Dissolution without Resolution- A disguised Strike-off under IBC?

Megha Mittal


In a first of its kind, the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal, Bengaluru Bench vide its order dated 16th November, 2020, in the matter of Synew Steel Private Limited[1], has ordered for direct dissolution from CIRP, thereby waiving off the mandatory requirement to undergo the liquidation process.

The said order was inspired by the fact that the corporate debtor had nil assets, which in turn made it certain that the liquidation process would not have been successful. Hence, to save the unfruitful costs that would have been incurred, the corporate debtor was allowed a direct dissolution.

In this article, the author makes a humble attempt to analyse this rather path-breaking order, and the implications it may carry.

Read more

MCA need not be mandatorily impleaded in applications: NCLAT sets-aside directions issued by of Principal Bench

Megha Mittal


The Hon’ble National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (‘NCLAT’), vide its order dated 22nd May, 2020[1] set aside the directions issued by the Hon’ble Principal Bench for impleadment of Ministry of Corporate Affairs (‘MCA’) as a respondent-party to all applications filed under the Companies Act, 2013 and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

This comes in light of the order dated 22nd November, 2019 of the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal, Principal Bench of New Delhi (‘NCLT’/ ‘Principal Bench’), in the matter of Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Sikka Papers Ltd. & Ors[2], wherein the Hon’ble NCLT directed that “…In all cases of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, and Company Petition, the Union of India, Ministry of Corporate Affairs through the Secretary be impleaded as a party respondent so that authentic record is made available by the officers of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs for proper appreciation of the matters..”(‘Impugned Directions’). The said requirement was directed to be made applicable in all benches of NCLT, pan-India.

Read more

Washout of Prior-period Claims in Resolution Plans: Rajasthan HC closes the door for pre-CIRP claims after revival of Corporate Debtor

Megha Mittal & Shreya Jain


Colloquially referred to as a ‘rebirth’, a resolution plan is the revival route for the corporate debtor, free of its past liabilities and dues, paid in accordance with the approved plan. Having said so, it might be noted that resolution plans assume the status of a statutory binding contract once approved by the adjudicating authority. Recently, the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court, in Ultra Tech Nathdwara Cement Ltd., (formerly known as Binani Cements Ltd.) vs. Commissioner, Central Goods And Service Tax and Central Excise Commissionerate and Ors.[1], held that no demands can be raised by any statutory body, for a period prior to the approval and finalization of resolution plan, after the resolution plan is successfully implemented.

The details of the case have been discussed below.

Read more


-Richa Saraf


The Apex Court, vide its order dated 22.01.2020, in the matter of Maharasthra Seamless Limited vs. Padmanabhan Venkatesh & Ors.[1] held that there is no requirement that the resolution plan should match the maximized asset value of the corporate debtors. Reiterating the principle laid down in the case of Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta[2], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that once a resolution plan is approved by the committee of creditors (CoC), the Adjudicating Authority has limited power of judicial review.

The judgment of the Supreme Court boldly brings out the object of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“Code”), i.e. “resolution before liquidation”. However, it will be pertinent to understand whether this ruling should be considered as a benchmark? Further, what will be the situation in case of liquidation? Whether sale under liquidation can be done for a value lower than the reserve price?

Below we analyse the ruling, seeking to answer the aforementioned questions.

Read more


Richa Saraf


It is common business practice for group entities to regularly engage in related party transactions such as cross collateralisation, guarantee comforts, tunnelling or significant influence arrangements. While such structures largely respect the separate legal status of the group companies, practice suggests such inter-linkages in business, operations and management often raise significant challenges when any one or more entity in the group become insolvent[1]. In such cases, for maximisation of value to the stakeholders and to enhance the prospects of resolution, creditors may seek for substantive consolidation.

Read more

The ‘net concentrate’ of ‘preference- Key takeaways from the SC ruling regarding preferential transactions

-Sikha Bansal


The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s ruling in Jaypee [Civil Appeal Nos. 8512-8527 of 2019] stands as a landmark for two reasons – first, it deals with an otherwise unexplored periphery of vulnerable transactions in the context of insolvency, and secondly, it will have far-reaching impacts on how secured transactions are structured and the manner in which the lenders lend.

Read more

Limits of the Limitation Law and IBC

-Megha Mittal


The law of limitation revolves around the basic concept of fixing or prescribing the time period for barring legal actions beyond that period. A concept widely acknowledged, in India, the law of limitation is governed by the Limitation Act, 1963[1]. As stated in its preamble, the Limitation Act, 1963 (“Act”) is an act to consolidate the laws for the limitation of suits and other proceedings and for purposes connected therewith.

As observed in the 89th Report of the Law Commission of India[2], the laws of limitation are ultimately based on justice and convenience. An individual should not live under the threat of possible action for an indefinite period, and at the same time, should be saved from the task of defending a stale cause of action, as it would be unjust. The Report states, “all that has been said on the subject can be summarised by stating that the laws of limitation rest upon three main foundations – justice, convenience and the need to encourage diligence.” 

The very crux of having a limitation law in force is that a person cannot sleep over his rights[3] for an indefinite period and seek such remedy at a later stage. That being the tenet on which the law is based, there are several basic principles which the law states. These principles substantively affect the rights of parties. Recently, there has been a lot of commotion around the manner and the circumstances, in which the limitation law can be invoked in the context of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘Code’), though it is established now that the limitation law is applicable to the proceedings under the Code by virtue of section 238A.

In this article, we have made a humble attempt to analyse the various principles of the Limitation Act and its impact on the Code.

Read more

Out-and-Out Ouster of Ineligible Persons- Liquidation Amendment Regulations, 2020 enact Discussion Paper proposals

-Megha Mittal


The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (“IBBI”/ “Board”) vide Notification No. IBBI/2019-20/GN/REG053, dated 06.01.2020, introduced the IBBI (Liquidation Process) (Amendment) Regulations, 2020 (“Amendment Regulations”) w.e.f. the same day.

In what seems to be an adaptation of the ideas proposed in the Discussion Paper dated 03.11.2019[1], the Amendment Regulations seem to have provided for  “out-and-out ouster” approach towards persons ineligible under section 29A of the Code, in liquidation processes too, thereby imbibing in the Liquidation Process Regulations, the orders of the Hon’ble National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) in Jindal Steel and Power Limited v. Arun Kumar Jagatramka & Gujarat NRE Coke Limited (Company Appeal (AT) No. 221 of 2018)[2] and State Bank of India v. Anuj Bajpai (Liquidator) (Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 509 of 2019)[3]

Read more


-Richa Saraf (resolution@vinodkothari.com)

It is a well settled principle that a writ petition may be entertained by the High Courts only in absence of any efficacious alternate remedy. However, one of the exceptions to the said rule is where there is lack of jurisdiction on the part of the statutory/ quasi- judicial authority, against whose order a judicial review is sought. In the recent case of Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors.[1], the primary issue for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was with regard to the jurisdiction of High Court to grant relief against the order of NCLT, disrupting the hierarchy laid down by the Code. For the said purpose, the Apex Court examined the limitations on the power exercisable by the Adjudicating Authority, and held that in case any party is aggrieved by the decision of NCLT, the Code provides for filing of an appeal before NCLAT, however, considering the exercise of excess jurisdiction by the NCLT, the High Court may entertain a petition under Article 226/ 227 of the Constitution.

The article analyses the impact of the ruling on the jurisdiction of NCLT to deal with various matters related to the corporate debtor under insolvency or liquidation.


The National Company Law Tribunal, Chennai Bench vide order dated 12.03.2018 ordered for initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process of Tiffins Barytes Asbestos & Paints Ltd. (“Corporate Debtor”).

The Corporate Debtor held a mining lease granted by the Government of Karnataka, which was to expire on 25.05.2018. A notice for pre- termination of the lease was issued by the Government of Karnataka before CIRP commencement, on ground of violation of various statutory rules, and terms and conditions of the lease agreement, however, the order of termination was passed by the Government of Karnataka after the commencement of CIRP.

The RP filed an application before NCLT, Chennai, praying for setting aside of the order of Government of Karnataka, and seeking a declaration that the lease should be deemed to be valid until 31.03.2020 in terms of Section 8A(6) of the Mines & Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (“Mines Act”), and also, a consequential direction on the Government of Karnataka to enter into a supplemental lease deed. The Adjudicating Authority allowed the RP’s application, setting aside the order of Government of Karnataka on the ground that the same is in violation to the moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. Challenging the order of NCLT, Government of Karnataka moved a writ petition before High Court of Karnataka, wherein the Hon’ble High Court granted a stay of operation of the NCLT directions. The RP, the Resolution Applicant and the Committee of Creditors (“Appellants”) then filed an appeal before the Supreme Court against the interim order passed by the High Court.


1. IBC is a complete code in itself and has an overriding effect over other laws: The Code covers the entire gamut of law relating to insolvency resolution of corporate persons and others in a time bound manner, therefore, one of the contentions raised in the matter was that there exists no room to challenge the orders of NCLT, otherwise than in the manner provided in the Code.  In this regard, it was contended that Section 60(5) provides an exclusive jurisdiction to NCTL to deal with all the matters relating to the corporate debtor. The relevant extract is reproduced below for reference:

“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, NCLT shall have jurisdiction to entertain or dispose of –

(a) any application or proceeding by or against the corporate debtor or corporate person;

(b) any claim made by or against the corporate debtor or corporate person, including claims by or against any of its subsidiaries situated in India; and

(c) any question of priorities or any question of law or facts, arising out of or in relation to the insolvency resolution or liquidation proceedings of the corporate debtor or corporate person under this Code.”

 Further, since Section 238 stipulates that the provisions of this Code shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law, the only option available with the RP is to move an application before NCLT under the provisions of the Code.

The Apex Court discussed the limitation on the jurisdiction of NCLT to exercise its power under Section 60(5). It held that NCLT is a creature of a special statute to discharge certain specific functions, and it cannot be elevated to the status of a superior court having the power of judicial review over administrative action. Observing that NCLT is not even a civil court, which has been granted the jurisdiction, by virtue of Section 9 of the Code of Civil procedure, to try suits of civil nature, and therefore, NCLT can only exercise only such powers which are within the contours of jurisdiction prescribed by the statute, which it is required to administer.

Citing an instance where a corporate debtor may have suffered an order at the hands of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, at the time of initiation of CIRP, the Apex Court observed that if Section 60(5)(c) of the Code is interpreted to include all questions of law or facts under the sky, an RP will then claim a right to challenge the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal before the NCLT, instead of moving a statutory appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the jurisdiction of NCLT laid down in Section 60(5) cannot be stretched so far as to bring such absurd results.

2. Measure to protect the asset of the Corporate Debtor: Section 25(1) of the Code stipulates that it shall be the duty of the resolution professional to preserve and protect the assets of the corporate debtor, and therefore, the IRP moved the NCLT for appropriate reliefs, for the purpose of preservation of properties of the Corporate Debtor.

It was further contended by the counsel of the IRP that Section 14 of the IBC granted a deemed extension of lease, and therefore, the application before NCLT was only for declaration of that the lease is valid. In this regard, reliance was placed on Section 14(1)(d) which prohibits, during the period of moratorium, the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor where such property is occupied by or in the possession of the corporate debtor.

The Supreme Court observed that the moratorium provided for in Section 14 cannot have any impact on the right of the Government to refuse extension of lease. The Apex Court discussed the purpose and scope of moratorium and held that moratorium is only to preserve the “status quo and not to create a new right. Analysing the provision contained in Section 14(1)(d), it was held that the said section will not go to the rescue of the Corporate Debtor since what is provided therein is only the right not to be dispossessed but does not by itself provides the right which the Corporate Debtor does not otherwise have (in the instant case, the right to have the renewal of lease). Further, considering that there existed disputes arising under the Mines Act, and those revolving around decisions of statutory or quasi-judicial authorities, the Supreme Court deliberated on the provisions contained in Section 18(f)(vi) of the Code-

The IRP shall take control and custody of any asset over which the corporate debtor has ownership rights as recorded in the balance sheet of the corporate debtor, or with information utility or the depository of securities or any other registry that records the ownership of assets, including assets subject to the determination of ownership by a court or authority.”

If the intent of the Code was to confer with NCLT the jurisdiction to decide all types of claims relating to the asset of the corporate debtor, Section 18(f)(vi) would not have provided for determination of ownership by a court or other authority, and therefore, the Apex Court held that wherever the corporate debtor has to exercise rights in judicial, quasi- judicial proceedings, the RP cannot short- circuit the same and bring a claim before NCLT taking advantage of Section 60(5).

3. Jurisdiction based on consensus between parties: One of the contentions raised in the appeal was that since the State of Karnataka recognised the jurisdiction of NCLT for raising all its contentions, it was not open to the Government to later question the jurisdiction of the NCLT in next round of litigation. The Apex Court held that the fact that the Government of Karnataka conceded to the jurisdiction of the NCLT does not ipso facto provide NCLT with the jurisdiction to entertain any application. NCLT is a creature of statue, any jurisdiction to the NCLT has also been granted by the statute, and the mere agreement between parties to approach a particular court or tribunal does not automatically provide jurisdiction to a court.


From the above discussion, it is clear that the jurisdiction of Adjudicating Authority is confined only to contractual matters between parties, and an order passed by a statutory/ quasi- judicial authority under certain special laws, or which falls in the realm of public law, cannot be determined by NCLT. A decision taken by the government or a statutory authority cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be brought within the fold of “arising out of or in relation to insolvency resolution” as appearing in Section 60 of the Code. The correctness of the said decision can be called into question only in a superior court vested with the power of judicial review over administrative action.


[1] https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2019/33953/33953_2019_4_1501_18757_Judgement_03-Dec-2019.pdf