Posts

Does Co-lending Make Default a Communicable Disease?

How to ensure uniform asset classification under co-lending

Simrat Singh | finserv@vinodkothari.com

Asset classification under RBI regulations has always been anchored to the borrower, not to individual loan facilities. Once a borrower shows repayment stress in any exposure, it is no longer reasonable to treat the borrower’s other obligations as unaffected; prudence requires that all other facilities to that borrower reflect the same level of stress. Even the insolvency law reinforces this borrower-level approach to default by allowing CIRP to be triggered irrespective of whether the default is owed to the applicant creditor or not (see Explanation to section 7 of the IBC)

This borrower-level approach is not unique to India. Globally, the Basel framework also defines default at the obligor level – the core idea being that credit stress is a condition of the borrower, not of a single loan. In other words, when a borrower sneezes financial distress, all his loans catch a classification cold.

Position under the earlier co-lending framework

Under the earlier 2020 framework for priority sector co-lending between banks and NBFCs, each RE applied its own asset classification norms to its respective share of the co-lent loan (see para 13 of 2020 framework). This allowed situations where the same borrower and same loan could be classified differently in the books of the two co-lenders. While operationally convenient, this approach sat uneasily with the borrower-level logic of RBI’s IRACP norms and diluted the consistency of credit risk recognition in a shared exposure.

Position under the Co-Lending Arrangements Directions, 2025

The 2025 Directions [now subsumed in Para B of the Reserve Bank of India (Non-Banking Financial Companies – Transfer and Distribution of Credit Risk) Directions, 2025] resolve this inconsistency by requiring uniform asset classification across co-lenders at the borrower level (see para 124 reproduced below for reference).

124. NBFCs shall apply a borrower-level asset classification for their respective exposures to a borrower under CLA, implying that if either of the REs classifies its exposure to a borrower under CLA as SMA / NPA on account of default in the CLA exposure, the same classification shall be applicable to the exposure of the other RE to the borrower under CLA. NBFCs shall put in place a robust mechanism for sharing relevant information in this regard on a near-real time basis, and in any case latest by end of the next working day.

Therefore, where one co-lender classifies its share of a co-lent exposure as SMA or NPA, the other co-lender must apply the same borrower classification to its share of the same exposure. It was an extension of RBI’s long-standing borrower-wise classification principle into a multi-lender structure.

Why “under the CLA” cannot be read in isolation

However, the wording of paragraph 124 has, in practice, been interpreted by some lenders in a much narrower manner. The phrase “under the CLA” has been read to mean that the classification of the other co-lender’s share would change only if the borrower defaults on the co-lent exposure itself. On this interpretation, where a borrower defaults on a separate, non-co-lent loan, lenders may in their books follow borrower level classification but they need not share such information with the co-lending partner since there is no default in the co-lent loan.

This approach, however, runs contrary to the regulatory intent and represents a classic case where the literal reading of a provision is placed in conflict with its underlying purpose. Market practice reflects this divergence. Traditional lenders have generally adopted a conservative approach, applying borrower-level classification across exposures irrespective of whether the default arises under the CLA. Certain other lenders, however, have taken a more aggressive position, limiting classification alignment strictly for defaults under the co-lent exposure. The conservative approach is more consistent with RBI’s prudential framework and intent, which has always treated credit stress as a condition of the borrower rather than of a particular loan structure.

Implications for other exposures to the same borrower

Once borrower-level classification is accepted as the governing principle, the consequence is straightforward: any other exposure that a co-lender has to the same borrower must also reflect the borrower’s SMA or NPA status, even if that exposure is not part of the co-lending arrangement. Let us understand this by way of examples.

Scenario 1: Multiple Loans, No Co-Lending Exposure 

A borrower has three separate loans:

  1. L1: 100% funded by A
  2. L2: 100% funded by B
  3. L3: 100% funded by C

Although A, B and B may be co-lending partners with each other in general, none of the above loans are under a co-lending arrangement (CLA).

Treatment: Since there is no co-lent exposure to the borrower, paragraph 124 of the Directions does not apply. Each lender classifies and reports its own loan independently, as per its applicable asset classification norms. There is no obligation to share asset-classification information relating to these loans among the lenders.

Scenario 2: One Co-Lent Loan and Other Standalone Loans

A borrower has three loans:

  1. L1: Co-lent by B (80%) and A (20%)
  2. L2: 100% funded by A (not co-lent)
  3. L3: 100% funded by C (not co-lent)

Case A: Default under the Co-Lent Loan

If B classifies its 80% share of L1 as NPA:

  • A’s 20% share of L1 must also be classified as NPA, even if it was standard in A’s books. While given that the asset classification norms for different REs are aligned and the invocation of any default loss guarantee also does not impact the asset classification; there does not seem to be any reason for a difference in the asset classification of the co-lenders in this case.  
  • Since asset classification is borrower-level, A must also classify L2 as NPA, even though L2 is not under a co-lending arrangement.
  • L3 remains unaffected, as C is not a co-lender to the same borrower and there is no requirement for B or A to share borrower-level information with C.

Case B: Default under a Non-Co-Lent Loan by any one of the Co-Lenders

If A classifies L2 as NPA:

  • Since asset classification is borrower-level, A must also classify L1 as NPA
  • B’s 80% share of L1 must also be classified as NPA
  • L3 remains unaffected, as C is not a co-lender to the same borrower and there is no requirement for B or A to share borrower-level information with C.

Case B: Default under a Non-Co-Lent Loan of a Third Lender

Assume L3 is classified as NPA by C, while L1 and L2 remain standard.

  • There is no impact on the books of B or A.
  • C is not required to share information on L3 with B or C, as there is no co-lending exposure between them for this borrower.

Note that borrower-level asset classification and information sharing activates only where there is a co-lending exposure to the borrower. Once such an exposure exists, any default in any loan of a co-lender triggers borrower-level classification across all exposures of that lender, including standalone loans. However, lenders with no co-lending exposure to the borrower remain outside this information-sharing loop. May refer the below chart for more clarity:

Fig 1: Decision chart for asset classification of loans under co-lending

Information Sharing and Operational Impact

To make borrower-level classification work in practice, the 2025 Directions require co-lenders to put in place information-sharing arrangements. Any SMA or NPA trigger must be shared with the other co-lender promptly and, in any case, by the next working day. It requires aligned IT systems so that both lenders update their books on the borrower at the same time, or as close to real time as possible.

Conclusion

The 2025 Directions reinforce a long-standing regulatory principle: credit stress belongs to the borrower, not to a specific loan or lender. Uniform borrower-level classification and timely information sharing are essential to preserve consistency in risk recognition across co-lenders. While this increases operational complexity, it aligns co-lending practices with RBI’s prudential intent.

See our other resources on co-lending.

Workshop on NBFCs: Ensuring Strong Compliance Management

Register here: https://forms.gle/311C3q9zreMJBK236
Loader Loading…
EAD Logo Taking too long?

Reload Reload document
| Open Open in new tab

Download as PDF [622.06 KB]

Non-Performing Assets: A Solution at Last?

– Shreyan Srivastava (resolution@vinodkothari.com)

Background

In India, Non-Performing Assets (“NPAs”) have been a chronic plaque in the economy for decades. Although recent reports indicate that the Gross NPA (“GNPA”) and Net NPA (“NNPA”) have been systematically declining, in comparison to other economies, the country still faces a high volume of NPAs. For this reason, for the last several budgets, economic policies in India have been tailored to provide relief from the existing NPAs and to provide mitigatory steps to reduce the rate of such NPAs.

In this article, we discuss the current situation of NPAs in the country and assess the feasibility of the steps taken by the Government to mitigate, control and resolve the same, specifically through measures introduced by the Union Budget 2021-22[1] leading upto the Union Budget 2022-23[2] and the extent of the reliefs they provide.

A Two-Decade History

As illustrated in Figure 1, from the fiscal year of 2008-09, both Gross NPA (“GNPA”) and Net NPA (“NNPA”) for Scheduled Commercial Banks (“SCBs”) were following an upward trend with a slight dip in 2010-11. The highest NPA was recorded for the financial year of 2017-18, following which a structural decline was observed despite the overwhelming impact of the pandemic on all economic sectors in 2020.[3]

As per data provided by the RBI, there has been a constant decline of Net and Gross NPA Ratios in Scheduled Commercial Bank ever since the fiscal year of 2018-19:-

  • As of September-end 2021, the NNPA ratio sits at 2.2% compared to 6% in 2017-18.
  • As of September-end 2021, the GNPA ratio sits at 6.9% compared to 11.2% in 2017-18.

Similarly, the NNPA and GNPA ratios for NBFCs stood at 6.55% and 2.93% and 6.55% for September-end 2021.

A large portion of this declining rates of GNPA and NNPA ratios can be attributed to various available resolution mechanisms, including the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), SARFAESI Act, Debt Recovery Tribunals, etc, which have proved to be useful to certain extent. However, there still remains a large stock of legacy NPAs which are yet to be resolved. As per a report issued by RBI[5], in F.Y. 2019-20, the total amount of NPAs recovered was merely 23% of the total NPAs worth a whopping Rs. 7,42,431 crores.

The Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (“ICRIER”) studied Asset Management in various foreign jurisdictions such as the United States, Sweden, Italy and Indonesia all of which had instituted a centrally owned Asset Management Company (“AMC”) during a financial crisis with a sunset clause. Thus, once the financial crises had been lifted the AMC would be dissolved via its sunset clause.

Union Budget 2021-22: Creation of the Bad Bank

The need for a government owned ARC to manage the NPA problem on a large scale was identified as early as 2017 by the ICRIER and recognising the same the Governor of the RBI: Shri Shaktikanta Das observed: “If there is a proposal to set up a bad bank, the RBI will look at it”.[6] Subsequently, the Finance Minister of India during the Union Budget Speech of 2021-22 stated:

“An Asset Reconstruction Company Limited and Asset Management Company would be set up to consolidate and take over the existing stressed debt and then manage and dispose of the assets to Alternate Investment Funds and other potential investors for eventual value realization”.[7]

Soon after the Union Budget of 2021-22, the Government incorporated the National Asset Reconstruction Company Limited (“NARCL”) under the Companies Act, 2013 and registered the same with the RBI. The NARCL is essentially the first government owned ARC in India, set up in a manner similar to Asset Management Companies in the foreign jurisdiction, and is owned primarily by public sector banks.

As provided in its mandate, the Indian Debt Resolution Company Limited (“IDRLC”) was set up to act as the operational entity designed to manage the NARCL such that while the latter would offer the purchase stressed assets of the lead bank and acquire them, the IDRLC would engage with the management (market professionals and turnaround experts) and value addition of such assets. Thus, what was born was a unique Public-Private Partnership of NARCL-IDRLC with the mandate to mitigate the NPA problem in the economy.

The NARCL had proposed to acquire stressed assets worth Rs 2 lakh crore in a phased manner in the proportion of 15% Cash and 85% in Security Receipts (SRs), all the while operating within the existing framework for ARCs as issued by the RBI.[8]In fact, the NARCL had already planned for Phase I with fully provisioned assets of about Rs. 90,000 crores expected to be transferred to NARCL before the end of the current financial year of 2021-22.[9] From what is understood, NARCL shall focus on the legacy assets, worth Rs. 500 crores or more, which are generally not targeted by the privately owned ARCs.

However, despite being proposed a year back, NARCL was only made live on 27th January, 2022, merely 4 days prior to the Union Budget 2022-23. Hence, we are currently in a very nascent and premature stage to gauge if at all the public-private relationship would give the expected results.

The National Bank for Financing Infrastructure and Development

With the NARCL due to begin their operations of Phase I, the Ministry of Finance issued a notification on 28th January 2022 (close to the Union Budget Speech of 2022-23) which formally established the National Bank for Financing Infrastructure and Development (“NBFID”).[10]As elaborated by the PRS India, the NBFID is to operate as a corporate body with authorised share capital of one lakh crore rupees which can only be held by selected public sector enterprises.[11] Its mandate would be to directly or indirectly lend, invest, or attract investments for infrastructure projects as selected by the Central Government located entirely or partly in India. The various sectors have been identified in Figure 2 below: –

Thus, unlike any other jurisdictions, India appears to adopt a three-fold sectoral approach to rectify their NPA problem:

  • Private Sector: Private ARCs registered with the RBI.
  • Public-Private: The NARCL-IDRLC
  • Public: The NBFID.

Concluding Remarks

While the Union Budget 2021-22 had formally recognised the commencement of the NBFID and NARCIL, its performance and efficacy is yet to be investigated. Moreover, what makes the NBFID stand out from its government owned AMC counterparts in foreign jurisdictions is the lack of a sunset clause given that it targets the Infrastructure Sector. Similarly, not much can be said about the NARCL-IDRLC which is also due to begin its Phase I sometime before 31st March 2022.

[1] https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2021-22/doc/Budget_Speech.pdf

[2] https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/doc/Budget_Speech.pdf

[3] https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/economicsurvey/doc/echapter.pdf#page=55

[4] https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/economicsurvey/doc/echapter.pdf#page=55

[5] https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/PublicationReportDetails.aspx?UrlPage=&ID=1188

[6] 39th Palkhivala Memorial Lecture

[7] https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget2021-22/doc/Budget_Speech.pdf

[8] https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1755466

[9] https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=1755466

[10] https://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2021/226210.pdf

[11] As per PRS India: the shares may be held by: (i) central government, (ii) multilateral institutions, (iii) sovereign wealth funds, (iv) pension funds, (v) insurers, (vi) financial institutions, (vii) banks, and (viii) any other institution prescribed by the central government.

[12] https://prsindia.org/billtrack/the-national-bank-for-financing-infrastructure-and-development-bill-2021

Sec 29A in the Post-COVID World- To stay or not to stay

-Megha Mittal

(resolution@vinodkothari.com)

If the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘Code’) is the car driving the ailing companies on road to revival, resolution plans are the wheels- Essentially designed to explore revival opportunities for an ailing entity, the Code invites potential resolution applicants to come forward and submit resolution plans.

Generally perceived as an alluring investment opportunity, resolution plans enable interested parties to acquire businesses at considerably reduced values. An indispensable aspect of these Resolution Plans, however, is the applicability of section 29A, which restricts several classes of entities, including ex-promoters of the corporate debtor, from becoming resolution applicants- for the very simple purpose of preventing re-possession of the corporate debtor at discounted rates. Hence, section 29A is seen as a crucial safeguard in revival of the corporate debtor, in its true sense.

In the present times, however, we cannot overlook the fact that the unprecedented COVID disruption, has compelled regulators around the globe, to reconsider the applicability and continuity of several laws, including those considered as significant; and one such provision is section 29A of the Code.

In a recent paper “Indian Banks: A Time to Reform? dated 21st September,2020, the authors, Viral V Archarya and Raghuram G. Rajan, the former Deputy Governor and Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, have discussed banking sector reforms in view of the COVID disruption, calling for privatisation of Public Sector Banks, setting up of a ‘Bad Bank’[1] amongst other suggested reforms.  In the said Paper, they also suggest that “for post-COVID NCLT cases to allow the original borrower to retain control, with the restructuring agreed with all creditors further blessed by the court. Another alternative might be to allow the original borrower to also bid in the NCLT-run auction”- thereby setting a stage for holding back applicability of section 29A in the post COVID world.

In this article, the author makes a humble attempt to analyse the feasibility and viability of doing-away with section 29A in the post-COVID world.

Read more