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Partial Credit Enhancement: A Catalyst for Boosting Infrastructure Bond Issuances?

-Abhirup Ghosh (abhirup@vinodkothari.com)

What is partial credit enhancement?

Partial Credit Enhancement (PCE) is a risk-mitigating financial tool where a third party provides limited financial backing to improve the creditworthiness of a debt instrument. It ensures that investors are partially protected against default risk, making it easier for issuers to raise funds at better terms.

The key features of a PCE are as follows:

  1. Parties involved: A typical PCE structure would involve at least three parties:
  • Issuer: A company or an entity that wants to raise funds by issuing debt instruments;
  • PCE Provider or Credit Enhancer: A third party (usually a government agency or a financial institution with strong credibility) that provides the credit enhancement 
  • Investor(s): The one who invests in the debt instruments. 
  1. Multiple forms: Can be structured in various forms, like guarantee, subordinated line of credit, investment in subordinated tranche, cash collateral etc. 
  2. Limited coverage: Unlike full credit enhancement, PCE covers only a portion of the potential losses in case of default. The extent of coverage is pre-fixed and does not extend once the same is exhausted.
  3. Improved Credit Rating: PCE lowers the perceived credit risk, leading to an improved bond rating by credit rating agencies. A higher credit rating results in lower interest rates, benefiting the issuer.

Why has this become so important all of a sudden?

The concept of PCE has been in India for quite some time now, and is commonly used in securitisation transactions. However, the Finance Minister’s announcement during Union Budget 2025 about setting up of a PCE facility under the National Bank for Financing Infrastructure Development (NaBFID) has brought this into the limelight.

How does it help issuance of bonds by an infrastructure entity?

Infrastructure development is the backbone of economic growth, but funding large-scale projects such as highways, railways, power plants, and airports requires substantial capital. Infrastructure projects often face challenges in raising funds due to their long gestation periods, high risks, and lower credit ratings. PCE serves as an effective financial tool to improve the creditworthiness of infrastructure bonds, making them more attractive to investors. By providing a partial guarantee or security, PCE helps reduce the cost of borrowing and widens investor participation, ultimately facilitating infrastructure financing.

Challenges in Infrastructure Bond Issuances

Infrastructure bond issuances face several obstacles that make fundraising difficult. One of the primary challenges is low credit ratings. Infrastructure projects, especially those in their early stages, often receive sub-investment-grade ratings (such as BBB or lower), making them unattractive to investors. Additionally, these projects are subject to high perceived risks, including revenue uncertainty, regulatory hurdles, construction delays, and cost overruns. Since many infrastructure projects rely on user charges, such as tolls or metro fares, their cash flow projections can be unpredictable.

Another major issue is the long maturity period of infrastructure bonds. Most investors prefer short- to medium-term investments, whereas infrastructure bonds typically have tenures of 10 to 30 years. This mismatch reduces the appetite for such bonds in the market. Lastly, lack of institutional investor participation further limits the success of infrastructure bond issuances, as pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds prefer highly rated bonds with stable returns.

Enhancing Credit Ratings and Investor Confidence

One of the most significant ways PCE helps infrastructure bond issuances is by improving their credit ratings. When a bank or financial institution provides partial credit enhancement in the form of a guarantee or reserve fund, it reduces the default risk associated with the bond. This leads to a higher credit rating, making the bond more attractive to investors. For example, an infrastructure company with a BBB-rated bond issuance may improve its rating to A with a 20% PCE support, or AA with a 50% PCE support thereby increasing demand from investors. A higher rating not only boosts investor confidence but also expands the pool of potential buyers, including institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies.

Reducing Cost of Borrowing

By improving the credit rating of infrastructure bonds, PCE directly leads to a reduction in interest costs. Bonds with higher ratings attract lower interest rates, which helps infrastructure companies secure financing at more affordable terms. For instance, without PCE, a BBB-rated bond may require 12%, whereas a bond upgraded to an AA rating with PCE support may only require 9%. This reduction in interest rates can result in significant savings over the life of the bond. Lower borrowing costs also make infrastructure projects more financially viable, ensuring their timely execution and long-term sustainability.

Attracting Institutional Investors

Institutional investors, such as mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies, typically have strict investment guidelines that restrict them from investing in low-rated securities. Since many of these investors require bonds to be rated AA or higher, infrastructure bonds often struggle to meet these requirements. PCE helps bridge this gap by enhancing the credit rating, making infrastructure bonds eligible for investment by these large institutional players. This leads to greater liquidity and stability in the corporate bond market, ensuring a steady flow of capital to infrastructure projects.

Why is issuance of bonds helpful/ important for the infrastructure entity?

PCE contributes to the overall development of the corporate bond market by encouraging more issuers to raise funds through bonds rather than relying solely on bank loans. Traditionally, infrastructure financing in India has been dependent on banks, which exposes them to high asset-liability mismatches due to the long tenure of infrastructure projects. By facilitating infrastructure bond issuances, PCE helps shift the burden away from banks and towards a broader investor base. This not only diversifies funding sources but also enhances financial stability in the banking sector.

As per a CII report (2022), the infrastructure financing gap is estimated at over 5% of GDP. Approx. 80% of the investment in infrastructure space is by government agencies (80%), and the remaining 20% comes from private developers. 

As per the National Infrastructure Pipelines, the total investment target was set at INR 111 trillion (USD 1.34 trillion) for the period between FY 20 and FY 25; and only 6-8% (INR 6.66-8.88) of the such targets were expected to be met by bond issuances. Reliance on bond markets is planned to the extent of 6% to 8% (INR 6.66 – 8.88 trillion). As per the said estimates, the average annual issuances should have been INR 1.480 trillion. However, between FY18 and FY22, the issuance of infrastructure bonds has been at INR 5.37 trillion, that is, an average of INR 1.07 trillion per annum, that is a shortfall of ~30% compared to the target.

Furthermore, the issuances have been highly concentrated in the top 5 PSUs. The charts below show the annual bond issuances between FY 18 – FY 22, and share of issuance by top 5 PSUs and others:

Source: CRISIL

The market is dominated by highly rated issuers. In general approx. 75% of bond issuers are rated AAA, and more than 90% of the issuances are by AA and above rated entities. The reason for this dominance by highly rated issuers is the fact that for practical purposes, the most acceptable rating in the infra bonds space is AA, as long term investors like insurance companies, pension funds etc. are by regulation required to invest in AA or above rated papers. 

PCE support from a credible source will help a lot of infrastructure operators, who are stopped at the gate, with ratings in the range of A, with easy access to the market. 

Existing scheme for PCE – why has it not found takers

The existing scheme for PCE was notified by the RBI in 2015. In a nutshell, the scheme provides for the following:

Form of PCE: To be structured as a non-funded, irrevocable contingent line of credit. This facility can be drawn upon in the event of cash flow shortfalls affecting bond servicing.

Limitations: The total PCE extended by a single bank cannot exceed 20% of the bond’s total size; however, overall, the PCE provided by all banks, in aggregate, cannot exceed 50% of the bond’s total size.

Further, PCE can be provided only to bonds which have a pre-enhanced rating of BBB- or above.

Capital Requirements: The bank providing PCE does not hold capital based only on its PCE amount. Instead, it calculates the capital based on the difference between:

  • The capital required before credit enhancement.
  • The capital required after credit enhancement.

The objective is to ensure that the PCE provider should absorb the risks that it covers in the entire transaction. Illustrating with an example:

Assume that the total bond size is Rs. 100 crores for which PCE to the extent of Rs. 20 crore is provided by a bank. The pre-enhanced rating of the bond is BBB which gets enhanced to AA with the PCE. In this scenario:

  1. At the pre-enhanced rating of BBB (100% risk weight), the capital requirement on the total bond size (Rs.100 crores) is Rs.9.00 crores.
  2. The capital requirement for the bond (Rs.100 crores) at the enhanced rating (AA, i.e., 30% risk weight)) would be Rs.2.70 crores.
  3. As such, the PCE provider will be required to hold the difference in capital i.e., Rs.6.30 crores (Rs.9.00 crores – Rs.2.70 crores).

As can be seen, the capital has to be maintained on the total bond issuance, and not just the exposure. Ironically, this capital has to be maintained until the outstanding principal of bonds falls below the extent of PCE provided​. Usually, the bonds are amortising in nature – that is, the actual exposure of the guarantor continues to come down. Given, however, that default in bonds may be back-ended, the capital has still to be maintained till the redemption of the bonds​. This requires the PCE provider to maintain huge regulatory capital for a significantly long period of time; which also gets reflected in the ultimate cost to the beneficiary, therefore, making it unviable. 

How to make it work?

The FM’s announcement though comes with a lot of promise, as it shows a positive intent. But to make things work, there are quite a few things that should be put into place:

  1. Specific applicability: Currently, the PCE framework applies only to banks. For NaBFID to commence its PCE operations, it would be ideal to receive explicit approval from the RBI, even if the requirement is minor or procedural in nature.
  1. Limitations: Currently, the RBI’s PCE framework restricts a single entity to providing only 20% of the total 50% PCE limit for a bond issuance. It is recommended that a single institution, such as NaBFID, be allowed to provide the entire PCE, which would enhance flexibility.  The existing framework is not particularly attractive for banks in India. In the infrastructure finance sector, a 20% PCE contribution from a single entity may not be sufficient to secure a strong rating from credit rating agencies. Removing this 20% sub-limit would grant NaBFID greater flexibility while also reducing the time required to identify multiple institutions to fulfill the remaining PCE. Additionally, this change would lead to a reduction in operational expenses associated with coordinating multiple PCE providers.
  1. Capital treatment: The current setting of capital requirement makes the transactions very costly. There has to be an alternative way of achieving the objective. Setting the capital requirement as a fixed proportion of the outstanding bond value may not be appropriate, as defaults can occur at any stage. A more effective approach would be to apply the capital treatment for structured credit risk transfer under the Basel III framework, that is SEC ERBA.  Under Basel III, capital requirements are not linked to the total bond issuance size but are instead based on the rating of the tranche and the extent of exposure undertaken. This method ensures that capital is aligned with the actual risk exposure, rather than a fixed percentage of the bond size. Additionally, it accounts for the possibility of defaults occurring later in the bond’s lifecycle, providing a more efficient risk management framework.
  1. Credit risk transfer: The PCE framework should specifically allow credit risk transfer by the PCE provider – this will help the PCE provider reduce its exposures, and consequently, extent of capital to be maintained on the PCE provided​. This will help in reducing the cost of the PCE support as well.

Partial Credit Guarantee Scheme

A Business Conclave on  “Partial Credit Guarantee Scheme” was organised by Indian Securitisation Foundation jointly with Edelweiss on September 16,2019 in Mumbai.

On this occasion, the presentation used by Mr. Vinod Kothari is being given here:

http://vinodkothari.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/partial-credit-enhancement-scheme-.pdf

 

We have authored few articles on the topic that one might want to give a read. The links to such related articles are provided below:

Government credit enhancement for NBFC pools: A Guide to Rating agencies

Vinod Kothari Consultants P Ltd (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

 

The partial credit enhancement (PCE) Scheme of the Government[1], for purchase by public sector banks (PSBs) of NBFC/HFC pools, has been discussed in our earlier write-ups, which can be viewed here and here.

This document briefly puts the potential approach of the rating agencies for rating of the pools for the purpose of qualifying for the Scheme.

Brief nature of the transaction:

  • The transaction may be summarised as transfer of a pool to a PSB, wherein the NBFC retains a subordinated piece, such that the senior piece held by the PSB gets a AA rating. Thus, within the common pool of assets, there is a senior/junior structure, with the NBFC retaining the junior tranche.
  • The transaction is a structured finance transaction, by way of credit-enhanced, bilateral assignment. It is quite similar to a securitisation transaction, minus the presence of SPVs or issuance of any “securities”.
  • The NBFC will continue to be servicer, and will continue to charge servicing fees as agreed.
  • The objective to reach a AA rating of the pool/portion of the pool that is sold to the PSB.
  • Hence, the principles for sizing of credit enhancement, counterparty (servicer) risk, etc. should be the same as in case of securitisation.
  • The coupon rate for the senior tranche may be mutually negotiated. Given the fact that after 2 years, the GoI guarantee will be removed, the parties may agree for a stepped-up rate if the pool continues after 2 years. Obviously, the extent of subordinated share held by the NBFC will have to be increased substantially, to provide increased comfort to the PSB. Excess spread, that is, the excess of actual interest earned over the servicing fees and the coupon may be released to the seller.
  • The payout of the principal/interest to the two tranches (senior and junior), and utilisation of the excess spread, etc. may be worked out so as to meet the rating objective, provide for stepped-up level of enhancement, and yet maintain the economic viability of the transaction.
  • Bankruptcy remoteness is easier in the present case, as pool is sold from the NBFC to the PSB, by way of a non-recourse transfer. Of course, there should be no retention of buyback option, etc., or other factors that vitiate a true sale.
  • Technically, there is no need for a trustee. However, whether the parties need to keep a third party for ensuring surveillance over the transaction, in form of a monitoring agency, may be decided between the parties.

Brief characteristics of the Pool

  • For any meaningful statistical analysis, the pool should be a homogenous pool.
  • Surely, the pool is a static pool.
  • The pool has attained seasoning, as the loans must have been originated by 31st March, 2019.
  • In our view, pools having short maturities (say personal loans, short-term loans, etc.) will not be suitable for the transaction, since the guarantee and the guarantee fee are on annually declining basis.

Data requirement

The data required for the analysis will be same as data required for securitisation of a static pool.

Documentation

  • Between the NBFC and the PSB, there will be standard assignment documentation.
  • Between the Bank and the GoI:
    • Declaration that requirements of Chapter 11 of the GFR have been satisfied.
    • Guarantee documentation as per format given by GOI

[1] http://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=192618

Other Related Articles :

Government Credit enhancement scheme for NBFC Pools: A win-win for all

Vinod Kothari (vinod@vinodkothari.com)

The so-called partial credit enhancement (PCE) for purchase of NBFC/HFC pools by public sector banks (PSBs) may, if meaningfully implemented, be a win-win for all. The three primary players in the PCE scheme are NBFCs/HFCs (let us collectively called them Originators), the purchasing PSBs, and the Government of India (GoI). The Scheme has the potential to infuse liquidity into NBFCs while at the same time giving them advantage in terms of financing costs, allow PSBs to earn spreads while enjoying the benefit of sovereign guarantee, and allow the GoI to earn a spread of 25 bps virtually carrying no risks at all. This brief write-ups seeks to make this point.

The details of the Scheme with our elaborate questions and answers have been provided elsewhere.

Modus operandi

Broadly, the way we envisage the Scheme working is as follows:

  1. An Originator assimilates a pool of loans, and does tranching/credit enhancements to bring a senior tranche to a level of AA rating. Usually, tranching is associated with securitisation, but there is no reason why tranching cannot be done in case of bilateral transactions such as the one envisaged here. The most common form of tranching is subordination. Other structured finance devices such as turbo amortisation, sequential payment structure, provisions for redirecting the excess spread to pay off the principal on senior tranche, etc., may be deployed as required.
  2. Thus, say, on a pool of Rs 100 crores, the NBFC does so much subordination by way of a junior tranche as to bring the senior tranche to a AA level. The size of subordination may be worked, crudely, by X (usually 3 to 4) multiples of expected losses, or by a proper probability distribution model so as to bring the confidence level of the size of subordination being enough to absorb losses to acceptable AA probability of default. For instance, let us think of this level amounting to 8% (this percentage, needless to say, will depend on the expected losses of respective pools).
  3. Thus, the NBFC sells the pool of Rs 100 crores to PSB, retaining a subordinated 8% share in the same. Bankruptcy remoteness is achieved by true sale of the entire Rs 100 crore pool, with a subordinated share of 8% therein. In bilateral transactions, there is no need to use a trustee; to the extent of the Originator’s subordinated share, the PSB is deemed to be holding the assets in trust for the Originator. Simultaneously, the Originator also retains excess spread over the agreed Coupon Rate with the bank (as discussed below).
  4. Assuming that the fair value (computation of fair value will largely a no-brainer, as the PSB retains principal, and interest only to the extent of its agreed coupon, with the excess spread flowing back to the Originator) comes to the same as the participation of the PSB – 92% or Rs 92 crores, the PSB pays the same to the Originator.
  5. PSB now goes to the GoI and gets the purchase guaranteed by the latter. So, the GoI has guaranteed a purchase of Rs 92 crores, taking a first loss risk of 10% therein, that is, upto Rs 9.20 crores. Notably, for the pool as a whole, the GoI’s share of Rs 9.20 crores becomes a second loss position. However, considering that the GoI is guaranteeing the PSB, the support may technically be called first loss support, with the Originator-level support of Rs 10 crores being separate and independent.
  6. However, it is clear that the sharing of risks between the 3 – the Originator, the GoI and the Bank will be as follows:
  • Losses upto first Rs 8 crores will be taken out of the NBFC’s first loss piece, thereby, implying no risk transfer at all.
  • Losses in excess of Rs 8 crores, but upto a total of Rs 17.20 crores (the GoI guarantee is limited to Rs 9.20 crores), will be taken by GoI.
  • It is only when the loss exceeds Rs 17.20 crores that there is a question of the PSB being hit by losses.
  1. Thus, during the period of the guarantee, the PSB is protected to the extent of 17.2%. Note that first loss piece at the Originator level has been sized up to attain a AA rating. That will mean, higher the risk of the pool, the first loss piece at Originator level will go up to protect the bank.
  2. The PSB, therefore, has dual protection – to the extent of AA rating, from the Originator (or a third party with/without the Originator, as we discuss below), and for the next 10%, from the sovereign.
  3. Now comes the critical question – what will be the coupon rates that the PSB may expect on the pool.
    1. The pool effectively has a sovereign protection. While the protection may seem partial, but it is a tranched protection, and for a AA-rated pool, a 10% thickness of first loss protection is actually far higher than required for the highest degree of safety. What makes the protection even stronger is that the size of the guarantee is fixed at the start of the transaction or start of the financial year, even though the pool continues to amortise, thereby increasing the effective thickness.
    2. Assume risk free rate is R, and the spreads for AAA rated ABS are R +100 bps. Assume that the spreads for AA-rated ABS is R+150 bps.
    3. Given the sovereign protection, the PSB should be able to price the transaction certainly at less than R +100 bps, because sovereign guarantee is certainly safer than AAA. In fact, it should effectively move close to R, but given the other pool risks (prepayment risks, irregular cashflows), one may expect pricing above R.
    4. For the NBFC, the actual cost is the coupon expected by the PSB, plus 25bps paid for the guarantee.
    5. So as long as the coupon rate of the pool for the NBFC is lower than R+75 bps, it is an advantage over a AAA ABS placement. It is to be noted that the NBFC is actually exposing regulatory and economic capital only for the upto-AA risk that it holds.

Win-win for all

If the structure works as above, it is a win-win for all:

  • For the GoI, it is a neat income of 25 bps while virtually taking no real risks. There are 2 strong reasons for this – first, there is a first loss protection by the Originator, to qualify the pool for a AA rating. Secondly, the guarantee is limited only for 2 years. For any pool, first of all, the probability of losses breaching a AA-barrier itself will be close to 1% (meaning, 99% of the cases, the credit support at AA level will be sufficient). This becomes even more emphatic, if we consider the fact that the guarantee will be removed after 2 years. The losses may pile up above the Originator’s protection, but very unlikely that this will happen over 2 years.
  • For the PSB, while getting the benefit of a sovereign guarantee, and therefore, effectively, investing in something which is better than AAA, the PSB may target a spread close to AAA.
  • For the NBFC, it is getting a net advantage in terms of funding cost. Even if the pricing moves close to AAA ABS spreads, the NBFC stands to gain as the regulatory capital eaten up is only what is required for a AA-support.

The overall benefits for the system are immense. There is release of liquidity from the banking system to the economy. Depending on the type of pools Originators will be selling, there may be asset creation in form of home loans, or working capital loans (LAP loans may effectively be that), or loans for transport vehicles. If the GoI objective of buying pools upto Rs 100000 crores gets materialised, as much funding moves from banks to NBFCs, which is obviously already deployed in form of assets. The GoI makes an income of Rs 250 crores for effectively no risk.

In fact, if the GoI gains experience with the Scheme, there may be very good reason for lowering the rating threshold to A level, particularly in case of home loans.

Capital treatment, rating methodologies and other preparations

To make the Scheme really achieve its objectives, there are several preparations that may have to come soon enough:

  • Rating agencies have to develop methodologies for rating this bilateral pool transfer. Effectively, this is nothing but a structured pool transfer, akin to securitisation. Hence, rating methodologies used for securitisation may either be applied as they are, or tweaked to apply to the transfers under the Scheme.
  • Very importantly, the RBI may have to clarify that the AA risk retention by Originators under the Scheme will lead to regulatory capital requirement only upto the risk retained by the NBFC. This should be quite easy for the RBI to do – because there are guidelines for securitisation already, and the Scheme has all features of securitisation, minus the fact that there is no SPV or issuance of “securities” as such.

Conclusion

Whoever takes the first transaction to market will have to obviously do a lot of educating – PSBs, rating agencies, law firms, SIDBI, and of course, DFS. However, the exercise is worth it, and it may not take 6 months as envisaged for the GoI to reach the target of Rs 1 lakh crores.


Other related articles:

GOI’s attempt to ease out liquidity stress of NBFCs and HFCs: Ministry of Finance launches Scheme for Partial Credit Guarantee to PSBs for acquisition of financial assets

Abhirup Ghosh  (abhirup@vinodkothari.com)

The Finance Minister, during the Union Budget 2019-20, promised to introduce a partial credit guarantee scheme so as to extend relief to the NBFC during the on-going liquidity crisis. The proposal laid down in the budget was a very broad statement and were subject to several speculations. At last on 13th August, 2019[1], the Ministry of Finance came out with a press release to announce the notification in this regard dated 10th August, 2019, laying down specifics of the scheme.

The scheme will be known by “Partial Credit Guarantee offered by Government of India (GoI) to Public Sector Banks (PSBs) for purchasing high-rated pooled assets from financially sound Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs)/Housing Finance Companies (HFCs)”, however, for the purpose of this write-up we will use the word “Scheme” for reference.

The Scheme is intended to address temporary asset liability mismatch of solvent HFCs/ NBFCs, owing to the ongoing liquidity crisis in the non-banking financial sector, without having to resort to distress sale of their assets.

In this regard, we intend to discuss the various requirements under the Scheme and analyse its probable impact on the financial sector.

Applicability:

The Scheme has been notified with effect from 10th August, 2019 and will remain open for 6 months from or until the period by which the maximum commitment by the Government in the Scheme is fulfilled, whichever is earlier.

Under the Scheme, the Government has promised to extend first loss guarantee for purchase of assets by PSBs aggregating to ₹ 1 lakh crore. The Government will provide first loss guarantee of 10% of the assets purchased by the purchasing bank.

The Scheme is applicable for assignment of assets in the course of direct assignment to PSBs only. It is not applicable on securitisation transactions.

Also, as we know that in case of direct assignment transactions, the originators are required to retain a certain portion of the asset for the purpose of minimum retention requirement; this Scheme however, applies only to the purchasing bank’s share of assets and not on the originators retained portion. Therefore, if due to default, the originator incurs any losses, the same will not be compensated by virtue of this scheme.

Eligible sellers:

The Scheme lays down criteria to check the eligibility of sellers to avail benefits under this Scheme, and the same are follows:

  1. NBFCs registered with the RBI, except Micro Financial Institutions or Core Investment Companies.
  2. HFCs registered with the NHB.
  3. The NBFC/ HFC must have been able to maintain the minimum regulatory capital as on 31st March, 2019, that is –
    • For NBFCs – 15%
    • For HFCs – 12%
  4. The net NPA of the NBFC/HFC must not have exceeded 6% as on 31st March, 2019
  5. The NBFC/ HFC must have reported net profit in at least one out of the last two preceding financial years, that is, FY 2017-18 and FY 2018-19.
  6. The NBFC/ HFC must not have been reported as a Special Mention Account (SMA) by any bank during year prior to 1st August, 2018.

Some observations on the eligibility criteria are:

  1. Asset size of NBFCs for availing benefits under the Scheme: The Scheme does not provide for any asset size requirement for an NBFC to be qualified for this Scheme, however, one of the requirement is that the financial institution must have maintained the minimum regulatory capital requirement as on 31st March, 2019. Here it is important to note that requirement to maintain regulatory capital, that is capital risk adequacy ratio (CRAR), applies only to systemically important NBFCs.

Only those NBFCs whose asset size exceeds Rs. 500 crores singly or jointly with assets of other NBFCs in the group are treated as systemically important NBFCs. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the benefits under this Scheme can be availed only by those NBFCs which – a) are required to maintained CRAR, and b) have maintained the required amount of capital as on 31st March, 2019, subject to the fulfilment of other conditions.

  1. Financial health of originator after 1st August, 2018 – The eligibility criteria for sellers state that the financial institution must not have been reported as SMA by any bank any time during 1 year prior to 1st August, 2018, the apparent question that arises here is what happens if the originator moves into SMA status after the said date. If we go by the letters of the Scheme, if a financial institution satisfies the condition before 1st August, 2018 but becomes SMA thereafter, it will still be eligible as per the Scheme. This makes the situation a little awkward as the whole intention of the Scheme was to facilitate financially sound financial institutions. This seems to be an error on the part of the Government, and it surely must not have meant to situations such as the one discussed above. We can hopefully expect an amendment in this regard from the Government.

Eligible assets

Pool of assets satisfying the following conditions can be assigned under the Scheme:

  1. The asset must have been originated on or before 31st March, 2019.
  2. The asset must be classified as standard in the books of the NBFC/ HFC as on the date of the sale.
  3. The pool of assets should have a minimum rating of “AA” or equivalent at fair value without the credit guarantee from the Government.
  4. Each account under the pooled assets should have been fully disbursed and security charge should have been created in favour of the originating NBFCs/ HFCs.
  5. NBFCs/HFCs can sell up to a maximum of 20% of their standard assets as on 31.3.2019 subject to a cap of Rs. 5,000 crore at fair value. Any additional amount above the cap of Rs. 5,000 crore will be considered on pro ratabasis, subject to availability of headroom.
  6. The individual asset size in the pool must not exceed Rs. 5 crore.
  7. The following types of loans are not eligible for assignment for the purposes of this Scheme:
    1. Revolving credit facilities;
    2. Assets purchased from other entities; and
  • Assets with bullet repayment of both principal and interest

Our observations on the eligibility criteria are as follows:

  1. Rating of the pool: The Scheme states that the pools assigned should be highly rated, that is, should have ratings of AA or equivalent prior to the guarantee. Technically, pool of assets are not rated, it is the security which is rated based on the risks and rewards of the underlying pools. Therefore, it is to be seen how things will unfold. Also, desired rating in the present case is quite high; if an originator is able to secure such a high rating, it might not require the assistance under this Scheme in the first place. And, the fact that the originators will have to pay guarantee commission of 25 bps. Therefore, only where the originators are able to secure a significantly lower cost from the banks for a higher rating, that would also cover the commission paid, will this Scheme be viable; let alone be the challenges of achieving an AA rating of the pool.
  2. Cut-off date of loan origination to be 31st March, 2019: As per the RBI Guidelines on Securitisation and Direct Assignment, the originators have to comply with minimum holding requirements. The said requirement suggests that an asset can be sold off only if it has remained in the books of the originator for at least 6 months. This Scheme has come into force with effect from 10th August, 2019 and will remain open for 6 months from the commencement.

Considering that already 5 months since the cut-off date has already passed, even if we were to assume that the loan is originated on the cut-off date itself, it would mean that closer to the end of the tenure of the Scheme, the loan will be 11 months seasoning. Such high seasoning requirements might not be motivational enough for the originators to avail this Scheme.

  1. Maximum cap on sell down of receivables: The Scheme has put a maximum cap on the amount of assets that can be assigned and that is an amount equal to 20% of the outstanding standard assets as on 31st March, 2019, however, the same is capped to Rs. 5000 crores.

It is pertinent to note that the Scheme also allows additional sell down of loans by the originators, beyond the maximum cap, however, the same shall depend on the available headroom and based on decisions of the Government.

Invocation of guarantee and guarantee commission

Guarantee commission

As already stated earlier, in order to avail benefits under this Scheme, the originator will have to incur a fee of 25 basis points on the amount guaranteed by the Government. However, the payment of the same shall have to be routed through the purchasing bank.

Invocation of guarantee

The guarantee can be invoked any time during the first 24 months from the date of assignment, if the interest/ principal has remained overdue for a period of more than 90 days.

Consequent upon a default, the purchasing bank can invoke the guarantee and recover its entire exposure from the Government. It can continue to recover its losses from the Government, until the upper cap of 10% of the total portfolio is reached. However, the purchasing bank will not be able to recover the losses if – (a) the pooled assets are bought back by the concerned NBFCs/HFCs or (b) sold by the purchasing bank to other entities.

The claims of the purchasing bank will be settled with 5 working days from the date of claim by the Government.

However, if the purchasing bank, by any means, recovers the amount subsequent to the invocation of the guarantee, it will have to refund the amount recovered or the amount received against the guarantee to the Government within 5 working days from the date of recovery. Where the amount recovered is more than amount of received as guarantee, the excess collection will be retained by the purchasing bank.

Other features of the Scheme

  1. Reporting requirement – The Scheme provides for a real-time reporting mechanism for the purchasing banks to understand the remaining headroom for purchase of such pooled assets. The Department of Financial Services (DFS), Ministry of Finance would obtain the requisite information in a prescribed format from the PSBs and send a copy to the budget division of DEA, however, the manner and format of reporting has not been notified yet.
  2. Option to buy-back the loans – The Scheme allows the originator to retain an option to buy back its assets after a specified period of 12 months as a repurchase transaction, on a right of first refusal basis. This however, is contradictory to the RBI Guidelines on Direct Assignment, as the same does not allow any option to repurchase the pool in a DA transaction.
  3. To-do for the NBFCs/ HFCs – In order to avail the benefits under the Scheme, the following actionables have to be undertaken:
    1. The Asset Liability structure should restructured within three months to have positive ALM in each bucket for the first three months and on cumulative basis for the remaining period;
    2. At no time during the period for exercise of the option to buy back the assets, should the CRAR go below the regulatory minimum. The promoters shall have to ensure this by infusing equity, where required.

[1] http://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=192618

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