks, etc. Finally, the loan is sanctioned in a jiffy, mostly within minutes.

The borrower interacts with the platform, but does the borrower know that the loan is actually not coming from the platform but from some NBFC? Whether the borrower knows or cares for who the lender is, the fact is that mostly, the technology provider (platform) and the funding provider (lender) are not the same. It may be two entities within the same group, but more often than not, the lender is an NBFC which is simply originating the loan based on the credit comfort provided by the platform.

The relation between the platform and the lender may take one of the following forms: (a) platform simply is procuring or referring the credit; the platform has no credit exposure at all; (b) the platform is acting as a sourcing agent, and is also providing a credit support, say in form of a first-loss guarantee for a certain proportion of the pool of loans originated through the platform; (c ) the platform provides full credit support for all the loans originated through the platform, and in return, the lender allows the platform to retain all the actual returns realised through the pool of loans, over an and above a certain “portfolio IRR”.

Option (a) is pure sourcing arrangement; however, it is quite unlikely that the lender will be willing to trust the platform’s credit scoring, unless there is significant skin-in-the-game on the part of the platform.

If it is a case of option (c ) [which, incidentally, seems quite common, the loan is actually put on the books of the lender, but the credit exposure is on the platform. The lender’s exposure is, in fact, on the platform, and not the borrower. The situation seems to be quite close to a “total rate of return swap”, a form of a credit derivative, whereby parties synthetically replace the exposure and the actual rate of return in a portfolio of loans by a pre-agreed “total rate of return”.

Our objective in this article is to examine whether there are any regulatory concerns on the practice as in case of option (c ) . Option c is an exaggeration; there may be a case such as option (b). But since option (b) is also a first loss guarantee with a substantial thickness, it is almost akin to the platform absorbing virtually all the risks of the credit pool originated through the platform.

Before we get into the regulatory concerns, it is important to understand what are the motivations of each of the parties in this bargain.

Platform’s motivations

The motivation on the part of the platform is clear – the platform makes the spreads between the agreed portfolio IRR with the lender, and the actual rate of return on the loan pool, after absorbing all the risk of defaults. Assume, the small-ticket personal loan is being given at an interest rate of 30%, and the agreed portfolio IRR with the lender is 14%, the platform is entitled to the spread of 16%. If some of the loans go bad, as they indeed do, the platform is still left with enough of juice to be a compensation for the risks taken by it.

The readiness on the part of the platform is also explained by the fact that the credibility of the platform’s scoring is best evidenced by the platform agreeing to take the risk – it is like walking the talk.

Lender’s motivations

The lender’s motivations are also easy to understand – the lender is able to disburse fast, and at a decent rate of return for itself, while taking the risk in the platform.  In fact, several NBFCs and banks have been motivated by the attractiveness of this structure.

Are there any regulatory concerns?

The potential regulatory concerns may be as follows:

  • De-facto, synthetic lending by an entity that is not a regulated NBFC
  • Undercapitalised entity taking credit risk
  • Skin-in-the-game issue
  • A CDS, but not regulated as a CDS
  • Financial reporting issues
  • Any issues of conflict of interest or misalignment of incentives
  • Good borrowers pay for bad borrowers
  • KYC or outsourcing related issues.

Each of these issues are examined below.

Synthetic lending by an unregulated entity

It is common knowledge that NBFCs in India require registration. The platform in the instant case is not giving a loan. The platform is facilitating a loan – right from origination to credit risk absorption. Correspondingly, the platform is earning a spread, but the activity is technically not a “financial activity”, and the spread not a “financial income”; hence, the platform does not require regulatory registration.

Per contra, it could be argued that the platform is essentially doing a synthetic lending. The position of the platform is economically similar to an entity that is lending money at 30% rate of interest, and refinancing itself at 14%. There will be a regulatory arbitrage being exploited, if such synthetic lending is not treated at par with formal lending.

But then, there are whole lot of equity-linked or property-linked swaps, where the returns of an investment in equities, properties or commodities, are swapped through a total rate of return swaps, and in regulatory parlance, the floating income recipient is not regarded as investor in equities, properties or commodities. Derivatives do transform one asset into another by using synthetic technology – in fact, insurance-linked securities allow capital market investors to participate in insurance risk, but it cannot be argued that such investors become insurance companies.

Undercapitalised entities taking credit risk

It may be argued that the platform is not a regulated entity; yet, that is where the actual credit risk is residing.  Unlike NBFCs, the platform does not require any minimum capitalisation norms or risk-weighted capital asset requirements. Therefore, there is a strong potential for risk accumulation at the platform’s level, with no relevant capital requirements. This may lead to a systemic stability issue, if the platforms become large.

There is a merit in the issue. If fintech-based lending becomes big, the exposure taken by fintech entities on the loans originated through them, on which they have exposure, may be treated at par with loans actually held on the balance sheet of the fintech. As in case of financial entities, there are norms for converting off-balance sheet assets into their on-balance sheet equivalents, the same system may be adopted in this case.

Skin-in-the game issue

Post the Global Financial Crisis, one of the regulatory concerns was skin-in-the-game. In light of this, the RBI has imposed minimum holding period, and minimum risk retention requirements in case of direct assignments as well as securitisation.

The transaction of guarantee discussed above may seem like the exposure being shifted by the platform to the NBFC. However, the transaction is not at all comparable with an assignment of a loan. Here, the lending itself is originated on the books of the NBFC/lender. The lender has the ultimate discretion to agree to lend or not. The credit decision is that of the lender; hence, the loan is originated by the lender, and not acquired. The lender is mitigating the risk by backing it up with the guarantee of the platform – but this is not a case of an assignment.

There is a skin-in-the-game on either side. For the platform, the guarantee is the skin-in-the-game; for the NBFC, the exposure in the platform becomes its stake.

A CDS, but not regulated as a CDS

The transaction has an elusive similarity to a credit default swap (CDS) contract. It may be argued that the guarantee construct is actually a way to execute a derivative contract, without following CDS guidelines provided by the RBI.

In response, it may be noted that a derivative is a synthetic trading in an exposure, and is not linked with an actual exposure. For example, a protection buyer in a CDS may not be having the exposure for which he is buying protection, in the same way as a person acquiring a put option on 100 gms of gold at a certain strike price may not be having 100 gms of gold at all. Both the persons above are trying to create a synthetic position on the underlying.

Unlike derivatives, in the example of the guarantee above, the platform is giving guarantee against an actual exposure. The losses of the guarantor are limited to actual losses suffered by the lender. Hence, the contract is one of indemnity (see discussion below), and cannot be construed or compared to a derivative contract. There is no intent of synthetic trading in credit exposure in the present case.

Financial reporting issues:

It may be argued that the platform is taking same exposure as that of an actual lender; whereas the exposure is not appearing on the balance sheet of the platform. On the other hand, the actual exposure of the lender is on the platform, whereas what is appearing on the balance sheet of the lender is the loan book.

The issue is one of financial reporting. IFRSs clearly address the issue, as a financial guarantee is an on-balance sheet item, at its fair value. If the platform is not covered by IFRSs/IndASes, then the platform will be reflecting the guarantee as a contingent liability on its balance sheet.

Conflicts of interest or misalignment of incentives:

During the prelude to the Global Financial Crisis, a commonly-noted regulatory concern was misalignment of incentives – for instance, a subprime mortgage lender might find it rewarding to lend to a weak credit and capture more excess spread, while keeping its exposure limited.

While that risk may, to some extent, remain in the present guarantee structure as well, but there are at least 2 important mitigants. First, the ultimate credit decision is that of the NBFC. Secondly, if the platform is taking full credit recourse, then there cannot be a misalignment of incentives.

Good borrowers pay for bad borrowers

It may be argued that eventually, the platform is compensating itself for the risk of expected losses by adding to the cost of the lending. Therefore, the good borrowers pay for the bad borrowers.

This is invariably the case in any form of unsecured lending. The mark-up earned by the lender is a compensation for risk of expected losses. The losses arise for the loans that don’t pay, and are compensated by those that do.

KYC or outsourcing related issues

Regulators may also be concerned with KYC or outsourcing related issues. As per RBI norms “NBFCs which choose to outsource financial services shall, however, not outsource core management functions including Internal Audit, Strategic and Compliance functions and decision-making functions such as determining compliance with KYC norms for opening deposit accounts, according sanction for loans (including retail loans) and management of investment portfolio.”

Usually the power to take credit decisions vests with the lender. However, in case the arrangement between the lender and the platform is such that the platform performs the decision-making function, the same shall amount to outsourcing of core management function of the NBFC, which is expressly disallowed by the RBI. The relevant extract from the KYC Master Directions is as follows:

“REs shall ensure that decision-making functions of determining compliance with KYC norms are not outsourced.”

Is it actually a guarantee?

Before closing, it may be relevant to raise a legal issue – is the so-called guarantee by the platform actually a guarantee?

In the absence of tripartite agreement between the parties, the arrangement cannot be said to be a contract of guarantee. Here the involvement is of only two parties in the arrangement i.e. the guarantor and the lender.

It was held in the case of K.V. Periyamianna Marakkayar and others vs Banians And Co.[1] that “Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act which defines a contract of guarantee though it does not say expressly that the debtor should be a party to the contract clearly implies, that there should be three parties to it namely the surety, the principal-debtor and the creditor ; otherwise it will only be a contract of indemnity. Section 145 which enacts that in every contract of guarantee there is an implied promise by the principal debtor to indemnify the surety clearly shows that the debtor and the surety are both parties to such a contract ; for it will be strange to imply in a contract a promise between persons who are not parties to it.”

Accordingly, the said arrangement maybe termed as a contract of indemnity wherein the platform agrees to indemnify the lender for the losses incurred on account of default by the borrower.

Conclusion

Fintech-based lending is here to stay, and grow. Therefore, risk participation by Fintech does not defeat the system – rather, it promotes lending and adds to the credibility of the Fintech’s risk assessment. Over period of time, the RBI may evolve appropriate guidelines for treating the credit exposure taken by the platforms as a part of their credit-equivalent assets.

 

 

[1] https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1353940/

Director’s liability has a nexus with his role and not the position

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– Pammy Jaiswal, Partner | corplaw@vinodkothari.com Updated as on 22nd July, 2022 Background While there has been a lot of rulings on the liability of directors, the question that mostly cropped up for examination was with respect to their involvement in the day-to-day operations. The liability of non-executive directors has mostly been scanned to evaluate […]

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