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RPTs: Testing Multiyear Contracts for Materiality

– Saloni Khant, Executive | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

It is common for companies to enter into multi-year contracts in its usual business operations, to secure supply of goods or services, access to premises for operations, or for other commercial reasons etc. In the maze of RPT compliances, however, given that the transactions are usually approved by the Audit Committee and/ or shareholders on an omnibus basis, challenges arise on the ideal way of dealing with and taking approval for multi-year contracts.

The relevance of multi-year contracts in the context of RPTs arises for two reasons:

  • the value of contract that is required to be taken for the purpose of ascertaining materiality of a contract or transaction, and
  • the tenure for which the approval can be taken for such contracts.

Several questions arise:

  • Should the entire value of the contract be placed for approval, even if that results in crossing the materiality threshold, and requires going to the shareholders?
  • Or can the shareholders’ approval be circumvented by dividing the total contract value into yearly values and taking approval only for the estimated yearly transaction value?
  • If so, what happens if the contract is not approved by the AC in any subsequent FY within the tenure of the contract?
  • If the total contract value is approved, should the approved value be considered for materiality thresholds again for the next FY?

Divisibility of contracts into smaller relevant units

The crucial point in considering whether a contract requires yearly approval or one single approval valid for the whole contract is based on the “divisibility” of the contract – that is to say, its ability to be divided into smaller units instead of considering the contract as a whole. If it is a single contract for a fixed term, the approval of the contract is approval of the entire exchange of resources/services that takes place over such term.

The divisibility of a contract may be judged against various factors, for instance:

  • Tenure of the contract
  • Contractual milestones for payment based on performance 
  • Satisfaction of performance through delivery of goods or services under a contract etc.

We discuss each of these in detail below.

Fixed tenure implies single approval for whole tenure?

Several contracts may have a fixed tenure, but does the fixity of tenure itself implies that such a contract shall be required to be approved through a single approval – valid for the whole tenure of the transaction?

There may be several  contracts having a fixed term, but the fixity of term in itself may  not be the essential feature in all such contracts. For example, a contract might have been entered into 3 years for supply of certain goods or services. While the tenure of the contract is 3 years, each instance of supply of goods or services constitutes an independent divisible supply in itself. Hence, in such cases, merely based on the tenure of the contract, the indivisibility of such arrangement cannot be argued.

Performance or payment milestones in a contract

In a multi-year contract, there are usually payment milestones based on performance of the contract. For example, a contract for development of software may contain milestones, such as, (i) development of UAT model, (ii) development of final software interface, and (iii) activation of the software etc. While the contract value may be divided based on the three different stages or milestones specified in the contract – it is important to note that the performance of the contract becomes complete only upon activation of the software, and hence, the divisions based on the performance milestones do not have an independent existence. Hence, dividing the contract would not be feasible here.

Performance of contract: delivery of goods or services

The most important factor in considering the divisibility of a contract is the actual performance of the contract. Whether the contract is of such nature that the delivery happens “over a period of time”, or is it such that while the exchange of resources/ services take place over the tenure of the term, the performance may be said to be complete only “at a point of time”.

Period of time v. point of time: drawing reference from Ind AS 115

In order to understand the divisibility of a contract based on ‘period of time’ v/s  ‘point of time’- reference may be drawn from its closest equivalent under Ind AS 115 read with its guidance note for the purpose of revenue recognition.

Divisible contracts: satisfaction of performance obligations over a period of time

Ind AS 115 specifies conditions based on which it may be said that the performance obligation is satisfied and revenue is required to be recognised over a period of time: [Para 35]

  • The nature of the activity is such that the counterparty is able to enjoy the supply simultaneously as it is made.
  • In case an asset is created/ enhanced, it remains within the control of the counterparty during such creation/ enhancement.
  • In case the nature of the asset so created is such that it has no alternative use and the payment terms provide that the supplier has a right to payment for supply till date.

Where none of these conditions are satisfied, the performance obligation in the contract is considered to be satisfied at a point in time.

(a) the customer simultaneously receives and consumes the benefits provided by the entity’s performance as the entity performs;

The key question here is if the performance of the contract is stopped midway, would the customer still be considered to have benefitted from the performance already done?

For e.g., in a rental agreement, the tenant takes the benefit of the premises simultaneously. Even if the tenancy is terminated midway, it does not take away the benefits already enjoyed by such tenant during the period of the contract,  he would remain benefitted for the fulfilled period of tenancy.

This may be compared with a construction agreement, where, in the event of an early termination of the contract, the performance obligations would remain incomplete, with no benefits to the customer for the period of time during which the service has been performed prior to its termination. Even where the work is rerouted to another supplier, it would require substantial rework.

(b) the entity’s performance creates or enhances an asset (for example, work in progress) that the customer controls as the asset is created or enhanced;

The renovation of an office building owned by the customer would amount to a contract over a period of time. The service may be terminated midway and can be completed by another service provider since the control of the asset remains with the owner at all times.

(c) the entity’s performance does not create an asset with an alternative use to the entity and the entity has an enforceable right to payment for performance completed to date.

The term ‘an alternative use’ must be considered from the perspective of practical limitations and contractual restrictions. Where the nature of the asset is such that it cannot be redirected to another contract, for example – machinery with unusual specifications cannot be sold to another customer, it is said to not have an alternative use. Even where the resources are portable, but the contractual terms restrict such redirection, there is no alternative use.

In such cases, where a contract is terminated midway, the service provider must have the right to receive payment on quantum meruit basis i.e. the work is sufficiently divisible to assess the payment due to the supplier.

When a contract fulfills any of the three conditions, it satisfies one principle criteria:  

Any exit from the contract may require the contractual parties to replace the party, and may have penal consequences, but it is not as if the contract was not performed at all.

Manner of seeking approval

Where the transaction is a single indivisible contract i.e. takes place over a period of time, the IND AS recognises revenue over time by measuring the progress in the performance of the contract[1]. Accordingly, the transaction must be placed in its entirety with its full value for approval before the audit committee, the board of directors and the shareholders (if the materiality threshold is crossed). The transactions placed before all the three bodies must be aligned. Once approved, the actual implementation of the transaction shall come merely for review before the audit committee on a yearly basis in terms of section III.B.5 of the SEBI Master Circular dated January 30, 2026.

An interesting question arises here. Once approved, shall this amount be aggregated with new proposed transactions in the next year? Let us consider an illustration here. The materiality threshold for A Ltd. (listed entity) is Rs. 2000cr. In FY 25-26, A enters into a construction contract (single indivisible multiyear contract) and in FY 26-27, a contract for purchase of goods (one off transaction) with B Ltd for various amounts as tabulated below:

S. No.FY 25-26FY 26-27
Construction Contract Amt (Rs.) (I)Whether I is material and approved by shareholders?Purchase Contract Amt (Rs.) (II)Whether II is material and needs shareholders’ approval?Whether (I) and (II) shall be aggregated for materiality threshold?Does the aggregate of (I) and (II) cross the materiality threshold?Whether (I) shall be placed for noting before shareholders?
11000crNo500crNoYesNoNo
21000crNo1500crNoYesYesYes
31000crNo2300crYesYesYesYes
43000crYes1NoNoNoAlready approved by the shareholders
53000crYes2500crYesNot requiredYes

For the first 3 cases, the transactions are aggregated for testing the material threshold since transaction (I), even though ongoing in FY 26-27, has never been placed before the shareholders. In effect, in case 2, the actual transactions ongoing with B in FY26-27 are crossing the materiality threshold and thus, must be placed for approval before the shareholders.

In case 3, while Transaction (II) crosses the threshold independently, it is only logical for the shareholders to be apprised of the other ongoing transactions (Transaction I) with the same RP to understand the true position of the transactions between the RP and the listed entity. The Industry Standard Note on RPTs (ISN), anyways, requires this disclosure. [Part A(3)] Read our latest article on the ISN: Repetitive Overhaul: RPT regime to get softer

In case 4, Transaction (I) has already been placed before the shareholders for approval. If its value is aggregated with Transaction (II), even a Rs. 1 transaction will require the approval of the shareholders. The essence of the materiality thresholds is seeking approval for material contracts. Such aggregation would defeat the very intent of the law.

In case 5, Transaction (I) is already approved by the shareholders and Transaction (II) crosses the materiality threshold independently. There arises no question of aggregation.

Thus, the decision of aggregating the value of a single indivisible contract in the previous FY for materiality thresholds in the current FY depends upon

  • whether such aggregated value crosses the thresholds in the current FY;
  • whether the transaction in the previous FY crossed the thresholds back then.

On the other hand, where the transaction is a divisible contract over a term, the estimated value to be utilised in that particular year may be placed for approval  before the audit committee, board of directors and shareholders, as the case may be. In case a material transaction was approved by the audit committee on an omnibus basis, it shall continue to be placed before the shareholders. [Section III.B.5 of the Master Circular]. Since the yearly value of the transaction is being approved and utilised, there arises no question of aggregation of previously approved value with proposed transactions in a new FY.

Specific disclosure of tenure of multi-year projects

The law enables securing transparent approvals for indivisible contracts. The ISN requires an estimated break-up financial year-wise in case of a transaction spanning over multiple years to be placed before the audit committee as well as shareholders, as the case may be [Para A5(5)]. (See our FAQs on the Industry Standard Note)

Further, while disclosing RPTs on a half yearly basis as a part of quarterly integrated filing (governance) to the stock exchange, the Master Circular requires disclosure of the aggregate value of the RPT as approved by the Audit Committee as well as the value of transaction during the reporting period.

Conclusion

With SEBI settling RPT approval related non-compliances for settlement fees running into crores[2], compliance officers need to tread more carefully than ever. Deciding whether a multi year contract should be approved as a whole or in parts remains a crucial decision, particularly in the absence of detailed guidance under Companies Act and SEBI LODR. While accounting standards primarily address revenue recognition and may not directly apply to all RPTs, the principles outlined therein can still offer useful guidance in navigating such situations.


[1] Para 39 of the IND AS 115

[2]https://www.sebi.gov.in/enforcement/orders/feb-2026/settlement-order-in-the-matter-of-kalyani-steels-limited_99922.html

Refer to our other resources:

  1. RPTs: Do extreme comparables distort arm’s length?
  2. Representation to SEBI for RPT provisions of LODR
  3. Related Party Transactions- Resource Centre
  4. Moderate Value RPTs : Interplay of disclosure norms and impracticalities

Shastrarth 29 – Compliance Officer’s risks in Abusive RPT Structures

You may register your interest and the questions that you’d like us to discuss at: https://forms.gle/1iR2xaFKGBU1kRJ3A

Our resource centre on RPTs can be accessed at: https://vinodkothari.com/article-corner-on-related-party-transactions/

Some of our recent resources on the subject: 
SEBI approves relaxed norms on RPTs 
Moderate Value RPTs : Interplay of disclosure norms and impracticalities

RPTs: Understanding the exact nature of Omnibus Approval

– Pammy Jaiswal | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Click here to watch the related video.

Our other resources:

  1. Related Party Transactions- Resource Centre
  2. SEBI approves relaxed norms on RPTs 
  3. Moderate Value RPTs : Interplay of disclosure norms and impracticalities

Relaxed Party Time?: RPT regime gets lot softer

Team corplaw | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

SEBI board decision for doubling the materiality threshold and make it scalar; lesser RPTs to need ISN details, plus other relaxations 

Highlights:

Following  a 32-pager consultation paper proposing significant amendments to RPT provisions, towards ease of doing business, rolled out by SEBI on August 4, 2025, several amendments have been approved by SEBI in its Board Meeting on 12th September, 2025 and the same will become effective in due course upon notification of the amendment regulations. We briefly discuss the approved changes with our analysis of the same. 

Some of our comments on the proposals, as recommended to SEBI, have also been accepted in the approved decisions. Our comments on the Consultation Paper may be read here

1. Materiality Thresholds: From One-Size-Fits-All to several sizes for the short-and-tall

A scale-based threshold mechanism has been approved, such that the RPT materiality threshold increases with the increase in the turnover of the company, though at a reduced rate, thus leading to an appropriate number of RPTs being categorized as material, thereby reducing the compliance burden of listed entities. The maximum upper ceiling of materiality has been kept at Rs. 5,000 crores, as against the existing absolute threshold of Rs. 1000 crores. 

Materiality thresholds as approved in SEBI BM: 

Annual Consolidated Turnover of listed entity (in Crores)Approved threshold (as a % of consolidated turnover)Maximum upper ceiling (in Crores)
< Rs.20,00010%2,000 
20,001 – 40,0002,000 Crs + 5% above Rs. 20,000 Crs3,000
> 40,0003,000 Crs + 2.5% above Rs. 40,000 Crs5,000  (deemed material) 

Back-testing the proposal scale on RPTs undertaken by top 100 NSE companies show a 60% reduction in material RPT approvals for FY 2023-24 and 2024-25 with total no. of such resolutions reducing from 235 and 293, to around 95 to 119. The 60% reduction may itself be seen as a bold admission that the existing regulatory framework was causing too many proposals to go for shareholder approval.

Our Analysis and Comments 

With the amendments becoming effective, RPT regime is all set to be a lot relaxed, with the absolute threshold for taking shareholders’ approval to be doubled to Rs. 2000 crores. In addition, for larger companies, there will be a scalar increase in the threshold, rising to Rs. 5000 crores. A lot lesser number of RPTs will now have to go before shareholders for approval in general meetings.

In times to come, a multi-metric approach, depending on the nature of the transaction, may be adopted, drawing on a consonance-based criteria as seen in Regulation 30 of the LODR Regulations, thus offering a more balanced and effective approach. See detailed discussion in the article here.

2. Significant RPTs of Subsidiaries: Plugging Gaps with Dual Thresholds

Extant provisions vis-a-vis SEBI approved changes

Pursuant to the amendments in 2021, RPTs exceeding a threshold of 10% of the standalone turnover of the subsidiary are considered as Significant RPTs, thus, requiring approval of the Audit Committee of the listed entity. The following modifications have been approved with respect to the thresholds of Significant RPTs of Subsidiaries: 

  • ‘Material’ is always ‘Significant’: There may be instances where a transaction by a subsidiary may trigger the materiality threshold for shareholder approval, based on the consolidated turnover of the listed entity, but still fall below the 10% threshold of the subsidiary’s own standalone turnover. As a result, such a transaction would escape the scrutiny of the listed entity’s audit committee. This inconsistency highlights a regulatory gap and reinforces the need to revisit and revise the threshold criteria to ensure comprehensive oversight in a way that aligns with evolving group structures and scale of operations. RPTs of subsidiary would require listed holding company’s audit committee approval if they breach the lower of following limits:
    • 10% of the standalone turnover of the subsidiary or 
    • Material RPT thresholds as applicable to listed holding company 
  • Alternative for newly incorporated subsidiaries without a track record: For newly incorporated subsidiaries which are <1 year old, consequently not having audited financial statements for a period of at least one year, the threshold for Significant RPTs to be based on lower of:
    • 10% of aggregate of paid-up capital and securities premium of the subsidiary, or
    • Material RPT thresholds as applicable to listed holding company 

Our Analysis and Comments

For newly incorporated subsidiaries, the Consultation Paper proposed linking the thresholds with net worth, and requiring a practising CA to certify such networth, thus leading to an additional compliance burden in the form of certification requirements.  The SEBI BM refers to a threshold based on paid-up share capital and securities premium, and hence, certification requirements may not arise.  

Further, the Consultation Paper proposed a de minimis exemption of Rs. 1 crore for significant RPTs of subsidiaries, thus, not requiring approval of the AC at the listed holding company’s level. However, the SEBI BM does not specifically refer to whether or not the proposal has been accepted, and hence, more clarity on the same may be gained upon notification of the amendment regulations.

Having said that, there is a need to revise and revisit the list of RPs of subsidiaries that gets extended to the listed holding company, thus attracting approval requirements for transactions with various such persons and entities, where there is absolutely no scope for conflict of interest. A Consultation Paper issued some time back on 7th February 2025 proposed extending the definition of related party under SEBI LODR to the subsidiaries of the listed entity as well. See an article on the same here. However, in the absence of any specific approval of SEBI on the same till date, such proposal seems to have been withdrawn by SEBI.

3. Tiered Disclosures: Balancing Transparency and Burden

Existing provisions vis-a-vis SEBI approved changes 

The Industry Standards Note on RPTs, effective from 1st September, 2025 provides an exemption from disclosures as per ISN for RPTs aggregating to Rs. 1 crore in a FY. The amendments seek to provide further relief from the ISN, by introducing a new slab for small-value RPTs aggregating to lower of: 

  • 1% of annual consolidated turnover of the listed entity as per the last audited financial statements, or 
  • Rs. 10 crore

In such cases, the disclosures will be required as per the Circular to be specified by SEBI. The draft Circular, as provided in the Consultation Paper, specifies disclosures in line with the minimum information as was  required to be placed by the listed entity before its Audit Committee in terms of SEBI Circular dated 22nd November, 2021 ( subsumed in LODR Master Circular dated November 11, 2024), prior to the effective date of ISN. Upon the same becoming effective, disclosures would be required in the following manner as per LODR: 

Value of transactionDisclosure RequirementsApplicability of ISN
< Rs. 1 croreReg 23(3) of SEBI LODR and RPT Policy of the listed entity (refer FAQs on ISN on RPTs)NA – exempt as per ISN 
> Rs 1 crore, but less than 1% of consolidated turnover of listed entity or Rs. 10 crores, whichever is lower (‘Moderate Value RPTs’)Annexure-2 of CP (Paragraph  4  under  Part  A  of  Section  III-B of SEBI Master Circular dated November 11, 2024)Exempt from ISN, upon notification of amendments 
Other than Moderate Value RPTs but less than Material RPTs (specified transactions)Part A and B of ISN Yes
Material RPTs (specified transactions are material)Part A, B and C of ISN Yes
Other than Moderate Value RPTs but less than Material RPTs (other than specified transactions)Part A of ISN Yes

Our Analysis and Comments 

The approved changes provide further relief from the task of collating a cartload of information as required under the ISN, subject to the thresholds as provided. While the introduction of differentiated disclosure thresholds aims to rationalise compliance, care must be taken to ensure that the disclosure framework does not become overly template-driven. RPTs, by nature, require contextual judgment, and a uniform disclosure format may not always capture the nuances of each case. It is therefore important that the regulatory design continues to place trust in the informed discretion of the Audit Committee, allowing it the flexibility to seek additional information where necessary, beyond the prescribed formats.

ISN: Standardising the way information is presented to audit committees
The whole thrust of the ISN is to harmonise and streamline the manner of presenting information to AC/shareholders while seeking approval.
It is good as a guidance or goal post, but does it have to become a regulatory mandate?
Where the manner of servicing food on the table becomes a mandate, the quality and taste will give precedence to form and mannerism.

4. Clarification w.r.t. validity of shareholders’ Omnibus Approval 

Existing provisions vis-a-vis SEBI approvals 

The existing provisions [Para (C)11 of Section III-B of LODR Master Circular] permit the validity of the omnibus approval by shareholders for material RPTs as: 

  • From AGM to AGM – in case approval is obtained in an AGM 
  • One year – in case approval is obtained in any other general meeting/ postal ballot 

A clarification is proposed to be incorporated that the AGM to AGM approval will be valid for a period of not more than 15 months, in alignment with the maximum timeline for calling AGM as per section 96 of the Companies Act. 

Further, the provisions, currently a part of the LODR Master Circular, have been approved to be embedded as a part of Reg 23(4) of LODR. 

5. Exemptions & Definitions: Pruning Redundancies

Problem Statement

Proviso (e) to Regulation 2(1)(zc) of the SEBI LODR Regulations exempts transactions involving retail purchases by employees from being classified as Related Party Transactions (RPTs), even though employees are not technically classified as related parties. Conversely, it includes transactions involving the relatives of directors and Key Managerial Personnel (KMPs) within its ambit. Additionally, Regulation 23(5)(b) provides an exemption from audit committee and shareholder approvals for transactions between a holding company and its wholly owned subsidiary. However, the term “holding company” used in this context has remained undefined, leaving ambiguity as to whether it refers only to a listed holding company or includes unlisted ones as well.

Proposal in CP

The Consultation Paper proposed two key clarifications:

  1. The exemption related to retail transactions should be expressly limited to related parties (i.e., directors, KMPs, or their relatives) to grant the appropriate exemption.
  2. The exemption for transactions with wholly owned subsidiaries should apply only where the holding company is also a listed entity, thereby excluding unlisted holding structures from this relaxation

Our Analysis and Comments

Under the existing framework, retail purchases made on the same terms as applicable to all employees are exempt when undertaken by employees, but not when made by relatives of directors or KMPs. This has led to an inconsistent treatment, where similarly situated individuals receive different regulatory treatment solely on the basis of their relationship with the company. The proposed language attempts to streamline this by including such relatives within the exemption, but it introduces its own drafting concern.

  • The phrasing – “retail purchases from any listed entity or its subsidiary by its directors or its employees key managerial personnel(s) or their relatives, without establishing a business relationship and at the terms which are uniformly applicable/offered to all employees and directors and key managerial personnel(s)” – would have created a potential loophole. As worded, the exemption could be interpreted to cover purchases made on favourable terms offered to directors or KMPs themselves, rather than being benchmarked against terms applicable to employees at large. The intended spirit of the provision seems to be to exempt only those transactions where the terms are genuinely uniform and non-preferential. A more appropriate construction would make it clear that the exemption is intended to apply only where such transactions mirror employee-level retail transactions, not privileged arrangements for senior management.

VKCO Recommendations: We had provided our comments to SEBI on the following lines: 

A minor drafting error has crept in the proposed language: retail purchases from any listed entity or its subsidiary by its directors or its key managerial personnel(s) or their relatives, without establishing a business relationship and at the terms which are uniformly applicable/offered to all directors and key managerial personnel(s). While the first part should refer to directors/ KMPs and their relatives, the second part should continue to refer to ’employees’, to ensure that the terms remain non-preferential, instead of introducing preferential treatment for senior management. 

Approved amendment: The approved amendment, as mentioned in the SEBI BM press release, refers to “terms which are uniformly applicable/offered to all employeesin line with our recommendation above. 

  • Regarding the exemption under Regulation 23(5)(b) for transactions between a holding company and its wholly owned subsidiary, a clarification has been inserted to provide the interpretational guidance that the term ‘holding company’ refers to the listed entity. 

The relevance of the aforesaid clarification would primarily be in cases where the unlisted subsidiary of the listed entity enters into a significant RPT with its wholly owned subsidiary (step-down subsidiary of the listed entity). Pursuant to the aforesaid proposal, as approved, no exemption will be available in such a case. 

Conclusion

SEBI’s August 2025 proposals, largely aimed at relaxation, have been approved in the September BM. Though in some cases, the ability to think beyond the existing track of the law seems missing, the amendments seem more or less welcoming, relaxing the RPT regime for listed entities. With the new leadership at SEBI meant to rationalise regulations, it was quite an appropriate occasion to do so. However, at many places, the August 2025 proposals are simply making tinkering changes in 2021 amendments and fine-tuning the June 2025 ISN. In sum, SEBI’s iterative approach to RPT governance demonstrates commendable responsiveness but calls for a holistic RPT policy road-map, harmonizing LODR regulations, circulars, and guidelines. Only a forward-looking, principles-based framework, will deliver the twin objectives of ease of doing business and investor protection in the long run.

Our resources on the topic:


RPTs: Wholly-owned but not wholly- exempt

– Application of RPT controls for transactions with Wholly owned Subsidiaries

– Payal Agarwal, Partner | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Enterprise Level v/s Entity Level: Paradox of a Wholly owned Subsidiary 

Wholly owned Subsidiaries (WoS) form a particular paradox in corporate laws with two contradictory positions – (a) the transactions entered into between the holding company and its WoS are viewed as transactions within a group, thus, permitting a seamless flow of resources between the two without any objection, looking at an “enterprise” level whereas, (b) limiting the access of the shareholders and creditors of the holding company and the WoS to the respective entity’s resources, thereby separation of the two at an “entity” level. 

Disregarding ‘entity’ concept over ‘enterprise’ concept: exemptions w.r.t. WoS 

Section 185 of CA 2013 exempts any financial assistance to the WoS from the compliance requirements under the section, and the limits on loans, guarantees, investments or provision of security under section 186 do not apply for transactions with WoS. Section 177(4)(iv) and 188 of CA 2013, pertaining to RPT controls, also extend certain exemptions for transactions with WoS. Reg 23(5) of SEBI LODR also exempts transactions with WoS as well as between two WoS from approval requirements, at both the Audit Committee and shareholders’ level. Reg 37A of SEBI LODR contains an exemption from shareholders’ approval requirements for sale, lease or disposal of an undertaking to the WoS. In each of the aforesaid provisions, the underlying presumption remains the same – the accounts of the WoS are consolidated with that of the holding company, and hence, the flow of resources remain within the same ‘enterprise’, despite change of ‘entity’. Thus the law takes an ‘enterprise’ wide view instead of an ‘entity’ level view while providing for such exemptions. 

Factors reinforcing the concept of separation of entity

On the other hand, the outreach of shareholders of a company is limited at an ‘entity’ level, that is to say, the shareholders of the holding company do not have access to the general meetings of the WoS. Similarly, the creditors of each entity do not have any recourse against the other entity. For instance, where the holding company has outstanding dues, but there are resources at the WoS level, can the creditors reach to the assets of the WoS? The answer is no. Similarly, a vice versa situation is also not possible. In fact, under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code too, the assets of the subsidiary are kept outside the purview of the liquidation estate of the holding corporate debtor [Section 36(4)(d)]. 

Further, the board of a WoS is different from its holding company. The board of the holding company does not have any rights over the board of the subsidiary. Therefore, under these situations, transactions between the holding company and its WoS, though between companies that are 100% belonging to the same group, cannot be viewed as completely seamless or free from any corporate governance concerns.   

RPTs between holding company and WoS: can the ‘enterprise’ approach be taken?

The aforesaid discussion makes it clear that while an ‘enterprise’ wide approach is taken in granting exemptions to WoS, the separation of legal entities cannot be completely disregarded, because the outreach of the shareholders, creditors and the board of directors remain limited. Now from the point of view of related party transactions, can it be argued that the transactions between a holding company and WoS are without any restraint altogether? For example, does the concept of arm’s length has no relevance in case of a transaction between a holding company and WoS? 

Concept of arm’s length and relevance in transactions with WoS

A light touch regulation or inapplicability of certain controls or approvals does not mean that arm’s length precondition becomes unnecessary. If such a view is taken, then the flow of resources between the holding company and the WoS will be completely without any fetters, thus breaching the concept of corporate governance at an entity level. For instance, can the board of directors of the holding company be absolved from its responsibilities to safeguard the assets of the holding company where the same flows to the subsidiary without any consideration? The answer surely is a no. Both ‘entity’ level and ‘enterprise’ level are significant, and hence, one cannot disregard the separation of legal entities, particularly, in the context of protection of assets of the entity (also see discussion under Role of Board below). 

As regards the concept of arm’s length, the same is omnipresent – required to be ensured in transactions with related parties as well as unrelated entities. The meaning of arm’s length transaction, as defined under SA 550 pertaining to Related Parties, is as follows:

A transaction conducted on such terms and conditions as between a willing buyer and a willing seller who are unrelated and are acting independently of each other and pursuing their own best interests.

Therefore, ‘independence’ and ‘own interests’ are important elements of an arm’s length transaction. If compromised in RPTs with WoS, absence of arm’s length criteria could lead to uncontrolled flow of wealth from the holding company to WoS, and may also lead to abusive RPTs. 

Are WoS structures immune from abuse?: Deploying WoS as a stop-over for abusive RPTs 

The exemptions w.r.t. transactions with WoS make the same prone to misuse, through use of the WoS as a conduit or a stop-over for giving effect to arrangements with non-exempt RPs. For instance, a listed entity in the FMCG sector is required to provide financial assistance to its upstream entities (promoter group entities). There may be a lack of business rationale and commercial justification for such a transaction, and therefore, it is highly unlikely that such a transaction would get the approval of the AC. Therefore, in order to give effect to the transaction, the company may route the same through its WoS, and thus escape RPT controls at its AC level. The WoS may, in turn, pass on the benefit to the promoter group entities, through a series of transactions, in order to cover the real character of the transaction (see figure below).  

A guidance note published by NFRA also, requires identification of indirect transactions, including through ‘connected parties’. In order to ensure no such indirect transactions have occurred, the management is expected to establish procedures to identify such transactions, and to obtain periodic confirmations from the directors, promoter group, large shareholders and other related parties that there are no transactions that have been undertaken indirectly with the listed company or its subsidiaries or its related parties.

Role of board

The role of the board towards avoiding conflicts of interests is deep-rooted under the corporate laws and securities laws, under various applicable provisions. For instance, the directors have a responsibility towards safeguarding the assets of the company and for preventing and detecting fraud and other irregularities [Section 134(5)(c) of CA 2013]. Section 166 of CA 2013 specifies the duties of directors. These include, among others, the duty to act in good faith in order to promote the objects of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in the best interests of the company [Section 166(2)]. 

The key functions of the board, as contemplated under Reg 4 of LODR, also includes monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of management, members of the board of directors and shareholders, including misuse of corporate assets and abuse in related party transactions. 

Scope of Exemption under Applicable Laws

As stated above, Reg 23(5) of SEBI LODR exempts RPTs entered into between a holding company and its WoS from the approval requirements of both the AC and the shareholders. 

Apart from Reg 23 of LODR, the RPT provisions are contained under Section 177 and 188 of CA 2013. Under section 177(4)(iv) of CA 2013, all RPTs require approval of the AC. The fourth proviso to the said sub-section exempts RPTs entered into with WoS from AC approval requirements. However, the said exemption is not absolute. The proviso reads as follows: 

Provided also that the provisions of this clause shall not apply to a transaction, other than a transaction referred to in section 188, between a holding company and its wholly owned subsidiary company.

Thus, the exemption for RPTs with WoS does not apply in case of a transaction referred u/s 188 of CA 2013. In other words, where an RPT with WoS triggers approval requirements u/s 188, the same will also be required to be approved by the AC u/s 177 first. 

Meaning of “a transaction referred to in section 188”

Section 188(1) of CA 2013 provides a list of 7 types of transactions. The list is wide enough to cover almost all types of transactions, except financial assistance in the form of loans etc. However, section 188 becomes applicable, only, in cases where any one or more of the two most crucial elements of a transaction are missing – (i) ordinary course of business and (ii) arm’s length terms. In cases where a transaction does not meet the ordinary course of business or the arm’s length criteria, the same is referred to the board of directors u/s 188 of CA 2013, and requires prior approval of the board. 

The fifth proviso to section 188(1) also contains an exemption for RPTs between the holding company and its WoS. Note that the said exemption is applicable only with respect to the approval of the shareholders, the approval of board is still required for RPTs that lack one of the two elements stated above, even though with WoS.

Provided that no contract or arrangement, in the case of a company having a paid-up share capital of not less than such amount, or transactions not exceeding such sums, as may be prescribed, shall be entered into except with the prior approval of the company by a resolution:

XXX

Provided also that the requirement of passing the resolution under first proviso shall not be applicable for transactions entered into between a holding company and its wholly owned subsidiary whose accounts are consolidated with such holding company and placed before the shareholders at the general meeting for approval:

The conditional exemption given u/s 177 and the absence of any exemption from board’s approval u/s 188 clearly confirms the requirement of ensuring arm’s length terms in transactions with WoS. 

Expectations from AC 

The AC is the primary decision-making authority in respect of matters relating to related party transactions. NFRA, the audit regulator of the country, has published the Audit Committee – Auditor Interactions Series 3 dealing with audit of Related Parties. The guidance sets out potential points on which the AC may interact with the auditors in the context of RPTs. Where a company avails exemptions w.r.t. AC and shareholders’ approval, the guidance note requires documentation of the rationale for not obtaining Audit Committee’s and Shareholders’ approvals. 

Thus, the AC is expected to be the scrutinising authority in ensuring that the terms on which a transaction is proposed to be entered into with a WoS are at an arm’s length, which, in turn, would require bringing the transaction before the AC, if not for approval, then for a pre-transaction scrutiny and information. 

Disclosures in financial statements 

Ind AS 24 pertaining to Related Party Disclosures require disclosures  to be made in the financial statements that the RPTs were made on terms equivalent to those that prevail in arm’s length transactions. However, such disclosure can be made only if such terms can be substantiated. Note that the Ind AS 24 does not contain any exemption for WoS. In the absence of a strict scrutiny of RPTs with WoS for satisfaction of arm’s length basis of the terms of the transaction, such an assertive statement in the financial statements for arm’s length of the terms is not possible.  

Dealings with WoS: the suggested approach

In view of the expectations from the AC, board and the auditors, and the potential risks of abusive RPTs using WoS as an intermediary, the following approach may be undertaken before entering into a transaction with WoS: 

  • A pre-transaction scrutiny may be conducted by the AC for RPTs to be entered into between the holding company and its WoS. This should include all the necessary details as may be required by the AC, such as, nature of transaction, terms of the transaction, total expected value of the transaction etc. 
  • Based on such scrutiny, the AC may give its comments or recommendations where the same has any concerns. Necessary modifications may be carried out to address the comments of the AC, in order to make the transaction commercially viable for the holding company. 
  • Where the proposed transaction is not in (a) ordinary course of business or (b) not at an arm’s length basis, the same will require approval of the AC. The AC will refer the transactions to the board for approval u/s 188. 
  • Every RPT entered into between the holding company and its WoS should, as a part of the quarterly review, be reported back to the AC. Any alteration in terms or value of the transactions should be brought to the notice of the AC. 
  • As required under Reg 23(9) of the LODR, the transactions with WoS to be reported to the SEs on a half-yearly basis. 

Read more:

Related Party Transactions- Resource Centre

Bo[u]nd to ask before transacting: High value debt issuers bound by stricter RPT regime

FAQs on Standards for minimum information to be disclosed for RPT approval

Representation to SEBI on SEBI (LODR) (Amendment) Regulations, 2025

– Team Corplaw | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Read more at:

  1. Bo[u]nd to ask before transacting: High value debt issuers bound by stricter RPT regime
  2. Presentation on CG Norms for HVDLEs
  3. SEBI strictens RPT approval regime, ease certain CG norms for HVDLEs

Ratification of RPTs:  a rescue ship or an alternative to compliance?

– SEBI brings ratification provisions for RPTs skipping prior AC approval

– Jigisha Aggarwal, Executive and Sourish Kundu, Executive

The laws governing related party transactions (RPTs) in India mandate seeking prior approvals for RPTs. The law has also provided for a rescue in the name of ‘ratification’ where prior approval could not be taken or taking prior approval was not feasible for various reasons. This article explains the meaning of ratification, consequences of failure to ratify either due to lapse of the time limit or exhaustion of the monetary limit, and reinforces the need for companies to tighten their process of RPT approvals. In particular, this article becomes pertinent in view of the recent amendments in Reg. 23 of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (“Listing Regulations”) inserting express provisions for  ratification of RPTs by Audit Committee (“AC”).

The ratification provision serves as a remedial measure, offering companies a chance to address regulatory lapses. This naturally raises several critical questions:

  1. Does ratification effectively rectify non-compliance arising from the failure to obtain prior approval?
  2. What happens if the required conditions for ratification by the AC are not fulfilled?
  3. Can material RPTs be ratified by shareholders or does the violation remain unresolved?

These questions and other related concerns are analyzed, explored and discussed in detail in this article.

Meaning of Ratification

In simple terms, ratification means giving formal consent to an act, deed, contract, or agreement that initially lacked the required approval, thereby making it valid. It involves granting consent to an action that has already taken place.

The Latin maxim “Omnis ratihabitio retrorahitur et mandato priori aequiparatur” translates to “every ratification is retroactively placed on equal footing with an act performed with prior authority.” This applies when someone acts on behalf of another without prior consent—if the concerned person later ratifies it, the act is treated as if it had been authorized from the start.

Ratification can be seen as a counterpoint to Admiral Grace Hopper’s well-known saying, “It is better to ask forgiveness than permission.” While this principle supports fast decision-making in large organizations, ratification should remain an exception rather than the norm for post-facto approvals.

The Supreme Court, in the matter of National Institute Of Technology & Anr v. Pannalal Choudhury & Anr [AIR 2015 SC 2846], traced back the meaning of the term “ratification” to a succinctly made definition by the English Court in the matter of Hartman v Hornsby [142 Mo 368 : 44 SW 242 at p. 244 (1897)] as follows:

“Ratification’ is the approval by act, word, or conduct, of that which was attempted (of accomplishment), but which was improperly or unauthorisedly performed in the first instance.”

Further, the Apex Court, in the matter of Maharashtra State Mining Corporation v Sunil S/O Pundikaro Pathak [2006 (5) SCC 96] reiterated the principle of ratification:

“The High Court was right when it held that an act by a legally incompetent authority is invalid. But it was entirely wrong in holding that such an invalid act cannot be subsequently ‘rectified’ by ratification of the competent authority. Ratification by definition means the making valid of an act already done. The principle is derived from the Latin maxim ‘Ratihabitio priori mandato aequiparatur’ namely ‘ a subsequent ratification of an act is equivalent to a prior authority to perform such act’. Therefore ratification assumes an invalid act which is retrospectively validated.”

As explained by the Bombay High Court in Pravinkumar R. Salian v. Chief Minister and Minister of Co-operation, Mumbai [2004(2)MHLJ12],[1] The essential conditions for a valid ratification include the following:

  • firstly, the person whose act is ratified must have acted on behalf of another person;
  • secondly, the other person on whose behalf the act was performed must be legally competent to perform the act the question and must continue to be legally competent even at the time of ratification; and
  • thirdly, the person ratifying the act does so with full knowledge of the act in question.  

As is understood from the jurisprudence around, the following are the broad principles of ratification –

  1. An act which is ultra-vires the company cannot be ratified.[2]
  2. An act which is intra-vires the company but outside the scope of an authority in the company may be ratified by the company in proper form.[3]
  3. Acts can be ratified by passing a resolution.[4]
  4. There can be no ratification without an intention to ratify.[5]
  5. The person ratifying the act must have complete knowledge of the act.
  6. Ratification relates back to the date of the act ratified i.e., has retrospective effect.[6]
  7. Ratification cannot be presumed, i.e., overt steps should have taken for the act of ratification.[7]

Global framework on ratification of RPTs

Ratification of RPTs is not a unique affair prevalent only in the Indian context. Even in the global parlance, regulatory references exist around the same, however, there is no concrete evidence of conditionalities around the same:

  1. The SEC Regulations do not prescribe the requirements with respect to approval, review or ratification, however, companies are required to have policies and procedure in place for dealing in RPTs, viz., approval, review and ratification of RPTs [Item 404(b)(1) of SEC Regulation S-K], to be disclosed as a part of non-financial reporting.  
  2. The newly notified UK Listing Regulations UKLR-8 (notified w.e.f. 29th July, 2024) requires the companies to take  prior approval of the board before entering into an RPT, however, does not elaborate on the manner of seeking ratification if prior approval has not been taken. Further, pursuant to UKLR-8, the shareholders’ approval requirements for RPTs under LR-11 has been substituted with a notification requirement.
  3. Article L225-42 of the French Commercial Code deals with the cancellation of transactions referred to in Article L225-38 (understood to be equivalent to related party transactions) without prior authorisation of the board of directors, if such transactions have prejudicial consequences for the company.  However, such transactions, entered into without prior authorisation of the board, can still be ratified by shareholders through a vote in a general meeting, based on the special report obtained from the auditors on setting out the circumstances due to which  the required approval process was not followed. No interested party can vote on such a matter.
  4. Chapter 2E of the Corporations Act, 2001 of Australia deals with RPTs that require prior shareholders’ approval. Where such approval is not obtained, penal provisions may attract on the persons involved in such violation, although the same does not impact the validity of such contract or transaction except by way of an injunction granted by a court to prevent the company from giving benefit to the related party.

Circumstances that may result in requiring ratification

Practically, there may be genuine cases where the transaction could be blessed with prior approval and therefore be at the mercy of ratification, few cases:

  • Subsequent identification of a related party: Companies maintain a related party list to identify RPTs and ensure necessary controls, including prior approvals. However, an entity/person may sometimes be overlooked / become a related party subsequently, leading to transactions occurring without prior approval.
  • Increase in contract value due to market changes: Market fluctuations can cause price revisions, potentially breaching the ceiling limit of an existing omnibus approval. Until the AC approves an enhancement in the omnibus approval value, any transactions exceeding the OA limit would require ratification.
  • Oversight of transactions: Manual RPT controls are prone to oversight, where a business team may enter into a related party transaction without verifying whether prior approval has been obtained.
  • Exigency of business: In rare cases, an unanticipated but necessary transaction may arise in the company’s interest. Following the legal approval process beforehand might result in lost opportunities or financial losses.

While strong internal controls, automation, and strict monitoring can mitigate most of these issues, obtaining prior AC approval in every case may not always be feasible—especially for large listed entities with numerous RPTs. In such instances, ratification serves as a remedial mechanism.

Ratification of RPTs by Audit Committee

Section 177(4) of the Companies Act, 2013 explicitly allows ratification of RPTs undertaken without prior AC approval for all companies [third proviso to clause (iv) of Section 177(4)]. However, before the LODR (Third Amendment) Regulations, 2024 (effective from December 13, 2024), no such provision existed for listed entities under the Listing Regulations.

With the recent amendment, Reg. 23(2)(f) now extends ratification provisions to listed entities. However, this is not unconditional, as specific criteria must be met, which are discussed in detail later.

The following section examines the differences between ratification provisions under the Listing Regulations and the Companies Act..

Ratification of RPTs by the Audit Committee – Listing Regulations vis-a-vis Companies Act, 2013

BasisListing RegulationsCompanies Act, 2013
Governing ProvisionReg. 23(2)(f)Section 177(4)
Authority to ratifyIndependent directors forming part of the ACAll members of the AC
Permitted valueRs 1 crore, aggregated with all ratifiable transactions during a FYRs 1 crore per transaction
Prescribed timelinesEarlier of:
– 3 months from date of transaction – Next AC meeting
Within 3 months from the date of transaction
What if the value / timeline is exceededTransaction shall be voidable at the option of the AC
Disclosure requirementsDetails of ratifications to be disclosed along with the half-yearly disclosures of RPTs under Reg. 23(9)No additional disclosures prescribed
Ratification of material RPTsAC does not have the authorisation to ratify material RPTsNA  
Consequences of not getting AC approval for RPTThe concerned director(s) shall indemnify the company against any loss incurred by the company concerned, if:  i. The transaction is with the related party to any director, or ii. The transaction is authorised by any director

Conditions for ratification of RPTs under Listing Regulations

The trail of AC ratifying an RPT is represented below:

Each condition is discussed in detail below:

  1. Authority to ratify

Only those members of the AC who are IDs, can ratify RPTs.

Rationale: This is to ensure that the authority to ratify is in sync with the authority to approve. In terms of Reg. 23(2), only those members of AC who are IDs are authorised to approve RPTs, and hence, the power of ratification also vests with them only.

Given their role and responsibilities, Independent Directors (IDs) are least likely to have a “conflict of interest”, which is the primary concern behind RPT regulations.

SEBI’s penalty order in the LEEL Electricals case underscores the importance of IDs, as penalties were imposed on them for failing to fulfill their AC duties in overseeing RPTs. The company was penalized for fund diversion involving certain related parties.

  1. Timeline

Earlier of:

3 months from the date of the transaction, or the next meeting of the AC.

Rationale: This is intended to aid in timely decision-making and minimizing the chances for undue delay in scheduling AC meetings. While recommendations were made to keep the provision as later of the two, in view of the probable misuse of such provision by causing deliberate delay in conducting AC meetings, the timeline has been kept at earlier of the two [refer SEBI BM Agenda].

In practice, this does not impose an additional compliance burden, as Reg. 18(2) of the Listing Regulations mandates at least four AC meetings per financial year. Given the AC’s quarterly responsibilities, meetings are typically held within a three-month gap. Thus, a ratifiable RPT is unlikely to fail due to delayed placement, except in cases where weak internal controls cause a significant delay in identifying the lapse in prior approval.

  1. Maximum value permitted for ratification

An aggregate threshold of Rs. 1 crore has been laid down, for ratified transaction(s) with a related party, whether entered into individually or taken together, during a financial year.

Rationale: A low threshold has been specified to prevent misuse of the provision [refer SEBI BM Agenda].

The provision refers to (a) all ratified transactions, (b) in a financial year, (c) with a related party. Hence, all instances of ratification are to be aggregated for the complete financial year, on a per related party basis, and the same should not exceed the value of Rs. 1 crore.

It should be noted that w.e.f. April 1, 2025, pursuant to the Industry Standards Note on minimum information to be placed before the Audit Committee, Minimum Disclosures as prescribed therein is required to be placed before the Audit Committee.

Anonymous omnibus approval vis-a-vis ratification of RPTs

Reg. 23(3)(c) of the Listing Regulations allows the AC to grant anonymous omnibus approval for unforeseen RPTs, with a maximum limit of ₹1 crore per transaction. This approval does not require details like the related party’s name, transaction amount, period, or nature and remains valid for up to one year.

This creates an implied exemption for RPTs up to ₹1 crore per transaction, as they can proceed under the omnibus framework without fresh AC approval. However, unlike this per-transaction limit, ratification limits apply on an aggregated basis for all transactions with a related party in a financial year.

This raises a key question: Does the anonymous omnibus approval provision make ratification redundant?

The aforesaid question can be discussed in two contexts –

  • for unforeseen RPTs covered by the limit of Rs. 1 crore per transaction, and
  • for foreseen RPTs for which an OA limit is approved by the AC

The relevance of ratification in each case can be understood with the help of specific examples.

i. Ratification for unforeseen RPTs

If an anonymous omnibus approval (OA) allows up to Rs. 1 crore per transaction, an unforeseen RPT of Rs. 80 lakhs falls within this limit and does not require ratification, as the OA serves as prior approval for such cases.

However, if an unforeseen RPT of Rs. 1.9 crores occurs, the entire Rs. 1.9 crore would require ratification, and the cover of Rs. 1 crore under the OA cannot be claimed.

In a case where the transaction is Rs. 2.5 crores and the OA is Rs. 1 crore, the entire amount (2.5 cr) exceeds ratification limits and therefore is voidable at the option of the AC.

Another example, where the foreseen RPT is for 1 cr – can this be included under the unforeseen RPTs? The answer should be No. Where the details of the RPT were available, irrespective of the value, they require prior approval of the AC after placing the requisite information before the AC.

ii. Ratification of foreseen RPTs

If the AC grants an omnibus approval for Rs. 100 crores for a specific transaction type with a particular RP, and the company undertakes an RPT of Rs. 101 crores, the excess Rs. 1 crore can be ratified by the AC, provided all specified conditions are met.

However, if a transaction of Rs. 105 crores is undertaken under the same approval, the excess increases to Rs. 5 crores, making ratification unavailable. This falls under “Failure to seek ratification,” discussed in detail below.

  1. Transaction should not be material

Reg. 23(1) sets the materiality thresholds for RPTs as the lower of Rs. 1,000 crores or 10% of the listed entity’s annual consolidated turnover. Transactions crossing this limit require prior shareholder approval.

Rationale: Ratification authority lies with the approving authority. Since AC cannot approve material RPTs, it also cannot ratify them. The authority to ratify remains with shareholders, who must approve such transactions in advance.

Listing Regulations do not explicitly allow shareholder ratification if materiality thresholds are breached. Failure to obtain prior approval leads to penalties, as seen in Premier Polyfilm Limited, where a fine was imposed despite later ratification.

If prior approval is missed, shareholders’ ratification may still be sought. While it does not remove the breach’s consequences, delayed compliance is better than non-compliance.

  1. Rationale to be placed before the AC

Ratification applies only when prior approval was not obtained, serving as a remedy for exceptional cases. It is crucial to present a proper rationale before the Audit Committee, explaining the inability to seek prior approval.

A key principle of ratification is the intent to ratify, as established in Sudhansu Kanta v. Manindra Nath [AIR 1965 PAT 144]. In Premila Devi v. The Peoples Bank of Northern India Ltd [(1939) 41 BOMLR 147], it was held that ratification requires both intent and awareness of illegality. The ratifying authority must have full knowledge of the breach, its reasons, and a justified basis for approval.

  1. Disclosure

The details of ratification shall be disclosed along with the half-yearly disclosures of RPTs under Reg. 23(9) of the Listing Regulations.

Pursuant to SEBI Implementation Circular dated 31st December, 2024 the format for half-yearly disclosures of RPTs has been revised to include a column: “Value of the related party transaction ratified by the audit committee” to effectuate the disclosure of ratified RPTs.

Rationale: This is to promote maintenance of adequate transparency of substantial information, with the investors and shareholders.

Failure to Seek Ratification: Meaning & Consequences

A proviso to the newly inserted Reg 23(2)(f) specifies the consequences of a “failure to seek ratification”. The failure to seek ratification refers to a situation where the post-facto approval of AC could not be sought in accordance with the conditions laid down for ratification.

The failure to seek ratification may occur on account of one or more of the following:

(a) lapse of timelines for seeking ratification, or

(b) value of ratifiable transactions exceeding the limit of Rs. 1 crore in a FY, or both.

Here, it is important to note that in such an event, the AC may render such RPT voidable, and not necessarily void. Further, if it considers appropriate, it may seek indemnification from the concerned director(s), if any, for any loss incurred by the Company as a result of entering into such a transaction.

Differentiating between  ‘voidable’ or ‘void’

Voidable means something that can be made invalid or nullified, and void means something that is invalid or null. 

In Pankaj Mehra v. State of Maharashtra [2000 (2) SCC 756], the Supreme Court drew a distinction between “void” and ‘voidable’:

“The word ‘void’ in its strictest sense, means that which has no force and effect, is without legal efficacy, is incapable of being enforced by law, or has no legal or binding force, but frequently the word is used and construed as having the more liberal meaning of ‘voidable. The word ‘void’ is used in statutes in the sense of utterly void so as to be incapable of ratification, and also in the sense of voidable and resort must be had to the rules of construction in many cases to determine in which sense the Legislature intended to use it. An act or contract neither wrong in itself nor against public policy, which has been declared void by statute for the protection or benefit of a certain party, or class of parties, is voidable only.”

If a company fails to seek ratification, the transaction does not automatically become void unless explicitly declared so by the approving authority, usually the AC. The AC has the discretion to either:

  • Adopt the transaction with or without modifications, or
  • Cancel the transaction entirely, rendering it void.

Indemnification by director(s):

If the transaction is deemed invalid, indemnification may be sought from the concerned directors if:

  • The transaction involves a related party of any director, or
  • A director authorized the transaction without obtaining the necessary approval.

Conclusion

With the introduction of ratification provisions in the Listing Regulations, the AC’s responsibility for RPT ratification has increased. This underscores the need for stronger internal control mechanisms to ensure efficiency and proactiveness. Automation of RPT controls should also be considered to reduce human errors and streamline compliance for better detection of RPTs. While ratification serves as a fallback in case of lapses, it should never be seen as a substitute for obtaining prior approvals.


[1] (2004) 2 MahLJ 12.

[2] Rajendra Nath Dutta and Ors. V. Shibendra Nath Mukherjee and Ors., (1982) 52 CompCas 293 Cal.

[3] Rajendra Nath Dutta and Ors. V. Shibendra Nath Mukherjee and Ors., (1982) 52 CompCas 293 Cal.

[4] Bulland Leasing & Finance Pvt. Ltd. v. Neelam Miglani, Delhi District Court, CC No.: 470664/16, 2018,

[5] Sudhansu Kanta v. Manindra Nath, AIR 1965 Pat 144.

[6] Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta v. Union of India, 1973 AIR 2389.

[7] New Fleming Spinning And Weaving Company Ltd. v.  Kessowji Naik, (1885) ILR 9 Bom 373.

Read more:

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– FAQs on RPT framework for HVDLEs

– Team Corplaw (corplaw@vinodkothari.com)

This version: 18th April, 2025

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