The global economy, as also that of India, is passing through a systemic disruption due to the COVID crisis. The Reserve Bank of India in its Seventh Bi-monthly Monetary Policy Statement 2019-20 dated March 27, 2020 has permitted banks and non-banking financial institutions to provide a moratorium to borrowers for a period of 3 months.
As a result, cashflows of banks and financial institutions from underlying loans will be disrupted, at least for the period of the moratorium. It is a different thing that the disruption may actually prolong, but 3 months as of now is what is explicitly regarded by the RBI has COVID-driven.
The financial sector is admittedly one the major issues of debt securities in India. Therefore, an issue that has arisen is, if the financial sector entities, or other issuers of debt obligations, are not able to repay the same on a due date, due to the pandemic crisis, will the same be a case of a default, and will the credit rating agencies (CRAs) report the same as a default?
In response, SEBI, vide Circular dated March 30, 2020, addressed to the CRAs, has clarified as follows:
- If the delay in payment of interest/ principal has arisen solely due to the lockdown conditions creating temporary operational challenges in servicing debt, including due to procedural delays in approval of moratorium on loans by the lending institutions, CRAs may not consider the same as a default event and/or recognize default.
- The above shall also be applicable on any rescheduling in payment of debt obligation done by the issuer, prior to the due date, with the approval of the investors/ lenders.
- The above relaxation is extended till the period of moratorium by RBI.
The above circular is, though, addressed to the CRAs, the intent of the regulator is quite clear. If a restructuring of debt obligations happens due to the disruption caused by the pandemic, it is not a case of default.
“Default” is a credit event, mostly analogously referred to as “failure to pay”. A “failure to pay” is a credit event under ISDA Master Agreement, globally followed as the standard for derivatives documentation. Even under ISDA master agreement, there is an exception in case of a force majeure event. It is being contended, and with lot of force according to the author, that the widespread disruption in activity due to the COVID 19 constitutes a force majeure event. If the same is taken as a “default’ leading to serious implications for the issuer, it will be exacerbating the problem of the present disruption. Therefore, a clarification from the regulators that any failure to pay under the present circumstances, solely connected with the disruption, is not itself a credit event.
On a reading of the definition of default under Guidelines for CRAs issued by SEBI it can be derived that “Debt obligations” refers to an obligation to repay a debt on the scheduled repayment date, failing which, the same will be treated as default. If the payment is not required to be made as per contractual terms between the borrower and lender in the first place, then the same is not a debt obligation.
It may therefore be implied as follows:
- Debentures/ Bonds – In case delay in payment of interest/ principal components of debentures by borrowers, is solely due to the lockdown conditions which create temporary operational challenges in servicing debt, the same may not be considered as a default event;
- Commercial Paper – The above is implied even in case of commercial paper;
- Pass through certificates – any rescheduling in payment obligation, if the waterfall clause is modified to reflect the reschedulement of the underlying cashflows, done by the issuer, prior to the due date, with the approval of investors/lenders shall not be treated as a default in PTCs, during the period of moratorium.
 See an article by Richa Saraf on this issue here: http://vinodkothari.com/2020/03/covid-19-and-the-shut-down-the-impact-of-force-majeure/
Vinod Kothari & Company
– Priya Udita
Observing that a lot of statutory auditors of the companies are abruptly resigning before completing their tenure either due to lack of cooperation or lack of information provided by the company, SEBI has taken the matter in its hand to strengthen the norms. Consequently, SEBI issued a Consultation Paper on policy proposals with respect to resignation of statutory auditors from listed entities (‘Paper’) dated July 18, 2019. The Paper discussed the policy proposal with the twin objective of strengthening disclosures to the investors and clarifying the role of the Audit Committee. Our analysis of the Paper can be assessed here.
Based on the policy proposal and public comments, SEBI issued circular on Resignation of statutory auditors from listed entities and their material subsidiaries (‘Circular’) dated October 18, 2019 defining compliance to be followed by the listed entity and its material subsidiary while appointing or reappointing the auditors.
The Circular is applicable on listed entities and its material subsidiaries. The material subsidiaries can be a listed or an unlisted entity. However, it is interesting to comprehend the applicability of the Circular on the debt listed companies (analysed below in our comment section).
Further, the Circular has come into force with immediate effect from the date of its notification.
The provisions of this Circular is inapplicable in case the auditor disqualified under section 141 of the Companies Act, 2013.
- Compliance for limited review or audit review while appointing or reappointing the auditors:
- Within 45 days from the end of quarter of a financial year- the auditor shall issue the limited review/ audit report for such quarter before resignation.
For Example: if the auditor resigns on May 28, 2019 then the auditor is required to submit limited review of quarter ending on June 30, 2019.
- Resignation after 45 days from the end of a quarter of a financial year- then the auditor shall issue the limited review/ audit report for such quarter as well as the next quarter before resignation.
For Example: if the auditor resigns on August 25, 2019, then the auditor needs to issue limited review/audit report of quarter ending on September 30, 2019 as well as December 30, 2019.
- However, if the auditor has signed the limited review/ audit report for the first 3 quarters of a financial year- then the auditor shall issue the limited review/ audit report for the last quarter of such financial year as well as the audit report for such financial year before the resignation.
- Role of Audit Committee
Though the SEBI (Listing and Disclosure Obligations) Regulation, 2015 (‘SEBI LODR Regulations’) laid down the broad role of the audit committee inter alia the appointment, remuneration of the statutory auditors, but, there was not much for the audit committee to delve once the auditor resigns. Thus, with the intention to further enhance the role of audit committee, SEBI has laid down following procedures:
- For the auditors:
- In case of conflict with the management of the listed entity due to lack of cooperation or non-availability of information, the auditor can approach the chairman of the audit committee of the listed entity.
- Where the auditor proposes to resign, all concerns with respect to the proposed resignation, along with relevant documents should be given to the audit committee.
- Further where the proposed resignation is due to non-receipt of information/explanation from the company, the auditor will have to inform the audit committee of the details of information asked and not provided by the management.
- For the Audit Committee:
- In case of concern raised due to non-availability of information, audit committee must receive such concern directly and immediately without specifically waiting for the quarterly audit committee meetings.
- On receipt of information from the auditor relating to the proposal to resign, the audit committee/board of directors must deliberate on the matter as soon as possible but not later than the date of the next audit committee meeting and communicate its views to the management and the auditor.
- Disclaimer by the auditor:
Where the auditor does not receive the information demanded for the purpose of auditing, an appropriate disclaimer in the audit report must be provided in accordance with the Standards of Auditing as specified by ICAI/NFRA.
- Obligations of the listed entity/material subsidiary
- The listed entity/its material subsidiary are required to ensure that the new compliance is included in the terms of appointment at the time of appointment or reappointment of the auditors. In case of existing auditors, the appointment letter is needed to be modified to give such effect.
- The listed entity/its material subsidiary need to obtain the information about the auditor’s resignation in a format as specified in the Circular. Further, the listed entity has the obligation to ensure disclosure of the same under Sub-clause (7A) of Clause A in Part A of Schedule III under Regulation 30(2) of SEBI LODR Regulations.
- The listed entity/material subsidiary will provide all the relevant document or information as required by the auditor during the period from its proposal to resign and submission of the limited review/audit report.
- The listed entity will disclose the views of the audit committee to the stock exchange as soon as possible and not later than later than twenty four hours after the date of such audit committee meeting.
Firstly, we need to understand the current regulatory provisions governing the resignation of the auditors and the need felt by SEBI to issue this Circular.
Section 140(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 along with the Companies (Audit and Auditors) Rules, 2014 mandates the auditor to file a statement in a prescribed form to the company and to the Registrar citing reasons for resignation, within 30 days from the date of resignation. In addition to that, sub-clause (7A) of Clause A in Part A of Schedule III under Regulation 30(2) of the SEBI (LODR) Regulations prescribes that the listed entity shall disclose detailed reasons of the resignation to the stock exchange within 24 hours of such resignation. ICAI’s auditing standards (SA-705) enumerates that in a situation where the possible effects on the financial statements of undetected misstatements are both material and pervasive such that a qualification of the opinion would be inadequate to communicate the gravity of the situation, the auditor can resign. According to the Rule 5 of National Financial Reporting Authority Rules, 2018 (‘NFRA Rules’), every auditor of the entities covered by these rules are required to file an annual return in form NFRA 2 with the authority giving details with respect to the audit as well as resignations given in the past 3 years.
Though the law provided these rules and regulation, the rising trend on abrupt resignations by the auditor citing reason as ‘pre-occupation’ were leaving the investors vulnerable to various threats. Due to resignation of the large audit firms, SEBI was forced to review its listing and disclosure obligations. In order to enhance accountability of auditors and protect the investors from the insecure environment due to abrupt resignation, SEBI felt the dire need to regulate such resignations and took the step in a right direction by issuing this Circular.
The Circular was much needed as the rules governing the resignation of auditors across different forums were inadequate. The Circular, in addition to regulation of abrupt resignation, will give a helping hand to the auditors especially in case of lack of cooperation by the management, if any, faced by them. This will ultimately benefit SEBI to look into the matter for potential fraudulent or vulnerable transactions. Further the enhancing role of the audit committee is commendable.
However, the Circular has few gaps such as the applicability of Circular on debt listed entities. Now, there can be various scenarios. Suppose the listed entity ‘A’ has a material subsidiary ‘B’. The Circular will be applicable where ‘B’ is unlisted but a material subsidiary of ‘A’. The question arises where ‘B’ is a debt listed entity only, whether the Circular will be applicable? In our view, the Circular will be applicable in the instant case since B is a material subsidiary.
Further, it is important to note that the intimation requirements under the Circular are two-fold and both are parallel to each other serving different intents. In the first part, the listed entity has to inform the stock exchange within 24 hours of the resignation as per Sub-clause (7A) of Clause A in Part A of Schedule III under Regulation 30(2) of SEBI LODR Regulations, whereas in the second part the audit committee is required to inform the stock exchange as soon as possible from the date of resignation but not later than date of next audit meeting. The intimation under the second part will carry the views of the audit committee on the concerns raised by the auditor before resignation whereas the intimation under Regulation 30 is an intimation of a material event. We shall be coming out with our set of FAQs on the Circular discussing the same at length from various perspectives.
By Falak Dutta (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Ruling of Bombay High Court
The Bombay High Court on March 27, 2019, in the case of Edelweiss Financial Services v. Percept Finserve Pvt. Ltd., ruled out an award passed by a sole arbitrator with respect to a share purchase agreement (SPA). The High Court allowed enforcing of a put option clause to be exercised by Edelweiss, the appellant, to sell back the shares it had acquired from Percept Group, the respondent.
Before delving into the proceedings of the aforesaid case, it is important to understand certain basic concepts, to appreciate the ‘option clause’ in the case. An option is a derivative contract which gives the holder the right but not the obligation to buy (call) or sell (put) the underlying within a stipulated time in exchange for a premium. Options are not just traded on exchanges but are also used in debt instruments (eg. callable and puttable bonds), private equity and venture capital investment covenants. Even insurance is a type of option contract where the insured pays monthly premium in exchange of a monetary claim upon the future occurrence of a contingent event (accident, disease, damage to property etc.).
Facts of the case
Edelweiss Financial Services Pvt. Ltd. entered into a share purchase agreement (SPA) dated 8, December, 2007 with the Percept Group where it invested in the shares of Percept Group subject to a condition that the latter shall restructure itself as agreed between the parties followed by an IPO. Under the terms of the SPA, the appellant (Edelweiss) purchased 228,374 shares for a consideration of Rs. 20 crores. One of the conditions in the agreement, required Percept to entirely restructure by 31st December, 2007 and to provide proof of such restructuring. Upon failure of compliance by the respondent, the date was further extended to 30 June, 2008 with obligation to provide documentary evidence of completion by 15th, July 2008. Upon non-fulfillment within the extended date, Edelweiss had the option to re-sell the shares to Percept, where Percept was obligated to purchase the shares at a price which gave the appellant an internal rate of return of 10% on the original purchase price.
As was the case, Percept failed to restructure itself within the stipulated time. Subsequently in view of this breach Edelweiss exercised the put option and Percept was required to buy back the shares for a total consideration of Rs. 22 crores. Since the respondent refused to comply the appellant invoked the arbitration clause in the SPA and a sole arbitrator was appointed to adjudicate the dispute. The arbitrator submitted that despite Percept being in breach of the conditions in the SPA, the petitioner’s claim to exercise the put option was illegal and unenforceable, being in conflict with the Securities Contracts regulation Act (SCRA), 1956. The unenforceability was proposed on two grounds. First, for the clause being a forward contract prohibited under Section 16 of SCRA read with SEBI March 2000 notification, which recognizes only spot delivery transactions to be valid. Secondly these clauses were illegal because they contained an option concerning a future purchase of shares and were thus a derivatives contract not traded on a recognized stock exchange and thus were illegal under Section 18 of SCRA, which deals with derivative trading.
Aggrieved by the arbitrator’s order, Edelweiss challenged it before the Bombay High Court under section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.
The Bombay High Court observed the reasoning of the order by the arbitrator and the contentions made by Percept. The said order confirmed the breach caused by Percept, but found the particular clauses of put option in the SPA to be illegal under two grounds as mentioned earlier. The Court divided the judgement along the sections involved.
The first of the arbitrator’s conclusion was found untenable when referred to the judgement in the case of MCX Stock Exchange Ltd. vs. SEBI which deals with such a purchase option as in the present case. The Court observed that the put option clause contained in the SPA cannot be a derivatives contract prohibited by SCRA, because there was no present obligation at all and the obligation arose by reason of a contingency occurring in the future. The contract only came into being upon the following two conditions being met: (i) failure of the condition attributable to Percept (ii) exercise of the option by Edelweiss upon such failure. Whereas a forward contract is an unconditional obligation, the option in the SPA only comes into being when the aforesaid conditions are met. Thus, the arbitrator’s claim of the clause being a forward contract disregards the law stated by the Court in MCX Stock (supra).
Subsequently, respondent (Percept Group) challenged the relevance of the MCX Stock case to the present one. In the MCX Stock Exchange case, upon the exercise of the option the contract would be fulfilled by means of a spot delivery, that is, by immediate settlement. Whereas Edelweiss’s letter by which it exercised the put option required the shares to be re-purchased with immediate effect or before 12 Jan, 2009. This deferral of repurchase upon exercise of the option was not part of the MCX Stock Exchange case’s option clause and hence is not comparable to the present case.
This too was disregarded by the Court on the ground:
“It is submitted that in as much as this exercise of options demands repurchase on or before a future date, it is not a contract excepted by the circular of the SEBI dated 1 March, 2000.
Just because the original vendor of securities is given an option to complete repurchase of securities by a particular date it cannot be said that the contract for repurchase is on any basis other than spot delivery.
There is nothing to suggest that there is any time lag between payment of price and delivery of shares.”
Now, this brings us to the second leg of the arbitrator’s award regarding the illegality and unenforceability of the SPA option on account of breach of Section 18A of SCRA, which deals in derivative trading. The following is an excerpt from Section 18A:
Contracts in derivative. — Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, contracts in derivative shall be legal and valid if such contracts are—
(a)Traded on a recognized stock exchange;
(b) Settled on the clearing house of the recognized stock exchange. In accordance with the rules and bye-laws of such stock exchange.
The respondent appeals that as the put option was not of a recognized stock exchange, it stands unenforceable and illegal. In response, the court submitted that the contract does contain a put option in securities which the holder may or may not exercise. But the real question is whether such option or its exercise is illegal? The presence of the option does not make it bad or impermissible.
“What the law prohibits is not entering into a call or put option per se; what it prohibits is trading or dealing in such option treating it as a security. Only when it is traded or dealt with, it attracts the embargo of law as a derivative, that is to say, a security derived from an underlying debt or equity instrument.”
There was further cross objections filed by the respondent but it was ruled out under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, which deals with the application for setting aside arbitral award. Since the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 are not applicable to the proceedings under Section 34 and the section itself does not make any provision for filing of cross objections, the appeal was ruled out.
This Bombay High Court ruling in favor of Edelweiss provides an important distinction of options, from forward contracts. It highlighted that although both options and forwards are commonly categorized as derivatives, they share an important difference. On one hand, a forward contract contains a contractual obligation to buy or sell, on the other hand, the option gives the holder the right or choice but not the obligation to do the same. Options have always been integral to finance, routinely appearing in corporate covenants and contracts. Options are widely observed in mezzanine financing, private equity, start-up and venture funding among others. Given the Court’s distinction of forwards from options in their very essence and nature, the author believes this ruling is likely to be useful and a point of reference in future derivative litigations.
By Falak Dutta, (email@example.com)
Since the Sarada scam in 2015, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) had been on high alert and had been subsequently tightening regulations for NBFCs, micro-finance firms and such other companies which provide informal banking services. As of December 2015, over 56 NBFC licenses were cancelled. However, recently in light of the uncertain credit environment (recall DHFL and IF&LS) among other reasons, RBI has cancelled around 400 licenses in 2018 primarily due to a shortfall in Net Owned Funds (NOF) among other reasons. The joint entry of the Central Govt. regulators and RBI to calm the volatility in the markets on September 21st, 2018 after an intra-day fall of over 1000 points amid default concerns of DHFL warrants concern. Had it been two isolated incidents the regulators and Union government would have been unlikely to step in. The RBI & SEBI issued a joint statement on September saying they were prepared to step in if market volatility warrants such a situation. This suggests a situation which is more than what meets the eye.
Coming back to NBFCs, over half of the cancelled NBFC licenses in 2018 could be attributed to shortfall in NOFs. NOF is described in Section 45 IA of the RBI Act, 1934. It defines NOF as:
1) “Net owned fund” means–
(a) The aggregate of the paid-up equity capital and free reserves as disclosed in the latest
Balance sheet of the company after deducting therefrom–
(i) Accumulated balance of loss;
(ii) Deferred revenue expenditure; and
(iii) Other intangible assets; and
(b) Further reduced by the amounts representing–
(1) Investments of such company in shares of–
(i) Its subsidiaries;
(ii) Companies in the same group;
(iii) All other non-banking financial companies; and
(2) The book value of debentures, bonds, outstanding loans and advances
(including hire-purchase and lease finance) made to, and deposits with,–
(i) Subsidiaries of such company; and
(ii) Companies in the same group, to the extent such amount exceeds ten per cent of (a) above.
At present, the threshold amount that has to be maintained is stipulated at 2 crore, from the previous minimum of 25 lakhs. Previously, to meet this requirement of Rs. 25 lakh a time period of three years was given. During this tenure, NBFCs were allowed to carry on business irrespective of them not meeting business conditions. Moreover, this period could be extended by a further 3 years, which should not exceed 6 years in aggregate. However, this can only be done after stating the reason in writing and this extension is in complete discretion of the RBI. The failure to maintain this threshold amount within the stipulated time had led to this spurge of license cancellations in 2018.
However, the Madras High Court judgement dated 29-1-2019 came as a big relief to over 2000 NBFCs whose license had been cancelled due a delay in fulfilling the shortfall.
On 27-3-2015 the RBI by notification No. DNBR.007/CGM(CDS)-2015 specified two hundred lakhs rupees as the NOF required for an NBFC to commence or carry on the business. It further stated that an NBFC holding a CoR and having less than two hundred lakh rupees may continue to carry on the business, if such a company achieves the NOF of one hundred lakh rupees before 1-04-2016 and two hundred lakhs of rupees before 1-04-2017.
The Petitioner’s claim
The petition was filed by 4 NBFCs namely Nahar Finance & Leasing Ltd., Lodha Finance India Ltd., Valluvar Development Finance Pvt. Ltd. and Senthil Finance Pvt. Ltd. for the cancellation of CoR against the RBI. The petitioners claim that they had been complying with all the statutory regulations and regularly filing various returns and furnishing the required information to the Registrar of Companies. These petitions were in response to the RBI issued Show Cause Notices to the petitioners proposing to cancel the CoR and initiate penal action. The said SCNs were responded to by the petitioners contending that they had NOF of Rs.104.50 lakhs, Rs.34.19 lakhs, Rs.79.50 lakhs and Rs.135 lakhs respectively, as on 31.03.2017.
Valluvar Development Finance also sent a reply stating that they had achieved the required NOF on 23-10-2017, attaching a certificate from the Statutory Auditor to support its claim. The other petitioners however submitted that due to significant change in the economy including the policies of the Govt. of India during the fiscal years 2016-17 and 2017-18 like de-monetization and implementation of Goods & Services Tax, the entire working of the finance sector was impaired and as such sought extension of time till 31-03-2019 to comply with the requirements.
Now despite seeking extension of time, having given explanations to the SCNs, the CoRs were cancelled without an opportunity for the NBFCs to be heard.
It was argued that there is a remedy provided against the cancellation of the CoRs, the petitioners had chosen to invoke Article 226 contending violation of the principles of justice. The proviso to Section 45-IA(6) relates to the contentions in regards to cancellation of the CoRs.
“45-IA. Requirement of registration and net owned fund –
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a non-banking financial company in existence on the commencement of the Reserve Bank of India (Amendment) Act, 1997 and having a net owned fund of less than twenty five lakhs rupees may, for the purpose of enabling such company to fulfill the requirement of the net owned fund, continue to carry on the business of a non-banking financial institution–
(i) for a period of three years from such commencement; or
(ii) for such further period as the Bank may, after recording the reasons in writing for so doing, extend,
subject to the condition that such company shall, within three months of fulfilling the requirement of the net owned fund, inform the Bank about such fulfillment:
Provided further that before making any order of cancellation of certificate of registration, such company shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
(7) A company aggrieved by the order of rejection of application for registration or cancellation of certificate of registration may prefer an appeal, within a period of thirty days from the date on which such order of rejection or cancellation is communicated to it, to the Central Government and the decision of the Central Government where an appeal has been preferred to it, or of the Bank where no appeal has been preferred, shall be final:
Provided that before making any order of rejection of appeal, such company shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The decision was taken on two grounds. First, the statute specifically provides for an opportunity of personal hearing besides calling for an explanation. The amended provision is very particular that opportunity of being personally heard is mandatory, as the very amendment relates to finance companies, which are already carrying on business also. Not affording this opportunity would cripple the business of the petitioners.
Second, the amended section provides NBFCs sufficient time to enhance their NOF by carrying on business and comply with the notifications. For the aforesaid reasons, the orders by the RBI requires interference. Resultantly, the respondents (RBI authorities) are directed to restore the CoR of the petitioners and also extend the time given to the petitioners.
This was a landmark hearing in the case of NBFCs as they had been under increasing pressure as of recent times. Many NBFCs can now apply for restoration of their licenses and might already have. The case doesn’t just stand the case for NOF conflicts but will also ring in the minds of regulators in the future, compelling greater caution and concern. The last statement of the judgement stands apt here. The brief sentence read,” Consequently connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.”
 Certificate of Registration