New rules of corporate control: Limit on layers of subsidiaries

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By CS Vinita Nair, (corplaw@vinodkothari.com)

MCA has issued a notification notifying the Companies (Restriction on Number of Layers) Rules, 2017[1], imposing a limit of two layers of subsidiaries which shall be effective from September 20, 2017[2]. Earlier, MCA vide public notice dated 1 June 28, 2017[3] had conveyed its intent of issuing a notification proposing amendments to the Companies (Specification of Definitions Details) Rules, 2014 containing the restriction on layers of subsidiaries beyond prescribed number and had invited suggestions on the draft notification. This write up initially discusses the conditions imposed and thereafter analyses the permitted combinations.

Proviso to Section 2 (87) along with explanation (d) was proposed to be omitted in Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2016. However, in view of reports of misuse of multiple layers of companies, where companies create shell companies for diversion of funds or money laundering, MCA has decided to retain the provisions and commence the aforesaid proviso and explanation. Further, MCA had no intent to exempt private companies from the requirement as well. Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2017 as passed by Lok Sabha omitted the amendment proposed in Proviso to Section 2 (87).

Figure 5 of Taxmann’s Your Queries on Companies Act, 2013

Exempted companies

Rule 2(2) of Companies (Restriction on number of layers) Rules, 2017 shall not apply to following classes of companies, namely:-

(a) a banking company;

(b) a non-banking financial company as defined in the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (2 of 1934) which is registered with the Reserve Bank of India and considered as systemically important non-banking financial company by the Reserve Bank of India; (Nothing specified in relation to housing finance companies/ NBFC CICs).

(c) an insurance company being a company which carries on the business of insurance in accordance with provisions of Insurance Act, 1938 and Insurance Regulatory Development Authority Act, 1999;

(d) a Government company referred to in clause (45) of section 2 of the Act.

Exemptions in cases of Housing Finance Companies, Core Investment Companies as well as Non-Operative Financial Holding Company, Companies that become subsidiary entities pursuant to lenders acquiring majority of shareholding in the borrowing entity as a measure to deal with stressed assets in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India from time to time are missed out in the Rules notified.

Exempted subsidiaries – subsidiaries incorporated outside India

 

First proviso to Rule 2 of the Rules provides exemption to a Company from acquiring a company incorporated in a country outside India with subsidiaries beyond two layers as per the laws of such country.

The exemption in case of acquiring of subsidiaries incorporated outside India should be extended equally to subsidiaries freshly incorporated outside India. There need not be a distinction in acquisition and incorporation of subsidiary outside India. Either a company may acquire a subsidiary outside India which in turn has several layers of downstream investment or it may float a subsidiary outside India which will keep on further incorporating or acquiring subsidiaries outside India.

It cannot be interpreted that a Company incorporating subsidiaries outside India will have to adhere to the restriction of layers even if the same is permitted as per law of that country.

Exempted subsidiaries – wholly owned subsidiaries

One layer which consists of one or more wholly owned subsidiary or subsidiaries shall not be taken into account while computing the number of layers. The proposed Rule provided the explanation to the effect that one layer which is represented by a wholly owned subsidiary shall not be taken into account.

‘Layer’ cannot mean ‘Layers’ based on interpretation that singular includes plural. Therefore, it should not be read as any layer represented by a wholly owned subsidiary. The whole purpose will get defeated if companies are allowed to incorporate layers of wholly owned subsidiaries without any restriction.

It is very pertinent to ponder whether the wholly owned subsidiaries can be at layer not immediately following the layer of holding company.

Example 1: Company ‘A Ltd’ has a subsidiary ‘B Ltd’ which in turn has a subsidiary ‘C Ltd’. ‘C Ltd’ forms a wholly owned subsidiary ‘D Ltd’. How can Company ‘A Ltd’ avail the exemption for the layer represented by ‘D Ltd’ which is not wholly owned subsidiary of ‘A ltd’.

Example 2: Company ‘A Ltd’ has wholly owned subsidiaries ‘B Ltd’ and ‘C Ltd’. Both of these wholly owned subsidiaries hold shares in ‘D Ltd’ in the ratio of 60% and 40% respectively. Thereafter, ‘D Ltd’ forms a subsidiary ‘E Ltd’. In this case, the layer represented by ‘B Ltd’ and ‘C Ltd’ shall not be considered.

Therefore, the layer of wholly owned subsidiary has to reflect in the first layer and not thereafter in order to avail the exemption.

Limit prescribed under Section 186 (1)

Similar restriction on number of layers of investment companies has already been in force under Section 186 (1).  The provisions of this rule shall not be in derogation of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 186 of the Act.

Rules are prospective in nature

The holding companies, other than exempted companies, that breach the conditions of layers of subsidiaries as on the date of commencement of provision are prohibited from incorporating additional layer of subsidiaries.

Such holding companies shall file return in Form CRL-1 with the Registrar within a period of 150 days from the date of publication of these rules in Official Gazette. The form requires specifying layer number of the subsidiary and percentage of shares held by holding company.

The Rules further provide that, such Company shall not, in case one or more layers are reduced by it subsequent to the commencement of these rules, have the number of layers beyond the number of layers it has after such reduction or maximum layers allowed in sub-rule (1), whichever is more.

No restriction on horizontal propagation

All the below mentioned structures are permitted and well in compliance

Figure 9 of Taxmann’s Your Queries on Companies Act, 2013

Figure 9 of Taxmann’s Your Queries on Companies Act, 2013

Permitted and prohibited combinations

Case 1:

Figure 8 of Taxmann’s Your Queries on Companies Act, 2013

In the aforesaid structure, if we consider on as is basis, there exists more than 2 layers of subsidiaries. Therefore, an existing company cannot go beyond ‘D’. Once the provisions are enforced, an existing holding company A will not be able to float ‘D’ unless any exemptions/ relaxations become applicable.

 

Case 2 – ‘B’ is a wholly owned subsidiary of ‘A’:

In that case, the structure is permissible.

Case 3 –’C’/ ‘D’[1] is a wholly owned subsidiary of ‘A’:

In that case, the structure is not permissible for reasons stated above.

Case 4 – ‘B’/’C’ is a subsidiary incorporated outside India:

Currently, the wording of draft rule prescribes ‘acquired’ subsidiaries to be exempted. However, there is no reason to infer that the benefit cannot be extended to subsidiaries incorporated outside India if the laws of host country permit the same.

Case 5 – ‘B” is a subsidiary acquired outside India while ‘C’ and ‘D’ and subsidiaries of ‘B’ incorporated in India

So ‘A’, ‘C’ and “D’ are companies incorporated in India while ‘B’ is a subsidiary outside India. The exemption cannot be extended to ‘C’ and ‘D’ merely because it’s immediately holding company is a subsidiary acquired outside India. Therefore, the limit is likely to be breached unless ‘B’ or ‘C’ or ‘D’ is a wholly owned subsidiary.

Case 6 – ‘A’/‘B’/’C’ fall under exempted companies:

In that case, the restriction shall not apply.

Case 7 – ‘B’/’C’/ ‘D’ is an LLP:

The expression ‘company’ includes body corporate. Therefore, an existing company cannot go beyond ‘D’. Once the provisions are enforced, an existing holding company A will not be able to float ‘D’ unless any exemptions/ relaxations become applicable.

[1] Either of ‘C’ or ‘D’

Onus of non-compliance

Figure 7 of Taxmann’s Your Queries on Companies Act, 2013

If any company contravenes any provision of these rules the company and every officer of the company who is in default shall be punishable with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees and where the contravention is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to one thousand rupees for every day after the first during which such contravention continues.

[1] http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2017/179104.pdf

[2] http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2017/179105.pdf

[3] http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/Notice_29062017.pdf

[4] Either of ‘B’ or ‘C’ or ‘D’

P2P lending comes under the ambit of RBI

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By Mayank Agarwal & Anita Baid (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

 

Peer to Peer lending (P2P Lending) is a virtual marketplace which connects borrowers and lenders online by providing quick funds to borrowers and high returns to lenders. The borrower can raise fund by borrowing from a single lender or a group of lenders. The accelerated growth in P2P Lending platforms was recognized for the first time by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in its First Bi-monthly Monetary Policy Statement, 2016-17[1]. Read more →

The Financial Resolution and Deposit Insurance Bill, 2017: Key Highlights

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By Nidhi Bothra, (nidhi@vinodkothari.com)

 

In March, 2016 a committee was constituted under the Chairmanship of Mr. Ajay Tyagi to draft and submit a bill on resolution of financial firms. In September, 2016, the Committee submitted its report and bill which was titled as “The Financial Resolution and Deposit Insurance Bill, 2016”[1] (Bill 2016). The objective of the Bill, 2016 was to provide for a framework for safeguarding the stability and viability of financial services providers and to protect the interest of the depositors, as the name of the bill also suggests[2].

The Financial Resolution and Deposit Insurance Bill, 2017[3] (Bill, 2017) is formulated to provide resolution to certain categories of financial service providers in distress; the deposit insurance to consumers of certain categories of financial services; designation of systemically important financial institutions; and establishment of a Resolution Corporation for protection of consumers of specified service providers and of public funds for ensuring the stability and resilience of the financial system and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

The proposed legislation together with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is expected to provide a comprehensive resolution mechanism for the economy.

The existing draft of the Bill, 2017 has been referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee of both the Houses, under the Chairpersonship of Shri Bhupender Yadav, for examination and presenting a Report to the Parliament.

The Bill is divided into several chapters, which deal with establishment of a Resolution Corporation, its powers, management and functioning which is broadly to function along with the appropriate regulator[4] of financial services provider, classification of persons as systematically important financial institutions, deposit insurance, restoration and resolution plan, method of resolution, liquidation etc.

Highlights of the Bill, 2017

The brief highlights of the Bill[5], 2017 are as follows:

  1. Establishing the Resolution Corporation – A resolution corporation would be formulated broadly with the objective of
    1. monitoring certain financial services provider[6];
    2. providing deposit insurance to banking institutions;
    3. classifying certain persons as specified service provider [7] into one of the categories of risks to viability;
    4. acting as an administrator or liquidator for such service provider or resolve a specified service provider which has been classified into critical risk category;
    5. set up funds including Corporation Insurance Fund, set up for deposit insurance provided by the Corporation to the insured service providers[8] and other funds such as Corporation Resolution Fund for meeting the expenses of carrying out resolution of specified service providers and Corporation General Fund for all other functions of the Corporation.
  2. Deposit Insurance – Chapter IV of the Bill, 2017 discusses about deposit insurance and largely deals with
    1. Determination of amount payable by the Corporation, to a depositor on account of deposit insured;
    2. Amount payable to an insured service provider[9] on account of resolution but not bail-out or eligible co-operative bank on account of merger or amalgamation;
    3. If the Resolution Corporation is dealing with the resolution of an insured service provider, then the Corporation may decide to invite offers from other insured service providers to take over the liabilities, deposits or realisable assets of the insured service provider.
  3. Categorisation as SIFIs[10] – Certain persons can be classified as SIFIs by the Central Government in consultation with the appropriate regulator, as per Section 25 of the Bill, 2017, if it meets the criteria prescribed by the Central Government in this regard. Once categorised as an SIFI, then are deemed to be specified service provider and the provisions of being a specified service provider under the Bill, 2017 become applicable to them. It is important to mention that any financial service provider or domestic systematically important banks can be classified as SIFIs. Once classified as SIFIs, the Central Government may designate, its holding, subsidiary, associate company or any other body corporate related to it as financial service provider and falling into the ambit of being SIFI.
  4. Registration of specified service provider – Chapter V of the Bill, 2017 talks about registration of specified service providers and states that if a person classified as a specified service provider or deemed to be a service provider, it shall be deemed to be registered under the Act, from the date of classification. If the appropriate regulator has issued a license in favour of a specified service provider, such license shall be deemed to be registration for the purpose of this Act as well.
  5. Risk to viability categories – The Bill, 2017 specifies 5 categories[11] of risk to viability under Section 36 (5) and are as follows —
    1. low, where the probability of failure of a specified service provider is substantially below the acceptable probability of failure;
    2. moderate, where the probability of failure of a specified service provider is marginally below or equal to acceptable probability of failure;
    3. material, where the probability of failure of a specified service provider is marginally above acceptable probability of failure;
    4. imminent, where the probability of failure of a specified service provider is substantially above the acceptable probability of failure;
    5. critical, where the probability of failure of a specified service provider is substantially above the acceptable probability of failure, and the specified service provider is on the verge of failing to meet its obligations to its consumers

The classification of a specified service provider into any of the categories of risk to viability except the category of critical risk to viability under section 45, shall be kept confidential by the appropriate regulator, the Corporation and by all relevant parties.

6.   Categorisation of specified service providers under risk to viability categories —

  1. The Resolution Corporation in consultation with the appropriate regulator categorise specified service providers under risk to viability categories.
  2. The Resolution Corporation shall have no power to classify a specified service provider into the category of low or moderate risk to viability.
  3. While classifying under risk categories, they can assess, evaluate and classify the holding or non-regulated operational entity within the group of the specified service provider as deemed to be a specified service provider.

7.   Restoration and Resolution Plan — Any specified service provider, classified in the category of material or imminent risk to viability shall submit a restoration plan to the appropriate regulator and a resolution plan to the Corporation within ninety days of such classification. Every restoration plan will prescribe for the details of restoring category to low moderate and resolution plan on who resolution will be achieved.

Where a systemically important financial institution is classified in the category of low or moderate risk to viability, it shall submit the information required under this subsection assuming that it is classified in the category of material or imminent risk to viability.

Where the Resolution Corporation determines that liquidation is the most appropriate method for the resolution of a specified service provider, notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being in force relating to liquidation and winding up, the Corporation shall make an application to the Tribunal for an order of liquidation in respect of such specified service provider.

The detailed actions as prescribed under the Bill for various categories of risks is tabulated in Annexure I to this note.

Changes from the Bill, 2016

The Bill, 2016 aimed at including all NBFCs its foray. Bill, 2017 only intends to cover such NBFCs and other entities in the group, if such NBFC is classified on high risks to viability categories. This was an important and a necessary change from the Bill, 2016.

All the NBFCs, big and small will be continued to be monitored by the appropriate regulators, however, matters will get escalated only if they are on the risks to viability meter. Similar would be the case with other financial services providers as well.

Some key issues

Some key issues that the Bill, 2017 does not address or overlook are as follows:

  1. Definition of financial services provider – The Bill does not provide for a definition of financial services providers. The specified services provider will be deduced from the financial services providers, by and large. However the Bill, 2017 does not expressly provide for the universe of which the monitoring will be carried out. The Bill, 2017 indicates, NBFCs, insurance companies and banking institutions will fall in the ambit of discussion.
  2. NBFC-Ds – While the concept continues to be theoretical for all practical purposes, but the Bill, 2017 does not make a mention at all of this category of entities.
  3. Resolution and restoration plan — Chapter VII provides for resolution plan and restoration plan to be submitted to appropriate regulator and resolution corporation for material and imminent risk category specified service providers. The plans are to be submitted with 90 days. The brief contents of the plans to be provided to the authorities is prescribed in the Bill, 2017. However, are both plans to be provided within 90 days from the date of categorisation and for both categories?

For both categories of risks to viability, there can be strong intervention of the authorities in running of the business itself. One may find it difficult to find the distinction between the two categories of the risks to viability as the action taken by the authorities and from the specified service providers seems to be almost similar.

In case an entity is categorised as critical risk to viability, the turnaround of the resolution plan is to be carried out within one year, else the Resolution Corporation may require the liquidation of the entity. The entities, in determination here have an element of systemic risks and therefore liquidation of such entities can have daunting consequences on the economy. The provision for triggering liquidation should be well defined or determined in consultation with the Central Government.

4.   Rule-making – The devil, as they say, lies in the details. A lot of actions to be taken in each of the risks categorisation will come by way of rule-making. This will determine the effectiveness of the resolution plans and restoration plans prescribed in the Bill, 2017.

5.  Existing resolution mechanisms – The appropriate regulators have introduced several policy initiatives and resolution guidance and schemes for restructuring of stressed assets, special restructuring norms, strategic restructuring norms, corporate debt restructuring wherein the entities were required to submit resolution/ restructuring/ restoration plans within certain timeframes. The experience with these guidelines have indicated the failure of these guidelines and schemes to provide for a resolution plan within the dedicated time frame and also restoring the position of the entities.Therefore, appropriate learnings from those guidelines should also be reflected in the Bill,2017.

Annexure I

SL no. Category of risk to viability (Section 36) Categorised by ** Immediate action to be taken by the specified service provider Continued Action required by the specified service provider Action taken by appropriate regulator and/ or corporation
 
1 Low Appropriate Regulator No Action taken, regular monitoring of the activities of the entity may be conducted.

Where a SIFI is classified in the category of low or moderate risk to viability, it shall submit the information required under section 39 (2) assuming that it is classified in the category of material or imminent risk to viability.
2 Moderate Appropriate Regulator No Action taken, regular monitoring of the activities of the entity may be conducted.

Where a SIFI is classified in the category of low or moderate risk to viability, it shall submit the information required under section 39 (2) assuming that it is classified in the category of material or imminent risk to viability.
3 Material Resolution Corporation or Appropriate Regulator Submit a restoration plan[12] to the appropriate regulator and a resolution plan[13] to the resolution corporation within 90 days of such classification.

A copy of the restoration plan and resolution plan to be submitted to the resolution corporation and appropriate regulator respectively, within 15 days of the first submission, thereof.

Every systemically important financial institution shall submit a restoration plan to the appropriate regulator and a resolution plan to the Corporation within ninety days of its designation under section 25.

 Every restoration plan or resolution plan shall be revised annually and the appropriate regulator and the Corporation shall be informed of such revised restoration plan, within seven days of the revision.

Every material change shall be immediately informed to the appropriate regulator and the Corporation.

 Additional inspection may be carried out to monitor the risk to viability.

Appropriate regulator may prevent entity from taking certain business decisions including declaration of dividend, establishing new business or acquiring new clients, undertaking related party transactions, increasing liabilities etc.

Appropriate regulator may require the entity to increase capital, sell assets etc.
4 Imminent Resolution Corporation or Appropriate Regulator

 

Or

If the specified service provider has not submitted the restoration plan or resolution plan within prescribed time frame.

 Submit a restoration plan to the appropriate regulator and a resolution plan to the resolution corporation within 90 days of such classification.

A copy of the restoration plan and resolution plan to be submitted to the resolution corporation and appropriate regulator respectively, within 15 days of the first submission, thereof.

Every systemically important financial institution shall submit a restoration plan to the appropriate regulator and a resolution plan to the Corporation within ninety days of its designation under section 25.

 Every restoration plan or resolution plan shall be revised annually and the appropriate regulator and the Corporation shall be informed of such revised restoration plan, within seven days of the revision.

Every material change shall be immediately informed to the appropriate regulator and the Corporation.

 The resolution corporation may appoint an officer to inspect the functioning of the entity and act as an observer.

The corporation may prevent the entity from accepting funds, declaring dividend, acquiring new businesses or new clients, undertake related party transactions etc.

The corporation may require the entity to infuse new capital or sell identified assets etc.

 

A specified service provider classified in the category of imminent risk to viability shall, if it is not a SIFI, submit a resolution plan to the Corporation within 90 days.

 
5 Critical Resolution Corporation or Appropriate Regulator – effective from the date of publication in official gazette N.A. N.A. Corporation shall be deemed to be the administrator[14] and may take the following actions:

a.       resolve the issue through a scheme or merger or amalgamation or bail-in instrument.

b.      Transfer whole or part of assets/ liabilities to another person

c.       Create a bridge service provider

d.      Cause liquidation of the entity

e.       No legal action or proceeding including arbitration shall commence or continue until conclusion of resolution.

f.       No repayment or acceptance of deposit shall be made or liabilities incurred.

g.      temporarily prohibit (not exceeding 2 business days) by an order in writing, the exercise of such termination rights of any party to such specified contract with the relevant specified service provider or its associate company or subsidiary

License granted to the entity by the appropriate regulator may be withdrawn or modified.

 

[1] http://dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/FRDI%20Bill-27092016_1.pdf

[2] See our article titled – Financial Resolution and Deposit Insurance Bill: Implications for NBFCs, by Vinod Kothari and Niddhi Parmar, here http://vinodkothari.com/blog/financial-resolution-and-deposit-insurance-bill-implications-for-nbfcs-by-niddhi-parmar/

[3] http://164.100.47.4/BillsTexts/LSBillTexts/Asintroduced/165_2017_LS_Eng.pdf

[4] Appropriate Regulator is defined in First Schedule to the Bill, 2017 to include a) RBI, b) IRDA, c) SEBI, d) Pension Fund Regulatory Development Authority or any other regulator as notified by the Central Government.

[5] http://164.100.47.4/BillsTexts/LSBillTexts/Asintroduced/165_2017_LS_Eng.pdf

[6] Financial services provider categorised as specified service providers and SIFIs fall within the purview of the Resolution Corporation. The detailed mechanism of monitoring is discussed further in the highlights.

[7] A specified service provider is a person as defined in Second Schedule to Bill, 2017 and includes

  1. A banking institution, , other than eligible co-operative bank including an insured service provider;
  2. Any insurance company
  3. Any Financial Market Infrastructure
  4. Any payment system, as defined under the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 (51 of 2007), not notified under section 227 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016)
  5. Any non-banking financial company, not notified under section 227 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016)
  6. Any systemically important financial institution
  7. Any other financial service provider (excluding individuals and partnership firms), not notified under section 227 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016)
  8. A holding company of any specified service provider enumerated under items 1 to 7, registered in India which is not notified under section 227 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), subject to the determination by the Corporation under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 33
  9. Non-regulated operational entities within a financial group or conglomerate of a specified service provider enumerated under items 1 to 7 subject to the determination by the Corporation under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 33.
  10. Branch offices of body corporates incorporated outside India, carrying on the business of providing financial service in India.
  11. Any other entity or fund which may be notified by the Central Government

[8] As defined in Section 2 (19) of the Bill, 2017 — means any banking institution, that has obtained deposit insurance under sub-section (3) of section 33. Section 33 (3) states that every banking institution that has been granted a banking license by the appropriate regulator shall be deemed to be categorised as insured service provider for obtaining deposit insurance under the Act.

[9] Insured service provider is a banking institution that has obtained deposit insurance

[10] To qualify as an SIFI, the Central Government will consider the size, complexity of the financial service provider, the nature and volume of transactions undertaken, interconnectedness with other financial service providers and nature of services offered and possibility of substitution such business.

[11] The categorisation are based on assessment of the following parameters:

(a) adequacy of capital, assets and liability; (b) asset quality; (c) capability of management; (d) earnings sufficiency; (e) leverage ratio; (f) liquidity of the specified service provider; (g) sensitivity of the specified service provider to adverse market conditions; (h) compliance with applicable laws; (i) risk of failure of a holding company of a specified service provider or a connected body corporate in India or abroad; and (j) any other attributes as the Corporation deems necessary

[12] A restoration plan as per the provisions of Section 39, will contain details of assets and liabilities of the entity, including contingent liabilities, steps to be taken by the entity to move to moderate classification at least, time frame within which such restoration plan will be executed and other information relevant for the appropriate regulator to assess the plan.

[13] A resolution plan, as per the provisions of Section 40, will contain details of assets and liabilities of the entity, identification of critical functions of the specified service provider, access to financial market infrastructure services, either directly or indirectly, strategy plans on exiting the resolution process and any other relevant information.

[14] The resolution plan must be completed within one year from the date of classification into critical risk to viability. Where the plan is completed within one year and the Corporation deems necessary, it shall require liquidation of the entity.

Slaying the slain: the law about strike-off of companies

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By Nikita Snehil, (corplaw@vinodkothari.com)

Striking off of the names of companies for having remained inoperative has been a concept which has always been there, both under the 1956 Act, and under the 2013 Act. Striking-off of defunct companies is a provision in law for chopping the dead wood – if the company has lost its substratum, and there is nothing in the company, then the long process of winding up is not relevant for the company, and the RoC can strike off the name of the company as if the company never existed. Striking-off of companies is an option that exists both with the company, and with the RoC.

However, the recent massive clean-up operation, whereby RoCs started issuing public notices[1] in April, 2017 to strike off the name of the companies from the register of companies and to dissolve them unless a cause is shown to the contrary, within thirty days from the date of the notice, has come to centre of focus. Thereafter, on September 5, 2017 the government confirmed that names of over 2.09 lakh companies have been struck off from the Register of Companies for failing to comply with regulatory requirements.

There are several words which are doing rounds currently – defunct companies, shell companies, benami companies, and so on. They all mean completely different things. Defunct company is what the Companies Act talks about – a company which is left with no substance; it is either inoperative, or has no assets or liabilities. The word “shell company”, commonly used in tax parlance, refers to such companies which are merely a shell, that is, hiding the identity of the real owners. Obviously, the current environment of the drive against black money suggests that the word has been used to refer to companies which might have been used for money-laundering. The word benami company might have similar connotations.

However, the Companies Act term “defunct” companies never really smelled about money laundering or a device to shield the identity of real owners. Therefore, over the years, the concept has been innocuous. In the current environment, however, the various expressions above have all been mixed up, as if to conclude that defunct companies were being used for money-laundering. If the company is really defunct, and there is no substance into it, it seems paradoxical to relate it to money laundering operations. The fact that there is no real asset or no real liability should mean that there is nothing in the company, including any evidence of untaxed wealth. However, the confusion between defunct companies and black money is quite evident in the MCA press release[2] issued on September 6, 2017 said that the action of the MCA “would not only help in checking the menace of black money” but would help the ease of doing business in India. The Press Release also sounded like a shock to the directors of such struck-off companies, as it said 3 important points:


This article endeavours to understand the provisions of the law about striking off of names of companies and the impact thereof on directors’ disqualifications.

Enabling provision of the law

As per Section 248 of the Companies Act, 2013 (‘Act’) which deals with the power of Registrar to remove name of company from register of companies:

“(1) Where the Registrar has reasonable cause to believe that—
(a) a company has failed to commence its business within one year of its incorporation;

(b) [omitted]

(c) a company is not carrying on any business or operation for a period of two immediately preceding financial years and has not made any application within such period for obtaining the status of a dormant company under section 455,

he shall send a notice to the company and all the directors of the company, of his intention to remove the name of the company from the register of companies and requesting them to send their representations along with copies of the relevant documents, if any, within a period of thirty days from the date of the notice.”

Therefore, though the public notice issued by the RoC stated the reference of Section 248 of the Act, it is pertinent to note that the said Section empowers the RoC to strike the names of the Companies only in two cases. But almost all the shell companies does not seem to have triggered any of the above two conditions.

Section 248 Vs Section 455 of the Act

Another section which empowers RoC to remove the name of a company from the register of members is Section 455 of the Act. As per the provisions of Section 455 of the Act, which deals with the provisions of dormant company:

“(4) In case of a company which has not filed financial statements or annual returns for two financial years consecutively, the Registrar shall issue a notice to that company and enter the name of such company in the register maintained for dormant companies.

(5) A dormant company shall have such minimum number of directors, file such documents and pay such annual fee as may be prescribed to the Registrar to retain its dormant status in the register and may become an active company on an application
made in this behalf accompanied by such documents and fee as may be prescribed.

(6) The Registrar shall strike off the name of a dormant company from the register of dormant companies, which has failed to comply with the requirements of this section.”

The section states the following procedure to be adopted by the the dormant company and the RoC:

(a) RoC may remove the name of an inactive company from the register of members and put the same in the register of dormant companies.
(b) The dormant company shall then comply with the requirements and retain its dormant status or make an application to become an active company.
(c) Thereafter, if the dormant company fails to comply with the requirements of the section, then the RoC can finally remove the name of such company from the register of dormant company as well.

However, in the current situation, the above mentioned procedure is not followed by the RoCs and names of the companies are directly struck off from the register of members.

Hence, there does not seems to be an enabling section under which the RoC has struck off the names of the companies.

Vacation of office of Directors

As per the Press release issued by MCA, the next move of MCA will be to compel the Directors of such shell companies which have not filed returns for three or more years to vacate the office.

Provisions of law:

Section 164 (2) of the Act, which deals with the disqualifications of appointment of directors, provides the following:

“No person who is or has been a director of a company which—

(a) has not filed financial statements or annual returns for any continuous period of three financial years; or

(b) has failed to repay the deposits accepted by it or pay interest thereon or to redeem any debentures on the due date or pay interest due thereon or pay any dividend declared and such failure to pay or redeem continues for one year or more,

shall be eligible to be re-appointed as a director of that company or appointed in other company for a period of five years from the date on which the said company fails to do so.”

Further, Section 167(1)(a) of the Act directs that the office of a director shall become vacant in case he incurs any of the disqualifications specified in section 164 of the Act.

Therefore, reading both the sections, it can be concluded that, the directors of such companies will:

1. have to vacate their office, due to the disqualification incurred;

2. not be able to be re-appointed as a director of that company;

3. not be eligible to be appointed in any other companies as well.

The second and third effect will last upto a period of five years from the date on which the said company fails comply with the provisions of section 164 (2) of the Act.

Having said so, there arises a further question:

‘Does disqualification to section 164(2)(b) of Act will also apply to directors newly appointed in the company?’

It is important to note the starting lines of section 164(2)(b), which read as follows:

“No person who is or has been a director of a company which xxX”

Thus, to attract disqualification under section 164(2)(b), it is important that the individual has to be on the board of the company when the default actually happened.

Therefore, even new directors of such company will attract the disqualification, inspite of the fact that they were not at all involved in such non-compliance. Basically, the intent of law might be to deter companies from defaulting, which would demotivate any new director to join the company.

Applicability of the law – prospective or retrospective?

Sections 164 and 167 came into force on April 1, 2014. However, the disqualifications under Section 164 (2) cannot become applicable as on April 1, 2014 for any annual filings not done in any of the previous financial years. The provisions were initially inapplicable to private companies. Section 164 (2) curtails the right of directors of such companies to continue as directors, casts a new burden, imposes a new liability on such directors for having defaulted in filing financial statements for any 3 continuous financial years.

It was discussed in the Supreme Court Judgment in case

of Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath … vs State Of Bihar And Ors on 7 October, 1999[3] that the true principle is that Lex prospicit non respicit (law looks forward not back). As Willes, J. said, retrospective legislation is `contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated ought, when introduced for the first time, to deal with future acts, and ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law.

However, in the recent case law of “Vikram Ahuja Vs. Greenstone Investments Pvt. Ltd. and ors., before the NCLT, Mumbai Bench, decided on November 11, 2016”[4], one of the point for discussion and decision before the Hon’ble bench was:

“whether the disqualification set forth in Section 164(2)(a) read with 167(1) (a) of the Act has retrospective effect or not?”.

The Hon’ble Tribunal, after considering various case laws considered that “this provision has to be read as applicable to the situations where non-filing has started, at the most in the past and continuing while this enactment has come to into existence and also to future non-filing”. Also, it has been provided that, the statute providing posterior disqualification on past conduct does not become a retrospective one because a part of a requisition for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing.

Therefore, the applicability of the Section, whether retrospective or prospective is still debatable.

Legal position of the company after strike-off

By virtue of a legal process, a company is born as a separate legal entity, so is its death process. In case of dissolution of a company pursuant to the company’s name being removed from the Register by the ROC in terms of Section 248 of the Act, the corporate status of an entity ceases to subsist, its functionality stops and for all practical purposes corporate activities come to an end.

Liability of directors

The pertinent question that arises here is that whether the liability of directors and other officers of the company struck off from the records will continue and whether it could be enforced. The answer to this is yes.

The relevant clause of Section 248 of the Act provides the followings:

“(7) The liability, if any, of every director, manager or other officer who was exercising any power of management, and of every member of the company dissolved under sun-section (5), shall continue and may be enforced as if the company had not been dissolved.”

Accordingly, it can be drawn that notwithstanding the company’s dissolution, the liabilities of its directors and officers who exercised powers along with its members continue, remain unaltered and enforceable. However, the dissolution does not makes any enhancement to the enforcement of the liabilities affecting the personal capacity of the abovementioned persons.

A view can be taken that the dissolution under section 248 is not a state complete extinction. Instead it is a state of suspension for a period of twenty years from the date of dissolution, as upon the revival of the company, all its rights and liabilities are restituted with retrospective effect from the date of strike-off.

Assets of the company

Another concern for a company whose name has been struck-off by the ROC is that there may be properties and rights vested in or held on trust for the company, cash balances of the company and other current or non-current assets of the company while it was functional. The fate of such assets is a question to be addressed.

Section 352(2) and 352(7) of the Act deals with the unclaimed or undistributed estate of a company, but these sections becomes applicable where there is a liquidator involved in winding up of a company. In case a company is dissolved in pursuance of Section 248, there is no liquidator appointed. Hence, the operative part of Section 352 is not applicable in the dissolution of a company under Section 248.

A reference can be drawn from the Companies Act of England, which has a provision stating that the property of dissolved company shall be bona vacantia. The Escheat over which no one has a claim is known as bona vacantia. The term can be expressed as ‘abandoned property’ too. In bona vacantia there is no owner of the property and the State merely takes possession of the property, which is an abandoned one. In India there is no such corresponding provision in the Act. However, as per the laws in India, the property of an estate dying without leaving lawful heirs passes to the government by escheat or as bona vacantia. Similarly, it can be inferred that the property of a dissolved company shall also pass to the government by escheat or as bona vacantia, including any subsisting interest of the company on the date of dissolution.

Though, it can be established that the doctrine of bona vacantia will be applicable for a company dissolved under section 248, however, whether the same shall come into operation immediately or after a lapse of the prescribed time period of twenty years is a debatable matter.

Effect of company notified as dissolved

As per Section 250 of the Act, where a company stands dissolved under section 248, it shall on and from the date mentioned in the notice issued by RoC in the Official Gazette, shall cease to operate as a company and the Certificate of Incorporation issued to it shall be deemed to have been cancelled from such date except for the purpose of realising the amount due to the company and for the payment or discharge of the liabilities or obligations of the company.

Recent judgements:

NCLT, at its hearing of Principal Bench at New Delhi, on March 14, 2017, in the case of Poly Auto System Pvt. Ltd. Vs. RoC Delhi[5], held that the Registrar of Companies has to comply with the comprehensive procedural obligations before passing the final order of striking off the name of the company from the register of members. The casual approach of the RoC which would lead to abrupt conclusion will not be a legal act. And the Tribunal ordered for restoration of the name of the Company in the register of members.

Similarly, the present act of the government of striking off the names of more than 2 two lakh companies, seems not to consider the post effect of such dissolution.
So, it will be interesting to see how the assets and liabilities of the companies will be managed – will there be appointment of any liquidator? How will the liabilities of the creditors will be discharged? Will the balances of the cash rest with the government? These are the few questions which will have to be addressed by the government in the due course.

Remedial Action

Section 252 of the Act empowers the Tribunal, to pass an order for the restoration of company which has been struck off by the ROC, in the following manner:

(a) Appeal filed by any person:

Any person aggrieved by the order of the RoC may file an appeal before the Tribunal within 3 years of the order passed by RoC and if the Tribunal is of the opinion that the removal of name of company is not justified in view of the absence of any of the grounds on which the order was passed by the ROC, it may pass an order for restoration of the name of the company in the register of companies after giving a reasonable opportunity of making representations and of being heard to the ROC, the company and all the persons concerned. The genuine companies, which have been struck off, will move to file an appeal to the NCLT in this case.

(b) Application filed by ROC:

The ROC may, within a period of three years from the date of passing of the order dissolving the company under section 248, file an application before the Tribunal seeking restoration of name of such company if it is satisfied that the name of the company has been struck off from the register of companies either inadvertently or on the basis of incorrect information furnished by the company or its directors. Genuine companies may make representations to prove their innocence or bonafide reason of such non-filings, pursuant to which RoC may on valid reasons but within a period of three years, restore the name of such companies.

(c) Application filed by company or any member or creditor or workmen:

The Tribunal, on an application made by the company, member, creditor or workman before the expiry of 20 years from the publication in the Official Gazette of the notice of dissolution of the company, if satisfied that:

1) the company was, at the time of its name being struck off, carrying on business or in operation; or
2) b) otherwise it is just that the name of the company be restored to the register of companies,

may order the name of the company to be restored to the register of companies. Further, the Tribunal may also pass an order and give such other directions and make such provisions as deemed just for placing the company and all other persons in the same position as nearly as may be as if the name of the company had not been struck off from the register of companies.

Therefore, in the present situation, it will be best for the genuine companies to make representations/ applications to the RoCs proving that the companies are not involved in any fraudulent activities or involved in syphoning of funds through illicit activities. The representations/ applications may convince the RoC to restore the names of the genuine companies.

 

[1] http://www.mca.gov.in/MinistryV2/roc.html

[2] http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=170579

[3] https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1293868/

[4] http://nclt.gov.in/Publication/Mumbai_Bench/2016/397_398/Greenstone%20Investments%20Pvt.%20Ltd.%2022.11.2016_.pdf

[5] http://nclt.gov.in/interim_orders/principal/14.03.2017/Poly%20Auto%20Systems%20Pvt.%20Ltd..pdf

HC disallows parallel proceedings in NCLT and debt recovery tribunal
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While the company moved the NCLT on its own seeking to obtain this ‘moratorium’, the guarantors found it an alibi to seek relief from the earlier DRT case – Richa Saraf. Read More

POWER TO ARREST AS PER COMPANIES ACT, 2013

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By Smriti Wadehra, (corplaw@vinodkothari.com).

The Companies Act, 2013 (‘Act’) empowers the Central Government to inspect the books of accounts of a company, to direct special audit, to order investigation into the affairs of a company and to launch prosecution for violation of the Act. These inspections are designed to ensure that the companies conduct their affairs in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and there is no mismanagement which may adversely affect the interest of the stakeholders. It further also keeps a check on any unfair practices prejudicial to public interest that is being resorted to by any company or a group of companies.

In light of this and the rise in financial crime, the need for a specialised agency to do cutting edge investigation and ensure quick closure of cases was necessitated. Accordingly, section 212 was introduced in the Act, however, the provisions of section relating to Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO), was notified only on 1st April, 2014 except sub-section (8) to (10). SFIO is a multi-disciplinary organisation, consisting of experts, for detecting and prosecuting or recommending for prosecution of white collar crimes and frauds.

The main intent of SFIO is to prosecute corporates liable for corporate offence under the Act. Since, the definition of offence was not very clear and references were provided to various sections of the Act, there was a need to clear the ambiguity in this regard. In this regard, Companies (Amendment) Act, 2015 substituted the references to the section of offences with “Offences covered under section 447 of the Act”[1].

POWER TO ARREST

Ministry has recently come out with a notification G.S.R. 1062(E)[2] dated 24th August, 2017 making the provisions of section (8) to (10) of section 212, applicable and bestowing the power to arrest on the Act. The provisions of the section specifically lays down that every Director, Additional Director or Assistant Director of SFIO, authorised by the Central Government may by general or special order, if it has reasons to believe on the basis of material in his possession that any person under investigation is guilty of any offence punishable under sections referred to in sub-section (6), may arrest such person and shall, as soon as may be, inform him of the grounds for such arrest. Further, the provisions of Sub-section (9) and (10) of the section, provides light on the procedure of conducting such arrest by the Director and rules as mentioned below. These rules shall come into force from the date of their publication in Official Gazette i.e. 24th August, 2017.

PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

  • The Director, Additional Director or Assistant Director, while exercising powers under sub-section (B) of section 212 of the Act, shall sign the arrest order together with personal search memo in the Form appended to these rules and shall serve it on the arrestee and obtain written acknowledgement of service.
  • The Director, Additional Director or Assistant Director shall forward a copy of the arrest order along with the material in his possession and all the other documents including personal search memo to the office of Director, SFIO in a sealed envelope with a forwarding letter after signing on each page of these documents, so as to reach the office of the Director, SFIO within twenty four hours through the quickest possible means.
  • An arrest register shall be maintained in the office of Director, SFIO and the Director or any officer nominated by Director shall ensure that entries with regard to particulars of the arrestee, date and time of arrest and other relevant information pertaining to the arrest are made in the arrest register in respect of all arrests made by the arresting officers. Entry shall be made immediately on receipt of documents.
  • The provisions of the code of criminal Procedure, 1973(2 of 1974), relating to arrest shall be applied mutatis mutandis to every arrest made under this Act
  • Arrest order together with supporting papers shall be preserved for a period of five years from:

(i) Date of judgement or final order of Trial court (in cases where judgement has not impugned in appellate court),OR

(ii) Date of disposal of the matter before appellate court (in case the judgement is impugned)

[WHICHEVER IS LATER]

CONCLUSION

Although it was difficult to prevent white-collar crime or corporate crimes, it wasn’t necessarily difficult to commit the same. This is the reason why the evolution of SFIO was important. SFIO has emerged with the main object of improving work practices among the corporates by imposing corporate criminal liability. If an individual who has committed a crime cannot be identified and there is no mechanism for corporate prosecution, the harmful practices would continue unbated. To avoid such a situation, SFIO acts as a corporate watchdog for critical research into corporate power and its doings. To conclude, we can say that corporate crimes are much in vogue today, and so are the methods to tackle them.

[1] http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/AmendmentAct_2015.pdf

[2] http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/companiesArrestsconnectionSFIORule_25082017.pdf

FAQs on Ind AS 116: The New Lease Accounting Standard

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By Vijaylakshmi Agarwal (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

Understanding Impact

  1. What is this new Standard all about, in brief?

The standard provides a new method for lease accounting. Ind AS 116 is largely converged with IFRS 16 Leases. Ind AS is expected to replace Ind AS 17 WEF from its proposed effective date being for annual periods beginning on or after 1st April, 2019. Essentially, lessee accounting undergoes major change, while lessor accounting largely remains unchanged. As for lessee, the existing distinction between financial and operating leases (whereby the former was on the balance sheet, and the latter was off-balance sheet) goes away, and in case of every lease (other than exceptions, discussed below), the lease comes on the balance sheet as a right-to-use (RTU) asset and a corresponding lease liability representing its obligation to make lease payments. Read more →

SEBI aborts brightening of fine lines of control

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By CS Vinita Nair, (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

SEBI at its Board meeting held on March 12, 2016[1] discussed and decided on several important matters, one of them being approving for initiation of public consultation process regarding Bright line Tests for Acquisition of ‘Control’ under the SEBI (SAST) Regulations, 2011[2] (SAST). Acquisition of control, in case of listed entities, entails making an open offer under SAST.

Control has been defined, by way of an inclusive definition, under various laws in India and internationally. The crux of the definition of ‘control’ under various laws has been discussed in Annexure 1. Primarily, the salient features of definition of ‘control’ are as under:

  • The right to appoint a majority of directors
  • The right to control the management
  • The right to control the policy decision

Such rights may be exercised by a person, directly or indirectly. The rights may accrue by virtue of shareholding, management rights, shareholder agreements, voting agreements or in any other manner. However, in case of contractual agreements, assessment of acquisition of control becomes complex and requires consideration of facts. It has been represented to SEBI to amend the definition of control, thereby shifting it from a principle based definition to rule based definition, in order to avoid multitude of opinions. In a given scenario multiple regulators may all be applying the test of control from different perspectives and arriving at differing results which may lead to ambiguity and confusion in the market

In view of the same, SEBI, in the Discussion paper, had proposed following two options to identify bright lines for control:

Option 1:- Framework for Protective Rights

Option 2:- Adopting a numerical threshold

The definition of ‘control’ under the SAST may be amended such that control is defined as:

“(a) the right or entitlement to exercise at least 25% of voting rights of a company irrespective of whether such holdings gives de facto control; and/or

(b) the right to appoint majority of the non-independent directors of a company.”

This article analyses the proposed definition of control in the light of past judgments, committee reports etc. The Discussion paper was put open for public comments till April 14, 2016.

Background

‘Control’ as explained in case of Subhkam Ventures v/s SEBI

Decision of Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) in case of M/s Subhkam Ventures (I) Private Limited versus SEBI[3] . The recital of the agreement entered into with MSK Projects (India) Limited and its promoters, provided that Subhkam is only a financial investor and will neither be regarded as the promoter nor acquire control and management of the target company for any reason. Subhkam argued that open offer was made under Regulation 10[4] of SAST, 1997 while SEBI insisted that control was acquired and therefore Regulation 12[5] was also required to be disclosed to enable shareholders to make an informed decision.

SAT explained the difference in case of proactive and reactive power and clarified that control, means creating or controlling a situation by taking the initiative and not reacting. It is a positive power and not a negative power. In case of Subhkam, the intent behind incorporating protective clauses in the shareholder’s agreement was to ensure that the target company does not undergo any paradigm shift from its present position without Subhkam’s knowledge and approval. Such provisions did not grant control but enabled Subhkam to oppose a proposal, provided fetters to protect the investment made. SAT allowed the appeal by inferring that none of the clauses of the agreement, individually or collectively demonstrates control in the hands of the appellant.

Being a key issue, SEBI appealed the SAT order before Supreme Court. Supreme Court, on November 16, 2011 stated that ‘keeping in view the above changed circumstances, it is in the interest of justice to dispose of the present appeal by keeping the question of law open and it is also clarified that the  impugned order passed by the SAT will not be treated as a precedent.’

Deliberations on ‘Control’ in TRAC[6] report

The Committee concluded that a holding level of 25% of voting rights permits the exercise de facto control (Para 2.6). The existence or nonexistence of control over a listed company would be a question of fact, or at best a mixed question of fact and law, to be answered on a case to case basis. Any blanket provision whereby a right to say “no” is in all circumstances deemed to either constitute “control” or not to constitute “control” may be liable to misuse (Para 3.3). Acquisition of de facto control, and not just de jure control should expressly trigger an open offer (Para 3.6). The Committee had recommended the definition of “control” be modified to include “ability” in addition to “right” to appoint majority of the directors or to control the management or policy decisions would constitute control. It further clarified that a director or officer of the target company would not be regarded as being in control merely by virtue of holding such position (Para 3.7).

The Committee examined the possibility of introducing a whitewash provision in the Takeover Regulations on the lines of international practice i.e. an open offer would not be required if a material majority of the shareholders of the target company were to pass a resolution waiving the open offer. The rationale for such a framework is that an open offer is ultimately made for the benefit of the shareholders and it is well within the shareholders‘ rights to renounce such a benefit if they so desire (Para 12.17). However, the whitewash provisions were not incorporated in SAST, 2011 in the absence of robust regulations on proxy solicitation, and given the realities of the Indian market, any provision for shareholder waiver for an open offer may not be in the best interests of investors at large.

Veto rights – protective rights not amounting to exercise of ‘control’

As was explained under SAT order in case of Subhkam Ventures v/s SEBI, veto rights are protective in nature rather than participative in nature. Veto rights are fetters for the purpose of good governance and aimed to protect the investments made from the whims and fancies of the promoters who manage the company. On similar lines, an illustrative list of protective rights has been provided which may be granted to an investor subject to following conditions is provided by way of Annexure 2:

  • The investor must invest atleast 10% or more in the target company;
  • Approval by way of majority of minority i.e. approval of public shareholder’s needs to be obtained and such rights needs to be incorporated in Articles of Association.
  • In case of IPO, the existing agreements to stand cancelled/ modified or suspended till approval is obtained in the aforesaid manner post listing of shares.

However, there still remains a likelihood of this leading to further complexities in assessment of control owing to ambiguity in interpretation.

Adopting numerical threshold

In view of the provisions relating to passing of special resolutions under Companies Act, 2013 and trigger limit for determining control under SAST being 25%, it was proposed to regard 25% as the threshold level for trigger of control in Indian listed companies. Further, it was proposed to determine control on the basis of right to appoint non-independent directors and not majority of directors. The reason for the same being Regulation 17 of SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 prescribes the composition of Board.

As compared to aforesaid option, this approach would reduce the uncertainty in assessment of acquisition of ‘control’, however, will not be able to capture control derived by way of special rights.

Stakeholders’ Comments and opinions

SEBI vide a Press Release dated September 08, 2017[7] informed that a number of comments from various stakeholders including industry bodies, intermediaries, advocates and investors were received on the Discussion paper issued on March 14, 2016. No particular option garnered overwhelming support amongst the stakeholders. SEBI also received the views of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and the Reserve Bank of India in this regard.

Few stakeholders including the MCA opined that changing the current definition of ‘control’ may reduce the regulatory scope and may be prone to abuse and hence, the current definition of ‘control’ may not be changed. Instead the stakeholders opined that it would be more appropriate to take decisions on a case-to-case basis. Further, it may be noted that the Justice Bhagwati Committee which was constituted in the year 1995 to review the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1994, had recommended a broad definition of control and opined that it should be left to SEBI to decide whether there has been an acquisition of control on the basis of facts of each case.

Conclusion

SEBI intended to align the definition of control, in line with the recommendations and deliberations made in report submitted by TRAC, justification given in the aforesaid SAT order. However, pursuant to the comments and opinions received from the various stakeholders and authorities it is felt that any change or dilution in the definition of control would have far reaching consequences since a similar definition of ‘control’ is used in the Companies Act, 2013 and other laws.  Consequently, it has been decided to not to proceed with the amendment and to continue with the practice of ascertaining acquisition of ‘control’ as per the extant definition in the SAST.

Annexure 1

Sr. no Act/ Regulations Parameter for determining control Exclusions, if any
1. SEBI (SAST) Regulations, 2011 ·         right to appoint majority of the directors or to

·         control the management or policy decisions

 

exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements or in any other manner

 ·         Mere holding of position of a director or officer in the target company.
2. SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 As defined under SAST  
3. SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2009 As defined under SAST, 1997 (same as above) ·         Where there are two or more persons in control over the target company, the cesser of any one of such persons from such control shall not be deemed to be a change in control of management nor shall any change in the nature and quantum of control amongst them constitute change in control of management:

Provided that the transfer from joint control to sole control is effected in accordance with clause (e) of sub-regulation (1) of regulation 3.
4. Companies Act, 2013 Similar to definition under SAST. Exclusions not included.
5. Consolidated FDI Policy, 2015 & FEM ( Transfer or issue of security by a person resident outside India) Regulations, 2000 Similar to definition under SAST. Exclusions not included.
6. Competition Act, 2002 ·     controlling the affairs or management by—

o   one or more enterprises, either jointly or singly, over another enterprise or group[8];

o   one or more groups, either jointly or singly, over another group or enterprise;

 –
7. AS-18 ·     (a) ownership, directly or indirectly, of more than one half of the voting power of an enterprise, or

·     (b) control of the composition of the board of directors in the case of a company or of the composition of the corresponding governing body in case of any other enterprise, or

·     (c) a substantial interest in voting power and the power to direct, by statute or agreement, the financial and/or operating policies of the enterprise

  
8. Ind AS-27 ·     power to govern the financial and operating policies of an entity so as to obtain benefits from its activities.  
9. IFRS 10 ·     Ownership of more than half the voting right of another entity  Power over more than half of the voting rights by agreement with investors

·     Power to govern the financial and operating policies of the other entity under statute/ agreement

·     Power to remove/appoint majority of directors

·     Power to cast majority of votes.

  
10. City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, UK ·     Control means an interest, or interests, in shares carrying in aggregate 30% or more of the voting rights (as defined below) of a company, irrespective of whether such interest or interests give de facto control.  
11. Takeover Guide, Canada ·     A “control person” is a person (or person within a combination of persons who are acting in concert) which holds a sufficient number of shares to affect materially the control of the target (and, if the ownership is greater than 20%, the person(s) are deemed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to hold a sufficient number of shares to affect materially the control).  
12. The Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers ·     Effective control means a holding, or aggregate holdings, of shares carrying 30% or more of the voting rights (as defined below) of a company, irrespective of whether that holding (or holdings) gives de facto control. “Acquiring effective control” of a company refers to a situation where a person and parties acting in concert with him, who previously held in aggregate less than 30% of the company’s voting rights, increase their aggregate holding of voting rights in the company to 30% or more.

·     “Consolidating effective control” in a company refers to a situation where a person and parties acting in concert with him, who already owned between 30% and 50% of the company’s voting rights, increase their aggregate holding of voting rights in the company by more than 1% within a 6 month period.

  
13. Malaysian Code on Takeovers and Mergers 2010 ·     Does not define control

 

  
14. Takeover Guide, Japan ·     Does not define control  

 

Annexure 2

Illustrative list of protective rights that do not amount to exercise of “control”, including quorum[9] rights for meetings involving matters stated below:

  • Appointment of Non executive Chairman/ Vice Chairman without any casting vote;
  • Appointment of investor’s nominee as observer of Board, without any voting or participation rights;
  • Covenants stipulated by banks, NBFCs etc granting loan on commercial basis, provided the rights are customary to the lending business
  • Non exclusive and Mutually beneficial commercial agreements, approved by the Board where the Board of target company has the right to terminate the agreement;
  • Veto rights in case of following matters that are not part of the ordinary course of business[10] or involve governance issues would be regarded as protective rights.
    • Amendment of MoA & AoA adversely impacting the investor’s rights;
    • Alteration to the capital structure of the company;
    • Change of statutory auditors;
    • Material[11] divestment, transfer or disposal of an undertaking or material subsidiary of the target company;
    • RPTs entered not in ordinary course of business or not on an arm’s length basis;
    • Material[12] acquisition of any companies, bodies corporate, business, undertaking or joint ventures;
    • Incurring indebtedness, granting loans, providing guarantees or creating security in excess of thresholds prescribed under Act, 2013 without shareholder approval;
    • winding up of the company or making a general assignment for the benefit of the creditors of the company and/or the subsidiaries or admitting in writing the inability of the company to repay its debts when they become due;
    • write-off of any of the receivables, loans and advances, investment or investments or inventories outside the ordinary course of business[13]

[1] http://www.sebi.gov.in/cms/sebi_data/pdffiles/33245_t.pdf

[2] http://www.sebi.gov.in/cms/sebi_data/attachdocs/1457945258522.pdf

[3] http://www.sebi.gov.in/satorders/subhkamventures.pdf

[4] Acquisition of fifteen per cent or more of the shares or voting rights of any company.

[5] Acquisition of control over a company.

[6] Takeover Regulations Advisory Committee – set up under the chairmanship of Mr. C Achuthan. Report was submitted on July 19, 2010  – http://www.sebi.gov.in/cms/sebi_data/attachdocs/1287826537018.pdf

[7] http://www.sebi.gov.in/media/press-releases/sep-2017/acquisition-of-control-under-the-sebi-substantial-acquisition-of-shares-and-takeovers-regulations-2011_35891.html

[8] “group” means two or more enterprises which, directly or indirectly, are  in a position to —

(i) exercise twenty-six per cent or more of the voting rights in the other enterprise; or

(ii) appoint more than fifty per cent of the members of the board of directors in the other enterprise; or

(iii) control the management or affairs of the other enterprise;

[9] If two meetings are not quorate, the next meeting would be deemed to have quorum despite the absence of the investor nominees.

[10] The company will be required to formulate a policy defining the parameters that will be ‘outside the ordinary course of business’.

[11] The company will be required to formulate a policy defining the parameters that will be ‘material’.

[12] The company will be required to formulate a policy defining the parameters that will be ‘material’.

[13] The company will be required to formulate a policy defining the parameters that will be ‘outside the ordinary course of business’

SEBI requires disclosure by banks in case of NPA divergence

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By Mayank Agarwal, (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

The banking sector is one of the pillars for economic development of any country, and any well balanced and healthy economy is largely dependent on a transparent and credible banking system. In recent years, the Indian economy has recognized the importance of a well-regulated and fundamentally strong banking framework and made it one of its priorities to clear out the vast amount of unhealthy practices and activities that tread on the fine line of regulation. A slew of new policies which led to clearer recognition norms, stricter disclosure requirements, more hands-on approach by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and an overall environment that is much more transparent than before are all testimony to the fact that the banking institutions are in for a major overhaul. The introduction of practices such as Asset Quality Review (AQR), restructuring norms and the introduction of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) by the RBI were steps aimed towards a fundamentally cleaner banking system. Read more →