Supreme Court’s Judgment in Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd.: a wake up call for the Resolution Professionals and Committee of Creditors

Team Resolution | resolution@vinodkothari.com

The Supreme Court judgement in the matter of Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd., set aside the resolution plan for Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd., and directed liquidation, after almost 6 years the resolution plan was approved by National Company Law Tribunal, citing  significant gaps in the conduct of corporate insolvency resolution processes – for instance,  lapses in meeting statutory timelines, deficiencies in eligibility verification under section 29A,  irregularities in plan implementation, judicial overreach by National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, among others. 

In this write up, we have made an attempt to discuss significant points of law as discussed by SC in this ruling and also provide our humble comments on the same. Needless to say, many of the concerns highlighted by the SC in this judgment would act as a binding code of conduct for all resolution professionals, CoCs, and even judicial institutions. 

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Classification of lease transactions under IBC: Financial vs. Operational debt

– Barsha Dikshit, Partner | resolution@vinodkothari.com

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’) broadly classifies debts into two categories-Financial Debt and Operational Debt. The classification of a debt as either financial or operational plays a pivotal role, particularly in determining the eligibility of the creditor for inclusion in the committee of creditors upon the initiation of the corporate insolvency resolution process 

Section 5(8) of the IBC defines “Financial Debt” as a debt, along with any interest thereon, that is disbursed against the consideration for the time value of money and encompasses a wide range of debts, including any liability or obligation arising from disbursement of funds to a borrower for financing the operations of a debtor., or any similar arrangement. Notably, the definition under Section 5(8) further elaborates that financial debt includes:

“Any liability in respect of any lease or hire purchase contract that is deemed a finance or capital lease under Indian Accounting Standards (IND AS) or other prescribed accounting standards.”

This provision underscores the significance of the classification of lease agreements. When a lease is structured in such a manner that it aligns with the criteria provided for lease arrangements under applicable accounting standards, it qualifies as a finance lease, and thus, a financial debt; otherwise will be treated as an operational debt (We have earlier discussed in detail the treatment of lease transactions under IBC. The same can be seen here.)

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Presentation on IBBI’s Discussion Paper on ‘Streamlining Processes under the Code: Reforms for Enhanced Efficiency and Outcomes’

– Team Resolution | resolution@vinodkothari.com

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Comments on the IBBI Discussion Paper on ‘Streamlining Processes under the Code: Reforms for Enhanced Efficiency and Outcomes’

Discussion on IBBI Discussion Paper dated 4th February, 2025

Comments on the IBBI Discussion Paper on ‘Streamlining Processes under the Code: Reforms for Enhanced Efficiency and Outcomes’

– Resolution Team, Vinod Kothari and Company | resolution@vinodkothari.com

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Group Insolvency: Relevance of Substantive Consolidation in Indian Context

Interim Finance becomes effective and attractive

Presentation on IBBI’s Discussion Paper on ‘Streamlining Processes under the Code: Reforms for Enhanced Efficiency and Outcomes’

Discussion on IBBI Discussion Paper dated 4th February, 2025

Snapshot of amendments in IBBI Regulations

– Sourish Kundu, Executive | resolution@vinodkothari.com

Budget 2025: Mergers not to be used for evergreening of losses

– Barsha Dikshit and Neha Malu | resolution@vinodkothari.com

The provisions related to the carry forward and set-off of business losses in the context of corporate restructuring have been a critical aspect of corporate taxation. The Budget 2025[1] proposes certain amendments concerning carry forward of losses in cases of amalgamation, pursuant to which mergers shall not be used for evergreening of losses. That is to say, the benefit of carry forward shall be limited to eight years from the onset of losses, and not eight years from the merger.

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Closure and Scaling Down of Business

Refer our related resources:

FAQs on Buyback

Section 53: Liquidation

Affixing Vicarious Liability on Directors: See a Breakthrough

Introduction:

It is well established that a company, being an artificial legal entity, conducts its day-to-day operations through a collective body of individuals known as the Board of Directors. This body bears direct responsibility for the company’s functioning and decision-making. Consequently, in instances of default, both the company and its directors are often held accountable. Under Section 2(60) of the Companies Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), directors can be designated as “officers who are in default,” thereby making them personally liable in specific situations.

Despite its artificial nature, a company is recognized as a separate legal entity under the law. Therefore, for any offence committed by a company, it is primarily the company itself that is liable to face legal consequences. However, this fundamental principle is sometimes overlooked, and directors are held accountable for the corporation’s adverse actions. This stems from the perception that directors act as the “mind” of the company and control its operations.

Recently, the Supreme Court of India, in Sanjay Dutt & ORS. v. State of Haryana & ANR (Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 2025), reaffirmed the distinction between the company’s liability and that of its directors. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to the principle of separate legal personality, ensuring that directors are not unfairly held liable unless their personal involvement or negligence in the offence is established.

Brief facts of the Case: 

The case under discussion revolves around a complaint lodged under the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900 (PLPA) against three directors of a company, alleging environmental damage caused by uprooting trees using machinery in a notified area. The appellants (directors of Tata Realty and related entities) sought to quash the complaint, asserting that the alleged actions were conducted by the company and not attributable to them personally. The complaint, however, excluded the company as a party and focused on the directors’ liability under Section 4 read with Section 19 of the PLPA.

Key observations by the Supreme Court:

  1. Primary Liability of the Company: The Court emphasized that the company itself, as the licensee and beneficiary of the land, was primarily liable for any violations. Excluding the company from the complaint undermined the case’s premise.
  1. Vicarious Liability Not Automatic: The Court reiterated that directors cannot be automatically held vicariously liable unless the statute explicitly provides for such liability or there is evidence of their personal involvement in the offence.
  1. Lack of Specific Allegations: The complaint failed to attribute specific actions or responsibilities to the directors. It merely assumed liability based on their official positions, which is insufficient for criminal prosecution.
  1. Legal Fiction Requires Explicit Provision: Vicarious liability in criminal matters requires clear statutory backing. The PLPA contains no provisions imposing vicarious liability on directors for offences committed by the company.

Understanding the Concept of Vicarious Liability:

The concept of vicarious liability allows courts to hold one person accountable for the actions of another. This principle is rooted in the idea that a person may bear responsibility for the acts carried out by someone under their authority or on their behalf. In the corporate context, this doctrine extends to holding companies liable for the actions of their employees, agents, or representatives.

Initially developed within the framework of tort law, the doctrine of vicarious liability later found application in criminal law, particularly in cases involving offences of absolute liability. This marked a departure from the once-prevailing notion that corporations, as artificial entities, could not commit crimes. Modern legal interpretations now recognize that a corporation may be held criminally liable if its human agents, acting within the scope of their employment, engage in unlawful conduct.

Doctrine of Attribution:

Currently, a company does not have the immunity to safeguard itself under the blanket of laxity of mens rea, an important component for the constitution of a criminal intent. It was established that corporations are  liable for  criminal and civil wrongdoings if the offences were committed through the corporation’s ‘directing mind and will’. This attribution of liability to the corporations is known as the ‘Doctrine of Attribution’

‘Doctrine of Attribution’ says that in the event of an act or omission leading to violation of criminal law, the mens rea i.e. intention of committing the act is attributed to those who are the ‘directing mind and will’ of the corporations. It can be said that Doctrine of Attribution is a subset of Principle of Vicarious Liability wherein a corporation can be held responsible even in case of a criminal liability.

The landmark judgment in H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd. v. T.J. Graham & Sons Ltd., (1957 1 QB 159) provided a foundational understanding of corporate liability. The court compared a corporation with a human body, with its directors and managers representing the “mind and will” of the organization. These individuals dictate the company’s actions and decisions, and their state of mind is legally treated as that of the corporation itself. Employees or agents, by contrast, are viewed as the “hands” that execute tasks but do not represent the company’s intent or direction.

This conceptual framework underscores that while corporations are artificial entities, they can be held criminally liable when those who embody their directing mind commit offences. The recognition of corporate criminal liability has since evolved, balancing the need for accountability with the distinction between the roles of employees and the decision-makers within an organization.

You can read more about the corporate criminal liability here.

Analyzing the Sanjay Dutt Judgment:

  1. Liability must be expressly mentioned

In the present case, the Court underscored the principle that vicarious liability cannot be imposed on directors or office-bearers of a company unless explicitly provided by statute. This was reiterated in Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (AIR 2015 SC 923) where it was held that individual liability for an offence must be clearly established through direct evidence of involvement or by a specific statutory provision. Without such statutory backing, directors cannot be presumed vicariously liable for a company’s actions.

The Court further emphasized that statutes must clearly define the scope of liability and the persons to whom it applies. This clarity is essential to prevent ambiguity and ensure that only those genuinely responsible for the offence are held accountable.

  1. Personal involvement of Directors :

The Court reaffirmed that corporate liability does not inherently extend to directors unless supported by statutory provisions or evidence of personal involvement. In Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and Anr. (AIR 2005 SC 3512), it was held that directors are not automatically vicariously liable for offences committed by the company. Only those who were directly in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company’s business at the time of the offence may be held liable.

The judgment further emphasized that liability must stem from personal involvement or actions beyond routine corporate duties. Routine oversight or general authorization does not suffice to establish criminal liability unless it can be shown that the director personally engaged in, or negligently facilitated, the unlawful act.

  1.  In charge of’ and ‘responsible to

In K.K. Ahuja vs V.K. Vora & Anr. (2009 10 SCC 48), the Supreme Court analysed the two terms often used in vicarious liability provisions, i.e., ‘in charge of’ and ‘responsible to’. It was held that the ‘in-charge’ principle presents a factual test and the ‘responsible to’ principle presents a legal test. 

A person ‘responsible to’ the company might not be ‘in charge’ of the operations of the company and so in order to be vicariously liable for the act, both the principles must satisfy. It stated as, “Section 141 (of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881), uses the words “was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company”. There may be many directors and secretaries who are not in charge of the business of the company at all.

  1. The Complainant’s Burden of Proof:

Under Section 104 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the burden of proof lies on the complainant. It is the complainant’s responsibility to make specific allegations that directly link a director’s conduct to the offence in question. This principle was reiterated in Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat (AIR 2007 SC 332), where the Court held that vague or generalized accusations against directors are insufficient.

A valid complaint must include:

  1. Clear and specific allegations detailing the director’s role in the offence.
  2. Evidence linking the director’s actions to the company’s criminal liability.
  3. Statutory provisions or legal grounds for attributing vicarious liability.

Referring to Susela Padmavathy Amma and M/s Bharti Airtel Limited (Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.12390-12391 of 2022), wherein it was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court that even when statutes explicitly provide for vicarious liability, merely holding the position of a director does not automatically render an individual liable for the company’s offences.

To establish a director’s liability, the Court emphasized the need for specific and detailed allegations that clearly demonstrate the director’s involvement in the offence. It must be shown how and in what manner the director was responsible for the company’s actions.

The Court further clarified that there is no universal rule assigning responsibility for a company’s day-to-day operations to every director. Vicarious liability can only be attributed to a director if it is proven that they were directly in charge of and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company at the time the offence occurred.

  1. MCA Directive to RD and ROCs: Circular Dated March 2, 2020:

It’s noteworthy that, even MCA, vide its General Circular no. 1/2020 dated 2nd March, 2020, directed Regional Directors and Registrar of Companies that at the time of serving notices relating to non-compliances, necessary documents may be sought so as to ascertain the involvement of the concerned officers of the company.

  1. Duties of Directors under the Companies Act, 2013

Section 166 of the Act lists down duties of directors of a company. To summarise, directors must adhere to the company’s articles, act in good faith for members’ benefit, exercise due care and independent judgment, avoid conflicts of interest, undue gain. However, of note, it does not mention that a director shall be responsible for all the affairs of a company. 

In addition to the above case, the following related judgements are also noteworthy:

  1. Pooja Ravinder Devidasani vs. State of Maharashtra and another, (2014) 16 SCC 1: In this case, the Court asserted that, only those persons who were in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the time of commission of an offence will be liable for criminal action.
  1. S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs Neeta Bhalla and another, (2005) 8 SCC 89: the Court considered the definition of the word “director” as defined in Section 2(13) of the Companies Act, 1956. It held that “…There is nothing which suggests that simply by being a director in a company, one is supposed to discharge particular functions on behalf of a company. It happens that a person may be a director in a company but he may not know anything about the day-to-day functioning of the company…”.
  1. SEBI vs. Gaurav Varshney, (2016) 14 SCC 430: The Court held that even a person without any official title or designation such as “director” in a company may still be liable, if they fulfill the main requirement of being in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business at the relevant time. Liability is contingent upon the role one plays in the affairs of a company, rather than their formal designation or status.
  1. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited and Anr., v. Datar Switchgear Limited and Ors., (10 SCC 479): The Supreme court held that wherever by a legal fiction the principle of vicarious liability is attracted and a person who is otherwise not personally involved in the commission of an offence is made liable for the same, it has to be specifically provided in the statute concerned and it is necessary for the the complainant to specifically aver the role of each of the accused in the complaint.

Vicarious liability must be explicitly provided for in the statute and supported by clear evidence of personal involvement and criminal intent. Also, it is necessary for the complainants to make specific averments in the complaints.  

Conclusion:

The above judgments reinforces the principle that corporate and individual liabilities are distinct. Vicarious liability of directors is not presumed and can only be imposed with statutory backing or compelling evidence of personal involvement. By placing the burden of proof on the complainant, the judiciary ensures fairness and prevents misuse of the legal system to harass directors without substantive evidence. This balanced approach safeguards both corporate governance and individual accountability.

You can read more about this subject here.

Supreme Court confirms, sale certificates from confirmed auction sales do not require mandatory registration

Barsha Dikshit and Neha Malu | resolution@vinodkothari.com

In the context of an auction sale conducted during liquidation or by a secured creditor, the sale certificate serves as a critical document, evidencing the transfer of title to the purchaser upon confirmation of the sale. Its legal nature and the procedural requirements such as registration and the payment of stamp duty have often been a subject of scrutiny and debate. 

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Punjab & Anr. v Ferrous Alloy Forgings P. Ltd. & Ors. reaffirmed the principle that a sale certificate issued by the authorised officer is not compulsorily registrable under section 17(1) of the Registration Act, 1908. The Court further clarified that compliance with Section 89(4) of the Registration Act, which provides for forwarding of a copy of the sale certificate by the authorised officer to the registering authority, is sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements. However, in instances where the purchaser voluntarily presents the original sale certificate for registration or uses the same for some other purpose, the document is liable to attract stamp duty as prescribed under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, or the relevant state enactments governing stamp duty. 

This article examines the legal framework governing sale certificates in auction sales, analyzing the procedural and practical nuances associated with their registration and the evolving interpretations rendered by courts in the context of SARFAESI Act and Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. 

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Navigating the Complexity of ‘Contingent Claims’ in IBC: a call for clarity

– Barsha Dikshit & Archana Kejriwal (resolution@vinodkothari.com)

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘Code’) provides a unified and collective resolution mechanism aimed at resolving the claims of multiple creditors against a corporate debtor. In this process, creditors who may have varying claims based on the nature of their financial or operational relationship with the debtor, submit their claims, which are collated either by the resolution professional (in the case of a resolution process) or the liquidator (in the event of liquidation) and ultimately these claims are satisfied from the recoveries made through either an approved resolution plan or by way of realization during the liquidation process in terms of section 53 of the Code.

At the core of this framework lies a critical question- What constitutes a legitimate “claim” as per the Code, and how does one qualify as a “creditor” eligible for repayment? 

While claims that are clearly defined or crystallized are relatively easy to account for, the matter becomes complex when dealing with contingent or unascertainable claims. Although there have been judicial interpretations addressing this concern, the law is still evolving and lacks clarity on certain aspects. 

In this write up, the author seeks to analyze the validity of ‘contingent claims’ under the Code in light of the recent judgement passed by Hon’ble NCLAT in the matter of SBS Holdings v Mohan Lal Jain, whereby NCLAT had held that claims arising from an arbitral award issued after the liquidation commencement date, even if the liquidator has participated in the arbitration process, cannot be entertained during the liquidation process of the corporate debtor.

Validity of contingent claims under the Code

A contingent claim, by its nature, is dependent upon the occurrence or non-occurrence of an uncertain future event. Such claims, although not crystallized at the time of insolvency initiation may have significant implications for creditors and the corporate debtor. While the term ‘contingent claim’ is not explicitly defined in the Code, Section 3(6) of the Code defines a “claim” as:

“(a) a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, fixed, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.

(b) right to remedy for breach of contract under any law for the time being in force, if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, fixed, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured or unsecured;”

While the definition does not explicitly distinguish between crystallized claims and contingent claims. However, the inclusive nature of the definition has led to the interpretation that contingent claims fall within the ambit of ‘claims’ that can be admitted during the CIRP or liquidation process, as the case may be. 

Status of ‘Contingent claim’ during CIRP

In CIRP, Regulation 13 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 (hereinafter, ‘CIRP Regulations’), provides that the Resolution Professional (RP) shall verify every claim submitted under the CIRP and may either admit or reject such claims based on the available evidence and records, and Regulation 14 acknowledges the possibility of contingent claims by allowing the RP to “estimate” claims that are not fully crystallized. This estimation is critical as it permits contingent claims to be included within the broader claim pool, ensuring that such claims are not ignored merely because they have not yet matured.

Status of ‘Contingent claim’ during Liquidation

In case of liquidation, Section 38 of the Code read with Regulation 16 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 (hereinafter, ‘Liquidation Regulations’) provides for submission of claims by creditors in the liquidation process. Further, Reg. 25 of the Liquidation Regulations empowers the liquidator to “make an estimate of the value of the claim” when a claim cannot be ascertained precisely, thereby allowing the liquidator to admit contingent claims in estimated value for distribution purpose. 

Thus, CIRP Regulations and Liquidation Regulations both recognize the existence of contingent claims, thereby imposing a duty on the IRP/RP or the Liquidator, as the case may be, to exercise due diligence and make reasonable estimates regarding such claims, admitting them accordingly. Notwithstanding the common duty to estimate and admit contingent claims, the roles, responsibilities, and rights of the RP and the Liquidator are distinct and operate within the separate frameworks of the CIRP and liquidation proceedings, respectively.

Judicial precedents relating to treatment of ‘contingent claims’ under the Code

The judicial precedents relating to ‘contingent claims’ under the Code emphasize an inclusive approach to recognise claims that could become liabilities in the future. While recognizing contingent claims, courts have upheld the need for fair and equitable treatment, balancing creditor interests with the efficiency of the insolvency process. Moreover, some of the judgments have underscored the importance of valuation methods that reflect the realistic likelihood of contingent events, ensuring that contingent claims do not unduly burden the resolution process or impair creditor interests. The treatment of contingent claims, while still evolving, is guided by the principles of fairness.

For instance, in the matter of Essar Steels Limited, Committee of Creditors v. Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors (2020), Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the resolution professional can admit a contingent claim at the notional value of INR1 if there are pending disputes regarding the claims in question.

In the matter of Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank and Anr. (2018), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has emphasized the inclusive definition of “claim” under the Code. The Court held that the term “claim” includes a right to payment, even if it is disputed i.e. whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, fixed, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured. This broad definition extends to contingent claims, allowing them to be admitted in insolvency proceedings, provided they can be substantiated as potential liabilities.

In Phoenix ARC Private Limited v Spade Financial Services Limited & Ors.(2021), Hon’ble SC has addressed the treatment of certain financial claims that had characteristics similar to contingent claims. The Court held that contingent claims, when verified and valued, must be recognized appropriately in the resolution process. However, their priority in distribution must align with established principles of fairness, prioritizing claims based on certainty and enforceability over those based on speculative or highly conditional events.

Thus it is clear that the existence of ‘contingent claim’ as on the CIRP commencement/ liquidation commencement cannot be denied. Infact, it is the IRP/RP or the Liquidator who are entrusted with the duty to make best estimates for such claims.

[May also read Global scenario on treatment of ‘Contingent claim’ in our related article here].

Views of NCLAT in the matter of SBS Holdings v. Mohanlal  Jain

In the instant case, an appeal was submitted before Hon’ble NCLAT , wherein the appellant contested the decision of the Liquidator. The appellant argued that a claim arising from an arbitration award, issued after the liquidation commencement date in ongoing arbitration proceedings in which the Liquidator participated on behalf of the CD), had not been considered by the Liquidator. The Liquidator had declined to admit the claim on the grounds that it was submitted after the deadline for claim submission as stipulated under Regulation 16 of the Liquidation Regulations.

Upon review, the Hon’ble NCLAT upheld the decisions of both the Liquidator and the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), dismissing the appeal. The Hon’ble NCLAT held that claims based on an arbitration award issued after the liquidation commencement date are inadmissible, even where the Liquidator has participated in the arbitration proceedings during the liquidation process. The Hon’ble NCLAT stated- “When a statute provides for liquidation commencement date as a date up to which claims can be filed and proved, no claim thereafter can be entertained by the Liquidator.

Conclusion

The treatment of contingent claims under the Code remains an evolving and intricate area of law. It is important to understand that contingent claims are not ‘unknown’, but rather ‘uncertain’ at the time of the insolvency proceedings, While the Code includes contingent claims within its broad definition of “claim,” their admission and valuation during the CIRP and liquidation processes necessitate careful assessment and estimation by IRP/RP/Liquidator, as the case may be. While there may be instances of delayed filing by claimants, such procedural delays are typically technical in nature, and the Code  also permits the late submission of claims under certain circumstances.

There are many judicial precedents that have supported the inclusion of contingent claims in insolvency proceedings. However, the recent ruling by NCLAT in SBS Holdings v. Mohanlal Jain, in the humble view of the author, tends to have added complexity by presenting divergent views. 

In the humble view of the author, the Code’s principal objective is to enable the swift revival of distressed companies and ensure equitable repayment to creditors. The exclusion of valid contingent claims would undermine this goal, potentially leaving creditors without recourse. As such, it is imperative that the legal framework surrounding contingent claims be clarified and refined to provide fair treatment to creditors with contingent liabilities, thus strengthening the overall integrity of the insolvency process.