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SEBI approves relaxed norms on RPTs 

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  • Materiality thresholds increased, significant RPTs relaxed for small-value RPTs and newly incorporated subsidiaries 

Highlights:

Following a 32-pager consultation paper proposing significant amendments to RPT provisions, towards ease of doing business, rolled out by SEBI on August 4, 2025, several amendments were approved by SEBI in its Board Meeting on 12th September, 2025. The SEBI (Listing Obligation and Disclosure Requirements) (Fifth Amendment) Regulations, 2025 have been notified on 19th November, 2025 amending the RPT framework for listed entities. 

Some of our comments on the proposals, as recommended to SEBI, have also been accepted in the approved decisions. Our comments on the Consultation Paper may be read here. 

Applicability of the Amendment Regulations 

While the Amendment Regulations have been notified, the amendments with respect to the RPT framework are effective from the 30th day of the notification of the Amendment Regulations, that is, with effect from 19th December, 2025. 

1. Materiality Thresholds: From One-Size-Fits-All to several sizes for the short-and-tall

A scale-based threshold mechanism has been approved, such that the RPT materiality threshold increases with the increase in the turnover of the company, though at a reduced rate, thus leading to an appropriate number of RPTs being categorized as material, thereby reducing the compliance burden of listed entities. The maximum upper ceiling of materiality has been kept at Rs. 5,000 crores, as against the existing absolute threshold of Rs. 1000 crores. The thresholds have been provided in Schedule XII, along with an illustration towards better understanding of the materiality thresholds. 

Materiality thresholds as specified in Schedule XII: 

Annual Consolidated Turnover of listed entity (in Crores)Approved threshold (as a % of consolidated turnover)Maximum upper ceiling (in Crores)
< Rs.20,00010%2,000 
20,001 – 40,0002,000 Crs + 5% above Rs. 20,000 Crs3,000
> 40,0003,000 Crs + 2.5% above Rs. 40,000 Crs5,000  (deemed material) 

Back-testing the proposal scale on RPTs undertaken by top 100 NSE companies show a 60% reduction in material RPT approvals for FY 2023-24 and 2024-25 with total no. of such resolutions reducing from 235 and 293, to around 95 to 119. The 60% reduction may itself be seen as a bold admission that the existing regulatory framework was causing too many proposals to go for shareholder approval.

Our Analysis and Comments 

With the amendments becoming effective, RPT regime is all set to be a lot relaxed, with the absolute threshold for taking shareholders’ approval to be doubled to Rs. 2000 crores. In addition, for larger companies, there will be a scalar increase in the threshold, rising to Rs. 5000 crores. A lot lesser number of RPTs will now have to go before shareholders for approval in general meetings.

In times to come, a multi-metric approach, depending on the nature of the transaction, may be adopted, drawing on a consonance-based criteria as seen in Regulation 30 of the LODR Regulations, thus offering a more balanced and effective approach. See detailed discussion in the article here.

2. Significant RPTs of Subsidiaries: Plugging Gaps with Dual Thresholds

Extant provisions vis-a-vis Amended Regulations

Pursuant to the amendments in 2021, RPTs exceeding a threshold of 10% of the standalone turnover of the subsidiary are considered as Significant RPTs, thus, requiring approval of the Audit Committee of the listed entity. The following modifications have been approved with respect to the thresholds of Significant RPTs of Subsidiaries: 

  • ‘Material’ is always ‘Significant’: RPTs of subsidiary would require listed holding company’s audit committee approval if they breach the lower of following limits:
    • 10% of the standalone turnover of the subsidiary or 
    • Material RPT thresholds as applicable to listed holding company 

This is a mathematical impossibility, since materiality threshold is based on “consolidated turnover”, and hence, includes the turnover of the subsidiary. Further, unlike networth, turnover cannot be a negative number, and hence, even if one or more of the subsidiaries of the listed entity are loss-making entities, the same cannot reduce the consolidated turnover of the listed entity to a number below the standalone turnover of its subsidiaries, whose accounts are being consolidated with the entity.  

  • Exemption for small value RPTs: The threshold for Significant RPTs is subject to an exemption for small value RPTs based on the absolute value of Rs. 1 crore. Thus, where a transaction between a subsidiary and a related party (of the listed entity/ subsidiary), on an aggregate, does not exceed Rs. 1 crore, the same is not required to be placed for approval of the Audit Committee of the listed entity, even if the aforesaid limits are breached.
  • Alternative for newly incorporated subsidiaries without a track record: For newly incorporated subsidiaries which are <1 year old, consequently not having audited financial statements for a period of at least one year, the threshold for Significant RPTs to be based on lower of:
    • 10% of aggregate of paid-up capital and securities premium of the subsidiary, or
    • Material RPT thresholds as applicable to listed holding company 

The aggregate value of paid-up capital and securities premium, to be considered for the purpose of determination of Significant RPTs, should not be older than three months prior to the date of seeking AC approval. Since the value of paid-up capital and securities premium would be available with the company on a real-time basis, the same does not result in any additional compliance burden. 

Our Analysis and Comments

For newly incorporated subsidiaries, the Consultation Paper proposed linking the thresholds with net worth, and requiring a practising CA to certify such networth, thus leading to an additional compliance burden in the form of certification requirements.  Following the approval in SEBI BM, the Amendment Regulations provide a threshold based on paid-up share capital and securities premium, and hence, certification requirement does  not arise.  

3. Clarification w.r.t. validity of shareholders’ Omnibus Approval 

Existing provisions vis-a-vis Amended Regulations  

The existing provisions [Para (C)11 of Section III-B of LODR Master Circular] permit the validity of the omnibus approval by shareholders for material RPTs as: 

  • From AGM to AGM – in case approval is obtained in an AGM 
  • One year – in case approval is obtained in any other general meeting/ postal ballot 

Pursuant to the Amendment Regulations, the timelines have been incorporated as a proviso to Reg 23(4). Further, a clarification has been incorporated that the AGM to AGM approval will be valid till the date of next AGM held within the timelines prescribed as per section 96 of the Companies Act.

4. Exclusions for retail purchases 

Proviso (e) to Regulation 2(1)(zc) of the extant SEBI LODR Regulations exempted transactions involving retail purchases by employees from being classified as Related Party Transactions (RPTs), even though employees are not technically classified as related parties. Conversely, it includes transactions involving the relatives of directors and Key Managerial Personnel (KMPs) within its ambit. 

The CP proposed that the exemption related to retail transactions should be expressly limited to related parties (i.e., directors, KMPs, or their relatives) to grant the appropriate exemption.

Under the extant framework, retail purchases made on the same terms as applicable to all employees were excluded from the meaning of RPTs when undertaken by employees, but not when made by relatives of directors or KMPs. This led to an inconsistent treatment, where similarly situated individuals receive different regulatory treatment solely on the basis of their relationship with the company. 

Pursuant to the Amendment Regulations, the exclusion for retail purchases has been extended to the relatives of the directors/ KMP, when undertaken on “terms which are uniformly applicable/offered to all employees, directors, key managerial personnel and relatives of directors or key managerial personnel ”. While the language refers to terms offered to “employees, directors, key managerial personnel and relatives of directors or key managerial personnel”, the same cannot be read to mean that preferential terms can be granted to “director”, “KMPs” or “relatives of such directors/ KMPs” as a separate class. The terms need to be uniform to what is otherwise offered to “employees” by such a listed entity/ its subsidiaries. 

5. Exemptions for RPTs between holding company and WoS

Regulation 23(5)(b) provides an exemption from audit committee and shareholder approvals for transactions between a holding company and its wholly owned subsidiary. However, the term “holding company” used in this context has remained undefined, leaving ambiguity as to whether it refers only to a listed holding company or includes unlisted ones as well.

A clarification has been inserted to provide the interpretational guidance that the term ‘holding company’ refers to the listed entity. The relevance of the aforesaid clarification would primarily be in cases where the unlisted subsidiary of the listed entity enters into a significant RPT with its wholly owned subsidiary (step-down subsidiary of the listed entity). Pursuant to the aforesaid proposal, as approved, no exemption will be available in such a case. 

Conclusion

The  amendments seem more or less welcoming, relaxing the RPT regime for listed entities. With the new leadership at SEBI meant to rationalise regulations, it was quite an appropriate occasion to do so. In sum, SEBI’s iterative approach to RPT governance demonstrates commendable responsiveness, contributing to the ease of compliances and in turn, of doing business by the companies. 

Our resources:

Related Party Transactions- Resource Centre

Virtual Certificate Course on Grooming of Chief Compliance Officers of NBFCs

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12 hours Certificate Course on Insider Trading for Compliance Officers

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When “Profit” Isn’t Always Distributable

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– Understanding Reportable vs Distributable Profits under Ind AS and the Companies Act, 2013

– Sourish Kundu | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

In the sphere of corporate law intertwined with accounting principles, there arises a question on profits that are reported in the financials of a company and the amount that can actually be distributed, that is to say, a company’s reported profits may be impacted by several accounting standards, yet that does not mean it can distribute all of that profit as dividends. Under Indian law and accounting rules, there is a clear distinction between reportable profits (what appears in the financial statements) and distributable profits (what a company is legally permitted to pay out to shareholders). In this article, we decode the difference between reportable profits and distributable profits and the implications of this difference, whether companies are expected to prepare two statements of profit or loss, how investors are expected to read the financials to ascertain what can be expected as dividend. 

What are Reportable Profits?

“Reportable profits” refers to the profits (or loss) shown in the Statement of Profit & Loss prepared under Indian Accounting Standards (Ind AS). It includes all recognised items of income, expenses, gains and losses, whether realised or unrealised, so long as they meet the recognition and measurement rules in terms of the relevant accounting standards. For example, under Ind AS 109 (Financial Instruments), paragraph 5.7.1 states that changes in fair value of financial assets or liabilities measured at fair value through profit or loss (FVTPL) must be recognised in the PnL. Similarly, fair-value measurement principles under Ind AS 113 (Fair Value Measurement) apply where other Ind ASs require or permit fair value. 

Because reportable profits include unrealised fair value gains, remeasurements, or other accounting adjustments, there is always a possibility of an inflated or deflated picture being painted wherein there is a difference between a company’s “profit” number from the perspective of distribution.

What are Distributable Profits?

“Distributable profits” are that portion of profits (or reserves) out of which a company can legally declare and pay dividends to its shareholders under the Companies Act, 2013. Section 123(1) of the Act states that a company shall not declare or pay any dividend for a financial year except:

  • out of the profits of the company for that year, after providing for depreciation, and
  • out of the profits of any previous financial years, after providing for depreciation and remaining undistributed.

The first proviso to section 123(1) further clarifies that unrealised gains, notional gains or revaluation surplus arising from measurement at fair value shall not be treated as realised profits for the purpose of dividend declaration. 

“Provided that in computing profits any amount representing unrealised gains, notional gains or revaluation of assets and any change in carrying amount of an asset or of a liability on measurement of the asset or the liability at fair value shall be excluded”

Thus, even though accounting standards allow recognition of such gains/losses in the PnL statement, the law restricts their distribution and ensures distribution can be made of only actual realised profits.

As per the section, following adjustments are required to be made to reportable profits to compute distributable profits

Reportable ProfitsXXX
Less:
(b) unrealised gains(XXX)
(c) notional gains(XXX)
(d) revaluation of assets (positive)(XXX)
(e) any change in carrying amount of assets (positive) on measurement at FV(XXX)
(f) any change in carrying amount of liability (reduction) on measurement at FV
Add:
(a) revaluation of assets (negative)XXX
(b) any change in carrying amount of assets (reduction) on measurement at FVXXX
(c) any change in carrying amount of liability (increment) on measurement at FVXXX
Distributable ProfitsXXX

So effectively, it is not the case that companies need to maintain or prepare parallel PnL, one for the accounting purpose and one for the purpose of ascertaining distributable profits, the adjustments as illustrated above needs to be carried out. This is similar to adjustments carried out for the purpose of ascertaining profits in terms of Section 198 of the Companies Act, 2013, which is broadly used for determining CSR expenditure and the limits of managerial remuneration. Interestingly, the treatment of fair value changes in assets and liabilities is akin to how it is treated here, that is, fair value gains are not given credit and hence reversed, and on the other hand, fair value losses are not deducted and hence added back to arrive at the figure out of which managerial remuneration is to be paid, or CSR expenditure is required to be made. 

Some examples of such fair value changes and their impact on the reportable and distributable profit figures are given below: 

Examples: 

Consider the following scenarios for company following Ind AS principles of accounting: 

  1. Treatment of FVTPL
DateParticularsValue Reportable Profits Distributable Profits 
July, 2024Acquisition of investment Rs. 100––
31st March, 2025Value of investments Rs. 15050 (represents fair value gains routed through PnL)–
January, 2026Sale of investments Rs. 200–100 (realised gain)
  1. Deferred Tax Asset
DateParticularsValue Reportable Profits Distributable Profits 
July, 2024Acquisition of investment Rs. 100––
31st March, 2025Value of investments Rs. 70-30 (represents fair value loss routed through PnL)–
Deferred tax assetRs. 9 (30% tax on Rs. 30)9 –
January, 2026Sale of investments Rs. 90–-10

Why the Difference Exists

The divergence arises because accounting standards and company-law provisions serve different purposes:

  • The Ind AS framework aims to present true and fair information about an entity’s financial performance and position, which includes remeasurements and accounting for fair value changes.
  • The company law legislation aims to protect the company’s capital base and ensure dividends are paid out of “real” profits, thereby protecting creditor interests and preventing erosion of capital.

Thus, distributing unrealised or notional gains could expose the company (and its creditors) to risk if those gains reversed. The legal restriction is a form of capital maintenance concept.

Conclusion

In sum: reportable profits (what Ind AS shows) is not always the same as distributable profits (what a company can legally pay out). The presence of items such as unrealised fair-value gains, which are recognised in profit but not “realised” and hence, not available for distribution under company law, creates this difference. Understanding this distinction is essential because in the end, the dividend cheque flows only from the legally distributable pool and not simply from what the profit and loss account might suggest.

Read more:

Should you expect adjustment in profits for “Expected Credit Loss”?

Cash in Hand, But Still a Loss? 

Piercing through subjectivity to reach out for SBOs

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ROCs uncovering SBOs through publicly available information

– Pammy Jaiswal and Darshan Rao | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Introduction

The framework for SBO identification can be traced back to the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global watchdog for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Section 90 of the Companies Act, 2013 (‘Act’) read with its Rules translates the recommendations into provisions for enforcing the concept, with two broad manners of identification methods. The first being the objective test where the shareholding is picked up through the layers to see the type of entity and the extent of holding to identify the SBO for the reporting entity. The second is the subjective test where the aspects of control and significant influence are evaluated from all possible corners to reach the SBO. It is generally seen that the objective test is the most common way for SBO identification, however, in most of the cases where the regulator has made the identification, it has held the hands of subjectivity.  As a follow-up to the LinkedIn case[1], we have discussed a few other rulings where the RoC has taken diverse ways under the subjectivity armour to reach out to the SBOs. The article also explains the principles of law that emerge from every case law, giving a broader angle to the readers on the ever evolving corporate governance norms in the context of SBO identification.

Some of the aspects via which SBOs have been identified in the rulings discussed in this article are as follows:

  • Control over the Board of the listed overseas parent
  • CEO in relation to and not only of the Pooled Investment Vehicle
  • Financial dependence and control established via usage of common domain name
  • Erstwhile promoters obligation to disclose where the new promoters are exempt for the then time period

We have discussed these in detail in the following paragraphs to inform the way RoCs went on a spree to unearthen the SBOs taking shields of the language of the existing legal provisions around SBO identification.

Subjectivity facets for SBO identification

As discussed above, the two broad subjective tests for SBO identification are right to exercise or the actual exercising of significant influence or control over the reporting entity. It is imperative note the relevance of stating both the situations as a potential to become SBO for the reporting, being:

  • Right to exercise significant influence or control [note here that actual exercise is not a prerequisite]; or
  • Actual exercising of significant influence or control.

Further, it is pertinent to note that ‘control’ has been defined under Section 2(27) of the Act to “include the right to appoint majority of the directors or to control the management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, including by virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders agreements or voting agreements or in any other manner”.

Again, the term ‘significant influence’ has been defined under Rule 2(1)(i) of the SBO Rulesas the “power to participate, directly or indirectly, in the financial and operating policy decisions of the reporting company but is not control or joint control of those policies”.

In the following parts of the article, we will be able to know, the manner in which these aspects have been investigated to reach out for the SBOs.

A.   Examining cross holdings, chairmanship and other publicly available data[2] 

The Indian reporting entity was a WoS of an overseas listed entity which was a large conglomerate and hence there were several cross holdings in the entities in the top level. There was no declaration of SBO in the given case on account of the argument given that the holding entity is a listed company and hence, there is no individual holding control or significant influence over the said parent. Enquiry was made about the details of the promoters, directors, KMP and shareholders of certain promoter entities as well as chairperson of board meetings and UBO for the reporting company.

Further, upon investigation into the public records of the holding entity, it was found that one particular individual from the promoter category along with his family holds approx 21.46% in the ultimate parent entity and that his son significant stake in two other promoter group entities which in turn holds in the ultimate parent entity of the reporting company.

RoC concluded that the son along with his family members, directly and indirectly exercises significant influence in the ultimate parent. Further, the same person also holds the position of a chairperson in the said entity when the said company already has a full-fledged chairperson already indicating a situation of proxy control through legally remote mechanism. Accordingly, he should have been declared as SBO for the reporting company in India. The snapshot of holding is given below:

B.   Individual manager/ CEO related to Pooled Investment Vehicle and not necessarily of the Investment Vehicle[3]

In cases where the SBO is identified via the members holding the reporting company and the ultimate shareholder as such is a pooled investment vehicle, in that case even if there is no individual as a general partner or the investment manager or the CEO of such vehicle, then any individual in relation to the pooled investment vehicle and not necessarily of such a vehicle can be regarded as an SBO. In this case the CEO of the investment manager was considered as an SBO since he was the one responsible for the decision making of such investment manager and hence, relevant for investment decisions of the vehicle.

While arriving at the conclusion of this ruling, RoC clearly indicated that the legislative scheme of Section 90 ensures that at the end of every ownership chain, a natural person(s) must be identifiable as the SBO. Companies cannot rely on the complexity of foreign fund structures or the absence of direct nominees to evade compliance; the obligation to investigate and file BEN forms lies squarely on the Indian company. The ROC implicitly aligned Indian law with FATF Recommendations 24 and 25[4], emphasizing that beneficial-ownership disclosure extends through investment vehicles, LLPs, and trusts

C.   Financial / Business Dependency, Usage of common domain name, KMPs of foreign parent employed in Indian reporting company[5]

In a very interesting case where 100% of the shares were only held by a few individuals, RoC concluded that even in such entities identification of SBO is still possible on account of assessment of several factors. These include the reporting test as well as financial control test. In such cases, one may consider evaluating the business dependency in terms of supply to or from the reporting entity, other clues like entities with a common domain name, similarity in trademark, procurement policies.

In this case it was investigated and consequently observed that the shareholder of the reporting company held a controlling stake in the overseas supplier entities on which the reporting company had the highest dependency. Further, the RoC also found out that both the reporting company and these supplier entities had applied for a similar trademark. Further, these entities were reported to be under the common control of an individual who happens to be the director as well the majority shareholder of the reporting company. It is also imperative to note that one of the director-cum senior employees and another senior employee are the ones who have been shown as the supervisor and UBO for the overseas supplier entities.

In this ruling, RoC also referred to the FATF Guidance[6] on control in cases with no shareholding. It includes the following means:

  • Control through positions held within a legal person: Natural persons who exercise substantial control over a legal person and are responsible for strategic decisions that fundamentally affect the business practices or general direction of the legal person may be considered a beneficial owner under some circumstances. Depending on the legal person and the country’s laws, directors may or may not take an active role in exercising control over the affairs of the entity.
  • Control through informal means: Furthermore, control over a legal person may be exercised through informal means, such as through close personal connections to relatives or associates. Further, when an individual is using, enjoying or benefiting from the assets owned by the legal person, it could be grounds for further investigation if such individual is in the condition to exercise control over the legal person.

D.   Current exemption gets overruled by past obligation to declare[7]

ROC held clearly in this case that the current holding structure even though exempt from the disclosure requirements pursuant to Rule 8 of the SBO Rules, the same will still be subject to penal actions where the declaration was not made as and when applicable in the period prior to qualifying for such exemption.

Concluding Remarks

On perusal of each of these rulings, it becomes clear that no matter how complicated or how simple the corporate structure is, the regulators will leave no stone unturned while carrying on their investigation for finding the real SBOs. Regulators have the determination to uncover SBOs who exercise control behind every legal entity.

A few measures that can be adopted include establishing robust frameworks to continuously track changes in shareholding and control arrangements, maintaining detailed documentation of every ownership and control analysis conducted and filing all SBO disclosures promptly with the Registrar of Companies (RoC). It is also imperative that suitable amendments are made to define the ‘ultimate beneficial owner’ (UBO) rather than the ‘significant beneficial owner’. To some extent, this can be helpful to those corporations with several layers of entities to identify the UBO, although the process would lose its viability considering the scale and extent of tracing.

However, the concern that remains is that the exercise to trace the origins of relationship may prove to be an onus on entities apart from the penal consequences it carries in case of non-compliance.

[1] Read our analysis here

[2] In the matter of Samsung Display Noida Private Limited

[3] In the matter of Leixir Resources Private Limited

[4]FATF Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons

[5] In the matter of Metec Electronics Private Limited

[6] FATF Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons

[7] In the matter of Shree Digvijay Cement Ltd

Resource Centre on SBOs

Control based SBO identification beyond the current legislation

Presentation on Fast Track Merger

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– Team Corplaw | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

FTM.pptx (1)Download

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Widening the Net of Fast-Track Mergers – A Step Towards NCLT Declogging

Fast Track Merger- finally on a faster track

MCA enabled fast track route for cross border mergers and added additional requirements in IEPF Rules

AIF Regulatory framework evolves from light-touch to right-hold

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Simrat Singh | Finserv@vinodkothari.com

When AIF Regulations were formally introduced in 2012, the regulatory approach was deliberately light. The framework targeted sophisticated investors, allowing flexibility with limited oversight. Over the years, however, AIFs have become significant participants in capital markets. Market practices over the decade exposed regulatory loopholes and arbitrages. For example, some investors who did not individually qualify as QIBs accessed preferential benefits indirectly through AIF structures and investors who were restricted to invest in certain companies started investing through AIF making AIF an investment facade. There were concerns regarding circumvention of FEMA norms as well1. In the credit space, regulated entities such as banks and NBFCs started channeling funds through AIFs to refinance their stressed borrowers, raising concerns around loan evergreening2. These developments prompted regulatory response. RBI first issued two circulars, one in 2023 and the other in 2024. Finally, in 2025 formal directions governing investments by regulated entities in AIFs were also issued3. These Directions introduced exposure caps and provisioning requirements.4 

While the RBI addressed prudential risks arising from regulated entities’ participation in AIFs, SEBI focused on investor protection, governance within the AIF ecosystem and curbing the regulatory arbitrages. First it mandated on-going due diligence by AIF Managers5. It then mandated specific due diligence6 of investors and investments of AIF to prevent indirect access to regulatory benefits. Fiduciary duties of sponsors and investment managers and reporting obligations were progressively codified through circulars. Managers were expected to maintain transparency vis-a-vis their investment decisions, maintain written policies including ones to deal with conflict of interest with unitholders and submit accurate information to the Trustee. What were once broad, principle-based expectations have evolved into detailed, enforceable rules. Regulatory tightening has been matched by a more assertive enforcement approach. SEBI’s recent settlement order7 against an AIF underscores its increasing scrutiny of governance lapses, mismanagement of conflicts and inaccurate reporting. This clearly signals that any compliance gaps will no longer be overlooked and are likely to attract regulatory action. In a separate adjudication order, SEBI imposed penalties on both the Trustee and the Manager for the delayed winding-up of the scheme, underscoring that accountability within an AIF structure extends to all key parties and is not limited to the Manager alone.  

However, SEBI’s approach has not been solely restrictive. Alongside regulatory tightening, it has also sought to preserve commercial flexibility and respond to market needs. Examples include the introduction of the co-investment framework8 for AIFs, framework for offering differential rights to select investors and a revamp for angel funds9.

Together, these measures are reshaping the regulatory landscape for AIFs and their managers. Investors can no longer rely on AIF structures to indirectly obtain regulatory advantages otherwise unavailable to them. As AIFs have grown in scale and importance, what is emerging is a more transparent, prudentially sound and closely supervised regulatory regime designed to align investor protection and commercial flexibility.

  1. See SEBI’s Consultation paper on proposal to enhance trust in the AIF ecosystem ↩︎
  2. See our write-up on AIFs being used for regulatory arbitrages here. ↩︎
  3.  RBI (Investment In AIF) Directions, 2025 ↩︎
  4. See our detailed analysis of the Directions here. ↩︎
  5. See our write-up on ongoing due diligence for AIFs here ↩︎
  6. See our FAQs on specific due diligence of investors and investments of AIFs here. ↩︎
  7. See the complete order here ↩︎
  8. See our write-up on co-investments here. ↩︎
  9. See our write-up on changes w.r.t Angel Funds here ↩︎

Revised Form IEPF-5 paves way for simplified claim process

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Lavanya Tandon, Senior Executive & Anushka Ganguly, Executive | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

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Demystifying Structured Debt Securities: Beyond Plain Vanilla Bonds

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Palak Jaiswani, Manager | corplaw@vinodkothari.com

Debentures, one of the most common means for raising debt funding, where investors lend money to the issuer in return for periodic interest and repayment of principal at maturity. While the basic feature of any debenture is a fixed coupon rate and a defined tenure (commonly referred to as plain vanilla instruments), sometimes these instruments may be topped up with enhanced features such as additional credit support, market-linked returns, convertibility option, etc., thus referred to as structured debt securities.

Structured debt securities: motivation for issuers

Apart from the economic favouring such structural modifications, a primary motivation for the issuer in issuing such structured instruments might be the regulatory advantages that these securities offer. For instance,

  • Chapter VIII of SEBI NCS Master Circular provides an extra limit of 5 ISINs for structured debt securities & market-linked securities, thus more room for the issuers to issue debt securities, compared to the restriction of a maximum of 9 ISINs for plain vanilla debt.
  • In addition, as per NSE Guidelines on Electronic Book Provider (EBP) mechanism, market-linked debentures are not required to be routed through EBP, allowing issuers to place such instruments almost like an over-the-counter trade. This allows issuers to structure the debt securities on a tailored basis and offer them directly to specific investors.
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Insider Trading Safeguards: Sensitising Fiduciaries

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– Team Corplaw | Corplaw@vinodkothari.com

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