Articles On Securitisation: Securitisation Primer

By Vinod Kothari, ( finserv@vinodkothari.com)

CHAPTER 1

Just as the electronics industry was formed when the vacuum tubes were replaced by transistors, and transistors were then replaced by integrated circuits, the financial services industry is being transformed now that securitised credit is beginning to replace traditional lending. Like other technological transformations, this one will take place over the years, not overnight. We estimate it will take 10 to 15 years for structured securitised credit to replace to displace completely the classical lending system -not a long time, considering that the fundamentals of banking have remained essentially unchanged since the Middle Ages.

Lowell L Bryan

Technological advancements have changed the face of the world of finance. It is today more a world of transactions than a world of relations. Most relations have been transactionalised.

Transactions mean coming together of two entities with a common purpose, whereas relations mean keeping together of these two entities. For example, when a bank provides a loan of a sum of money to a user, the transaction leads to a relationship: that of a lender and a borrower. However, the relationship is terminated when the very loan is converted into a debenture. The relationship of being a debentureholder in the company is now capable of acquisition and termination by transactions.

Basic meaning of securitisation:

“Securitisation” in its widest sense implies every such process which converts a financial relation into a transaction.

History of evolution of finance, and corporate law, the latter being supportive for the former, is replete with instances where relations have been converted into transactions. In fact, this was the earliest, and by far unequalled, contribution of corporate law to the world of finance, viz., the ordinary share, which implies piecemeal ownership of the company. Ownership of a company is a relation, packaged as a transaction by the creation of the ordinary share. This earliest instance of securitisation was so instrumental in the growth of the corporate form of doing business, and hence, industrialisation, that someone rated the it as one of the two greatest inventions of the 19th century -the other one being the steam engine. That truly reflects the significance of the ordinary share, and if the same idea is extended, to the very concept of securitisation: it as important to the world of finance as motive power is to industry.

Other instances of securitisation of relationships are commercial paper, which securitises a trade debt.

Asset securitisation:

However, in the sense in which the term is used in present day capital market activity, securitisation has acquired a typical meaning of its own, which is at times, for the sake of distinction, called asset securitisation. It is taken to mean a device of structured financing where an entity seeks to pool together its interest in identifiable cash flows over time, transfer the same to investors either with or without the support of further collaterals, and thereby achieve the purpose of financing. Though the end-result of securitisation is financing, but it is not “financing” as such, since the entity securitising its assets it not borrowing money, but selling a stream of cash flows that was otherwise to accrue to it.

The simplest way to understand the concept of securitisation is to take an example. Let us say, I want to own a car to run it for hire. I could take a loan with which I could buy the car. The loan is my obligation and the car is my asset, and both are affected by my other assets and other obligations. This is the case of simple financing.

On the other hand, if I were to analytically envisage the car, my asset in the instant case, as claim to value over a period of time, that is, ability to generate a series of hire rentals over a period of time, I might sell a part of the cash flow by way of hire rentals for a stipulated time and thereby raise enough money to buy the car. The investor is happier now, because he has a claim for a cash flow which is not affected by my other obligations; I am happier because I have the cake and eat it also, and also because the obligation to repay the financier is taken care of by the cashflows from the car itself.

Blend of financial engineering and capital markets:

Thus, the present-day meaning of securitisation is a blend of two forces that are critical in today’s world of finance: structured finance and capital markets. Securitisation leads to structured finance as the resulting security is not a generic risk in entity that securitises its assets but in specific assets or cashflows of such entity. Two, the idea of securitisation is to create a capital market product – that is, it results into creation of a “security” which is a marketable product.

This meaning of securitisation can be expressed in various dramatic words:

  • Securitisation is the process of commoditisation. The basic idea is to take the outcome of this process into the market, the capital market. Thus, the result of every securitisation process, whatever might be the area to which it is applied, is to create certain instruments which can be placed in the market.
  • Securitisation is the process of integration and differentiation. The entity that securitises its assets first pools them together into a common hotchpot (assuming it is not one asset but several assets, as is normally the case). This the process of integration. Then, the pool itself is broken into instruments of fixed denomination. This is the process of differentiation.
  • Securitisation is the process of de-construction of an entity. If one envisages an entity’s assets as being composed of claims to various cash flows, the process of securitisation would split apart these cash flows into different buckets, classify them, and sell these classified parts to different investors as per their needs. Thus, securitisation breaks the entity into various sub-sets.

We will return to this specific, present-day meaning of securitisation. However, let us go back to the generic meaning of the term – that is, converting an asset or a relationship into a security, a commodity.

Very understandably, further developments in this area will continue to take place. More financial relations of today will in time to come be converted into and be transferable as “securities”.

In connection with securitisation, the word “security” does not mean what it traditionally might have meant under corporate laws or commerce: a secured instrument. The word “security” here means a financial claim which is generally manifested in form of a document, its essential feature being marketability. To ensure marketability, the instrument must have general acceptability as a store of value. Hence, it is generally either rated by credit rating agencies, or it is secured by charge over substantial assets. Further, to ensure liquidity, the instrument is generally made in homogenous lots.

The generic need for securitisation is as old as that for organised financial markets. From the distinction between a financial relation and a financial transaction earlier, we understand that a relation invariably needs the coming together and remaining together of two entities. Not that the two entities would necessarily come together of their own, or directly. They might involve a number of financial intermediaries in the process, but nevertheless, a relation involves a fixity over a certain time. Generally, financial relations are created to back another financial relation, such as a loan being taken to acquire an asset, and in that case, the needed fixed period of the relation hinges on the other which it seeks to back-up.

Financial markets developed in response to the need to involve a large number of investors in the market place. As the number of investors keeps on increasing, the average size per investors keeps on coming down -this is a simple rule of the marketplace, because growing size means involvement of a wider base of investors. The small investor is not a professional investor: he is not as such in the business of investments. Hence, he needs an instrument which is easier to understand, and is liquid. These two needs set the stage for evolution of financial instruments which would convert financial claims into liquid, easy to understand and homogenous products, at times carrying certified quality labels (credit-ratings or security ) , which would be available in small denominations to suit every one’s purse. Thus, securitisation in a generic sense is basic to the world of finance, and it is a truism to say that securitisation envelopes the entire range of financial instruments, and hence, the entire range of financial markets.

Following are the reasons as to why the world of finance prefers a securitised financial instrument to the underlying financial claim in its original form:

1. Financial claims often involve sizeable sums of money, clearly outside the reach of the small investor. The initial response to this was the development of financial intermediation: an intermediary such as a bank would pool together the resources of the small investors and use the same for the larger investment need of the user. However, then came the second difficulty, noted below.

2. Small investors are typically not in the business of investments, and hence, liquidity of investments is most critical for them. Underlying financial transactions need fixity of investments over a fixed time, ranging from a few months to may be a number of years. This problem could not even be sorted out by financial intermediation, since if the intermediary provided a fixed investment option to the seeker, and itself sought funds with an option for liquidity, it would get caught into serious problems of a mismatch. Hence, the answer was a marketable instrument.

3. Generally, instruments are easier understood than financial transactions. An instrument is homogenous, usually made in a standard form, and generally containing standard issuer obligations. Hence, it can be understood generically. Besides, an important part of investor information is the quality and price of the instrument, and both are far easier known in case of instruments than in case of underlying financial transactions.

In short, the need for securitisation was almost inescapable, and present day’s financial markets would not have been what they are, unless some standard thing that market players could buy and sell, that is, financial securities, were available.

So powerful is the economic logic for securitisation that the trend towards securitisation knows no limits. Capital markets are today a place where everything is traded: from claims over entities to claims over assets, to risks, and rewards.

One of the applications of the securitisation technique has been in creation of marketable securities out of or based on receivables. The intention of this application is to afford marketability to financial claims in the form of receivables. Obviously, this application has been applied to those entities where receivables form a large part of the total assets of the entity. Besides, to be packaged as a security, the ideal receivable is one which is repayable over or after a certain period of time, and there is contractual certainty as to its payment. Hence, the application was traditionally principally directed towards housing/ mortgage finance companies, car rental companies, leasing and hire-purchase companies, credit cards companies, hotels, etc. Soon, electricity companies, telephone companies, real estate hiring companies, aviation companies etc. joined as users of securitisation. Insurance companies are the latest of the lot to make an innovative use of securitisation of risk and receivables, though the pace at which securitisation markets are growing, the word “latest” is not without the risk of being stale soon.

Though the generic meaning of securitisation is every such process whereby financial claims are transformed into marketable securities, in the sense in which we are concerned with this term here in this book, securitisation is a process by which cashflows or claims against third parties of an entity, either existing or future, are identified, consolidated, separated from the originating entity, and then fragmented into “securities” to be offered to investors.

Securitisation of receivables is a unique application of the concept of securitisation. For most other securitisations, a claim on the issuer himself is being securitised. For example, in case of issuance of debenture, the claim is on the issuing company only. In case of receivable, what is being securitised is a claim on the third party /parties, on whom the issuer has a claim. Hence, what the investor in receivable-securitised product gets is a claim on the debtors of the originator. This may at times be further include, by way of recourse, a claim on the originator himself.

The involvement of the debtors in receivable securitisation process adds unique dimensions to the concept, of which at least two deserve immediate mention. One, the very legal possibility of transforming a claim on a third party as a marketable document. It is easy to understand that this dimension is unique to securitisation of receivables, since there is no legal difficulty where an entity creates a claim on itself, but the scene is totally changed where rights on other parties are being turned into a tradeable commodity. Two, it affords to the issuer the rare ability to originate an instrument which hinges on the quality of the underlying asset. To state it simply, as the issuer is essentially marketing claims on others, the quality of his own commitment becomes irrelevant if the claim on the debtors of the issuer is either market-acceptable or is duly secured. Hence, it allows the issuer to make his own credit-rating insignificant or less-significant, and the intrinsic quality of the asset more critical.

Though there is a complete terminology appended to this Chapter, this section will help the reader to quickly get familiarised with the essential securitisation jargon.

The entity that securitises its assets is called the originator: the name signifies the fact that the entity was responsible for originating the claims that are to be ultimately securitised. There is no distinctive name for the investors who invest their money in the instrument: therefore, they might simply be called investors.

The claims that the originator securitises could either be existing claims, or existing assets (in form of claims), or expected claims over time. In other words, the securitised assets could be either existing receivables, or receivables to arise in future. The latter, for the sake of distinction, is sometimes called future flows securitisation, in which case the former is a case of asset-backed securitisation.

In US markets, another distinction is mostly common: between mortgage-backed securities and asset-backed securities. This only is to indicate the distinct application: the former relates to the market for securities based on mortgage receivables, which in the USA forms a substantial part of total securitisation markets, and securitisation of other receivables.

Since it is important for the entire exercise to be a case of transfer of receivables by the originator, not a borrowing on the security of the receivables, there is a legal transfer of the receivables to a separate entity. In legal parlance, transfer of receivables is called assignment of receivables. It is also necessary to ensure that the transfer of receivables is respected by the legal system as a genuine transfer, and not as a mere eyewash where the reality is only a mode of borrowing. In other words, the transfer of receivables has to be a true sale of the receivables, and not merely a financing against the security of the receivables.

Since securitisation involves a transfer of receivables from the originator, it would be inconvenient, to the extent of being impossible, to transfer such receivables to the investors directly, since the receivables are as diverse as the investors themselves. Besides, the base of investors could keep changing as the resulting security is essentially a marketable security. Therefore, it is necessary to bring in an intermediary that would hold the receivables on behalf of the end investors. This entity is created solely for the purpose of the transaction: therefore, it is called a special purpose vehicle (SPV) or a special purpose entity (SPE) or, if such entity is a company, special purpose company (SPC). The function of the SPV in a securitisation transaction could stretch from being a pure conduit or intermediary vehicle, to a more active role in reinvesting or reshaping the cashflows arising from the assets transferred to it, which is something that would depend on the end objectives of the securitisation exercise.

Therefore, the originator transfers the assets to the SPV, which holds the assets on behalf of the investors, and issues to the investors its own securities. Therefore, the SPV is also called the issuer.

There is no uniform name for the securities issued by the SPV as such securities take different forms. These securities could either represent a direct claim of the investors on all that the SPV collects from the receivables transferred to it: in this case, the securities are called pass through certificates or beneficial interest certificates as they imply certificates of proportional beneficial interest in the assets held by the SPV. Alternatively, the SPV might be re-configuring the cashflows by reinvesting it, so as to pay to the investors on fixed dates, not matching with the dates on which the transferred receivables are collected by the SPV. In this case, the securities held by the investors are called pay through certificates. The securities issued by the SPV could also be named based on their risk or other features, such as senior notes or junior notes, floating rate notes, etc.

Another word commonly used in securitisation exercises is bankruptcy remote transfer. What it means is that the transfer of the assets by the originator to the SPV is such that even if the originator were to go bankrupt, or get into other financial difficulties, the rights of the investors on the assets held by the SPV is not affected. In other words, the investors would continue to have a paramount interest in the assets irrespective of the difficulties, distress or bankruptcy of the originator.

A securitised instrument, as compared to a direct claim on the issuer, will generally have the following features:

Marketability:

The very purpose of securitisation is to ensure marketability to financial claims. Hence, the instrument is structured so as to be marketable. This is one of the most important feature of a securitised instrument, and the others that follow are mostly imported only to ensure this one. The concept of marketability involves two postulates: (a) the legal and systemic possibility of marketing the instrument; (b) the existence of a market for the instrument.

As far as the legal possibility of marketing the instrument is concerned, traditional mercantile law took a contemporaneous view of marketable documents. In most jurisdictions of the world, laws dealing with marketable instruments (also referred to as negotiable instruments) were mostly limited in application to what were then in circulation as such. Besides, the corporate laws mostly defined and sought to regulate issuance of very usual corporate financial claims, such as shares, bonds and debentures. For any codified law, this is not unexpected, since laws do not lead commerce: most often, they follow, as the concern of the law-maker is mostly regulatory and not promotional.

Hence, in most jurisdictions of the world, well-coded laws exist to enable and regulate the issuance of traditional forms of securitised claims, such as shares, bonds, debentures and trade paper (negotiable instruments). Most countries lack in legal systems pertaining to other securitised products, of recent or exotic origin, such as securitisation of receivables. On a policy plane, it is incumbent on the part of the regulator to view any securitised instrument with the same concern as in case of traditional instruments, for reasons of investor protection.

However, it needs to be noted that where a law does not exist to regulate issuance of a securitised instrument, it is naive to believe that the law does not permit such issuance. As regulation is a design by humanity itself, it would be ridiculous to presume that everything that is not regulated is not even allowed. Regulation is an exception and freedom is the rule.

The second issue is one of having or creating a market for the instrument. Securitisation is a fallacy unless the securitised product is marketable. The very purpose of securitisation will be defeated if the instrument is loaded on to a few professional investors without any possibility of having a liquid market therein. Liquidity to a securitised instrument is afforded either by introducing it into an organised market (such as securities exchanges) or by one or more agencies acting as market makers in it, that is, agreeing to buy and sell the instrument at either pre-determined or market-determined prices.

Merchantable quality:

To be market-acceptable, a securitised product has to have a merchantable quality. The concept of merchantable quality in case of physical goods is something which is acceptable to merchants in normal trade. When applied to financial products, it would mean the financial commitments embodied in the instruments are secured to the investors’ satisfaction. “To the investors’ satisfaction” is a relative term, and therefore, the originator of the securitised instrument secures the instrument based on the needs of the investors. The general rule is: the more broad the base of the investors, the less is the investors’ ability to absorb the risk, and hence, the more the need to securitise.

For widely distributed securitised instruments, evaluation of the quality, and its certification by an independent expert, viz., rating, is common. The rating serves for the benefit of the lay investor, who is otherwise not expected to be in a position to appraise the degree of risk involved.

In case of securitisation of receivables, the concept of quality undergoes drastic change making rating is a universal requirement for securitisations. As already discussed, securitisation is a case where a claim on the debtors of the originator is being bought by the investors. Hence, the quality of the claim of the debtors assumes significance, which at times enables to investors to rely purely on the credit-rating of debtors (or a portfolio of debtors) and so, make the instrument totally independent of the oringators’ own rating.

Wide Distribution:

The basic purpose of securitisation is to distribute the product. The extent of distribution which the originator would like to achieve is based on a comparative analysis of the costs and the benefits achieved thereby. Wider distribution leads to a cost-benefit in the sense that the issuer is able to market the product with lower return, and hence, lower financial cost to himself. But wide investor base involves costs of distribution and servicing.

In practice, securitisation issues are still difficult for retail investors to understand. Hence, most securitisations have been privately placed with professional investors. However, it is likely that in to come, retail investors could be attracted into securitised products.

Homogeneity:

To serve as a marketable instrument, the instrument should be packaged as into homogenous lots. Homogeneity, like the above features, is a function of retail marketing. Most securitised instruments are broken into lots affordable to the marginal investor, and hence, the minimum denomination becomes relative to the needs of the smallest investor. Shares in companies may be broken into slices as small as Rs. 10 each, but debentures and bonds are sliced into Rs. 100 each to Rs. 1000 each. Designed for larger investors, commercial paper may be in denominations as high as Rs. 5 Lac. Other securitisation applications may also follow this logic.

The need to break the whole lot to be securitised into several homogenous lots makes securitisation an exercise of integration and differentiation: integration of those several assets into one lump, and then the latter’s differentiation into uniform marketable lots. This often invites the next feature : an intermediary to achieve this process.

Special purpose vehicle:

In case the securitisation involves any asset or claim which needs to be integrated and differentiated, that is, unless it is a direct and unsecured claim on the issuer, the issuer will need an intermediary agency to act as a repository of the asset or claim which is being securitised. Let us take the easiest example of a secured debenture, in essence, a secured loan from several investors. Here, security charge over the issuer’s several assets needs to be integrated, and thereafter broken into marketable lots. For this purpose, the issuer will bring in an intermediary agency whose basic function is to hold the security charge on behalf of the investors, and then issue certificates to the investors of beneficial interest in the charge held by the intermediary. So, whereas the charge continues to be held by the intermediary, beneficial interest therein becomes a marketable security.

The same process is involved in securitisation of receivables, where the special purpose intermediary holds the receivables with itself, and issues beneficial interest certificates to the investors.

  1. Meaning of security:
  2. Need for securitisation:
  3. Securitisation of receivables:
  4. quick guide to Jargon:
  5. Features of securitisation:
  6. Securitisation and financial disintermediation:

Securitisation is often said to result into financial disintermediation. This concept needs to be elaborated. The best way to understand this concept is to take the case of corporate debentures, a well-understood security.

As was discussed earlier, if one imagines a financial world without securities (and such world is only imaginary), all financial transactions will be carried only as one-to-one relations. For example, if a company needs a loan, if will have to seek such loan from the lenders, and the lenders will have to establish a one-to-one relation with the company. Each lender has to understand the borrowing company, and to look after his loan. This is often difficult, and hence, there appears a financial intermediary, such as a bank in this case, which pools funds from a lot of such investors, and uses these pooled funds to lend to the company. Now, let us suppose the company securitises the loan, and issues debentures to the investors. Will this eliminate the need for the intermediary bank, since the investors may now lend to the company directly in small amounts each, in form of a security which is easy to appraise, and which is liquid ?

Utilities added by financial intermediaries:

A financial intermediary initially came in picture to avoid the difficulties in a direct lender-borrower relation between the company and the investors. The difficulties could have been one or more of the following:

(a) Transactional difficulty: An average small investor would have a small amount of sum to lend whereas the company’s needs would be massive. The intermediary bank pools the funds from small investors to meet the typical needs of the company. The intermediary may issue its own security, of smaller value.

(b) Informational difficulty: An average small investor would either not be aware of the borrower company or would not know how to appraise or manage the loan. The intermediary fills up this gap.

(c) Perceived risk: The risk as investors perceive in investing in a bank may be much lesser than that of investing directly in the company, though in reality, the financial risk of the company is transposed on the bank. However, the bank is a pool of several such individual risks, and hence, the investors’ preference of a bank to the borrower company is reasonable.

Securitisation of the loan into bonds or debentures fills up all the three difficulties in direct exchange mentioned above, and hence, avoids the need for a direct intermediation. It avoids the transactional difficulty by breaking the lumpy loan into marketable lots. It avoids informational difficulty because the securitised product is offered generally by way of a public offer, and its essential features are well disclosed. It avoids the perceived risk difficulty too, since the instrument is generally well-secured, and is rated for the investors’ satisfaction.

Securitisation: changes the function of intermediation:

Hence, it is true to say that securitisation leads to a degree of disintermediation. Disintermediation is one of the important aims of a present-day corporate treasurer, since by leap-frogging the intermediary, the company intends to reduce the cost of its finances. Hence, securitisation has been employed to disintermediate.

It is, however, important to understand that securitisation does not eliminate the need for the intermediary: it merely redefines the intermediary’s loan. Let us revert to the above example. If the company in the above case is issuing debentures to the public to replace a bank loan, is it eliminating the intermediary altogether ? It would possibly be avoiding the bank as an intermediary in the financial flow, but would still need the services of an investment banker to successfully conclude the issue of debentures.

Hence, securitisation changes the basic role of financial intermediaries. Traditionally, financial intermediaries have emerged to make a transaction possible by performing a pooling function, and have contributed to reduce the investors’ perceived risk by substituting their own security for that of the end user. Securitisation puts these services of the intermediary in a background by making it possible for the end-user to offer these features in form of the security, in which case, the focus shifts to the more essential function of a financial intermediary: that of distributing a financial product. For example, in the above case, where the bank being the earlier intermediary was eliminated and instead the services of an investment banker were sought to distribute a debenture issue, the focus shifted from the pooling utility provided by the banker to the distribution utility provided by the investment banker.

This has happened to physical products as well. With standardisation, packaging and branding of physical products, the role of intermediary traders, particularly retailers, shifted from those who packaged smaller qualities or provided to the customer assurance as to quality, to the ones who basically performed the distribution function.

Securitisation seeks to eliminate funds-based financial intermediaries by fee-based distributors. In the above example, the bank was a fund-based intermediary, a reservoir of funds, whereas the investment banker was a fee-based intermediary, a catalyst, a pipeline of funds. Hence, with increasing trend towards securitisation, the role of fee-based financial services has been brought into the focus.

In case of a direct loan, the lending bank was performing several intermediation functions noted above: it was distributor in the sense that it raised its own finances from a large number of small investors; it was appraising and assessing the credit risks in extending the corporate loan, and having extended it, it was managing the same. Securitisation splits each of these intermediary functions apart, each to be performed by separate specialised agencies. The distribution function will be performed by the investment bank, appraisal function by a credit-rating agency, and management function possibly by a mutual fund who manages the portfolio of security investments by the investors. Hence, securitisation replaces fund-based services by several fee-based services.

Securitisation: changing the face of banking:

Note the quotation with which we began this Chapter – it says securitisation is slowly but definitely changing the face of modern banking and by the turn of the new millennium, securitisation would have transformed banking into a new-look function.

Banks are increasingly facing the threat of disintermediation. When asked why he robbed banks, the infamous American criminal Willie Sutton replied “that’s where the money is.” No more so, a bank would say ! In a world of securitized assets, banks have diminished roles. The distinction between traditional bank lending and securitized lending clarifies this situation.

Traditional bank lending has four functions: originating, funding, servicing, and monitoring. Originating means making the loan, funding implies that the loan is held on the balance sheet, servicing means collecting the payments of interest and principal, and monitoring refers to conducting periodic surveillance to ensure that the borrower has maintained the financial ability to service the loan. Securitized lending introduces the possibility of selling assets on a bigger scale and eliminating the need for funding and monitoring.

The securitized lending function has only three steps: originate, sell, and service. This change from a four-step process to a three-step function has been described as the fragmentation or separation of traditional lending.

Capital markets fuelled securitisation:

The fuel for the disintermediation market has been provided by the capital markets:

  • Professional and publicly available rating of borrowers has eliminated the informational advantage of financial intermediaries. Imagine a market without rating agencies: any one who has to take an exposure in any product or entity has to appraise the entity. Obviously enough, only those who are able to employ high-degree analytical skills will be able to survive. However, the availability of professionally and systematically conducted ratings has enabled lay investors to rely on the rating company’s professional judgement and invest directly in the products or instruments of user entities than to go through financial intermediaries.
  • The development of capital markets has re-defined the role of bank regulators. A bank supervisory body is concerned about the risk concentrations taken by a bank. More the risk undertaken, more is the requirement of regulatory capital. On the other hand, if the same assets were to be distributed through the capital market to investors, the risk is divided, and the only task of the regulator is that the risk inherent in the product is properly disclosed. The market sets its own price for risk – higher the risk, higher the return required.

Capital markets tend to align risks to risk takers. Free of constraints imposed by regulators and risk-averse depositors and bank shareholders, capital markets efficiently align risk preferences and tolerances with issuers (borrowers) by giving providers of funds (capital market investors) only the necessary and preferred information. Any remaining informational advantage of banks is frequently offset by other features of the capital markets: variety of offering methods, flexibility of timing and other structural options. For borrowers able to access capital markets directly, the cost of capital will be reduced according to the confidence that the investor has in the relevance and accuracy of the provided information.

 As capital markets become more complete, financial intermediaries become less important as cotact points between borrowers and savers. They become more important, however, as specialists that (1) complete markets by providing new products and services, (2) transfer and distribute various risks via structured deals, and (3) use their reputational capital as delegated monitors to distinguish between high- and low-quality borrowers by providing *third-party certifications of creditworthiness. These changes represent a shift away from the administrative structures of traditional lending to market-oriented structures for allocating money and capital.

In this sense, securitisation is not really-speaking synonymous to disintermediation, but distribution of intermediary functions amongst specialist agencies.

Securitisation is a “structured financial instrument”. “Structured finance” has become a buzzword in today’s financial market. What it means is a financial instrument structured or tailored to the risk-return and maturity needs of the investor, rather than a simple claim against an entity or asset.

Does that mean any tailored financial product is a structured financial product? In a broad sense, yes. But the popular use of the term structured finance in today’s financial world is to refer to such financing instruments where the financier does not look at the entity as a risk: but tries to align the financing to specific cash accruals of the borrower.

On the investors side, securitisation seeks to structure an investment option to suit the needs of investors. It classifies the receivables/cash flows not only into different maturities but also into senior, mezzanine and junior notes. Therefore, it also aligns the returns to the risk requirements of the investor.

Securitization is more than just a financial tool. It is an important tool of risk management for banks that primarily works through risk removal but also permits banks to acquire securitized assets with potential diversification benefits. When assets are removed from a bank’s balance sheet, without recourse, all the risks associated with the asset are eliminated, save the risks retained by the bank. Credit risk and interest-rate risk are the key uncertainties that concern domestic lenders. By passing on these risks to investors, or to third parties when credit enhancements are involved, financial firms are better able to manage their risk exposures.

In today’s banking, securitisation is increasingly being resorted to by banks, along with other innovations such as credit derivatives to manage credit risks.

Securitisation and credit derivatives:

Credit derivatives are only a logical extension of the concept of securitisation. A credit derivative is a non-fund based contract when one person agreed to undertake, for a fee, the risk inherent in a credit without acting taking over the credit. The risk could be undertaken either by guaranteeing against a default, or by guaranteeing the total expected return from the credit transaction. While the former could be just another form of traditional guarantees, the latter is the true concept of credit derivatives. Thus, if B bank has a concentration in say Iron and Steel segment while A bank has concentration in Textiles, the two can diversify their risks, without actually taking financial exposure, by engaging in credit derivatives. A can agree to guarantee the returns of B from a part of its Iron and Steel exposures, and B can guarantee the returns of A from Textiles (derivatives do not necessarily have to be reciprocal). Thus, A is now earning both from its own exposure in Iron and Steel, as also from the fee-based exposure it has taken in Textiles.

Credit derivatives were logically the next step in development of securitisation. Securitisation development was premised on credit being converted into a commodity. In the process, the risk inherent in credits was being professionally measured and rated. In the second step, one would argue that if the risk can be measured and traded as a commodity with the underlying financing involved, why can’t the financing and the credit be stripped as two different products?

The development of credit derivatives has not reduced the role for securitisation: it has only increased the potential for securitisation. Credit derivatives is only a tool for risk management: securitisation is both a tool for risk management as also treasury management. Entities that want to go for securitisation can easily use credit derivatives as a credit enhancement device, that is, secure total returns from the portfolio by buying a derivative, and then securitise the portfolio.

Securitisation is as necessary to the economy as any organised markets are. While this single line sums up the economic significance of securitisation, the following can be seen as the economic merits in securitisation:

-1 Facilitates creation of markets in financial claims:

By creating tradeable securities out of financial claims, securitisation helps to create markets in claims which would, in its absence, have remained bilateral deals. In the process, securitisation makes financial markets more efficient, by reducing transaction costs.

-2 Disperses holding of financial assets:

The basic intent of securitisation is to spread financial assets amidst as many savers as possible. With this end in view, the security is designed in minimum size marketable lots as necessary. Hence, it results into dispersion of financial assets.One should not underrate the significance of this factor just because most of the recently developed securitisations have been lapped up by institutional investors. Lay investors need a certain cooling-off period before they understand a financial innovation. Recent securitisation applications, viz., mortgages, receivables, etc. are, therefore, yet to become acceptable to lay investors. But given their attractive features, there is no reason why they will not.

-3 Promotes savings:

The availability of financial claims in a marketable form, with proper assurance as to quality in form of credit ratings, and with double safety-nets in form of trustees, etc., securitisation makes it possible for the lay investors to invest in direct financial claims at attractive rates. This has salubrious effect on savings.

-4 Reduces costs:

As discussed above, securitisation tends to eliminate fund-based intermediaries, and it leads to specialisation in intermediation functions. This saves the end-user company from intermediation costs, since the specialised-intermediary costs are service-related, and generally lower.

-5 Diversifies risks:

Financial intermediation is a case of diffusion of risk because of accumulation by the intermediary of a portfolio of financial risks. Securitisation further diffuses such diversified risk to a wide base of investors, with the result that the risk inherent in financial transactions gets very widely diffused.

-6 Focuses on use of resources, and not their ownership:

Once an entity securitises its financial claims, it ceases to be the owner of such resources and becomes merely a trustee or custodian for the several investors who thereafter acquire such claim. Imagine the idea of securitisation being carried further, and not only financial claims but claims in physical assets being securitised, in which case the entity needing the use of physical assets acquires such use without owning the property. The property is diffused over an investor crowd.In this sense, securitisation carries Gandhi’s idea of a capitalist being a trustee of resources and not the owner. Securitisation in its logical extension will enable enterprises to use physical assets even without owning them, and to disperse the ownership to the real owner thereof: the society.

  1. Securitisation and structured finance:
  2. Securitisation as a tool of risk management:
  3. Economic impact of securitisation:
  4. The alchemy of securitisation: is the sum of parts more than the whole?

An essential economic question often raised is: does securitisation lead to any overall social benefit? After all, all that securitisation does is to break a company, a set of various assets, into various subsets of classified assets, and offer them to investors. Imagine a world without securitisation: each investor would be taking a risk in the unclassified, composite company as a whole. So, how does it serve any economic purpose, if the company is “de-composed” and sold to different investors?

A New Zealand-based scholar takes the following example to illustrate the alchemy of securitisation:

To appreciate the underlying economics driving a securitisation, consider a hypothetical holding company XYZ Ltd, which has on its balance sheet nothing other than three wholly-owned subsidiaries, X, Y & Z. (The process of securitisation can be thought of as treating distinguishable pools of assets as if they were the wholly-owned subsidiaries, X, Y and Z.)

Assume X is 100% debt financed (5 year debentures issued at 9%) with its only asset a single 5 year loan to an AAA-rated borrower paying 10%.

Assume Y is a new software company with no earnings or performance history, but with projections for extremely attractive, albeit volatile, future earnings.

Assume Z is a well-known manufacturing company with predictable but unspectacular earnings.

If XYZ went to the debt markets seeking additional senior unsecured funding, potential investors would face the difficult task of evaluating its assets and assessing its debt repaying abilities. The assessed cost of marginal XYZ borrowing might consist of an “average” of the conservatively calculated returns on the assets of the segments that comprise XYZ. Note that this average would necessarily reflect known and unknown synergies, and costs and associative risks arising from the collective ownership of the constituent parts (i.e., the group’s imputed contribution for credit support, insolvency risk and liability recourse) and would likely include an “uncertainty” discount.

Now consider the probable outcomes if XYZ were to legally sell or “spin-off” the ownership of one or more of its “parts.” In exchange for the exclusive rights to the cash flows from X, investors would return to XYZ maximum equivalent value in the form of cash.

Such an offering:

    • appeals to a wide range of investors, including those with a preference for, and superior information regarding, the risk represented by X’s obligors and those new investors who have had an aversion for the risk presented by the associated costs and risks represented by Y and Z
    • returns to XYZ the full value the market attaches to the certainty of the information concerning X, now free of any discount imposed by the uncertainty of the information regarding Y and Z.

Admittedly, the value of the resulting XYZ shares depends in part on the disposition of the cash received from the spin-off. If XYZ retains the cash, there may be a discount or revaluation resulting from the market’s assessment of XYZ’s ability to achieve a return equal or better than it would have earned from keeping the asset.

There is always one clear collateral benefit to the resulting XYZ that derives from any divestment. The perceived value of the remaining components is relieved of any previously imposed discount for the disposed component’s credit support and insolvency risk.

Holding aside separate considerations of corporate strategy and intentional and coincidental internal synergies, to the extent that the consideration received from the divestment improves (in the perception of the market) the capital structure of the resulting XYZ and/or improves the marginal funding cost for the resulting XYZ, the decision to divest or securitise is simplified. If the information held by XYZ concerning any of its segments is not or cannot be fully disclosed, or when disclosed will not be fully or accurately valued, the correct decision is to retain the asset.

Without securitisation, XYZ’s bank or factor faces significant and largely irreducible costs of evaluating the marginal impact on XYZ’s borrowing cost from XYZ’s pledging of assets (receivables) and of evaluating similar information for each other borrower that the lender or factor finances. If the imposed cost of borrowing is to be judged solely on the assets (which is, as we’ve shown, the most efficient way to assess the true cost of asset based borrowing), evaluating each pool of assets and assessing the likelihood that the cash flows from them will be uninterrupted must be repeated for each borrowing.

By developing a market for asset-specific expertise (not the least of which is represented by the expertise of the rating agencies), and by relying on the capital markets to determine the best price for the rated asset-backed securities (such rating representing the expression of the information provided by the developed expertise), the cost of borrowings for issuers using properly organised securitisation structures has steadily decreased and is well below the cost of borrowing from a lending institution. 

Capturing scale and volume efficiencies

By aggregating similarly originated assets into a sufficiently large pool, the consequences of an individual receivable defaulting, and the levels of risk of default, are minimised. If we further collect and aggregate dissimilar pools of assets, and issue securities backed by the aggregated cash flows derived from the underlying assets, as a result of rules of probability and the basic principles of diversification, the marginal risk to the purchaser (investor) of such a security is significantly less than the risk of holding even a pool of individual receivables. And it is far less than the risk associated with a single receivable.

 If a borrower can identify, segregate and then satisfactorily describe for investors a pool of securitisable assets otherwise held on its balance sheet, the securitisation process can give that borrower a lower cost of funding and improve its balance sheet management. The borrower faced with such an opportunity who chooses not to securitise runs the risk of handicapping its ability to compete.

  1. risks and benefits of securitisation:

 The Bank for International Settlements in a 1992 publication titled Asset Transfers and Securitisation had the following to say on the risks and benefits of securitisation:

 The possible effects of securitisation on financial systems may well differ between countries because of differences in the structure of financial systems or because of differences in the way in which monetary policy is executed. In addition, the effects will vary depending upon the stage of development of securitisation in a particular country. The net effect may be potentially beneficial or harmful, but a number of concerns are highlighted below that may in certain circumstances more than offset the benefits. Several of these concerns are not principally supervisory in nature, but they are referred to here because they may influence monetary authorities’ policy on the development of securitisation markets.

While asset transfers and securitisation can improve the efficiency of the financial

system and increase credit availability by offering borrowers direct access to end-investors, the process may on the other hand lead to some diminution in the importance of banks in the financial intermediation process. In the sense that securitisation could reduce the proportion of financial assets and liabilities held by banks, this could render more difficult the execution of monetary policy in countries where central banks operate through variable minimum reserve requirements. A decline in the importance of banks could also weaken the relationship between lenders and borrowers, particularly in countries where banks are predominant in the economy.

One of the benefits of securitisation, namely the transformation of illiquid loans into liquid securities, may lead to an increase in the volatility of asset values, although credit enhancements could lessen this effect. Moreover, the volatility could be enhanced by events extraneous to variations in the credit standing of the borrower. A preponderance of assets with readily ascertainable market values could even, in certain circumstances, promote a liquidation as opposed to going-concern concept for valuing banks.

Moreover, the securitisation process might lead to some pressure on the profitability of banks if non-bank financial institutions exempt from capital requirements were to gain a competitive advantage in investment in securitised assets.

Although securitisation can have the advantage of enabling lending to take place beyond the constraints of the capital base of the banking system, the process could lead to a decline in the total capital employed in the banking system, thereby increasing the financial fragility of the financial system as a whole, both nationally and internationally. With a substantial capital base, credit losses can be absorbed by the banking system. But the smaller that capital base is, the more the losses must be shared by others. This concern applies, not necessarily in all countries, but especially in those countries where banks have traditionally been the dominant financial intermediaries.

The funny piece below seeks to capture the inherent risks of securitisation:

10 reasons as to why the Titanic was actually a securitisation instrument:

1) The downside was not immediately apparent.

2) It went underwater rapidly despite assurances it was unsinkable.

3) Only a few wealthy people got out in time.

4) The structure appeared iron-clad.

5) Nobody really understood the risk.

6) The disaster happened overnight London time.

7) Nobody spent any time monitoring the risk.

8) People spent a lot trying to lift it out of the water.

9) People who actually made money were not in original deal.

10) Despite the disaster, people still went on other ships.

The above highlights the risks inherent in securitisation. One of the biggest inherent threat in securitisation deals is that the market participants have necessarily believed securitised instruments to be safe, while in reality, many of them represent poor credit risks or doubtful receivables. For example, a growing section of securitisation market is sub-prime auto loans and home equity loans. Similarly, many of the health-care receivables or student loan receivables may not represent good credits.

One instance of a failure in securitisation deals in the USA is the securitisation of health care receivables by a company called Towers Financial. Its Chairman was later sentenced to 20 years in prison for fraud. In fact, the first bank to securitize credit-card payments–RepublicBank Delaware, in 1987–failed in 1988, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. paid off investors early.

In an article titled On the Frontiers of Creative Finance: How Wall Street can Securitise Anything [Fortune, April 28, 1997] Kim Clark noted: ” Investors do need to beware, of course. Financial markets are notorious for pushing investment ideas into the absurd. Some of these exotic securities will undoubtedly collapse, which will undoubtedly cause a backlash.”

The revised article 9 of Uniform Commercial Code

Links

The revised article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code of the United States of America deals with the creation, perfection, and priority of security interests in personal property including accounts receivables and intangibles. Though securitization is not a "security interest" as traditionally understood, yet the UCC article includes provisions relating to securitization.

As such, securitisation transactions are affected by the new article. In general, analysts believe that the new article is favourable for securitisation transactions.

To provide a comprehensive guide on the revised article 9, we provide these significant links:

Ministry of Finance of Republic of Latvia : LAW ON MORTGAGE BONDS

Chapter I

General conditions

Article 1

The following terms are used in this Law:

1) mortgage bond(s) – (hereinafter referred to as mortgage bond or bonds) – a security of

public circulation, issued by a bank and secured by mortgages and other collateral,

stipulated by this Law;

2) mortgage loan(s) (loan(s)) – is a loan, secured by pledged real estate (mortgage),

registered with the Land Book in accordance with the regulations of the Civil Law;

3) market value of the real estate to be mortgaged – the calculated value – the money

amount, determined as of the day of valuation, for which the property may be sold

(purchased), in a transaction between a willing seller and willing buyer.

Article 2

The terms "mortgage" and "mortgage bonds" and their derivatives together or separately may

be used only when referring to securities, which are issued and are in circulation in

accordance with this Law.

Article 3

The provisions of this Law shall be applied only to such mortgage loans which can serve as

security for the mortgage bonds in circulation as set forth in this Law.

Chapter II

Issue and Circulation of Mortgage Bonds

Article 4

The mortgage bonds are issued and circulated under the Law "On Securities", this Law and in

cases determined by the Law " On Securities Market Commission", under the regulations of

the Securities Market Commission.

Article 5

(1) Banks meeting the following criteria are entitled to issue mortgage bonds:

1) which have own capital not less than five million Lats; and

2) which are permitted to conduct all the banking operations (transactions), specified by

Paragraph 4 of Article 1 of the Law "On Credit Institutions" without any restrictions

imposed by the Bank of Latvia; and

3) which have submitted to the Securities Market Commission rules of the banks' board

of directors on mortgage transactions and internal bank procedures, which must

provide for the establishment of a Mortgage Bond Collateral Register and

management of data therein including mortgage claims and substitute collateral. The

mortgage claims and substitute collateral must be kept separately from all other assets

of the bank.

(2) Subsequent to the request of the Securities Market Commission, the Bank of Latvia will

issue an opinion on the procedures, specified in sub-paragraph 3 of Paragraph (1) of this.04-08-99 2

Article, as well as with the criteria, determined by sub-paragraphs 1 -2 of Paragraph (1)

of this Article.

Article 6

The following basic provisions shall be followed in respect of mortgage bonds:

1) the issue prospectus shall determine whether the mortgage bonds have a call option; if

there is a call option, it should set forth the procedures;

2) if the issue prospectus defines a term during which the mortgage bonds call option shall

not be exercised, the provisions of Article 1767 of the Civil Law are not applicable;

3) should a call option be exercised while the bonds are still in circulation, the accrued

interest payments should only be terminated on the interest payment date subsequent to

the mortgage bond retirement date;

4) if any part of mortgage bonds series is prepaid, then all the mortgage bonds of that

respective series shall be subject to a similar right of prepayment;

5) the interest coupon payment on mortgage bonds shall take place not less than once per

annum.

Article 7

If the mortgage bond prospectus provides for recalculation of the nominal value and interest

on mortgage bonds in accordance with changes in macroeconomic indicators, foreign

exchange rates or refinancing interest rate of the Bank of Latvia, or other changes, then the

basis for recalculation may be only the official data published by the State Statistics

Committee of Latvia or the Bank of Latvia.

Article 8

If a mortgage loan is included in a mortgage bond issued then the bank shall not refuse to

accept the repayment of such loan by delivery of a mortgage bond of the same series for the

nominal value of the loan outstanding.

Chapter III

Mortgage Bond Collateral

Article 9

(1) The mortgage bonds in circulation shall be backed in the full amount of their nominal

value at least by the same volume of mortgages. Guarantees of the government of Latvia

may fully or partially replace the mortgage bond security.

(2) The total interest expenditure on mortgage securities shall always be covered by at least

the same amount of total interest revenues from mortgage loans.

(3) The collateral of mortgages, government guarantees and interest income from mortgage

loans may be replaced by the substitute collateral (see below), not exceeding 20% of the

total amount of nominal value and accrued interest on mortgage bonds in circulation.

(4) The issuer may include as substitute collateral:

1) liquid T-bills of the Government of Latvia or securities, guaranteed by the

Government of Latvia, in the amount of 95 % of their market value, but not

exceeding nominal value of these securities;

2) a cash deposit with the bank and correspondent account with the Bank of Latvia.

(5) Redemption of the mortgage bonds in circulation and their interest payments (in

compliance with the issue rules) shall always be secured by principal and interest

repayments of mortgage loans of at least the same value (in accordance with the loan

agreement) and substitute collateral.

Article 10

(1) If as a result of the collection of a mortgage loan serving as collateral for the mortgage

bonds the bank takes onto its balance sheet the real estate, then such real estate may be

utilised as mortgage bond collateral. In this circumstance the real estate may be valued at

no more than 50% of the original mortgage loan collateral value, and the real estate may

be held as collateral at the reduced value for a maximum period of two years.

(2) A mortgage loan, obtained by the issuer from another bank pursuant to a contract, may

be utilised as a collateral for the mortgage bonds, only if either the issuer assumes

responsibility for valuation of the real estate, or the contract stipulates which bank is

responsible for the valuation.

(3) A mortgage may not serve as the collateral for bonds, if the bank, when granting the

mortgage loan, has not complied with the provisions of Article 52 of the Law on Credit

Institutions.

Article 11

(1) The bank shall keep a Mortgage Bond Collateral Register, to provide evidence of the

mortgage bonds collateral at any moment of their life.

(2) The form and content for the entries in the Mortgage Bond Collateral Register are to be

determined by the Securities Market Commission from time to time.

Article 12

(1) A mortgage shall be deemed incapable of providing acceptable collateral, if within three

months of a default the bank has not taken any steps to exercise the rights of mortgage as

defined in Paragraph (4) Article 17 or if the borrower has been declared insolvent by the

court.

(2) A mortgage, incapable of providing the collateral in accordance with the provisions of

the Paragraph (1) of this Article, must be removed from the Mortgage Bond Collateral

Register only subsequent to execution of the bank's claim.

Article 13

(1) It is only permitted to utilise the mortgages included in the Mortgage Bond Collateral

Register, and substitute collateral to secure execution of the liabilities, arising on

mortgage bonds issued.

(2) The mortgages and substitute collateral, included in the Mortgage Bond Collateral

Register, shall be managed by the bank separately from its other assets.

(3) In case of bankruptcy of the bank, mortgages and substitute collateral, recorded in the

Mortgage Bond Collateral Register, shall not be included in the bankrupt's estate

(financial means), from which expenses of the insolvency and liquidation procedures are

covered and creditors' claims addressed.

Chapter IV

A Mortgage Loan

Article 14

A mortgage loan shall not exceed 60% of the market value of the real estate pledged as a

collateral for this loan.

Article 15

The market value of the real estate to be pledged is determined by persons, who have received

real estate valuation license (a professional qualifications certificate) in accordance with rules

set forth by the Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 16

The collateral of a mortgage loan shall only be such a real estate, which is not encumbered by

any prior debts registered with the Land Book, or if the creditor of any prior claim has

assigned the priority rights to the bank..04-08-99 4

Article 17

(1) The mortgage loan agreement must include at least the following obligations of the

borrower (mortgagor):

1) within the course of validity of the contract to make regular repayments of the loan,

repaying principal together with the interest in equal amounts (except during first 12

months and the last payment, if stipulated by the contract conditions);

2) to provide continuous and sufficient insurance of the mortgaged property during the

whole period of mortgage agreement validity or reimburse the bank for the costs of

insuring the property;

3) not to cash in lease or rent payments from the tenants (lessees) of the pledged asset

for more than one year in advance.

(2) Loans in the amount of up to 20 % of the total amount of loans included in the Mortgage

Bond Collateral Register may not comply with the sub-paragraph 1) of Paragraph (1) of

this Article.

(3) The contract shall stipulate such activities of the borrower (mortgagor), which reduce or

may reduce the value of the mortgaged property, and therefore require a prior written

consent of the bank.

(4) The bank is entitled to withdraw unilaterally from the mortgage agreement before expiry

of the contract and apply to the court with a claim to sell the mortgaged real estate in the

following cases:

1) the mortgagor has fallen into arrears with the payment or violated other

obligations stipulated in Paragraph (1), Article 17;

2) the market value of the mortgaged real estate has been essentially reduced and the

amount of the claim exceeds 60% of the value of the property as a result of

activities or inactivity of the borrower (mortgagor).

Article 18

The loan may be renewed not more than twice and only, if complying with the provisions of

sub-paragraph 1) of Paragraph (1) of Article 17 of this Law, at least 33 % of the loan amount

have been repaid during the initial term, and each term of renewal.

Article 19

The insurance contract or policy with assignment of the insurance payment to the bank must

be held with the bank during the whole period of the mortgage agreement validity.

Article 20

Should the market value of the real estate decrease due to reasons outside the borrower's

control, the bank is entitled to request repayment of the part of loan not secured as specified

in Article 14 of this Law.

Chapter V

Supervision

Article 21

(1) The bank, issuing mortgage bonds, shall monthly submit to the Securities Market

Commission, in term and form established by it, the information, describing the

underlying mortgage bond security.

(2) The Securities Market Commission is entitled to require additional information and

receive documents, containing such information, as well as, carrying out an examination

of the valuation of the mortgaged property, to insure the safety of the mortgages, recorded

in the Mortgage Bond Collateral Register..04-08-99 5

Article 22

Should a bank not comply with the requirements under sub- paragraphs 1 – 2 of Paragraph (1)

of Article 5 of this Law or not follow in its operations the internal procedures, specified in

sub-paragraph 3 of Paragraph (1) of Article 5, it is the duty of the Bank of Latvia to notify the

Securities Market Commission, indicating the concrete violations.

Article 23

(1) The Securities Market Commission is entitled to suspend the issue of mortgage bonds should any of the following arise:

1) in case it has received information from the Bank of Latvia, specified in Article 22 of this Law; or

2) if according to the evaluation of the Commission, the security registered in the Mortgage Bond Collateral Register does not comply with requirements of this Law; or

3) if the terms and conditions of mortgage transactions are not followed.

(2) If the Securities Market Commission decides to suspend the issue of mortgage bonds, it shall specify the reasons for such a decision and set a deadline for correction of the stated

deficiencies.

(3) Suspension of the mortgage bond issue shall not affect the liabilities of the issuing bank, as established in the mortgage bond issue prospectus, and shall not create rights to

demand pre-mature redemption of the bonds.

Transitional Provisions

With this Law taking effect, Regulations No. 127 "Decree on Mortgage Bonds" (Latvijas Republikas Saeimas un Ministru Kabineta Zi n ot a js, 1998, No. 10) issued by the Cabinet of Ministers according to provisions of Article 81 of the Satversme (Constitution) become ineffective.

The Law passed by the Saeima (Parliament) on September 10, 1998.

President of the State G. Ulmanis

Riga, September 29, 1998

Articles and News on The Dodd-Frank Act

This page contains a comprehensive collection of articles on the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 2010.

News on Covered Bonds: The EBA’s Blow to Denmark’s Covered Bonds

December 6, 2013

Denmark’s $530 billion mortgage-backed covered bond industry is facing uncertainty because the European Banking Association is planning to urge the European Commission not to give the covered bonds the stamp of Level 1 assets, but that only sovereign debt is given the highest liquidity status. According to the Denmark’s Economy Ministry, the European Banking Authority is planning to recommend covered bonds not be treated as highly liquid assets, dealing a blow to the nation’s $530 billion mortgage bond market. In doing so, the EBA was ignoring the findings of its own report, which suggested covered bonds have all the key characteristics of the most liquid assets, the ministry said. Denmark’s central bank also rejected the EBA’s recommendation that covered bonds should not be given the highest liquidity status. It would lead to a paradox if highly rated, very liquid covered bonds get a lower status than lower-rated, illiquid sovereign bonds. It contends that the EBA’s recommendation not to treat covered bonds as highly liquid assets ignores its own findings, which show the securities are at least as safe as government debt.

If approved by the European Commission, the EBA’s recommendation would limit banks’ ability to use covered bonds to fulfil their liquidity requirements. That might trigger a sell-off of the securities and send mortgage rates higher. While banks may have alternatives to building their liquidity buffers, the biggest fallout would be felt by the Danish mortgage market. This would also cause a situation where the banking sector would place more reliance on sovereign debt and might hamper the objective of delinking the sovereign from the banking sector. 

Germany and Norway have also questioned the logic of the EBA’s recommendation. The EBA isn’t due to publish its final recommendations until later this month, with draft technical standards set to be finalized by March. Fitch Ratings announced that it is going to closely monitor the outcome of the EBA’s proposal. 

Shambo Dey

SECURITISATION NEWS AND DEVELOPMENTS

July – Nov 2003 onwards

[This page lists news and developments in global securitisation markets – please do visit this

page regularly as it is updated almost on a daily basis. Join our mailing list for regular news

fed direct into your mailbox]

Read on for chronological listing of events, most recent on top:

Previous newsletters

Dec 03 onwards.Mar 03 – June 03.Nov02- Feb 03.Sept-Oct 02 ...June-Aug 02 ...May 02 ...Apr 02 ...Mar 02 .Feb 02 .Jan 02 .Dec., 01.Nov, 01 .  Oct.,2001.Sep.,2001., Aug 2001… July, 2001.June, 2001May, 2001,… April 2001… March 2001 ..Jan. and Feb.2001  Nov. and Dec.2000 Sept. and Oct. 2000 July and August 2000 May and June 2000 April 2000  Feb and March 2000   
For all news added before 21 January, 2000, please 
click here   
For all news added before 9th November, please 
click here   
For News items added prior 3rd August, 1999, 
click here.

FASB staff issues FIN 46 clarification on collateral manager's fees

FIN 46, the accounting interpretation that tries to rope in special purpose entities on to the balance sheet of its primary beneficiaries, continues to invite confusion and clarification – arguably more of the former than the latter.

The latest staff position or FSP relates to whether the fees of the collateral manager will be treated as a part of the residual returns of the entity. The collateral manager for most CDOs is vested with discretionery powers of collateral management and can hence be treated as the "decision-maker". Resultantly the fees paid to the decision-maker are treated as a part of the residual returns. This has led to consolidation of many CDOs with their collateral managers as such fees constitute a majority of the residual returns so computed.

The instant clarification provides for the circumstances in which the fees paid to the collateral manager could be excluded residual returns. The FSP 7 provides for 4 cumulative conditions for the exclusion:

1. The fees are compensation for services provided and are commensurate with the level of effort required to provide those services.
2. The fees are at or above the same level of seniority as other operating liabilities of the entity that arise in the normal course of business, such as trade payables.
3. Except for the fees described in conditions 1 and 2, the decision maker and the decision maker's related parties1 do not hold interests in the variable interest entity that individually, or in the aggregate, will absorb more than a trivial amount of the entity's expected losses or receive more than a trivial amount of the entity's expected residual returns.
4. The decision maker is subject to substantive kick-out rights, as that term is described in this FSP. However, substantive kick-out rights alone are not sufficient to allow a decision maker's fees to be excluded from paragraph 8(c) in the calculation of an entity's expected residual returns.

Notably, Point 1 talks about the fees being commensurate with the "level of effort" and not the outcome thereof. Therefore, if the fees are structured or variable in any manner, it would be necessary to establish the link of the variability with the level of effort.

The kick out rights in Point 4 are the substantive rights of the investors or others (let us say, voting right holders) to remove the decision maker. These rights must be exercisable by majority of voters other than the decision-maker himself of his related parties, and there must not be significant barriers to exercise of the kick out option.

The FSP above is expected to be incorporated in the amendment to FIN 46, exposure draft of which has already been circulated.

Link: For more on FIN 46, see our new page on FIN 46 here. For more on accounting issues, see page here.

Hong Kong government to securitise toll revenues

The Hong Kong government is set to raise HK $ 6 billion by securitisation of toll revenues of brides and tunnels owned by it.

Securitisation is apparently high on the agenda of the government for its funding as a government spokesman outlined several securitisation plans: The government is budgeting HK$21 billion in revenue from the sale or securitization of state assets in this fiscal year. It has already made HK$4.8 billion this year from a sale of civil service housing loans to the Hong Kong Mortgage Corp. The government expects to realize another HK$10.9 billion this year from the sale of other loan assets, including home starter loans, to the Hong Kong Mortgage Corp.

For the toll revenues securitisation, reports say that HSBC has been selected as a the lead arranger. HSBC is among the top in bond league tables in Asia, and is prominent for securitisation programs.

The overall securitisation activity in Hong Kong has been subdued for a larger part of this year. There have been some synthetic securitisation deals from Hong Kong, including a synthetic securitisation of light bus and taxi receivables originated by HSBS itself.

Links For more on securitisation in Hong Kong, see our page here.

CDOs set to take off in Asia: experts

Finance Asia 30th Oct 2004 carries an interview of Richard Gugliada and Diane Lam of Standard and Poor's who contend that the CDO market is heating up in Asia. Gugliada says that there were only 9 deals upto Sept. last year, but this year, there have been 35, which is nearly 4 times.

On the type of deals, Gugliada says that the majority of the transactions have been synthetics and of this type, about two thirds have come out of Australia and most of these have been smaller two counterparty type deals. Deals like that are coming out of the rest of the region – especially Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Korea as well, but they are mostly privately placed. We're seeing some of the funded type structures and the larger, synthetic and syndicated type deals emerging as well.

The experts admitted that Asia has so far been a buyer of CDOs, rather than a seller – but that is how the market evolves.

Diane Lam says that there is a temporary lull in arbitrage activity: "People are using a lot of these structures for arbitrage purposes and trying to make money. What we're hearing is that it is very hard to structure a good, profitable deal right now because spreads have tightened so much recently. That's why we are seeing a pause at the moment. That being said, we've rated a number of transactions this year and with the right timing, deals go to market very quickly. With all the press attention on CDOs, investor awareness is very high in Asia at the moment." But, she continues, "It's a good time for Asia as we have the benefit of looking at deals that didn't happen in the past and we can understand why they did not work out. For instance there are things that we do not like to see in the documentation now that were there before".

Links For more on CDOs, see our page here.

FASB decides to issue draft of FIN 46 amendments: experts say most application difficulties not addressed

The FASB decided to issue an exposure draft of amendments to FIN 46 that will be on a "fast track" – meaning short comment period, and quick effective date. Experts who have been associated with the discussions have felt that most of the operative difficulties of the Interpretation remain unresolved. "For the most part, my personal opinion is that the nature of the modifications fall into the categories of technical corrections, clarifications or slight relaxations that impact only a minority of situations involving the application of fin 46", says Marty Rosenblatt.

By a vote of 4 to 3, the board rejected a suggestion that the proposed modifications not become effective until a complete package of necessary revisions or interpretations or reaffirmations of fin 46 are identified, debated, exposed and resolved. The amendments are likely to become effective Q1, 2004 for public companies.

The crux of changes relating to securitization transactions is as under:

1. Paragraph 8a and 8b which say that a variable interest entity's (VIE) expected losses or residual risk shall include the expected variability in the entity's net income or loss and the expected variability of the entity's assets if it is not included in net income will be replaced by to-be-drafted words intended to communicate something along the lines of: the expected variability in returns which would be available to the variable interest holders over the life of the VIE or perhaps, the life of the variable interests, if the VIE was required to prepare an income-like statement showing such returns, including fees to decision-makers and certain guarantors.

2. The following sentence from paragraph A5 of FIN 46 would be deleted: "If different parties with different rights and obligations are involved, each party would determine its own expected losses and expected residual returns and compare that amount with the total to determine whether it is the primary beneficiary." They would also delete the phrase "if they occur" from the first sentence in paragraph 14 (and other places) which presently reads: "An enterprise shall consolidate a variable interest entity if that enterprise has a variable interest (or combination of variable interests) that will absorb a majority of the entity's expected residual returns if they occur, or both." There has been much confusion in attempting to apply FIN 46 on the method (or methods) to be used to allocate expected losses to the variable interest holders and often the sum of the parts exceeds the whole. FASB has looked at a variety of methods proposed by constituents and thinks more than one might have conceptual support, but has not decided on a single, preferred method to date or whether they would express any preference or requirement. The modification to paragraph A5 is intended to accommodate some flexibility and to eliminate what some say is an internal conflict with paragraph 14 while the Board continues to study this issue, leading perhaps to the issuance of an FSP at some future date.

3. The Board rejected a suggestion to expand the proposed scope exception for situations in which the reporting entity is unable to obtain the necessary information ("the information-out") to also apply to entities created after February 1, 2003.

4. The Board agreed to delete the examples of different types of variable interests in appendix B of fin 46 since it has been pointed out that some of the examples could be viewed as conflicting with other parts of fin 46, were stated in absolute terms without the necessary context or were otherwise confusing or wrong. in its place, the staff will attempt to develop new commentary on examples of different types of variable interests for inclusion in a possible FSP.

Links For more on accounting issues including articles on FIN 46, see our page here

Panelists on FDIC roundtable laud CMBS for strong CRE performance

Recently, the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) organised a roundtable of commercial real estate (CRE) experts to take stock of the performance of CRE during a period of unprecedented weak fundamentals of CRE in the USA. Nevertheless, banks had weathered the storm with a remarkably strong performance in their portfolios. This was said to be partly answered by a large public ownership of CRE lending in form of CMBS transactions.

The FDIC's concerns against CRE lending were brought forcefully by Rich Brown, Chief Economist of FDIC. FDIC holds insurance funds to cover banks' lending losses, and "there is hardly a better way to lose a lot of money in a short period of time" for a bank than CRE lendings, as, "when they collapse, can result in losses of $10 to $20 million at a time".

The panel discussed wide range of issues relating to the CMBS industry – as to how the CMBS has changed the face of commercial mortgage lending. Unlike in RMBS business, in CMBS, there is no residual risk retention by the seller-servicer, as even the B-pieces are sold in the market. The panelists also said that the risks in a CMBS environment are considerably lesser than in the whole loan held by the originating bank.

For full text of the discussions at the roundtable, click here.

Links For more on CMBS, see our page here.

Securitisation without true sales work in Europe: can they work in the rest of the World?

Ian Bell, a legal expert with Standard and Poor's has written a thought-provoking article on the relevance of true sales in securitisation. True sales and securitisation are seen as so closely-knit together that most people in the structured finance market find it difficult to imagine a securitisation without a true sale. This is the legacy of the US securitization practice where, on commonly shared perception, transactions which are not true sales will not provide bankruptcy proofing under the US bankruptcy laws.

However, says, Ian Bell, "This is not what securitization is about. At the heart of securitization is the removal of the seller's corporate risk so that noteholders can measure their risk solely by reference to the relevant assets. Since only a true sale can achieve that result in the U.S., it became the hallmark of all securitizations…And yet, in Europe, transactions have been emerging without true sales, relying instead on various local law security interests." True sale or not, the idea of securitisation is to ensure that investors have unqualified, undeterred rights over certain assets in the event of bankruptcy – in European transactions, that result is achievable by creating security interests of various kinds.

Ian Bell cites the example of the landmark Marne et Champagne deal where security interest was created using the age-old French concept of "gage avec depossession", close to the British law concept of pledge. A pledge is a possessory security interest which common law systems have always held above any non-possessory security interests. The author cites more instances – for example, the Broadgate office buildings CMBS deal which also relied on security interests rather than true sales.

The author concludes to say that " in most European countries true sales are still the cleanest, most efficient way to remove the originator's credit risk. All transactions without a true sale are done for commercial, regulatory, or legal reasons. Second, the legal analysis required to show that the highest ratings can be assigned without a true sale is highly sophisticated. Nevertheless, these transactions are a testament to creativity and flexibility."

Vinod Kothari comments: I have raised a similar, though stronger, issue in a recent editorial – see here. Though most securitisation deals achieve a legally certified true sale, but the fact remains that from a risk rewards perspective, most of them have a financial substance. There are several instances spanning over some 200 years of legal thought that over time, Courts start questioning the spirit of such transactions – one can see the story of Bills of sales in England, hire purchase law all over common law countries, sale and leaseback deals in several countries, financial lease transactions, etc. Harping on the true sale aspects of securitisations is both unnecessary and undesirable: instead, the industry must try understand the basic objective: which is not sale of assets but isolation of assets from bankruptcy risks of the originator. If there are not sound means of achieving this isolation, without a transfer, under existing legal framework (which itself is a misnotion in my view), one must search for that legal framework that would allow isolation without transfers. It is not difficult to visualise such a structure – one where it is possible to create a protected cell within a corporation.

Links See our page on true sales here.

Asian securitisation market is stressed but surviving: Fitch

Rating agency Fitch recently published an overview of the Asian structured finance market. One has to strive to find optimism in the report. At the close of 2002, there were big hopes of repeat issuance and a geographically spreading market with new countries as well as all-time players: Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, India and even Hong Kong. The volume for 2002 was estimated at USD 3.8 billion, and was expected to grow in 2003.

However, by end of Q3 of 2003, " it would appear that 2002 was a false dawn, with a flurry of unexpected events prompting a dearth of Asia-originated issuance, both domestic and cross-border. At the close of the first half of 2003, only two internationally-rated ABS transactions had been closed, with a further two unrated ABS
transactions with conduit execution completed in Korea." The only bright spot was the CDO market: "While the first half was fairly quiet in Asia’s securitisation/structured finance markets in general, the one exception was the CDO market, which saw the completion of five publicly announced (although not public in the true sense of the
word) transactions and an increasing interest in synthetic CDOs."

Fitch lists SARS related consequences as having the strongest adverse impact on the Asian securitisation market. In addition, recessionery trends prevailed in Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. To add to this, the liquidity crisis in the Korean bond market led to ebbing of consumer finance based transactions from Korea. One of the credit card transactions, Plus One, entered into an early amortisation.

Fitch structured finance rating migration study: 2002 was bad

Rating agency Fitch recently published its own structured finance ratings migration report over a 12 year period upto 2002: and the results are not radically different from those published by other similar reports by S&P or Nomura.

As everyone knows, 2002 was a bad year in terms of rating migrations. The Fitch report says there were 747 downgrades, as compared to only 287 in 2001. An interesting feature of Fitch-rated transactions is also the sharp increase in number of upgrades: upgrades nearly quadrupled to 3,404, relative to 2001 levels. This startling upgrade jump is due to the performance of the RMBS segment, where historically low interest rates led to robust performance. Of the upgrades, nearly 3100 upgrades came from the RMBS market.

As for downgrades, the ABS section was responsible for 62% of the downgrades, and within ABS, major contribution came from the manufactured housing segment.

CMBS segment was expected to be affected by the prevailing economic uncertainties and falling occupancy rates: however, despite contrary expectations, CMBS remains extremely strong. Neraly 99% of the investment grade CMBS tranches were not downgraded.

At the end of the day, Fitch, like other rating agencies, concludes that rating stability is far higher in structured finance than in corporate finance: over the long term, Fitch structured finance ratings exhibited less negative rating volatility than corporates. This was especially true for investment-grade tranches, which saw few
incidences of downgrades over an average oneyear horizon through 2002. In fact, more than 97% of investment-grade rated tranches either maintained their rating or were upgraded over a one-year period.

Structured finance players are now concerned with end use of money: NYT article

As a fall out of the Enron debable, structured finance industry is now also concerned with the end-use of the money, says an article in New York Times. The article says that though the device of securitisation and special purpose vehicles was created with good intentions, over time, the device found a use in creating artificial asset sales to merely restructure balance sheets. "In essence, an ethereal marketplace had been created, with "sales" done for the benefit of the company often without a real buyer on the other side of the table. Banks and investment houses eagerly lent money, booking big fees as Enron and other companies used the deals to make their financial performance appear better than it actually was", says the article by Kurt Eichewald.

However, after the Enron story, investment bankers see a whole new layer of reputational risk in what is being done. Therefore, larger players like J. P. Morgan and Citigroup have established their own voluntary standards for structured deals. Transactions with no economic substance that might be used to make a company's performance look better come under tremendous scrutiny.

The pressure comes not only from the government, but from investors as well. Ultimately, the vast majority of structured finance deals are sold as securities to investors; indeed, many individual investors have indirect interests in them through instruments like money market accounts. Now, market participants said, sophisticated investors are playing a large role in pushing for standards and practices intended to reduce the chance that the market will be harmed by another corporation abusing structured finance.

FASB meeting agrees on several amendments to FIN 46

FIN 46 is far from FIN-al, and SPEs will continue to be the accountants' nightmare for several months to come. After months of having issued the accounting interpretation that seeks to rope in rudderless and driverless SPEs onto the balance sheet of the backseat driver (decision-maker), the FASB staff issued several FSPs giving the staff's views on certain contentious matters. However, on Wednesday afternoon, the FASB board sought to differ with the staff on some of these matters, and agreed to put up an exposure draft of amendments that would significantly change FIN 46. Thus, FIN 46 continues to sizzle on the front burner.

According to sources closely associated with the Board's FIN 46 deliberations, the Board decided to proceed towards the issuance of an exposure draft of a proposed interpretation modifying FIN 46 in the following ways:

  1. Providing a limited scope-exception for an entity that cannot ensure whose baby it is. This must be an existing SPE on Feb 1,2003 and after due efforts, is uanble to find out the holder of primary beneficial interest in the entity. This exemption comes under the pretention that several variable interest do not have the means to identify their primary beneficiaries as they are not privy to the requisite information.
  2. Specifying that under paragraph 8(c), if a decision maker has no exposure to the expected losses of the entity and no right to expected residual returns except a fee that has no expected variability (it is fixed and not subordinated), then such fee would not be considered part of the expected residual returns of a variable interest entity. The Board discussed but wants to wait until their re-deliberations after the comment period, to conclude on whether "fixed" means it has to be fixed in dollar amount or whether it could also be a fixed number of basis points of assets under management, and if the latter, should that be limited to amortizing pools whose principal amount will not grow. Notably, the FASB staff has issued an FSP on this issue, see report below.
  3. Specifying in paragraph 15 that whenever a variable interest holder acquires additional interests in the entity, it will have to reconsider whether it is the primary beneficiary, not just when such interests are acquired from the primary beneficiary.
  4. Clarifying in paragraph 16.d.(1) with respect to de facto agent status when one party can not sell, transfer, or encumber its interests in the entity without the prior approval of another party, the intent is that the agency relationship exists when the rights of the party holding the interests are constrained from realizing the benefits of that interest. Restrictions on sale so long as the interests can be monetized through a pledge would be OK as would conditions requiring approval of the other party so long as that approval can not be unreasonably withheld.
  5. Modifying the guidance in paragraph 17 to identify that the party in a related party group that should consolidate a variable interest entity if the aggregate interests of the parties would, if held by a single party, identify that party as the primary beneficiary would be the party whose activities are more closely related to the entity.
  6. Expanding the term investor in part (i) of the last sentence of paragraph 5 to include the investor's related parties as indicated in footnote 6.
  7. Changing the second reference to paragraph 5 in paragraph 11 (regarding development stage enterprises) to paragraph 5(a) to clarify that paragraph 11 does not exempt development stage companies from the requirements of paragraph 5(b.)

    There was no indication as to when the Exposure Draft would be available. There will be a 30-day comment period. It will be proposed that restatements of previously issued financial statements would be required upon the effective date of the new Interpretaion, but the Board will specifically solicit comments on whether some other form of transition would be more appropriate.

    The Board also directed the staff to issue a proposed FSP to defer the effective date of FIN 46 until the end of first interim or annual period ending after December 15, 2003, for an interest held by a public entity in a variable interest entity that was not created for a single specified purpose on behalf of a certain party (loosely referred to as not being a special-purpose entity ) and has assets that are predominately nonfinancial. Examples of the types of interest to be considered are franchise arrangements, supplier arrangements and troubled debt restructurings. The Board will continue to work with the staff to develop more precise wording of this limited-scope deferral.

    Sources indicate that two newest Board members (not on the Board when FIN 46 was issued) were vocal supporters of a broader and longer deferral period .

Links For more on FIN 46, see our page here.

Bangladesh grants tax immunity to securitisation vehicles

While a World Bank aided project to usher in securitisation and fixed income securities is yet to see the light of the day in Bangladesh, the government a major positive move. Daily Star Bangladesh reports that In order to facilitate securitised bonds, the government has exempted SPVs, from paying all kinds of taxes including value added tax (VAT), income tax and stamp duty. Three separate notifications of the Ministry of Finance granted these exemptions.

However, the exemption is not available generically: the SPV in question must have approval from the central bank for getting the tax exemption.

Vinod Kothari adds I have been associated as a trainer to several Bangladeshi banks, and have also conducted a course sponsored by the World Bank project mentioned above. The government's move to grant tax exemptions to SPVs is a major bold move and indicates the success of the Financial Insitutions Development Program being run under the aegis of the Bangladesh Bank itself.

With these notifications, the legal hurdles to securitisation are almost over. Hopefully the stamp duty notifications provide for duty relief for both transfers to and transfers by SPVs. With this step, the World Bank project must now be allowed to run in top gear and let transactions happen.

Hope Indian authorites are listening: usually Bangladesh follows Indian law making; this time, India must reciprocate.

Spiegel misreported ABS data, claims investigators

Yet another case goes into the securitisation "hall of shame". Spiegel, a well known US furniture retailer and "catalogue" supplier, was a repeat issuer of private label credit card ABS. Spiegel had earlier filed in March 2003 for bankruptcy protection and hence triggered early amortisation events under all its outstanding securitization deals.

Independent investigations launched at the SEC's behest have revealed that Spiegel misreported the performance of its ABS transactions to avoid hitting the early amortisation triggers, which would have only hastened the bankruptcy process by exacerbating the cash crunch. These observations were made by the independent investigator into Spiegel appointed by SEC.

Investors in Spiegel's ABS also face the decision of the Office of Comptroller of Currency to raise the servicing fees being charged by Spiegel from 2% to 3.5%, thereby squeezing the excess spread.

Links For more on securitisation sad episodes, please see our page here.

US regulatory agencies allow capital relief on ABCP FIN 46 consolidation

As a measure to save banks from having to provide regulatory capital for the ABCP conduits that come in for consolidation due to FIN 46, US bank regulatory agencies allowed banks capital relief.

The interim final rule allows sponsoring banking organizations to remove the consolidated ABCP program assets from their risk-weighted asset bases for the purpose of calculating their risk-based capital ratios.

A hint about this capital relief was given at a Standard and Poor's forum sometime back. The agencies justify the capital relief thus: "The agencies believe that the consolidation of ABCP program assets onto the balance
sheets of sponsoring banking organizations could result in risk-based capital requirements that do not appropriately reflect the risks faced by banking organizations that sponsor these programs. The agencies believe that sponsoring banking organizations generally face limited risk exposure to ABCP programs, which generally is confined to the credit enhancements and liquidity facility arrangements that they provide to these programs. In addition, operational controls and structural provisions, along with overcollateralization or other credit enhancements provided by the companies that sell assets into ABCP programs can further mitigate the risk to which sponsoring banking organizations are exposed. Because of the limited risks, the agencies
believe that it is appropriate to provide an interim risk-based capital treatment that permits sponsoring banking organizations to exclude from risk-weighted assets, on a temporary basis, assets held by ABCP programs that must be consolidated onto the balance sheets of sponsoring banking organizations as a result of FIN 46."

Simultaneously, the regulators have also proposed a revision of the capital rules for ABCP conduits carrying early amortisation triggers, and for liquidity facilities upto a period o 1 year. Under current rules, short term liquidity facilities do not require capital as the credit conversion factor is zero in such cases. However, now the agencies propose a conversion of short term liquidity facilities with 20 % credit conversion factor.

The agecies have also sought comment as to whether capital should be required against securitisations of revolving assets which carry an early amoritisation trigger, in line with the proposals from Basle II. The conversion factors are based on the excess spread or the net margin income, based on Basle II recommendations.

Links For more on FIN 46, see our page here.

Asian market generally dull, but rays of hope: S&P

Problems in the growth zones in Asia persist causing a sobering impact on the structured finance market, but Standard and Poor's sees rays of hope. Major volumes in ex-Japan Asia have been coming from Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong where activity levels have been low of late, due to slower generation of consumer financial assets.

However, S&P pockets of hope are – the new Taiwanese real estate securitisation law, and synthetic activity in Singapore.

Taiwan recently passed a real estate securitisation law that would promote REIT-type bodies in the country. S&P feels is optimistic about this law: "The impact of this new law is important for Taiwan's financial markets, since many of the nonperforming loans are backed by real estate and the financial industry is overweight with real estate," explained Ms. Daine Lam. "Drawing in new investors and having debt issues and REIT ratings would go a long way in restoring investor confidence in real estate, which has subperformed over the last 12 years due to a combination of economic changes and oversupply."

In Hong Kong, one of the traditional mainstays of Asian securitisation, economic worries continue to weaken securitisation prospects. "Unemployment continues to rise as property prices fall; recent political unrest is beginning to affect investor confidence; an increased percentage of mortgage loans are in negative equity; and most important, signs of increasing numbers of personal bankruptcies have yet to taper off. With this deterioration in consumer confidence comes a noticeable slowdown in issuance for securitization, particularly with mortgage loans and other consumer assets. "

Volumes have been receding in Korea too.

Other markets such as Malaysia, India etc are so far only meant for domestic investors.

Links For more on markets in Asia, see our site here

FASB issues several staff position papers on FIN46

They first make a rule, and then interpret it, and then interpret the interpretations, and then…Over the last few days, Financial Accounting Standards Board has come out with 4 draft FASB Staff positions (FSPs) relating to FIN46. FIN 46 is the interpretation issued by the FASB that applies special consolidation criteria to certain special purpose entities, known as variable interest entities. These FSPs are drafts and are placed for comments.

FSP d, issued on 10th Sept (comments deadline 10th October) outlines the computation of expected residual returns of a variable interest entity based on the fees payable to decision makers and guarantors. These fees will always be variable interests for the purpose of the interpretation, even if the amount of fees is fixed and is not based on a success rate or other variables. This FSP also includes several illustrations for computation of the amount of expected losses or expected residual returns.

FSP c clarifies that the option of the investors (or others) to remove the decision maker (kick out options) will not exclude the fees payable to the decision-maker from variable interest computation.

The other two FSPs defer the application of FIN 46 in certain cases.

Links For more on FIN 46, see our page on accounting issues. Vinod Kothari's Securitisation: The Financial Instrument of the New Millennium includes an elaborate chapter on accounting, including FIN 46.

Moody's publishes NPL securitisation criteria

If you ever wondered how bad apples can be turned into good apples or how you can spin gold from straw, you must look at the structure of a securitisation of non-performing loans. As yields in standard securitisation deals flatten out, there is an increasing urge for such transactions.

Seeing lots of these transactions happen in the World, particularly in Italy, rating agency Moody's has published rating criteria for NPL securitsations. Italy deserves a special mention due to the sheer scale of activity in the country: between the enactment of the securitisation law in June 1999 and April 2003, a total of approximately €31 billion (in gross book value, that is, nominal value of portfolio in originator's account) of NPL portfolios were securitised through 34 transactions, making Italy one of the world’s largest reference markets for this asset class.

The report discusses various types of NPL securitisation structures, including the levels of servicer advances and other collaterals in most transactions. Primarily, the collateral is either secured or unsecured. In case of secured collateral, cashflow modelling is based on the recovery rates and estimated time it would take in the process of recoveries. In case of unsecured collateral, the rating agencies use static pool data based on historical studies.

In either case, however, the key element is the servicer. Apart from the primary servicer, that is, the originator of the defaulted loan, most transactions rely on a special servicer, that is, a specialised recovery agency – there is an increasing trend towards the latter in Italian NPL securitisations.

In all NPL securitisations, credit enhancements are understandably quite high. To get a Aaa (equivalent to S&P AAA) rating, the enhancement in Italian transactions have ranged from 47% to 94%. These percentages are different for Japanese NPLs due to several factors, primarily the time taken in the legal process (converging at around 1 year, whereas it is 7 years in Italy).

Links: For more on NPL securitisation, see our page here.

Equipment leasing delinquency at its least, says Fitch

The leasing industry was once said to be passing through a perfect storm. The Equipment Leasing Association had conducted a study titled The Perfect Storm wherein it analysed the reasons why top 10 of the US leasing entities that failed really failed. A Fitch report now says that the industry is apparently emerging out of the storm. "The U.S. equipment lease and finance industry is
emerging from what the industry has dubbed “The Perfect Storm.” Industry bankruptcies, mergers, and acquisitions, combined with reduced and more costly funding sources during the economic slowdown created a ripe atmosphere for this storm."

That the landscape of the leasing industry is greatly changed is apparent from the following data: During the 1998-2001 period, approx. USD 45.2 billion volume of lease-backed securitisation was generated in the market, from 48 issuers. Of these, only 1/4th are in the securitisation market currently, though this percentage in volumes is 66.5%. The rest have either been wound up, or are no longer securitising. The volume in 2002 was only USD 7.9 billion.

The equipment leasing volumes themselves have been coming down – there was a decline in volumes consistently in 2001 and 2002.

Fitch, however, sees winds of change in 2003. As the leasing sector emerges from the storm that has plagued the industry for several years, positive trends continue to surface. Equipment ABS issuance of $5.9 billion for the first six months of 2003 compares favorably with $7.8 billion of equipment issuance for all of 2002. Consolidation, as well as the frequency and magnitude of equipment ABS rating actions, has slowed considerably."

Links For more on the leasing industry, see Vinod Kothari's website dedicated to leasing at: http://india-financing.com

Time to fix Fannie and Freddie, says columnist

The voices that advocate some sort of a revamping of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been there for long time, but after derivatives accounting discrepancies were discovered in Freddie's reports, these voices have gathered a great force. Robert Stevenson, who writes a well-read column in Washington Post said that Freddie and Fannie are not exactly broke, but it is time that they are fixed.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are the agencies supported by the US government (GSEs or government-sponsored enterprises) that are engaged in securitisation of residential mortgages – the third one being Ginnie Mae which is government corporation. Most of the residential mortgage loans that conform to their guidelines are securitised through the agencies.

The key note of Stevenson's argument is the size of the GSEs. "They have grown so large that if they ever experience serious financial problems, they will almost certainly have to be rescued by the government at immense cost. The potential exposure reflects their huge debt. At the end of 2002 Fannie's and Freddie's combined debt totaled $1.5 trillion. This is equal to almost half the publicly held federal debt, $3.7 trillion". The GSE debt itself is held by some 3000 US banks and the total holding is almost equal to their combined capital.

Stevenson says that the purpose of empowering Freddie and Fannie with special powers was to promote home lending which was a lopsided industry in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Today, securitisation is by itself a very strong market and the government support to the GSEs is not required. ".. paradoxically, Fannie and Freddie are no longer essential for strong housing finance. "Securitization" is now widespread. If Fannie and Freddie vanished, mortgages would still be packaged and bought by investors just as they already buy riskier securitized credits — credit-card debt and auto loans, for instance",says Stevenson.

Links There are more stories on GSEs on this website – use site search. For more on the US RMBS market, see our page here.

Fund managers to take micro credits into securitisation markets

For the first time, micro credits will be taken into the securitisation market by European and US fund managers. Micro credit is a concept of funding pioneered by Pro Mohammed Yunus of Bangla Desh and practiced by several institutions all over the World, with Bangla Desh's Grameen Bank being the model micro credit bank. A micro credit bank typically finances household entrepreneurs at the absolute micro level, such as women running a small household enterprise.

According to a report on Asia Times of Sept 9,in early 2004, Dexia Microcredit Fund of Luxembourg, and Developing World Market of Darien CT, will securitise micro credits and allow European and US investors to invest into the same.

The delinquency rates in micro credits have been something around 4-5%, which is much lower than that in subprime consumer lending in the US markets. Besides micro credit is taken as a device of women empowerment, since it essentially promotes householder enterprises.

National Century's former executive admits fraud

National Century securitisation-related fraud was a bad news to the securitisation industry in 2002: it highlighted how lack of proper surveillance over the cashflows could keep servicer-frauds under cover for quite some time.

As prosecutors are still chasing up the defaulters in this case, at least one of the officials has admitted role in the fraud: former National Century executive Sherry Gibson pleaded guilty to her role, including providing false information to investors. Gibson admitted that she was involved in hiding the shortfall in investors' funds by by shuffling funds between bank accounts and sending false reports to investors and auditors. Gibson faces up to five years in prison without parole, a $250,000 fine and three years of supervision following release.

The case reveals that such false reporting was going on since 1995.

The National Century case led to shortfalls of nearly USD 1 billion, on outstandings of nearly USD 3.5 billion in the ABS market.

Links For this and more sad episodes in the ABS market, see our page here.

Industry bodies submit joint response to Basle:

Several industry bodies joined to serve a joint response to Basle's Consultative Paper 3 (CP 3), comment period for which expired 31st July. These are the American Securitization Forum, the Australian Securitisation Forum, The Bond Market Association, the European Securitisation Forum, the International Association of Credit Portfolio Managers, Inc. the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. and the Japanese Bankers Association.

The industry bodies commented that the Basle's CP 3 proposals relating to securitisation shall, in many cases, cause a divergence between regulatory capital and economic capital. For one, the industry bodies are concerned that the risk-weights in case of ratings-based approach (RBA) are much higher than shown by calibrated results. The industry bodies said that the risk weights under the RBA were based on CDOs and corporate exposures, and they produce a highly exaggerated picture of the risks in case of most retail exposures such as credit cards, auto loans or RMBS deals.The bodies have submitted that Basle comes out with separate RBA tables for significant asset classes: (1) retail revolving credit cards, (2) other retail non-revolving/ auto loans, (3) residential mortgages, (4) corporate exposures / commercial mortgages and (5) collateralised debt obligations.

The bodies also submit that the BIS makes unreasonable discrimination against synthetic transactions while theoretically there is no reason for any such distinction. Current proposals for credit derivatives substitute the risk weight of the protection seller for that of the obligor, and therefore, lead to an exaggerated double-default probability.

The bodies also make suggestions for improvement of the capital treatment to ABCP and revolving credit.

Links Full text of the industry bodies' representation is here. For more on Basel norms, see our page here.

Industry learns tricks to live with FIN 46

The FASB is meeting on 13th August to consider several issues relating to FIN 46, among those, more importantly, whether the decision-maker's residual interest in the VIE should include fixed and unsubordinated fees paid by the entity. In addition, the FASB is also considering the situations important in identifying the holder of a variable interest. However, in the meantime, the market seems to have learnt devices to limit the impact of FIN 46.

A report in Financial Times dated 4 August says that Citigroup is expected to add $5bn to both assets and liabilities as a result of the new rule, down from the $55bn it had previously anticipated. This could obviously be achieved by restructuring the SPEs so as to come out of the definition of variable interest entities..

The report also says that everyone has not been equally successful in coping with FIn 46. General Electric, for example, is expected to consolidate some $51bn in its third-quarter results due to FIN 46. However, the banks' success in restructuring existing transactions means the new accounting rule has not decimated the asset-backed commercial paper market, as had been initially feared.

FIN 46 is an accounting interpretation that uses new consolidation criteria in case of certain entities, called variable interest entities (VIEs). SPEs, other than qualifying SPEs for securitization deals and other excepted ones, are likely to be treated as VIEs.

Links For more on variable interest entities, see our page here.

American securitization body opposes QSPE rules:
says this may be the end of QSPEs

Commenting on the exposure draft of changes to FAS 140 relating to qualifying special puropse entities, the American Securitization Forum (ASF) and The Bond Market Association put up a strong opposition to the proposed amendments. This was not unexpected, as the USD 6 trillion securitization industry in the USA rests largely on the idea of off-balance sheet, non-consolidated SPEs, and anything done to hook up SPEs is bound to raise opposition.

The key note of the joint representation is to oppose the pro-consolidation orientation of the exposure draft. Besides, if implemented literally as it stands, the exposure draft may completely eliminate QSPEs: "In fact, if the Exposure Draft is given its broadest reading, we doubt whether any current qualifying special-purpose entity would qualify under the proposed new standards", says the representation.

Qualifying SPEs are non-substantive, legal fictions which hold securitised assets, and do not come for consolidation under the accounting rules for consolidation, or under the new rule called FIN 46.

The ASF fears that under the garb of making reactive changes in response to experience gained in applying FAS 125/ FAS 140, the US standard setters are reversing the very approach of surrender of control/ financial components, on which the current US (and broadly, also International) accounting standards are based. In other words, the FASB seems to be leaning towards the risks-rewards approach: "The Exposure Draft substantially turns away from that approach (components approach) by importing a number of risks and rewards concepts that do not fit coherently with the basic control standard in Statement 140."

The ASF also made an alternative suggestion, should the FASB not be inclined to budge much. This, by itself is a brave approach: let the US standard-setters adopt the UK-type approach called linked presentation approach. Under the UK-type linked presentation approach, securitised assets generally do not off the books but are netted by amount of funding raised. There is no gain-on-sale booked. Under ASF's modified "matched presentation" approach, the SPE will not be off the balance sheet, but will be a separate section of the asset side of the transferor's balance sheet. Here, the gross assets of the SPE, less all non-recourse liabilities and external equity of the SPE will be reported. The issue of gain-on-sale under the ASF's modified approach remains to be resolved.

Will this brave new approach force the standard-setters at this stage to have a total review of FAS 140? SPEs and off balance sheet accounting have been the "hall of shame" of securitization industry, and may be, a suggestion to include SPEs on the balance sheet of the transferor might instantly appeal to the FASB.

Your comments please Do you have any views on the new approach suggested by ASF? Do write your viewsPlease see some thoughts and questions here for you.

Full text of the comment letter is here.

Related links Please see our page on accounting issues here.

Japanese structured finance market continues to grow

Total annual issuance volume in Japan's structured market could reach JPY5.5 trillion (US$46 billion) by year-end 2003, according to rating agency Standard and Poor's. Residential mortgage transactions, CLOs (both cash and synthetic) and securitisation of non-performing loans continue to dominate the scene in Japan. A positive thrust is expected to be given by the recent decision of the Bank of Japan to start investing in asset-backed securities.

The total annual volume rated by Standard & Poor's was about JPY4.7 trillion in 2002. The rating agency expects securitized transactions in Japan to gradually increase overall in the second half of fiscal 2003 toward the end of March 2004.

Another expected trend is an increase in transactions structured to be beneficial to both originators and investors, such as the master trust transactions. In addition, originators have been keen to structure new types of assets, such as whole businesses or future receivables, which suggests a further expansion of the market.

For the first half of 2003, Standard & Poor's in Japan rated a total of 90 securitized transactions, up 36% compared to the first half of 2002. The aggregate issue amount for these deals of JPY2.08 trillion was an increase of 20%. The first half performance results show that the entire securitization market continued to expand, in both number of transactions and issue amounts. However, in comparison with 2002, the rate of growth has slowed slightly.

In terms of products, ABS and ABCP achieved substantial growth, increasing by 47% or 2.4x in terms of issue amount from the same quarter last year. RMBS increased by 10% in terms of issue amount. One of the key transactions in this period was a CLO deal originated by Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp.This CLO is backed by a number of diversified loan receivables extended to SMEs.

Links For more on the Japanese securitisation market, click here

Securitisation funding for port development in Malaysia

Ringgit 1.31 billion will be raised by way of securitisation to development what is expected to be an A-grade trans-shipment hub in Asia. The securitisation exercise is structured following the sale of a piece of land belonging to Kuala Dimensi to Port Kelang Authority (PKA). Kuala Dimensi will undertake the development of the Transshipment Mega Hub. The port, which is modelled after the Jebel Ali Free Zone Port in Dubai, will serve as a regional distribution hub and cargo consolidation centre in line with the Government's objective of making Port Klang a distribution base and a trade and logistics midpoint.

The transaction, the first of its kind in Malaysia, has been structured by Malaysian International Merchant Bankers (MIMB). To be issued in 11 series, the term of the bonds will range from 4 years to 14 years. The senior bonds are expected to be rated AAA. According to reports, MIMB will also be the initial subscriber to the bonds.

Vinod Kothari adds: The Malaysian ABS market was going through doldrums over the last few months and this deal may help to instil some life in the market. Evidently, Malaysian market is prepared to try out new assets instead of being contented with traditional asset classes such as residential mortgages and auto loans.

Links For more on Malaysia, see our page here.

Training courses in Malaysia Vinod Kothari Consultants with Rating Agency Malaysia regularly hold public and private training courses in Malaysia. For more information, contact us.

Taiwanese real estate securitisation law to push commercial property volumes

Taiwan recently [July 8-10] promulgaged a new law on real estate securitisation that allows either a property owner to put real estate into an authorised trust for the latter to raise funding, or, similar to REITs, for an authorised financial intermediary to raise funding from the capital markets and invest the same in real estate.

This, along with certain other economic laws passed by the Govt recently, are said to have given a positive strength to the current ruling party, as also are expected to push real estate development in the country.

The new law gives important tax benefits to the investment conduits. According to the law, investors will be exempted from paying stock-transaction taxes when buying the certificates, though a 6-percent tax will be levied on other transactions similar to that on financial asset-backed securities. Moreover, investment earnings will not be included in consolidated income or corporate business income taxes of beneficiaries.

According to an evaluation by the Council for Economic Planning and Development, the law will add 0.45 percent to 0.65 percent to economic growth in addition to providing diversified financial products and enlarging capital markets. Furthermore, objectives of securitized ownership, public funding and professional management will be achieved. Market analysts said securitization would be most common for commercial properties that have stable rental or cash incomes such as office buildings, department stores, shopping centers, hotels, exhibition halls and rental apartments.

Links For more on securitisation in Taiwan, see our page here.

Eurpean securitisation continues to try diverse asset classes, as volumes grow in H1, 2003

European securitisation registered impressive growth in first half of 2003, with securitisation spreading to new countries in the continent and strengthening in the traditional strongholds.

A notable feature is the dominating presence of Italy, which has risen from a one-time position of number 3 to number 1. In the first half of 2003, Italy takes more than half of the total issuance. Indications are that Italy will continue being a strong player, with strong activity by both the government (SCIP and INPS programs) and private players.

Europe can easiy be described as the securitisation laboratory of the World: with the most diverse range of asset classes. With death bonds (bonds backed by funeral fees) to wool, champagne and metals, Europe has done more experiments with asset classes than any other part of the World.

This half, legislative developments continued to take place. Greece passed a new law to encourage securitisation.

Links For more on European securitisation, see our page here.

Latin America: activity shifting to domestic flows

Citing Mexico as an example, S&P sees a growing market for domestic flows in Latin America. This is a shift from the usual future-flows dominance in these markets.

A report dated 16th July states that in Mexican market, for example, there are growing inquiries for auto loan ABS transactions and consumer lending securitizations. The market is showing interest for credit card ABS transactions. The report ascribes this to the changing undercurrents in the Latin American market: "An important shift emerging in the Latin American structured market is that domestic markets are gaining strength. This has been especially true in recent years because domestic interest rates in some countries, particularly Mexico, have been declining, which discourages the need for cross-border transactions. Other reasons for the strengthening of domestic markets include the consolidation of institutional investors, resulting in a more sophisticated local investor base. In addition, transaction costs for domestic deals below $100 million are more affordable than cross-border transactions and local securitization reduces currency risk.

Links For more about Latin American markets, see our country pages here.

2003 to be the best year for US RMBS: S&P

Half-way through, rating agency S&P is already in a mood to celebrate the record breaking volume for the US RMBS industry. In a note of 15th July 2003, S&P says that the 2003 volumes will likely have witnessed its most active year in history, with issuance volume surging to as high as $500 billion, up from $373 billion in 2002. Quite obviously, this is due to historically low interest rates, pushing up mortgage origination volumes. The projected mortgage origination volume for 2003 is $3.2 trillion, up from $2.6 trillion in 2002, and $2.1 trillion in 2001.

Apart from interest rates, S&P analysts also spotted other factors such as rising incomes, baby boomers buying second homes at a record pace, and much of the population continuing to shun other financial assets in favor of investing in their homes.

Links For more on RMBS, see our page here.

BBC looking for CMBS funding

The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is looking for funding to the tune of USD 1.33 billion (GBP 800 million) for the redevelopment of its London headquarters, Broadcasting House.The state-owned broadcaster hired Morgan Stanley to manage the issue.

For securing the CMBS funding, BBC will pledge to bondholders the rental payments on its 150-year lease on its art deco building, shaped like a luxury liner, in London's West End. With a legal maturity of 30 years, the expected maturity is likely to be 22.3 years.

The BBC wants to raise fundin at this opportune time when yields on AAA bonds are at their lowest. The AAA rating of the bonds wil be assured by a monoline wrap from Ambac.

The securities will be sold through Juturna (European Loan Conduit No. 16) PLC, a specially-created company.

Links For more on CMBS, see our page here.

Australian deal proposes revolving funding for construction firm

Everything can be securitised: is the buzz these days. A recent Australian structure seems to exhibit this. This structure proposes a revolving line of credit for a property construction firm which can tap the facility to build, sell what it builds, and then re-use the funds until the amortisation begins.

According to reports, Australian property developer Mirvac Group Ltd. has established a A$500 million pre-sold residential development securitization program. Apparently, the pool allows the developer to tap the funds for construction of specified portfolio of properties. Called Multi Option Pre-sale Securitisation, or MOPS, the program offers a rolling facility to Mirvac for selected residential property developments. Mirvac may draw funds for projects in the portfolio based on the off-the-plan value of those projects and once a project is completed and sold, the sale funds can be used to repay investors and finance further projects.

The structure was reportedly developed by Coudert Bros. Initially, 6 property projects will be covered by the funding. The program allows the special purpose vehicle to issue either MTNs or commercial paper.

Links For more on Australian market, see our page here.

Workshops We regularly hold training events in Australia: for calendar of courses in offing, see here