Highlights of Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2019

by Vinod Kothari 

The Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2019 has been placed before the Parliament[1] on 25th July, 2019. While the Bill, 2019 is largely to enact into Parliamentary law the provisions already promulgated by way of Presidential Ordinance, the Bill also brings some interesting changes.

The key feature of the Bill is to replace the existing system of judicial prosecution for offences by a departmental process of imposition of penalties. As a result, while the monetary burden on companies may go up, but offenders will not be having to face criminal courts and the stigma attached with the same.

Some of the other highlights of the changes are as follows:

Dematerialisation of securities may now be enforced against private companies too

It is notable that amendments were made by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017 effective from 10th September, 2018 effective from 2nd October, 2018, whereby all public unlisted companies were required to ensure that the issue and transfer of securities shall henceforth be done in dematerialised mode only. This provision alone had brought about major cleansing of the system, as in lots of cases, shareholding records included men of straw.

However, the reality of India’s corporate sector is private companies, constituting roughly 90% of the total number of incorporated companies.

The provision of section 29 is now being extended to all companies, public and private. This means, that the Govt may now mandate dematerialisation for shares of private companies too. Whether this requirement will be made applicable only for new issues of capital by private companies, or will require all existing shares also to be dematerialised, remains to be seen, but if it is the latter, the impact of this will be no lesser than “demonetisation-2” at least for the corporate sector. Evidently, all shareholders of all private companies will have to come within the system by getting their holdings dematerliaised.

CSR is now mandatory, and unspent amounts will go to PM’s Funds

When the provision for corporate social responsibility was introduced by Companies Act 2013, the-then minister Sachin Pilot went public to say, the provision will follow what is globally known as “comply or explain” (COREX). That is, companies will not be mandated to spend on CSR – the board report will only give reasons for not spending.

Notwithstanding the above, over the last few months, registry offices have sent show-cause notices to thousands of companies for not spending as required, disregarding the so-called reasons given in the Board report.

Now, the rigour being added takes CSR spending to a completely different level:

  • If companies are not able to spend the targeted amount, then they are required to contribute the unspent money to the Funds mentioned in Scheduled VII, for example, PM’s National Relief Fund.
  • Companies may retain amounts only to the extent required for on-going projects. There will be rule-making for what are eligible on-going projects. Even in case of such on-going projects, the amount required will be put into a special account within 30 days from the end of the financial year, from where it must be spent within the next 3 years, and if not spent, will once again be transferable to the Funds mentioned in Schedule VII.
  • Failure to comply with the provisions makes the company liable to a fine, but very seriously, officers of the company will be liable to be imprisoned for upto 3 years, or pay a fine extending to Rs 5 lacs. Given the fact that the major focus of the Injecti Srinivas Committee Report, which the Ordinance tried to implement, was to restrict custodial punishment only to most grave offences involving public interest, this by itself is an outlier.

Unfit and improper persons not to manage companies

The concept of undesirable persons managing companies was there in sections 388B to 388E of the Companies Act, 1956. These sections were dropped by the recommendations of the JJ Irani Committee. Similar provisions are now making a comeback, by insertions in sections 241 to 243 of the Act. These insertions obviously seem a reaction to the recent spate of corporate scandals particularly in the financial sector. Provisions smacking similar were recently added in the RBI Act by the Finance Bill.

The amendment in section 241 empowers the Central Govt to move a matter before the NCLT against managerial personnel on several grounds. The grounds themselves are fairly broadly worded, and have substantial amplitude to allow the Central Govt to substantiate its case. Included in the grounds are matters like fraud, misfeasance, persistent negligence, default in carrying out

obligations and functions under the law, breach of trust. While these are still criminal or quasi-criminal charges, the  notable one is  not conducting the business of the company on  “sound business principles or prudent commercial practices”. Going by this, in case of every failed business model, at least in hindsight, one may allege the persons in charge of the management were unfit and improper.

Once the NCLT has passed an order against such managerial person, such person shall not hold as a director, or “any other office connected with the conduct and management of the affairs of any

Company”. This would mean the indicted person has to mandatorily take a gardening leave of 5 years!

Disgorgement of properties in case of corporate frauds

In case of corporate frauds revealed by investigation by SFIO, the Govt may make an application to NCLT for passing appropriate orders for disgorgement of profits or assets of an officer or person or entity which has obtained undue benefit.

[1] https://www.prsindia.org/sites/default/files/bill_files/Companies%20%28Amendment%29%20Bill%2C%202019_0.pdf

Ind AS vs Qualifying Criteria for NBFCs-Accounting requirements resulting in regulatory mismatch?

-Financial Services Division and IFRS Division,  (finserv@vinodkothari.com  ifrs@vinodkothari.com)

The transition of accounting policies for the non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) is on the verge of being completed. As was laid down in the implementation guide issued by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, the Indian Accounting Standard (Ind AS) was to be implemented in the following manner:

Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs)
Phase I


 From 1st April, 2018 (with comparatives for the periods ending on 31st  March, 2018)
·         NBFCs having net worth of rupees five hundred crore or more (whether listed or unlisted)
·         holding, subsidiary, joint venture and associates companies of above NBFC other than those already covered under corporate roadmap shall also apply from said date
Phase II From 1st April, 2019 (with comparatives for the periods ending on 31st March, 2019)
·         NBFCs whose equity and/or debt securities are listed or in the process of listing on any stock exchange in India or outside India and having net worth less than rupees five hundred crore


·         NBFCs that are unlisted companies, having net worth of rupees two-hundred and fifty crore  or more but less than rupees five hundred crore
·         holding, subsidiary, joint venture and associate companies of above other than those already covered under the corporate roadmap
· Unlisted NBFCs having net worth below two-hundred and fifty crore shall not apply Ind AS.

· Voluntary adoption of Ind AS is not allowed (allowed only when required as per roadmap)

· Applicable for both Consolidated and Individual Financial Statements

As may be noted, the NBFCs have been classified into three major categories – a) Large NBFCs (those with net worth of ₹ 500 crores or more), b) Mid-sized NBFCs (those with net worth of ₹ 250 crores – ₹ 500 crores) and c) Small NBFCs (unlisted NBFCs with net worth of less than ₹ 250 crores).

The implementation of Ind AS for Large NBFCs has already been completed, and those for Mid-sized NBFCs is in process; the Small NBFCs are anyways not required implementation.

The NBFCs are facing several implementation challenges, more so because the regulatory framework for NBFCs have not undergone any change, despite the same being closely related to accounting framework. Several compliance requirements under the prudential norms are correlated with the financial statements of the NBFCs, however, several principles in Ind AS are contradictory in nature.

One such issue of contradiction relates to determination of qualifying assets for the purpose of NBFC classification. RBI classifies NBFCs into different classes depending on the nature of the business they carry on like Infrastructure Finance Companies, Factoring Companies, Micro Finance Companies and so on. In addition to the principal business criteria which is applicable to all NBFCs, RBI has also laid down special conditions specific to the business carried on by the different classes of NBFCs. For instance, the additional qualifying criteria for NBFC-IFCs are:

(a) a minimum of 75 per cent of its total assets deployed in “infrastructure loans”;

(b) Net owned funds of Rs.300 crore or above;

(c) minimum credit rating ‘A’ or equivalent of CRISIL, FITCH, CARE, ICRA, Brickwork Rating India Pvt. Ltd. (Brickwork) or equivalent rating by any other credit rating agency accredited by RBI;

(d) CRAR of 15 percent (with a minimum Tier I capital of 10 percent)

Similarly, there are conditions laid down for other classes of NBFCs as well. The theme of this article revolves the impact of the Ind AS implementation of the conditions such as these, especially the ones dealing with sectoral deployment of assets or qualifying assets. But before we examine the specific impact of Ind AS on the compliance, let us first understand the implications of the requirement.

Relevance of sectoral deployment of funds/ qualifying assets for NBFCs

The requirement, such as the one discussed above, that is, of having 75% of the total assets deployed in infrastructure loans by the company happens to be a qualifying criteria. IFCs are registered with the understanding that they will operate predominantly to cater the requirements of the infrastructure sector and therefore, their assets should also be deployed in the infrastructure sector. However, once the thresholds are satisfied, the remaining part of the assets can be deployed elsewhere, as per the discretion of the NBFC.

The above requirement, in its simplest form, means to have intentional and substantial amount of the total assets of the NBFC in question to be deployed in the infrastructure area, both, at the time of registration, as well as a regulatory requirement, which has to be met over time. Breaching the same would result in non-fulfilment of the RBI regulations.

Impact of Ind AS on the qualifying criteria

The above requirement might seem simple, however, with the implementation of Ind AS on NBFC, there can be important issues which might result in the breach of the above requirement.

With the overall slogan of “Substance over Form”, and promoting “Fair Value Accounting” and an aim to make the financial statements more transparent and just, Ind AS have been implemented. However, the same fair value accounting can result in a mismatch of regulatory requirement, to such an extent that the repercussion may have a serious impact on the existence of being an NBFC.

As already stated above, once an NBFC satisfies the qualifying criteria, it can deploy the remaining assets anywhere as per its discretion. Let us assume a case, where the remaining assets are deployed in equity instruments of other companies. All this while, under the Indian GAAP, investments in equity shares were recorded in the books of accounts as per their book value, but with the advent of Ind AS, most of these investments are now required to be recorded on fair values. This logic not only applies in case of equity instruments, but in other classes of financial instruments, other than those eligible for classification as per amortised cost method.

The problem arises when the fair value of the financial instruments, other than the NBFC category specific loans like infrastructure loans, exceed the permitted level of diversification (in case of IFC – 25% of the total assets). Such a situation leads to a question whether this will breach the qualifying criteria for the NBFC. A numeric illustration to understand the situation better has been provided below:

Say, an NBFC-IFC, having a total asset size of Rs. 1,000 crores would be required to have 75% of the total assets deployed in infrastructure loans i.e. Rs. 750 crores. The remaining Rs. 250 crores is free for discretionary deployments. Let us assume that the entire Rs. 250 crores have been deployed in other financial assets.

Now, say, after fair valuation of such other financial assets, the value of such assets increases to ₹ 500 crores, this will lead to the following:

Under Indian GAAP Under Ind AS

(in ₹ crores)

As per a % of total assets Amount

(in ₹ crores)

As per a % of total assets
Infrastructure Loans 750 75% 750 60%
Other financial assets 250 25% 500 40%
Total assets 1000 100% 1250 100%


Therefore, if one goes by the face of the balance sheet of the NBFC, there is a clear breach as per the Ind AS accounting, as the qualifying asset comes down to 60% as against the required level of 75%. However, is it justified to take such a view?

The above interpretation is counter-intuitive.

It may be noted that the stress is on “deployment” of its assets by an IFC. Merely because the value of the equity has appreciated due to fair valuation, it cannot be argued that the IFC has breached its maximum discretionary investment limits. The deployment was only limited to 25% or so to say that even though the fair value of the exposure has gone up but the real exposure of the NBFC is only to the extent of 25%. Under Ind AS, the fair value of an exposure may vary but the real exposure will remain unchanged.

Taking any other interpretation will be counter-intuitive. If the equity in question appreciates in value, and if the fair value is captured as the value of the asset in the balance sheet, the IFC will be required to increase its exposure on infrastructure loans. But the IFC in question may be already fully invested, and may not have any funding capability to extend any further infrastructure loans. Under circumstances, one cannot argue that the IFC must be forced to disinvest its equities to bring down its investment in equities, particularly as the same had nothing to do with “deployment” of funds.

This is further fortified by Para 10. Accounting of Investments, Chapter V- Prudential Regulations of the Master Direction – Non-Banking Financial Company – Systemically Important Non-Deposit taking Company and Deposit taking Company (Reserve Bank) Directions, 2016 about valuation of equities:

“Quoted current investments for each category shall be valued at cost or market value whichever is lower”.

Hence, the RBI Regulations have been framed keeping in view the historical cost accounting. There is no question of taking into consideration any increase in fair value of investments.


Therefore, it is safe to say that while determining the compliance with qualifying criteria, one must consider real exposures and not fair value of exposures as the same is neither in spirit of the regulations nor seems logical. This will however be tested over time as we are sure the regulator will have its own say in this, however, until anything contrary is issued in this regard, the above notion seems logical.

SEBI requires companies to be serious in reporting Insider Trading lapses

Pammy Jaiswal

Partner, Vinod Kothari and Company


The listed entities are burdened with the compliance requirements under numerous regulations issued by SEBI including the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 (‘PIT Regulations’). The said regulations lay down various to dos for the listed companies as well as the designated persons (‘DP’) for the purpose of regulating and prohibiting the insider trading in the securities of the listed company.

SEBI has vide its circular[1] dated 19th July, 2019 laid a format for reporting insider trading lapses thereby forcing all companies to follow a standard reporting format. The existing practice of companies using rather informal and self- generated reporting formats will no longer be available to them.

It is not that insider trading lapses noted by companies are those of profiteering based on Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (UPSI). Most of the noted instances in practice are technical and unintentional breaches of either the trading window closure or contra trading restrictions. Most of these are reported to the audit committee or stakeholder’s relationship committee which typically takes action based on the gravity of the offence. However, reporting to SEBI was done on a rather diminutive manner.

Further, the circular also provides for recording the violations in the digital database maintained by the compliance officer under the PIT Regulations for the purpose of taking appropriate action against the offender. The said circular is effective with immediate effect.

Current Reporting Scenario

The current practice of the corporates for reporting the violation under the code (either for entering into contra-trade within a period of six months or trading during the closure of trading window, etc.) along with the action taken by the entity is diverse. While some companies used to mark a copy of the reprimand to SEBI while sending the same to the concerned DP or their immediate relatives, others used to send a brief of the violation along with the action taken to SEBI depending on the frequency and gravity of the violation so made in accordance with their respective codes.

Revised Reporting

The revised reporting format contains all the required fields for the entity (listed entity, intermediary or fiduciary) to report the violation to SEBI. Following is the summary of details that is mandatory required to be filled up about the entity, the DP or his immediate relative and the violation along with the action taken by the entity:

Information about the entity Information about the DP/ immediate relative Transaction details
·            Name and capacity of the entity.

·            Action taken by the entity.

·            Reasons for the action taken.

·     Name and PAN.


·     Designation and functional role of DP.


·     Whether a part of the promoter and promoter group or holding CXO position.



·      Name of the scrip

·      No. and value of shares traded (including pledge)

·      In case trading value exceeds Rs. 10 lakhs date of disclosure made under regulation 7 of the PIT Regulations by both the entity as well as the concerned person.


·      Details of violation observed under the PIT Regulations.


·      Instances of any violation in the previous financial year.

Concluding Remarks

Evidently, the format contains concrete information about the violation which will place SEBI in a better position to oversee and take on record the instances of violation taking place in the regulated entities. While the current practice had deficiencies in terms of the basic information supplied to SBI, the revised reporting format will take care of the same henceforth.

However, the prompt reporting will be a task for the entities. At the same time, SEBI will now be in receipt of the complete information on the offence and may take strict action against the offender or may even direct the entities to take stricter action in cases where it feels the action taken is not commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violation.


Our other resources on SEBI PIT Regulations can be viewed here

[1] https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/jul-2019/standardizing-reporting-of-violations-related-to-code-of-conduct-under-sebi-prohibition-of-insider-trading-regulations-2015_43618.html

Abrupt auditor resignations: SEBI seeks transparency

By Vinod Kothari & Vinita Nair,

Partner, Vinod Kothari & Co


A SEBI proposal by way of a Consultative Paper[1] to amend Reg. 33 of SEBI (LODR) Regulations seeks to lay down in the rule book of listed entities that when auditors want to resign in the middle of an auditing assignment, they cannot be allowed to leave citing reasons such as “pre-occupation”. They must be encouraged and asked to open their heart, and speak out the real reason, or confirm that there is no reason other than the one that they mention while resigning. Also, the auditor must not leave the auditee in the lurch, and complete the on-going audit engagement to the point of completing the audit of the year or limited review of the quarter. The resignation must be discussed with the Audit Committee chairman, and thence, to the Audit Committee, highlighting the concerns, if any. The views of the Audit Committee will be filed before the stock exchanges.

In essence, the proposal of SEBI tries to implement what seems to be the clear intent – that the veil of secrecy behind auditor resignation, where everyone can sense that everything is not alright but does not get to know what exactly it is – should be lifted.

Inspiration of the proposed amendment

The inspiration of the SEBI proposal is the recent turmoil in the corporate sector, where, mostly in the midst of worsening financial position, auditors put in papers. There are rumours of auditors’ discomfort with the financial statements; mostly people smell transactions that may involve transfer of assets to connected entities, inflation of profits or hiding of losses. One wonders as to why most of these resignations come only when the financial position of the entity is suddenly worsening – is it that in good times, financial statements are immune from such vulnerable transactions or practices? However, it mostly seems that an impending default will bring the entity into regulatory glare, and the auditor may have to face persecution action.

What has made the auditor fraternity even more jittered is the action of the regulators against auditors of a failed financial entity, seeking to use the very heavy provisions of section 140 (5) of the Companies Act. It is just a matter of time when the country will see witness class action suits against auditors, which abound in the Western world.

The instinctive auditor action in such cases is, try to control the damage by quitting the scene, rather than qualify the statements which, in the past, have been affirmed by the same auditor. Of course, the reasons cited can be as slippery as “pre-occupation” or lack of bandwidth.

It was reported in 2018 that the Minister of State for Corporate Affairs, P P Chaudhary’s written reply to the Rajya Sabha stated that as per the filings in MCA 21 registry, auditors of 204 listed entities had resigned since January 1, 2018 to July 17, 2018.

ICAI also constituted a Group and the task of developing guidance for the members was entrusted to the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AASB). In December 2018, ICAI released ‘Implementation Guide on Resignation/Withdrawal from an Engagement to Perform Audit of Financial Statements[2] which provides matters to be included in the resignation letter (Para 19) which is similar to the Annex-B of the SEBI Consultative Paper. It additionally required the response from the management or those charged with governance, on the written communication made by the auditor, to be included in the resignation letter.

Is it wrong to resign?

No, as ICAI’s auditing standards (SA-705) provides the situation under which an auditor may resign from the audit. If the auditor concludes that the possible effects on the financial statements of undetected misstatements, if any, could be both material and pervasive so that a qualification of the opinion would be inadequate to communicate the gravity of the situation, the auditor shall resign from the audit, where practicable and not prohibited by law or regulation.

Is it necessary to cite reason for resignation?

Section 140 (2) of Companies Act, 2013 mandates an auditor to indicate the reason and other facts as regard to its resignation while filing the statement of resignation with the Registrar and the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India, where applicable.

What is meaning of resignation?

It is important to note that the appointment of an auditor is done for a term of 5 years. Therefore, even if an auditor resigns after completion of the audit for a financial year, within the term of 5 years, it is still a case of resignation.

Provisions of section 139 (9) may be interpreted to mean that the auditor may actually state before a general meeting, within the term of 5 years, that he is not willing to be reappointed. However, is that a case of resignation?

Read with section 140 (2), even an unwillingness to be reappointed becomes a case of resignation. This is so because the appointment is done for 5 years, and the ratification of the appointment at the annual general meeting, every year during the 5 year term, has been done way with by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017 w.e.f. May 7, 2018.

Therefore, the following are some examples of what may be construed as a case of resignation:

(a) The auditor was appointed in the AGM of Year 1, for completing the audit for FY 1 to FY 5, until the  conclusion of the AGM for year 5. At the end of Year 2, after completing the audit of year 2, auditor gives a letter to the management that the auditor is not willing to audit for year 3.

(b) Same case as above, however, instead of the auditor indicating unwillingness to be reappointed, the audit committee while evaluating the performance of the auditor does not recommend continuation of appointment.

(c) Same case as (a), however, the auditor becomes ineligible to continue.

Case (a) is a case of resignation; (b) is a case of removal and (c) is a case of vacation of office resulting in casual vacancy.

SEBI’s prescription: Reveal the truth

The resigning auditor shall reveal all the reasons for resignation in the resignation letter along with the efforts made by the auditor prior to resignation. Whom the concern was raised? In relation to what the concern was raised? Why the concern was not addressed – due to a management-imposed limitation or circumstances beyond the control of the management. The auditor is expected to pour his heart out in the resignation letter, which is in line with the prescription made in ICAI’s implementation guide.

Role of Audit Committee

After the auditor approaches the Chairman/ Audit Committee, the Audit Committee has to communicate its views to the management and the auditor, which is also required to be disclosed to the stock exchange.

As per SEBI (LODR) Regulations, the Audit Committee is responsible for the appointment, performance evaluation, ensuring independence of the auditors, finalising the audit plan and reviewing and monitoring effectiveness of the audit process. The Audit Committee is also required to mandatorily review management letters / letters of internal control weaknesses issued by the statutory auditors.

Auditor duty to complete pending assignments

The language seems unclear. The Consultative Paper provides that if the auditor makes a decision to resign in August, 2019 the auditor shall issue the audit report for the quarter ended September 30.

However, the proposed amendment to SEBI (LODR) Regulations mandates issuance of the limited review/audit report for that financial year/ quarter, as applicable, before such resignation (i.e. previous financial year/ quarter in reference to the date of resignation).

It will be logical to interpret that the auditor will resign first, and then complete the audit/ limited review for the current/ on-going quarter.

Concluding remarks

Thankfully, for all Indians, one can relate most tricky situations in life to a Bollywood song, and that really helps to dismiss the gravity of the matter. When it comes to something like auditor’s resignations (judaai), or auditors’  silence (khamoshi), there will a large number of songs or flicks on such situations, evidently the popular themes for Bollywood. Therefore, without claiming to be the best for the situation, here is one that may possibly help to lighten the pain that SEBI and investors may be having:

कभी ऐसा लगता है
दिल में एक राज़ है
जिसे कहना चाहूँ, पर मैं कह पाऊँ ना
आँखों ही आँखों में कह जाती है जो ये
खामोशियों की ये कैसी ज़ुबां
मैंने सुना जो ना उसने कहा

[1] https://www.sebi.gov.in/web/?file=https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/jul-2019/1563449963980.pdf#page=1&zoom=auto,-15,842

[2] https://resource.cdn.icai.org/52929aasbicai-igr.pdf

Applicability of NFRA Rules on overseas subsidiaries and associates: Conflict between the Rules and FAQs

Pammy Jaiswal

Partner, Vinod Kothari and Company



National Financial Reporting Authority (‘NFRA’) being a quasi-judicial authority has been empowered by the Central Government to independently regulate and monitor the accounting and auditing standards (‘A&AS’). The intent of NFRA is to oversee the quality of A&AS of large entities as mentioned under Rule 3 (1) of the NFRA Rules.

Evidently NFRA intends to oversee the A&AS of large entities in terms of being listed or the size of the company or being functionally different entities like electricity companies or insurance companies, etc. Such entities have the presence of its subsidiaries and associates all around the world which may be contributing materially in terms of Rule 3 (1) (e) of the NFRA Rules to the net worth and turnover of the Indian parent entity.

While the last date for filing one time return by bodies corporate is approaching fast i.e. 31st July, 2019, there seems to a lot of ambiguity in the applicability of the NFRA Rules.

This note has been prepared with the intent to showcase the conflict between the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 (‘Act’) read with its allied Rules and the FAQs issued by NFRA.

Various Provisions of the Act applying to bodies corporate

  • Applicability section of the Act

The first section of the Act laying down the applicability of the Act clearly mentions the following under clause (f) of sub-section (4) – such body corporate, incorporated by any Act for the time being in force, as the Central Government may, by notification, specify in this behalf, subject to such exceptions, modifications or adaptation, as may be specified in the notification.”

This provision makes it very clear that the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (‘MCA’) has been vested with the powers of applying the provisions of the Act to any bodies corporate. Further, the provision is also quite clear that such body corporate may be either incorporated under the Act or any other Act. This implies that even for foreign companies, the MCA has the power to apply the provisions of the Act subject to the changes as may be notified.

  • Definition of the term body corporate

Section 2 (11) defines the term ‘body corporate’ to include a company incorporated outside India. Here also, the intent of law is explicitly clear to cover the bodies corporate governed by foreign laws.

  • Chapter 22 of the Act

Section 379 (2) of the Act provides that a foreign company which is substantially owned and controlled by an Indian citizen or by an Indian company is required to comply with the provisions of the Act as mentioned thereunder.

Areas of conflict

While the consolidated financial statements of the Indian parent entities include the accounts of the subsidiaries and associates also, it cannot be argued that the quality of auditing and accounting is anywhere less relevant than the A&AS of the Indian parent. Therefore, it seems in fitness of things under clause (e) of Rule 3 (1) of the NFRA Rules to include foreign subsidiary and associates if they fulfil the condition of materiality under the said Rules (foreign subsidiaries and associates whose income or net worth exceeds 20% of the consolidated income and net worth of the Indian parent [‘material subsidiaries and associates]).

However, the FAQs[1] issued by NFRA have taken a different stand altogether with respect to the applicability of the NFRA Rules. It states that only those material subsidiaries and associates are covered under the scope which are having place of business in India.

While it sounds very surprising that if this wouldn’t have been the case, the condition of the foreign subsidiaries and associates which has an Indian parent, doing business back in India is very unlikely.

In any event, if merely by not having a business in India absolves the material subsidiaries and associates from the overview of the NFRA that would frustrate the whole intent and objective of the NFRA and allow such subsidiaries and associates to escape from the regulation of NFRA by virtue of the additional clause in the FAQs.

It seems that this condition of having business in India should have either be mixed with section 379 of the Act which talks about foreign companies having business in India or should may have actually been intended to be referred to the Indian parent’s business in India.

Further, if the question is one of jurisdiction as of how the Act extends its application to foreign bodies corporate not having business in India is concerned, it may be noted that section 1 (4) of the Act allows the Central Government to extend the provision of Act to bodies corporate, and it may therefore, it may be construed that in a manner of speaking is actually extended to foreign bodies corporate which have a business connection in India by virtue of having an Indian parentage.


One of the major questions in front of the stakeholders is the jurisdiction of NFRA which the FAQs have seemingly restricted to bodies corporate having place of business in India. However, considering the other provisions of the Act, it is quite clear that NFRA has been constituted not only to govern the auditors registered in India but also those in abroad as MCA has left number of provisions open under the Act which applies to bodies corporate.

If one interprets the applicability of NFRA on Indian bodies corporate, the whole intent and object of setting this regulatory body will get frustrated.


[1] https://nfra.gov.in/sites/default/files/FAQ.pdf

Distinguishing between Options and Forwards

By Falak Dutta (rajeev@vinodkothari.com)

Ruling of Bombay High Court

The Bombay High Court on March 27, 2019, in the case of Edelweiss Financial Services v. Percept Finserve Pvt. Ltd.[1], ruled out an award passed by a sole arbitrator with respect to a share purchase agreement (SPA). The High Court allowed enforcing of a put option clause to be exercised by Edelweiss, the appellant, to sell back the shares it had acquired from Percept Group, the respondent.

Before delving into the proceedings of the aforesaid case, it is important to understand certain basic concepts, to appreciate the ‘option clause’ in the case. An option is a derivative contract which gives the holder the right but not the obligation to buy (call) or sell (put) the underlying within a stipulated time in exchange for a premium. Options are not just traded on exchanges but are also used in debt instruments (eg. callable and puttable bonds), private equity and venture capital investment covenants. Even insurance is a type of option contract where the insured pays monthly premium in exchange of a monetary claim upon the future occurrence of a contingent event (accident, disease, damage to property etc.).


Facts of the case

Edelweiss Financial Services Pvt. Ltd. entered into a share purchase agreement (SPA) dated 8, December, 2007 with the Percept Group where it invested in the shares of Percept Group subject to a condition that the latter shall restructure itself as agreed between the parties followed by an IPO. Under the terms of the SPA, the appellant (Edelweiss) purchased 228,374 shares for a consideration of Rs. 20 crores. One of the conditions in the agreement, required Percept to entirely restructure by 31st December, 2007 and to provide proof of such restructuring. Upon failure of compliance by the respondent, the date was further extended to 30 June, 2008 with obligation to provide documentary evidence of completion by 15th, July 2008. Upon non-fulfillment within the extended date, Edelweiss had the option to re-sell the shares to Percept, where Percept was obligated to purchase the shares at a price which gave the appellant an internal rate of return of 10% on the original purchase price.

As was the case, Percept failed to restructure itself within the stipulated time. Subsequently in view of this breach Edelweiss exercised the put option and Percept was required to buy back the shares for a total consideration of Rs. 22 crores. Since the respondent refused to comply the appellant invoked the arbitration clause in the SPA and a sole arbitrator was appointed to adjudicate the dispute. The arbitrator submitted that despite Percept being in breach of the conditions in the SPA, the petitioner’s claim to exercise the put option was illegal and unenforceable, being in conflict with the Securities Contracts regulation Act (SCRA), 1956. The unenforceability was proposed on two grounds. First, for the clause being a forward contract prohibited under Section 16 of SCRA read with SEBI March 2000 notification, which recognizes only spot delivery transactions to be valid. Secondly these clauses were illegal because they contained an option concerning a future purchase of shares and were thus a derivatives contract not traded on a recognized stock exchange and thus were illegal under Section 18 of SCRA, which deals with derivative trading.

Aggrieved by the arbitrator’s order, Edelweiss challenged it before the Bombay High Court under section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.


The Judgement

The Bombay High Court observed the reasoning of the order by the arbitrator and the contentions made by Percept. The said order confirmed the breach caused by Percept, but found the particular clauses of put option in the SPA to be illegal under two grounds as mentioned earlier. The Court divided the judgement along the sections involved.

The first of the arbitrator’s conclusion was found untenable when referred to the judgement in the case of MCX Stock Exchange Ltd. vs. SEBI [2]which deals with such a purchase option as in the present case. The Court observed that the put option clause contained in the SPA cannot be a derivatives contract prohibited by SCRA, because there was no present obligation at all and the obligation arose by reason of a contingency occurring in the future. The contract only came into being upon the following two conditions being met: (i) failure of the condition attributable to Percept (ii) exercise of the option by Edelweiss upon such failure. Whereas a forward contract is an unconditional obligation, the option in the SPA only comes into being when the aforesaid conditions are met. Thus, the arbitrator’s claim of the clause being a forward contract disregards the law stated by the Court in MCX Stock (supra).

Subsequently, respondent (Percept Group) challenged the relevance of the MCX Stock case to the present one. In the MCX Stock Exchange case, upon the exercise of the option the contract would be fulfilled by means of a spot delivery, that is, by immediate settlement. Whereas Edelweiss’s letter by which it exercised the put option required the shares to be re-purchased with immediate effect or before 12 Jan, 2009. This deferral of repurchase upon exercise of the option was not part of the MCX Stock Exchange case’s option clause and hence is not comparable to the present case.

This too was disregarded by the Court on the ground:

“It is submitted that in as much as this exercise of options demands repurchase on or before a future date, it is not a contract excepted by the circular of the SEBI dated 1 March, 2000.

Just because the original vendor of securities is given an option to complete repurchase of securities by a particular date it cannot be said that the contract for repurchase is on any basis other than spot delivery.

There is nothing to suggest that there is any time lag between payment of price and delivery of shares.”

Now, this brings us to the second leg of the arbitrator’s award regarding the illegality and unenforceability of the SPA option on account of breach of Section 18A of SCRA, which deals in derivative trading. The following is an excerpt from Section 18A:

Contracts in derivative. — Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, contracts in derivative shall be legal and valid if such contracts are—

(a)Traded on a recognized stock exchange;

(b) Settled on the clearing house of the recognized stock exchange. In accordance with the rules and bye-laws of such stock exchange.

The respondent appeals that as the put option was not of a recognized stock exchange, it stands unenforceable and illegal. In response, the court submitted that the contract does contain a put option in securities which the holder may or may not exercise. But the real question is whether such option or its exercise is illegal? The presence of the option does not make it bad or impermissible.

“What the law prohibits is not entering into a call or put option per se; what it prohibits is trading or dealing in such option treating it as a security. Only when it is traded or dealt with, it attracts the embargo of law as a derivative, that is to say, a security derived from an underlying debt or equity instrument.”

There was further cross objections filed by the respondent but it was ruled out under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, which deals with the application for setting aside arbitral award. Since the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 are not applicable to the proceedings under Section 34 and the section itself does not make any provision for filing of cross objections, the appeal was ruled out.


This Bombay High Court ruling in favor of Edelweiss provides an important distinction of options, from forward contracts. It highlighted that although both options and forwards are commonly categorized as derivatives, they share an important difference. On one hand, a forward contract contains a contractual obligation to buy or sell, on the other hand, the option gives the holder the right or choice but not the obligation to do the same. Options have always been integral to finance, routinely appearing in corporate covenants and contracts. Options are widely observed in mezzanine financing, private equity, start-up and venture funding among others. Given the Court’s distinction of forwards from options in their very essence and nature, the author believes this ruling is likely to be useful and a point of reference in future derivative litigations.



[2] https://indiankanoon.org/doc/101113552/