Liquidity Risk Management Framework- Snapshot

Applicability

  1. Non-deposit taking NBFCs with asset size of Rs.100 crore and above
  2. Systemically important Core Investment Companies
  3. Deposit taking NBFCs irrespective of their asset size

All other NBFCs are also encouraged to adopt these guidelines on liquidity risk management on voluntary basis

Exclusion:

  1. Type 1 NBFC-NDs- NBFC-ND not accepting public funds/ not intending to accept public funds in the future andnot having customer interface/ not intending to have customer interface in the future
  2. Non-Operating Financial Holding Companies and Standalone Primary Dealers

Action to be taken:

The Board of Directors must revise the existing ALM policy or adopt a new LRM Framework to put in place internal monitoring mechanism for the following:

  • Adopt liquidity risk monitoring tools/metrics to cover
    1. concentration of funding by significant counterparty/ instrument/ currency[1],
    2. availability of unencumbered assets that can be used as collateral for raising funds; and,
    3. certain early warning market-based indicators, such as, book-to-equity ratio, coupon on debts raised, breaches and regulatory penalties for breaches in regulatory liquidity requirement.
    4. The Board / committee set up for the purpose shall monitor on a monthly basis, the movements in their book-to-equity ratio for listed NBFCs and the coupon at which long-term and short-term debts are raised by them. This also includes information on breach/penalty in respect of regulatory liquidity requirements, if any.
  • Monitor liquidity risk based on a “stock” approach to liquidity
    • Board to set predefined internal limits for various critical ratios pertaining to liquidity risk.
    • Indicative liquidity ratios are
      • short-term liability to total assets;
      • short-term liability to long-term assets;
      • commercial papers to total assets;
      • non-convertible debentures (NCDs) (original maturity less than one year) to total assets;
      • short-term liabilities to total liabilities; long-term assets to total assets.
    • Put in place process for identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling liquidity risk.
      • It should clearly articulate a liquidity risk tolerance that is appropriate for its business strategy and its role in the financial system
      • Senior management should develop the strategy to manage liquidity risk in accordance with such risk tolerance and ensure that the NBFC maintains sufficient liquidity
    • Develop a process to quantify liquidity costs and benefits so that the same may be incorporated in the internal product pricing, performance measurement and new product approval process for all material business lines, products and activities.
    • Conduct stress tests on a regular basis for a variety of short-term and protracted NBFC-specific and market-wide stress scenarios (individually and in combination)
    • Ensure that an independent party regularly reviews and evaluates the various components of the NBFC’s liquidity risk management process

Revision in the existing ALM framework to incorporate granular buckets

As per the existing norms, the mismatches (negative gap) during 1-30/31 days in normal course shall not exceed 15% of the cash outflows in this time bucket. Pursuant to the revised framework, the 1-30 day time bucket in the Statement of Structural Liquidity is segregated into granular buckets of 1-7 days, 8-14 days, and 15-30 days. The net cumulative negative mismatches in the maturity buckets of 1-7 days, 8-14 days, and 15-30 days shall not exceed 10%, 10% and 20% of the cumulative cash outflows in the respective time buckets.

Revision in interest rate sensitivity statement

Granularity in the time buckets would also be applicable to the interest rate sensitivity statement required to be submitted by NBFCs.

Composition of Risk Management Committee

The Risk Management Committee, which reports to the Board and consisting of Chief Executive Officer (CEO)/ Managing Director and heads of various risk verticals shall be responsible for evaluating the overall risks faced by the NBFC including liquidity risk.

Asset Liability Management (ALM) Support Group

The existing Management Committee of the Board or any other Specific Committee constituted by the Board to oversee the implementation of the system and review its functioning periodically shall be substituted with ALM Support Group. It shall consist of operating staff who shall be responsible for analysing, monitoring and reporting the liquidity risk profile to the ALCO. Such support groups will be constituted depending on the size and complexity of liquidity risk management in an NBFC.

Public Disclosure

To enable market participants to make an informed judgment about the soundness of its liquidity risk management framework and liquidity position-

  1. Disclose information in the format provided under Appendix I, on a quarterly basis on the official website of the company and
  2. In the annual financial statement as notes to account

Responsibility of Group CFO

The Group Chief Financial officer (CFO) shall develop and maintain liquidity management processes and funding programmes that are consistent with the complexity, risk profile, and scope of operations of the ‘companies in the Group’- as defined in the Master Directions.

MIS System

Put in place a reliable MIS designed to provide timely and forward-looking information on the liquidity position of the NBFC and the Group to the Board and ALCO, both under normal and stress situations.

Liquidity Coverage Ratio- Snapshot

Applicability:

  1. Non-deposit taking NBFCs with asset size of Rs.5,000 crore and above,
  2. Deposit taking NBFCs irrespective of their asset size

Exclusion:

  1. Core Investment Companies,
  2. Type 1 NBFC-NDs,
  3. Non-Operating Financial Holding Companies and Standalone Primary Dealer

Computation:

Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) is represented by the following ratio:

Stock of High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA)/ Total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days

Here, “High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA)” means liquid assets that can be readily sold or immediately converted into cash at little or no loss of value or used as collateral to obtain funds in a range of stress scenarios.

Timeline:

Effective date of implementation of the LCR norm is December 01, 2020, as per the timeline mentioned herein below. The LCR shall continue to be minimum 100% (i.e., the stock of HQLA shall at least equal total net cash outflows) on an ongoing basis with effect from December 1, 2024, i.e., at the end of the phase-in period.

  1. For non-deposit taking systemically important NBFCs with asset size of Rs.10,000 crore and above and all deposit taking NBFCs irrespective of the asset size, LCR to be maintained as per the following timeline:
From December 01, 2020 December 01, 2021 December 01, 2022 December 01, 2023 December 01, 2024
Minimum LCR 50% 60% 70% 85% 100%
  1. For non-deposit taking NBFCs with asset size of Rs. 5,000 crore and above but less than Rs. 10,000 crore, the required level of LCR to be maintained, as per the time-line given below:
From December 01, 2020 December 01, 2021 December 01, 2022 December 01, 2023 December 01, 2024
Minimum LCR 30% 50% 6

0%

85% 100%

Disclosure Requirements:

NBFCs shall be required to disclose information on their LCR every quarter. Further, NBFCs in their annual financial statements under Notes to Accounts, starting with the financial year ending March 31, 2021, shall disclose information on LCR for all the four quarters of the relevant financial year.

[1] A “Significant counterparty” is defined as a single counterparty or group of connected or affiliated counterparties accounting in aggregate for more than 1% of the NBFC-NDSI’s, NBFC-Ds total liabilities and 10% for other non-deposit taking NBFCs

A “significant instrument/product” is defined as a single instrument/product of group of similar instruments/products which in aggregate amount to more than 1% of the NBFC-NDSI’s, NBFC-Ds total liabilities and 10% for other non-deposit taking NBFCs.

 

Our other related write-ups:

Sale assailed: NBFC crisis may put Indian securitisation transactions to trial

-By Vinod Kothari (vinod@vinodkothari.com)

Securitisation is all about bankruptcy remoteness, and the common saying about bankruptcy remoteness is that it works as long as the entities are not in bankruptcy! The fact that any major bankruptcy has put bankruptcy remoteness to challenge is known world-over. In fact, the Global Financial Crisis itself put several never-before questions to legality of securitisation, some of them going into the very basics of insolvency law[1]. There have been spate of rulings in the USA pertaining to transfer of mortgages, disclosures in offer documents, law suits against trustee, etc.

The Indian securitisation market has faced taxation challenges, regulatory changes, etc. However, it has so far been immune from any questions at the very basics of either securitisability of assets, or the structure of securitisation transactions, or issues such as commingling of cashflows, servicer transition, etc. However, sitting at the very doorstep of defaults by some major originators, and facing the spectrum of serious servicer downgrades, the Indian securitisation market clearly faces the risk of being shaken at its basics, in not too distant future.

Before we get into these challenges, it may be useful to note that the Indian securitisation market saw an over-100% growth in FY 2019 with volumes catapulting to INR 1000 billion. In terms of global market statistics, Indian market may now be regarded as 2nd largest in ex-Japan Asia, only after China.

Since the blowing up of the ILFS crisis in the month of September 2018, securitisation has been almost the only way of liquidity for NBFCs. Based on the Budget proposal, the Govt of India launched, in Partial Credit Guarantee Scheme, a scheme for partial sovereign guarantee for AA-rated NBFC pools. That scheme seems to be going very well as a liquidity breather for NBFCs. Excluding the volumes under the partial credit enhancement scheme, securitisation volumes in first half of the year have already crossed INR 1000 billion.

In the midst of these fast rising volumes, the challenges on the horizon seem multiple, and some of them really very very hard. This write up looks at some of these emerging developments.

Sale of assets to securitisation trusts questioned

In an interim order of the Bombay High court in Edelweiss AMC vs Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited[2], the Bombay High court has made certain observations that may hit at the very securitisability of receivables.  Based on an issue being raised by the plaintiff, the High Court has directed the company DHFL to provide under affidavit details of all those securitisation transactions where receivables subject to pari passu charge of the debentureholders have been assigned, whether with or without the sanction of the trustee for the debentureholders.

The practice of pari passu floating charge on receivables is quite commonly used for securing issuance of debentures. Usually, the charge of the trustees is on a blanket, unspecific common pool, based on which multiple issuances of debentures are covered. The charge is usually all pervasive, covering all the receivables of the company. In that sense, the charge is what is classically called a “floating charge”.

These are the very receivables that are sold or assigned when a securitisation transaction is done. The issue is, given the floating nature of the charge, a receivable originated automatically becomes subject to the floating charge, and a receivable realised or sold automatically goes out of the purview of the charge. The charge document typically requires a no-objection confirmation of the chargeholder for transactions which are not in ordinary course of business. But for an NBFC or an HFC, a securitisation transaction is a mode of take-out and very much a part of ordinary course of business, as realisation of receivables is.

If the chargeholder’s asset cover is still sufficient, is it open for the chargeholder to refuse to give the no-objection confirmation to another mode of financing? If that was the case, any chargeholder may just bring the business of an NBFC to a grinding halt by refusing to give a no-objection.

The whole concept of a floating charge and its priority in the event of bankruptcy has been subject matter of intensive discussion in several UK rulings[3]. There have been discussions on whether the floating charge concept, a judge-made product of UK courts, can be eliminated altogether from the insolvency law[4].

In India, the so-called security interest on receivables is not really intended to be a security device – it is merely a regulatory compliance with company law rules under which unsecured debentures are treated as “deposits”[5]. The real intent of the so-called debenture trust document is maintenance of an asset cover, which may be expressed as a covenant, even otherwise, in case of an unsecured debenture issuance. The fact is that over the years, the Indian bond issuance market has not been able to come out of the clutches of this practice of secured debenture issuance.

While bond issuance practices surely need re-examination, the burning issue for securitisation transactions is – if the DHFL interim ruling results into some final observations of the court about need for the bond trustee’s NOC for every securitisation transaction, all existing securitisation transactions may also face similar challenges.

Servicer-related downgrades

Rating agencies have recently downgraded two notches from AAA ratings several pass-through certificate transactions of a leading NBFC. The rationale given in the downgrade action, among other things, cites servicer risks, on the ground that the originator has not been able to obtain continuous funding support from banks. While absence of continuing funding support may affect new business by an NBFC, how does it affect servicing capabilities of existing transactions, is a curious question. However, it seems that in addition to the liquidity issue, which is all pervasive, the rating action in the present case may have been inspired by some internal scheme of arrangement proposed by the NBFC in question.

This particular downgrades may, therefore, not have a sectoral relevance. However, what is important is that the downgrades are muddying the transition history of securitisation ratings. From the classic notion that securitisation ratings are not susceptible to originator-ratings, the dependence of securitisation transactions to pure originator entity risks such as internal funding strengths or scheme of arrangement puts a risk which is usually not considered by securitisation investors. In fact, the flight to securitisation and direct assignments after ILFS crisis was based on the general notion that entity risks are escaped by securitisation transactions.

Servicer transitions

The biggest jolt may be a forced servicer transition. In something like RMBS transactions, outsourcing of collection function is still easy, and, in many cases, several activities are indeed outsourced. However, if it comes to more complicated assets requiring country-wide presence, borrower franchise and regular interaction, if servicer transition has to be forced, the transaction will be worse than originator bankruptcy.

Questions on true sale

The market has been leaning substantially on the “direct assignment” route. Most of the direct assignments are seen by the investors are look-alikes and feel-alikes of a loan to the originator, save and except for the true-sale opinion. Investors have been linking their rates of return to their MCLR. Investors have been viewing the excess spread as a virtual credit support, which is actually not allowed as per RBI regulations. Pari-passu sharing of principal and interest is rarely followed by the market transactions.

If the truth of the sale in most of the direct assignment transactions is questioned in cases such as those before the Bombay High court, it will not be surprising to see the court recharacterise the so-called direct assignments as nothing but disguised loans. If that was to happen in one case of a failed NBFC, not only will the investors lose the very bankruptcy-remoteness they were hoping for, the RBI will be chasing the originators for flouting the norms of direct assignment which may have hitherto been ignored by the supervisor. The irony is – supervisors become super stringent in stressful times, which is exactly where supervisor’s understanding is required more than reprimand.

Conclusion

NBFCs are passing through a very strenuous time. Delicate handling of the situation with deep understanding and sense of support is required from all stakeholders. Any abrupt strong action may exacerbate the problem beyond proportion and make it completely out of control. As for securitisation practitioners, it is high time to strengthen practices and realise that the truth of the sale is not in merely getting a true sale opinion.

Other Related Articles:


[1] For example, in a Lehman-related UK litigation called Perpetual Trustees vs BNY Corporate Trustee Services, the typical clause in a synthetic securitisation diverting the benefit of funding from the protection buyer (originator – who is now in bankruptcy) to the investors, was challenged under the anti-deprivation rule of insolvency law. Ultimately, UK Supreme Court ruled in favour of securitisation transactions.

[2] https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-365465.pdf. Similar observations have been made by the same court in Reliance Nippon Life AMC vs  DHFL.

[3] One of the leading UK rulings is Spectrum Plus Limited, https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2005/41.html. This ruling reviews whole lot of UK rulings on floating charges and their priorities.

[4] See, for example, R M Goode, The Case for Abolition of the Floating Charge, in Fundamental Concepts of Commercial Law (50 years of Reflection, by Goode)

[5] Or partly, the device may involve creation of a mortgage on a queer inconsequential piece of land to qualify as “mortgage debentures” and therefore, avail of stamp duty relaxation.

UPDATE: No GST input if supplier doesn’t upload details of output: GST Council amends CGST rules to curb ineligible credit availing

-Rahul Maharshi

(rahul@vinodkothari.com) (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

The GST council in its 37th Meeting held on 20th September, 2019, had proposed to make amendments in the CGST Rules, 2017 (“Rules”) pertaining to matters relating to the extension of due date of filing of GSTR-3B GSTR-1 as well as voluntary requirement of filing of GST Annual return for registered person whose aggregate turnover is less than Rs. 2 crores.

One of the major amendment proposed was to restrict the claiming of input tax credit by the recipient, in case of mismatch in details uploaded by the supplier, to the extent of 20% over and above the value of uploaded details by the supplier.

The above proposed amendment has been brought into force through notification 49/2019- Central Tax   [1] whereby the input credit availed by a registered person, the details of which have not been uploaded by the suppliers vide GSTR-1, the same should not exceed 20% of the eligible credit that has been uploaded by the suppliers.

As per the insertion in the CGST rules, 2017, viz. sub-rule (4) of rule 36:

“(4) Input tax credit to be availed by a registered person in respect of invoices or debit notes, the details of which have not been uploaded by the suppliers under sub-section (1) of section 37, shall not exceed 20 per cent. of the eligible credit available in respect of invoices or debit notes the details of which have been uploaded by the suppliers under sub-section (1) of section 37.”

For example, as per the books of the recipient, there is an input tax credit of Rs. 5,000 for a particular month from a particular supplier against 5 tax invoices having the GST component of Rs. 1,000 each.  Post the amendment, the following scenarios shall arise:

Case-1: In case the supplier has uploaded all 5 invoices:

In case the supplier has duly uploaded the details of all the 5 invoices through filing the GSTR-1 for the particular month, the auto-populated GSTR-2A will have the details of all such invoices and accordingly the recipient will be eligible to claim the input tax credit of all 5 invoices

Case-2: In case the supplier has uploaded 3 invoices:

In case the supplier has uploaded less than 5 invoices, i.e. 3 invoices having GST component of Rs. 3,000, the recipient will be eligible to claim input tax credit at a maximum of Rs. 3,600 (viz. 3,000+20% of 3,000= 3,600).

Case-3: In case the supplier has not uploaded any invoice:

In case the supplier has not uploaded any invoice in the GSTR-1 of the respective month, the recipient will not be eligible to claim the input tax credit in that particular month. However, the recipient may claim the input as soon as the supplier uploads the details in the GSTR-1 and corresponding details reflect in the auto-populated GSTR-2A.

As a result of the said amendment, the recipient will be required to monitor the duly uploading of the invoices by the supplier in a more stringent manner, since omission of the same will result in reduction in claiming of input tax credit by the recipient.

Also, an important point of concern will be the change in accounting of the input tax credit in the books of the recipient. The excess claim over 20% of the eligible input tax credit will require allocation against the invoices of which the input tax credit would pertain to.

Continuing the above example viz. Case 2, where the supplier has uploaded 3 invoices, how will the recipient allocate the said portion of 20% viz. Rs. 600 if the recipient claims input tax credit at the excess of 20%. The recipient has to allocate the said amount against portion of particular invoices.

The above move may be seen as a way to monitor the claiming of inputs by the recipients as well as a check on the supplier for uploading the returns on a regular basis. However, there are pertinent issues which require further clarification from the department.

 

[1] http://www.cbic.gov.in/resources//htdocs-cbec/gst/notfctn-49-central-tax-english-2019.pdf;jsessionid=15BA096E92769114F368D806E28B8FF5

Draft guidelines for on tap licensing of SFBs: decoded

-Kanakprabha Jethani | Executive

(kanak@vinodkothari.com)

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has issued draft guidelines for ‘on tap’ licensing of Small Finance Banks (SFBs). The guidelines are largely similar to the existing guidelines for licensing of SFBs. However, the major difference is that the licensing will be allowed ‘on tap’. Further, there are certain changes in the eligibility requirements as well. The following write-up intends to answer all the questions relating to licensing of SFBs under the new ‘on tap’ mechanism.

What is ‘on-tap’ licensing?

Under the existing framework, the RBI issues licences for SFBs in batches i.e. all the applications are reviewed in a decided time frame and approvals for a number of SFBs are issued at once. The RBI doesn’t give out approvals as and when applications are received. Rather, when sufficient number of applications are received, they are reviewed at once and the applications that satisfy RBI’s criteria are issued with licenses.

Under the ‘on-tap’ mechanism, RBI will initiate the review of applications as and when they are received. Individual applications will be reviewed and licenses will be issued accordingly.

Who is eligible to apply?

Eligible Promoters:
Resident individuals Atleast 10 years’ experience in banking and finance sector at senior level
Professionals who are Indian citizens Atleast 10 years’ experience in banking and finance sector at senior level
Companies/societies owned and controlled by residents Having successful track record of running their business for atleast 5 years
Conversion:
Existing NBFCs, Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs), Local Area Banks (LABs) -in private sector + controlled by residents + successful track record of running the business for atleast 5 years
Primary Urban Co-operative Banks (UCBs) As per the scheme for voluntary transition.
Fit and Proper Criteria:
Promoters/ promoter group Past record of sound credentials and integrity, financial soundness and successful track record of professional experience or of running their business for atleast 5 years

Who cannot apply?

Joint ventures by different promoter groups for purpose of setting up SFB. Public sector entities, large industrial houses or business groups, bodies set up under state legislature, state financial corporations, etc. Group with assets of Rs. 5000 crores or more+ non financial business accounting for 40% or more

What will be the structure of SFB?

An SFB maybe floated either as a standalone entity or under a holding company, which shall act as the promoting entity of the bank. Such holding company shall be a Non-Operative Financial Holding Company (NOHFC) or be registered with the RBI as NBFC-CIC.

What activities can an SFB carry out?

Primarily, an SFB is allowed to carry out basic banking activities.

Apart from the primary functions, SFBs can also undertake non-risk sharing simple financial activities, not requiring commitment of their own funds, after obtaining approval of the RBI. Also, they are allowed to become Category II Authorised Dealer in foreign exchange business.

An activity that involves commitment of funds of the SFB, such as issue of credit cards, shall not be allowed.

What will be the capital structure in SFB?

Minimum paid-up equity capital:
All applicants Rs. 200 crores
For UCBs converting into SFB Initially Rs. 100 crores, which shall be required to be increased to Rs. 200 crores within 5 years
Capital Adequacy Ratio:
Tier I capital 7.5% of total risk-weighted assets
Tier II capital Maximum 100% of tier I capital
Capital 15% of total risk- weighted assets
Promoters Contribution:
Promoters’ holding Minimum 40% of paid-up voting equity capital

·         Bring down to 30% in 10 years

·         Bring down to 15% in 15 years

In case of conversion of NBFC/MFI to SFB, if promoters’ shareholding is maintained below 40% but above 26% due to regulatory requirements or otherwise, the same shall be acceptable. Provided that promoters’ shareholding doesn’t fall below 20%.
Lock-in on promoters’ minimum holding 5 years
If promoters’ shareholding > 40% Bring down to 40%

·         within 5 years from commencement of business (in case of other SFB)

·         within 5 years from the date paid-up capital of Rs. 200 crores is reached (in case of conversion from UCB)

No person other than promoters shall be allowed to hold more than 10% of the paid-up equity capital.
Foreign Shareholding:
Under automatic route Upto 49%
Government route Beyond 49% upto 74%
Atleast 26% of the paid-up equity capital should be held by resident shareholders.

Will the SFB be listed?

An application for listing of the SFB can be made voluntarily after obtaining approval of the RBI. However, on reaching a paid-up equity capital of Rs. 500 crores, listing shall be made mandatory.

What will be the compliance requirements for SFBs?

  • Have in place a robust risk management system.
  • Prudential norms as applicable to commercial banks shall be applicable.
  • 75% of Adjusted Net Bank Credit (ANBC) shall be extended to priority sectors.
  • The maximum loan size to a single person or group shall not be more than 10% of SFB’s capital funds.
  • The maximum investment exposure to a single person or group shall not be more than 15% of SFB’s capital funds.
  • Atleast 50% of loan portfolio should consist of small size loans (upto Rs. 25 lakhs per borrower).
  • There should be no exposure of the SFB to its promoters, shareholder holding 10% or more of the paid-up capital, and relatives of promoters.
  • Payments bank may make application to set up an SFB, provided that both the banks shall be under NOHFC structure.
  • SFB cannot be a Business Correspondent of other banks.

Are there any specific compliance requirements for NBFCs/MFIs/LABs converting into SFB?

Following are the specific requirements to be complied with in case of conversion from NBFC/MFI/LAB:

  • Have minimum paid-up capital of Rs. 200 crores. In case of deficiency, infuse the differential capital within 18 months.
  • Convert the branches of NBFC/MFI to branches of the SFB within 3 years from commencement of operations.
  • In case any floating charges stand in the balance sheet of the NBFC/MFI, the same shall be allowed to be carried until the related borrowings are matured.

How to make an application to set up an SFB?

An application shall be made to the RBI in Form III along with a business plan and detailed information of the existing as well as proposed structure, a project report regarding viability of the business of SFB and any other relevant information. The application shall be submitted to the RBI in physical form in an envelope superscripted “Application for Small Finance Bank” addressed to the Chief General Manager of the RBI.

In case, the application satisfies the RBI criteria, the fact of approval shall be placed on the RBI website. In case, the application is rejected, the applicant will be barred from making fresh application for a period of three years from such rejection.

 

Partial Credit Guarantee Scheme

A Business Conclave on  “Partial Credit Guarantee Scheme” was organised by Indian Securitisation Foundation jointly with Edelweiss on September 16,2019 in Mumbai.

On this occasion, the presentation used by Mr. Vinod Kothari is being given here:

http://vinodkothari.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/partial-credit-enhancement-scheme-.pdf

 

We have authored few articles on the topic that one might want to give a read. The links to such related articles are provided below:

Introduction of Digital KYC

Anita Baid (anita@vinodkothari.com)

The guidelines relating to KYC has been in headlines for quite some time now. Pursuant to the several amendments in the regulations, the KYC process of using Aadhaar through offline modes was resumed for fintech companies. The amendments in the KYC Master Directions[1] allowed verification of customers by offline modes and permitted NBFCs to take Aadhaar for verifying the identity of customers if provided voluntarily by them, after complying with the conditions of privacy to ensure that the interests of the customers are safeguarded.

Several amendments were made in the Prevention of Money laundering (Maintenance of Records) Rules, 2005, vide the notification of Prevention of Money laundering (Maintenance of Records) Amendment Rules, 20191 issued on February 13, 2019[2] (‘February Notification’) so as to allow use of Aadhaar as a proof of identity, however, in a manner that protected the private and confidential information of the borrowers.

The February Notification recognised proof of possession of Aadhaar number as an ‘officially valid document’. Further, it stated that whoever submits “proof of possession of Aadhaar number” as an officially valid document, has to do it in such a form as are issued by the Authority. However, the concern for most of the fintech companies lending through online mode was that the regulations did not specify acceptance of KYC documents electronically. This has been addressed by the recent notification on Prevention of Money-laundering (Maintenance of Records) Third Amendment Rules, 2019 issued on August 19, 2019[3] (“August Notification”).

Digital KYC Process

The August Notification has defined the term digital KYC as follows:

“digitial KYC” means the capturing live photo of the client and officially valid document or the proof of possession of Aadhaar, where offline verification cannot be carried out, along with the latitude and longitude of the location where such live photo is being taken by an authorised officer of the reporting entity as per the provisions contained in the Act;

Accordingly, fintech companies will be able to carry out the KYC of its customers via digital mode.

The detailed procedure for undertaking the digital KYC has also been laid down. The Digital KYC Process is a facility that will allow the reporting entities to undertake the KYC of customers via an authenticated application, specifically developed for this purpose (‘Application’). The access of the Application shall be controlled by the reporting entities and it should be ensured that the same is used only by authorized persons. To carry out the KYC, either the customer, along with its original OVD, will have to visit the location of the authorized official or vice-versa. Further, live photograph of the client will be taken by the authorized officer and the same photograph will be embedded in the Customer Application Form (CAF).

Further, the system Application shall have to enable the following features:

  1. It shall be able to put a water-mark in readable form having CAF number, GPS coordinates, authorized official’s name, unique employee Code (assigned by Reporting Entities) and Date (DD:MM:YYYY) and time stamp (HH:MM:SS) on the captured live photograph of the client;
  2. It shall have the feature that only live photograph of the client is captured and no printed or video-graphed photograph of the client is captured.

The live photograph of the original OVD or proof of possession of Aadhaar where offline verification cannot be carried out (placed horizontally), shall also be captured vertically from above and water-marking in readable form as mentioned above shall be done.

Further, in those documents where Quick Response (QR) code is available, such details can be auto-populated by scanning the QR code instead of manual filing the details. For example, in case of physical Aadhaar/e-Aadhaar downloaded from UIDAI where QR code is available, the details like name, gender, date of birth and address can be auto-populated by scanning the QR available on Aadhaar/e-Aadhaar.

Upon completion of the process, a One Time Password (OTP) message containing the text that ‘Please verify the details filled in form before sharing OTP’ shall be sent to client’s own mobile number. Upon successful validation of the OTP, it will be treated as client signature on CAF.

For the Digital KYC Process, it will be the responsibility of the authorized officer to check and verify that:-

  1. information available in the picture of document is matching with the information entered by authorized officer in CAF;
  2. live photograph of the client matches with the photo available in the document; and
  3. all of the necessary details in CAF including mandatory field are filled properly.

Electronic Documents

The most interesting amendment in the August Notification is the concept of “equivalent e-document”. This means an electronic equivalent of a document, issued by the issuing authority of such document with its valid digital signature including documents issued to the digital locker account of the client as per rule 9 of the Information Technology (Preservation and Retention of Information by Intermediaries Providing Digital Locker Facilities) Rules, 2016 shall be recognized as a KYC document. Provided that the digital signature will have to be verified by the reporting entity as per the provisions of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

The aforesaid amendment will facilitate a hassle free and convenient option for the customers to submit their KYC documents. The customer will be able to submit its KYC documents in electronic form stored in his/her digital locker account.

Further, pursuant to this amendment, at several places where Permanent Account Number (PAN) was required to be submitted mandatorily has now been replaced with the option to either submit PAN or equivalent e-document.

Submission of Aadhaar

With the substitution in rule 9, an individual will now have the following three option for submission of Aadhaar details:

  • the Aadhaar number where,
    1. he is desirous of receiving any benefit or subsidy under any scheme notified under section 7 of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 or
    2. he decides to submit his Aadhaar number voluntarily
  • the proof of possession of Aadhaar number where offline verification can be carried out; or
  • the proof of possession of Aadhaar number where offline verification cannot be carried out or any officially valid document or the equivalent e-document thereof containing the details of his identity and address;

Further, along with any of the aforesaid options the following shall also be submitted:

  1. the Permanent Account Number or the equivalent e-document thereof or Form No. 60 as defined in Income-tax Rules, 1962; and
  2. such other documents including in respect of the nature of business and financial status of the client, or the equivalent e-documents thereof as may be required by the reporting entity

The KYC Master Directions were amended on the basis in the February Notification. As per the amendments proposed at that time, banking companies were allowed to verify the identity of the customers by authentication under the Aadhaar Act or by offline verification or by use of passport or any other officially valid documents. Further distinguishing the access, it permitted only banks to authenticate identities using Aadhaar. Other reporting entities, like NBFCs, were permitted to use the offline tools for verifying the identity of customers provided they comply with the prescribed standards of privacy and security.

The August Notification has now specified the following options:

  1. For a banking company, where the client submits his Aadhaar number, authentication of the client’s Aadhaar number shall be carried out using e-KYC authentication facility provided by the Unique Identification Authority of India;
  2. For all reporting entities,
    1. where proof of possession of Aadhaar is submitted and where offline verification can be carried out, the reporting entity shall carry out offline verification;
    2. where an equivalent e-document of any officially valid document is submitted, the reporting entity shall verify the digital signature as per the provisions of the IT Act and take a live photo
    3. any officially valid document or proof of possession of Aadhaar number is submitted and where offline verification cannot be carried out, the reporting entity shall carry out verification through digital KYC, as per the prescribed Digital KYC Process

It is also expected that the RBI shall notify for a class of reporting entity a period, beyond which instead of carrying out digital KYC, the reporting entity pertaining to such class may obtain a certified copy of the proof of possession of Aadhaar number or the officially valid document and a recent photograph where an equivalent e-document is not submitted.

The August Notification has also laid emphasis on the fact that certified copy of the KYC documents have to be obtained. This means the reporting entity shall have to compare the copy of the proof of possession of Aadhaar number where offline verification cannot be carried out or officially valid document so produced by the client with the original and record the same on the copy by the authorised officer of the reporting entity. Henceforth, this verification can also be carried out by way of Digital KYC Process.


[1] https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_ViewMasDirections.aspx?id=11566#F4

[2] http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2019/197650.pdf

[3] http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2019/210818.pdf

Injeti Srinivas’s Committee: Changes recommended in provisions of Corporate Social Responsibility

Government credit enhancement for NBFC pools: A Guide to Rating agencies

Vinod Kothari Consultants P Ltd (finserv@vinodkothari.com)

 

The partial credit enhancement (PCE) Scheme of the Government[1], for purchase by public sector banks (PSBs) of NBFC/HFC pools, has been discussed in our earlier write-ups, which can be viewed here and here.

This document briefly puts the potential approach of the rating agencies for rating of the pools for the purpose of qualifying for the Scheme.

Brief nature of the transaction:

  • The transaction may be summarised as transfer of a pool to a PSB, wherein the NBFC retains a subordinated piece, such that the senior piece held by the PSB gets a AA rating. Thus, within the common pool of assets, there is a senior/junior structure, with the NBFC retaining the junior tranche.
  • The transaction is a structured finance transaction, by way of credit-enhanced, bilateral assignment. It is quite similar to a securitisation transaction, minus the presence of SPVs or issuance of any “securities”.
  • The NBFC will continue to be servicer, and will continue to charge servicing fees as agreed.
  • The objective to reach a AA rating of the pool/portion of the pool that is sold to the PSB.
  • Hence, the principles for sizing of credit enhancement, counterparty (servicer) risk, etc. should be the same as in case of securitisation.
  • The coupon rate for the senior tranche may be mutually negotiated. Given the fact that after 2 years, the GoI guarantee will be removed, the parties may agree for a stepped-up rate if the pool continues after 2 years. Obviously, the extent of subordinated share held by the NBFC will have to be increased substantially, to provide increased comfort to the PSB. Excess spread, that is, the excess of actual interest earned over the servicing fees and the coupon may be released to the seller.
  • The payout of the principal/interest to the two tranches (senior and junior), and utilisation of the excess spread, etc. may be worked out so as to meet the rating objective, provide for stepped-up level of enhancement, and yet maintain the economic viability of the transaction.
  • Bankruptcy remoteness is easier in the present case, as pool is sold from the NBFC to the PSB, by way of a non-recourse transfer. Of course, there should be no retention of buyback option, etc., or other factors that vitiate a true sale.
  • Technically, there is no need for a trustee. However, whether the parties need to keep a third party for ensuring surveillance over the transaction, in form of a monitoring agency, may be decided between the parties.

Brief characteristics of the Pool

  • For any meaningful statistical analysis, the pool should be a homogenous pool.
  • Surely, the pool is a static pool.
  • The pool has attained seasoning, as the loans must have been originated by 31st March, 2019.
  • In our view, pools having short maturities (say personal loans, short-term loans, etc.) will not be suitable for the transaction, since the guarantee and the guarantee fee are on annually declining basis.

Data requirement

The data required for the analysis will be same as data required for securitisation of a static pool.

Documentation

  • Between the NBFC and the PSB, there will be standard assignment documentation.
  • Between the Bank and the GoI:
    • Declaration that requirements of Chapter 11 of the GFR have been satisfied.
    • Guarantee documentation as per format given by GOI

[1] http://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=192618

Other Related Articles :

Government Credit enhancement scheme for NBFC Pools: A win-win for all

Vinod Kothari (vinod@vinodkothari.com)

The so-called partial credit enhancement (PCE) for purchase of NBFC/HFC pools by public sector banks (PSBs) may, if meaningfully implemented, be a win-win for all. The three primary players in the PCE scheme are NBFCs/HFCs (let us collectively called them Originators), the purchasing PSBs, and the Government of India (GoI). The Scheme has the potential to infuse liquidity into NBFCs while at the same time giving them advantage in terms of financing costs, allow PSBs to earn spreads while enjoying the benefit of sovereign guarantee, and allow the GoI to earn a spread of 25 bps virtually carrying no risks at all. This brief write-ups seeks to make this point.

The details of the Scheme with our elaborate questions and answers have been provided elsewhere.

Modus operandi

Broadly, the way we envisage the Scheme working is as follows:

  1. An Originator assimilates a pool of loans, and does tranching/credit enhancements to bring a senior tranche to a level of AA rating. Usually, tranching is associated with securitisation, but there is no reason why tranching cannot be done in case of bilateral transactions such as the one envisaged here. The most common form of tranching is subordination. Other structured finance devices such as turbo amortisation, sequential payment structure, provisions for redirecting the excess spread to pay off the principal on senior tranche, etc., may be deployed as required.
  2. Thus, say, on a pool of Rs 100 crores, the NBFC does so much subordination by way of a junior tranche as to bring the senior tranche to a AA level. The size of subordination may be worked, crudely, by X (usually 3 to 4) multiples of expected losses, or by a proper probability distribution model so as to bring the confidence level of the size of subordination being enough to absorb losses to acceptable AA probability of default. For instance, let us think of this level amounting to 8% (this percentage, needless to say, will depend on the expected losses of respective pools).
  3. Thus, the NBFC sells the pool of Rs 100 crores to PSB, retaining a subordinated 8% share in the same. Bankruptcy remoteness is achieved by true sale of the entire Rs 100 crore pool, with a subordinated share of 8% therein. In bilateral transactions, there is no need to use a trustee; to the extent of the Originator’s subordinated share, the PSB is deemed to be holding the assets in trust for the Originator. Simultaneously, the Originator also retains excess spread over the agreed Coupon Rate with the bank (as discussed below).
  4. Assuming that the fair value (computation of fair value will largely a no-brainer, as the PSB retains principal, and interest only to the extent of its agreed coupon, with the excess spread flowing back to the Originator) comes to the same as the participation of the PSB – 92% or Rs 92 crores, the PSB pays the same to the Originator.
  5. PSB now goes to the GoI and gets the purchase guaranteed by the latter. So, the GoI has guaranteed a purchase of Rs 92 crores, taking a first loss risk of 10% therein, that is, upto Rs 9.20 crores. Notably, for the pool as a whole, the GoI’s share of Rs 9.20 crores becomes a second loss position. However, considering that the GoI is guaranteeing the PSB, the support may technically be called first loss support, with the Originator-level support of Rs 10 crores being separate and independent.
  6. However, it is clear that the sharing of risks between the 3 – the Originator, the GoI and the Bank will be as follows:
  • Losses upto first Rs 8 crores will be taken out of the NBFC’s first loss piece, thereby, implying no risk transfer at all.
  • Losses in excess of Rs 8 crores, but upto a total of Rs 17.20 crores (the GoI guarantee is limited to Rs 9.20 crores), will be taken by GoI.
  • It is only when the loss exceeds Rs 17.20 crores that there is a question of the PSB being hit by losses.
  1. Thus, during the period of the guarantee, the PSB is protected to the extent of 17.2%. Note that first loss piece at the Originator level has been sized up to attain a AA rating. That will mean, higher the risk of the pool, the first loss piece at Originator level will go up to protect the bank.
  2. The PSB, therefore, has dual protection – to the extent of AA rating, from the Originator (or a third party with/without the Originator, as we discuss below), and for the next 10%, from the sovereign.
  3. Now comes the critical question – what will be the coupon rates that the PSB may expect on the pool.
    1. The pool effectively has a sovereign protection. While the protection may seem partial, but it is a tranched protection, and for a AA-rated pool, a 10% thickness of first loss protection is actually far higher than required for the highest degree of safety. What makes the protection even stronger is that the size of the guarantee is fixed at the start of the transaction or start of the financial year, even though the pool continues to amortise, thereby increasing the effective thickness.
    2. Assume risk free rate is R, and the spreads for AAA rated ABS are R +100 bps. Assume that the spreads for AA-rated ABS is R+150 bps.
    3. Given the sovereign protection, the PSB should be able to price the transaction certainly at less than R +100 bps, because sovereign guarantee is certainly safer than AAA. In fact, it should effectively move close to R, but given the other pool risks (prepayment risks, irregular cashflows), one may expect pricing above R.
    4. For the NBFC, the actual cost is the coupon expected by the PSB, plus 25bps paid for the guarantee.
    5. So as long as the coupon rate of the pool for the NBFC is lower than R+75 bps, it is an advantage over a AAA ABS placement. It is to be noted that the NBFC is actually exposing regulatory and economic capital only for the upto-AA risk that it holds.

Win-win for all

If the structure works as above, it is a win-win for all:

  • For the GoI, it is a neat income of 25 bps while virtually taking no real risks. There are 2 strong reasons for this – first, there is a first loss protection by the Originator, to qualify the pool for a AA rating. Secondly, the guarantee is limited only for 2 years. For any pool, first of all, the probability of losses breaching a AA-barrier itself will be close to 1% (meaning, 99% of the cases, the credit support at AA level will be sufficient). This becomes even more emphatic, if we consider the fact that the guarantee will be removed after 2 years. The losses may pile up above the Originator’s protection, but very unlikely that this will happen over 2 years.
  • For the PSB, while getting the benefit of a sovereign guarantee, and therefore, effectively, investing in something which is better than AAA, the PSB may target a spread close to AAA.
  • For the NBFC, it is getting a net advantage in terms of funding cost. Even if the pricing moves close to AAA ABS spreads, the NBFC stands to gain as the regulatory capital eaten up is only what is required for a AA-support.

The overall benefits for the system are immense. There is release of liquidity from the banking system to the economy. Depending on the type of pools Originators will be selling, there may be asset creation in form of home loans, or working capital loans (LAP loans may effectively be that), or loans for transport vehicles. If the GoI objective of buying pools upto Rs 100000 crores gets materialised, as much funding moves from banks to NBFCs, which is obviously already deployed in form of assets. The GoI makes an income of Rs 250 crores for effectively no risk.

In fact, if the GoI gains experience with the Scheme, there may be very good reason for lowering the rating threshold to A level, particularly in case of home loans.

Capital treatment, rating methodologies and other preparations

To make the Scheme really achieve its objectives, there are several preparations that may have to come soon enough:

  • Rating agencies have to develop methodologies for rating this bilateral pool transfer. Effectively, this is nothing but a structured pool transfer, akin to securitisation. Hence, rating methodologies used for securitisation may either be applied as they are, or tweaked to apply to the transfers under the Scheme.
  • Very importantly, the RBI may have to clarify that the AA risk retention by Originators under the Scheme will lead to regulatory capital requirement only upto the risk retained by the NBFC. This should be quite easy for the RBI to do – because there are guidelines for securitisation already, and the Scheme has all features of securitisation, minus the fact that there is no SPV or issuance of “securities” as such.

Conclusion

Whoever takes the first transaction to market will have to obviously do a lot of educating – PSBs, rating agencies, law firms, SIDBI, and of course, DFS. However, the exercise is worth it, and it may not take 6 months as envisaged for the GoI to reach the target of Rs 1 lakh crores.


Other related articles: