Introduction to Securitisation

  By TIM NICOLLE, Director of Risk Limited

[We are obliged to Tim Nocolle for permitting us to put his extensive work on our site. Tim Nicolle is the managing director of Risk Limited, a firm specialising in securitisation-related services. Below in this Article, you find a profile of Risk Limited. Tim Nicolle's web site address is http://www.riskltd.demon.co.uk/Tim can be reached at mailto:Tim.Nicolle@Demica.com ]

Contents

Click on a heading or simply page down to read the document in its natural order.

1. Introduction to Securitisation
2. Background
3. Securitisation Credit
4. Parties Involved
5. Rating Agencies
6. Structural Considerations
7. Administration Issues
8. System Issues
9. Preparation For A Securitisation
10. Summary
11. Introduction to Risk Limited

1. Introduction to Securitisation

This paper starts with a section explaining what securitisation is, and how it works.

It then goes onto discuss some of the issues associated with securitisation, in particular:

  • the number of counterparties who can become involved (section 3)
  • the need to negotiate a path through the rating agencies (section 4)
  • the number of structural alternatives which originators may use (and the possible implications of each) (section 5)
  • the implementation of systems in order to run a securitisation (section 6);
  • failure to carry out the necessary preparations properly (section 7).

Several key points should be made:

  • Although the internal and external costs of a transaction are high, securitisation can raise significant amounts of funds. As a result, the costs are generally worth bearing (and when amortised, are not significant).
  • Securitisation appears to be complicated to the uninitiated. However, once the basic principles have been learned and an appropriate transaction structure designed, most clients wonder what the fuss was all about.
  • Transactions are generally easy to administer (and to repeat), provided they have been correctly structured. Most of the work from an originator's perspective is involved in: (i) setting up systems and procedures before transactions are launched, (ii) ensuring the legal and tax neutrality of the transaction and (iii) assisting in the delivery of a transaction which meets the originators commercial objectives.

Selecting the advisers with the skills to design, negotiate and support the transaction from a number of different perspectives is therefore critical. Securitisations involve many different facets of an originator's activities: credit, tax, legal, systems, ratings, banking relationships, project management, accounting and so on. Ensuring that each area understands its role in the delivery of the whole is the key to a successful transaction.

At the back of this paper is a review of Risk Limited's activities in the markets, and an explanation of Risk Limited's role in transaction structuring and execution.

2. Background

2.1 DEFINITION

Securitisation is a method of funding receivables of whatever kind (mortgage debts, leases, loans, credit card balances etc…). It involves producing bearer asset-backed securities which can be freely traded (and which are normally rated) secured on a portfolio of receivables. Not all receivables can be securitised, and not all originators are capable of meeting the requirements of the rating agencies.

The basic technique requires the rights to the receivables to be transferred to a special purpose company (referred to as the "Issuer") which then purchases or arranges credit enhancement, and then issues rated debt (normally floating rate eurobonds).

2.2 SECURITISATION: OVERVIEW

There are a number of varieties of "securitisation" and a number of different structures. However, there is a common theme to all of these transactions which is illustrated in the following:

  1. Assets are originated by a company, and funded on that company's balance sheet. This company is normally referred to as the " Originator".
  2. Once a suitably large portfolio of assets has been originated, the assets are analysed as a portfolio, and then sold or assigned to a third party which is normally a special purpose vehicle company (an " SPV") formed for the specific purpose of funding the assets. The SPV is sometimes owned by a trust, or even, on occasions, by the Originator.
  3. Administration of the assets is then sub-contracted back to the Originator by the SPV.
  4. The SPV issues tradeable "securities" to fund the purchase of the assets. The performance of these securities is directly linked to the performance of the assets – and there is no recourse (other than in the event of breach of contract) back to the Originator.
  5. Investors purchase the securities, because they are satisfied (normally by relying upon a rating) that the securities will be paid in full and on time from the cash flows available in the asset pool. A considerable amount of time is spent considering the different likely performances of the asset pool, and the implications of defaults by borrowers on the corresponding performance of the securities. The proceeds upon the sale of the securities are used to pay the Originator.
  6. The SPV agrees to pay any surpluses which arise during its funding of the assets back to the Originator – which means that the Originator, for all practical purposes, retains its existing relationships with the borrowers and all of the economics of funding the assets (ie: the Originator continues to administer the portfolio, and continues to receive the economic benefits (profits) of owning the assets).
  7. As cash flows arise on the assets, these are used by the SPV to repay funds to the investors in the securities.

2.3 PURPOSE

Securitisation is one way in which a company might go about financing its assets. There are generally seven reasons why companies consider securitisation:

  • to improve their return on capital, since securitisation normally requires less capital to support it than traditional on-balance sheet funding;
  • to raise finance when other forms of finance are unavailable (in a recession banks are often unwilling to lend – and during a boom, banks often cannot keep up with the demand for funds);
  • to improve return on assets – securitisation can be a cheap source of funds, but the attractiveness of securitisation for this reason depends primarily on the costs associated with alternative funding sources;
  • to diversify the sources of funding which can be accessed, so that dependence upon banking or retail sources of funds is reduced;
  • to reduce credit exposure to particular assets (for instance, if a particular class of lending becomes large in relation to the balance sheet as a whole, then securitisation can remove some of the assets from the balance sheet);
  • to match-fund certain classes of asset – mortgage assets are technically 25 year assets, a proportion of which should be funded with long term finance; securitisation normally offers the ability to raise finance with a longer maturity than is available in other funding markets;
  • to achieve a regulatory advantage, since securitisation normally removes certain risks which can cause regulators some concern, there can be a beneficial result in terms of the availability of certain forms of finance (for example, in the UK building societies consider securitisation as a means of managing the restriction on their wholesale funding abilities).

Establishing the primary rationale for the securitisation activity, is a vital part of the preparation for a securitisation transaction, since it influences the sorts of administrative tasks which need to be developed as well as the transaction structures themselves.

2.4 TYPICAL ASSET CHARACTERISTICS

Assets which can be securitised easily have a number of characteristics:

  • Cash-flow

A principal part of the asset is the right to receive a cash flow from a debtor in certain amounts (or amounts defined by reference to a market or administered rate) on certain dates ie: the asset can be analysed as a series of cash flows.

  • Security
    If the security available to collateralise the cash flows is valuable, then this security can be realised by the SPV. For instance, for a mortgage loan, there is security over the property and other collateral, which will make a significant contribution towards recovering any losses which might otherwise arise. Consequently, if there is a default, an effective method of ensuring that the SPV can gain the benefit of the security will be required (otherwise securitisation will be an uneconomic way of arranging funding).

    • Distributed risk

Assets either have to have a distributed risk characteristic or be backed by a suitably-rated credit support. For instance: a single retail loan is relatively small in value in the context of the available supply of retail loans to a single transaction (normally in the region of 4,000 mortgage accounts or 100,000 personal loans or small leases); in this way, the performance of one single asset is not likely to distort the performance of the entire portfolio. Consequently, the entire portfolio can be considered as a single asset, with a predictable performance. Concentrations of risk do not have this characteristic. If individual assets were to have a significant value in relation to the whole (eg: suppose only 100 mortgages were to be securitised) then a different approach has to be taken, and these individual assets have to be analysed individually and specific enhancement arranged.

  • Homogeneity
    Assets have to be relatively homogeneous – this means that there are not wide variations in documentation, product type or origination methodology. Otherwise, it again becomes more difficult to consider the assets as a single portfolio.

    • No executory clauses

    The contracts to be securitised must work, even if the Originator goes bankrupt. Certain clauses are therefore difficult to include in a securitisable contract -eg: in a photocopier lease, the inclusion of a clause stating that the Originator will maintain the photocopier would make that lease difficult to securitise. These sorts of contract are normally referred to as "executory contracts".

  • Capacity
    It must be possible for the necessary transactions which are needed for the securitisation to take place in relation to the assets concerned – for instance, if the assets contain specific prohibitions against assignment, then they will not be securitisable in the traditional sense.

    • Independence from Originator

    The on-going performance of the assets must be independent of the existence of the Originator. This tends to be a wider restriction than the example given above about executory contracts. A number of technical matters can arise, for instance, if asset yields are quoted only by reference to the Originator (eg; as the Originator's rate), then this will cause a structural difficulty in the event of the Originator's insolvency (ie: what now is the rate that the assets yield?).

3. Securitisation credit

Understanding why securitisation works is fundamental to understanding the nature of the task which has to be completed by the Originator.

Securitisation works because rating agencies are prepared to assign ratings to the liabilities of the SPV. As described above, the performance of these liabilities is determined by the performance of the assets which the SPV owns – hence the securities are normally described as "pass-through" securities (as the cash flows and credit risks are passed through from the assets to the securities directly).

Consequently, the starting point for the credit analysis is an analysis of the assets.

CORPORATE CREDITS

Prior to the securitisation, the assets which are to be securitised form part of a corporate balance sheet. In simple terms, each company has a different "credit personality", which is a function of its own management style, the quality of the assets which make up the balance sheet and the types of liabilities which the company has. Taking these three items together establishes the credit standing of the company.

A normal company has very few restrictions upon its ability to do something rash – there are plenty of examples of companies which have prejudiced their own long-standing creditworthiness with an ill-judged acquisition or foray into an inappropriate market. Similarly, the mixture of assets which makes up a balance sheet may not be well understood (or fully analysed) by the market. There may be residual dependencies within the balance sheet which are not disclosed – as the amount of information about a company is often restricted to that required to be given by law. Finally, the balance sheet may be stable, but cash flow is critical – and there are often few restrictions on corporate liquidity management. A number of otherwise successful businesses have failed as a result of liquidity mismanagement.

SPV CREDIT ANALYSIS

There are a number of key criteria, which the SPV will adhere to, which are not attributes that apply to a normal company. Together these are referred to as the "SPC Criteria", (SPC is the same as SPV) which have been developed over the years by the rating agencies (SPC in rating terms is used to refer to a bankruptcy-remote special purpose company). Principally they relate to a series of activities and conditions which a securitisation company has to meet before a rating can be given to any liabilities issued by it. These include:

  • prevention of trading outside funding the assets and servicing the securities – so that the SPV cannot endanger the transaction by introducing new and different risk factors;
  • sub-contracting all services required to maintain the SPV and its assets – eg: administering its receivables, company secretarial work;
  • SPVs are not permitted to have any employees or (normally) to have general fiduciary responsibilities to third parties (eg: acting as a trustee);
  • any person who contracts with the SPV is required to agree not to sue the SPV in the event that the SPV fails to perform under the contract (unless that person is "senior" ranking and effectively rated);
  • all of the SPV's liabilities (present and future) should be quantifiable, and shown to be capable of being met out of the resources available to it, including corporation tax, advance corporation tax and any value added tax;
  • the extent to which the SPV is reliant on third parties to meet its obligations should be minimised (and in some circumstances limited to a reliance on either AAA-rated or on other bankruptcy remote companies only);
  • funds which are due to the SPV have to be separated and ring-fenced as soon as they are received (to the extent that this is possible).

In this way, assets which formed a part of a corporate balance sheet (supporting perhaps an overall credit at a low level) can be extracted, ring-fenced and put into a controlled environment, such that they are capable of supporting a AAA/Aaa rated transaction (the top ratings available from Standard & Poors and from Moodys).

Since the SPV cannot have any employees, the administration of the SPV's assets has to be wholly subcontracted. One of the principal documents which regulates the SPV is therefore the Administration Agreement. This is a contract, normally between the SPV and the Originator (who acts also in an administrative capacity), which describes all of the different tasks which are necessary to permit the SPV to conduct its business. These range from

  • the collection of cash each day;
  • operating bank accounts;
  • enforcing agreements with the underlying debtors (eg: collecting on security and chasing borrowers who are in arrears);
  • company secretarial matters (managing licences, producing statutory returns);
  • accounting;
  • taxation (in the UK this normally extends to Corporation Tax, Advance Corporation Tax, VAT, MIRAS, withholding taxes, and Stamp Duty);
  • reporting – to investors, rating agencies and trustees;
  • pool management (dealing with requests for additional funds, changes to the asset contracts etc..);
  • management of related insurance (MIG, buildings insurance, payment protection and so on).

One of the reasons why the securitisation process is so difficult is the requirement to track through all of the ways in which the Originator conducts its business. This flows from the desire to understand all of the risk factors which can affect the SPV, and is also simply a result of the need to document that administrative process.

4. Parties involved

Securitisation normally involves a wide variety of counterparties and advisers. On one particularly complex transaction a few years ago there were 6 law firms, 3 firms of accountants, 1 insurance broker, 1 investment bank, 1 consultant and 12 principals (banks, originators, administrators, credit enhancers, underwriters and so on).

A transaction normally involves the following parties:

  • Originator and Administrator
  • Lead Underwriter ­ who purchases the debt issued by the SPV (and sells it to eurobond investors)
  • Structuring Team ­ either involving personnel from the lead underwriter and/or other advisers
  • Two sets of lawyers, at least one of whom is a securitisation specialist
  • Trustee and Trustee's lawyers ­ representing the interests of the noteholders in the event that there is (a) an enforcement event (things go wrong) or (b) any requirement to change or amend the documents or procedures after the transaction completes;
  • Rating Agencies ­ required to undertake an analysis of the risks associated with the transaction and to award a credit rating to the debt issued
  • Originator's accountants ­ to agree accounting treatment for the transaction, to verify the analysis and existence of the assets involved and to confirm work undertaken to show solvency
  • Credit Enhancement Providers and their lawyers ­ transactions often involve a third party fronting some of the risks associated with the assets
  • Standby Servicer and their lawyers ­ a third party prepared to administer the assets in the event that the existing servicer fails or is incompetent; this is now becoming a requirement for all transactions where the administrator does not already have at least an A1/P1 short term rating
  • Clearing Bank and its lawyers ­ running the originator's and the Issuer's bank accounts, all of which normally require new mandates and a Bank Agreement is also set up to regulate the operation of all aspects of the accounts
  • Banking Facility Providers and their lawyers ­ often there are requirements for additional banking facilities, eg: liquidity facilities or guaranteed deposit arrangements ("GICs")
  • Hedging Providers and their lawyers ­ assets often need some form of hedging, either using swaps, caps or both
  • Paying Agents, Agent Banks, Common Depositary etc.. a whole host of organisations with mysterious Euromarket responsibilities
  • Printer ­ to produce the prospectus (choosing the wrong printers can cause the transaction to fail)

5. Rating agencies

There are four rating agencies who comment on asset­backed transactions in the UK:­ Standard & Poors ("S & P"), Moodys, Fitch and Duff & Phelps ("D & P"). This note focusses on the approaches of S & P and Moodys. The other two agencies have their own distinctive styles but their analytical approach tends to be based upon those of S & P and Moodys.

5.1 CONCEPTS

A rating normally covers the FULL and TIMELY payment of interest and principal on the rated notes. The "full" part means that investors get all of their money back; the "timely" part means that the money is paid on time. These two elements equate to credit risk and liquidity risk.

S & P

S & P have a more formal approach than Moodys, and there is a greater certainty of result (since the rules are more explicit and therefore easier to abide by).

S & P favour a weak­link approach ­ the strength of the structure is as good as it's weakest link. If a AAA rating is required, then all of the elements of the structure should be AAA. However, as with all rules, the first thing that has to be learned is when it does not apply. With some fancy footwork, it is possible to engineer a AAA rating from only A1+ rated facilities and assets. Additionally, some elements can be poorly rated (or unrated) ­ for instance the administrator does not have to have a formal credit rating.

The perverse result of these rules means that (i) if an entity performing a role is not rated (and a rating is required for that part of the structure) then that entity cannot be used ­ so if your favourite bank is rated Aaa by Moodys and does not have an S & P rating, too bad, or (ii) worse is if such entity is on credit­watch ie: it has a rating but that rating is currently being questioned ­ then again, no reliance can be put on it.

Another interesting result is that, because all of the elements are rated to a sufficiently high level, S & P is not normally interested in the position AFTER an event of default ­ such an event is assumed not to happen. One client of mine has managed to push this rule to its ultimate extreme ­ on their transactions an event of default only occurs if you had the money but did not pay it (eg: you forgot) ­ mere failure to pay because you did not have the money is not an event of default.

MOODYS

Moodys take an opposite position in many respects. A rating is derived from an assessment of the cumulative strengths of a structure: the "building block approach". An additional feature of a Moodys rating is that the analysis is supposed to be based upon an assessment of bond values: that is that the value returned to the Noteholders is quantified in a variety of different stress environments ­ Moodys will tend to look at the position in the transaction after default as well as before it.

Perversely, just as S & P do not require a rated administrator, Moodys do require a rated administrator, or a rated standby administrator.

A consequence of this "noteholder value" approach, is that it is much harder to deal with Moodys with any certainty. With S & P it is possible to determine the relative strengths and weaknesses of a transaction, and to assess the likely rating (almost without talking to them) ­ their rules are not written down, but are well known. With Moody's it is possible that they could re­assess the position at the last minute and change their mind, with potentially disastrous consequences for the transaction.

5.2 TYPICAL RATING CONCERNS

CREDIT RISK

Rating Agencies really only deal with credit risk as a commercial matter (ie: they will make an assessment of credit risk). All other risks have to be structured out, dealt with beyond doubt or shown to be sufficiently remote. Sufficiently remote normally means inconceivable. Any residual concerns which are not specifically analysable as credit risks will involve serious costs for the structure (eg: corporation tax and VAT risks).

SOLVENCY

Both rating agencies need to feel comfortable that the seller of the assets is solvent and is expected to remain solvent for a period of two years from the date of the transaction. Proving solvency to this standard is not a straightforward exercise. The legal definition of solvency is a 20 page paper, and the tests which are necessary to show that a company is solvent can be tortuous. A true solvency analysis will also take into account contingent assets and liabilities (including deferred tax) which are not normally shown on the face of a balance sheet, and will require a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the balance sheet and projected cash flows.

TAX RISKS

The rating agencies require tax, accounting and actual cash surpluses to be in step (or to the extent out of step, so that it does not matter) throughout the transaction and in a variety of tax, interest rate and credit environments.

Corporation tax

Since the Inland Revenue does not give advance rulings on the likely tax treatment of different structures, the rating agencies normally require the structures to be analysed across all potential tax treatments.

On the Anglo transaction, for instance, it was determined that there were 9 different potential tax treatments for the transaction. Each had to be analysed, and the 3 principal tax treatments had to be modelled in detail.

VAT

The key issue is ensuring that the Issuer does not become responsible for the VAT liabilities of the rest of the originating group (eg: by being grouped for VAT purposes), and that there is the potential to recover VAT bad debt relief. There are more subsidiary issues relating to VAT on fees.

Unfortunately, VAT on the initial costs of the transaction is not normally recoverable, since the issue of the notes constitutes an exempt supply. This is a tangible additional expense, and advice needs to be taken before the transaction starts to minimise this cost. There are mechanisms which can be used to avoid this particular problem.

Stamp duty

If stamp­able transfers are involved, then it would be normal for the transfers to be completed off­shore. However, the rating agencies normally consider that the assets could be repatriated (if the trustee was required to enforce the security) and therefore provision has to be made to pay any stamp duty which COULD then become payable. If more than one transfer has been made, then double, or even triple stamp duty provision can be needed. This is a real capital cost to the transaction, but careful management and structuring can enable the capital so required to be used efficiently.

SPECIFIC LEGAL RISKS

This is an area which the lawyers specialising in securitisation will be able to advise on more fully. These are normally dealt with by either investigation or by the production of an opinion. However, a thumb­nail sketch follows:

Title

Nothing must be capable of upsetting the title to the assets which the Issuer is acquiring. Dealing with these concerns is often not straightforward. No charges (actual or implied) must be capable of operating so as to restrict the originator's ability to sell the assets, in particular in existing banking facilities. This means a thorough review of any likely source of implied right to the assets is required.

Consequently, if the assets have passed through a number of hands prior to the securitisation, then each transfer has to be considered. Portfolios purchased from other companies raise particular problems.

The question as to the solvency or insolvency of any company involved at any stage with the receivables has to be addressed.

Contractual

All of the agreements must be binding upon all of the parties. The Issuer must be properly constituted etc….

Statutory

CCA regulated agreements in particular cause problems of their own. A full CCA review of the documents is normal practice.

Similarly, product liability issues need to be analysed out or shown to be de minimis.

SPECIAL RISKS

Each structure has to address different problems. Sometimes the answer to these problems is empirical (ie: the risk is included in the analysis of the transaction and quantified). However, some points can only be dealt with by legal analysis and an opinion. The extent to which the law firm involved is prepared (on occasions) to be slightly "sporting" can be critical.

Set off and related risks

Set off can occur in a variety of ways ­ for instance: lessees could have deposited money with an originator of the assets (who then becomes insolvent), or lessees could have paid for maintenance of equipment (which is then not carried out). Even if there is no legal justification for the set off (ie: the lessor is wrong), it may still have to be taken into account in the structure.

Similar risks relate to the position of the Issuer in the event that there is a liquidation of the administrator. A critical aspect of the structure will be the consideration of the liquidator's rights in this circumstance ­ can the collection of the Issuer's receivables (and their payment to the Issuer) be interrupted or stopped?

Executory contracts

Contracts which impose obligations upon the lessor are not generally securitisable. An example of an obligation would be procuring that maintenance is carried out, or agreeing to collect funds on behalf of a third party. The concern arises from a view that, were these obligations to be carried out poorly, then the lessor would be in default, which could then permit the lessee to avoid his obligations. A lessee may also have the right to reject the replacement of the lessor with a third party. Essentially the problem is that the contract becomes personal to the particular lessor and not generic.

However, there are certain techniques and credit enhancement structures which could be used in these circumstances.

Unsecured creditors

The rating agencies are also concerned to ensure that either the Inland Revenue or HM Customs do not become unsecured creditors to any part of the transaction structure ­ in other words, that there are known liabilities to either body which might not be met at any future point. This is considered to give an excuse to "go after" the Issuer or the structure as a whole to try to recover assets which have been sold to the Issuer and unravel the deal.

A detailed investigation of the deferred tax positions of the originator and any group companies is therefore required. Plans have to be made to show how any resulting liabilities are proposed to be paid, given certain assumptions about origination levels and credit losses.

Contractual failure

Even if a party has committed in contract to do XYZ, will they actually do it? On the Anglo transaction, officers of both the trustee and the clearing bank were required to confirm separately to Moodys that if their respective organisations agreed in contract to do something, then they would actually do it.

REQUIRED STEPS

Review / presentation

The rating agencies will wish to visit the originator/administrator to assess the quality of the management, the way that the company is set up and to review the administrative procedures.

Prior to the visit, it is normal practice to prepare a file on the company including financial information, procedures, company history, senior staff biographies and example contracts. Collating and preparing this information normally takes several weeks.

Asset analysis

This is the one risk which the rating agencies are prepared to take a commercial view on. This view is based upon an analysis of the asset pool proposed to be securitised, and a review of the historical performance of the originator's assets based upon certain assumptions. Generally the golden rules are:

  • present your data appropriately (detailed advice is required on this point, since the exact approach should be closely linked to the way that the transaction is to be structured), and
  • generate as much data as possible ­ irrelevant data can be discarded, but data which is missing is impossible to replace; rating agencies, in the absence of data, make conservative guesses (eg: 100% default rates, no recoveries etc..).

Once they have reviewed this information, the rating agencies will make an assessment of their worst case expectations as to the performance of the portfolio (normally absolutely dismal, of course). The structure then has to be designed to ensure that, should these losses appear, the rated debt is paid in full and on time.

Transaction analysis

This involves the production of detailed computer models of the transaction, which are then used to determine the way in which the structure will behave in different stress environments. Typical variables are: credit loss levels, delinquency levels, interest rates, corporation tax rates, VAT rates etc.. Each rating level normally has associated with it a certain combination of stress assumptions, becoming more stressful for higher ratings.

Models are used differently by the two rating agencies: S & P require that the model demonstrates that noteholders will receive all amounts due on time using the appropriate stress assumptions for that rating. The model normally has to be audited, and S & P require a copy of it which they review in detail.

Moody's will not normally rely on models produced by third parties, and would seek to write their own. However, lease transactions are too complex to permit them to take this approach. On the Anglo transaction, for instance, they used our model, but treated its results with some circumspection. Their view seemed to be not that the structure had to meet certain minimum levels of stress (as S & P) but that the structure should be set up to deal with a variety of combinations of assumption, and that in certain circumstances, these assumptions could show a default.

S & P's approach means that, once the structure and the model is agreed, it is possible to be reasonably certain as to the required levels of credit enhancement for each rating level. Moody's approach is less empirical, and this means that there can be no certainty that the credit enhancement levels are appropriate.

Legal and tax

It is now normal for the rating agencies to require detailed opinions on the transaction addressing both legal and tax risks. These opinions are extremely difficult documents for lawyers to write, since the levels of comfort required are higher than those which would be necessary from a commercial perspective. This is one of the expensive elements of a transaction.

For the ALPS transaction (aircraft leases), for instance, a separate legal opinion had to be procured for each jurisdiction in which an aircraft could land ­ result: 118 legal opinions. From a rating perspective, the intrinsic value of the aircraft was a key part of the credit analysis ­ and therefore the aircraft have to be demonstrated to be recoverable if there is a default on the lease.

On the Anglo transaction, the tax analysis was so complex that the only way that sufficient comfort could be given was to offer nine alternative tax treatments for the transaction. The relevant partner of Clifford Chance was fairly happy (at a commercial level) as to the likely tax treatment of the transaction ­ but at a rating level (100% certainty), he could only be certain that it would be one of the nine. This meant that the tax opinion ended up the wrong side of 80 pages.

5.3 SUMMARY

The rating process is complicated, but not too mysterious. Managing the rating process is a key element in the control of the transaction. Our advice is always that it is the originator who should control this process. As a result, the selection of the originator's advisers is a crucial element in ensuring a successful and controlled transaction – since it is through the assistance of these persons that the rating agency relationship is maintained. Several transactions which we have worked upon have changed radically as a result of the mismanagement of the rating process by third parties over whom the originator had no control.

6. Structural considerations

This is a brief over view of the sorts of decisions which face a potential issuer of an asset­backed security.

6.1 CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

There are four basic ways which can be used to uplift the credit quality of a portfolio of assets to a highly rated level; often these are used in combination:

i)

Subordination or over­collateralisation

splitting the Issuer liabilities into different classes: senior, mezzanine and junior (for instance), and arranging to pay them in that order, so that the senior liabilities are effectively protected by the existence of the subordinated liabilities

ii)

Insurance

insuring the credit performance of the assets (so that, from the Issuer's perspective, losses do not occur)

iii)

Financial Guarantee

arranging for the Issuer's obligations under the rated notes to be guaranteed (so that if the Issuer is unable to make a payment, then someone else will make it for him)

iv)

Letter of Credit

arranging for a bank facility which the SPV can draw down in the event that it suffers significant credit losses.

It has been our experience that senior­subordinated structures are the easiest to implement, (provided that the computer modelling work is done well), for the simple reason that the real risk takers in the transaction structure (the Mezzanine Noteholders) are not present at the negotiations.

6.2 COST OF FUNDS OR CAPITAL?

Securitisation structures can be designed to achieve different aims. A key structural issue is the extent to which the originator of the assets is prepared to sacrifice return on assets for taking less risk (and therefore putting up less capital).

The extreme position could be illustrated by examining some of the early mortgage­backed securities. By purchasing a pool policy from an insurer (a policy insuring the issuer against suffering credit losses) with a minimal deductible, it was possible to set the transaction up with virtually no capital commitment from the originator. The resulting gearing was normally in the region of 200:1. Clearly, the premium which had to be paid to purchase such a policy meant that the cost of funds associated with the transaction was higher than it might have been.

The alternative would be to retain all of the commercial risk associated with the assets by putting up a sizeable amount of capital. Since the credit enhancers are therefore taking less risk themselves, the cost of funds would be lower.

6.3 PROFIT EXTRACTION

There are about a dozen ways to extract profit from a securitisation: these include use of receivables trusts, dividends, super­interest on loans, parallel loans, swaps, and simple fees. The key issues are: corporation tax, ACT, VAT and the timing and accounting treatment of the payments.

This is never a simple matter – profit extraction has to be considered for both the payer and receiver of the cash flows. It is generally possible for a "profit stall" to arise (as a result of the combination of a cash based profit extraction mechanism and initial delinquencies), which can cause adverse consequences for originators. Inevitably there are compromises to be made.

6.4 ACCOUNTING

The key decisions relate to whether the transaction is to be on­balance sheet or to have a linked presentation, and how the investment (if any) in the Issuer is to be shown on the originator's balance sheet. This can become a critical area, particularly for banks and building societies, since the regulators normally follow the accounts in their treatment of the transaction, and for companies concerned about gearing.

The possible permutations of accounting treatments are governed by FRS5. A key problem with FRS5 is that it is aimed at reflecting the substance of transactions in Originator's balance sheets, rather than the form ­ and hence value judgements are inevitably involved. As a result, it is usual for the Originator's accountants to have to read certain transaction documents, and for their views as to the likely implications of FRS5 to be important.

A number of transactions have now been completed within the auspices of FRS5, most recently for Gracechurch Mortgage Finance No.2 (a securitisation of first mortgages by Barclays, referred to as GMF2). Already a number of aspects of FRS5 have had to be blurred ­ and parts of the GMF2 deal had to be reviewed directly with the ASB.

6.5 RISK ALLOCATION

The Issuer will normally only assume the credit risk on the receivables. All other risks usually remain with the originator. The warranties given on the sale of the receivables to the Issuer are therefore normally rather more extensive than those given on a commercial transaction. For instance, warranties are given about legal risks (eg: relating to the CCA) and enforceability (that the contracts are enforceable in accordance with their terms). The originator therefore often needs to be prepared to concede what appears to be a variety of unreasonable and non­commercial points.

The exact allocation of risk between originator and Issuer is also a function of the type of credit enhancement chosen. If a senior­subordinated structure is used, then the amount of risk which remains with the originator is normally higher than if, for instance, a financial guarantee structure is used. If the originator is paying a premium to a third party specifically to assume risk in the transaction, it would be reasonable to expect the assumption of more than mere credit risk by that party.

However, it should always be remembered that in commercial terms, the SPV is an extension of the originator – and so fighting risk allocation battles can often mean taking funds from one pocket and putting them in the other. Getting the balance right is the key – too little risk transfer, and the transaction will be on-balance sheet, too great and the transaction may not complete!

6.6 HEDGING

Whatever the characteristics of the assets, sufficient hedging has to be in place to permit the full and timely payment of the Issuer's rated obligations. With fixed rate leases and floating rate notes, for instance, a number of hedging structures are required to ensure that the Issuer is not exposed to interest rate movements.

Accurate and efficient hedging forms a critical part of the transaction economics. The Anglo transaction was a first, not only in terms of involving leased assets, but also in the hedging structure used, which was designed by Risk Limited. Previous transactions had used caps or strips of swaptions to achieve what is considered by the rating agencies to be a "perfect hedge". However, we were able to demonstrate that, for the Anglo transaction, no interest rate options of any kind were required, saving option premiums and reducing the capital needed in the transaction by several million pounds.

6.7 GROUP RELIEF AND CORPORATION TAX

Tying the Issuer back into the group tax affairs efficiently is a necessary part of the structuring process. Securitisation should be tax neutral.

TAX ADVANTAGES

The first issue is ensuring that the existence of the Issuer, and the contractual arrangements contemplated, do not involve either significant tax advantages or costs. Tax advantages are likely to give the Inland Revenue the excuse to challenge the structure, and these tend to give the rating agencies the opportunity to raise concerns about the structure as a whole.

This is principally an issue with leasing transactions. Two structures have broadly been used in public transactions: the DAF structure and the Anglo structure.

There is quite a contrast between the DAF structure and the Anglo structure as regards the tax effects. In DAF, the lease agreements were effectively re­characterised as simple receivables and the leased assets (the vehicles) became treated as stock (with no resulting capital allowances). The entire basis for the taxation of the leases was changed.

For Anglo, the overall amount of tax paid by the group should not change as a result of the transaction, since the securitised leases are still expected to be taxed as leases (with another part of the group claiming the tax allowances).

TAX STATUS OF THE ISSUER

As a result of the perverse application of some of the Inland Revenue's dicta, it is also conceivable that tax losses can get stuck in the Issuer ­ which could produce a real tax cost for the transaction. The key debate centres around whether the Issuer is a trading company or an investment company for tax purposes ­ or in the case of the Anglo transaction, which of the 9 potential tax treatments is most likely to arise.

Tax planning is a large part of the structuring process. The rating agencies will assume that the worst possible tax treatment of the Issuer will apply in their analysis.

HOSEPIPES

These are facilities which are designed to change the nature of the Issuer's receipts, so as to deal with a tax risk which the rating agencies perceive to be a real concern. This is very much a technical issue which does not require a full explanation in this forum. Avoiding the use of a hosepipe can be important, especially for a leasing transaction. No hosepipe was used in the Anglo transactions (since the structure was designed to work without one), and a more efficient version of the hosepipe was developed by Clifford Chance for the SABRE transaction. This is one area of transaction structure which can be expected to change over the next few years – and an area in which any originator contemplating a securitisation requires some detailed advice.

GROUP RELIEF

The rules governing the availability of group relief in a securitisation are complex, and, rather odd. In the Anglo transaction we persuaded the rating agencies to allow the Issuer to surrender losses (for minimal consideration) subject to certain conditions. However, the ability to integrate the Issuer into the tax affairs of the originating group may not always be so straightforward, and is a direct function of other aspects of the structure.

7. Administration Issues

Setting up the internal procedures to set up the transaction and then to run it is a time consuming process ­ and could be the subject of a detailed paper all of their own.

This is one of Risk Limited's real areas of expertise.

The big topics which need to be covered are:

i)

asset analysis and selection

identifying the appropriate assets, specifying and producing the necessary credit analyses

ii)

provisional list management

picking, analysing, auditing and selling the appropriate assets to the Issuer (start of transaction)

iii)

closing arrangements

cash and asset transfers on closing ­ designing fall­backs and ensuring efficient management of funding

iv)

asset identification: computer

flagging assets to indicate ownership, dealing with originator­issuer transfers and buy­backs

v)

asset identification: practical

ensuring that the securitised assets can be easily separated from other assets, dealing with storage issues and over­zealous trustees

vi)

procedures and documentation

amendments to procedures and documentation to include the transaction

vii)

cash management

the most difficult area: reorganising collection processes, separating Issuer cash from other cash, dealing with payments in advance, in arrears, partial payments, VAT, payment allocation (between parts of payments), unidentified funds, unmatched funds etc…

viii)

clearing arrangements

setting up new bank accounts, dealing with Issuer overdrafts, bank mandates, EFT

ix)

standby servicer

primarily a liaison exercise, normally some computer file transfers and links have to be designed and written

x)

reporting

internal reporting has to be carefully designed (operational control over the Issuer's cash flows is difficult to maintain) external reporting can be a problematic, but sensible co­ordination of reporting requirements with all parties and with the accounting requirements can make this an easier task

xi)

accounting for the SPV

can also be problematic ­ dealing with rule of 78 / accrual issues, asset identification, auditor education, special securitisation audit requirements, consolidation rules (if on­balance sheet), transaction tracking between Issuer and Originator (important for FRS5).

xii)

accounting within the originator

in order to support a linked presentation, it is often necessary to design two accounting structures within the originator's systems: one to operate on the existing accounting policies (including the rule of 78, if necessary) and one to operate on the SPV's. It is also necessary to ensure that the SPV's assets are effectively removed from the originator's accounts (without also disturbing existing reconciliation processes).

Securitisation will involve virtually every area of an organisation.

 


 

Risk Limited has a standard process which it uses to accelerate the process of implementing a securitisation capability, and there are many simple solutions to the above systems issues, some of which are highlighted in the next section.

8. Systems Issues

These are numerous and complex and largely depend upon the precise transaction structure contemplated, the nature of the assets and the nature of the Originator's business. A typical summary of systems and processes involved would be as follows:

Prior to completion of the transaction.

  • Analyse the assets prior to completion of the transaction, select provisional lists.
  • Manage the audit process (provision of information, reports, liaison with auditors).

Completion of the transaction.

  • Select the final list of assets, reflect the ownership change in the system, produce completion reports, post accounting entries. Repeat processes required for substitution.

Post completion of the transaction.

  • Store the ownership of the receivables showing clearly which receivables are securitised and which are not.
  • Set up a reconciliation process to manage the first few days of the transaction whilst cash payments are not being correctly directed (for instance, it takes 3 days for transmissions to BACS to be updated to reflect the change in ownership of the assets).
  • Separate cash receipts relating to securitised receivables from those which belong to the originator (for direct debits, possibly separating receivables at the point of transmission to BACS).
  • Split cash receipts into different types (principal, income and other amounts: VAT service charges and so on). Track payments received in advance of their due date, and allocate the same to outstanding payments at the appropriate time.
  • Store transactions between Originator and the SPV (date of sale, price paid, amount outstanding, accrued interest, arrears of income).
  • Deal with changes to any of the underlying receivables contracts (which may change a contract's value, outstandings or payment profiles). This can then result in a requirement to make incremental provisions, cash payments to the SPV or simply to reverse the change (some are likely not to be permitted under the terms of the Transaction documents).
  • Establish procedures to track any assets sold in breach of warranty, to calculate the repurchase price and to effect the repurchase.
  • Run the securitisation provisioning policy, which will normally be different to that of the Originator.
  • Ensure that the accounting requirements can be met. These typically require that the SPV's accounts can be produced using the SPV's accounting policies, and also that the consolidated or linked presentation accounts can also be produced using the Originator's accounting policies. Often there are different accounting bases used which means that adjustments are required (for instance, between the rule of 78 and constant yield accounting methods).
  • Update financial control processes so that they operate on a multi-company basis rather than on a single company basis, particularly in relation to bank reconciliations.
  • Set up a periodic (usually quarterly) reporting cycle to produce the required administrator's reports and to complete the calculations typically required in order to run the transaction (ie: manage the liabilities of the SPV). This involves systems time, the production of dedicated reports, and the attention of key personnel within the organisation.
  • Set up reconciliation systems to allow the amount of cash profit extraction from the securitisation to be reconciled to the amount of originator's own profit recognition policy (which will, in all likelihood, be a different amount).

8.1 DATABASE STRUCTURES

This section examines which aspects of the systems are likely to be relevant to a securitisation transaction.

Running a portfolio of receivables normally involves four basic systems which are referred to in this document as "customers", "collections", "asset management" and "accounting". Some of these functions may be embedded in one system, but the principles tend to remain the same nevertheless.

Outline systems view

This arrangement of the systems is typical but not universal. However, in order to write some general comments it is necessary to make some assumptions, and this note is based upon the above understanding as to how receivables processing systems usually work.

The interfaces between the systems are very important – and this is where most of the work is carried out relating to securitisation.

COLLECTIONS SYSTEMS

For originators without a branch network, the collection process is often not a separate system, but an interface to BACS together with an [automatic] payments reconciliation system.

For an originator with a large branch network (eg: a bank or building society) the collections system is often a significant and complex affair dealing with over-the-counter payments and relationships with the clearing system in general.

Collections can be split into those which are originator generated (eg: direct debits) from those which are customer originated (eg: standing orders or cheques).

Any investigation for securitisation purposes would also include determining the extent of the BACS authorities, the exact nature of the transmissions, the represent cycle and the relationship with the relevant clearer (ie: what happens with bounced direct debits).

RECEIVABLES ADMINISTRATION

These are systems which typically record the amount owed by each customer of the originator by reference to an "account". The system is usually single company, that is there is no concept that more than one person might own any of the receivables which are managed by it.

Most receivables systems store the amount owed by the customer, the amounts of any payment arrears, the date of the last payment, the date of the next payment, the remaining amounts due, the yield or rate applied to the account and so on. There are usually several deficiencies. In particular, that the system is unlikely to track principal and interest amounts separately (ie: to record the principal amount owing by the customer rather than the simply the total amount owing (which can include arrears of interest and other fees)).

ACCOUNTING

Usually the accounting systems are simply mechanisms for storing information generated by other systems. For instance, it usually the receivables administration system which calculates interests and posts it onto borrower's accounts. The aggregate amount of interest then debited is posted to the general ledger as one figure spanning the entire book. The general ledger system usually only stores summary level information about the receivables book (eg: total principal balance, total arrears and so on).

The general ledger is usually already multi-company – in that it is possible to set up more than one chart of accounts to receive postings from other systems.

CUSTOMERS

Relations with customers are often handled outside the receivables administration system, as customers can have more than one relationship with the originator.

Generally the customer relationship is not affected by securitisation, and so this system is not directly relevant. There are exceptions, for instance, if the originator is a bank, it may be inappropriate to encourage securitised accountholders to make deposits (since there are usually controls on the extent to which securitised borrowers are depositors with the originator). Another example would be a building society where a securitisation caused borrowers to lose membership rights (and so mailing borrowers with notices of AGMs would be inappropriate).

INTERFACES

The databases described above usually rely on a series of interfaces between them to run the administrative operation. Most of the work for securitisation is in the interfaces between the different systems, rather than changes to the systems or databases themselves.

There are three important interfaces: between the receivables system and the collections system, the receivables system and the general ledger and between the general ledger and the collections system.

One of the main financial controls will be in the general ledger, to compare information from the collection system with information from the receivables system. These controls (and the accompanying reconciliations) are usually single company. One of the principal tasks for the systems' administrators is to amend these processes to give effect to a multi-company posting and a multi-company reconciliation.

8.2 METHODOLOGY

Over the last few years, Risk Limited has advised a wide variety of originators on securitisations. These have spanned organisations with systems which are good (and not so good), a range of asset classes, and originators with different credit profiles.

The following methodology is typically adopted as the basis of the originator's approach to a securitisation transaction:

  1. Establish the rationale for the transaction within the originator.
  2. Consider the extent to which originator credit risk can be left in the transaction (and therefore the amount of low-level systems work which can be avoided). Generally, the poorer the originator's credit, the more work is required as:
    • cash has be to identified more quickly;
    • less reliance is allowed on representations and warranties so a fuller data analysis and audit has to be undertaken;
    • little or no credit risk is acceptable on the originator for payments received in advance and in relation to set off risks (eg: credit balances on deposit accounts or amounts which could arise with respect to the originator's other relationships with the customer); and
    • tight restrictions are placed upon permitted adjustments to contracts (which in some deals can be absorbed into the transaction structure).
  1. Determine the high-level requirements of the transaction (see further below). In particular, it is important to gauge the extent to which certain risks can be accommodated within a structure – for instance, conduit transactions (a particular financing technique) can usually accept a higher level of practical risks than a public securitisation. This is a result of the role which the banks play in conduit transactions.
  2. Undertake a systems and procedures review (see further below). Allied to this will be a determination as to the appropriate resources to involve and the amounts of (and timings of) effort which will be required.
  3. Produce implementation documents and a structure note (see further below).

Following the above process, in our experience, results in transactions which complete faster and are easier to administer. Generally they are also cheaper to execute.

The principal discipline is that of documenting and agreeing all
aspects of the transaction before formal, legal documentation begins.

HIGH LEVEL REQUIREMENTS

Securitisation transactions are basically cash flow driven. This even extends to the way in which the SPV's accounts (in the UK) tend to be produced. Consequently, in attempting to determine exactly what is required of systems and processes it is usually best to start with a definition of the cash flow receipts and cash flow payments to be involved.

For instance, in the UK a typical mortgage-backed security will have a quarterly payment cycle of payments of principal and interest (based upon 3 month libor). The assets underlying this transaction (mortgages) will have monthly payments, some fixed and some variable, of principal and interest, generally calculated (in systems terms) by reference to some originator controlled base rate.

Other high level attributes of the transaction also need to be determined, for instance:

  • Only certain assets will be selected for securitisation.
  • The debt issued will be placed in the euromarkets.
  • An SPV will be used requiring various licences.
  • Credit enhancement will be provided by senior-subordination.
  • Profit extraction will be effected by means of a receivables trust.
  • Interest rate swaps will be required.

and so on.

The above listing can usually be derived from standard heads of terms documents prepared by the relevant investment bank.

With this document in place, it is already possible to distill a variety of practical requirements. For instance, the reporting cycles can be distinguished into daily and periodic work loads, daily to match the collections cycle on the assets and quarterly to match the payments cycle on the liabilities. If a UK tax resident SPV is to be involved, then splits of receipts into principal and interest will be required.

Unfortunately it is experience which provides the best guide
as to the likely requirements expected of the originator.

Particular points which can have a significant difference on the amount of work in a transaction are:

  • Whether the SPV is likely to have a different accounting policy to the originator at an asset-by-asset level?
  • Is a formal separation of principal and income required?
  • Is future business with a customer to be included or excluded from the transaction (eg: further advances on a mortgage)?

SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES REVIEW

Having established some ground rules for the transaction, it is then sensible to analyse the way in which the originator actually carries out its business and operates its systems. NOTE: This section only summarises some of the work involved.

In our experience, the best way to achieve this is to examine the variety of interest groups which typically make up the originator's administrative team. The size of organisation is also relevant – and the larger the operation, the more important it is to be disciplined about the process. It is surprising how little some companies know about the real details of their systems. Discrepancies will also arise in descriptions as to how systems and processes work across different areas of the originator, in particular as to the amount of discretion which is afforded to operators of the systems!

The typical high level interest group structure for a medium-sized organisation would be:

  • asset & liability systems
  • accounts and financial control
  • asset administration

In a large organisation it is possible that some 10 different groups can be identified who may have information relevant to the transaction contemplated.

Risk Limited would typically spend some time with each of these groups to determine the detailed base line of operation for the organisation.

With each group, the asset life-cycle needs to be plotted and the work flow of the group determined in relation to each stage. For most transactions, the way in which assets are created can be largely ignored (since, securitisations normally deal with assets which have been in existence and "seasoned" on the originator's balance sheet).

Systems

In system terms, one of the most interesting pieces of information is the listing of permitted transactions which can be passed across the receivables financing database (that is transactions in the systems sense of the word). A map of the relationships between the systems is needed, together with an indication as to the fields which drive the key interfaces (since these usually need to be changed or amended).

The exact fields which are maintained need to be considered, and whether any of the data fields in the system are unreliable. The ability of the system to produce reports showing receipts by account is also important, and the way in which the overnight accounting and batch processes operate needs to be flexible enough to allow reports to be added.

Accounts and financial control

The best starting point is generally with the bank accounts – how often are they reconciled and typically how great is the amount of "unreconciled" items? To the extent that there are problems or issues with the BACS interface, or any issues with the quality of the main receivables financing system, they usually surface in the financial control process. The extent to which manual reconciliations are carried out is also important. In a securitisation transaction, the amount of reconciliation work inevitably increases.

The accounting policies of the originator need to be established, especially if profit recognition is not on a conventional actuarial basis. Are accruals of income daily or monthly? How are they effected? What is the carrying value of the assets in the chart of account? Are the different classes of assets distinguished by product codes? How does the interface with the receivables financing system work? How does the provisioning policy work (general and specific)? and so on.

All of the above need to be related back to the entries made on the system at the asset level. Typically these should be feeding the general ledger directly via the interface from the receivables financing system. Often there are different product codes or account number structures which are used to drive different accounting policies and postings within the interface. If this is the case, then the securitisation will involve amending these codes and using the existing interface structure to direct the securitisation postings to another part of the general ledger.

Asset administration

The asset life cycle needs to be explored with a particular emphasis on both normal running of an asset and any unusual or discretionary activity which is permitted. For the latter, it is important to find out how the discretion is exercised in systems' terms – since this information can be used later to specify exactly how transactions on the receivables financing system should be related to information to be produced on reports to run the deal.

It is also important to establish the extent to which the terms of the assets can be varied in the course of the administration – for instance, contracts extended or payments forgiven. Often certain elements of the collections process are initiated and managed on other systems which cannot easily pick up information on which account is securitised and which is not. Consequently, there may be a need to revisit the transaction structure to remove certain cash flow items from the deal. On one transaction, the administration of defaulting assets was transferred to another system completely separated from the main receivables financing system. The originator therefore required that the recoveries on enforcement were excluded from the transaction and significant structural changes flowed from this requirement.

By establishing these requirements before legal documentation commenced, it was possible to manage the costs of what became an unusual transaction.

IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS AND STRUCTURE NOTE

Once all of the aspects of the transaction have been considered in the context of the originator's existing capabilities, it is then possible to produce a working document which describes how each part of the transaction will work. The elapsed time to this point can be as little as 1 week and as much as 1 month. It largely depends upon the complexity of the transaction and the way in which the originator's systems and processes work.

The most important point is that the solutions proposed are formally documented and based upon consensus. They should be adopted in detail by all parties to the deal: internal AND external.

In our experience, it is usual for the originator to drive the details of the implementation process based upon their level of knowledge and experience of what is possible. Even with our involvement, this is still very much the way in which transactions proceed – it is simply that Risk Limited can provide technology, experience and knowledge as to what can be accommodated by other elements of the transaction structure.

Risk Limited would typically produce a range of documents which are used by different parts of the organisation and by the originator's professional advisers. There are normally two key elements: a structure note and implementation notes.

Structure note

This is a document which covers all of the cash flow, legal, tax and accounting issues associated with the transaction. It would usually contain the principal definitions associated with the cash flow mechanics of the transaction, including definitions of principal, income, losses, provisions and the ways in which these amounts flow through any bank accounts involved. A complete analysis of the collections process would also be included.

Implementation notes

These are a series of documents which covers the reporting cycles, timetables, and forms the basis of system specifications and enhancements and the procedures for a transaction. These are derived from the structure note and represent internal memoranda for the specialist interest groups identified during the process reviews. It is Risk Limited's practice to take responsibility for the production of these notes, although they rapidly become adopted by the originator directly.

COMPLETING THE TRANSACTION

If the preparation set out above is effectively carried out, it is possible to ensure that even the most complex transactions are completed within short time frames and with a minimum of risk to the originator.

As legal documentation starts, the structure note rapidly becomes less important. It is usual for the note to be updated at the completion of the transaction to reflect any changes which occurred during negotiations.

8.3 TYPICAL SOLUTION STRUCTURE

The principal risks with most transactions are:

  • over-engineering the systems solution for asset selection and analysis; and
  • under-specifying the work required to run the transaction leaving key financial control issues and reports until after the transaction has closed (when the requirements creep up on the originator who is left to sort out the mess).

Dealing with these is generally a case of ensuring that the relevant areas within the originator are suitably informed as to what is needed of them – and that all requirements and actions are documented in full and in detail.

The work involved can be examined from the perspective of changes to tables and interfaces, and then in terms of the reports and information which can then be produced from the system. There is no panacea however.

The following sections outline the typical nature of the reports required and do not focus on where the changes have to be made in systems terms. The reports can be related to the list of securitisation requirements in section 2 above. By examining the arrangement of the typical originator's systems, it is also possible to see how the reports can be produced from the systems involved.

EXECUTION AND STRUCTURING PROCESS

The amount of systems work during this phase is dependent largely upon the asset class involved.

Unsecured assets will require a considerable amount of analysis. This is best done using static pools of loans (cut by origination month or quarter) and then tracking their performance over time. It is necessary to establish benchmark levels for historic losses, prepayments and delinquencies.

Mortgage assets have their own specialist requirements. As owners of the system normally used by Standard & Poors to analyse mortgage pools outside the US, Risk Limited is ideally placed to advise on the details of what is required.

There are usually also requirements for tables to go into public documents which then have to be audited. Establishing what is needed for these is a matter of precedent (what has been done before) and negotiation with the lead underwriter.

CLOSING A TRANSACTION

This is usually a matter of asset selection (applying pre-defined criteria to pick a portfolio of assets to be securitised), asset-flagging (reflecting the sale transaction and storing relevant information) and the reporting on the assets so chosen.

It is Risk Limited's practice to negotiate a number of concessions to the usual arrangements to protect the originator in terms of potential systems risks during the closing process. This can involve an analysis of possible systems problems and their consequences to ensure that the reports can be produced to the right place at the right time. Without the reports, the transaction normally cannot close.

DAILY REPORTS

A report is required each morning which sets out the cash transactions of the previous day as they relate to the securitisation by payment source, with credits and debits separately shown. This will then be used to make payments to the SPV's bank accounts and as part of the bank account reconciliation process. The report should also show the non-securitised cash movements by source in the same way.

A daily report is usually required setting out unusual financial activity on the receivables financing systems. This is a report which looks for particular transactions being processed against securitised accounts. Each line on the report would provide information allowing the recipient (typically in financial control) to make adjustments and payments into the SPV as a result.

PERIODIC REPORTS

These are produced to allow the calculations necessary to run the securitisation. In the UK, these would be produced quarterly. It is Risk Limited's practice to provide originators with a spreadsheet which contains all of the calculations necessary to run the deal. In this way, the periodic process is simply a matter of collating information from the systems.

If there are differences between accounting policies, profit recognition arrangements, definitions of principal and interest between the transaction and the SPV, then they are typically dealt with at this point (see the next section).

8.4 SPECIFIC RISK LIMITED TECHNOLOGY

Over the last few years Risk Limited has developed a number of structural features which have proven to be invaluable in saving time and costs for originators. The following list sets out some examples of our approach and the value which they offer.

FAIL-SAFE CLOSINGS

Most securitisations are extremely complex, and so usually fail to close within normal banking hours. It is usual for an originator to tranche in funds to the closing date so that on the morning of closing the originator pays away with the expectation of receiving the proceeds of the securitisation in the afternoon. If the transaction fails to close in good time, the originator is left with a significant overdraft and the originator's clearer is unhappy (and may end up with Bank of England problems as a result).

The alternative is to tranche into the day after closing – but there are problems with banks in doing this because the proceeds of sale will end up on deposit (likely to be in one place) and so can break the large exposures rules. In addition, the deposit is typically made late in the day and receives a poor rate.

Risk Limited has a solution to the above allowing the originator (bank or otherwise) to tranche into the sale date safely and ensures that all necessary deposits are placed into the market early in the morning so that good rates are earned. This is an entirely controlled process which is not affected if there are problems closing the deal.

PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ANALYSIS

Splitting receipts into principal and income is usually difficult – since most systems work on an accruals basis. Risk Limited has pioneered the use of the "declining balance" method of cash-type recognition. This is a complex area, but it is possible to achieve remarkable functional results with little or no changes to the operation of the main systems. In order to use these methods it is necessary to structure the transaction documents carefully – and it is usually possible to spot deals which have used this approach from the way in which the prospectus is written!

PROVISIONAL LIST / FINAL LIST MANAGEMENT

Rigid application of the rules about links between Provisional Lists (assets selected at the start of the structuring process) and Final Lists causes a considerable amount of systems work. Risk Limited has successfully negotiated a relaxation of the rules relating to these processes for a number of transactions – considerably simplifying the work required.

FRS5 / LINKED PRESENTATION MANAGEMENT

For transactions that used to be off-balance sheet, FRS5 now stipulates that the SPV's accounts be consolidated with the originator's – albeit shown via a "linked presentation". This can result in a requirement for a dual-accounting process which requires congruent applications of different accounting principles to the same underlying transactions Using techniques pioneered on the Anglo Leasing and Prospect securitisations, it is possible to provide the necessary accounting functions without amending core originator accounting systems.

On these transactions, the SPV's accounts are produced from a series of reports using both accounting and portfolio information. The originator's accounts (in particular the SPV element of them) is produced from the existing accounting systems. Again, it is necessary to reflect the approach adopted in the transaction documents.

CREDIT CARD TRANSACTIONS

Risk Limited has designed and pioneered the use of "disaggregated" structuring technology and has a proprietary interest the only structure successfully used in the market. Further information is available from Risk Limited.

9. Preparation for a securitisation

9.1 PRELIMINARIES

To decide whether or not securitisation is appropriate, there are four key determinations which need to be made:

i)

what are the corporate objectives ­ funding costs (or is it … "funds at any cost"), capital, accounting, tax etc..?

ii)

is the originator and its assets of a sufficient and consistent quality? This involves undertaking the sort of review and briefing process which is set out in the preceding section:

 

a)

a systematic review of the financial state of the originator, particularly its funding covenants (and whether the consent of any third parties is required) and its solvency for a two year period following the intended close of the transaction

 

b)

a legal analysis of the documentation supporting the receivables

 

c)

a review of underwriting and administration procedures

 

d)

consideration of the tax position of the originating group

 

e)

a systems review, including a detailed analysis of the data structures and transaction recording processes to determine the costs and time frames for the amendments which would be required for securitisation

 

f)

agreeing internal responsibilities, selecting and educating a working party team (representatives from every area in an organisation)

 

g)

obtaining commitments to the transaction internally

iii)

is there sufficient time, available resources and commitment to complete the transaction?

iv)

are the assets suitable? This involves a consideration of the risk characteristics of the receivables proposed to be used and the possible transaction size. Not all portfolios of receivables are sensible to securitise ­ for instance, risk concentrations of any kind should be avoided, and certain receivables carry additional risks with them, relating to liquidity, interest rate, foreign exchange etc…

All of the above questions can be answered relatively cheaply, and without the formal appointment of investment banking advisers and lawyers.

9.2 PREPARATION

Once a company has determined that it is possible and desirable to complete a securitisation, and has assessed its own capabilities in relation to work required of a securitisation transaction, then the public aspects of the transaction can begin:

  • formal selection of assets to securitise;
  • agreement on a structure;
  • agreement on a realistic timetable;
  • documenting the structural approach (production of a preliminary document and systems specifications setting out how the transaction should work from everyone's perspective);
  • selecting counterparties and underwriters;
  • contacting the rating agencies; and
  • formally appointing lawyers.

The key is being ORGANISED and having the appropriate advisers.

10. Summary

Securitisation is time­consuming, complicated and can be expensive. Avoiding some of the costs, ensuring that timetables are adhered to and getting a transaction which meets the originator's needs is a question of organisation and preparation.

The variety of issues, and the amounts of work involved mean that it is inevitable that a large number of advisers are needed to complete any transaction. Although there are both high internal and external costs associated with any transaction on this scale ­ securitisation does offer access to large amounts of funding, and once programmes are set up, they can be repeated relatively cheaply and easily.

Select your advisers carefully – and ensure that the advice which is received covers all aspects of the transaction, and includes systems, accounting, legal, tax, banking, rating and general administration.

11. Introduction to Risk Limited

Risk Limited has advised in connection with the issuance of over £4.5 billion of asset-backed securities in the public markets during the last 7 years spanning 19 transactions. Normally, Risk Limited is employed by the Issuer or the Originator in a transaction (although, in connection with a number of issues, the company has been employed by leading underwriters in the market also).

These issues have had the following characteristics:

  1. they have used different types of receivables (first mortgages, second mortgages, vehicle leases, hire purchase agreements, stocking finance contracts, sales aid finance leases);
  2. amongst them, a variety of different methods of credit enhancement were employed (insurance, re-insurance, senior-subordination, capitalisation, letter of credit);
  3. together they have involved working with every major investment bank in the sector, and with both regular and first-time issuers, and banks and building societies;
  4. a number of the transactions included asset types or structural enhancements which were firsts for the UK market, and one transaction which is reported to be the most complex deal executed within the European markets;
  5. both public and private transactions are involved – into the banking markets, euro-markets and into commercial paper conduit structures, using both asset sale and sub-participation methods to transfer the benefit of receivable flows;
  6. transactions have included an analysis of the implications of US, German and UK accounting principles (ie: producing transaction structures which are off-balance sheet in the UK, the US and Germany).

Other Related Work

We have been involved in a number of projects related to securitisation. Most recently we have been hired to advise two leading mortgage lenders in Hong Kong about the implications of a securitisation programme on their business and systems. This role requires a systematic review of the entire mortgage operation and the teaching of the principles and requirements of securitisation to internal personnel. The result of our efforts, in each case, is the production of an agreed work list for the organisation based upon the best way to meet the requirements given the Originator's systems and working practices.

We have advised a number of leading mortgage lenders in the UK on risk management and treasury functions, which involves analysis of the implications of securitisation for corporate balance sheets and the provision of low level systems support to a number of originators of asset-backed securities.

We have written and own the software programme which is used by Standard & Poors to analyse mortgage credit risk throughout the world (outside the US). This programme is called "SPA" and it is actively marketed by Risk Limited to mortgage originators, investment banks and other persons involved in the mortgage markets.

We have invented leading edge structures to manage the securitisation of revolving receivables for non-US companies. These are in the process of being implemented for a number of clients.

There are two other aspects to Risk Limited's work which are not securitisation related:

  • we have advised on management buyouts, corporate re-structurings and business planning in general, with particular emphasis on cash flow modelling;
  • we are leading advisers on risk management and treasury systems – design, installation and selection.

Risk Limited's Typical Role

The European structured finance markets are different to those in the US. Transactions tend to be more complex and take longer to execute. Repeat transactions which can re-use existing structures are rare. Consequently, there is a premium in the market on efficient transaction design and implementation.

Risk Limited offers a unique approach to transaction structuring. Our goals are to:

  • minimise the amount of systems work required to support a transaction;
  • ensure that the originator is fully capable of running the transaction contemplated, and understands all of the implications of the legal agreements involved;
  • ensure that the objectives of the transaction are met (in terms of credit enhancement levels, regulatory and accounting treatments and cost of funds); and
  • deliver the transaction within the Originator's desired time frames.

We have been involved in the structuring and implementation of some of the most complex deals executed in the structured finance markets. In order to deliver a transaction which meets the above goals, Risk Limited usually takes responsibility for the detailed elements of the implementation, working alongside investment banks, lawyers and accountants.

These detailed issues tend to be associated with the way in which the originator operates its business. Examples would be:

  • analysing the flow of data through the originator's systems
  • dealing with reversals and amendments to underlying asset records
  • turning single company operations into multi-company operations
  • calculations and reporting for the securitisation
  • coping with the provisioning and accounting requirements of the securitisation (which can often be different to those used on-balance sheet)
  • setting up charts of accounts, procedures, journals, and resolving financial control issues
  • re-purchasing securitised agreements (sold in breach of warranty, for instance)
  • dealing with accrued interest on the date of sale
  • calculation of sale prices for assets
  • tracking, accounting for and controlling inter-company transactions between securitisation companies and the originator

Our experience is that incorrect management of these issues results in long delays to transaction timetables and expensive execution. There are a number of well-known examples in the markets of transactions which have been managed inappropriately. The result is sometimes a 2 or 3 year timetable and very high advisory costs.

Risk Limited has a number of proprietary methodologies and implementation strategies which have been proven across a variety of clients and asset classes. All of our work is fully documented by us and backed up with procedures notes and detailed specifications. In addition, we usually take over some of the drafting of the transaction documents and the details of the transaction structure (without changing either the credit analysis or the nature of the flows paid to investors). We aim to ensure that the mechanical aspects of the deal are a direct function of the way in which the systems have been designed to operate. This ensures a complete match between the obligations assumed by the originator and the way in which those same obligations are carried out.

The use of our techniques usually produces a reduction in credit enhancement levels, faster implementation times and lower execution costs as transactions can be made to operate more efficiently.

Clients / transactions

On all of these transactions, Risk Limited (or Risk Limited personnel) advised the Issuer or Originator/Administrator directly in an independent capacity (in addition to any advice which was available from the lead manager).

Rating

Amount

Asset­type

Originator

Lead-Manager

Structure

Comment

AA

£200m*

First mortgages

Allied Dunbar

CSFB

Pool Insured

One of the first non-US securitisations.

AAA/AA

£126m*

First mortgages

Mortgage Trust

Kleinwort Benson

Pool Insured & Junior/Senior

First transaction to incorporate pool insurance and junior-senior structures, first securitisation of assets originated by a subsidiary of a regulated institution.

AAA/AA

£135m*

First mortgages

Abbey Life

Kleinwort Benson

Pool Insured & Junior/Senior

 

AA

£200m*

First mortgages

Allied Dunbar

Citicorp

Pool Insured

Accesses US$ commercial paper markets via a conduit.

AAA

£200m

First mortgages

Allied Dunbar & Mortgage Trust

CSFB

Upgraded & Pool Insured

First transaction without any external liquidity facility, relying on internal cash flows for liquidity).

AAA/A

£88m

Second mortgages

National Home Loans

Goldman Sachs

Junior/Senior

First securitisation of second mortgages, completed in 10 days.

AAA/AA

£226m

First mortgages

Mortgage Trust

Goldman Sachs

Pool Insured & Junior/Senior

First transaction dealing effectively with credit-watch risk on the part of the principal credit-enhancer.

AAA

£180m

Vehicle Leases, Hire Purchase Agreements, Floorplan Agreements

Leyland Daf Finance

UBS

Letter of Credit

First transaction involving UK leases and Stocking Finance, and VAT-able supplies – structure required 6 SPVs.

AAA/A

£189m

Sales Aid Leases

Anglo Leasing

Kleinwort Benson

Junior/Senior

First tranasction involving Sales Aid Leases involved 14 originating companies, 3 SPVs; first transaction to use Risk Limited partial hedging structure.

Aa2

£55m

Sales Aid Leases

Anglo Leasing

Kleinwort Benson

Junior/Senior

First transaction within the UK involving "executory contracts".

AAA/A

£270m

First Mortgages

Barclays

BZW

Junior/Senior

 

Aa

£200m

First Mortgages

NHL

Private placement

Junior/Senior

Mortgage warehousing transaction.

AAA/A

£165m

Personal Loans

HFC Bank

UBS

Junior/Senior

Off-balance sheet for US GAAP as well as for UK FRS5

unrated

£100m

First Mortgages

National & Provincial Building Society

JP Morgan

Junior/Senior

Uses SPA to support five years of substitution, ability to top up credit enhancement within FRS5 / BSC rules, sub-participation structure.

AAA/A

£196m

Revolving personal loans

HFC Bank

BZW

Junior/Senior

First securitisation of revolving credits under Bank of England rules using structure designed and implemented by Risk Limited

AAA

£175m

Vehicle HP contracts

Mercedes Benz Finance

Deutsche Bank

Conduit to US & Euro CP markets

Transaction works on a gross loss basis and not a net loss basis

AAA/A

£225m

Personal Loans

HFC Bank

UBS

Junior/Senior

 

unrated

£860m

First Mortgages

Citibank

UBS

Junior/Senior

Warehouse deal, part of portfolio acquisition finance for major UK building society

AAA/A
BBB

£808m

First Mortgages

Britannia

UBS

Junior/senior

Re-financing of warehouse

Total:

£4,602m

 

 

 

 

 

* when on secondment to Mortgage Funding Corporation plc.

Risk Limited's other clients (in addition to the above) include:

AT&T Istel

First Mortgage Securities

Lloyds of London

SEMA Group

Bank of Ireland Mortgages

Hambros

Manchester Exchange Bank

Southern & District Finance

Barings-ING

Hang Seng Bank

Mercedes Benz Finance

Special Risk Services

Beneficial Bank

Heritable Investment Bank

Mortgage Trust

Standard & Poors Corporation

CIBC Mortgages

Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation

Pheonix Securities

Summit Corporate Finance

Credit Suisse

Kleinwort Benson Limited

Robert Fraser Group

Union Bank of Switzerland

Datalink

Kleinwort Benson Investment Management Limited

Royal Bank of Scotland

Unilever plc